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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2011

112–3 

IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM 

A MILITARY MISSION TO 

A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT 

A REPORT 

TO THE MEMBERS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

VACANT 

VACANT 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

1 Committee membership for the 112th Congress had not been set when this report was sent to press. 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ........................................................................................... v 

Part One: Executive Summary and Recommendations .................................... 1 

Part Two: Current Conditions in Iraq ................................................................ 4 

Part Three: An Ambitious Transition ................................................................. 7 

Regional Engagement ...................................................................................... 9 

U.S. Military Presence ..................................................................................... 13 

Budgeting and Authorities ............................................................................... 16 

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 19 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Iraqi Security Forces ‘‘Minimum Essential Capabilities’’ ............ 21 

Appendix II: Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq .................................. 22 

Appendix III: Security Incident Trends: January 2004 to May 2010 .............. 23 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, January 31, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This will be a year of unprecedented transition for the United States in Iraq as we move from a military-led 

mission to a civilian-led effort. The diplomatic mission that results 

will be of extraordinary size and complexity and it will assume security responsibilities in a still-dangerous environment. The stakes 

are high, not just for our civilian personnel, but for American foreign policy in the Middle East. While Iraq has made dramatic 

progress in recent years, the situation remains fragile and potentially reversible. The success of our diplomatic mission there will 

be an important factor in whether Iraq emerges from years of turmoil as a strategic partner or turns toward Iran. This report by the 

majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sheds 

new light on this important topic and offers a number of policy recommendations. The report’s central message—that our government 

needs to make sure our objectives in Iraq are aligned with both our 

civilian capacities and a financial commitment to succeed—will be 

vital as we face a similar transition in Afghanistan in the years to 

come. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN F. KERRY, 

Chairman. 

(V)

(1) 

1The U.S. military effort peaked in November 2007 with some 170,000 troops. Today, there 

are about 50,000 troops present, in addition to 75,000 contractors, most of them third country 

nationals. 

IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM 

A MILITARY MISSION TO 

A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT 

PART ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the U.S. military presence is withdrawn from Iraq, civilians, 

rather than soldiers, are likely to write the last chapter of the 

American war effort there. There is much encouraging news: There 

has been a remarkable transformation since sectarian war threatened state collapse in 2006 and 2007. A permanent government is 

finally in place. While the negotiations to form this government 

spanned most of 2010, the Iraqi leaders’ commitment to the political process over violence has helped sustain hard fought security 

gains. 

But these advances remain fragile, uneven, and potentially reversible. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups continue their 

efforts to foment violence and sectarian strife. The nine months it 

took to form the new government is evidence that Iraq’s political 

processes are not yet self-sustaining. Fundamental political issues 

remain unresolved, from the hydrocarbon laws, to Kirkuk and 

other disputed internal boundaries, to the nature of Iraqi federalism. While Iraq has the potential to become a wealthy country, 

it faces a difficult fiscal environment until at least 2014 when increased oil production is projected to begin coming online. 

The transition in the coming year from a military to a civilian 

mission will be critical to the United States’ broader interests in 

the Middle East. It will test the sustainability of the progress made 

in recent years. It will be an indicator of United States’ commitment to the bilateral partnership. And it will have a significant 

bearing on Iraq’s place in the regional security architecture. 

By December 2011, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement, the American military is scheduled to withdraw its 

remaining 50,000 troops.1 The diplomatic mission that remains will 

be an initiative of unprecedented size and complexity, currently 

projected to consist of some 17,000 individuals on 15 different sites, 

including 3 air hubs, 3 police training centers, 2 consulates, 2 embassy branch offices, and 5 Office of Security Cooperation sites. 

But even though the new mission must attain full operational capability by October 2011 to facilitate a smooth transition, fundamental questions remain unanswered. The State Department is 

scheduled to assume full security responsibilities in a still danVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
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2 According to State Department officials, the branch offices are projected to cost about $350 

million apiece to set up. The embassy branch office in Kirkuk is also scheduled to house an Office of Security Cooperation site which will include about 100 functional staff, as well as about 

300 additional security and life support personnel. 

gerous and unpredictable environment and must strike a difficult 

balance between maintaining a robust presence and providing a 

sufficient level of security. In almost any scenario, the United 

States will continue to have military personnel stationed at the 

American embassy in a non-combat role under the Office of Security Cooperation. As in many countries around the world, these 

troops will be responsible for enhancing the bilateral defense relationship by facilitating security assistance. But the size, scope, and 

structure of this presence remain undetermined, even at this late 

date. Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear what kind of security 

relationship the incoming Iraqi Government would like with the 

United States. 

In the wake of such uncertainties, a complicated diplomatic plan 

has emerged that highlights a dilemma that will likely confront the 

nation for as long as counterinsurgency warfare and state-building 

are central components of American foreign policy: How can the 

State Department effectively operate in difficult security environments without the support of the American military? 

The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including 

State Department capacity, the financial commitment from Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the backing of the 

Iraqi Government. If these elements are not fully in place, the administration may be forced to choose between scaling back the diplomatic mission or accepting a degree of physical risk familiar to 

military personnel, but normally unacceptable for diplomats. Because this is a difficult and unappealing choice, this report will examine how elements of the transition can be aligned with U.S. diplomatic goals to increase the likelihood of success. Two Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members visited Iraq to examine 

the military-to-civilian transition in detail. These are their principle findings: 

First, it is unclear whether the State Department has the capacity 

to maintain and protect the currently planned diplomatic presence 

without U.S. military support. Among the planned satellite offices 

are consulates in Basra and Irbil and smaller branch offices in 

Kirkuk and Mosul. There is no doubt about these cities’ strategic 

importance. But given the ongoing security challenges in Iraq and 

the immense manpower the military brings to bear, maintaining an 

American diplomatic presence without military support will cost 

hundreds of millions of dollars to set up, cost even more to operate, 

and have large ‘‘tooth-to-tail’’ ratios. The consulates will require a 

combined security and life support staff of roughly 1,400 to sustain 

about 120 functional personnel, whereas the branch offices will require more than 600 staff to support 30 functional personnel—a 

ratio of 20 to 1.2

If a vigorous regional presence is necessary to support Iraq’s stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted follow-on military presence should be considered to help secure American dipVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
3 

lomats. But it is not yet clear that the Iraqi Government desires 

such an arrangement on terms compatible with American interests. 

Second, uncertainty about the nature of the U.S. military presence 

in Iraq after 2012 is complicating all other aspects of transition 

planning. The transition’s most important element also remains its 

biggest unknown. Although the new Iraqi Government is publicly 

signaling that it will not seek to renegotiate the terms of the security agreement, the door is still open for a limited follow-on U.S. 

military presence. Clarity is needed on what this presence will look 

like and how it will integrate into the larger diplomatic mission. 

The authors have identified three distinct possibilities for the U.S.- 

Iraq security relationship beyond 2011. Each involves significant 

tradeoffs, but only the first two may be politically palatable to the 

new Iraqi Government. 

• Total drawdown of U.S. troops: A full military withdrawal in 

2011, except for a limited Office of Security Cooperation 

housed within the embassy, would confirm the United States 

as true to its word (an essential message to deliver throughout 

the region) and it would force Iraq to take full responsibility 

for its own affairs. However, security and political gains could 

be jeopardized with the full exit of American forces. In this scenario, given the prohibitive costs of security and the capacity 

limitations of the State Department, the United States should 

consider a less ambitious diplomatic presence in Iraq. 

• Expanded Office of Security Cooperation: The United States 

maintains, on a temporary basis, an expanded Office of Security Cooperation that includes a limited number of non-combat 

military forces functioning in a reduced capacity under the 

State Department’s purview. They provide logistical support 

for the Iraqi army, shore up administrative gaps within the 

Ministry of Defense, and provide ‘‘behind the wire’’ capabilities 

to better enable the State Department to sustain its proposed 

mission. Although new funding authorities would need to be 

negotiated between the State and Defense Departments and 

approved by Congress, the limited military presence would 

augment the State Department’s ability to execute its current 

plan in Iraq. 

• New security agreement: The United States negotiates a new 

security agreement to allow a limited and temporary U.S. troop 

presence to include the support described above as well as a 

continuing partnership with the Iraqi military to conduct select 

counterterrorism operations, and to sustain the nascent security cooperation between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish 

peshmerga throughout the disputed internal boundaries. This 

approach should only be considered if it comes at Iraq’s request 

within parameters consistent with American interests, which 

may be unlikely given the current posture of the newly formed 

government. It risks reinforcing the notion of the United States 

as an occupying power and would elicit political and popular 

opposition in both the United States and Iraq. In this scenario, 

the State Department, although still responsible for significant 

facets of diplomatic security, would be substantially aided by 

the continued but limited presence of the U.S. military. 

4 

3See Appendix III. 

Third, bureaucratic integration between the Departments of Defense and State remains incomplete, and the unity of effort in Baghdad has not yet been matched in Washington. Under the direction 

of Ambassador Jim Jeffrey and General Lloyd Austin, an effective 

partnership has been fostered between the embassy leadership 

team and the senior officers on the ground. But the supporting bureaucracy has not matched that cohesiveness. For example, according to military and civilian personnel in Iraq, it is easier to transfer 

critical ‘‘non-excess’’ equipment from the military to a third country 

than it is to the State Department. While the U.S. military has a 

pressing need for helicopters, including in Afghanistan, it is not in 

the taxpayers’ interest for the State Department to purchase new 

helicopters and ship them to Iraq if more suitable ones are already 

in country. There appear to be tensions within the State Department between those bureaus responsible for conducting the ambitious diplomatic strategy and those responsible for securing and 

supporting them. Embassy security personnel need to be empowered to face risks rationally and creatively, and protected from second-guessing from Washington that produces risk-aversion. 

Fourth, a creative and sustainable funding mechanism is needed 

to pay for the diplomatic mission in Iraq. Congressional support 

has been undermined by a constrained fiscal environment and war 

fatigue. Yes, there are significant unanswered questions about 

what kind of presence the United States will have in Iraq post2011. But regardless of whether the U.S. military withdraws as 

scheduled or a smaller successor force is agreed upon, the State Department will take on the bulk of responsibility for their own security. Therefore, Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to complete the diplomatic mission. Consideration should be 

given to a multiple-year funding authorization for Iraq programs, 

including operational costs (differentiated from the State Department’s broader operational budget), security assistance, and economic assistance programs. The price tag will not be cheap—perhaps $25–30 billion over 5 years—but would constitute a small 

fraction of the $750 billion the war has cost to this point. 

PART TWO: CURRENT CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

The situation in Iraq is at a critical juncture. Terrorist and insurgent groups are less active but still adept; the Iraqi army continues to develop but is not yet capable of deterring regional actors; 

and strong ethnic tensions remain along Iraq’s disputed internal 

boundaries. Although a government has finally been formed, it remains to be seen how cohesive and stable it will be. 

Threat assessment: Violence has been reduced by more than 90% 

since peaking in early 2007.3 After an upward spike in the third 

quarter of 2010—and notwithstanding horrific episodes such as the 

October 31st Al-Qaeda in Iraq attack against a Catholic church in 

Baghdad in which dozens of hostages were killed—the number of 

Iraqi civilians killed in violent attacks declined every month between the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31 and 

5 

4 According to the Iraqi Health, Defense and Interior Ministries, the violent death totals for 

the last five months are: December: 89 civilians + 62 Iraqi security forces (ISF); November: 105 

civilians + 66 ISF; October: 120 civilians + 65 ISF; September: 185 civilians + 88 ISF; August: 

295 civilians + 131 ISF. Source: multiple Reuters and Associated Press stories. By way of comparison, during the worst spasms of sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007, Iraqi civilians died at a rate of more than 100 per day. 5 In addition to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, notable Sunni insurgent groups include Jaysh al-Islami, the 

1920 Revolutionary Brigade, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al Naqshabandia, Hamas alIraq, and the Mujahidin Army. Active Shi’a groups include the Promised Day Brigade, Muqtada 

al-Sadr’s movement, and Kata’ib Hizbollah. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and 

Security in Iraq,’’ June 2010, p 28. 6 As of October 2010, the Iraqi security forces stood at approximately 645,000, of which 

247,000 are Ministry of Defense forces and 398,000 Ministry of Interior forces. 

December. 4 American combat fatalities are down from an average 

of 75 a month between 2004 and 2007 to an average of five a 

month in 2010. A number of insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq 

are still capable of violent attacks, but they are generally diminished in strength and many have begun the process of political assimilation.5

Despite the encouraging trend, the U.S. embassy and certain satellite sites, such as the forward operating base outside Mosul, are 

under daily threat from mortar and rocket fire. January 2011 was 

a relatively bad month, with as many as 159 Iraqis killed in a single week, but it remains to be seen whether this level of violence 

will be sustained. Al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the country’s most 

dangerous terrorist organization, although the pace of its high-profile attacks has slowed considerably. Joint engagements by Iraqi 

and U.S. Special Operations Forces killed at least 34 of its 42 top 

leaders in 2010. But its remaining fighters, estimated to be 95% 

Iraqi, are well-trained and dedicated insurgents. Al-Qaeda in Iraq 

and other extremist groups do not currently constitute an existential threat to Iraq’s political order. But continued political instability could provide them the opportunity to rejuvenate, especially 

in the absence of constant pressure and an integrated intelligence 

effort. 

Iraqi security capacity: The withdrawal of the U.S. military from 

population centers in June 2009 left the Iraqi forces in control of 

all eighteen provinces. To their credit, they have withstood significant security tests, from the drawdown of over 100,000 U.S. forces 

to the March 2010 parliamentary elections and the ongoing government formation process that followed. 

As a result of an earlier American focus on force generation, the 

Iraqi army has been the fastest growing professional military in 

the world over the past several years.6 More recently, efforts have 

shifted towards developing specialization, professionalism, and the 

administrative capability throughout the military and police. Despite great strides, the ability of the Iraqi forces to operate without 

the support of a robust U.S. presence remains unknown. 

Complicating matters, Iraq’s political leadership may not fully 

appreciate how integral U.S. military support is to buttressing the 

Iraqi army’s basic capabilities. In large part operating behind the 

scenes, American troops still provide critical administrative and 

logistical functions, skills the Iraqi forces have yet to master. 

The U.S. military has developed metrics known as ‘‘minimal essential capabilities’’ to measure the Iraqi security forces’ 

foundational effectiveness at independently providing internal secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
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7 Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy officials and Iraqi military 

officials. See also Appendix II. 

rity and defending against external threats. Alarming deficiencies 

are projected beyond 2011, which will have a serious impact on the 

State Department’s ability to provide its own force-protection: 7

• The Ministry of Defense is deficient in its ability to maintain 

and support the armed forces. Although the Iraqi military has 

developed into a competent counterinsurgency force, the logistics, training, and maintenance requirements that contribute to 

its sustainment will potentially go unfulfilled without U.S. 

military assistance. 

• The army and air force lack the full conventional ability to defend Iraq’s borders against external threats. Although Iraq 

does not currently face a conventional threat, it cannot yet 

deter its neighbors from interfering in domestic politics. 

• Iraq’s skillful counterterrorism force is likely to become less capable because it still relies on the United States to integrate 

intelligence. 

• The U.S. military presence is the glue that holds together nascent cooperation between the Iraqi army and Kurdish 

peshmerga. Without U.S. troops to resolve disputes and foster 

relations, the situation could deteriorate, leaving the country 

with two separate heavily armed security forces at odds over 

contentious political issues. 

Arab/Kurdish security: Unresolved political tensions between 

Baghdad and the Kurdish regional government remain a threat to 

Iraq’s long-term stability. In an effort to manage these tensions, 

the U.S. military established Combined Security Mechanisms beginning in 2009, in which Arabs, Kurds, and Americans operate 

checkpoints and conduct joint patrols in four provinces along the 

Arab-Kurd trigger line (Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Kirkuk, and 

Diyala). The effort has reduced tensions and put in place lines of 

communication in case of a breakdown. However, it remains to be 

seen if this architecture can be sustained after the U.S. military 

withdrawal, absent progress towards resolving the underlying political disputes between Irbil and Baghdad. 

The United States has also pushed for the integration of the 

Kurdish peshmerga into the Iraqi security forces. Prime Minister 

Maliki announced in April 2010 the formation of four unified 

peshmerga regional guard brigades which theoretically will report 

to Baghdad, and laid out plans to train and equip eight additional 

units in hopes of forming two Iraqi army divisions within Kurdish 

provinces. 

Politics: All of Iraq’s major constituencies participate, at least 

grudgingly, in the Iraqi political order. But fundamental questions 

remain about the make-up of the Iraqi state, including the nature 

of Iraqi federalism, the final disposition of the disputed internal 

boundaries, the organization of Iraq’s energy sector, and the political reintegration of the Sunni Arabs. The contentious nine-month 

period of government formation indicates that Iraq’s political processes are not yet self-sustaining. 

7 

8The August 31 transition is not included in the security agreement, but was outlined by 

President Obama in his February 27, 2009 speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

Mistrust between political factions remains high, sectarian 

wounds have not fully healed, and decisions to forgo violence in 

favor of the political process may still be reversible. The integration 

of the Sons of Iraq—comprised mostly of former Sunni insurgents— 

into the army and local governments remains uneven. Should the 

new government break down along sectarian lines, Sunni extremist 

groups may have an opening to lure back former fighters into the 

insurgency. 

Bilateral agreements: The U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship is delineated in two accords that were negotiated in tandem and signed 

by the Bush administration in November 2008: the strategic framework agreement and the security agreement. 

The strategic framework agreement is an aspirational document 

intended to broaden the U.S. partnership with Iraq beyond security. Although short on detail and non-binding, the agreement provides a template for normalizing the bilateral relationship in areas 

such as economic, cultural, diplomatic, and security cooperation. 

The security agreement is the legal framework that dictates the 

terms of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. It contains two significant milestones. First, it required U.S. combat troops to withdraw 

from Iraqi population centers by June 30, 2009. Second, it obligates 

all U.S. forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. Any changes to 

the agreement would require the consent of the Iraqi Government 

and parliamentary ratification. 

On August 31, the U.S. military formally ended Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and began Operation New Dawn, dedicated to three distinct functions: train, equip, and advise the Iraqi military; continue 

counterterrorism operations; and protect U.S. diplomatic initiatives.8

PART THREE: AN AMBITIOUS TRANSITION

Already the largest in the world, the American diplomatic mission in Iraq will expand further as the State Department takes on 

full responsibility for its own security. But time for planning is 

short, as the new mission must attain full operational capability by 

October 2011. 

The embassy compound will continue to be the center of American diplomatic gravity. But it will be supported by a planned 15 

satellite sites across the country: three air hubs, three police training centers, two consulates, two embassy branch offices, and five 

Office of Security Cooperation sites. Roughly 17,000 individuals are 

expected to be under ‘‘chief of mission authority,’’ mostly thirdcountry nationals working as life-support and security contractors. 

The number of American diplomats in Iraq is projected to remain 

at roughly 650, with an additional several hundred functional staff 

posted at the embassy from a variety of other government agencies, 

including USAID and the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and 

Agriculture. 

As of December, land use agreements had not been signed and 

construction had not begun at the satellite sites. The size and charVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
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9 Although both run by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 

the police training program and air wing will be operationally separate. INL developed its air 

transportation capacity during its Latin America training and drug interdiction programs in the 

1990s, and now has a worldwide fleet of about 230 fixed and rotary wing aircraft. But this will 

be its most complex operation. 10 INL also operates a small number of MD-530 helicopters in Baghdad for surveillance and 

ground movement air support. 

acter of the Office of Security Cooperation has not been determined. The transfer from the military to the embassy of sensitive 

materiel has not been completed. Thousands of critical life-support 

and security personnel contractors need to be vetted and hired. 

In an April 7, 2010 letter sent to his counterpart at the Department of Defense, Undersecretary of State for Management Patrick 

Kennedy highlighted the magnitude of the challenge: 

Secure ground and air movements within Iraq, essential 

to DOS’ current and proposed provincial presence, are now 

possible only because of U.S. military capabilities and 

availability of support. Without such support in the future, 

DOS will be forced to redirect its resources towards obtaining and supporting less-appropriate vehicles and airframes 

to allow the [branch offices and consulates] to function in 

an insecure environment. We will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and 

scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of 

the Department of State. [State] does not have within its 

Foreign Service cadre sufficient experience and expertise 

to perform necessary contract oversight. 

Connecting the satellite sites will be a contractor-operated air 

wing, operated by the State Department’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.9 A fixed-wing component 

of four turboprop aircraft, which seat roughly fifty passengers, will 

transport officials across international borders and between Baghdad, Basrah, and Irbil. Unlike diplomats from some other nations, 

U.S. Government personnel are generally prohibited from arriving 

via commercial aircraft at Baghdad International Airport, significantly increasing transportation costs. Instead, they are flown in on 

military aircraft, landing within the commercial terminal’s sight 

line. Beginning this year, they will enter the country on the embassy’s air-wing. 

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs plans to augment its current rotary-wing 

fleet of 14 UH-1N Twin Huey helicopters, with 20 Sikorsky S-61 

helicopters and four more UH-1Ns, operating out of the three air 

hubs.10 State Department requested in writing 24 UH-60 

Blackhawk helicopters from the Defense Department, which are 

faster, carry more passengers and were already in theater. The Defense Department never formally responded. The rotary-wing fleet 

is theoretically capable of moving several hundred passengers a 

day, though this tempo may be hard to sustain in practice. 

As reported by the Commission on Wartime Contracting, an 

independent legislative commission created by Congress, the State 

Department has identified fourteen military functions that will be 

9 

11 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Report 3, July 12, 

2010: ‘‘Better planning for Defense-to-State transition in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and 

waste.’’ http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports. The fourteen lost military functions are: 

• Recovering killed and wounded personnel 

• Recovering damaged vehicles • Recovering downed aircraft • Clearing travel routes • Operations center monitoring of private security contractors 

• Private security contractor inspection and accountability services 

• Convoy security 

• Explosive-ordnance disposal 

• Counter rocket, artillery and mortar notification 

• Counter-battery neutralization response 

• Communications support 

• Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams 

• Policing Baghdad’s international zone 

• Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities. 12The observations in this section are based upon discussions with civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Washington. The authors visited Kirkuk in November 2010, and 

visited Kirkuk and Mosul in November 2009. 

lost once the U.S. military is gone from Iraq.11 The State Department is looking to reproduce limited versions of many of these 

functions through security contractors. But there are roles that a 

diplomatic mission is not capable of replacing. The U.S. military’s 

strategic over-watch function in Iraq provides a deterrent to armed 

militia groups, demonstrates American resolve, and bolsters the political order. 

The capacity of the diplomatic effort depends in large part on the 

short-term U.S. military footprint and the budget and bureaucratic 

support the embassy receives from Washington. The administration 

must be willing to make tough choices to ensure strategic goals are 

in line with realities on the ground and available resources. 

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

By October, the Embassy will transition from 16 provincial reconstructions teams down to four regional posts—permanent consulates in Basrah and Irbil and shorter-term embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. 

The provincial reconstruction teams have been a cost-effective 

enterprise, with the military providing security, logistics and transportation support. Peaking at 31 teams in 2008, the teams have 

interacted with provincial and sub-provincial political leaders, and 

been a focal point of such diplomatic initiatives as outreach to the 

Sons of Iraq, efforts to manage Arab-Kurdish tensions, and interactions with the Shiite religious establishment. While the State Department originally contemplated five to seven provincial sites, the 

rapidly rising cost estimates have reduced the number to four, 

leaving engagement outposts in Najaf, Ramadi, and Baquba unfilled. 

In comparison to the provincial reconstruction teams, the successor sites will have reduced functional staffs, smaller operational 

radii, and no funding for discretionary projects. Three of the four— 

Basrah, Kirkuk and Mosul—will be located in dangerous locales. 

As the U.S. military withdraws from these locations, it will take 

much of its local situational awareness with it, the product of relationships cultivated over seven years.12 Similarly, the branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul will have little capacity for sustaining 

10 

13The Baghdad hub will hold roughly 110 trainers at Forward Operating Base Shield east 

of the Tigris River, near a large Iraqi Government complex which houses the Ministry of Interior and several other important government ministries. The Basrah and Irbil hubs will be contained on the same compounds that house the consulates and will be home to roughly 45 and 

25 trainers, respectively. 14 As of November 2010, USF-I planned posts in Balad, Taji, Besmaya, and Umm Qasr with 

additional ‘‘spokes’’ in Tikrit, Taji, Ali Air Base, and Kirkuk. At these locations, training, maintenance, and operations will occur on equipment including F-16 Aircraft, M1A1 Tanks, T-6A 

Training Aircraft, UH-1H Huey Helicopters, Armored Vehicles, M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, and OH-58 Helicopters. 15Though the numbers remain in flux, current plans call for about 600 guards in Irbil, 575 

in Baghdad, 335 each in Kirkuk and Mosul, and about 3,650 in Baghdad. Most of State’s security contractors, both perimeter and movement, will be hired through the Worldwide Protective 

Services (WPS) contract, the successor to the current Worldwide Personal Protective Security 

(WPPS II) contract. However, some of the specialized security functions described in this section 

the Combined Security Mechanisms, a key element of the current 

strategy to manage Arab-Kurdish tensions in disputed areas, which 

are currently supported by several thousand American troops. 

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs will take over the police-training program from the U.S. military, based on a hub-and-spoke system. Approximately 190 police 

trainers will be based at Baghdad, Basrah and Irbil, from which 

they can deploy to approximately 25 field locations.13 Iraq now 

runs its own police training academies. So rather than classroom 

training, the program will focus on advising and mentoring the 

local and national police leadership, as well as supporting the Ministry of Interior and focusing on specialized disciplines such as 

forensics and prosecution. 

While the U.S. military has begun reconfiguring existing sites as 

part of the military withdrawal, real estate agreements could not 

be formally negotiated until the new government was in place. 

With the consulates and branch offices becoming fully operational 

by October 2011, the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations has 

been left with precious little margin for error. 

There is cause for concern that the Defense Department has not 

yet finalized planning on the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation and how its activities will integrate into the larger diplomatic mission, including decisions on its size, locations, lines of 

funding, and force protection. Current plans call for a central hub 

in Baghdad; four fully staffed auxiliary posts; and an undetermined 

number of ‘‘spokes’’ throughout the country. Each site will serve as 

a base for distinct training, maintenance, and logistical missions to 

improve Iraqi defense capabilities.14 More than 200 permanent 

military and civilian staff will be augmented by a still undetermined, but steadily increasing number of skilled contractors (currently estimated somewhere in the range of 800), supplemented by 

perhaps 3,000 or more life-support and security contractors. But it 

is unclear whether the Office will use the embassy’s air wing or 

contract its own helicopters, which could have significant consequences for the larger diplomatic mission. 

The period immediately after the military withdrawal may be especially sensitive, as extremist groups test the new defenses and 

attempt to demonstrate their own relevance. Current planning calls 

for 5,500 security contractors to be employed by the State Department in Iraq, roughly double the current number and not including 

the Office of Security Cooperation.15 Roughly four thousand of 

11 

will be contracted separately. For more information, see http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/ 

143420.htm. 16While mortar and rocket attacks against the embassy and other American facilities usually 

do little damage, three Triple Canopy perimeter guards were killed in July by indirect fire. 17Two other factors could reduce the branch offices’ engagement tempo. First, the U.S. military moves more personnel per movement than Diplomatic Security is able to support. Second, 

provincial reconstruction team Kirkuk personnel currently maintain virtual offices in the main 

Kirkuk Government building, allowing them to coordinate multiple meetings per movement. It 

is not clear that the branch offices will be able to maintain this virtual presence. 18 Regional Security Officers, special agents with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, coordinate all aspects of a diplomatic mission’s security. The Embassy has used private security contractors to conduct ‘‘red zone’’ movements in Baghdad for some time, though it will soon lose 

the military’s quick response capacity. Since the tragic shooting incident in Nisour Square in 

2007, at least one Diplomatic Security agent now participates in every movement outside the 

Green Zone. 

these will be third-country nationals serving as static perimeter security for the various installations, a continuation of current practice at both civilian and military sites. 

Despite the continuing threat of indirect fire,16 the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s ability to provide security on American compounds after 2011 is encouraging. The State Department already 

coordinates perimeter security and external movements through an 

impressive high-tech tactical operations center inside the embassy. 

More limited operations centers will be set up in satellite facilities 

located on Iraqi Government compounds or military bases, thus 

providing for an additional layer of local security. However, security contractors will have to take over highly specialized functions, 

such as explosive-ordnance disposal; counter rocket, artillery and 

mortar notification; and aerial surveillance, raising important questions about both the desirability and capacity of military functions 

in the hands of private security contractors. 

The more difficult challenge will be maintaining the ability to 

make frequent secure ground movements. That the State Department will have considerably less firepower at its disposal ‘‘outside 

the wire’’ is obvious, but arguably desirable for a diplomatic mission. The State Department has been coordinating movements in 

Baghdad and other locations for some time. What the civilian mission will lose, though, is the military’s over-watch capabilities. 

Functions like surveillance, intelligence, liaising with the Iraqi 

military, rapid response, and the like are less visible, but they cannot easily be replaced. The embassy’s central location in the ‘‘Green 

Zone’’ provides relatively good security and easy access to key Iraqi 

leaders in Baghdad. But the satellite sites will only be as effective 

as their inhabitants’ ability to get off their compounds. 

The branch offices are designed to support the movements of personnel to two different local destinations simultaneously. (For the 

sake of comparison, the current provincial reconstruction team in 

Kirkuk averages three movements per day.) However, given current conditions and security standards, we believe this projection 

may be overly optimistic and that functional personnel will be 

greatly restricted in comparison with the existing construct.17

There is a built-in tension between a diplomat’s desire to energetically engage local actors and the Regional Security Officers’ 

prerogative to keep those diplomats safe.18 This is nowhere truer 

than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where strategically critical diplomatic objectives are paired with formidable security threats. Unlike 

their military counterparts, diplomats are unarmed, and every proVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
12 

tection must be taken to ensure their safety. On the other hand, 

there is also a risk of compromising the mission with excessive or 

inflexible security requirements. The question is whether the benefits at these diplomatic missions will justify their enormous costs 

if the functional staff’s ability to move off compound is constrained. 

Effective risk management and clear strategic guidance from 

Washington will be essential. 

Recommendations 

1. The State Department should reconsider whether the embassy 

branch offices will have sufficient freedom of movement to justify their considerable expense. If a vigorous regional presence 

is necessary to support Iraq’s stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted follow-on military presence should be considered to help secure American diplomats. But it is not yet 

clear that the Iraqi Government desires such an arrangement 

on terms compatible with American interests. 

2. The size and scope of the Office of Security Cooperation must 

be determined as soon as possible and integrated into the diplomatic mission. In Afghanistan, it will be important to stand up 

a similar office sooner. Within the organization, the administration should develop an integrated team consisting of State, 

Defense, and specialized contracting personnel adept at dealing 

with the intricacies of U.S. security assistance. Compared to 

the current ad hoc arrangements in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

these offices will be capable of carefully assessing the needs of 

the host nation, aligning those desires with national interests, 

gauging the requirements to sustain continued support (both in 

terms of potential training sites and required contractors), and 

assessing the regional impact of arms sales. 

3. Regional security officers need to be empowered to face risks 

rationally and creatively. They have an incredibly difficult balancing act to perform and must be protected from secondguessing from Washington that produces risk-aversion. While 

all prudent security measures should be taken, allowances 

need to be made for the nature of the diplomatic mission in 

Iraq. In the authors’ experience, American diplomats in are 

courageous, committed and cognizant of the dangers, but often 

chafe at what they see as excessive security requirements. Examples of possible security measures include: 

• Reconsider security in the Kurdish Regional Government. Not 

a single American has died in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003, 

and until recently, American diplomats in Irbil received a 

higher level of movement security than in Sanaa, Yemen. 

Excessive security requirements in the north drain resources 

that could be better used elsewhere and constrain our diplomats’ ability to function. 

• Consider the use of Baghdad International Airport. If there 

are systemic security gaps at the airport, the United States 

should forcefully engage the Iraqi Government to address 

these gaps. It is enormously expensive, inefficient for smaller 

groups and undiplomatic not to use a country’s international 

airport. 

13 

19 Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy officials and Iraqi military 

officials. 

• Explore the feasibility of ‘‘Iraqizing’’ security. Local security 

guards are more affordable, understand the local language 

and culture, and have a superior situational awareness. As 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker has pointed out, highly trained 

and vetted Lebanese guards were used during the worst 

years of the Lebanese civil war without a single ‘‘friendly 

fire’’ instance. 

4. A joint State and Defense Department task force should be set 

up to explore options for sustaining the Combined Security 

Mechanisms. The Iraqi Government should be consulted on the 

feasibility and desirability of maintaining a smaller presence of 

U.S. military liaison or training teams that would not require 

the renegotiation of a new security agreement. 

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Even after the expiration of the 2008 security agreement, the 

United States will have military personnel stationed at the American embassy in a non-combat role, as it has in most countries in 

the world, as affirmed by the strategic framework agreement. But 

the size, scope, structure and role of this presence remain undetermined, even at this late date. Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear what kind of security relationship the incoming Iraqi Government would like with the United States. The outcome will shape 

the nature of the bilateral relationship, and have a profound effect 

on the State Department’s diplomatic posture. 

Assuming no renegotiation of the security agreement, the U.S. 

military will transfer the vestiges of its mission to the Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq under embassy authority by October 

2011. Similar offices throughout the region assist host nations with 

sustainment, training, acquisition, and the conduct of joint exercises, but the office in Iraq—the largest U.S.-funded organization 

of its kind—will face unique challenges based on the security environment.19 The Office’s responsibilities will include the provision of 

training and logistical support for current and future arms sale to 

Iraq. This is not an insignificant task given that some $13 billion 

in U.S. arms sales are currently pending. 

The authors suspect that many U.S. and Iraqi senior military 

commanders, along with some senior diplomats, would like an augmented residual U.S. military presence in Iraq after 2011 not only 

to bolster the Iraqi army, but also to support the Combined Security Mechanisms, protect hard fought gains in security, and provide 

a counter to Iran. But the new Iraqi Government has not yet signaled a public desire to renegotiate the 2008 security agreement. 

And a continued military presence poses significant risks, as 

well: that it validates our status as occupiers in the eyes of the 

local population and the larger Muslim community, that it exacerbates Iraqi dependencies and thereby retards rather than accelerates Iraqi political accommodation, and that an opportunity is 

missed to finalize the American military exit from Iraq. It remains 

to be seen whether the Iraqi Government will request a continued 

14 

U.S. military presence or how the Obama administration would respond. 

Although several variations exist, the authors see three broad options for the U.S. military posture going forward. A long-term U.S. 

military presence in Iraq is both unsustainable and undesirable. 

Thus, each option is a temporary solution to help manage the 

evolving security situation while Iraq’s political class evolves and 

its armed forces continue to develop. Each involves significant 

tradeoffs, but only the first two may be politically palatable to the 

new Iraqi Government. 

Total drawdown of U.S. troops: In this scenario, the U.S. 

military departs as scheduled by the end of 2011, though 

presumably still leaving behind the Office of Security Cooperation described above. The United States will be 

viewed as upholding its end of the security agreement, delivering a critical message throughout the region: it is not 

in the business of occupying foreign countries. 

But this option is not without significant risks. The Iraqi 

military will be forced to sustain itself with only limited 

American support. This could lead to outside political interference and a deteriorated security environment allowing Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups to reenergize and potentially destabilize Iraq, with significant negative consequences for the region. In this scenario, the diplomatic mission will not have the capacity to support the 

Combined Security Mechanisms set up to foster communication and coordination between the Iraqi army and 

Kurdish peshmerga along Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries, potentially leaving two heavily armed forces at odds 

over unresolved politically contentious issues. 

Forced to operate without the security blanket of the 

military, American diplomats would be exposed to additional danger without adequate protection from the host 

nation. Unless the Iraqi security forces can demonstrate 

the capability to provide a more permissive security environment, the State Department should reconsider whether 

it has the capacity to undertake the ambitious regional 

posture described in this paper. 

Expanded Office of Security Cooperation: In this scenario, U.S. combat forces depart in accordance with the security agreement, but the Office of Security Cooperation 

would be expanded, to include additional military personnel under the ambassador’s chief of mission authority. 

Though these personnel would serve in a strictly advisory 

capacity, they could continue to perform critical functions 

such as sustaining logistics, administrative duties, and 

training—roles that many in the Iraqi military and political classes seem keen for the United States to maintain. 

While not directly participating in force protection or combat operations, these troops could provide critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, as well 

as a coordination function with the Iraqi security forces, to 

15 

better enable the State Department to carry out its engagement. 

This arrangement would require the consent of the Iraqi 

Government, though perhaps not parliamentary approval. 

This creates its own problems: the presence of troops, even 

in a limited fashion, could come to be politicized and seen 

as allied with ruling parties against the opposition. Such 

a footprint might not be capable of supporting the Combined Security Mechanisms in the north. And it would lack 

a quick reaction capacity or any kind of force projection except in self-defense. Though such a force would have little 

interaction with the Iraqi public, it might also be cited as 

evidence that the United States has no intention of leaving 

Iraq. 

New security agreement: Under this scenario, the Obama 

administration would renegotiate, at Iraq’s public request, 

a new security agreement to allow a continued U.S. military presence—a lean force capable of partnering in support of counterterrorism operations and maintaining the 

Combined Security Mechanisms in the north. This residual 

presence would address the projected shortfalls in the 

Iraqi security forces by providing sustained logistics, intelligence, and maintenance support and be positioned to 

help the Iraqi counterterrorism forces exert maximum 

pressure against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist 

groups. A larger troop presence could reinforce Iraqi border security and air sovereignty, and would probably retain a robust, if little used, rapid reaction capability. 

But this scenario does not seem compatible with the 

public statements of the new Iraqi Government. Furthermore, the Obama administration has committed to abide 

by the terms of the current security agreement, negotiated 

by the Bush administration, and withdraw all troops by 

December 2011. The presence of American troops is a contentious issue in Iraqi politics. Even if the Iraqi Government signaled a desire to renegotiate the security agreement, there is likely to be significant parliamentary opposition, especially among the large Sadrist bloc. Rather 

than building Iraqi capacity, a continued U.S. military 

presence could instead foster Iraqi dependency. 

If Iraq were to request a new security agreement, the 

United States should carefully consider the appeal, but 

only agree if the terms are favorable to American interests. The U.S. military presence would be purposefully limited and only present to facilitate highly selective missions. 

Recommendations 

1. The administration should ensure that its resources, capacities 

and policy objectives are in balance. Each of the security options described above leads to separate conclusions about how 

best to structure the diplomatic presence in Iraq. But there is 

a clear relationship between the U.S. military support in place 

and the capacity of the State Department, which the authors 

16 

20Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides wrote in response to questions for the record from 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, received November 17: ‘‘The current average monthly 

obligation rate for ongoing Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP)-funded operations of the 

embassy and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) is approximately $120 million per month. 

As the transition of DOD-supported activities to State accelerates over the coming year, average 

monthly obligations will grow by $275 million, peaking at approximately $395 million per month 

around the end of the third quarter before dropping to lower obligation rates by year end. This 

includes significant security and construction contracts related to the two Embassy Branch Offices, two consulates, and Sather Air Base-funded by the FY 2010 supplemental—to be awarded 

during January–March. The Department foresees total FY 2011 obligations for D&CP of nearly 

$3.2 billion.’’ 21 Appropriations for the war in Iraq peaked in FY08 at $142 billion and declined in FY10 to $51 billion. See Appendix II. 22The FY2010 supplemental appropriations act, passed in July 2010, included a $540 million 

cut from the administration’s D&CP (Diplomatic and Consular Programs account) request. FY11 

appropriations have not yet been resolved with the Government operating on a continuing resolution until March 2011, but the Senate and House appropriations committee markups included 

cuts to administration’s $1.78 billion FY11 Iraq D&CP request, to $1.65 billion and $1.34 billion 

respectively. 

are concerned, is not adequately incorporated into the current 

transition planning. 

2. The administration should clarify to lawmakers in Washington 

what the military presence in Iraq, if any, will look like beyond 

2012. 

BUDGETING AND AUTHORITIES

The total request for Congressional appropriations in Iraq in FY12, after the transition is completed, could reach $6 billion. Of 

that, diplomatic operations will cost at least $3 billion, roughly 

double the FY11 request and encompassing more than a quarter of 

the State Department’s global operational budget.20 This does not 

include other State Department programs in Iraq such as economic 

and security assistance, or the Office of Security Cooperation. 

While these are indisputably expensive programs, their cost constitute a mere fraction of what was spent on earlier military operations. And if Iraq emerges from the chaos of the last years as an 

important regional partner it will have been money well spent.21

Given this enormous cost disparity between military and diplomatic operations, it is notable that Congress cut the State Department’s requests for Iraq operations twice in 2010.22 With the nation deeply involved in a second war in Afghanistan and recovering 

from a severe recession, Iraq receives less attention in a difficult 

fiscal environment. Security costs in Iraq are enormous compared 

to most diplomatic postings, and thus disruptive to the budgeting 

cycle. Nonetheless, the cuts have raised serious concerns that the 

current funding baselines might limit the scope of future operations. A more stable funding mechanism must be found that contains both clarity for operational planners at the State Department 

and mechanisms for effective Congressional oversight. 

Meanwhile, the unity of mission in Baghdad does not appear to 

have been matched in Washington. Communication between military personnel and civilian counterparts is much better in the field 

than in Washington. This is hardly an unusual phenomenon, but 

the ‘‘stove-piping’’ of information and resources can have a particularly deleterious effect in such a complex operation. Within the 

State Department there appear to be tensions between the embassy and the Bureau of Near-East Affairs, which are looking to 

maintain a vigorous provincial profile, and operational bureaus 

17 

23Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, November 17: ‘‘The Department of Defense (DoD) 

does not currently have the authority to transfer ‘non-excess’ property. Therefore, for items identified as ‘Non-excess’ the Department of State (DOS) will either have to fund those items or DoD 

may require exceptional, temporary authorities to transfer them to the Department of State at no 

cost. Giving DoD such authority would greatly facilitate such transfers.’’ 

such as the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building 

Operations responsible for securing them. While an element of bureaucratic tension can help refine strategic objectives, there is also 

a danger that differing bureaucratic prerogatives lead to muddled 

policy. Creative thinking is especially important to security. Because this is a transition of such extraordinary importance and 

complexity—and because time is so limited—the State Department 

must articulate sharper strategic and operational guidelines. 

Furthermore, it is not clear that the State and Defense Departments have all of the legal authorities they need. For example, according to military and diplomatic personnel in Baghdad, it is easier to transfer ‘‘non-excess’’ military equipment in Iraq to a third 

country than it is to the State Department.23 New authorities could 

conceivably be needed in a number of different areas: flexibility between spending accounts, operations and staffing of the Office for 

Security Cooperation, the definition of ‘‘chief of mission’’ authority, 

on the security standards employed, etc. Such legal questions urgently need to be resolved. 

Adding to the uncertainty, Foreign Military Sales to Iraq have 

sharply increased in recent months. In August 2010, the U.S. military was tracking 170 Iraqi cases valued at almost $6 billion. But 

by November, the number had skyrocketed to approximately 400 

cases valued at nearly $13 billion, raising serious questions about 

the Iraqi military’s capacity to deal with such an influx of highly 

technical equipment. This dramatic increase—and the accompanying contractors necessary to fulfill the orders—could result in 

an even larger footprint likely to overwhelm the State Department’s already lean resources. Arms sales professionals, who typically broker such deals, were not present in Iraq soon enough and 

political-military specialists from the State Department were insufficiently involved in the early stages of arms negotiations with 

Iraqis. 

The startup costs associated with the Office of Security Cooperation, responsible for managing Foreign Military Sales, are typically 

funded by the State Department. However, in Iraq this is problematic for two reasons. First, the security environment is such that 

the State Department may not be able to afford the associated security costs. The Defense Department however, has less restrictive 

requirements—which could reduce site-protection costs by as much 

as $750 million—and a larger, more flexible budget. Second, the 

State Department, if forced to outfit the Office of Security Cooperation to its security standards, will not achieve full operational capability by October. Due to the expanding footprint, there would be 

too much to do with not enough time. 

Funding streams to support the Iraqi military are changing. The 

Iraqi army must be properly resourced and adequately equipped to 

deter future challenges from outside its borders. From 2005–2012 

this was accomplished through the Iraq Security Forces Fund withVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Feb 01, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63954.TXT MIKE
18 

24The administration request for FY 2011, through the defense budget, was $2 billion dollars 

of which Congress is likely to appropriate closer to $1.5 billion. 

in the Defense budget.24 The fund has been a discretionary spending vehicle for procurement, operations, and maintenance. But in 

FY 2012, that funding line will be replaced with a more restrictive 

and traditional form of security assistance, Foreign Military Financing, granted through the Department of State’s budget to finance the purchase of U.S. equipment, training, and services. The 

administration will likely request approximately $1 billion annually through FY 2014 after which Iraq is forecast to be capable of 

financing its own military. 

With the departure of combat troops, the security assistance is 

the principal point of leverage the United States has in promoting 

Kurdish integration and developing a professional generation of 

soldiers and police. The sale of military equipment gives us an edge 

in diplomacy, builds relationships, and fosters interoperability. But 

perhaps most importantly, it fills a void that other countries, including Iran, are more than willing to step into if left empty. 

Although there are many unknowns still associated with the 

transition to a diplomatic mission in Iraq, it will not serve the 

United States to sit back and take a ‘‘wait and see’’ approach to 

funding our efforts there. A future presence of the U.S. military, in 

any form, will not alleviate the responsibilities of the State Department, but will only help facilitate its effectiveness. 

Recommendations 

1. Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to 

complete the diplomatic mission in Iraq. To this end, senior administration officials in Washington should be more vocal on 

the importance of full Congressional funding for its budget requests for Iraq programs. 

2. Consideration should be given to a multiple-year funding authorization for Iraq programs, including operational costs (differentiated from the State Department’s global operational 

budget account), security assistance, and economic assistance 

programs. The State Department would have to articulate a 

more comprehensive three-to-five year strategy for Iraq, but 

would receive assurances that critical programs would not fall 

victim to the vagaries of the budgeting process. Congress would 

demonstrate its commitment to the bilateral relationship, but 

also be able to create benchmarks for progress and establish 

sunsets to ensure the transition period to normal diplomatic 

operations is not open-ended. 

3. State Department should appoint a senior coordinator for Iraq, 

housed within the Bureau of Near East Affairs, empowered to 

engage across bureaus. This office would be responsible for ensuring a unity of effort within the State Department, including 

on difficult security matters and serve as the principle interlocutor with the Defense Department on transition issues. It will 

also serve as the model for transition in Afghanistan. 

19 

4. If the administration needs new authorities to execute the new 

diplomatic mission in Iraq, these need to be urgently communicated to the appropriate Congressional committees. 

5. Congress should approve an authority whereby the Department 

of Defense funds the stand-up costs of the Office of Security Cooperation inside Iraq. This would alleviate a financial burden 

that the State Department would not be able to bear. Consideration should also be given to authorizing the Defense Department to subsidize security costs associated with arms sales. In 

the Iraqi security environment these costs are highly inflated 

and if incorporated could have the dual effects of pricing U.S. 

defense contractors out of a competitive Iraqi market and offending our Iraqi partners by calling their security measures 

into question. 

6. Congress should fully fund the current request for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund and future requests for Foreign Military Financing. This will ensure future defense cooperation between 

the U.S. and Iraq. The ‘‘total package’’ approach associated 

with American arms sales will establish an ongoing relationship where the Iraqis will depend on specialized U.S. skills for 

training and maintenance. An extensive security aid package 

will also prohibit other regional actors from inserting their 

undue influence on Iraq’s fledgling democracy. 

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including 

civilian capacity, the financial commitment from Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the backing of the Iraqi Government. If these elements are not fully in place, the administration 

may be forced to choose between scaling back the diplomatic mission or accepting a degree of physical risk familiar to military personnel, but normally unacceptable for diplomats. 

Debate over the balance between conventional and unconventional military capacity is often heard through the halls of the Pentagon. A similar discussion must take place within the State Department regarding the role and capabilities of our diplomatic 

corps. Although the State Department’s budget is a fraction of the 

Pentagon’s, the distinctions between the diplomatic and military 

missions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are quickly blurring. 

To adapt to the counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. troops are asked 

to put down their weapons and converse over cups of tea. Conversely, in Iraq the State Department is being asked to augment 

its traditional diplomatic functions with a forceful, though defensive, security capacity. 

Reevaluating the role of diplomats is not about giving up on Iraq. 

Quite the opposite, it is an acknowledgment of the importance of 

getting the transition right. Some will argue that the war’s faulty 

pretext—that Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction stocks 

constituted ‘‘a grave and gathering danger’’—justify a quick American disengagement from Iraq once our troops are withdrawn next 

year. While such an approach may be ideologically fulfilling, it constitutes snatching ‘‘defeat from the jaws of victory.’’ 

20 

For all the challenges the diplomatic mission faces, its success or 

failure has profound implications on the nature of the American 

sacrifice in Iraq. It will be an important factor in whether a more 

stable Iraq emerges from decades of turmoil as a strategic partner 

of the United States, or, instead, potentially turns towards Iran. 

More than 4,400 American lives have been lost and $750 billion 

spent. But no figure can encapsulate the horrific loss of life, treasure, and the associated sweat that was poured into waging war, 

crafting a peace, and charting the transition. Now is not the time 

to politically disengage. The transition must be fostered through 

this critical stage, for the template being created in Iraq now will 

serve as the model in Afghanistan in years to come. 

21 

Appendix I: Iraqi Security Forces 

‘‘Minimum Essential Capabilities’’ 

22 

Appendix II: Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq 

Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq, 2003–2011 

(In billions of U.S. dollars by fiscal year) 

Department 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

Total 

2003– 

2010 

2011 

Request 

Defense ........................................ 50 56 83 98 127 139 92 61 707 46 

State (incl. USAID) ...................... 3 20 2 3 3 3 2 3 39 4 

Veterans Affairs .......................... 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 1 

Total: Iraq ............................... 53 76 86 102 131 142 96 66 751 51 

Source: Congressional Research Service 

23 

Appendix III: Security Incident Trends: 

January 2004 to May 2010 

Source: Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security 

in Iraq,’’ June 2010. 

Æ