NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER CLAY ROMANTUTTLE, AKA Sarahsong, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50191 

D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00722-PA-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2021**

Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. 

Christopher Clay Roman-Tuttle appeals from the district court’s judgment 

and challenges the 300-month sentence and three conditions of supervised release 

imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for advertising child pornography in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) and (e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 25 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-50191 

§ 1291. We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part. 

Tuttle contends that the 300-month sentence is substantively unreasonable 

because it creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity and fails to account for the 

allegedly flawed child pornography Guideline and his mitigating circumstances. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). The below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light 

of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, 

including the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public. See 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Whatever the merits of Tuttle’s criticism of the child 

pornography Guideline—a criticism that Tuttle did not raise to the district court—

the district court did not impose a sentence within the range dictated by that 

Guideline. Moreover, the record reflects that the court considered Tuttle’s 

mitigating arguments, as well as his sentencing disparity arguments, and was not 

persuaded that they warranted a lower sentence. 

Tuttle also challenges the residency restriction imposed in special condition 

16. The district court did not plainly err in imposing this condition. See United 

States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (if counsel does not 

object to a supervised release condition in the district court, this court reviews the 

condition for plain error). The residency restriction is reasonably related to the 

goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and public protection, and does not involve a 
3 19-50191 

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary in Tuttle’s case. See 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d). Moreover, Tuttle has not provided support for his assertion that 

he will be unable to find compliant housing upon his release. See Wolf Child, 699 

F.3d at 1095 (to prevail on plain error review, appellant must show the alleged 

error affected his substantial rights).

Finally, Tuttle challenges two conditions of supervised release on the ground 

that they are unconstitutionally vague. As the government concedes, this court has 

previously determined that standard condition 14 is unconstitutionally vague. See

United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2020). The government 

further concedes that, in this case, special condition 13 is impermissibly vague as 

to which “victims” the district court intended to include in the condition.

1

 See 

United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we 

vacate standard condition 14 and special condition 13, and remand for the district 

court to strike or modify the conditions. See Magdirila, 962 F.3d at 1159. 

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part. 

1 The parties appear to dispute whether the victim or victims need to be identified 

by name to remedy the condition. We do not reach this issue. See United States v. 

Ped, 943 F.3d 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2019) (the district court is better suited to craft 

appropriate supervised release conditions on remand).