alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

A RACELI GARDEA

,

Appellant

,

v.

JOSE GARDEA

,

Appellee

. §

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 23

- 00 2 14

- CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 5

o f El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2 023DCM 1824 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before this Court is Appellant’s motion to voluntarily dismiss this appeal

. The motion to

dismiss is granted , and this appeal is dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a) (1) (allowing appe llate

courts to dismiss an appeal on the motion of the appellant). Costs of the appeal are taxed against

Appellant. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(d).

J EFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

January 11 , 202 4

Before Alley , C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
HomeTimor-Leste

# Timor-Leste

53 items

        -    Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet  		U.S. Relations With Timor-Leste	  April 25, 2022 
        -    Press Statement  		Timor-Leste Presidential Election	  Ned PriceApril 21, 2022 
        -    Report  		2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Timor-Leste	  April 12, 2022 
        -    		Three New Assisted Schools in 2021-2022	  November 12, 2021 
        -    Report  		2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Timor-Leste	  July 1, 2021 
        -    Press Statement  		Timor-Leste National Day	  Antony J. BlinkenMay 19, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Timor-Leste	  May 12, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Timor-Leste	  March 30, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Investment Climate Statements: Timor-Leste	  September 8, 2020 
        -    Report  		2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Timor-Leste	  June 25, 2020 

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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

November 9, 2010 

Order 

 

November 9, 2010 

139996(54) 

139997 

ERNEST HORVATH, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139996-7 

 COA: 283931, 284842 

Wayne CC: 07-713287-NI 

DON JOHNSON and SUBURBAN 

MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL 

TRANSPORTATION, d/b/a SMART, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

______________________________________ 

 On order of the Chief Justice, the motion by the Michigan Association for Justice 

for leave to file a brief amicus curiae in this case is considered and it is GRANTED.
§ 1001.801 Failure of HMOs and CMPs to furnish medically necessary items and services. ( a ) *Circumstances for exclusion.* The OIG may exclude an entity— ( 1 ) That is a— ( i ) Health maintenance organization (HMO), as defined in section 1903(m) of the Act, providing items or services under a State Medicaid Plan;
( ii ) Primary care case management system providing services, in accordance with a waiver approved under section 1915(b)(1) of the Act; or
( iii ) HMO or competitive medical plan providing items or services in accordance with a risk-sharing contract under section 1876 of the Act;
( 2 ) That has failed substantially to provide medically necessary items and services that are required under a plan, waiver or contract described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section to be provided to individuals covered by such plan, waiver or contract; and
( 3 ) Where such failure has adversely affected or has a substantial likelihood of adversely affecting covered individuals.
( b ) The OIG's determination under paragraph (a)(2) of this section—that the medically necessary items and services required under law or contract were not provided—will be made on the basis of information, including sanction reports, from the following sources: ( 1 ) The QIO or other quality assurance organization under contract with a State Medicaid plan for the area served by the HMO or competitive medical plan;
( 2 ) State or local licensing or certification authorities;
( 3 ) Fiscal agents or contractors, or private insurance companies;
( 4 ) State or local professional societies;
( 5 ) CMS's HMO compliance office; or
( 6 ) Any other sources deemed appropriate by the OIG.
( c ) *Length of exclusion.* ( 1 ) An exclusion imposed in accordance with this section will be for a period of 3 years, unless aggravating or mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section form a basis for lengthening or shortening the period.
( 2 ) Any of the following factors may be considered aggravating and a basis for lengthening the period of exclusion— ( i ) The entity failed to provide a large number or a variety of items or services;
( ii ) The failures occurred over a lengthy period of time;
( iii ) The entity's failure to provide a necessary item or service that had or could have had a serious adverse effect;
( iv ) Whether the individual or entity has a documented history of criminal, civil or administrative wrongdoing; or
( v ) The individual or entity has been the subject of any other adverse action by any Federal, State or local government agency or board, if the adverse action is based on the same set of circumstances that serves as the basis for the imposition of the exclusion.
( 3 ) Only the following factors may be considered as mitigating and a basis for reducing the period of exclusion— ( i ) There were few violations and they occurred over a short period of time; or
( ii ) The entity took corrective action upon learning of impermissible activities by an employee or contractor.
[57 FR 3330, Jan. 29, 1992, as amended at 63 FR 46688, Sept. 2, 1998; 82 FR 4114, Jan. 12, 2017]
§ 31.13 Use of other than Service facilities. ( a ) When a person specified in § 31.11 who is on active duty requires immediate medical, surgical, or dental treatment or hospitalization and the urgency of the situation does not permit treatment at a medical relief station or by a designated physician or designated dentist, an officer or other appropriate supervisory official of the Coast Guard may arrange for treatment or hospitalization.
( b ) In every such case of treatment or hospitalization, a full report thereof shall be submitted to the Surgeon General through Coast Guard headquarters. As soon as practicable, unless the interests of the patient or the Government require otherwise, treatment or hospitalization shall be continued at a medical relief station or by a designated physician or designated dentist or at another appropriate Federal medical facility.
( c ) When the necessary medical relief cannot be obtained from a medical relief station or a designated physician or designated dentist, preference shall be given to other Federal medical facilities when reasonably available and when conditions permit.
( d ) Vouchers on proper forms covering expenses for treatment or hospitalization under the circumstances specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall be forwarded to the Surgeon General through Coast Guard headquarters. Each such voucher shall be accompanied by or contain a statement of the facts necessitating the treatment or hospitalization. Unreasonable charges for emergency treatment or hospitalization will not be allowed.
( e ) Expenses for consultants or special services, or for dental treatment other than emergency measures to relieve pain, shall not be allowed except when authorized in advance by the headquarters of the Service or, in extraordinary cases, when subsequently approved by such headquarters upon receipt of report and satisfactory explanation as to the necessity and urgency therefor.
(Sec. 610(b), 58 Stat. 714 as amended; 33 U.S.C. 763c)
694 A.2d 1099

#### William H. URBAN, Jr., Petitioner, v. RADICE CORPORATION, a Corporation; Radice Office Building One, Inc., a Corporation v. Robert COLOSIMO d/b/a Public Parking of Pittsburgh Company, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 3, 1997.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 3rd day of July, 1997, we GRANT the Petition for Allowance of Appeal limited to the issue of whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury to apply the ‘hills and ridges’ doctrine.
§ 800.1001 Determinations. ( a ) The Committee may determine at any time that a foreign state has established and is effectively utilizing a robust process to analyze foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate coordination with the United States on matters relating to investment security.
( b ) The Committee may rescind a determination under paragraph (a) of this section if the Committee determines that such a rescission is appropriate.
( c ) The Chairperson of the Committee shall publish a notice of any determination or rescission of a determination under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, respectively, in the Federal Register.
Document

Exhibit 10.1
FIRST AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS


This First Amendment to Agreement for Distribution of Products (this “Amendment”) is entered into between Whole Foods Market Distribution, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“WFM”), and United Natural Foods, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“UNFI”), as of March 3, 2021.


RECITALS:


A.WFM and UNFI entered into that certain Agreement for Distribution of Products dated October 30, 2015 (the “Distribution Agreement”).


B.WFM and UNFI desire to amend the Distribution Agreement to extend the Term as set forth herein.


AGREEMENT:


For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which WFM and UNFI hereby acknowledge, WFM and UNFI agree as follows:


1.Recitals. The Recitals are incorporated into and made a part of this Amendment by reference.


2.Term.  Effective as of the date of this Amendment, Section 1 of the Distribution Agreement is hereby terminated in its entirety and replaced with the following:


1.  Term.  
(a) This Agreement shall commence as of September 28, 2015 (the “Effective Date”) and expire on September 27, 2027 (the “Term”).


3.   Exhibit A.  Effective as of the date of this Amendment, Exhibit A to the Distribution Agreement is hereby updated to conform to the Term of the Distribution Agreement.


4.    Incorporation of Terms.  The terms of this Amendment shall be fully incorporated into the terms of the Distribution Agreement, which shall be modified as set forth herein.


5.    Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.  The execution and delivery of this Amendment may be evidenced by electronic transmission of a signed copy of this Amendment and each party consents to the use of electronic signatures.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WFM and UNFI have executed this Amendment as of the date first set forth above.


															
	Whole Foods Market Distribution, Inc.		United Natural Foods, Inc.
					
	By: /s/ Bart Beilman                      
		By: /s/ Steven Spinner                

	Bart Beilman		Steven L. Spinner, CEO & Chairman
	SVP of Supply Chain and Retail Ops
#### § 598.411 Charitable contributions.

Unless specifically authorized by OFAC pursuant to this part, no charitable contribution of funds, goods, services, or technology, including contributions to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, or medicine, may be made by, to, or for the benefit of, or received from, a specially designated narcotics trafficker. For the purposes of this part, a contribution is made by, to, or for the benefit of, or received from, a specially designated narcotics trafficker if made by, to, or in the name of, or received from or in the name of, such a person; if made by, to, or in the name of, or received from or in the name of, an entity or individual acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such a person; or if made in an attempt to violate, to evade, or to avoid the bar on the provision of contributions by, to, or for the benefit of such a person, or the receipt of contributions from such a person.

[86 FR 26669, May 17, 2021]
#### Robert Lee BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 74-535.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 17, 1974.

Appeal dismissed.
HomeJamaica

# Jamaica

87 items

        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (05-923) – Agreement Regarding the Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System	  September 23, 2005 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (04-0921) – Agreement Regarding a Debt-for-Nature Swap to Prepay or Cancel Certain Debt Owed by the Government of Jamaica to the Government of the United States	  September 21, 2004 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (01-822) – Agreement Regarding the Sharing of Forfeited Assets or the Proceeds of Disposition of Such Assets	  August 22, 2001 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (98-310) – Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking	  March 10, 1998 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (97-307) – Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment	  March 7, 1997 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (95-725) – Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters	  July 25, 1995 
        -    TIAS  		Jamaica (91-707) – Extradition Treaty	  July 7, 1991 

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# C_2005193EN.01000802.xml

| 6.8.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 193/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.8.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 193/8

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Fifth Chamber)

of 9 June 2005

in Case C-510/04: Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations - Directive 2002/6/EC - Formalities for ships - Failure to transpose within the prescribed period)

(2005/C 193/13)

Language of the case: French

In Case C-510/04 Commission of the European Communities (Agents: K. Simonsson and W. Wils) v Kingdom of Belgium (Agent: M. Wimmer) — action under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, brought on 13 December 2004 — the Court (Fifth Chamber), composed of R. Silva de Lapuerta, President of the Chamber, G. Arestis and J. Klučka (Rapporteur), Judges; P. Léger, Advocate General; R. Grass, Registrar, gave a judgment on 9 June 2005, in which it:

Commission of the European Communities

Kingdom of Belgium

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to adopt within the prescribed period the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2002/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States of the Community, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt within the prescribed period the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2002/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States of the Community, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | Orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 31 of 5.2.2005.

1

---
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**pursuant
      to**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**as
      adopted pursuant to**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








I,
      Robert
      Y. Lee, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of
      Hydromer, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2006 fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on
      Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition
      and
      results of operations of Hydromer, Inc.





Date:
      September 27, 2006  By: /s/
      Robert Y. Lee


Robert
      Y.
      Lee


Vice
      President, Chief Financial Officer
# C_2005155EN.01000902.xml

| 25.6.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/9

---

Action brought on 28 April 2005 by the Commission of the European Communities against the Portuguese Republic

(Case C-191/05)

(2005/C 155/18)

Language of the case: Portuguese

An action against the Portuguese Republic was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on 28 April 2005 by the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Michel van Beek and António Caeiros, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg.

The Commission of the European Communities claims that the Court should:

| 1. | declare that, by altering the demarcation of the Moura, Mourão e Barrancos Special Protection Area (SPA), excluding from it areas providing a habitat for species of wild birds for whose protection that SPA was designated, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79/409/EEC (1) of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds; |
| --- | --- |

1.

declare that, by altering the demarcation of the Moura, Mourão e Barrancos Special Protection Area (SPA), excluding from it areas providing a habitat for species of wild birds for whose protection that SPA was designated, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79/409/EEC (1) of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds;

1

| 2. | order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

| 1. | The Moura, Mourão e Barrancos Special Protection Area (SPA) was established by the Portuguese Government on 23 September 1999 by Decree-Law No 384-B/99 of 23 September 1999. The boundaries of that SPA are laid down in Annex XXIV to that piece of legislation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Moura, Mourão e Barrancos Special Protection Area (SPA) was established by the Portuguese Government on 23 September 1999 by Decree-Law No 384-B/99 of 23 September 1999. The boundaries of that SPA are laid down in Annex XXIV to that piece of legislation.

| 2. | It is clear from the information provided by the Portuguese authorities that the alteration of the demarcation of the Moura, Mourão e Barrancos SPA by Decree-Law No 141/2002 of 20 May 2002 has no scientific basis. However, it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that species whose protection was considered necessary can be excluded only on scientific grounds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

It is clear from the information provided by the Portuguese authorities that the alteration of the demarcation of the Moura, Mourão e Barrancos SPA by Decree-Law No 141/2002 of 20 May 2002 has no scientific basis. However, it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that species whose protection was considered necessary can be excluded only on scientific grounds.

---

(1)  OJ 1979 L 103, p. 1.

1

---
40411.

#### CAIN v. CHAMBLESS.

Frankum, Judge.

The assignment of error in this case is on the judgment of the trial court sustaining a motion to dismiss in the nature of a general demurrer addressed to the purported cross action of the defendant in the case of *Chambless v. Cain,*ante. Paragraph 12 of the answer and cross action of the defendant in that case, which is the only portion of the defendant’s pleading material to the issue thus presented, reads as follows: “This defendant shows that although only $2,000 indebtedness has accrued under the option entered into between the defendant and the plaintiff, this defendant has paid to the plaintiff the sum of $4,000, and is entitled to recover of the plaintiff the sum of $2,000 on and after July 10, 1963, if, prior to July 10, 1963, plaintiff shall not have made a deed to the defendant conveying fee simple title thereto, (a) This defendant paid to the plaintiff $1,000 on July 10, 1961, and this defendant paid to the plaintiff the additional and further sum of $3,000 on March 20,1962.”

1‘. One of the assignments of error to the sustaining of the motion to dismiss is that it was contrary to the law of the case established by the. previous ruling and judgment of the court overruling certain demurrers addressed to this paragraph. However, an examination of the record shows that the prior order of the court dealt only with two special demurrers attacking the allegations of this paragraph on the ground that they were conclusions of the pleader and because no copy of the option contract referred to therein was attached as an exhibit. Clearly, these grounds of demurrer did not present any question as to the sufficiency of the pleading attacked so that a judgment overruling them constituted an adjudication that paragraph 12 of the answer and cross action was sufficient to set forth a cause of action, and such judgment was no bar to the action of the court in subsequently entertaining a motion to strike in the nature of a general demurrer. *Kelly v. Strouse,*116 Ga. 872 (5a) 883 (43 SE 280).

2. Assuming that paragraph 12 of the defendant’s answer may have otherwise been sufficient as a cause of action or cross complaint against the plaintiff, it clearly alleges that the right of the defendant to recover the sum of $2,000 from the plaintiff accrued only on and after July 10, 1963, if prior *167to that date plaintiff shall not have made the defendant a deed conveying fee simple title to the property. This answer and cross action, having been filed on October 10, 1962, affirmatively shows that the cause of action, if any the defendant has against the plaintiff, had not accrued at the time it was filed, and in the absence of any allegation setting forth some reason why the defendant would be entitled to recover sooner, it was properly dismissed on motion of the plaintiff. *Crosby v. Ga. Realty Co.,*138 Ga. 746 (1a) (76 SE 38); *Kingsdale Apts. v. Board of Lights &c. of Marietta,*219 Ga. 49, 50 (131 SE2d 557).

Decided January 29, 1964.

*Zachary & Hunter, John L. Coney,*for plaintiff in error.

*George C. Kennedy,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*