J-S67037-17 

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT WILLIAM KNIPPSCHILD

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1344 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005530-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUSMANNO, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2017

Appellant, Robert William Knippschild, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following 

the revocation of his probation. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On March 12, 2012, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count 

each of possession of child pornography and criminal use of a 

communication facility. The court sentenced Appellant on June 20, 2012, to 

an aggregate term of nine (9) to twenty-three (23) months’ imprisonment, 

plus seven (7) years’ probation with special conditions, and other 

requirements associated with his sentence. The special conditions of 

Appellant’s probation provided, in relevant part, as follows:

[T]he following rules apply in addition to the standard rules 

of Adult Probation and Parole:
J-S67037-17

- 2 -

* * *

7. [Appellant] shall not have any pornographic material of 

any kind in his possession at any time. ... A search of his 

person, his personal computer, his residence, and his 

vehicle may be made at any time. 

(Order, 6/20/12, at ¶7). Additionally, Rule 8 of Appellant’s parole plan 

prohibited him from viewing any pornographic material. On July 5, 2012, 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, but he subsequently sought no 

appellate review of the judgment of sentence. 

In the summer of 2014, Appellant violated the terms of his probation. 

On November 18, 2014, the court held a Gagnon II1 hearing, revoked 

Appellant’s probation, and resentenced him to six (6) to twelve (12) months’ 

imprisonment, plus six (6) years’ probation with special conditions. The

special conditions of Appellant’s probation and parole prohibited Appellant 

from accessing the internet and from possessing any device that can access 

the internet, without the approval of his parole/probation officer. Appellant 

filed a post-sentence motion on December 3, 2014, but he subsequently

sought no appellate review of the judgment of sentence. 

On September 12, 2016, Appellant again violated the terms of his 

probation when Appellant’s parole/probation officer, John Firestone, 

confiscated an internet-enabled tablet during a compliance search of 

____________________________________________

1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 

(1973). 
J-S67037-17

- 3 -

Appellant’s residence. The tablet contained erotic literature, nude 

photographs, and an internet history that included visits to several 

pornographic websites. Appellant filed a motion on January 26, 2017, to 

suppress the tablet on the ground that Agent Firestone lacked reasonable 

suspicion to search Appellant’s residence. On February 14, 2017, the court 

conducted a hearing on Appellant’s suppression motion and heard testimony 

from, inter alia, Agent Firestone. 

The revocation court accurately summarizes Agent Firestone’s 

testimony as follows:

5. ... [Agent Firestone] requested permission to conduct 

a home compliance check and search of [Appellant]’s 

property on September 12, 2016. 

6. [Agent Firestone] based his request on the following 

facts: in January of 2016, during a polygraph, [Appellant] 

admitted that he was still masturbating to the thoughts of 

minors and that he viewed an erotic book at a library. 

[Appellant] had a prior Gagnon II hearing with the same 

violations. In addition, [Appellant] had another polygraph 

in June of 2016, which he failed on the question about 

using social media sites on the internet. Agent Firestone 

wanted to make sure [Appellant] was not reading any 

more of the erotic books or viewing pornography on the 

internet which are forbidden pursuant to his parole plan. 

* * *

10. When Agent Firestone visited [Appellant] at his 

residence he immediately noticed [Appellant]’s demeanor. 

[Appellant] was in his living room, in front of his couch, 

and he was acting nervous. He was shaking a lot. 

[Appellant] was pacing back and forth in front of his couch, 

and when Agent Firestone was talking to him, he wouldn’t 

make eye contact. 
J-S67037-17

- 4 -

11. During the conversation, the phone rang and 

[Appellant] asked permission to answer it. While 

[Appellant] was on the phone, Agent Firestone lifted the 

left cushion of the couch where he found an internet 

enabled tablet. 

12. Agent Firestone asked [Appellant] who owned the 

tablet and [Appellant] responded it was his. [Appellant] 

then provided his passcode and admitted there was 

pornography on the tablet. 

(Order, filed March 27, 2017, at ¶¶ 5-6, 10-12) (citations to record omitted). 

The court denied Appellant’s suppression motion on March 27, 2017. 

On March 29, 2017, the court held a Gagnon II hearing, revoked 

Appellant’s probation, and resentenced Appellant to twelve (12) to thirty-six 

(36) months’ imprisonment, plus two (2) years’ probation. On April 24, 

2017, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court ordered Appellant 

on April 25, 2017, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant complied on May 15, 2017. 

Appellant raises one issue for our review:

DID THE [PROBATION OFFICER] LACK REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO SEARCH THE RESIDENCE OF [APPELLANT] 

WHICH RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF A TABLET 

CONTAINING PORNOGRAPHY WHICH WAS A VIOLATION 

OF HIS SUPERVISION?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

is as follows: 

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited 

to determining whether the suppression court’s factual 
J-S67037-17

- 5 -

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because 

the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, 

we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where...the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations 

of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are 

not binding on [the] appellate court, whose duty it is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial court 

are] subject to our plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 618 Pa. 684, 57 A.3d 68 (2012). 

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section [8] of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom 

from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. El, 933 

A.2d 657, 660 (Pa.Super. 2007), aff’d, 602 Pa. 126, 977 A.2d 1158 (2009). 

“A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically 

established, well-delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 

Pa. 238, 247, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (2007). 

The aim of probation and parole is to rehabilitate and reintegrate a 

lawbreaker into society as a law-abiding citizen. Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1212 (Pa.Super. 2012). The institution of 

probation and parole assumes a probationer or parolee is more likely than 
J-S67037-17

- 6 -

the ordinary citizen to violate the law. Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 

A.2d 616, 619 (Pa.Super. 2002). Consequently, probationers and parolees 

have limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation 

of privacy. Id. See also Chambers, supra (stating probationers’ and 

parolees’ Fourth Amendment constitutional rights are virtually 

indistinguishable). This Court explained that probation officers, like parole 

officers:

[A]re in a supervisory relationship with their offenders. 

The purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in 

their rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community 

and to protect the public. Supervision practices shall 

reflect the balance of enforcement of the conditions of 

parole and case management techniques to maximize 

successful parole completion through effective reentry to 

society. As such, probationers and parolees are subject to 

general and individual rules of conduct and supervision 

described at sentencing and/or in the parole agreement.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 536 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The statute governing the supervisory relationship between probation 

officers and probationers and the concomitant rights of the probationers, in 

effect at the time of the search in this case, provided in relevant part:

§ 9912. Supervisory relationship to offenders

(a) General rule.−Officers are in a supervisory 

relationship with their offenders. The purpose of this 

supervision is to assist the offenders in their rehabilitation 

and reassimilation into the community and to protect the 

public.

(b) Searches and seizures authorized.−
J-S67037-17

- 7 -

(1) Officers and, where they are responsible for the 

supervision of county offenders, State parole agents 

may search the person and property of offenders in 

accordance with the provisions of this section. 

* * *

(d) Grounds for personal search.−

(1) A personal search of an offender may be 

conducted by an officer: 

(i) if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that 

the offender possesses contraband or other evidence 

of violations of the conditions of supervision; 

* * *

(2) A property search may be conducted by an officer 

if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real 

or other property in the possession of or under the 

control of the offender contains contraband or other 

evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.

* * *

(6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search 

shall be determined in accordance with constitutional 

search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial 

decision. In accordance with such case law, the 

following factors, where applicable, may be taken into 

account:

(i) The observations of officers. 

(ii) Information provided by others. 

(iii) The activities of the offender. 

(iv) Information provided by the offender. 

(v) The experience of the officers with the 

offender. 
J-S67037-17

- 8 -

(vi) The experience of officers in similar 

circumstances. 

(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of 

the offender. 

(viii) The need to verify compliance with the 

conditions of supervision. 

* * *

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(a), (b)(1)(i), (d)(1)(i), (d)(2), (d)(6) (effective October 

13, 2009, to September 18, 2016).2 See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9913 

(explaining probation officer is declared to be peace officer and shall have 

police powers and authority to arrest, with or without warrant, writ, rule or 

process, any person on probation under supervision of court for failing to 

report as required by terms of that person’s probation, or for any other 

violation of that person’s probation). 

“Essentially, Section 9912 authorizes county probation officers to 

search a probationer’s person or property, if there is reasonable suspicion to 

believe the probationer possesses contraband or other evidence of violations 

of the conditions of supervision.” Chambers, supra at 1214 (citing 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(d)(1)(i), (d)(2)). “Reasonable suspicion to search must be 

determined consistent with constitutional search and seizure provisions as 

____________________________________________

2 The legislature amended this statute on July 20, 2016, effective in 60 days. 

The current version of the statute contains substantially similar language. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912 (amended July 20, 2016; effective September 19, 

2016). 
J-S67037-17

- 9 -

applied by judicial decisions; and in accordance with such case law, 

enumerated factors, where applicable, may be taken into account.” 

Chambers, supra (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(d)(6)). 

In establishing reasonable suspicion, the fundamental 

inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of the intrusion 

warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 

the action taken was appropriate. This assessment, like 

that applicable to the determination of probable cause, 

requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, 

with a lesser showing needed to demonstrate reasonable 

suspicion in terms of both quantity or content and 

reliability.

Moore, supra at 619-20 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he threshold question in cases such as this is whether the probation 

officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of 

probation prior to the...search.” In re J.E., 907 A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa.Super. 

2006), aff’d, 594 Pa. 528, 937 A.2d 421 (2007) (emphasis omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Mary Alice 

Brennan, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. The trial court 

opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the question 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed, June 13, 2017, at 1-2; Order, 

filed March 27, 2017, at 2-4, 6-8) (finding: Agent Firestone requested 

permission to conduct home compliance check and search of Appellant’s 

property on September 12, 2016, based on several factors, including: (a) 

Appellant had Gagnon II hearing with same violations in 2014; (b)
J-S67037-17

- 10 -

Appellant admitted during January 2016 polygraph test that he was still 

masturbating to thoughts of minors and had viewed erotic book at library;

and (c) during June 2016 polygraph test, Appellant failed question on his use 

of social media websites; purpose of home compliance check was to ensure 

Appellant was not reading erotica or viewing pornography in violation of 

terms of his supervision; during September 12, 2016 home compliance 

check, Agent Firestone immediately observed Appellant appeared unusually 

agitated; Appellant paced in front of couch, shook, and failed to make eye 

contact with Agent Firestone, in contrast with Appellant’s more relaxed 

demeanor on previous occasions; Appellant’s criminal history and Agent 

Firestone’s experience as probation officer led him to believe Appellant 

possessed pornography or prohibited form of internet access;

3 Agent

Firestone had reasonable suspicion to search Appellant’s couch, where he

____________________________________________

3 We are aware of the U.S. Supreme Court recent decision in Packingham 

v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (decided June 19, 2017), which declared 

unconstitutional North Carolina’s statute that completely banned sex 

offenders from accessing commercial social networking websites. The Court 

said the statute violated the First Amendment of the federal constitution

because it imposed an unprecedented burden on free speech that was overly 

broad; and no State can enact such a complete bar to the exercise of First 

Amendment rights. Id. The Court did say, however, that a State could 

enact a more specific law so long as the internet restrictions are limited in 

context and narrowly tailored; but a state cannot enact what constitutes a 

complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on “websites integral 

to the fabric of our modern society and culture.” Id. at 1738. The 

Packingham decision does not affect the instant case, because Appellant’s 

internet access was a tailored parole/probation restriction, subject to 

supervision, and based on his criminal history. As well, Appellant did not 

challenge Rule 8 of his parole plan or the internet access restrictions. 
J-S67037-17

- 11 -

found Appellant’s internet-enabled tablet that contained pornography). The 

record supports the court’s decision to deny Appellant’s suppression motion. 

Accordingly, we affirm based on the trial court’s opinions.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/4/2017
Circulated 11/20/2017 10:52 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

v. NO. CP-23-CR-0005530-2011 

ROBERT KNIPPSCHILD 

Michael Galantino, Esquire, for the Commonwealth 

Scott Galloway, Esquire, for Defendant 

OPINION 

Brennan, J. June 12, 2017 

After a Gagnon II hearing held on March 29, 2017, the Defendant was found 

guilty of violating hispntakKeel and thereafter re -sentenced. Defendant filed a timely 

Notice of Appeal and timely statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

Matters were limited to one issue. Specifically, Defendant alleges this court erred 

when it did not grant his motion to suppress the search of his residence. 

When reviewing the denial of a Motion to Suppress Evidence, an appellate 

court examines "the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in context of the record as a 

whole." Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (2010). The 

appellate court then determines "whether the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct." Id. Its review of the application of the law to the facts is plenary. Id. 

1 
On March 27, 2017, this court issued an Order denying Defendant's 

suppression motion which contains Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 

Discussion that offer a complete basis upon which the appellate courts can conduct 

a review. A copy of that Order is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference 

and marked Exhibit "A". The Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion to 

Suppress Evidence for the reasons stated in that Order. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court's Judgment of Sentence should be 

affirmed on appeal. 

BY THE COURT: 

2 

mL 

CO CA) 6.) 
Circulated 11/20/2017 10:52 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON. PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

v. NO. CP-23-CR-0005530-2011 

ROBERT ICNIPPSCHELD 

Michael Galantino, Esquire, for the Commonwealth 

Scott Galloway, Esquire, fox Defendant 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

AND NOW, this 271 day of March, 2017, upon consideration of the Motion to 

Suppress, the Suppression Hearing heard on February 14, 2017, it is hereby ORDERED 

and DECREED that said Motion to Suppress is DENIED it appearing as follows: 

Findings of Fact 

1. Jeffrey Roney is employed by Delaware County Adult Probation and Parole 

as a supervisor in the Sex Offender Unit. He has been the supervisor of the Sex Offender 

Unit for five years. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 5. 

2. As Supervisor he is familiar with procedures within his office regarding 

compliance searches of parolees and probationers under supervision. The office policy is 

that agents must notify him either in person or through email with a list of people they 

plan on visiting to conduct the compliance checks. Agent Roney reviews that list and 

authorizes the compliance checks. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 6. 

1 
3 A search consists of searching the home for any material that would be a 

violation of probation and parole rules and regulations. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 9. 

4. In this case, Agent Roney approved the compliance check of the Defendant. 

N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 8. 

5. John Firestone is employed as a probation officer with the Delaware County 

Office of Adult Probation and Parole. He has been so employed for almost 13 years. He is 

currently assigned to the Sex Offender Unit. He requested permission to conduct a home 

compliance check and search of this Defendant's property on September 12, 2016. N.T. 

Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 10, 11. 

6. He based his request on the following facts: in January of 2016 during a 

polygraph, the Defendant admitted that he was still masturbating to the thoughts of 

minors and that he viewed an erotic book at a library. The Defendant had a prior Gagnon 

II hearing with the same violations. In addition, the Defendant had another polygraph in 

June of 2016 which he failed on the question about using social media sites on the 

internet. Agent Firestone wanted to make sure the Defendant was not reading any more of 

the erotic books or viewing pornography on the internet which are forbidden pursuant to 

his parole plan. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 11, 12. 

7. Rule 8 of Defendant's parole plan prohibits him from looking at 

pornography of any type, whether it's a minor or an adult. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 

13. 

2 
8. Rule 2 of the general rules of supervision permits Defendant's parole 

officer to search his residence upon the agent's request. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 14. 

9. Commonwealth Exhibit G-4 was admitted into evidence without objection. 

It is a copy of the Defendant's signed parole plan. According to the plan, the Defendant is 

restricted from accessing the internet or possessing any device that can access the 

internet; internet access in Defendant's residence is not allowed until approved by 

treatment and/or Adult Probation and Parole; and Defendant agreed to abide by the 

general and sexual offenders rules and regulations. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 14, 15. 

10. When Agent Firestone visited the Defendant at his residence he 

immediately noticed the Defendant's demeanor. The Defendant was in his living room, in 

front of his couch, and he was acting nervous. He was shaking a lot. The Defendant was 

pacing back and forth in front of his couch, and when Agent Firestone was talking to him, 

he wouldn't make eye contact. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 17. 

11. During the conversation, the phone rang and Defendant asked permission to 

answer it. While the Defendant was on the phone Agent Firestone lifted the left cushion 

of the couch where he found an internet enabled tablet. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 18. 

12. Agent Firestone asked the Defendant who owned the tablet and the 

Defendant responded it was his. The Defendant then provided his passcode and admitted 

there was pornography on his tablet. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 19. 

3 
13. This Court fmds Agent Firestone had reasonable suspicion to search 

Defendant's couch. 

14. At that point the tablet seized and placed into evidence and the Defendant 

was detained for a frobikviolation. N.T. Suppression 2/14/2017 p. 21. 

Conclusions of Law 

1. The Federal and Commonwealth Constitutions protect against unreasonable 

searches and seizures by law enforcement. U.S. Const., Amend IV; 2 Pa. Const., Art. I, 

Section 8.3 Generally, speaking, a warrantless search and seizure may not be conducted 

unless an exception applies. Commonwealth v. Ballard, 806 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). 

2. A parolee may be subject to a warrantless search based on reasonable 

suspicion if he has consented or if it is under the auspices of an existing statutory or 

regulatory framework. Commonwealth v. Altadonna, 817 A.2d 1145, 1150-1151 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997)). 

The reason for this approach is that the concept of parole assumes a supervisee is more 

likely to violate the law. Commonwealth v. Curry, 900 A.2d 390, 394 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa.Super. 2002)). Accordingly, a parolee 

agrees to warrantless searches in exchange for their early release. Curry, 900 A.2d at 394 

(citing Commonwealth v. Appleby, 856 A.2d 191, 195 (Pa.Super. 2004)). 

4 
3. The statutory authority for a county parole agent to search the person and 

property of a supervisee without a search warrant is codified at 42 P.S. Section 9912. 

4. A suppression court must utilize the factors in 42 P.S. Section 9912 and 

case law to measure whether reasonable suspicion is met. However, the defmition of 

reasonable suspicion is: " [W]hether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

[intrusion] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate. This assessment, like that applicable to the determination of probable cause, 

requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, with a lesser showing needed 

to demonstrate reasonable suspicion in terms of both quantity or content and reliability." 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 619-620 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted). 

Discussion 

Defendant contends his parole agent lacked reasonable suspicion to search his 

residence. As a result, Defendant argues that all evidence seized as a result of the search, 

specifically the tablet containing pornography, must be suppressed as the fruit of unlawful 

police conduct. For the reasons that follow this Court disagrees. 

42 P.S. Section 9912 (d)(2) provides; "A property search may be conducted by an 

officer if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the 

possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence 

of violations of the conditions of supervision." Section 9912 (d)(6) states "The existence 

5 
of reasonable suspicion to search shall be determined in accordance with constitutional 

search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision. In accordance with such 

case law, the following factors, where applicable, may be taken into account: 

(i) The observations of agents. 

(ii) Information provided by others. 

(iii) The activities of the offender. 

(iv) Information provided by the offender. 

(v) The experience of agents with the offender. 

(vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances. 

(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the offender. 

(viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditions of supervision." 

Applying the law to the facts here, it is clear thatAgent Firestone's search of the 

Defendant's couch was supported by a reasonable suspicion. The first enumerated factor 

to be evaluated is the observations of the agent (42 P.S. Section 9912(d)(6)(i)). Here, 

evidence supporting the first factor is that when Agent Firestone visited the Defendant at 

his residence he immediately noticed the Defendant's demeanor. The Defendant was in 

his living room, he was in front of his couch, and he was acting very nervous. He was 

shaking a lot. The Defendant was pacing back and forth in front of his couch, and when 

Agent Firestone was talking to him, he wouldn't make eye contact. The other times he met 

with Agent Firestone the Defendant' s demeanor was more relaxed. The fifth enumerated 

6 
factor to be evaluated is the experience of agents with the offender (42 P.S. Section 

9912(d)(6)(v)). Again, the evidence of Defendant's nervous demeanor in contrast to his 

more calm demeanor at prior meetings added to Agent Firestone's suspicions. The sixth 

enumerated factor to be evaluated is the experience of agents in similar circumstances (42 

P.S. Section 9912(d)(6)(vi)). Evidence of the sixth factor is supported by the evidence of 

record that Agent Firestone had worked as a parole agent for 13 years. Based on that 

experience, Agent Firestone thought it was possible that the Defendant was in possession 

of pornography or a prohibited internet device. The seventh enumerated factor to be 

evaluated is the prior criminal and supervisory history of the offender (42 P.S. Section 

9912(d)(6)(vii)). Agent Firestone testified that the Defendant's history led him to believe 

that he could be in violation of the terms of his parole. In January of 2016, during a 

polygraph, the Defendant admitted that he was still masturbating to the thoughts of 

minors and that he viewed an erotic book at a library. The Defendant had a prior Gagnon 

II hearing with the same violations. In addition, the Defendant had another polygraph in 

June of 2016 which he failed on the question about using social media sites on the 

internet. The eighth enumerated factor to be evaluated is the need to verify compliance 

with the conditions of supervision (42 P.S. Section 9912(d)(6)(viii)). This factor is 

supported by Agents Firestone's testimony that he wanted to make sure the Defendant 

was not reading any more of the erotic books or viewing pornography on the internet 

which are forbidden pursuant to his parole plan. 

7 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, there were a variety of specific and 

articulable factors which led Agent Firestone to suspect that the Defendant was violating 

the conditions of his faixtium and conduct a search of his residence. 

In evaluating these factors it is useful to note the caution of the Court in Moore, 

when it quoted: 

"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only 

in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different 

in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense 

that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required 

to show probable cause." 

Moore, 805 A.2d at 620 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 

2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). 

In support of his argument the Defendant cites the recent Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court case of Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149 (2016). The narrow holding of that 

case is that the exclusionary rule derived from the state constitution applies to parole and 

probation revocation proceedings. It is of no benefit to Defendant is this case because we 

have concluded Agent Firestone had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. 

8 
For the above reasons Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENTED. Additional 

findings of fact and conclusions of law will be submitted in an Opinion by the Court at 

the appropriate time if one becomes necessary. 

BY THE COURT: 

9