# Montenegro - United States Department of State

- Diplomacy Lab Fair 2024: Student Research Furthering the State Department’s Mission Office of Global PartnershipsNaila Nicole RicarteThe Return of Diplomacy Lab FairMore than 200 students and faculty representing 26 academic institutions gathered at the George C. Marshall Center within the U.S. Department of State’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., for the Diplomacy Lab Fair, organized by the Office of Global Partnerships.  This April 19, 2024, event, the first of its kind since 2017, was a celebration of students and faculty in the Diplomacy Lab network and an opportunity to share their semester-long research projects with diplomats, policymakers, and peers.  Diplomacy Lab is a partnership between the Department and more than 60 U.S. colleges and universities that enables collaboration on research and tools around a wide-variety of Department-identified topics in priority policy areas.  From countering violent extremism to climate adaptation, the diversity of Diplomacy Lab&#8217;s numerous projects was on full display.Last week marked the long-awaited return of the in-person Diplomacy Lab Fair after 6+ years! Students nationwide gathered in #WashingtonDC, presenting their projects with boundless enthusiasm for diplomacy. Witnessing the future of global relations in action is inspiring! 🤝🌍 pic.twitter.com/4ORZhlaekW&mdash; Special Rep for Global Partnerships McAuliffe (@GPatState) April 23, 2024Modern Diplomacy:  Inspiring the Next Generation of DiplomatsDuring his virtual welcome remarks, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized that &#8220;partnerships like these help us foster ideas, draw on diverse perspectives, and, ultimately, better address the issues affecting the lives of our people and people around the world.&#8221;  Diplomacy Lab exposes students to the work of the Department of State and inspires them to pursue careers in foreign policy.  For example, Salisbury University students partnered with the Foreign Service Institute to research post-conflict nation-building and its potential application to Ukraine&#8217;s reconstruction efforts.  Alison Wright, an aspiring Foreign Service Officer, quoted Secretary Blinken himself to express her commitment to this cause: &#8220;diplomacy is about the last three feet.”No matter their personal or academic background, there is a place for every student in Diplomacy Lab and at the Department of State.  Carter Dills, who is pursuing a Bachelor of Science in Earth Science and Physics from Indiana University, assessed natural hazard risk in the Yukon region of Canada for his research project.  Carter commented: &#8220;In terms of the different backgrounds that can come in and contribute to projects, it is truly unlimited.&#8221;   A Diplomacy Lab participant explains a research project during this year&#8217;s Diplomacy Lab Fair at the State Department. &nbsp;One unique aspect of Diplomacy Lab is its direct engagement with U.S. Embassies and Consulates overseas.  For instance, Nancy Kwang Johnson from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, researched transitional justice in Montenegro by conducting interviews with nongovernmental organization (NGO) directors in the Balkans.  This was made possible with the guidance of the Political-Economic Chief at Embassy Podgorica. After their presentations, Diplomacy Lab Fair attendees interested in learning more about careers and fellowships at State met with Diplomat-in-Residence John Dinkelman.  Representatives for the U.S. Foreign Service Internship Program, Paid Student Internship Program, Pickering Fellowship, and Rangel Fellowship were also available to lend their advice.Influence of Student Research on U.S. Foreign PolicyBeyond the practical utility of student research to meet the immediate needs of the Department, the Diplomacy Lab program incorporates the diversity of the American people, most notably, diversity in perspectives within Generation Z.  Diplomacy Lab projects provide an avenue for students to contribute to U.S. foreign policy while studying topics where their work and passions align.  At the Marshall Center students also learned about careers at State. &nbsp;In this context, students from the University of Michigan collaborated with Consular Officers at the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey to protect the rights of seasonal and temporary workers participating in the H-2 visa program.  Their end-of-semester deliverable was a recommendation for engagement with and a comprehensive list of workers centers that have resources to support Mexican H-2 visa holders and protect their rights and wellbeing in the United States.  Consular leadership at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City will share this information with relevant stakeholders in the Mexican Government and NGOs.Throughout Diplomacy Lab’s eleven-year legacy, this model of mutual exchange has been applauded by Department of State employees.  Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma, underscored this in his Diplomacy Lab Fair speech, saying: “It’s clear to me that the future of diplomacy is in good hands because of all of you.  You are our next generation of leaders&#8230;we need your voices to address the problems of today.”
- Montenegro HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Montenegro				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Montenegro																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Montenegro during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government officials; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious restrictions on freedom of expression, including threats of violence against journalists; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and the existence of any of the worst forms of child labor.The government took limited credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.The trial of Slobodan Pekovic, accused of the 1992 killings of two Bosniaks and the rape of a civilian while serving as a soldier for the Bosnian Serb Army in the Bosnian town of Foca, continued. This was the first trial in the country for sexual violence committed during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pekovic, who was arrested in 2021, remained in custody and was deemed a flight risk.Human Rights Action and other human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) criticized the government’s lack of progress in war crimes prosecution, as well as victim recognition and compensation.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.The government’s Committee for Missing Persons continued to monitor, study, and determine proposals for resolving the matter of missing persons from armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Committee resolved several cases and facilitated the repatriation of the remains of 33 persons during the year.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										Although the constitution and law prohibited such practices, there were credible reports government officials employed them. While the government ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and such practices were prohibited by domestic law, prominent NGOs such as Human Rights Action (HRA) reported police tortured suspects and beatings occurred in prisons and detention centers across the country. The government prosecuted some police officers and prison guards accused of overstepping their authority, but there were delays in the court proceedings. NGOs noted several police officers responsible for violating the rules of their service, including cases of excessive use of force, remained on duty. The Office of the Ombudsman received complaints alleging police torture, noting most complaints involving criminal proceedings did not result in heavy penalties.The NGO HRA received reports on the sporadic use of torture resulting in severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Some detained suspects or prisoners were subjected to such treatment by police or prison officials.In June, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on its June 2022 ad hoc visit to the country, accompanied by a response from the government. To address ill-treatment by police and improve the poor situation of remand prisoners, authorities needed to take serious measures, the Committee concluded. The CPT delegation received numerous allegations of serious physical ill-treatment of detained persons by police officers. These included allegations against officers from the Sector for the Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption, Special Units, the criminal police, and inspectors from a wide range of police offices across the country.In response to the 2022 report by CPT, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported there was no evidence of systemic torture in the country, while acknowledging individual incidents might have occurred.In June, the Basic Court in Bijelo Polje convicted two police officers and sentenced them to five months of house arrest for their ill-treatment of a man in Pljevlja during a 2020 protest. Another four police officers accused in the same case were acquitted because the court could not determine with certainty they also used force against the protester.Impunity was a problem in the security forces, particularly among police and prison officers. NGOs cited corruption, lack of transparency, a lack of capacity by oversight bodies, and political influence over prosecutors and officials within the Police Administration and the Ministry of Interior as factors contributing to impunity. During the year authorities offered numerous training sessions, often in conjunction with international partners, and held working groups dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights.NGOs noted the lack of designated interrogation rooms, including audio and video equipment to record interrogations and help deter mistreatment, was a problem.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and pretrial detention facilities were poor due to severe overcrowding and limited access to medical care. The CPT reported some prison and detention center conditions raised human rights concerns.Abusive Physical Conditions: There were some abusive physical conditions in prisons and pretrial detention facilities due to overcrowding and limited access to medical care. The CPT reported problematic levels of prison overcrowding, including less than 32.3 square feet of space per inmate in multiple-occupancy cells in certain facilities, and remand prisoners awaiting trial confined to their cells for 23 hours a day for months or years. Material conditions in police stations the CPT visited were not suitable for detaining persons for up to 72 hours due to structural deficiencies such as poor access to natural light, inadequate ventilation, poor conditions of hygiene, and irregular provision of food. NGOs reported that detainees who were addicted to drugs or had mental disabilities faced difficulties in obtaining adequate treatment.Prisoner-on-prisoner violence was a persistent problem at the remand prison and the Administration for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions, the country’s main prison. During the year there were reports of violence in this prison attributed to the long-standing conflict between the country’s two largest organized criminal groups. There were widespread allegations prison employees cooperated with members of organized criminal groups. According to NGO reports, prisoners complained of waiting long periods of time for specialized medical examinations and indicated problems in communication with the psychiatrists in the prison system. According to HRA, instances of prison and police torture and mistreatment were significantly underreported, due in part to intimidation by police officers and a lack of due diligence by prison doctors.Administration: Authorities conducted investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment but usually did so in reaction to media campaigns or upon the ombudsman’s recommendation. The results of these investigations were generally made available to the public.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits to prisons by independent nongovernmental observers, including human rights groups and media, and international bodies such as the CPT. Even when monitors visited on short notice, prison authorities allowed them to speak with the prisoners without the presence of a guard.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government usually observed these requirements. Detainees had a right to be compensated in cases of unfounded detention, and the government generally followed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Arrests required a judicial ruling or a “reasonable suspicion by police that the suspect committed an offense.” Police generally made arrests using warrants issued by judges and based on sufficient evidence. The law required a suspect be brought promptly before a judicial officer and charged with a crime, but those rights were not always respected. Police and prosecutors could detain suspects for up to 72 hours before bringing them before a judge and charging them. Although the law prohibited excessive delays in filing formal charges against suspects and in conducting investigations, delays sometimes occurred, without punitive repercussions for authorities responsible. At arraignment, judges made an initial determination regarding the legality of the detention, and arraignment usually occurred within the prescribed period.Courts increasingly used bail. Judges could also release defendants without bail and limit their movements, impose reporting requirements on them, or retain their passports or other documents to prevent flight. The law permitted a detainee to have an attorney present during police questioning and court proceedings, and detainees generally had prompt access to a lawyer. Although the law required legal assistance be made available to those in need, government financial constraints sometimes limited the quality and availability of assistance. The law restricted free legal assistance to those noncitizens who did not have “money or belongings of high value.” Authorities had to immediately inform the detainee’s family, common-law partner, or responsible social institution of an arrest, and they usually did so.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary; however, the government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. Some NGOs, international organizations, and legal experts asserted political pressure, corruption, and nepotism influenced prosecutors and judges. The process of appointing judges and prosecutors was politicized, although the constitution and law provided for an independent Prosecutorial Council to select prosecutors and a Judicial Council to select judges. According to the 2022 European Commission progress report for the country, concerns remained over the institutional performance and formation of the Judicial and Prosecutorial councils. The Commission also stated the independence, integrity, accountability and professionalism of the judiciary needed to be further strengthened, including by implementing the relevant constitutional and legal frameworks and by adopting legislative reforms in line with European standards.																Trial Procedures						The constitution and law provided for the right to a fair and public trial and the judiciary generally enforced that right. The judiciary was unable to hold all criminal trials publicly due to a shortage of proper facilities. The shortage also affected the timeliness of trials.Courts could try defendants in absentia but by law had to repeat the trial if the convicted individuals were later apprehended.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government had property seizure and restitution laws and mechanisms in place, but NGOs and advocacy groups reported it did not make significant progress on resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens. The pre-World War II Jewish population was estimated at approximately 30 individuals, with no identified synagogue or communal property. There was one claim for restitution regarding Holocaust-era properties that involved the palace of the Marassi family, which the Society of Jewish Women from Belgrade bought in 1925 and utilized as a summer house for children. The property was confiscated by the Council of the National Liberation of the Kotor Municipality in 1956. The case was pending at year’s end.The country’s restitution law was most recently amended in 2007. The country had not passed any laws dealing with restitution following the endorsement of the Terezin Declaration in 2009, nor did it make any special provisions for heirless property from the Holocaust era.A large number of restitution claims for private and religious properties confiscated during the communist era remained unresolved. Private individuals, NGOs, and the Serbian Orthodox Church criticized the government for delays in addressing this problem.The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in July 2020, can be found on the Department’s website:  https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress/.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions; however, human rights organizations alleged authorities engaged in illegal wiretapping and surveillance.The trial of former National Security Agency Director Dejan Perunicic was postponed several times during the year, reportedly for medical reasons. Perunicic was charged with abuse of office, illegal wiretapping, and illegal surveillance carried out in 2020 on several opposition leaders, the former special prosecutor, the Serbian Orthodox metropolitan, and two journalists critical of the former government.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected these rights. An increasing trend of hate speech, verbal threats and insults against journalists and civil activists, officials’ targeting of critical media, and unresolved attacks on journalists undermined freedom of expression.Freedom of Expression: Media generally expressed a wide variety of political and social views, including criticism of the government.The Agency for Electronic Media’s (AEM) 2022 ban on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik programs, based on the government’s decision to align with EU sanctions and impose restrictions on certain Russian individuals and entities, including state media outlets, remained in place during the year. The AEM urged all audio-visual media service providers to suspend airing or distributing programs of both Russian state-owned media via any means, including cable, satellite, internet protocol television, internet services, video sharing platforms, or applications. Some observers, including the Atlantic Council of Montenegro’s Digital Forensic Center noted, however, authorities did not fully implement the decision as the electronic platforms of RT and Sputnik remained accessible from the country.On October 27, the High Prosecutor’s Office urged the Misdemeanor Court in Podgorica to launch a judicial procedure against Professor of the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature Boban Batricevic for criticizing the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in an op-ed published by the Antena M portal on August 11. Batricevic was suspected, per the prosecutors, of violating the Law on Public Order and Peace by stating in his article that SOC priests “do not preach the faith of Christ,” that they “spread Serbian nationalism, hatred, and xenophobia,” and that “in the long term, it (SOC) destroys multi-ethnic and multi-religious Montenegro and the Montenegrin national, cultural and territorial identity.”Violence and Harassment: There were no reports the government used violence against media; however, unsolved attacks from previous years contributed to an atmosphere of intimidation against media.Pro-opposition media and civil society organizations criticized Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic for inappropriately targeting media outlets critical of him. On April 24, during a public event, Abazovic accused the local public broadcaster RTV Podgorica of “spreading religious and ethnic hatred.” On June 15, Abazovic accused private E Television of being owned by “leaders of organized crime.” Commenting for media on a procedure initiated by E Television before the Ombudsman Office against him, Abazovic said the ombudsman did not mind that E Television was “financed by a narco-cartel.”Similarly, on September 14, while responding to critical reporting, President Jakov Milatovic accused pro-opposition newspaper Pobjeda of being linked to criminals.The investigation into the 2004 killing of Dusko Jovanovic, editor in chief of the daily newspaper Dan, continued at year’s end.  On July 16, the Podgorica High Prosecutor reportedly questioned former President of the Supreme Court Vesna Medenica, who was the supreme state prosecutor at the time of the killing. On November 25, the High Prosecutor’s Office reported six more individuals were questioned since April, when the new prosecutor took over the investigation.There was progress during the year in the investigation of the 2018 shooting of Vijesti investigative reporter Olivera Lakic in Podgorica. On December 1, the Special Prosecutor’s Office filed charges against 14 individuals for the shooting. The group accused of the assault was also charged with creating a criminal organization and committing multiple crimes, including attempted murder, illegal possession of weapons, and drug trafficking.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Independent and pro-opposition media alleged unfair treatment and economic pressure from government ministries and agencies. Low salaries and political pressure contributed to self-censorship. Several media columnists complained of being legally prosecuted or threatened during the year because of their publicly expressed views.Nongovernmental Impact: Journalists faced intimidation, threats of violence, and attacks from unknown individuals for their reporting, including reporting on controversial political, ethnic, and religious matters as well as on corruption and smuggling.On August 9, acting Supreme State Prosecutor Tatjana Begovic ordered the Basic Prosecutor’s Office in Niksic to file criminal charges against Djordjije Tadic for calling on social media for the killing of Antena M editor Darko Sukovic and his deputy Milena Aprcovic. Prior to Begovic’s order, the prosecutor’s office had declined to bring criminal charges against Tadic based on his August 8 Facebook post that said Antena M’s editor and his deputy should be “liquidated” and the media outlet shut down. Tadic posted the death threats as a reaction to an Antena M article criticizing an event commemorating Serb Chetnik troops from World War II, whom former socialist Yugoslav authorities considered Nazi collaborators.Another columnist, Ljubomir Filipovic of the CdM portal, reported receiving more than 1,000 threats and insults, including death threats, from Serbia-based tabloid media and social media users for criticizing the Serbian tennis national team’s use of a nationalistic song allegedly advocating annexation of parts of Montenegro and Kosovo by Serbia during its Davis Cup matches on November 23-26. Numerous local and foreign organizations condemned the threats and urged authorities to investigate all kinds of intimidation and violence against media.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution and law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.Between the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and September 11, more than 181,300 Ukrainians arrived in the country, 63,533 of whom recorded some presence in the country by the end of November, representing approximately 10 percent of the country’s overall population. The government cooperated with the Red Cross of Montenegro, UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration to provide housing, necessities, and other assistance to the refugees. In March, the government extended the temporary protection regime for Ukrainian refugees for one year following a similar decision by the EU. Under the extended program of temporary protection, the country offered free medical care, elementary education, limited accommodation, and eligibility for employment for temporary protection holders.In parallel with Ukrainian refugees, a significant number of citizens of the Russian Federation and Belarus entered the country after February 2022. As of September, there were 32,800 citizens of the Russian Federation residing in the country.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of refugee or subsidiary protection status, and the government had an established a system for providing protection to refugees. Authorities did not employ methods for managing mixed migration movements effectively, such as prioritization or accelerated procedures.Authorities mainly referred asylum seekers to the Asylum Center in Bozaj. UNHCR advocated with the Border Police to allow such declarations to be filed in every municipality, as prescribed in the asylum law.During the year, the backlog of asylum applications pending more than six months decreased and the government made significant efforts to resolve at the first-instance level all pending applications within a six-month period. Despite progress made by the government to process asylum applications within a six-month period, the NGO Civic Alliance reported applicants waited for periods beyond this timeframe. Although the deadline for a decision was six months, the asylum law allowed its extension up to 21 months. During the year, authorities received 4,973 declarations of persons intending to seek asylum. The government processed 145 asylum applications during the year and approved 13.Employment: Ukrainian refugees had unhindered access to the labor market once their temporary protection status was approved. Due to legal restrictions related to their status, however, they could not benefit from the employment agency’s services, such as support in finding a job, reclassification courses, or language courses. The Civic Alliance noted many banks stopped opening accounts for Ukrainians with temporary protected status, affecting their employment opportunities. At the end of the year, UNHCR reached an agreement with a local bank to address this issue. Other refugees and persons granted subsidiary protection had full access to the labor market and the employment agency’s services.Access to Basic Services: Throughout the year, newly recognized refugees faced problems with the Ministry of Interior in obtaining identification documents after receiving refugee status, limiting their access to social and economic benefits.Durable Solutions: A path to citizenship for refugees was available but required evidence the applicant had renounced citizenship in their country of origin, which many refuges could not obtain. Those displaced persons from countries of the former Yugoslavia who chose integration rather than return to their country of origin enjoyed access to basic services and naturalization in the country.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to persons in need following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. In three cases, the government also provided so-called subsidiary protection to individuals who might not have qualified as refugees but were still in need of protection.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Ministry of Interior statistics indicated that between 2009 and 2014 it received 15,273 applications by displaced persons from the former Yugoslavia to resolve their residency status in the country. During the year, the Ministry of Interior resolved 43 applications, and 51 applications were pending resolution. By the end of the year, 11,803 individuals received permanent resident status and 616 received temporary resident status. A significant number of applications were submitted multiple times.Individuals with temporary residence up to three years and persons with pending applications still needed to acquire identity documents, such as birth and citizenship certificates or passports from their country of origin, to complete the application process and obtain permanent resident status.Persons whose applications for “foreigner with permanent residence” status were pending with the Ministry of Interior held the legal status of displaced persons or IDPs. Some persons who were entitled to apply faced difficulties in obtaining the required documentation, particularly in regularizing previously unregistered births or paying the fees required to procure documents.With the support of UNHCR, the government, together with the Government of Kosovo, assisted displaced Roma and Balkan-Egyptians in obtaining personal identification documents under a Montenegro-Kosovo agreement on registration of IDPs residing in the country based on birth registry and registry of citizens in Kosovo. Approximately 40 persons received assistance through this cooperation during the year.Conditions for IDPs and displaced persons from the former Yugoslav republics varied. Access to employment, health care, and social services was sometimes limited due to language barriers, insufficient integration programs, a lack of documentation, or unclear or inconsistent administrative procedures. According to UNHCR, many were vulnerable, in need of support to become self-reliant, and lived below the poverty line.Together with Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country was a party to the Regional Housing Program, facilitated by international donors, to provide durable solutions for up to 6,060 displaced persons in the country.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center: https://internal-displacement.org.																																				g. Stateless Persons										As of October, there were 478 persons at risk of statelessness in the country, down from 494 in 2022. Through the 2018 Law on Foreigners, the government introduced a statelessness determination procedure in its legal system. By mid-year, nine persons in total had been recognized as stateless since 2018 through this procedure while applications from 20 individuals were pending with the Interior Ministry.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to be largely fair and free of abuses and irregularities.The country held two rounds of presidential elections on March 19 and April 2. An observation mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) noted in its preliminary findings that both rounds of the election were competitive and adequately managed, and fundamental freedoms were respected in the campaign. The election administration worked transparently; however, politicization and the lack of inclusiveness in the candidate registration process reduced public trust. Observers also noted registered candidates’ harsh rhetoric and some media’s biased coverage of the campaign did not contribute to the ability of voters to make an informed choice.Separately, the country held parliamentary elections on June 11. The elections were competitive and well-run despite taking place in a context of a protracted institutional and constitutional crisis. ODIHR stated the election administration efficiently managed the elections, the campaign was free, and voters had a wide choice. ODIHR also found the electoral legal framework provided a basis for the conduct of democratic elections but contained gaps, inconsistencies, and ambiguities, with most of the previous ODIHR and Council of Europe Venice Commission recommendations remaining unaddressed. Observers noted election day was transparent, calm and professionally managed with some procedural safeguards not always followed during the counting.Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties were able to form and operate freely. The parties that participated in the government of Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic continued the previous tradition of using state administration and state-owned companies for political patronage, known as “party employment.” According to NGOs, political leaders viewed employment in state-owned companies and central and local government agencies as a significant resource that could be leveraged in future local and national elections.On February 18, the State Election Commission (SEC) rejected the nomination of Milojko Spajic, leader of the Europe Now movement and the apparent front runner, as a candidate for the presidential election. The commission explained the rejection as driven by “contradictions” in documentation available to the SEC, citing an email it received from the Serbian Interior Ministry stating Spajic had deregistered his residence in Serbia only on February 15 and submitted a request to renounce his Serbian citizenship one day prior. According to the SEC, this information raised questions concerning whether Spajic met the legal residency and citizenship requirements to run for president. Several NGOs, as well as multiple legal experts, however, sharply criticized the SEC’s decision as politically motivated, asserting the SEC overstepped its responsibilities and acted on behalf of political rivals aiming to eliminate a competitor. Spajic ultimately did not participate in the presidential race.On October 4, a retrial against 13 defendants, including two Russian GRU operatives and two leaders, including Speaker of Parliament Andrija Mandic, accused of participating in a 2016 attempted coup which attempted to block the country’s entry into NATO, resumed at the High Court in Podgorica. The retrial was the result of a 2020 Appellate Court decision overturning a 2019 High Court verdict sentencing the accused to a total of 69 years and seven months in prison and ordering the first instance court to repeat the trial.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: The inclusion of women in political life was low and undermined by insufficient state and public efforts to overcome gender stereotypes and the failure of most political parties to promote their participation. As of November, there were 22 women in the 81-seat parliament.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and corruption was a significant problem.Corruption:  On July 3, the Special State Prosecutor’s Office (SSPO) filed an indictment charging 12 members of former Prime Minister Dusko Markovic’s government with violations related to housing loans provided to state officials. The SSPO alleged the suspects, who at the time were members of a government commission for approving housing loans, violated internal procedures on loan repayment agreements with state officials, adding that their actions cost the state budget €2.6 million ($2.81 million). According to the indictment, from 2016 to 2020 the commission approved 119 loans to former government members, members of parliament, parliamentary officials and employees, judges, and prosecutors that were more than the legal limit of €15,000 ($16,215).In September, the first hearing took place in the trial of former Supreme Court President Vesna Medenica, accused of abuse of office and participation in the creation of a criminal organization. Medenica and her son Milos were arrested and indicted in 2022 after media publication of transcripts of alleged encrypted conversations during which Milos claimed his mother used her position to protect his criminal activities and influence court actions. The indictment also accused Milos and 10 other individuals of smuggling, bribery, illegal influence, and the unauthorized production, possession, and marketing of narcotics.The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC) carried out capacity-building activities and technical assistance during the year, but domestic NGOs were critical of the agency’s lack of transparency and overall efficacy. NGOs criticized the APC’s practice of not engaging with cases of alleged corruption dating prior to the agency’s formation in 2016. NGOs also criticized the APC for insufficiently investigating campaign finances. The European Commission maintained on November 8 that more needed to be done to ensure the APC’s integrity and accountability, and to improve its tangible results, in line with the recommendations of the peer review mission conducted in 2021. The European Commission also stated the government needed to improve its track record of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in the fight against corruption, including high-level corruption.Separately, the SSPO pursued organized crime and corruption. The SSPO and its law enforcement arm, the Special Police Department, took numerous actions during the year against high-profile officials, including arrests or indictments on charges such as abuse of office, creating a criminal organization, and drug trafficking. The agency brought charges against senior police officials for involvement with criminal organizations.Agencies tasked with fighting corruption acknowledged that cooperation and information sharing among them was inadequate. The persistence of handwritten records hampered effective data management, particularly in the context of asset declarations data. Politicization of public servants, poor salaries, and lack of motivation and training contributed to the problem.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were usually cooperative and responsive to the views of international groups, but some domestic NGOs assessed this cooperation was uneven and noted the government selectively ignored their requests for information under the Law on Free Access to Information.Government Human Rights Bodies: The ombudsman served within the Office of the Protector of Human Rights to prevent torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as well as discrimination. The Office of the Protector of Human Rights could investigate alleged government human rights violations and inspect such institutions as prisons and pretrial detention centers without prior notification. It could access all documents, irrespective of their level of secrecy, relating to detainees or convicts and talk to prisoners or detainees without the presence of officials. The office could not act upon complaints regarding judicial proceedings in process, except when the complaint involved delays, obvious procedural violations, or failure to carry out court decisions. The ombudsman could propose new laws, ask the Constitutional Court to determine whether a law violated the constitution or treaty obligations, evaluate particular human rights problems upon request of a competent body, address general problems important for the protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms, and cooperate with other organizations and institutions dealing with human rights and freedoms.Upon finding a violation of human rights by a government agency, the ombudsman could request remedial measures, including dismissal of the violator, and evaluate how well the agency implemented the remedial measures. Failure to comply with the ombudsman’s request for corrective action was punishable by fines of €500 to €2,500 ($541 to $2,703).The government and courts generally implemented the ombudsman’s recommendations, although often with delays. The ombudsman operated without government or party interference and enjoyed cooperation from NGOs.Parliament had a 13-member Standing Committee for Human Rights and Freedoms and a 13-member Standing Committee for Gender Equality. There was a Ministry of Human and Minority Rights within the government.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal rape and domestic or intimate partner violence. Authorities generally enforced the law. In most cases the penalty provided by law for rape, including spousal rape, was one to 10 years in prison, although the law permitted lower sentences in cases where there were exceptionally extenuating circumstances or a significant lack of evidence. Actual sentences were generally lenient, averaging three years. Judges often used questionable methods, including forcing confrontations between survivors and alleged perpetrators, to assess the credibility of survivors. Domestic violence was generally punishable by a fine or a one-year prison sentence.The NGO Women’s Rights Center reported state prosecutors were more likely to opt for lesser charges in domestic violence cases. NGOs expressed concern regarding the security of the courtrooms where survivors were often forced to meet with alleged abusers. NGOs also pointed to inadequate protection of survivors, with protection orders being used in only a limited manner, and a lack of specialized services for sexual violence survivors, women with disabilities, and survivors of child marriages in Romani communities.According to NGO reports, domestic violence survivors experienced difficulties having their cases prosecuted in the judicial system, promoting an atmosphere of impunity for abusers. Lengthy trials, economic dependency, societal norms, and a lack of alternative housing often forced survivors and perpetrators to continue to live together.Police response to domestic violence was also reported to be substandard, with officers often counseling women to “forgive” their attackers or to “not harm their (the attackers’) job prospects.”Domestic violence was a persistent and serious problem in all communities. The government did not seriously attempt to address the problem. The law permitted survivors to obtain restraining orders against abusers. When the abuser and survivor lived together, authorities could remove the abuser from the property, regardless of ownership rights, but it was rarely done.Romani and Balkan-Egyptian women often faced increased barriers to escaping domestic violence, including potential condemnation and abandonment by their broader family and loss of access to their children. Apart from the SOS Hotline Niksic domestic violence shelter, which offered consultation services in Albanian and Romani, there was a lack of survivor support resources available in either language.According to NGOs and the ombudsman, women survivors of domestic violence often complained government-run social welfare centers did not respond adequately to their appeals for help. NGOs reported state institutions did not provide physical protection for survivors.The government, in cooperation with the NGO SOS Hotline Niksic, operated a free hotline for survivors of family violence.Discrimination: The law provided for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including under family, religious, personal status, and nationality laws, as well as laws related to labor, property inheritance, access to credit, and owning or managing businesses or property. All property acquired during marriage was joint property. The government enforced these laws somewhat effectively. The NGO SOS noted, however, women often had trouble defending their property rights in divorce proceedings due to the widespread public belief that property belonged to the man. Sometimes women ceded their inherited property and inheritance rights to male relatives due to tradition and pressure from their families. Men consequently tended to be favored in the distribution of property ownership, sometimes limiting a woman’s options in cases of domestic violence or divorce.Women were occasionally subjected to discrimination in employment based on their marital status, pregnancy, or physical appearance. According to the Union of Free Trade Unions, gender-based violence, harassment, and discrimination discouraged most victims from reporting incidents. A 2022 study by the NGO Women’s Rights Center stated 44 percent of women reported they had experienced at least one form of sexual harassment at work. Women also faced discrimination in access to pension benefits, since the legal age at which men and women could retire and access both full and partial pension benefits was not the same.Women were underrepresented in political and economic decision making. Romani and Balkan-Egyptian women as well as women in rural areas of the north faced discrimination and barriers to employment.According to Romani rights NGOs, half of Romani women ages 15-24 were illiterate. Romani women often faced double discrimination based on their gender and ethnicity.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.While free health care was available to citizens, health-care costs acted as a barrier for noncitizens and those lacking identification documents to access regular prenatal care. NGOs reported Romani and Balkan-Egyptian women often had insufficient access to health-care education, resulting in high-risk deliveries outside of health-care institutions. NGOs noted Romani and Balkan-Egyptian women had limited access to gynecologists, obstetricians, or doctors.NGOs reported that, depending on the location, there was one gynecologist per 5,000 to 8,000 women, which affected women’s access to routine health services during pregnancy and childbirth.Although there were no legal barriers to contraception, a 2020 United Nations Population Fund report indicated the country had enacted only 37 percent of legislation and regulations necessary to provide for full and equal access to contraceptive services. According to NGOs, there was a lack of publicly available information and appropriate educational programs, and economic status and restrictions by partners were barriers preventing women from using contraception.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, including services for the management of complications arising from abortion; the government services included emergency contraception; and postexposure prophylaxis was available as part of clinical management of rape. NGOs stated these services were often not tailored to those experiencing sexual violence and persons performing examinations sometimes lacked the necessary expertise to prepare a valid forensic report. Survivors also often waited up to seven days for an examination, and there was no specialized center for supporting survivors of sexual violence.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The government did not enforce the laws protecting members of racial or ethnic minorities against violence effectively. The Law on Minority Rights and Freedoms provided for the protection of human rights and freedoms guaranteed to all citizens, including the right to publicly manifest national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity. Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptians were the most vulnerable victims of discrimination. These groups had limited access to social services due to a lack of required government documentation. The Law on Citizenship and its accompanying regulations made obtaining citizenship difficult for persons without personal identity documents or for those individuals born outside of a hospital. Access to health-care services, including childbirth, was challenging for members of these communities due to their lack of medical-care cards.According to the Roma Education Fund, the poverty rate among Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptians was higher than for the general population. The NGO Young Roma stated that one of the biggest problems for the Romani community living in informal settlements was the risk of eviction, especially in the southern part of the country. According to the NGO Center for the Affirmation of Roma and Egyptian Population, the Roma and Balkan-Egyptian population, particularly children, faced discrimination during schooling. According to a 2022 study by the NGOs Center for Roma Initiatives and CIN-CG, Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptians faced discrimination in the labor market, including through racial discrimination, the use of short-term, insecure job contracts, and comparatively lower wages.Albanians and Bosniaks in the southern and northeastern parts of the country also frequently alleged they were victims of discrimination by the government and argued they suffered from economic neglect.Government-supported national councils for Serbs, Bosniaks, Albanians, Muslims, Croats, and Roma represented the interests of those groups. NGOs, legal observers, and media outlets accused the government of misappropriating money from a fund established to finance the national councils.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Registration of birth, a responsibility of the parents, was required for a child to have the necessary documents to establish citizenship. The parents of Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian children not born in hospitals registered their births at much lower rates than other groups, mostly due to lack of awareness of the registration process or the parents’ own lack of identification documents. NGOs asserted it was difficult for the unregistered children of Romani and Balkan-Egyptian parents to access such government services as health care, social allowances, and education.Education: A 2021 UNICEF study on child poverty in the country noted children in rural areas faced additional hurdles to educational access in comparison to their peers in urban areas, and Romani and Balkan-Egyptian children experienced additional barriers to accessing education. According to UNICEF, 16 percent of Romani and Egyptian children attended preschool institutions, 56 percent of them completed elementary school, and 3 percent completed high school. A Center for Roma Initiatives 2022 study exploring the reasons for low enrollment in school specifically among the Romani and Balkan-Egyptian population similarly cited the inability of some parents to provide children with appropriate attire or money for lunch and snacks. The study also noted Romani and Balkan-Egyptian students faced challenges such as the inability of children to integrate into peer groups due to discrimination, family migration, language barriers, and low achievement partially due to low expectations from teaching staff. High unemployment rates among Romani and Balkan-Egyptian children who graduated from secondary school were common. For Romani and Balkan-Egyptian girls, education was sometimes pejoratively associated with the postponement of marriage.Romani NGOs claimed there were serious shortcomings in the quality of education Romani children received and that a significant number of Romani children had problems with basic literacy. Parents of Romani and Egyptian students noted the government occasionally failed to provide transportation for their children to school, even when their children were required to attend schools further from their homes as part of government integration efforts.Child Abuse: Penalties for child abuse ranged from one year in prison for violence without a weapon to 12 years’ imprisonment for actions that resulted in the victim’s death; however, severe penalties were rarely imposed, and short prison stays, suspended sentences, or small fines were the norm.The law prescribed that a perpetrator of sexual offenses against a child be punished by a fine or maximum two years of imprisonment for illicit sexual activity committed against a child; the penalty was imprisonment for two to 10 years if the act caused grievous bodily injures to the child or if the act was committed by several persons or in a particularly cruel or degrading manner. If the child died as a result of the act, the perpetrator could be punished by imprisonment for three to 15 years.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal age for marriage was 18 in most cases, and persons as young as 16 could marry with the consent of a court or a parent, but the law was not effectively enforced by the government. Punishment for arranging forced marriages ranged from six months to five years in prison, but convictions were rare, generally due to a lack of evidence or poor understanding of the law.Child marriage was a serious problem in the Romani and Balkan-Egyptian communities. According to UNICEF, 32 percent of Romani girls and one in six Romani boys ages 15-19 were married. There were reports underage girls were sold into “traditional” or “arranged” marriages without their consent, including to persons in neighboring countries. These marriages generally did not meet the criteria necessary for legal, documented marriages. As such, they were difficult to track and regulate, regardless of legality.The custom of buying or selling virgin brides was common in the Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities. Brides found not to be virgins prior to marriage faced severe repercussions, including violence, from the groom’s family, their family, and the community at large.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited commercial sexual exploitation, sale, grooming, or using children for commercial exploitation, including child sex trafficking, including acts involving child pornography. The government partially enforced the law. The minimum age of consensual sex was 18. There was a statutory rape law. Sexual activity with a juvenile carried a prison sentence of up to three years. Paying a juvenile for sexual activity carried a prison term of three months to five years. Authorities could fine or imprison for one to 10 years any person found guilty of inducing a child into commercial sex.Child pornography was illegal, and sentences for violators ranged from six months in prison for displaying child pornography to eight years for using a child in the production of pornography.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community population was estimated to be approximately 400 to 500 individuals. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: There were no laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors. Seemingly neutral laws were not disproportionately applied to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.Violence and Harassment: In July, unidentified persons verbally and physically assaulted psychologist Petar Markovic, a member of the LGBTQI+ community, in Podgorica and Bar. Markovic was also subjected to hate speech and a public smear campaign because of his professional attitudes and personal characteristics.Danijel Kalezic, executive co-director of ERA &#8211; LGBTI Equal Rights Association for Western Balkans and Turkey, stated in December police and prosecutors did not adequately investigate or prosecute individuals who sent him death threats on several occasions since 2021. Kalezic and other NGO activists stated the problem of inadequate prosecution of cases of violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ individuals was prevalent.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. The government partially enforced the law. LGBTQI+ persons enjoyed some degree of societal acceptance; however, discrimination and abuse were prevalent. Anti-LGBTQI+ bias was an aggravating circumstance in the prosecution of hate crimes.Activists asserted the government and parliament did not take necessary steps to modify government policies relating to government services for LGBTQI+ couples, including social benefits and provision of identity documents, steps that would allow citizens to benefit from the Law on Same-Sex Life Partnerships that was adopted in 2020. At year’s end, courts had not yet held hearings on the NGO LGBT Forum Progress’ lawsuit against the government for discriminatory application of the law.The NGO Queer Montenegro filed two lawsuits against the government in 2022 for discrimination because the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not grant citizenship to the children of a same-sex couple despite their meeting all legally required conditions for citizenship.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The government required sterilization, gender-affirming surgery, and compulsory divorce if married as prerequisites for transgender individuals seeking legal gender recognition, despite the lack of legal basis for this practice.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There was no ban on involuntary or coercive so-called conversion therapy practices on the grounds of LGBTQI+ identities or sexual orientation. During the year there were no reported instances of forced or involuntary conversion therapy to authorities; however, stigma and discrimination might have limited individuals’ willingness or ability to report on it.There were no official reports of surgeries performed on intersex children or nonconsenting adults, but civil society activists claimed they heard reports of these practices. There were no laws prohibiting such surgeries or policies by medical organizations limiting these practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws or other restrictions on individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations, or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities did not have access to education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The constitution and law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities. According to the United Nations Development Program, persons with disabilities often faced a lack of access to information on government support resources, including the right to a disability assessment and professional rehabilitation. Persons with disabilities also frequently faced lengthy delays in receiving government assistance.Authorities generally enforced the legal requirement that new public buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but most public facilities, including buildings and public transportation, were older and lacked access.Persons with disabilities faced significant discrimination in employment, despite affirmative action programs that provided significant financial incentives to employers to hire persons with disabilities. Advocates maintained there were too few training programs for persons with disabilities to contribute significantly to their economic integration. Neither governmental entities nor private employers hired many persons with disabilities. NGOs reported employers often chose to pay fines rather than employ a person with a disability.Despite legal protections, persons with disabilities often hesitated to file charges against persons or institutions violating their rights. Observers ascribed this reluctance to the adverse outcomes of previous court cases or, according to the ombudsman, to insufficient public awareness of human rights and protection mechanisms relating to disabilities.The NGO Association of Youths with Disabilities stated the failure of the government to form the Council for Care of Persons with Disabilities led to a lack of institutional mechanisms for persons with disabilities to engage with the government and their subsequent exclusion from decision-making processes. In addition, as part of a government reorganization, the Directorate for the Protection against Discrimination of Persons with Disabilities that existed as part of the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights was eliminated.According to NGOs, services at the local level to children with mental and physical disabilities were inadequate. Associations of parents of children with disabilities were the primary providers of these services. The law permitted parents or guardians of persons with disabilities to work half-time, but employers often did not respect this right. Paid leave was not ensured to some parents of children with disabilities. There were no daycare centers available specifically for children with disabilities.The government made efforts to enable students with disabilities to attend schools and universities, but the quality of the education they received and the facilities to accommodate them were inadequate at all levels. NGOs stated supported-living assistance at home and similar services were not provided to families and parents of children with disabilities, as these services were not required under the law. Persons with disabilities were often institutionalized or encouraged towards institutions, which perpetuated stigmatization. Persons with physical disabilities also had difficulty obtaining high-quality medical devices through health and social insurance to facilitate their mobility.Institutionalized Children: During the year there was one institution dedicated to orphaned children with disabilities, the Small Group Community Home for Children with Developmental Disabilities, in Bijelo Polje, where nine children resided. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the home was organized to emulate a family environment, with children staying in “family groups,” based on their age and gender. Children were integrated into local communities, attended school, and engaged in sports and other activities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The NGOs Juventas and the Montenegrin HIV Foundation stated persons with HIV and AIDS were stigmatized and experienced discrimination, although most discrimination was undocumented. Observers believed fear of discrimination, societal taboos relating to sex, and the lack of privacy of medical records discouraged many persons from seeking testing for HIV. NGOs reported patients often faced discrimination by medical personnel and received inadequate treatment.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the rights of workers, including members of the armed forces, to form and join independent trade unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. To represent workers in collective bargaining at the enterprise level, a union had to count at least 20 percent of the workforce in the enterprise as members. To act as a worker representative in a sector, group, or branch of industry, a trade union had to include at least 15 percent of the total workforce in that sector, group, or branch. The law prohibited discrimination against union members or those seeking to organize a union and required the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity.The law required employers to consult with a labor union (or employee representatives) and notify the Employment Agency regarding the consultations in cases of a collective layoff (i.e., dismissal of at least 20 employees over a 90-day period). All employment agreements had to contain a reference to bargaining agreements being defined with the employer, which had to be registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.The government effectively enforced laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers. Workers faced employer interference despite exercising their right to unionize and bargain collectively. According to the Union of Free Trade Unions, workers in the trade sector were intimidated when establishing their union, and they belonged to the category of workers whose rights were the most endangered.Penalties for violations against freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike were commensurate with those for analogous crimes such as civil rights violations and penalties were regularly applied against violators.Although allowed by law, collective bargaining was rare. The government was party to collective negotiations at the national level. Only the union with the largest registered membership at any given level was entitled to bargain, negotiate settlements of collective labor disputes, and participate in other government bodies. In December 2022, trade unions, the Union of Employers, and government representatives signed the General Collective Agreement (OKU). The unions stated the OKU was important for tens of thousands of employees, particularly in those sectors in which there were no collective agreements concluded with employers.The right to strike was restricted for public servants whose absence from work would jeopardize public interests, national security, the safety of persons and property, or the functioning of the government. International observers noted the range of professions in which strikes were proscribed exceeded international standards. Employers could unilaterally establish minimum service requirements if negotiations with trade unions failed to lead to an agreement.Management and local authorities often blocked attempts to organize strikes by declaring them illegal, citing lack of legally required advance notice, which ranged from two to 10 days, depending on circumstances.Employees of privatized or bankrupt companies were eligible for retroactive pay and severance, although there were outstanding claims. Workers occasionally were not able to collect on their claims, despite valid court decisions in their favor. Several local governments failed to pay their staff for months at a time. Trade unions claimed workers were largely unaware of their rights and afraid of retaliation if they initiated complaints.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: According to the National Statistics Office, the national monthly minimum wage was slightly above the government’s absolute poverty line. Significant portions of the workforce, particularly in rural areas and in the informal sector, earned less than the minimum wage.The law limited overtime to 10 hours per week, and total work time could not exceed 48 work hours per week on average within a four-month period, but seasonal workers often worked much longer.Occupational Safety and Health: The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were current and appropriate for the main industries. The government proactively identified unsafe conditions. Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. Regulations required employers and supervisors to supply and enforce the use of safety equipment, conduct risk assessment analysis, and report any workplace deaths or serious injuries within 24 hours.Employment in the construction, energy, wood-processing, transportation, and heavy industries presented the highest risk of injury. Most of the injured were foreign nationals. Common causes of injuries on construction sites were unsecured workstations at a height and lack of use of protective equipment. The most frequent reasons cited for unsafe working conditions were the lenient fines for violations of safety rules, failure to use safety equipment, lack of work-related information and training, inadequate medical care for workers, and old or inadequately maintained equipment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage and overtime laws, although penalties for violations were commensurate with those for other similar crimes. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.Many workers, particularly women employed in the commercial, catering, and service industries, worked unpaid overtime, and employers sometimes forced them to work on religious holidays without additional compensation or to forgo their rights to weekly and annual leave. Employers sometimes failed to pay the minimum wage, other employee benefits, or mandatory contributions to pension funds. Employees often did not report such violations due to fear of retaliation. The practice of only formally paying a worker the minimum wage, thus being responsible for lower mandatory contributions, and giving the employee cash payments as a supplement was common. Also common was the practice of signing short-term work contracts or having lengthy “trial” periods for workers instead of signing them to permanent contracts as prescribed by law.Administrative and judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals, sometimes taking years. As a result, many persons sought recourse through alternative dispute resolution. Most disputes reviewed by the Agency for Peaceful Resolution of Labor Disputes involved accusations of government institutions violating laws on overtime, night work, holidays, social insurance contribution requirements, or other administrative regulations.The government effectively enforced OSH laws. Penalties for violations of OSH standards were generally commensurate with those for other similar crimes in the formal sector. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.The Labor Inspectorate was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. The number of labor inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance in the formal economy. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions, but rarely did so. The government did not have sufficient resources to enforce labor laws in the informal sector.A November report by the European Commission stated the Ministry of Finance estimated the size of the informal economy at 20.6 percent of GDP, considering businesses and employees working in the formal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Montenegro
- Special Representative to the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar’s Travel to Belgium, Kosovo, Austria, and Montenegro Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs and Special Representative to the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar is traveling to Belgium, Kosovo, Austria, and Montenegro March 10-18, 2024.  His visit will reaffirm the United States’ commitment to the countries of the Western Balkans as they pursue Euro-Atlantic integration and deeper regional cooperation.While in Belgium, Special Representative Escobar will meet with EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák and other European Union and NATO officials to discuss efforts to advance reforms that will bring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity to the Western Balkan region.  In Kosovo, he will meet with Kosovan government leaders, civil society, and Kosovan Serb communities to underscore the United States’ continued strong support for the EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.The Special Representative will conduct meetings on the impact of the new Central Bank of Kosovo regulations on cash operations and urge steps to ensure that the needs of Kosovans citizens are met fully and without interruption.  In Austria, Special Representative Escobar will meet with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to discuss Serbia’s December elections and upcoming municipal elections in Serbia and national elections in North Macedonia.  The Special Representative will also travel to Montenegro, where he will emphasize U.S. support for a democratic Montenegro firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community in meetings with Montenegrin government, civil society, and business leaders.
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Anti-Corruption Champions Award Ceremony Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C.Burns AuditoriumASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Good morning, everybody.  Before we get started this morning, I’d like to acknowledge the tragedy in the Seychelles.  Commissioner De Silva, our thoughts are with you and your country, your people, at this time.It’s an honor to welcome this year’s Anti-Corruption Champions Award honorees.  Thank you for joining us here today and from across the globe.  My name is Todd Robinson, the assistant secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL as it’s better known.  And let me give you just a little bit of an overview of what we’re going to do this morning.We have, as you see, a high-powered lineup for you today – (laughter) – starting with Secretary Antony Blinken, who has made it his business since day one to place the fight against corruption at the center of our foreign policy.  We also have here from – we will also hear from Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya, a diplomat with three decades of experience around the world, and my boss.  (Laughter.)  And Richard Nephew, our global anti-corruption coordinator, is going to introduce our honorees today.  We will also have an opportunity to hear from one of our inspiring award recipients.As I mentioned, the fight against corruption is front and center in our U.S. foreign policy.  As I’m sure our honorees can attest, this fight is a difficult one, but from Europe to Africa to Central America, we have seen remarkable wins in 2023.In Guatemala, there was an election victory by a presidential candidate, Bernardo Arévalo from the Semilla party, who ran on a platform of weeding out corruption.In Ukraine, INL works closely with anti-corruption investigators and prosecutors, who this year alone have opened cases against over 20 high-level government officials, including the former chief justice of the supreme court.  Since the summer, Ukraine has advanced significant reform measures, including requiring government officials to declare their assets and adding judges to the High Anti-Corruption Court.In Liberia, our embassy’s stalwart support for action against corruption has put compromised officials on the defensive and is fueling the Liberian public’s desire for increased accountability and sanctions.As you’ll see shortly, the tenacious men and women with us here today are responsible for successes like these.  Tenacious, but also – let’s not forget – fearless.  Corruption is silent, secret, and corrosive.  People know it’s out there but it’s difficult to root out.  That has not deterred our honorees, who have joined this fight at great personal and professional risk, but not without recognition.  To today’s honorees, we see what you are doing and we applaud it.With that, I would like to invite Under Secretary Zeya.  (Applause.)UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Thank you to my dear friend, Assistant Secretary Robinson.  Your leadership on this issue set has been indispensable.  Secretary Blinken, Coordinator Nephew, colleagues and friends, I am delighted to be here today to celebrate these courageous honorees.This weekend, we will commemorate the 20-year anniversary of the first and only global anti-corruption instrument, the UN Convention Against Corruption, or UNCAC.  This distinguished group, through their advocacy and actions, embodies the central message of that consequential document:  The betrayal of the public trust will no longer be tolerated.The drafters of UNCAC, which included the United States, understood the corrosive impact of corruption and recognized it as a transnational challenge.  It affects all countries, regardless of the level of development, political system, or history.  Thus, preventing and countering corruption is a shared responsibility among all countries.UNCAC responded to these threats by providing governments with the tools to counter this scourge at the global level.  The convention endures.  Its comprehensive set of standards, measures, and rules are even more relevant today than they were 20 years ago.  What we’ve learned since the UNCAC’s adoption is that while corruption is a cross-cutting global challenge, every country experiences it in different ways, which requires tailored solutions.For example, in Moldova, through the courageous work of President Sandu’s administration, the country is countering Russia’s interference and the actions of other corrupt actors by fortifying its democracy, modernizing its economy, and aligning its institutions with its European neighbors.  I myself had the privilege of visiting Moldova last week, and I was honored to meet with Minister of Justice Veronica Mihailov-Moraru, who is on the front lines of these efforts and is one of the champions that we are celebrating here today.For our part, President Biden has elevated anti-corruption as a core national security interest.  We’re actively implementing the first-ever U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption that the President issued two years ago.  Now, this strategy has domestic and international components, acknowledging that we must combat corruption here at home as well as prioritize it in our foreign policy.  We’re also committed to working with all of you, the honorees here today and all of those who stand with us across the globe, dedicated to shining a light on corrupt behavior.When Secretary Blinken launched the Anti-Corruption Champions Award in 2021, we not only wanted to celebrate you, but we also want to learn from your invaluable expertise and experience.  The fight against corruption is a collective effort, and thus we must foster critical engagement across public and private institutions and across borders.  This will bolster our policies and advance the unshakable principles of accountability and integrity ingrained in the UNCAC.So thank you all for joining us here today, and congratulations again to our honorees.I now have the immense honor of introducing an admired friend and a phenomenal boss, Secretary of State Antony Blinken.  (Applause.)SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you.  Good morning, everyone.AUDIENCE:  Good morning.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  So this is a day, a moment I’ve been looking forward to.  And we’ll share the reasons why in just a minute.  But first, let me say to Under Secretary Zeya, to Assistant Secretary Robinson, to our Coordinator Nephew:  Thank you not just for today, but for the extraordinary work you’re doing every day, including and notably on taking the fight to corruption.In public service – whether in government or in civil society – I know it can feel at times like the challenges are just too big; the forces arrayed against change too strong, too entrenched to make meaningful progress.One of the things that I love most about this ceremony each year is that every one of our awardees has proved that idea wrong.  There is no force against progress that is actually immovable.  You’ve demonstrated with your work, with your courage, with your commitment that it can be done.  Even in places where impunity is the rule, you’ve shown how determined individuals can tip the balance, make the difference toward justice.Today, we gather not only to honor these extraordinary champions, but to learn from them.  Corrupt officials and their partners are constantly borrowing from each other’s playbooks.  Well, governments, organizations, citizens committed to fighting corruption need to do the same thing, because in so many different ways, in so many different places, each of you has found a particular angle, a particular way of being effective in combatting corruption.  And so the more we’re talking to each other, the more we’re listening and learning from you, the more effective we are going to be.Now, before speaking to the accomplishments of the awardees, let me underscore that no matter who they are or where they work, none of them does this alone – and I know you would be the first to say that.Indeed, one of the reasons that these leaders are so effective is because they inspire others to join them.  So today, we’re honoring not only these 11 champions, but all of their partners.Including their teammates here at the State Department.  Every awardee was nominated by American diplomats around the world, most of whom work side-by-side with all of our champions to advance our shared priorities.Take any goal of our foreign policy, anything that we really care about – expanding economic opportunity, empowering underserved communities, enhancing security, defending human rights – all of them are served by building more accountable institutions, more accountable societies, more transparency.So we have an abiding interest in rooting out corruption – both to improve lives in local communities and to build more prosperous, more secure, more rights-respecting partners for the American people.As we were looking at the awardees and learning from their stories, I think what’s powerful is you can really draw lessons from each of their work.  And I’ve seen, as we’ve been talking about this together, maybe five things that really jump out.  So let me share those with you in talking about the awardees.First, a key part of combatting corruption is working to reform corrupt institutions from within wherever possible.  That’s a very powerful thing.You heard reference to Veronica Mihailov-Moraru and what she’s done in the Republic of Moldova.  Having worked as a public defender, she knew firsthand how broken her country’s justice system was, but that didn’t stop her from working to overhaul the justice ministry when offered the chance to lead it.  That’s change from within.  Veronica designed and implemented a rigorous vetting process to root out corrupt judges, corrupt prosecutors; she helped reform the country’s anticorruption agencies.  She’s made a point of pursuing these reforms out in the open, not a secret, modeling the transparency she’s trying to foster, and that in turn has allowed her to build broad public support for this work.Vladimir Novovic made a similar leap when he left his post as a judge to become Montenegro’s chief prosecutor for organized crime, corruption, war crimes, terrorism, and money laundering.  That’s a portfolio.  He inherited an ineffective and an infiltrated institution, in a country where citizens were disillusioned by graft that they were experiencing every single day in their institutions.  By pursuing investigations of corrupt judges, of national security officials, senior police, Vladimir showed citizens that even the most powerful people are not above the law.  Since he took office, public trust in the corruption prosecutor’s office has doubled.As Liberia’s anti-corruption commissioner, Marc Kollie led a series of investigations that uncovered bribery of powerful politicians in exchange for favors.  Despite being threatened, Marc pursued his work.  He testified in the case, and then went on to lead other groundbreaking investigations, including one in which he froze bank accounts being used by organized crime to launder money.  His efforts demonstrated how a few committed individuals can turn government institutions from sources of corruption into sources of accountability.Second broad lesson that I’m drawing from our awardees:  When they’re informed, when they’re empowered, citizens – citizens – are our most effective anti-corruption allies.So Nikhil Dey has spent more than four decades in India working with and for those harmed by corruption, and those particularly who are harmed most by it: underserved, marginalized populations.  Nikhil has helped communities in Rajasthan demand access to essential services and rights – education, health care, fair wages, better working conditions.  His organization pioneered the practice of public audits, in which local officials have to report to communities how and where they spend the resources, and citizens have a chance themselves to ask probing questions of these officials.  As these public audits spread across India, more citizens started taking the lead in holding officials to account.  And that, at its heart, is how democracy needs to work.After decades of writing about corruption and organized crime for Ecuador’s newspapers, Arturo Torres founded an independent media site to report on these issues.  In a series of articles, Arturo and his team combined rigorous analysis of publicly available information with deep investigations to uncover the corrupt ties of candidates for judges, for mayors, and other important public offices.  In a country of 16 million people, the website’s reporting garnered 18 million views in just a couple of months – 16 million people in the country, 18 million views in a couple of months.  That showed the public hunger for this information and for the incredibly powerful role it can play in informing voters.Third, more than ever, if we’re going to address corruption effectively, we also have to address forces outside our countries that are looking to weaponize corruption for their gain.In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Mputu has helped lead “Congo is Not for Sale.”  That’s a civil society coalition that uncovers the way mining deals have benefitted foreign companies, governments, and corrupt officials at the expense of the people.  By exposing the bribes that were used to win these contracts and the billions in lost revenue to the state, the investigations led the DRC Government to try to recover funds for the Congolese people, and has resulted in international sanctions against corrupt businesses and corrupt investors.In Timor-Leste, reporting by Francisco Belo Simoes da Costa showed the way a Beijing-based company used bribes to win a contract to digitize the country’s national television broadcast corporation.  Francisco uncovered the way a corrupt official profited by awarding the contract with no competition.  His reporting also showed the way the agreement would have allowed the Chinese Government to disseminate propaganda throughout the Timorese nation.  Francisco’s reporting prevented the tainted deal from going forward, it sparked an investigation by Timor-Leste’s anti-corruption commission, which is ongoing.For advocate Stanislau Ivashekvich, fighting for accountability, for transparency, for space for civil society in Belarus has long meant taking on the country – excuse me, he’s taking on the country working with Belarus’s dictator to try to quash it, and that is Russia.  Stanislau’s organization, the Belarus Investigative Center, has shone a spotlight on the ways that Russia and Belarus collaborate to try to evade sanctions, to enrich oligarchs, to fuel Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine.  His organization’s reporting has been critical to closing sanctions loopholes, seizing the illicit assets of Russian officials and oligarchs.Fourth broad lesson:  Every individual that we’re honoring today has made educating, inspiring, and mentoring young people a key part of their work.With Anette Plannells leading civil society campaigns resulting in the first-ever prosecution of high-ranking officials in Panama – even as she was doing that, she also helped build a youth wing of the nation’s anti-corruption movement.  Thanks to her trainings, thanks to her workshops, not only are countless Panamanians more engaged citizens, but scores of young people have now been inspired to pursue careers in advocacy and in elective office.  And so a whole new generation is coming up at the same time thanks to her work that she was engaged in, the work of the of the moment.As the Seychelles anti-corruption commissioner, May De Silva – you already heard reference to her before – has built an unprecedented case against businesses and former officials for international tax evasion.  At the same time, she’s designed and implemented seminars, conferences, workshops, an anti-corruption curriculum – all of this for students in schools and for colleges across the country.  She says her goal is to show how corruption eats away at societies, but also what every citizen can do to fight it.In Kyrgyzstan, Ali Toktakunov leads MediaHub.  This is an independent news outlet that exposes corruption and shows corrupt actors and how they’re using social media to try to hide, to obfuscate their crimes.  A key part of MediaHub’s efforts is building greater digital literacy among young people, something that they’re doing by holding workshops across the country’s universities, so that individuals are better prepared, better equipped to detect and call out online disinformation.Fifth and finally, every one of these champions – every one – has in some fashion been subject to repression, to threats, to persecution for their work.  Several had been forced into exile.  Many are subject to ongoing legal proceedings.  Some had been locked up.  Their families have also been threatened.  One of our awardees said that his small children can no longer play in public playgrounds and parks because of targeted threats.And yet, each and every one of them persists.  They continue to do the work.  As awardee Arturo Torres said, “It’s part of the job.”To all of today’s awardees, your bravery, your commitment to truth, to justice – it humbles us, it inspires us to do more, and it adds even greater urgency to the enduring effort to strengthen protections for advocates, for human rights defenders, for journalists, for educators around the world who are threatened and attacked for the work they’re doing to fight corruption and to better their societies.As you’ve heard from Under Secretary Zeya, Assistant Secretary Robinson, this has been a top priority for President Biden, for this administration, for this department from day one.  We’ll keep working to build effective ways to have the backs of those who are at risk and to hold perpetrators to account.I know that there are folks watching today who are leading hard fights for transparency and good governance in hard places.  And I know there have to be days when you feel disillusioned, when you feel isolated, when you feel fearful.So I hope, if nothing else, you’ll take heart from today, you’ll take heart from the stories of your colleagues around the world who are doing such remarkable work in the ways that you are – doing it a great cost, at great risk, but doing it.And I hope that today’s ceremony reminds us that, again, the actions of determined individuals can make a difference, are making a difference.  They can puncture the seemingly impenetrable walls of impunity.  They can rekindle citizens’ faith in their own capacity to make governments and institutions work for them.Indeed, they and you are often the only way that change effectively happens.To all the anti-corruption champions far beyond this room, please know you have a partner in the United States.With that, it is my honor to give the floor to one of our awardees so deserving who can speak most effectively for all of our awardees, Minister Mihailov-Moraru.Minister, congratulations.  The floor is yours.  (Applause.)JUSTICE MINISTER MIHAILOV-MORARU:  Good morning.  Honorable Secretary Blinken, colleagues and new friends, ladies and gentlemen, I am very honored to be with you here and be among of this group of all about – with all remarkable activists, journalists, and public officials you have brought together from all around the world.  Thank you very much for all the appreciation.  I am not sure I actually deserve this recognition or to be in the company of this inspiring group of people, but I am very grateful for the honor and I will use it as a reminder and motivation when I need it to persist and to press forward against the resistance we encounter every day in fighting corruption in Moldova and around all the world.The Republic of Moldova is currently undergoing broad reform in its justice sector, addressing challenges relating to integrity, accessibility, efficiency, and widespread lack of trust.  Corruption remains, unfortunately, a central obstacle to the formation of trust in government in Moldova.  But one of our main goals in my country is to improve living standards, to change society’s perception of the independence of the judicial system in order to ensure transparency, but also their responsibility, and ultimately to increase trust in the acts of justice.  And this can only be happen by fighting everywhere and with increasing success against corruption.Corruption, of course, is not unique to Moldova.  It is a global problem that affects us all.  Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gains, and it undermines the rule of law, the legitimacy of government, and the trust of citizens.  Corruption is a threat to the realization of the United Nation Sustainable Development Goals, which aim to create a better and more sustainable future for all.But I am sure that corruption is not inevitable.  It can be prevented and combated through effective anti-corruption policies, practices, and a lot of courage.  Anti-corruption efforts vary in scope and strategy and include both preventive and reactive measures – preventive measures to reduce the opportunities for – of corruption actions, but reactive measures – detect, investigate, prosecute, and sanction corruption and return stolen assets.In Moldova, we have committed to implement de-oligarchization measures to eliminate excessive influence of powerful and at times dangerous vested interest in economic, political, and public life.  We have taken action to fortify our agencies charged with responsibility for investigation and prosecution of high corruption act cases.  We have modernized our legislation for combating money laundering and terrorism financing, and also we are in the process to improve our asset recovery mechanism.But this is only the beginning, and we in Moldova cannot do this alone, of course.  None of us can.  So we are committed to increasing our mutual legal cooperation, including on financial investigations, international and organized crime cases, to identify and to recover criminal assets.  But we also need, as do anti-corruption fighters in every country, the commitment and collaboration of all stakeholders, including the international community, the private sector, civil society, journalists, and academia.So I really believe that every effort counts.  Only together we can make a difference and create a more transparent, accountable, and inclusive society for ourselves and for future generations.During IVLP meetings throughout this week, I was inspired by some quotes.  Finding and fighting corruption – your anti-corruption fight is our fight.  And I want to thank to the American people for the inspiration and all the support toward rule of law.Let me please on behalf of all the IVLP group to receive our gratitude to all of you for your attention, and for the honor you bestow, and the kindness, and the continuing support you have shown to all of us.  Thank you very much.  (Applause.)
- Recognizing the 2023 Anti-Corruption Champions   Todd D.  Robinson, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsIn a world faced with myriad challenges, including terrorism, health epidemics, and strategic competition to shape the future of the international order, corruption may not always seem to be at the top of the list of threats.   But that is changing, for the U.S. government and partners around the world.  Left unchecked, corruption steals from a country’s citizens and can sell out a country’s future &#8212; giving a foothold to hostile, criminal actors in the process. Corruption keeps unaccountable officials in power, slows the pace of development, facilitates crime, and ensures unequal distribution of resources – which can affect underrepresented and underserved populations disproportionally.  For all these reasons, the Biden-Harris Administration released and is now implementing the first-ever U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption.   Our strategy recognizes that preventing, uncovering, and combatting corruption takes a mix of courage, intelligence, and doggedness by many stakeholders, and each year the Department seeks out examples to highlight.  And each year, we find many examples of individuals who are committed to pushing back on corruption.  Recently, Department leadership, including Secretary Blinken, gathered to recognize 11 exemplary corruption fighters. They include reporters, government practitioners, and civil society activists.   We hope you will join us in celebrating our 11 State Department International Anti-Corruption Champions for 2023, and in recognizing all those who fight for accountability, the rule of law, and press freedom.   More information on each of our 2023 honorees can be found below. Moldovan Justice Minister Veronica Mihailov-Moraru advanced countless transparency initiatives as part of a broader effort to cleanse Moldova’s judiciary and prosecution services of corrupt actors.  She now leads the ministry she helped reform. For the past 35 years, activist Nikhil Dey has championed policy reforms to empower workers in India.  He and his counterparts have brought to light official corruption, such as the underpayment of workers on official projects, and built peasant and worker empowerment campaigns targeting corruption in the delivery of government services.    Stanislau Ivaskhevich not only took huge personal risks by engaging in independent media reporting in Belarus, but he and his team also tackled government and business corruption despite intense government pressure – all while building a 50-person organization that serves as a resource to civil society and journalists alike.   Marc N. Kollie fearlessly took on high-level bribery and corruption among Liberia’s powerful political elites as part of his tireless work at the Liberian Financial Intelligence Agency.  His commitment to uncovering corruption cost him his job, exposed him and his family to harassment and threats, and forced him to relocate his family for safety.   In Timor-Leste, Francisco Belo Simoes da Costa exposed a corrupt deal for a Beijing-funded project to digitalize the country’s largest broadcaster.  The deal, involving a company majority-owned by a PRC-based businessperson, ultimately led to charges being filed against a sitting minister.  Jean-Claude Mputu is a leading anti-corruption activist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and spokesperson for the NGO “The Congo is Not for Sale,” which focuses on extractive industries, and has called attention to billion-dollar losses due to mining sector corruption.    Montenegro has long struggled to stem transnational organized crime.  In an effort to turn the tide and root out corruption within the government, Chief Special Prosecutor Vladimir Novovic has aggressively targeted high-profile individuals, indicting the former president of the Supreme Court, among others. Panamanian civil society leader Annette Planells is a tireless advocate of transparency in government and a leading figure of anti-corruption efforts in her country.  She has experienced retaliatory lawsuits and government intimidation, but wins more than she loses, including joining a successful suit against the former Chief Justice of Panama’s Supreme Court, who was sentenced to five years in prison.    Seychelles anti-corruption commissioner May De Silva has 35 staff but – like many successful public servants – is extending her reach by leveraging external allies, to include FBI agents and investigators from the United Kingdom.  She also shaped the outlook of young people around her country and their civic engagement.  Ecuadoran investigative journalist Arturo Torres published research into drug trafficking, corruption, and exploitation of his country’s natural resources.  A judge sued him for $15M for defamation, a case that Mr. Torres ultimately won.    Journalist “Ali” Totakunov is known as one of the most effective and visible anti-corruption advocates in his native Kyrgyz Republic.  Ali’s reporting initially as a correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – and his MediaHub team’s independent journalism &#8212; have resulted in legal victories, but they have come at a price including lawsuits, cyber attacks, harassment, and even credible death threats.  This award demonstrates our support for anticorruption leaders who put their lives on the line to spur lasting change.  Secretary of State Antony Blinken was pleased to honor these 11 honorees, who inspire us all to stand up firmly to champion more equitable societies, in a December 7 event at the Department of State. For more from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, you can follow us on Twitter @StateINL, Facebook @StateINL, and Instagram @StateINL.   
- Expanding the Global Equality Fund and Protecting Human Rights with New International Partners Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborArshelle CarterJust this last week, the United States welcomed New Zealand as the 19th government to the Global Equality Fund. Together with the private sector, the Global Equality Fund has dedicated over $100 million to more than 100 countries – providing advocates training, giving them tools to prevent violence, to prevent discrimination.In late June, Secretary Blinken announced New Zealand as the latest donor partner to join the Global Equality Fund (GEF), during a Pride Month event at the U.S. Department of State.  The GEF is a  public-private partnership comprised of like-minded governments and private-sector entities dedicated to advancing and defending the human rights and fundamental freedoms of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons around the world.  Through the GEF, governments, companies, foundations, and NGOs work collaboratively to advance local initiatives spearheaded by human rights defenders and civil society organizations working to protect LGBTQI+ persons from violence and abuse, criminalization, discrimination, and stigma, and to empower local LGBTQI+ movements and people.The New Zealand announcement follows the joining of another key ally to the GEF.  In May, the Secretary held a signing ceremony alongside Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, announcing Spain’s commitment to join the Global Equality Fund (GEF) as a donor partner.  Spain and New Zealand’s partnership strengthens the GEF’s ability to support human rights and representative democracies.  Secretary Blinken and Spanish Foreign Minister Albares participate in a signing ceremony announcing Spain’s commitment to join the Global Equality Fund as a donor partner on May 10, 2023. &nbsp;GEF programs expand citizen access to full civic and political participation.  Promoting and protecting the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons is a year-round commitment of the Department and critical for strengthening democracy.  GEF programs have made significant impacts globally.  In just the past two years, GEF programs have:trained and supported more than 6,600 human rights defenders globally;provided emergency assistance to more than 470 human rights defenders and more than 90 civil society organizations, helping to provide safety and security so they can continue their critical work; andimproved legal assistance for more than 2,300 individuals from low-income or marginalized communities through legal and victim’s aid.A telling example of the GEF’s impact is apparent in Botswana, where the sustained, flexible support of the GEF over 10 years contributed not only to the registration of the first LGBTQI+ organization in the country, but also to a historic decriminalization judgment.  Through a holistic approach, GEF support – coupled with efforts by other donors – enabled activists and partners to determine local priorities and to chart the best path forward.  The GEF supported projects to reduce stigma, discrimination, and violence by implementing an incremental strategy to decriminalize consensual same-sex sexual acts.  However, LGBTQI+ community needs do not end with major court decisions; the GEF will continue to fund community-driven movement building in Botswana and globally in pursuit of a safer, more equal world for all. Members of civil society in Botswana held public dialogues on the implications of decriminalizing same-sex relations. In November 2021, the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the High Court’s decision to decriminalize. As it enters its second decade, the GEF remains a leading global force to:   Mobilize funding and resources that strengthen local LGBTQI+ movements and leadership that reflect the diversity of the community; Empower locally led and diverse movements leading efforts to mitigate violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons; and    Connect donors, international and regional institutions, and LGBTQI+ civil society groups to ensure that voices of local communities are heard, authentically represented, and affirmed. The critical work of the GEF is not possible without the support and leadership of its partners: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, the Arcus Foundation, the John D. Evans Foundation, the MAC AIDS Fund, Deloitte LLP, Royal Bank of Canada, Hilton, Bloomberg L.P., Marriott International, the Thomson Reuters Foundation, and Out Leadership. About the Author:  Arshelle Carter is a 2022 Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellow and Summer 2023 intern in the Office of Global Programs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 
- Montenegro HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Montenegro				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Montenegro																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties																																																									Bilateral Taxation Treaties																																																																											Investment Treaties																																																																																	3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange Policies																																																																																																																		Remittance Policies																																																																											Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources  																																																																											Climate issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for more information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Montenegro relies on a narrow tax base with an economy centered on three sectors, and the government largely focuses its efforts on developing tourism, energy, and to a lesser extent, agriculture. The tourism sector officially accounts for about 25 percent of GDP, although some analysts believe it accounts for over one third when considering the grey economy. In the energy sector, the most important project in the transmission system was the construction of a two-way underwater electricity cable to export power to Italy, which included the development of a 433-kilometer-long tunnel approximately 1,200 meters below the Adriatic Sea surface. The project cost 800 million euro and began operation in December 2019. There are several other ongoing energy projects, including the controversial ecological reconstruction of the coal-fired thermal plant in Pljevlja in partnership with People’s Republic of China (PRC) company Dongfang Electric Corporation that began in April 2022, as well as the development of a 55-megawatt wind power plant in Gvozd, a project supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).According to the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG), foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2022 totalled to €1.15 billion. Although no one source country dominates FDI, significant investments have come from Serbia, Russia, Germany, Switzerland, UAE, Turkey, Italy, and the United States, with other investments coming from Cyprus, the Netherlands and Austria. Montenegro has one of the highest public debt-to-GDP ratios in the region, but this ratio has been declining over the last two years thanks to strong growth and repayments, dropping from a high of 105 percent in 2020 to about 73 percent in April 2023. Infrastructure development remains a government priority. The most visible current project is the Bar-Boljare highway, Montenegro’s first modern highway which is designed to better connect the more developed south with the relatively underdeveloped north of the country. The highway, the first and most expensive portion of which was built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation and became operational in July 2022, has been widely criticized as a textbook example of PRC “debt trap diplomacy”. The completion of the full four-stage project continues to pose challenges to Montenegro&#8217;s fiscal position, given limited room to finance the construction of the three remaining sections.The pandemic hit Montenegro’s economy hard, with the unemployment rate reaching 24 percent by the end of 2021, although it has since dropped to 16 percent at the end of 2022. In addition, gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 15.3 percent in 2020, the biggest drop in Europe. The country enjoyed a strong recovery in 2021, however, with the government announcing a GDP growth rate of 14 percent for the year, one of the highest in Europe. GDP growth was 6.9 percent in 2022, led by private consumption and a better-than-expected tourism season. Economic recovery will continue to face challenges, however. Developments in Ukraine and Russia, two of Montenegro’s main sources of tourists and together accounting for about 16 percent of total arrivals and over 20 percent of tourism spending in 2021, will threaten economic growth as the country will likely struggle to compensate for their absence during the 2023 tourism season.In 2022, Montenegro began implementing a wide-ranging economic reform program known as Europe Now, which eliminated all individual health care contributions, almost doubled the minimum wage, increased pensions, and introduced a system of progressive taxation. The economic impact of these ambitious new measures will take time to become clearer. However, analysts have attributed Montenegro’s 20 percent increase in consumption and an inflation rate of over 17 percent in 2022 to the reforms, coupled with a huge inflow of Russian and Ukrainian citizens as the result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Montenegro has not yet joined the Open Balkan Initiative, previously known as “Mini-Schengen,” a project championed by Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia and designed to facilitate trade, services, and movement of people throughout the Western Balkans. Montenegro continues to grapple with rule of law concerns, including corruption and organized crime.As the 29th NATO member and the long-standing EU-accession front-runner, Montenegro plays a pivotal role in a volatile region still struggling to fully embrace Euro-Atlantic values and susceptible to malign foreign influence.  This has been a central theme since the country’s first transition of power in 30 years following the narrow victory of a broad but disparate coalition of civic, moderate, and radical pro-Serb and pro-Russian parties in the August 2020 national elections. Since then, two successive coalition governments have lost votes of no confidence in the parliament, first in February and then in August of 2022. Voters elected a political newcomer in the country’s presidential runoff election held on April 2, 2023, ending the 32-year rule of Europe’s longest serving leader. After a long-standing political impasse, snap parliamentary elections were called for June 11, 2023.&nbsp;Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings MeasureYearIndex /RankWebsite AddressTransparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 202265 of 180http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewGlobal Innovation Index 202260 of 132https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicatorU.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2022USD 45 million https://mia.gov.me/World Bank GNI per capita2021USD 9,340http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 																																					Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment										Montenegro regained its independence in 2006, and since then, the country has adopted an investment framework that in principle encourages growth, employment, and exports. Montenegro, however, is still in the process of establishing a liberal business climate that fosters foreign investment and local production. The country remains dependent on imports from neighboring countries despite its significant potential in some areas of agriculture and food production. Although the continuing political transition has not yet eliminated all structural barriers, the government generally recognizes the need to remove impediments to remain competitive, reform the business environment, open the economy to foreign investors, and attract further FDI.In general, there are no distinctions made between domestic and foreign-owned companies. Foreign companies can own 100 percent of a domestic company, and profits and dividends can be repatriated without limitations or restrictions. Foreign investors can participate in local privatization processes and can own land in Montenegro generally on the same terms as locals. Expropriation of property can only occur for a “compelling public purpose” and compensation must be made at fair market value. There have been no known direct expropriations of foreign investments in Montenegro. However, the government in 2022 activated a bank guarantee during an unresolved dispute being heard by the Montenegrin commercial court, an action the U.S. investor has alleged to be an indirect expropriation. In addition, long-standing property restitution cases dating back to WWII remain unresolved. International arbitration is allowed in commercial disputes involving foreign investors.Registration procedures have been simplified to such an extent that it is possible to complete all registration processes online. In addition, bankruptcy laws have been streamlined to make it easier to liquidate a company; accounting standards have been brought up to international norms; and custom regulations have been simplified. There are no mandated performance requirements.Montenegro has enacted specific legislation outlining guarantees and safeguards for foreign investors. Montenegro has also adopted more than 20 other business-related laws, all in accordance with EU standards. The main laws that regulate foreign investment in Montenegro are: the Foreign Investment Law; the Enterprise Law; the Insolvency Law; the Law on Fiduciary Transfer of Property Rights; the Accounting Law; the Law on Capital and Current Transactions; the Foreign Trade Law; the Customs Law; the Law on Free Zones; the Labor Law; the Securities Law; the Concession Law, and the set of laws regulating tax policy. Montenegro has taken significant steps in both amending investment-related legislation in accordance with global standards and creating necessary institutions for attracting investments. However, as is the case with other transition countries, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation remains weak and inconsistent. While Montenegro has taken steps to make the country more open for foreign investment, some deficiencies still exist. The absence of fully developed legal institutions has fostered corruption and weak controls over conflicts of interest. The judiciary is still slow to adjudicate cases, and court decisions are not always consistently reasoned or enforced. Montenegro’s significant grey economy impacts its open market, negatively affecting businesses operating in accordance with the law. Favorable tax policies established at the national level are often cancelled out with taxes introduced by different municipalities on the local level.To better promote investment and foster economic development, the government adopted in December 2019 a new Law on Public Private Partnerships and established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA), merging the Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and the Secretariat for Development Projects. MIA seeks to promote Montenegro as a competitive investment destination by facilitating investment projects in the country. Together with the Privatization and Capital Investment Council, MIA promotes investment opportunities in various sectors of the Montenegrin economy, primarily focusing on the tourism, energy, technology, and agricultural sectors. These two institutions will maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors already present in Montenegro and, at the same time, seek to promote future projects and attract new investors to do business in Montenegro. MIA is also the state agency that leads the controversial Economic Citizenship Program, which started on January 1, 2019, and was designed to accelerate Montenegro’s economic development by creating new tourism, agriculture and processing capacities and create new jobs, especially in the underdeveloped northern part of the country. The program was intended to last three years and be available for up to 2,000 applicants. Thus far, almost 800 applications have been submitted, of which 166 have been approved, bringing about €310 million in investments into the country and about €70 million into the budget. In December 2021, the program was extended until the end of 2022, but it was abolished at the end of 2022 after strong opposition from European Commission officials who cited risks of money laundering, tax evasion, financial terrorism, corruption, and the influence of organized crime. More information is available at  https://mia.gov.me .																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										Montenegro&#8217;s Foreign Investment Law, which was adopted by the Parliament in 2011, establishes the framework for investment in Montenegro. The law eliminates previous investment restrictions, extends national treatment to foreign investors, allows for the transfer and repatriation of profits and dividends, provides guarantees against expropriation, and allows for customs duty waivers for equipment imported as capital-in-kind. There are no limits on foreign control and right to private ownership or on establishing companies in Montenegro. There are no institutional barriers to foreign investors, including U.S. businesses. As an aspiring EU Member State, Montenegro monitors and implements best practices regarding foreign investments, according to government officials, but the country still has no screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment in Montenegro. In December 2021, the Embassy hosted a presentation to Montenegrin officials by the U.S. Department of Treasury on the U.S. government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investment screening mechanism. Montenegrin officials have stated the Government’s intention is to have a screening mechanism in place by the end of 2023, but limited progress has been made due to political instability, personnel turnover, and limitations in current Montenegrin law.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										The WTO secretariat conducted its first review of Montenegrin trade policies and practices in April 2018 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp469_e.htm ).The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Montenegro prepares a biannual Business Climate Report (BCR), an assessment of issues on which the Government needs to take action to improve the country’s business environment. The most recent 2021-2022 edition was the seventh BCR to date, and recommends that the Government tackle the grey economy, improve public procurement procedures, address weak labor legislation, and correct inconsistencies in the implementation of existing laws. More information is available at  http://www.amcham.me/advocacy/publications/The White Book is the most recognized publication of the Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council. It is published every year and its main goal is to help the improvement of the business environment in the country through various recommendation provided by the Council’s members. All reports are available on the following website:  http://mfic.me/activities/white-book Other useful links: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&amp;search=Montenegro&amp;language=en  https://ejatlas.org/country/montenegro 																																				Business Facilitation										The Central Register of the Business Entities (CRPS) is responsible for business registration procedures. The register maintains an electronic database of registered business entities, and contracts on financial leasing and pledges. The process to register a business in Montenegro takes an average of 4-5 working days. The minimum financial requirement for a Limited Liability Company (LLC) is just EUR 1 (USD 1.1), and three documents are required: a founding decision, bylaws, and a copy of the passport (if an individual is founding a company) or a registration form for the specific type of company. Samples of all documents are available for download at the CRPS website. Montenegrin law permits the establishment of six types of companies: entrepreneur, limited liability company, joint stock company, general partnership, limited partnership, and part of a foreign company. All included in the business activities need to open a bank account. Once a bank account is established, the company reports to the tax authority in order to receive a PIB (taxation identification number) and VAT (Value Added Tax) number. For classification of companies by size, based on number of employees, the government’s definition is as follows: (i) small enterprises (from one to 49 employees), (ii) medium-sized enterprises (from 50 to 249) and (iii) large enterprises (more than 250 employees).																																				Outward Investment										While the Montenegrin government is very active in attracting and inviting foreign investors to do business in Montenegro, the government is not as dedicated to promoting outward investments. There are no government restrictions to domestic investors for their investments abroad.																																												2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties						    																						Montenegro signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in July 2007. The agreement has been signed by seven other countries (Albania, North Macedonia, Moldova, UNMIK/Kosovo, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). A free trade agreement with Turkey has been in force since March 2010. Montenegro had a free trade agreement with Russia, but the agreement is not currently in force, nor are the free trade agreements with Kazakhstan and Belarus, which have a customs union with Russia. In 2011 Montenegro signed a free trade agreement with Ukraine and with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein).Montenegro has not signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States.The United States restored Normal Trade Relations (Most-Favored Nation status) to Montenegro in December 2003.  This status provides improved access to the U.S. market for goods exported from Montenegro.  Montenegro has also been designated as a beneficiary developing country under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program which expired on January 1, 2021. As a result, Montenegrin imports entering the United States that were eligible for duty free treatment under GSP up to December 31, 2020 (jewelry, ores, stones, and various agricultural products) are now subject to regular duties.																										Bilateral Taxation Treaties										Montenegro does not have a double taxation treaty with the United States. On March 1, 2018, Montenegro’s Parliament approved the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between the governments of Montenegro and the United States. Implementation of FATCA will help the countries better track and report tax evasion.The country has signed 43 taxation treaties with various countries on income and property, which regulate double taxation. The treaties in force are with following countries: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, India, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, North Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Treaties with Spain and Qatar are pending.																																				Investment Treaties										Investment treaties seek to ensure a stable framework for investment and better use of economic resources. They define the conditions for investments, allowing free transfer of funds, the right of subrogation, compensation in the event of expropriation and settlement of disputes between investors and countries, including the settlement of disputes between the countries themselves.Montenegro has 24 BITs in force, and more than half have been concluded with the EU member states. Additional information can be found at  https://www.gov.me/clanak/ostali-sporazumi Montenegro joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS in December 2019. More information available athttps://www.oecd.https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/search/?term=montenegro/tax/beps/search/?term=montenegro																																												3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										The main law governing foreign investment, the Montenegrin Law on Foreign Investment, is based on the national treatment principle, which is a basic principle of GATT/WTO that prohibits discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods with respect to internal taxation or other government regulation. All proposed laws and regulations put forth by the government are published in draft form and open for public comment, generally for a 30-day period.Regulations are often applied inconsistently, particularly at the municipal level. Many regulations conflict with other regulations, or are ambiguous, creating confusion for investors. As noted in the American Chamber of Commerce’s (AmCham) biannual Business Climate Survey conducted in 2020, many municipalities lack adequate detailed urban plans, complicating investment plans. Some municipalities have made efforts to speed up procedures in order to improve the business environment for investors. While at the national level there are fewer obstacles for investments and other activities, many larger-scale projects involve both local and national authorities, and it is often necessary to work with both administrations in order to complete a project. AmCham members surveyed are dissatisfied with the duration of the court proceedings (79.5 percent) and unequal implementation of the law (63.6 percent). At the same time, over 70 percent of AmCham member companies surveyed believe that conditions for doing business when it comes to the duration of the court proceedings, and unequal implementation of the laws have not changed in the past two years.Foreign investors are subject to the same conditions as domestic investors when it comes to establishing a company and making an investment. There are no other regulations in place which might deprive a foreign investor of any rights or limit the investor’s ability to do business in Montenegro. The Law of Foreign Investments is currently fully harmonized with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.In 2004, the Parliament established an Energy Regulatory Agency, which maintains authority over the electricity, gas, oil, and heating energy sectors. Its main tasks include approving pricing, developing a model for determining allowable business costs for energy sector entities, issuing operating licenses for energy companies and for construction in the energy sector, and monitoring public tenders. The energy law mandates that in the energy sectors, when prices are affected by monopoly positions of some participants, business costs will be set at levels approved by the Agency. In those areas deemed to function competitively, the market will determine prices. The price of gasoline is set nationally every two weeks and is uniform across all petrol stations.The Agency for Electronic Communication and Postal Services (known by its Montenegrin acronym EKIP) was established by the government in 2001. It is an independent regulatory body whose primary purpose is to design and implement a regulatory framework and to encourage private investment in the sector. In March 2021, EKIP prepared a “Study on the Strategy for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks in Montenegro”.  In December 2021, the Government adopted the “Roadmap for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks” and in December 2022, EKIP held a spectrum auction for the radiofrequencies from the 700MHz, 3.6GHz and 26GHz bands, which will allow telecom companies to expand the 5G and upgrade their 4G networks.While there is a full legal and regulatory infrastructure in place to conduct public procurement, U.S. companies have complained in numerous cases about irregularities in the procurement process at the national level and maintain there is an inability to meaningfully challenge decisions they believe were erroneously taken through the procurement apparatus. In other cases, the system delivers appropriate outcomes, though in a complex and time-consuming way. Public procurement is conducted jointly by the Public Procurement Directorate, the Ministry of Finance (as the main line ministry for the procurement area), and the State Commission for Control of Public Procurement Procedures in the protection of rights area. The Public Procurement Directorate began operations in 2007 while the State Commission for the Control of Public Procurement Procedures was established in 2011. The State Commission takes decisions in the form of written orders and conclusions made at its meetings. The decisions are made by a majority of present members. The State Commission’s Rules of Procedure specify the method for this work. The revised Law of Public Procurement entered into force in December 2019. The Administrative Court oversees cases involving public procurement procedures.The Montenegro State Audit Institution (SAI) is an independent supreme audit institution for verification of the entire government’s financial statements, including state-owned enterprises.  The audits are made publicly available on the SAI’s website ( http://www.dri.co.me/  ).  Accounting standards implemented in Montenegro are transparent and consistent with international norms. In addition, various international companies that conduct accounting and auditing procedures are present in the country.More information on whether Montenegrin Government publish or consult with the public about proposed regulations is available at  https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/montenegro /																																				International Regulatory Considerations										Montenegro is a candidate country for membership to the EU, with accession negotiations launched on June 29, 2012. All 33 negotiating chapters have been opened, while three are provisionally closed. Montenegro is currently taking steps to harmonize its regulations and accepted best practices with those of the EU, as part of the negotiation process.The government has not notified the WTO of any measures that are inconsistent with the WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), nor have there been any independent allegations that the government maintains any such measures.																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										Montenegro’s legal system is of a civil, continental type based on Roman law.  It includes the legal heritage of the former Yugoslavia, and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.  As of 2006, when the country regained its independence, Montenegrin codes and criminal justice institutions were applicable and operational.  Montenegro&#8217;s Law on Courts defines a judicial system consisting of three levels of courts: Basic, High, and the Supreme Court.  Montenegro established the Appellate Court and the Administrative Court in 2005 for the appellate jurisdiction in criminal and commercial matters, and specialized jurisdiction in administrative matters.  The specialized Commercial Court has first instance jurisdiction in commercial matters. Apart from those, there are also specialized Misdemeanors Courts.The Basic Courts have first instance jurisdiction in civil cases and criminal cases in which a prison sentence of up to 10 years is possible.  There are 15 Basic Courts for Montenegro&#8217;s 23 municipalities.  Two High Courts in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje have appellate review of Basic Court decisions.  The High Courts also decide on jurisdictional conflicts between the Basic Courts.  They are also first instance courts for serious crimes where prison sentence of more than 10 years is specified.  The Podgorica High Court has specialized judges and department who deal with organized crime, corruption, war crimes, money laundering, and terrorism cases.According to the Law on Courts, there is just one Commercial Court based in Podgorica.  The Commercial Court has jurisdiction in the following matters: all civil disputes between legal entities, shipping, navigation, aircraft (except passenger transport), and disputes related to registration of commercial entities, competition law, intellectual property rights (IPR), bankruptcy, and unfair trade practices.  The High Court hears appeals of Basic Court decisions, and High Courts’ first instance decision may be appealed to the Appellate Court which is also a second instance court for decisions of the Commercial Court. The Supreme Court is the third (and final) instance court for all decisions.  The Supreme Court is the court of final judgment for all civil, criminal, commercial, and administrative cases, and it acts only upon irregular (i.e., extraordinary legal remedies).  There is also the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, which checks constitutionality and legality of legal acts and acts upon constitutional complaints in relation to human rights violations.  The Commercial Court system faces challenges, including weak implementation of legislation and confusion over numerous changes to existing laws; development of a new system of operations, including electronic communication with clients; and limited capacity and expertise among the judges as well as a general backlog in cases. Over the last several years, the adoption of 20 new business laws has significantly changed and clarified the legislative environment.  Recently adopted legislative reforms improved the efficiency and effectiveness of court proceedings, a trend which is already visible through the introduction of Public Enforcement Agents.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										In order to attract foreign investment and to lead interested investors through the process, the government established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA) (https://mia.gov.me/) and the Privatization and Capital Investment Council  https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte ). These organizations aim to promote Montenegro’s investment climate and opportunities in the local economy, with a focus on the tourism, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors.																																				Competition and Anti-Trust Laws										In 2013, the Agency for Protection of Competition was established as a functionally independent entity after the Law on Protection of Competition entered into force and the Central Register of Economic Entities registered the law. The area of free market competition, regulated by the law, represents the area that has direct and significant impact on economic development and investment activity, by raising the level of the quality of goods and services, thus creating the conditions for lower prices and creation of a modern, open market economy. This, in turn, provides Montenegro with the possibility to participate in the single market of the EU and in other international markets.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										Montenegro provides legal safeguards against expropriation with protections codified in several laws adopted by the government. There have been no known cases of direct expropriation of foreign investments in Montenegro. However, the government in 2022 activated a bank guarantee during an unresolved dispute being heard by the Montenegrin commercial court, an action the U.S. investor has alleged to be an indirect expropriation. In addition, Montenegro has outstanding claims related to property nationalized under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A number of unresolved restitution cases involve U.S. citizens. The cases are in various stages of adjudication and have languished for over a decade.At the end of 2007, Parliament passed the new Law on Restitution, which supersedes the 2004 Act. In line with the law, three review commissions have been formed: one in Bar (covering the coastal region); one in Podgorica (for the central region of Montenegro); and one in Bijelo Polje (for the northern region of Montenegro). The basic restitution policy in Montenegro is restitution in kind, when possible, and cash compensation or substitution of other state land when physical return is not possible.In addition, Montenegro provides safeguards from expropriation actions through its Foreign Investment Law. The law states that the government cannot expropriate property from a foreign investor unless there is a &#8220;compelling public purpose&#8221; established by law or based on the law. If an expropriation is executed, compensation must be provided at fair market value plus one basis point above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate for the period between the expropriation and the date of payment of compensation.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Montenegro ratified its ICSID Convention membership in 2012, and the country fully enforces the Convention.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						Montenegro does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. There are several individual American investors involved in public procurement and construction cases that are in various stages of dispute resolution with the government.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						Dispute resolution is under the authority of national courts, but it can also fall under the authority of international courts if the contract so designates. Accordingly, Montenegro allows for the possibility of international arbitration. Various foreign companies have other bilateral and multilateral organizations providing risk insurance against war, expropriation, nationalization, confiscation, inconvertibility of profit and dividends, and inability to transfer currency; these are the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA of the World Bank), U.S. Development Finance Corporation (USDFC), U.K. Exports Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), Slovenia Export Corporation (SID), Italian Export Credit Agency (SACE), French Export Credit Agency (COFACE), and Austrian Export Financing Group (OEKB). In 2012 Montenegro became a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention).Montenegro is a member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards since December 2006.Montenegro has taken steps to improve court-system inefficiencies, which frequently result in long and drawn-out trials. Procedural laws have been amended in the last few years to improve efficiency of the proceedings in line with the standards of the European Convention of Human Rights. It should be noted that most complaints that go to the European Court of Human Rights against Montenegro concern Article 6 of the Convention – the right to a fair trial in a reasonable time. Civil appellate procedures have been simplified as part of an effort to eliminate the possibility of long appellate procedures, which was common in the past. In addition, Montenegro has passed the Law on the Protection of the Right to a Fair Trial in a Reasonable Time, which enables the court to award compensation for an excessively long trial and introduces a series of controlling mechanisms during the trial itself. In 2011, Montenegro adopted the Law on Public Bailiffs, which subsequently improved the procedure to enforce civil judgments. 																										Bankruptcy Regulations										The Bankruptcy Law, adopted in 2011, mandates that debtors are designated insolvent if they cannot meet financial obligations within 45 days of the date of maturity of any debt obligation. However, the law still offers some latitude for restrictive measures and discretionary government interference. Bankruptcy is criminalized in Montenegro and a responsible officer in a business entity who caused bankruptcy and damage to another person by irrational spending of assets or their bargain selling, by excessive borrowing, undertaking disproportional obligations, recklessly concluding contracts with insolvent entities, omitting to collect claims in time, by destroying or concealing property or by other acts which are not in compliance with  prudent business practices shall be punished by a prison term from six months to five years.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										The Ministry of Economic Development, in cooperation with the World Bank Group (WBG), has created an Investment Incentives Inventory, which provides a comprehensive list of available financial and non-financial support programs for the private sector as well as domestic and foreign investors offered by the Government of Montenegro. This initiative is part of the WBG-supported Regional Investment Reform Agenda, whose objective is the development of commonly accepted investment standards for the Western Balkans region in order to improve the attractiveness of the region for regional and other foreign investors. Montenegro’s goals are to leverage this program to spur a higher inflow of investments and achieve a higher level of entrepreneurship, trade and job creation.The inventory contains data on 40 incentive measures that are available to domestic and foreign investors through various support programs intended for the private sector. The MIA oversees the incentive program implementation. More information is available on the Agency’s website (https://mia.gov.me/investment-incentive-inventory/).																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										In 2004, Montenegro adopted the Law on Free Zones, which offers businesses benefits and exemptions from custom duties, taxes, and other duties in specified free trade zones. The Port of Bar is currently the only free trade zone in Montenegro.  All free zone users have many benefits provided by the law and other regulations (import free of customs duties, customs fees and VAT; storage of goods in a duty-free regime for an unlimited period of time; low corporate tax, simplified procedures) in addition to the use of infrastructure, port handling services, and telecommunication services.All regulations relating to free trade zones are in compliance with EU legal standards. Complete equality has been guaranteed to foreign investors in reference to ownership rights, organizing economic activities in the zone, complete free transfer of profit and deposit, and the security of investments. More information is available at  http://www.lukabar.me/  																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										The government does not impose any performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. There is a defined package of incentives offered to foreign investors, including duty exemptions for imported equipment.AmCham Montenegro and the Foreign Investors’ Council announced that Montenegro has improved and liberalized its business environment due to amendments to the Law on Foreigners.  This law addressed previous requirements placed on hiring practices. According to revisions to the law, businesses no longer need to prove that there are no local citizens of the required vocational profile that are available for a particular job before the company decides to hire a foreigner.The government does not use “forced localization,” the policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. The only exception is an agreement with a Chinese company that is constructing the country’s first national highway. The agreement for this project, which is currently the largest infrastructure project in Montenegro, requires that 30 percent of the labor contract be engaged locally.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										In 2002 Montenegro enacted the Law on Secured Transactions and established a collateral registry at the Commercial Court in 2003. The registry&#8217;s operational guidelines have been drafted and approved by the Commercial Court. The main goal of the Law on Secured Transactions is to establish a clear and transparent framework for property transactions. In 2004, Montenegro adopted a new Law on Mortgages by which immovable property may be encumbered by security interest (mortgage) to secure a claim for the benefit of a creditor who is authorized, in the manner prescribed by the law, to demand satisfaction of the claim by foreclosing the mortgaged property with priority over creditors who do not have a mortgage created on that particular property, as well as over any subsequently registered mortgage, regardless of a change in the owner of the encumbered immovable property. The Real Estate Administration has taken progressive steps over the last few years to improve the quality and service provided in the registry, though additional improvements are needed.																																				Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)										The acquisition and disposition of IPR are protected by the Law on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, which entered into force in 2006. The law provides for fines for legal entities of up to EUR 30,000 (approximately USD 37,000) for selling pirated and/or counterfeited goods. It also provides ex-officio authority for market inspectors in the areas mentioned above. An additional set of amendments to the existing Law on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights were adopted over the last several years (beginning in 2006) in line with the EU regulations, and it is expected to bring more efficiency in implementation as well as a multifunctional approach to property-rights protection. In 2005, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Regulation on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Border Measures that provides powers to customs authorities to suspend customs procedures and seize pirated and counterfeit goods. Statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods is published by the Revenue and Customs Administration and available on their webpage  https://www.gov.me/upravaprihoda  Montenegro&#8217;s Penal Code penalizes IPR violations, allows ex-officio prosecution, and provides for stricter criminal penalties; however, copyright violation is a significant problem in the outerwear and apparel market, and unlicensed software can be easily found on the general market. The Law on Optical Disks was adopted in 2006; it requires the registration of business activity when reproducing optical disks for commercial purposes and provides for surveillance of optical disk imports and exports, as well as imports and exports of polycarbonates.The Montenegrin Intellectual Property Office is the competent authority within the state administration system for the activities related to industrial property rights, copyrights, and related rights. The Intellectual Property Office was established under the Regulation on Organization and Manner of Work of the State Administration in 2007, and officially started working on in 2008.At the end of 2007, the Customs Administration signed a Letter of Intent for acceptance of Standards to be Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE) Standards, adopted by the World Customs Organization (WCO), to promote the efficient protection of IPR by customs authorities.Montenegro is not on the Special 301 Watch List. Montenegro is not listed in the notorious market report. However, the sale of pirated optical media (DVDs, CDs, software) as well as counterfeit trademarked goods, particularly sneakers and clothing, is widespread. According to the 2017 joint survey of Business Software Alliance and the International Data Corporation (IDC), the software piracy rate in Montenegro is among the highest in Europe constituting 74 percent of the market, two percentage points below the 2015 study. Enforcement is slowly improving as customs, police, and judicial authorities obtain the necessary tools, but institutional capacity and public awareness is still limited.To further improve intellectual property protection, AmCham Montenegro established an IPR Committee in April 2009, which currently operates under the Grey Economy Committee. The main goal of the committee is to work closely with the Montenegrin institutions which deal with IPR, to increase public awareness of the importance of intellectual property protection, and to help the Government of Montenegro strengthen its administrative capacities in this field. More information about the committee’s activities can be found on AmCham’s website  http://www.amcham.me/ .Montenegro became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2006, with more information available on the WIPO’s website  http://www.wipo.int/members/en/details.jsp?country_id=193 Resources for Rights HoldersContact at the U.S. Embassy in Montenegro: Walter Andonov, Political and Economic Deputy Chief +382 20 410 500																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										The banking sector in Montenegro is fully privatized with 11 privately owned banks operating in the country. The banking sector operates under market terms. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, and they have access to a variety of credit instruments since the majority of the banks in Montenegro belong to international banking chains.The largest foreign banks are OTP (Hungary) operating as CKB in Montenegro, Erste Bank (Austria) and NLB (Slovenia). The remaining, smaller foreign banks do not belong to large international groups. A new set of banking laws have been adopted and some of the existing laws have been amended to improve regulation of the banking sector, provide a higher level of depositor safety, and increase trust in the banking sector itself. The Law on the Protection of Deposits has been adopted to bring local legislation on protecting deposits up to European standards. In accordance with the law, a fund for protecting deposits has been established and deposits are guaranteed up to the amount of EUR 50,000 (approximately USD 55,000).Until 2010, Montenegro had two stock exchanges. After a successful merger, only one stock operates under the name Montenegro Stock Exchange (MSE). The turnover of the MSE in 2022 included 1,618 transactions, totaling EUR 156 million, a 235 percent increase over 2021.In December 2013, the Istanbul Stock Exchange purchased 24.38 percent of the MSE ( www.montenegroberza.com ). Three types of securities are traded: shares of companies, shares of investment funds, and bonds (old currency savings bonds, pension fund bonds, and bonds from restitution.) The MSE is organized on the principle of member firms, which trade in their own names and for their own account (dealers) in the name and for the account of their clients (brokers). Members of the MSE can be a legal entity registered as a broker under the Law on Securities provided, they meet conditions laid down by the Statute of the Stock Exchange. In addition, members may include banks and insurance companies, once approved by the Commission for Securities to perform stock exchange trade. MSE currently has 5 stockbrokers.																																				Money and Banking System										According to Central Bank of Montenegro, the banking sector remained solvent and liquid. Total bank assets amounted to EUR 6.4 billion at the end of 2022, an increase of EUR 1.07 billion, or 20 percent over the previous year. Loans make up the dominant share of bank balance sheets, amounting to EUR 3.84 billion at the end of 2022, a 14.28 percent increase over 2021. Non-performing loans accounted for 6.2 percent of the total. In 2021, the latest data available, lending activity grew by 13.9 percent over 2020, while the interest rate dropped to 5.66 percent due to increased competition.Montenegro is one of a few countries that does not belong to the Euro Zone but uses the Euro as its official currency (without any formal agreement). Since its authority is limited in monetary policies, the Central Bank, in its role as the state’s fiscal agent, has focused on control of the banking system and maintenance of the payment system. The Central Bank also regulates the process for establishing a bank. A bank can be founded as a joint-stock company and acquire the status of a legal entity by registering in the court register. An application for registration in the court register must be submitted 60 days from when the bank is first licensed.On March 1, 2018, Montenegro’s Parliament approved the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between the governments of Montenegro and the United States.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange Policies						The Foreign Investment Law guarantees the right to transfer and repatriate profits in Montenegro. Montenegro uses the Euro as its domestic currency. There are no other limitations placed on the transfer of foreign currency.																										Remittance Policies										There are no difficulties in the free transfer of funds exercised on the basis of profit, repayment of resources, or residual assets. The Central Bank of Montenegro publishes statistics on remittances as a proportion of GDP, with the latest data available indicating that in 2020 remittances accounted for approximately 12.3 percent of GDP.																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds										There are no sovereign wealth funds in Montenegro.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						Since the beginning of the privatization process in 1999, nearly 90 percent of formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized. The most prominent SOEs still in operation include the Port of Bar; Montenegro Railways; Airports of Montenegro; Plantaze Vineyards; the national electricity provider Elektroprivreda Crne Gore (EPCG); several companies in the tourism industry, including Ulcinjska and Budvanska Rivijera; and national air carrier ToMontenegro that had its inaugural flight in June 2021; and most recently, the Niksic Steel Mill that was purchased by EPCG in December 2022. All these companies are registered as joint-stock companies, with the government appointing one or more representatives to each board based on the ownership structure. All SOEs must provide an annual report to the government and are subject to independent audits. In addition, SOEs are listed and have publicly available auditing accounts on the Montenegrin Securities Commission’s website  www.scmn.me . Political affiliation has been known to play a role in job placement in SOEs.In August 2021, the Government of Montenegro established a new state entity known as Montenegro Works that is to have financial and administrative oversight over all SOEs. While it has established a board of directors, hired a management team, and received two years of funding from the Government, its operations remain in their infancy, and it has not yet received approval from Parliament for its long-term objectives and operations.																										Privatization Program										The privatization process in Montenegro is currently in its final phase. The majority of companies that have not yet been privatized are of strategic importance to the Montenegrin economy and operate in such fields as energy, transport, and tourism.Further privatization of SOEs should contribute to better economic performance, increase the competitiveness of the country, and enable the government to generate higher revenues (while lowering its outlays), which will enhance capital investments and reduce debts.The Montenegrin government is the main institution responsible for the privatization process. The Privatization and Capital Investment Council was established in 1996 to manage, control, and implement the privatization process as well as to propose and coordinate all activities necessary for the non-discriminatory and transparent application process for capital projects in Montenegro. The prime minister of Montenegro is the president of the Privatization and Capital Investment Council. More information about the council, the privatization process, and the actual privatization plan is available on the council’s website  https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte .																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						While there are several good examples of companies undertaking responsible business conduct (RBC) in Montenegro, practices are still developing and are not adopted evenly across the private sector. The government, together with various business organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the international community, organizes events in order to promote and encourage RBC. Since last year, efforts have focused on introducing the RBC concept in the education system. The promotion of RBC through the media has also been used as an effective tool as the media can play a pivotal role in raising awareness about RBC initiatives.The concept of corporate social responsibility (a term that preceded RBC) features regularly on the agenda of many companies in Montenegro. The most recent survey showed that large private companies and associations are, indeed, more engaged in RBC activities, whereas small companies cited the lack of knowledge about RBC and the lack of support and interest from clients as the main reasons for not participating.																										Additional Resources  										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOFAC Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ )&nbsp;																																				Climate issues										Montenegro is a country with relatively low per capita greenhouse gas emissions, producing 1.8 tons of CO2 per person, compared to a world average of 4.8 tones per person, according to the most recent available data. In 2015, the Government adopted its National Strategy in the Field of Climate Change by 2030. Montenegro in December 2022 increased its nationally determined contributions (NDC) target to decrease greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement from 35 percent to 55 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, but the government has not introduced any new policies or programs to achieve these climate goals. The Government is also developing a national energy and climate plan, as well a strategy on air quality management.																																												9. Corruption						    																						Corruption and the perception of corruption are significant problems in Montenegro’s public and private sectors.  Corruption routinely places high on the list of citizen concerns in opinion polls, in addition to risks cited by foreign investors.  Montenegro placed 65th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International (TI) 2022 Corruption Perception Index list. An improved legal framework to help combat corruption and organized crime has been in force since the adoption of the Law on Prevention of Corruption in 2014 and the Law on the Special State Prosecution in 2015.  The government has also taken substantial steps to strengthen the Rule of Law, including the establishment of a special police unit focused on corruption and organized crime, the creation of an Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, the creation of an independent Office of the Special State Prosecutor that handles major cases including organized crime and corruption, and the appointment of the Chief Special State Prosecutor.  In line with these laws, the Special Prosecution, the Special Police Team, and the Agency for Prevention of Corruption became operational in 2015 and 2016.  In 2015, Montenegro’s Parliament adopted the Law on the Confiscation of Proceeds from Criminal Activities, which provides for expanded procedures for the freezing, seizure, and confiscation of illicit proceeds.  It also authorizes the creation of multi-disciplinary financial investigation teams.  In February 2019, a multi-institutional operational team for fight against commercial crime was founded. The Head of Crime Police presides over the team, and it consists of representatives of the police, Customs Authority, Tax Authority, and Administration for Inspection Affairs. A focus of the team’s work is on the prevention, investigation, and fight against misuse in commercial activity.  In 2105, the Parliament also adopted the Law on the Center for Training of the Judiciary and State Prosecution which created a new independent judicial training institute, with greatly expanded powers and autonomy.  The adoption of the Law on Courts in 2015 has created one centralized Special Department for Organized Crime, Corruption, War Crimes, Terrorism and Money Laundering in the Podgorica High Court.Over the past year, the government has made some progress in the fight against corruption. The Special Prosecution initiated several high-level corruption investigations which resulted in arrest of former Supreme Court President and former Commercial Court President. Further arrests in the past year include former board members of state company Plantaze as well as a senior prosecutor in the Office of the Special Prosecutor.The government encourages state institutions and the private sector to establish internal codes of conduct.  They are encouraged to have ethical codes, as well as obliged to have preventive integrity plans.Montenegro is a signatory to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. It also succeeded to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery, formally signed by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro prior to Montenegro’s independence. To date, no foreign firms have lodged complaints against the government under any of these agreements. Several U.S. firms have specifically noted corruption as an obstacle to direct investment in Montenegro, and corruption is seen as one of the typical hurdles to be overcome when doing business in the country.Corruption is most pervasive in Montenegro in the government procurement sector. The purchase and sale of government property takes place in a non-transparent environment with frequent allegations of bribery and cronyism.In December 2020, the government established the High-Level National Anti-Corruption Council. The members of the Council were the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Social Welfare, as well as representatives of the academia and the NGOs MANS and Institute Alternativa. The Council’s task was to collect documentation related to all suspicious government activities, and then submit any questionable findings to the relevant authorities, including the Prosecutor&#8217;s Office in all cases where there is a suspicion of corrupt activities and damage to the budget of Montenegro. However, in January 2022, due to the political instability facing the country, the NGO representatives and several other Council members left the body, after which it was dissolved. After the change of Government, in January 2023, a new body called the National Council for Fight against Corruption was formed consisting of Prime Minister, several ministers, heads of the judiciary and prosecution, and other highest-level officials. So far only few Council sessions have been held and this body has not proved as efficient tool in combatting corruption. In light of scheduled snap Parliamentary elections in June 2023, further changes in relation to this body are expected.																										Resources to Report Corruption										Contact at government agencies responsible for combating corruption:Vladimir NovovicChief Special Prosecutor for Fighting Organized Crime, Corruption, War Crimes and Terrorism and Money LaunderingOffice of the Special State ProsecutorEmail:  specijalno@tuzilastvo.me Jelena PerovicDirector, Agency for the Prevention of CorruptionEmail:  kabinet@antikorupcija.me MANS (Network for Affirmation of the NGO sector) is a non-governmental organization that fights against corruption and organized crime in Montenegro. The NGO is engaged in investigating concrete cases of corruption and organized crime, monitoring the implementation of legislation and government policy, providing free legal aid to citizens, CSOs, media and businesses, developing law and policy proposals and analysis, and conducting advocacy campaigns.Vanja CalovicExecutive DirectorMANS (Network for Affirmation of NGO sector)Email:  mans@t-com.me ; Website:  www.mans.co.me 																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Montenegro has a multi-party political system with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system.  The country’s political picture was turned upside down following the August 2020 national elections, which unexpectedly resulted in the toppling of the former ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) by a broad coalition of civic and pro-Serb parties. While this transition of power ended nearly 30 years of DPS rule, it ushered in a period of political turmoil. Despite high public expectations for change, the coalition government of Zdravko Krivokapic could deliver only limited reform results, feeding dissatisfaction and disappointment across the political spectrum, leading to a February 4, 2022 no confidence vote. After nearly three months of bargaining that followed, parliament on April 28, 2022 voted in a new government led by Dritan Abazovic, the leader of the same centrist party that had launched the no confidence vote, and who had served as Deputy Prime Minister in the outgoing government. The new cabinet was a so-called “minority” government, as the parties that joined it did not hold a majority of seats in the parliament, but instead relied on the support of the opposition DPS, although DPS did not formally participate in the cabinet.Despite the long talks required to form it, and the expansion of the cabinet from 12 ministries to 18 so that all the participating parties could share in the spoils, the Abazovic government almost immediately fell into internal disagreements much like its predecessor. To the surprise of many observers and despite clear threats from DPS that doing so would bring down his government, Abazovic on August 3, 2022, signed a framework agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church. This act inflamed long standing questions of national identity and drew strong opposition from members of his own cabinet as well as the DPS, precipitating an August 20 no-confidence vote that toppled Abazovic’s cabinet. The fall of Abazovic’s government, after just over 100 days in office, returned the country to political uncertainty. The Abazovic government continues to operate under a “technical mandate”, with new parliamentary elections called for June 11, 2023.Former Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, who was elected President of Montenegro in April 2018 for a five-year term, will complete his term of office on May 21, 2023. Djukanovic, Europe’s longest-serving leader, lost an April 2 presidential run-off election to Jakov Milatovic, a political newcomer who served as Minister of Economic Development in the Krivokapic government and is one of the founders of the newly formed Europe Now movement. Many analysts believe Europe Now will likely ride the momentum of the Milatovic victory to a strong performance in the planned parliamentary elections, giving it a good chance to become the largest party in Parliament, replacing DPS in that role.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						Montenegro&#8217;s total labor force consists of approximately 224,000 people with over 55,000 workers, or close to 25 percent of the labor pool, employed in the public sector.  The unemployment rate was 20 percent as of December 2022, according to the country’s Unemployment Agency. As a result of the Europe Now economic reform program that took effect in January 2022, the minimum wage almost doubled from EUR 250 to EUR 450 per month, which also led to the increase of the country’s average salary from EUR 537 to EUR 727 per month, as of January 2023. One of the reform program’s goals was to tackle the informal economy, estimated at almost 30 percent of GDP, with large numbers of workers officially earning only the minimum wage but receiving additional payments in cash out of sight of the tax authorities.According to AmCham Montenegro, finding skilled middle managers represents a serious challenge for its member companies, and many foreign companies choose instead to hire foreigners for skilled positions. To tackle youth unemployment, Montenegro is prioritizing efforts to improve practical job skills, including English language training and digital literacy. However, university students in Montenegro obtain little or no practical work experience while studying for their bachelor’s degree. It is widely mentioned in business circles that Montenegrin young adults prefer public sector work to private companies, which offer higher salaries. 2019 was marked by the intensive work on the Labor Law in a form of a dialogue among social partners regarding disputable legal solutions and the new Labor Law has been adopted in December 2019.Over the past few years, private sector employment has increased, and total employment in the public sector (including SOEs) has decreased.  Employment in Montenegro is led by three major sectors: tourism, maritime and offshore jobs (including on cruise ships or freighters), and manufacturing.The new Montenegrin Labor Act introduced important employment regulations. The maximum duration of a fixed-term contract has been extended from 24 months to 36 months. Employers that employ more than 10 employees must adopt an internal general policy which lists positions and sets out job descriptions. Part-time positions cannot be for fewer than 10 hours per week, except for the GM/CEO. Full-time positions are 40 hours per week. Minimum statutory annual leave is 20 working days for regular jobs and 30 working days for jobs with severe conditions where full-time work hours are reduced from 40 to 36 hours per week. As of October 2019, Sunday became a non-working day for trade shops in Montenegro. Employees who have a six-day long work week are entitled to a minimum of 24 working days of annual leave. Employers are obliged to adopt an annual leave plan prior to April 30 each calendar year for the current year. Employers are not allowed to compensate employees for unused annual leave, except in the case of employment termination that occurs before the employee has consumed his or her entire annual leave allowance for the given year. Should an employer’s operations be shut down, employees can receive 60 percent of their average salary earned over the previous six months, but not less than the minimum wage, for a maximum period of four months within a given calendar year.The new Labor Law contains an explicit provision stating that an employer may only pay salaries to the employee’s bank account. Employment may not be terminated during pregnancy or maternity/ parental leave, except in case of a serious breach of work duties. Maternity leave may be taken for 365 days, beginning 28 days prior to childbirth. In cases in which employees claim unlawful termination, the employee must initiate proceedings before the Agency for Peaceful Resolution of Labor Disputes or before the Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution. After doing so, the employee may initiate court proceedings against the employer. Court proceedings must be initiated within 15 days from the end of the mandatory mediation. The statute of limitations for monetary claims arising out of employment is four years from the date on which the obligation became due. Claims for payment of pension and disability insurance contributions are not subject to any statute of limitations.The procedure for determining a breach of work duties has been adjusted, now allowing for dismissal for breach without having to first conduct disciplinary proceedings in the following cases: (i) if the employee’s behavior is such that he/she cannot continue to work for the employer (e.g. coming to work intoxicated; drinking or using narcotics during work; refusing to undergo a medical examination to determine intoxication; abusive, offensive, or inappropriate behavior towards customers or employees, etc.); (ii) if the employee knowingly provided inaccurate data during the hiring process; (iii) abuse of sick leave; (iv) failure to return to work after the end of unpaid leave.The Law on Peaceful Resolution of Labor Disputes was adopted in 2007. It introduces out-of-court settlements of labor disputes.The Law on the Employment of Nonresidents took effect in 2009 and mandates the government to set a quota for nonresident workers in the country. In December 2020, the Government established a quota 20,454 work permits for foreigners in 2021. Procedures for hiring foreign workers were simplified, and taxes for nonresident workers have been significantly decreased to help domestic companies that are experiencing problems engaging domestic staff, particularly for temporary and seasonal work.The Law on Foreigners in Montenegro came into force in 2015. At the beginning of 2016, amendments suggested by AmCham Montenegro and other business organizations (including the Montenegrin Employers’ Federation, Montenegrin Chamber of Economy, Montenegro Business Alliance, and Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council) were adopted that improve and liberalize Montenegro’s business environment.  According to changes to the law, businesses are no longer required to provide official records proving that the company was unable to hire Montenegrin nationals with the required skills before hiring foreigners.Changes were made to the Law on Pensions and Care of Invalids in 2017, including gradually increasing the age of retirement from 65 to 67 years (for both men and women) by 2042. These revisions are designed to eliminate anticipated shortfalls in the pension fund. The amended Law on Pensions and Care of Invalids which improves the conditions for retirement and harmonization of pensions, and increases the minimum pension was adopted in July 2020. The new Law improves the conditions for retirement, because one quarter of the period of service that was the most unfavorable for future retirees is excluded from the accounting period.Until 2008, there was only one trade union confederation at the national level in Montenegro, the Confederation of Trade Unions of Montenegro (SSCG). SSCG is the successor of the former socialist trade union and inherited the property, organizational structure, and rights to participation in the tripartite bodies on the national level. As of 2008, a new confederation, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Montenegro (USSCG), split away from SSCG.All international labor rights are recognized within domestic law, such as freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, child labor employment discrimination, minimum wage, occupation safety and health, as well as weekly working hours.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs						    																						Montenegro, through the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, became eligible for OPIC programs in July 2001, and it is eligible for DFC financing. DFC is currently not active in Montenegro. Prior to the establishment of the DFC, OPIC activities in Montenegro included: insurance for investors against political risk, expropriation of assets, damages due to political violence and currency convertibility, and insurance coverage for certain contracting, exporting, licensing, and leasing transactions. See the “Guide to Partnering with U.S. International DFC for more information on DFC programs:  https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/DFC_Partner_Guide.pdf _Guide.pdf																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics						    																						&nbsp;Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical sourceUSG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Billions USD) 2022USD  5.36 2022USD 6.143http://www.worldbank.org/en/country https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/Foreign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical sourceUSG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions)2022 45.5 2022N/ABEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions)2022N/A 2022N/ABEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 202216.8 2022N/AUNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html&nbsp;Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIDirect Investment from/in Counterpart Economy DataFrom Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)Inward Direct InvestmentOutward Direct InvestmentTotal Inward1,033.5100%Data not available.Serbia 13112.6%Russian Federation 12211.8%Germany 1009.6%Switzerland959.1%UAE 858,2%&#8220;0&#8221; reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.&nbsp;																																		14. Contact for more information						    																						Walter AndonovPolitical and Economic Deputy ChiefU.S. Embassy MontenegroSt. Dzona Dzeksona 2, 81000 Podgorica+382 20 410 528Email:  andonovwb@state.gov 																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											The Bahamas											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties																																							Bilateral Taxation Treaties																																																						Investment Treaties																																																			3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange Policies																																																																																				Remittance Policies																																																						Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources  																																																						Climate issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																14. Contact for more information																						Tags																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Montenegro
- Transatlantic Leadership Network Geoffrey R. Pyatt, Assistant SecretaryBureau of Energy ResourcesAssistant Secretary Pyatt:  Thank you to the Transatlantic Leadership Network and Sasha for having me here at this event.I was saying to my fellow guests as we were walking into the Library of Congress building this morning, this is arguably the most spectacular building in all of Washington, DC, so it’s really nice to be able to meet in this setting.And let me also say what a privilege it is for me to have this opportunity to engage with so many of the Energy Ministers, the Deputy Prime Ministers who are here from the Western Balkans for this important event today.  I, of course, lived in the neighborhood for six years as U.S. Ambassador to Greece and had the opportunity in that period to get a good appreciation for both the challenges that the Western Balkans faces but also the tremendous opportunities, especially to deepen an already important partnership with the United States on the issues that I’m responsible for in energy security, energy transition, and climate.There are also all of the related issues where American companies have sought to be strong partners, for instance in terms of technology, in terms of smart cities, all of the work that I did as Ambassador in Greece working with our Greek partners, especially in Thessaloniki, and to build on the famous Thessaloniki vision which still informs our approach to these issues.Of course the other major issue that shaped my last months in Athens and has been the defining issue for my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources is Russia’s brutal, illegal invasion of Ukraine that began more than 500 days ago now.In addition to the horrific human cost that Russia’s invasion has inflicted &#8212; the suffering, the destruction of property, the targeting of civilian infrastructure &#8212; the invasion of Ukraine has had a dramatic impact on global and in particular European energy markets.  By weaponizing Russia’s oil and gas resources Putin has ensured that Russia will never again be viewed as a reliable energy supplier.  That fact alone is going to have a dramatic impact on how global energy markets behave in the years ahead.But it has also perversely had the impact of accelerating the energy transition, in particular in Europe where governments have seen more clearly than ever before the risks of dependency on a single source of supply for fossil fuel and are therefore doubling down on their commitment to renewable energy for geopolitical and security reasons along with the obvious economic and environmental benefits.The Biden administration has put forward two guiding principles in carrying out our foreign policy.  The first, work with allies and partners as closely as possible and build on those alliance relationships.  I think you saw that very dramatically in President Biden’s approach yesterday to the Vilnius summit.The other, of course, is partnership with the private sector, including our private sector energy companies.  And my team in the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources apply these principles every day, including through the very intensive work that the ENR team does with American companies operating in the energy space.I want to be very clear.  If there’s one message I can leave with you today it’s that the Bureau of Energy Resources and I personally are committed to continuing our very strong partnership with the Western Balkans on clean energy and energy security.  This includes both diversification away from Russian fossil fuels and the rapid and responsible push for decarbonization, particularly through the immediate phasing out of coal and the increasing deployment of renewable energy where the Western Balkans has so much potential on wind, on solar, on geothermal where the United States wishes to be a strong partner.But we also recognize that the Western Balkans is a region that represents challenges for historic and political reasons, for geographic reasons, for issues like water scarcity and leveraging your hydro resources, and because many of the countries of the Western Balkans are themselves developing countries that have been highly vulnerable to the external shocks that Vladimir Putin has induced on the price of fertilizer, the price of energy, the availability of basic commodities.  But we are very, very committed to our partnership with your region.Since 2021, for instance, the ENR Bureau has provided assistance to support the commercialization of geothermal energy and to catalyze private sector investment in geothermal projects across the Western Balkans.  And of course as we move globally on the energy transition you are seeing a dramatically increased demand for the clean energy minerals that will be so essential to driving that electrified transformational economy &#8212; cobalt, lithium, copper, nickel.  For this reason, the ENR Bureau’s mineral governance program is going to continue to work with the countries of the Balkans to promote new mining investment by helping to improve mining sector governance and the legal frameworks to attract the investment that will help to grow the region’s output of critical minerals.We are convinced that these reform measures will accelerate progress towards renewable energy goals by increasing the supply of the minerals that will be so important to the energy transition.We also of course are strongly committed to our partnership with the European Union on these issues.  We very much support the EU’s green agenda for the Western Balkans and we are working to build complementarity between our programmatic initiatives and those of the European Union including with our development tool kit &#8212; institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, the work that you are doing under the Mineral Security Partnership to help strengthen transatlantic critical mineral supply chains.Our immediate priority is to help the Western Balkans get through this next winter as we did through the previous.  Demonstrating to Putin that his efforts to weaponize energy against the countries of Europe and NATO will not be successful.  We also recognize that we have opportunities as we get into the latter part of the 2020’s as there will be a much greater supply of LNG from America and other international sources.The United States, for instance, now the world’s largest LNG exporter will, by 2025, accomplish roughly a 50 percent increase in our capacity for LNG production.It should be clear to everyone at this point that Russia uses its energy as a weapon of coercion.  But that tactic has failed, just as Putin is failing on the battlefield.  I am convinced that we have crossed the Rubicon in terms of how Europe thinks about its energy relationship with Europe and there will be no going back to business as usual with Gazprom, with the Kremlin.  This is the new reality of Russia’s isolation.  And we are committed as the G7 to use our sanctions regime in the most targeted and effective way possible to reduce and restrict Russia’s ability to extract future energy resources.As a result of all of this, we are seeing major structural shifts in European energy planning and European energy flows that are going to ripple across the continent and in particular across the Western Balkans for years and years to come.In Southeastern Europe we have seen a dramatic transformation of the energy map as new interconnectors come online and open the region to alternative energy supplies and also facilitate greater regional energy integration and cooperation.  These regional projects bring both energy security and diplomatic benefits as I saw so dramatically during my time in Athens leading U.S. support for the Alexandroupolis Floating Regasification Unit, a project which will come online later this year which has as its off-takers Serbia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia with investment shares from several of these countries and a vision of facilitating even more ambitious flows to the north to Ukraine and across the Western Balkans.In the same spirit, we have been strong supporters of the TAP Pipeline, a project that I was just discussing with the Deputy Prime Minister of Albania which has literally transformed the energy map from Italy across to TANAP and Turkiye.We also of course have been strong supporters of the Krk Island FSRU in Croatia, the IGB interconnector with Bulgaria.  These are all projects that facilitate diversification of energy sources and energy routes.In the same vein, we are very strong supporters of the planned interconnector between Greece and North Macedonia which we see as bringing both energy security benefits and reinforcing the political benefits from the Prespa Agreement and the dramatic improvement in relations between Greece and North Macedonia.In both the short and the long-term the interconnectors between Bulgaria and Serbia which are set to be complete by 2023, and the Southern Interconnection between Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina which needs to advance now could further expand the region’s access to natural gas from non-Russian sources.I want to be clear.  We view natural gas as a positive step towards diversifying the region’s energy mix and as part of the pathway towards a zero carbon energy system that we all are committed to.In the near term, of course, one other benefit of these new gas interconnectors will be to reduce the region’s reliance on coal and thereby improve local air quality.  We also want to work together with all of the governments of the Western Balkans to accelerate their investment in new zero carbon alternative sources like wind, solar and geothermal.Transatlantic energy cooperation continues to contribute to the stability and transparency of global markets by promoting diversification and security, by endorsing energy efficiency measures, and by developing the technologies that we will all need to transition towards net zero by 2050.The United States is pursuing an “all of the above” strategy to support the accelerated deployment of clean energy resources.  Transitioning away from coal to clean energy sources helps to achieve our collective decarbonization targets, promotes clean energy and green jobs, and enhances energy security goals by reducing vulnerabilities and opportunities for malign influence.But of course there are challenges to our shared success.  One fundamental principle is the need to continue adherence to the Dayton Accords.  Without that the United States will be limited in our ability to help.We also hope to see the Western Balkans really commit to fighting corruption.  Corruption has a deeply corrosive impact on democratic and economic development and thus to the energy security of the region.We also want to seize this moment to make real progress in helping our European and Western Balkans allies find viable alternatives to imports from Russia, including fuel substitutes, and implementing demand reduction strategies to use energy resources more effectively.To conclude, I want to underline that the United States and our allies and partners are more united today than ever before in our determination to stand up to Russia, to ensure global energy security, and to accelerate the clean energy transition and in a just and equitable manner.The Western Balkans is very much part of this larger story.  It’s a story that I’ve been privileged to participate in through the past seven years of my diplomatic career and I very much appreciate, Sasha, the opportunity to be part of the discussions today.Thank you very much, and I look forward to hearing the further conversation.
- Montenegro Statehood Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Montenegro as you celebrate your Statehood Day.This year, we are encouraged by Montenegro’s national elections and its democratic transition of power.  We support all those who seek to accelerate their country’s EU accession as Montenegro takes its rightful place as a full member of the European community, strengthening the country’s unity and resilience.  A tolerant, inclusive, and democratic Montenegro firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community will lead to a more prosperous and secure future for all citizens.As NATO Allies, our countries have made great strides in our defense and security relationship.  Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine is a grim reminder that we must all be diligent in defending our freedom, which the United States is proud to do alongside NATO Ally Montenegro.  I look forward to ensuring that our deep friendship continues to grow stronger in the year ahead.
- Montenegro HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Montenegro				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Montenegro																																					Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons																																																																																																				 In this section										/																							MONTENEGRO (Tier 2 Watch List)																																													MONTENEGRO (Tier 2 Watch List)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								MONTENEGRO (Tier 2 Watch List)				The Government of Montenegro does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.  These efforts included prosecuting more defendants and identifying more trafficking victims.  The government adopted the NAP for 2022, and government coordinating bodies met consistently.  However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity.  The government did not convict any traffickers and reorganized the police office dedicated to investigating trafficking, which reduced its ability to conduct proactive investigations.  The government did not quickly act and establish alternative means of victim protection after experts published credible allegations of abuse by an employee with management duties of the government-funded, NGO-run anti-trafficking shelter (anti-trafficking shelter), including physical violence against victims, intimidation, and blackmail.  Following the misconduct allegations, civil society and international organizations ceased victim referrals to the anti-trafficking shelter.  While the state prosecution initiated an investigation against an employee of the shelter, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) did not suspend the anti-trafficking shelter’s license and funding and continued to refer two child victims and allocate funding to the shelter until the grant ended in December 2022.  Thereafter, the MLSW did not renew the anti-trafficking shelter’s grant, and the government decided to start renovating a government-run shelter for child trafficking victims.  Consequently, there was no alternative shelter or specialized assistance for trafficking victims at the end of the reporting period.  The government attempted to organize accommodations for child victims in foster families; however, it did not develop a concrete plan to provide victim protection for adult victims.  Therefore Montenegro was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Establish and provide victim protection, including specialized accommodation, assistance, and support for adult and child trafficking victims.Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and convict traffickers using Article 444 of the criminal code, rather than lesser offenses (when possible), including by ensuring adequate staffing and specialization among police officers.Allocate sufficient resources for victim protection, establish standards and guidelines for victim protection, and hire and train staff to provide specialized victim assistance.Increase proactive identification efforts for trafficking victims and screen for trafficking among individuals engaged in commercial sex, migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, seasonal workers, and other at-risk populations.Provide advanced training to judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement on trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including collecting evidence on subtle forms of coercion or the use of specialized investigative techniques.Increase access to justice and victim-witness assistance for victims, including access to experienced attorneys and Romani interpreters.Integrate Romani groups into decision-making processes regarding victim protection.Create and finance an accessible compensation fund and inform victims of their right to compensation during legal proceedings.Regulate and monitor labor recruitment agencies.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government decreased law enforcement efforts.  Article 444 of the criminal code criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from one to ten years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.  Law enforcement investigated three cases, compared with two cases in 2021.  The government prosecuted six defendants, compared with three defendants in 2021.  Courts did not convict any traffickers, compared with one sex trafficker in 2021 sentenced to one year and two months’ imprisonment.  The government initiated an investigation of misconduct by a management employee of the anti-trafficking shelter for “negligence at work” and “abuse and unlawful deprivation of liberty.”  Positively, the government maintained a multi-disciplinary operational task force to identify and investigate trafficking.  However, the government reorganized the National Police Directorate’s (NPD) office responsible for investigating trafficking.  Following the reorganization, the government moved the Department for Illegal Smuggling, Human Trafficking, and Illegal Migration to a sub-group within the NPD’s Department for Suppression of Serious Crime (DSSC).  This reorganization reduced the NPD’s anti-trafficking police inspectors’ ability to assign specialized officers for trafficking cases in local police offices, according to experts, who reported the DSSC’s jurisdiction also included terrorism, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking.Police conducted law enforcement actions in bars, nightclubs, commercial sex venues, escort agencies, and businesses suspected of illegal employment practices; but these raids did not result in any trafficking investigations in 2022 or 2021.  Basic State Prosecutor’s Offices (BSPO) relied almost exclusively on victim testimony with little corroborating evidence; and GRETA reported authorities prosecuted possible sex trafficking cases under lesser crimes that prescribed significantly lower penalties than those available under the trafficking law, such as “brokering in prostitution” (Article 210), due to a lack of sufficient evidence.  In 2022, courts processed many trafficking cases slowly due to a legal amendment that established a retirement age for judges, requiring those that reached or exceeded the age limit to step down, which caused significant delays in transferring and bringing cases to final judgement.  Separately, experts reported some prosecutors stopped potential trafficking investigations when they secured enough evidence to prosecute under other offenses and did not investigate for more subtle forms of coercion or seek additional evidence through specialized investigative techniques.  Law enforcement and social workers justified cases of potential forced child begging, forced labor, and forced criminality involving Roma as traditional cultural practices and customs rather than investigating for evidence of trafficking.  Case referral procedures required the Higher State Prosecutor’s Office (HSPO) to initially review all trafficking-related cases and refer cases not deemed as trafficking to BSPO.  The government, with financial and technical assistance from international organizations and a foreign donor, provided training to – and maintained institutionalized training programs for – police, prosecutors, and judges on various anti-trafficking issues.  The government cooperated with North Macedonian authorities to extradite a suspect to North Macedonia.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government decreased victim protection efforts.  The government identified seven victims, compared with three victims in 2021.  Of these, three women from Russia were victims of sex trafficking and two girls and two boys from Montenegro were victims of forced labor.  First responders carried out the preliminary identification of possible victims and then contacted police, who recognized the individuals as potential victims.  The government reported screening foreign nationals and individuals in commercial sex for trafficking indicators; however, police and prosecutors generally did not seek to proactively identify victims, according to experts and observers, who reported most ongoing trafficking cases were referred by NGOs rather than initiated by law enforcement.  GRETA reported continued gaps in screening and identifying victims among asylum-seekers and migrants; police did not make identification efforts during the summer tourism season to screen the influx of seasonal workers from neighboring countries.  The government maintained the Team for Formal Identification of Trafficking Victims (TFITV) to assess and officially recognize potential victims and coordinate victim care and placement.  TFITV used SOPs for identifying and referring victims to services, which eliminated the requirement for victims to cooperate with law enforcement to receive services.  TFITV comprised a doctor, a psychologist, an NGO representative, a police officer, a social worker from the Center for Social Work, and a representative from the Office for the Fight against Trafficking in Persons (TIP office); TFITV met 22 times and conducted eight field missions, compared with meeting 15 times and conducting eight field missions in 2021.  The government, with financial and technical assistance from international organizations, provided training on victim identification and assistance to police, labor inspectors, health workers, social workers, and municipality officials.In 2020, MLSW opened a call for proposals and selected an NGO to establish an anti-trafficking shelter.  In 2022, experts and the Ombudsman’s Office published credible allegations of abuse by an employee of the NGO-run anti-trafficking shelter, including physical violence against victims, intimidation, and blackmail.  While the employee officially resigned in August 2022, the employee reportedly maintained influence in the shelter’s operations.  Following the misconduct allegations, civil society and international organizations ceased victim referrals to the anti-trafficking shelter.  MLSW reported the inability to immediately suspend the license and funding of the shelter and continued to allocate €60,000 ($64,100) for operational costs and €250.00 ($270) per victim per month assisted at the shelter; the shelter accommodated at least two child victims even after credible allegations were known.  The MLSW did not renew the shelter’s grant after it ended in December 2022, and the government adopted a decision to open a government-run shelter for child trafficking victims (the new shelter for child victims).  The government reported plans to renovate a building for the new shelter for child victims that was co-located on the premises of a shelter for children with behavioral issues; however, renovations had not finished at the end of the reporting period.  International organizations and NGOs also voiced their concerns with hastily opening a new shelter and recommended competent NGOs and staff assist in the process.  Until the government opened the new shelter for child victims, there was no alternative shelter or specialized assistance for trafficking victims.  While the government attempted to organize foster families for child victims after credible allegations were known, it failed to develop a concrete plan to provide victim assistance for adult victims.The law allowed foreign victims to acquire temporary residence permits from three months to one year, with the ability to extend; no victims applied for temporary residence permits in 2022 or 2021.  The law provided victim-witness assistance, free legal aid, and a psychologist to participate in prosecutions; seven victims participated in prosecutions.  However, observers continued to report the government assigned lawyers with little or no experience to victims aid, including lawyers with experience in only civil proceedings and not criminal proceedings.  The government operated support services for victims and witnesses in 15 first instance courts and two high courts that provided assistance during proceedings, including legal and logistical assistance, and measures to prevent re-traumatization.  Authorities hired interpreters when necessary from an official list of court interpreters, although the list did not include a Romani interpreter.  Judges did not issue restitution in criminal cases or seize assets and property from traffickers towards restitution and/or compensation.  Similarly, courts have not awarded any victims compensation in civil proceedings; civil proceedings frequently last two to five years which discourages victims from seeking such compensation.  The law on compensation of victims, intended to provide financial assistance to victims of violent crimes, will not go into effect until Montenegro becomes a member of the EU.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained prevention efforts.  The government implemented the national anti-trafficking strategy for 2019-2024 and adopted the NAP for 2022.  The government maintained a coordination body for monitoring the implementation of the strategy and NAP, which is composed of NPD, HSPO, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Justice, other relevant ministries, and several local NGOs; the coordination body met twice.  The national coordinator led the TIP office and overall anti-trafficking efforts and chaired the trafficking in persons working group, which consisted of government agencies, civil society organizations, and the international community.  The government allocated €100,806 ($ 107,700) to the TIP office within the MOI, compared with €96,102 ($102,670) in 2021.  The TIP office published limited information on anti-trafficking efforts but, in previous years, experts reported difficulties in sharing and obtaining information from relevant government actors.  The government maintained a cooperation agreement (signed in 2020) between law enforcement, relevant ministries, and six NGOs to strengthen anti-trafficking efforts.  The government continued to award five NGOs a total of €40,000 ($42,740) to raise public awareness on trafficking.  The TIP office, with financial support from a foreign donor and international organizations, continued their multi-year awareness campaign to promote the government funded NGO-run hotline for trafficking victims and produced informational flyers in Ukrainian on trafficking and distributed them to those fleeing Russia’s war against Ukraine.  The government continued to finance an NGO-run hotline for trafficking victims; the hotline received 2,552 calls but most calls focused on obtaining information or reports of other forms of violence (2,961 calls in 2021).  The labor inspectorate, which was trained on indicators of trafficking, inspected businesses and identified workers with contract violations but did not provide data for 2022, compared with identifying 945 contract violations in 2021 and resolving contract violations 234 workers in 2021).  The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.  The government did not have procedures in place to regulate labor recruitment agencies.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Montenegro, and traffickers exploit victims from Montenegro abroad.  Traffickers are predominantly men between ages 25 and 49 and members of organized criminal groups that operate in the Western Balkans.  Victims of sex trafficking identified in Montenegro are primarily women and girls from Montenegro, neighboring Balkan countries, and, to a lesser extent, other countries in Eastern Europe.  Traffickers exploit victims in the hospitality industry, including bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and cafes.  Children, particularly Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptian children, are exploited in forced begging.  Romani girls from Montenegro reportedly have been sold into marriages and forced into domestic servitude in Romani communities in Montenegro and, to a lesser extent, in Albania, Germany, and Kosovo.  Migrants from neighboring countries are vulnerable to forced labor, particularly during the summer tourism season.  Transnational organized criminal groups exploit some Montenegrin women and girls in sex trafficking in other Balkan countries.  In 2020, traffickers recruited Taiwanese workers, confiscated their passports and restricted their movement, and set up a call center where they forced the Taiwanese victims to make fraudulent calls.																																				    							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