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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. MICHAEL DAVID BRAMHA LL Appellant No. 1383 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 15 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland Coun ty Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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- CR -0001531-2011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2014 Michael David Bramhall appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberlan d County, after a jury convicted him of simple assault 1 and aggravated assault. 2 Upon review, we affirm. On November 16, 2011, at approximately 6:50 p.m., several officers from the Northumberland County Probation Office arri ved at Bramhall’s house looking for his daughter, Maryann. An arrest wa rrant was issued for

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). Following the imposition of sentence, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion requesting thi s charge to be nolle prossed on February 14, 2013.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6).J-S37009- 14

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Maryann after she absconded from supervision. 3 When the probation officers (“P.O.s”) arrived at Bramhall’s residence, they ask ed if Maryann was inside, to which Bramhall replied “no.” Bramhall asked the P.O.s to meet him at the back door because his front door was inoperab le. At the back door, Probation Officer Dan Shoop explained to Bramh all that Maryann had absconded from supervision and they wanted to speak with him about her whereabouts. Without opening the door, Bramhall tol d the P.O.s that they should come back with a warrant. Upon their return, the P.O.s explained to Bramhall that they just wanted to speak about Maryann. At trial, P.O. Shoop testified that Bramhall invited them in; however, Bramhall maintains that he never let the P.O.s
in side. Officer Shoop also testified that when he opened the back door, he saw that Bramhall was holding a shotgun. The P.O.s ins tinctively drew their weapons, resulting in Bramhall becoming agitated. Bra mhall then began thumping his gun on the floor whil e saying “[C]ross the line. See what happens. Cross this line.” N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at 44 . Feeling fearful, the P.O.s backed their way out of the residence. Id. at 45, 150. Approximately ten minutes later, Bramhall received a call from 911, asking him to step outside and speak with the Coal Tow nship Police Officers

____________________________________________ 3 As a condition of her probation, Maryann was prohibi ted from contacting her father; however, the probation officers had exhau sted their avenues of inquiry with all other relations and felt it necessary to follow up with Bramhall as next of ki n.J-S37009- 14

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who had arrived on the scene. Bramhall acquiesced and e xited the house with his hands above his head. The police officers placed Bramhall in handcuffs while the P.O.s executed a search of the reside nce in order to determine whether anyone was inside the house, if ther e were more weapons, and secure the house. The police officers relea sed Bramhall approximately twenty minutes later. A criminal complaint was filed against Bramhall on Nove mber 16, 2011. On October 25, 2012, a jury trial took place, with a guilty verdict rendered that same day. The court imposed a sentence of three to eighteen months’ imprisonment on January 14, 2013. On Februar y 25, 2013, Bramhall filed post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law on June 26, 2013. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Bramhall presents the following issues for ou r review:
1. Whether the court erred when it granted the Commonwe alth’s motion in limine permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence of bad acts that did not demonstrate a common plan or scheme on the part of [Bramhall]. 2. Whether the court erred when it denied [Bramhall] th e opportunity to present his defense pursuant to the Seco nd Amendment right to possess a firearm inside his household. 3. In consideration of the multitude of inconsistencies in t he Commonwealth’s testimony, whether the court erred when it denied [Bramhall’s] demurrer at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence. 4. Whether the court erred when it denied [Bramhall’s] motion for judgment of acquittal following the jury’s verdict

. 5. Whether the court erred when it failed to grant [Bra mhall’s] motion for arrest of judgment at sentencing in consider ationJ-S37009- 14

- 4 - of the numerous inconsistencies in the Commonwealt h’s testimony. Brief of Appellant, at 3. In his first issue, Bramhall argues that the trial court erred when it granted the portion of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine requesting admission into evidence of a letter that Bramhall had written to public officials about certain officers in the Northumberland C ounty Adult Probation Department and the department in general. The lett er alleged that on two occasions, Northumberland County Probation officers broke into his daughter’s apa rtment and beat her before arresting her. In his let ter, Bramhall compared the Northumberland County Probatio n Department to Hitler’s gestapo and included a direct threat of physical violence to one P.O. in particular. Bramhall believes the trial court impr operly admitted this evidence of a prior bad act because the subject matter of the letter was unrelated to what occurred on the night in question.
The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discr etion. In determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court must weigh the relevant and probative value of the e vidence against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. Commonwealth v. Weakley , 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009). Regarding the admission of evidence of prior bad acts o f a defendant, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide: (b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts. (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or ot her act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to showJ-S37009- 14

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that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordan ce with the character. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mi stake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is ad missible only if the probative value of the evidence outweigh s its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). This list is not exhaustive. P a.R.E. 404(b)(2) cmt. For instance, our Supreme Court has recognized a res gestae exception to Rule 404(b), “which allows admission of other crimes evide nce when relevant to furnish the context or complete story of t he events surrounding a crime.” Commonwealth v. Dillon , 925 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2007). After extensive argument on the issue prior to trial , the court determined that the probative value of the letters o utweighed any potential prejudicial effect, and admitted the letters into evi dence for establishing state of mind of both parties on the night in question. N.T. Trial, 10/25 /12, at 1-16 (emphasis added). Because the trial court prope rly applied the law regarding admission of evidence of prior bad acts, see Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), we find no abuse of discretion. In his second issue, Bramhall argues that the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to raise a defense based u pon the Second Amendment. Bramhall is mistaken and the record belies his argument. As the trial court explained, The Commonwealth’s motion in limine . . . contained a second portion, in which the Commonwealth sought to prevent [Bramhall] from raising the Second Amendment in front of theJ-S37009- 14

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jury. The [c]ourt denied this portion of the motion deliberately leaving [Bramhall] free to pursue this defense if he w ished to do so. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at [11]. Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/14, at 2. Bramhall then p roceeded to make specific reference to the Second Amendment during his opening s tatement without objection from the Commonwealth or interference from the bench. N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at 227-28. As the record reflects, th e trial court did not deny Bramhall the opportunity to present a Second Ame ndment defense. 4 Bramhall’s three remaining claims all raise the same issue See Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(1), (4), and (5) (allowing moti ons for judgment of acquittal at close of the Commonwealth’s case, after jur y renders its verdict, and at sentencing). 5 Therefore, we will address them as a single challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Bramahall ’s conviction for aggravated assault. The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of t he evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every elem ent of the

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4 Bramhall ultimately failed to make any meaningful attempt at a Second Amendment argument or defense. Therefore, when Bram hall requested a specific jury instruction on justification, the trial cour t denied it, noting that the facts presented during trial did not suggest that s uch an instruction would be appropriate. N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at 304

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5 We note that the terms “demurrer” and “motion in arrest of judgment” were discarded in 1993 in favor of the standardized t erm “motion for judgment of acqui ttal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 606 cmt. Further, inadvertent u se of “demurrer” does not affect an otherwise valid sufficiency challenge, and a defendant does not waive a sufficiency challenge by put ting on his own evidence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(B).J-S37009- 14

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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the abo ve test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgm ent for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts reg arding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact -finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonabl e doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be eva luated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Final ly, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of wi tnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believ e all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Brown , 23 A.3d 544, 559-60 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson , 947 A.2d 800, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2008). A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “ attempts by physical menace to put any of the officers, agents, employees . . . while in the performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious bod ily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6). Here, the trial court determined that the evidence w as sufficient to

re asonably support a finding of guilt by the jury. Tri al Court Opinion, 1/6/14, at 4. After reviewing all of the evidence a dmitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict win ner, we agree that the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find each element of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. When B ramhall thumped his gun on the floor and dared the P.O.’s to “cross the line ,” he physicallyJ-S37009- 14

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menaced the officers and placed them in fear of imminen t serious bodil y injury. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Bramhall’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2014