NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0343n.06 Filed: May

11, 2007 No. 05-5177 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
ROY YOUN G STEWART, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. J AMES MORGAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY O P I N I O N

Be for e : K

EN NE DY , M OORE, a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Petitioner-Appellant Roy Young Stewart (“Stewa rt”) a ppeals fr om the district court’s ju dg ment denying his pe tition for a writ of ha beas
c o r p u s . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt r e je c te d thr e e in te rtw in e d c la im s : th a t St e w art’ s tr ia l c o u n s el was ineffe ctive; that the state courts err ed by ref using to hold a retrospe ctive compe tency hear ing; a

nd that Stewart’s guilty

plea wa s not e nte r e d voluntarily , intelligently , and knowing ly . The district cour t adopted in full a repor

t and re commendation fr om the mag istrate judg e, who r easone d that Stewart’s ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- tr ia l- c ouns e l c l a i m w a s p r o c e d

u r a l l y d e f a u l t e d a n d th a t hi s o the r t

wo c la ims fa i l ed o n the merits. Althoug h our re asoning differ s markedly from that of the district court, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

be c a us e Ste wa

rt ha s n ot d e mo ns tr ated that th e state
c ourt s’ fa ilure to h old

a re tr os pe c tiv e c omp e te nc y he ari ng wa s an un re a so na ble a pp lic a tio n of

c le a rl y2

e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l la w a nd ha s n ot s ho wn

by c lea r and c on vin c inge vid e nc e that th e state c ourt s
e r r e d b y c o n c l u d i n g t h a th i s g u i l t y p l e a w a s e n t e r e d

v o l u n t ar i l y, i n t e l l i g e n t l y, an d kn o w i n g l y. I. BACKG ROUND I n the fa ll of 1979, Stewart wa s discharg ed fr om a psy chiatric hosp i t al i n Philadelphia, Pennsy lvania. Soon there afte r, he moved to L ouisvill e, Ke ntucky . I n Dec ember 1979, Stewart robbed a woman at knife point, and in Marc h 1980, while on bond awa iting trial for the Dec ember robber y , Stewart ra

ped and r obbed anothe r woman. He was char g ed for c rimes re lating to these two inc ide nt s, but be fo re tr ia l, a ps y c hiatr ist

de te rm ine d th a t Ste wa

rt su ff e re d f ro m a me nta l il lne ss
re qu ir ingme dic a tio n a

nd ps y c hiatr ic su

pe rv isi on , a

nd he wa s c on fi ne d in

a c or re c tio na l ps y c hiatr ic fac ility . After

a short per iod of treatment, Stewart’s mental illness went into remission, and he wa s de c lare d c omp e te nt to stand tr ia l. On Oc tob e r 6 and

No ve mbe r 1 8, 19 80 , St e wa rt ple a de d guil ty

to char g es re lating to the two inc idents and wa s sentence d to a total of ninetee n y ear s in prison. I n Se pte mbe r 19 87 , Ste wa rt wa s re le a se d on pa

ro le
. I n July

19 88 , h e a lle g e dly

a tte mpt e d to murder a woman, and in August 1988, he allege dly rape d and robbe d a woman at knife point. He
was indicted on char g es related to the se two incidents, and on J anuar y 25, 1990, Stewart p l ea d ed g uilty (while maintaining hi s innocenc e, pursua nt to Nor th C

ar oli na v . A lfo rd , 400 U.S. 25 (1970)) to first-deg ree burg lary , first-deg ree robber y , terror istic threatening , and two counts of four th-deg ree assault, and was sentenc ed as a persistent fe lony

offe nder in the se cond deg ree . Stewart wa s
se nte nc e d to a tot a l of tw e nty -t wo y e ars in p ri so n. F ive da y s late r, he fi le d a

mot ion to s e t a sid e his conviction pursuant to Ke ntucky Rule of Crimi n al P roce dure 11.42, a nd on Fe bruar

y 5, 1990, the state trial cour

t denied his motion.I n th e f ir s t o p in io n o f th e K e n tu c ky Co u rt o f A p p e a ls , th e c o u rt me n ti o ned only the 1 ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of

-counse l claim, J oint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 56 ( Ste war t v. C om mo nwe alt

h ( S te war t I ), No
. 9 3-CA-0435-MR, slip op. at 3 (Ky . Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1995)) , but in the third opinion of t he Kentucky Court of Appeals, the cour t also mentioned the invalid-plea claim, J .A. at 69 ( Ste war t v . Co mm on we alt h ( Stewart III

), No. 1999-CA-001933-MR, sl ip op. at 2 (Ky . Ct. App. J an. 12, 2001)). Thus, it is unclea r fr om the rec ord bef

ore us whe ther Stewa

rt raise d an indepe ndent claim that his g uilty

plea wa s not entere d voluntarily , intelligently , and knowing ly , or mere ly made thi s a sse rt ion

in s up po rt

of his ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la im. 3 On No ve mbe r 2 5, 19 92 , St e wa rt fi le d a se c on d mo tio n to va c a te his c on vic tio n p ur su a nt t o Ke n t u ck y Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42. He a rg ued that his g uilty

plea wa s not entere d
vo lun tari ly , in te lli g e ntl y , a nd kn ow ing ly , a

nd tha t hi s c ouns e l w a s in e ff

e ctive fo r f

a ili ngto investigate leg al issues arising from his me ntal condition. On J anuar y 6, 1993, the state trial c ourt 1 denied Stewa

rt’s motion, concluding that Stewart ha d pleade d g uilty voluntarily , intelligently , and knowing ly . Stewart a

ppeale d, and the Ke ntucky Court of Appea ls concluded that, beca use of Stewart’s “ history

of mental proble ms, his evident misunderstanding of an A l f o rd plea , a

nd his possibly compulsive criminal beha vior,” it was not appa

rent fr om the rec ord that Stewar t’s counsel had per formed a dequate ly by failing to investigate Stewart’s psy cholog ical condition. J oint Appendix (“J .A.” ) at 57 ( Ste war t v . Co mm on we alt h ( Ste war t I

), No. 93-CA- 0435-MR, slip op. at 4 (Ky
. Ct. App. M ar. 10, 1995)). The Kentucky Court of Appea ls vacated the orde r of the state trial court a nd rema nded the case “so that appellant may , with the assistance of counse l, elaborate at an evidentiar y hear ing the claim that his trial attorney unrea sonably neg lected leg al issues arising from his psy cholog ical condition.” J.A. at 57-58 ( Ste war t I , No. 93-CA-0435- MR, sli p op. at 4-5). On Oc tob e r 1 4, 19 96 , the state tr ia l c ourt he ld a he a ri ngon Ste wa rt ’s mot ion

to v a c a te his
c on vic tio n a

nd a g a in de nie d the mot ion on the g ro un d that he ha d e nte re d his g uil ty ple a kn ow ing ly and voluntarily
. Stewart a ppeale d, and the Ke ntucky Court of Appea ls ag ain vac ated the or der a nd4

rema nded the c ase, a g ain instructing the state trial c ourt to hold a hea ring to determine w hether Stewart’s c ounsel unrea sonably neg lected le g al issues arising from his psy cholog ical condition. Ste war t v . Co mm on we alt h ( Stewart II

), No
. 19 96 -C A- 00 32 91 -M R, sli p op . a t 5 (K y . Ct . App . O c t. 23, 1998), available at

http:// 162.114.92.72/COA/1996-CA-003291.pdf. On Ap ri l 26 , 199 9, th e state tr ia l c ourt he ld a he ari ngon

Ste wa rt ’s mot ion

to v a c a te his conviction. Stewar

t introduced e vidence that he ha d b ee n u n d er psy chiatric car e in the past, ha d been hospitalized in the past, had be en hospitalized in 1980 while f acingcriminal cha

rg es, and ha d been e valuated a

t that time for his competenc y to sta nd trial. Wallace Rog ers ( “Rog ers” ), Stewar t’s trial counsel, “ testified that he wa s unawa re of S t ew ar t’s prior mental he alth history and that he would have move d for a

competenc y

hear ing pr ior to the guilty pleas had he known about i t.” J .A. at 70-71 ( Ste war t v . Co mm on we alt h ( Stewart III

) , N o . 1 9 9 9

- C A

- 0 0 1 9 3 3

- M R , s l i p o p . a t3

- 4 ( K y. Ct. App. J an. 12, 2001)) . Dr. Vic tor i a Yu n k er (“Yunke r”) perf ormed a competenc y

evaluation at the state trial court’s reque st, and her r eport c oncluded that Stewa rt was “ competent whe n he ente red his guilty pleas a nd when the of

fense s we re co m m i t t ed .” J.A. at 71 ( Stewart III, No. 1999-CA00 19 33 -M R, slip op . at 4)
. On the ba sis of thi s e vid e nc e , th e state tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t, b e c a

us e of Rog ers’ s failure to investigate Stewar t’s mental conditi on, his perf ormanc e “‘may well have been outside the rang e of pr ofess i o n al l y competent a ssistance.’” Id. (quoting the state trial c ourt’s opinion). The state tria l court also conc luded, howeve r, that bec ause Dr
. Yu n k er de termined that Stewart would have been found competent to stand trial had a competenc y

hear ing be en held pr ior to his guilty

plea, beca

use the evidenc e ag ainst Stewart on the char g es ag ainst him was “‘da mning,’ ”
and be c a us e he ple a de d to re du c e d c ha rg e s a s a re su lt o f h is p le a

a g re e me nt, Ste wa

rt ha d “ ‘f a ile d to show that t h er e i s a reasonable pr obability he would have g one to trial fa cing the above char g es5

instead of takingthe dea l offer ed by the Commonwealth.’” J.A. at 72 ( Stewart III , No. 1999-CA00 19 33 -M R, s lip op . at 5 (qu oti ng the state tr ia l court ’s op ini on )) . T he state tr ia l c ourt a c c or din g ly conclude d that Stewart ha d failed to show pr ejudice f rom h i s counsel’s a lleg edly defic ient perf ormanc e and onc e ag ain denied Stewa rt’s motion to vacate his conviction. Stewart a ppeale d, arguing that t h e s t at e trial c ourt err ed by relying on D r. Yunke r’s re port without holding a r etrospec tive competenc y hear ing
. T h e Kentucky

Court of Appea ls concluded that the state trial c ourt had not er red a nd aff irmed the state trial c ourt’s dec ision, finding “no a buse of dis c re tio n” in t

he state tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t Ste wa rt had no t be e n p re

jud ic e d b y

his counsel’s a lleg edly

defic ient perf

ormanc e. J.A. at 74 ( Stewart III , N o. 19 99 -C A- 00 19 33 -M R, s lip op. at 7). Ste wa rt fi l ed a motion for discre tionary revie w in the Kentuc ky Supreme Court. The Ke ntu c ky Sup re me Court va c a te d th e Ke ntu c ky Court of Ap pe a ls’ s d e c isi on

and re mand e d th e c a se back to the Court of Appea ls f or further consideration in light of Tho mp so n v . Co mm on we alt h , 56 S.W .3d 406 (Ky . 2001), a then-re cent Kentucky Supreme Court decision reg ardingwhen a trial court should or must hold a competenc y hear ing. O n rema

nd, the Kentuc ky

Court of Appea ls concluded that the state trial c ourt did not err by ref using to hold a competenc y hear ing be cause “ther e we re no
rea sonable g rounds to question Stewart’s competenc y and no harm resulted from the a bsence of a
c o mp e te n c y h e ar in g ” an d a f f ir me d th e d e c is io n o f th e s tate tr ia l c o u rt. J. A
. a t 91 ( S t ew art v. Com mo nwe alt

h ( Stewart IV

), No. 1999-CA- 001933-MR, slip op. at 8 (Ky
. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2002))
. On Aug ust 13, 2003, t

he Ke ntucky

Supreme Court denie d Stewart’s motion for discr etionary revie w. J .A. at 83 ( Ste war t v . Co mm on we alt h , 2002-SC-0989-D (K

y . Aug . 13, 2003)).6

On Fe bruar

y 11, 2004, Stewart filed a petition fo r a writ of habe as cor pus in the fede ral dis tr ic t c ourt
. Ste wa

rt os te ns ibl y

ra ise d tw o c la ims : th a t th e state tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to h old a compe tency

hear ing; a

nd that he wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. On April 12, 2004, the state fi le d an ans we r, and on June 16 , St e wa rt fi le d a re sp on se to t

he state ’s ans we r. Th e c a se
was re fer re d t o a magistrate judge , and on June 29, 2004, the mag istrate judg e filed a repor t and
re c omm e nd a tio n. Th e ma g istrate jud g e c on str ue d St e wa

rt ’s ha be a s p e tit ion

a s r a isi nga

thi rd c la im
a s w e ll: that hi s g uil ty

ple a wa s no t e nte re d vo lun tari ly , int e lli g e ntl y , and kn ow ing ly . T he ma g istrate jud g e re c omm e nd e d tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis s Ste wa

rt ’s ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la im as proc edura lly

defa ulted and dismiss Stewart’s other c laims on the merits. On September 3, 2004, St e w art f il e d o b je c ti o n s to th e ma g is tr a te ju d g e ’ s r e p o rt a n d r e c o mm e n d a ti o n , b u t o nJa n u a r y 5, 2005, the district c ourt adopted the repor t a nd rec ommendation in full, denied Stewar t’s petition for
a wr it o f h a be a s c or pu s, and de nie d St e wa

rt a c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity on a ll issu e s. Ste wa rt tim e ly fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l, a nd on Au g us t 25 , 2 00 5, we g ra nte d St e wa

rt a cert if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity
on a ll i ssu e s. II. AN AL YSI S We revie w de novo a district court’s de cision in a habe as proc eeding
. Souter v. Jone s , 395 F.3d 577, 584 ( 6th Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ). W e re view the district cour t’s fac tual finding s for c lear err or. Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the f amiliar standa rd that g uides our ana ly sis of a petition for
a wr it of habea s corpus unde r the Antiterr orism and Eff ective D eath Pena lty

Act of 1996: An application for a writ of habea s corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgme nt of a State c ourt shall not be g rante d with respect t o an y cl ai m that was a djudicated on the me rits in St ate c ourt proce eding s unless the adjudication of the c la im—7 (1 ) re su lte d in

a de c isi on that w a s c on tr ary

to, or inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble application of, clea

rly established Fe dera l la w, as deter

mine d b y t he Supreme Court of the U nited States; or (2) resulted in a de cision that was based on an unre asonable deter mination of the fa cts in light of the e vidence prese nted i n the State cour t p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] deter mination of a fac tual issue made by a S tate cour t shall be presume d to be co rrect. The a

pplicant shall have the burde n of re butting the pr esumption of corr ectne ss by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.” Id. § 2254(e) (1). A. Ineff ect ive Assistance of Counsel B e c a us e ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la ims pr e se nt m ixed qu e sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t,
we revie w such claims de novo. United States v. W agner , 3 8 2 F
. 3 d 5 9 8 , 6 1 5 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 4 )
. We
ana ly ze i ne ff e c tiv e -a ss istanc e -o f- c ouns e l c la ims un de r t he fa mil iar t wo -p ro ngte st s e t f

or th i n Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “F irst, the defe ndant must show that counsel’s perf ormance wa s d eficient.” Id. at 687. “Sec ond, the def endant must show that the def icient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense .” Id. I n order to show that deficie nt perf ormanc e prejudiced the defense when a defe ndant pleads g uil ty , “ the de fe nd ant mus t show that the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, b ut f or c ouns e l’ s e rr or s, he would not have plea ded g uilty and would have insisted on goingto trial.” Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). A def endant c an mee t this burden by showing , for e x ample, that ther e wa s an “af firmative de fense ,” such as an insanity defe nse, that “likely would have suc cee ded at tria l,” id. , or by showing that he or she was not c ompetent to plead g uilty , se e J e rm y n v . H or n , 266 F.3d 257, 28 3 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 1) ; Ed

dm on ds v . P e te rs , 93 F.3d 1307, 1317 ( 7th Cir. 1996), cert. de nied , 5 20 U. S. 11 72 (1 99 7) ; Theriot v. W hitley , 1 8 F .3 d 3 11 , 3 13 -1 4 (5t h Cir. 19 94 ). A d e fe nd ant i s c omp e te nt i fTh e ma g istrate jud g e su a sp on te dis mis s e d

S t e w a r t ’ s i n e f f e c t i v e - a s s i s t a

n c e - o f

- c o un se l c la im 2 as proce durally defa

ulted, but that decision raise s conce rns. Se e Ho war d v . B ou c ha rd , 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , - - - U
. S
. - - - , 1 2 6 S
. C t
. 1 0 3 2 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( “ T h e m a i nc o n c e r n wi th raising proce dural de fault sua sponte is that a petitioner not be disadva ntag ed without having had an opportunity

to respond.”) . Acc ording ly , we e x erc ise our discre tion to dis m i s s t h i s claim on the merits rathe r than a ddress the issue of proce dural de fault. Se e Ly on s v . S tov all , 188 F.3d 327, 333 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. de nied , 530 U.S. 1203 (2000). 8 he or she “has suf

ficient pre sent ability

to con s u l t wi t h his lawy er w ith a rea sonable de g ree of
ra t i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g” a n d “h as a r at i o n al as we l l as fa ct u al u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst him [ or her ].” Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Notably , a state c ourt’s deter mination of competenc y is a fac tual finding entitled to a presumption of cor rec tness on fede ral habea s revie w, rebuttable only by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See Mack ey v . Dutton , 217 F.3d 399, 413 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. de nied , 5 31 U. S. 1 08 7 ( 20 01 ); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
. The state tr ial court c oncluded that Stewa rt’s trial counse l’s perf

ormanc e “‘ may

well have been outside the rang e of pr ofessionally competent assistance .’” J .A. at 71 ( Stewart III , No. 1999- CA -0 01 93 3- MR, sli p op . a t 4 (q uo tin g the state tr ia l c ourt ’s op ini on ))
. On a ppeal in th is c ourt , Stewart fur

ther a rg ues that his trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s d efic ient beca use eve n a cur sory revie w of the se ntencingand p l ea tr anscr ipts from Stewart’s pr evious convictions—par t of the dis c ov e ry ma te ri a ls p ro vid e d b y

the state to S te wa

rt ’s tr ial cou ns el pr ior

to h is guil ty

ple a in t his
case —would have r evea led serious menta l health conc erns wa rra nting f urther inve stigat i o n . The state does not counte r this argument on appea l. The parties instead foc us their ar g uments on whether Stewart c an esta

blish prejudice be cause of his trial counsel’ s deficie nt perfor mance . 2 To the extent that St ewa

rt now arg ues that he ha s established on the rec ord as it st ands that he was prejudice d by his trial counsel’s de ficient pe rfor mance , his claim clea

rly fails. Dr. Y unker’ s repor t concluded that Stewart wa s competent whe n he committed the cr imes and whe n he plea ded9

g uilty , an d S t ewa

rt’s only evidenc e to the contr ary is that he requir ed psy chiatric car e at va rious points in t he past a

nd that h e expressed some he sitancy when plea ding guilty . Stewart ha s not introduced a

ny evide n ce counter ing D r. Yunke r’s re port and showingaff irmatively

that he wa s incompetent whe n he pleade d g uilty or would have ha d a valid insanity defe nse to the cr imes, much less showing by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that he was incompetent. Acc ording ly , Stewart ha s failed to mee t his burden of e stablishing that he was pre judiced by

his trial counsel’s de ficient perf ormanc e, and the state trial cour t’s decision wa s, at the ver y least, a r easona

bl e ap p l i cation of clea rly established fe dera l law. Cf. United States v. Branham , 97 F. 3 d 8 3 5 , 8 5 5 (6th Cir. 1996) (conc luding on dire ct revie w that a district cour t’s finding that a def

endant wa s competent to stand trial was not cle arly

err oneous whe re the district c ourt relied on its own observations and cre dited one expert opinion over a nother). Howeve r, Stewar

t consistently

argued in state c ourt that he would be able to establish that he wa s prejudice d by

his trial counsel’s de ficient pe rfor mance if the state tria l cour t held a retrospe ctiv e c o mp e te n c y h e a r in g , an d th a t th e s tate tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d b y r e f u s in g to h o ld s u c h a hear ing. See, e .g. , J .A. at 92 ( Stewart IV , No. 1999-CA-001933- MR, sli p op. at 9) (stating that Stewart did not argue that he ha d established inef fec tive assistance of trial counse l on the rec ord as it stands, but ins tead “ argued that the trial court should not have made its decision on the ineffe ctive assistance of counse l claim wi t h o u t fi rst holding a competenc y

hear ing” ). The c rux of St ewa rt’s ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laim, then, is his claim that he was e ntitled to a retrospe ctive compe tency hear ing, the claim to which we now turn.Al tho ug h th e re is at tr ia l a du e pr oc e ss r ig ht t o a

he ari ngwh e n th e c ir c ums tanc e s e sta bli sh 3 a doubt w ith r espec t to c o m p etenc y , se e Dr op e v . M iss ou ri , 4 20 U. S. 1 62 , 1 79 -8 2 ( 19 75 ); Pate v. Robinson , 383 U. S. 3 75 , 3 84 -8 6 ( 19 66 ); Sm ith , 63 7 F .2 d a t 10 70 -7 2, it i s unc le ar w he the r t hat sa me standard a pplies when a defe ndant attempts to show that he or she was pre judiced by

trial counsel’ s defic ient perf

ormanc e. When ra ising a

n ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of -counse l c la im , it

is th e d efe ndant’s burden to e stablish that he or she was prejudice d beca use he or she was actua lly incompetent at the time of trial, se e su

pra Section I I .A, and thus d u e p ro ce s s m ay perha ps not require an evide ntiary hear ing unle ss the defe ndant makes some g reater showing. Be cause Stewart’s c laim fails even unde r the direc t-revie w standar d, howeve r, we decline to r esolve this issue. 10 B. R e tr os pe c ti ve Co m pe te nc y He ar ing

“ [W]he re the re is s ub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e of

a de fe nd ant’ s in c omp e te nc e at th e ti me of tr ia l a trial judg e has the duty

to order a hea ring sua sponte.” Pa te v . S mi th , 637 F.2d 1068, 1071 ( 6th Cir. 19 81 ). We ag re e wi th the Ke ntu c ky c ourt s th a t on dir e c t r e vie w o f a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

no t to ho ld a compe t en cy h ea ri n g at the time of trial, the sta ndard of revie w is “whe ther a

rea sonable judg e, situated as wa s the trial cour t j u d ge whose failure to conduct an e videntiary hear ing is be ing revie wed, should have ex p er i en ced doubt with respect to compe tency to stand trial.” Id. at 1072 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ; se e als o J .A. at 90 ( Stewart IV , N o. 19 99 -C A- 00 19 33 -M R, s lip op. at 7). We assume, w ithout deciding, that the same standa rd applies whe n revie wing a trial court’s de cision not to hold a retrospec tive competenc y hear ing as part of an inef

fec tive-assistance

of-c ounsel claim. Thus, we must de cide whether the Kentucky Court of Appea ls’s conclusion that 3 “ther e we re no rea sonable grounds to question Stewart’s competenc y and no harm resulted from the absenc e of a compete ncy

hear ing,” J .A. at 91 ( Stewart IV , No. 1999-CA-001933-MR, slip op. at 8),
was a n unrea sonable a

pplication of that standar d. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Th e Sup reme Co urt ha s d e te rm ine d th a t a c omp e te nc y

he ari ngwa s r e qu ir e d in

tw o c a se s. I n Pate v. Robinson , the Court note d that the “uncontr adicted testimony of four witnesses ca lled by the defe nse reve aled that [t he petitioner] ha d a long history of disturbed be havior,” including in theThe Court a ctually stated that “the stipulation did not inc lude a finding of sa nit y ,” Robinson , 4 383 U.S. at 383 (empha sis added), but the Court made clea r elsew here in its opi nion that releva nt state law at the time used the ter m “s an ity ” to desc ribe both compe tency to stand trial and leg al insanity , id. at 384 n.6. 11 wee ks and day s leading up to the commi ssion of t he cr ime at issue. Id. at 378 (footnote omitted). The pe titioner exhi bited normal beha vior at trial, id. at 385-86, and the state introduced into evide nce a stipulation that an expert would, if called, testify that the petit ioner “knew the nature of the c harg es ag ainst him and was able to cooper ate with counse l when [the expert] examined him two or three months before trial,” id. at 383. Notably , the stipulation did not ref lect the e x pert’s c onclusion
re g ard ing wh e the r or no t the pe tit ion e r wa s com pe te nt to s tand

tr ia l. Id. a t 38 3; c

f. Dusky , 3 62 U. S. 4

a t 40 2 ( c on c lud ingthat a

de fe nd ant is c omp e te nt i f h e “ ha s su ff ic ie nt p re se nt a

bil ity to c on su lt w ith his lawy er w ith a rea sonable deg ree of rational understanding ” and “has a rational as well as f actua l understandingof t he procee dings ag ainst him”). The Court c oncluded that due proce ss require d that the trial cour

t hold a co m p et en cy

hear ing be cause this evidence raised suf ficient doubt as to the petitioner’s c ompetence to stand trial. Robinson , 383 U.S. at 385-86. Nine y ear s later, the Court r evisited this issue in Dr op e v . M iss ou ri . I n that case , the petitioner submitted before trial a re port of a psychiatric evaluation indicating that he had sig nificant mental problems, including potential diag noses of “ Sociopathic per sonality disorder, se x u al pe r v e r s io n , ” “ B o r d e r li n e me n ta l d e f ic ie n c y , ” an d

“ Ch r o n ic A n xie ty

r e a c ti o nw it

h d e p r e s s io n .” Drope , 420 U.S. at 165. At trial, the petitioner’ s wife recounte d a history of bizarre behavior
. Id. at 165-66. F inally , in the m i d s t o f t ri al , petitioner attempted suicide
. Id. at 166. The Court
co n cl u d edt h at t h e t ri al co u rt , fa ce d wi t h t h i s ev i d en ce , erre d

b y n o th o l d i n g a c o mp et en cy h ea ri n g. Id. at 180.12

I n the ca se at ha

nd, the evidenc e tendingto show t h at Stewart wa s not competent to plead g uilty was not as strongas the e vidence in either Robinson or Drope . Stew ar t h ad rec eived psy chiatric treatment in the past, but there wa s no eviden ce i n troduce d that Stewart ha d rec ent psy chiatric problems, and he had pre viously been f ound competent by

a state c ourt in criminal proce eding s. Cf. Splitt v. United States , 364 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1966) (“[W] hen a pe rson is sane or has be en adjudg ed to be sane he is pr esumed to be sane until he is proven insane.” ), cert. de nied , 385 U.S. 1019 (1967). The plea tra nscript shows th at S t ew ar t took two rec esses duringthe plea hear ing a nd had some misg ivings about pleadingg uilty , but does not ref lect any bizarre be havior or
any oth e r i nd ic a tio ns that Stew art wa s not co mpe te nt at the tim e . St e wa rt ’s lawy e rs te sti fi e d th a t, be fo re ple a din g g uil ty , St e wa rt a ssi ste d th e m, p ro vid e d r e le va nt i nf or mation, and

a pp e are d to
un de rs tand the pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t hi m. F ina lly , D r. Yu nk e r’ s r e po rt , th e on ly

e xpe rt e vid e nc e in this case, c oncluded that Stewa rt was c ompetent when he pleade d g uilty . Absent any aff irmat i ve evidenc e showing that Stewart was not c ompetent when he pleade d g uilty , we concl u d e t h at the Kentucky Court of Appea ls’s determination th at S t ew ar t was not entitled to a re trospective
c om p e t e n c y h e ar i n g w a s a r e a s o n a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n o f c l e ar l y e s t a

b l i s h e d f e d e r a l l aw a s s e t fo rt h in Robinson and Drope
.The state a rg ues for the first time o n appeal that this arg ument is procedur ally defa ulted 5 be c a us e Ste wa

rt did no t pr e se nt i t to the Ke ntu c ky Court of Ap pe a ls. B e c a us e “ pr oc e dura l de fa

ult is n or ma lly a de fe ns e that th e State is o bli g a te d to ra ise and pr e se rv [e] if

it i s n ot t o lo se the ri g ht t o asser t the defense ther eaf

ter,” Tre st v . Ca in , 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (a lteration in orig inal) (inter nal quotation ma

rks omitted), we ag ain exercise our discre tion to dis miss thi s claim on the merits rather than addr ess the issue of pr ocedur al def ault, se e Sto v all , 188 F.3d at 333. 13 C. G uilty Plea F ina lly , St e wa

rt argue s th a t hi s g uil ty

ple a wa s in va lid
. To be va lid , guil ty ple a s “ no t on ly 5

m u s t b e v o l u ntary

but must be knowing, intellig ent ac ts done with sufficient a war eness of

the rele vant circ umstances and likely conseque nces.” Brady v. U nited States , 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The va lidity

of a ple a must be base d on an ana ly sis of the totality of the c ircumstance s. Id. at 749; Garcia v. J

ohnson , 9 91 F .2 d 32 4, 327 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 3) . Astate c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t a g uil ty plea wa s valid is a fac tual finding entitled to a presumption of corr ectne ss on f eder al habe as re view, rebuttable only

by clea r and c onv i n ci n g evidenc e. Ga rc ia , 9 91 F .2 d at 32 6; see also 28 U. S.C. § 2254(e) (1). Ste wa rtar g u e s t h a th i s p l e a

w a s i n v a l i d

b e c a u s e h e h a d

a h i s t o r y o f p s y c h i a t r i c p r o b l e m s, took two rec esses during the plea hear ing, answe red some que stions from the court untruthfully , and had used marijuana

immediately

befor e the plea

hear ing. A s discussed above , the re cord a s it stands do e s n ot re ve a l that Ste wa rt ’s his tor y of ps y c hiatr ic pr ob le ms re nd e re d him un a ble to e nte r a

va lid plea, a nd the re cord doe s not refle ct s ufficie nt doubt reg arding Stewart’s c ompetency

to warr ant our order ing a retrospe ctive competency hear ing. The re cesse s that Stewart took during the plea he aring
reve al that Stewar

t had som e mi sg ivings about pleading g uilty to such a longsentenc e, but do not
s h o w t h a th e w a s u n aw ar e o f t h e c o n s e qu e n c e s o f

h i s p l e a o r t h a th e e n t e r e d

h i s p l e a i n v o l u n t a r i l y. Stewart’s untruthf

ul statements that he had never been treate d for a mental illness and had ne ver be en14

in a mental hospit al do ra ise some conc ern, but none theless do not establish that he wa s unawa re of the conseque nces of his plea or that he enter ed his plea involuntarily . The state tr ial court e ng ag ed in a full plea colloquy , and S tewar t’s statements on the record that he understood the c onsequenc es of his plea “provide strong evidenc e that [hi s] plea was intelligent a nd knowing .” Boyd v . Y

ukins , 99 F . App ’x 69 9, 70 3 (6 th Cir
. 20 04 ) ( un pu bli sh e d o pin ion ). Ste wa

rt ’s e vid e nc e of

pa st p sy c hiatr ic problems and his self-ser ving, a fter- the-fa ct testimony that he had use d marijuana befor e ente ring his plea, testimony

that was in contra diction with his statement at the ple a hea ring that he wa s not
curr ently under the influence of any d ru gs or alc ohol, do not constitut e the c lear and convinc ing evidenc e nec essa ry t o re b u t the state trial c ourt’s finding that Stewart e ntere d his guilty plea
vo lun tari ly , in te lli g e ntl y , a nd kn ow ing ly . A c c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that Stew art is not e nti tle d to ha be a s r e lie f o n th is c la im. III . C ON CL USI ON Be cause Stewart ha s not shown by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the state courts er red by c o n c l u d i n g t h a th i s g u i l t y p l e a w a s e n t e r e d

v o l u n t ar i l y , i n t e l l i g e n t l y , an d kn o w i n g l y , b e c a

us e Stewart ha s not demonstrated that the state cour ts’ failure to hold a retrospe ctive compe tency hear ing
was a n unrea sonable a

pplication of cle arly established fe dera l law, and be cause Stewart c annot preva il on his i neff

ective- assistance -o f- counsel claim unless he preva ils on his retrospectivecompetenc y -hea

ring claim, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.