National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

National Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

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NTSB

Permit No. G-200

Highway Accident Report

Passenger Vehicle Median Crossover 

and Head-On Collision 

With Another Passenger Vehicle 

Linden, New Jersey

May 1, 2003 

NTSB/HAR-06/02

PB2006-916202 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7754 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted February 7, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Passenger Vehicle Median Crossover and Head-On 

Collision With Another Passenger Vehicle, Linden, New Jersey, May 1, 2003. Highway Accident 

Report NTSB/HAR-06/02. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On May 1, 2003, about 2:11 a.m., eastern daylight time, a 1998 Mercedes Benz CLK320, driven 

by a 34-year-old off-duty police officer, was traveling southbound on U.S. Route 1 through the city of 

Linden in Union County, New Jersey. The vehicle was traveling in the right lane of a six-lane divided 

highway. The weather was clear, and the roadway was dry, except for a puddle of water adjacent to a 

service station on the west side of the roadway. Near milepost 41.4, the Mercedes, traveling 48 to 62 mph, 

hit the curb on the west side of the road and swerved to the left. The Mercedes crossed the other two 

southbound lanes; mounted and crossed an 11.5-foot-wide, 6-inch-high raised concrete curb median; and 

entered the northbound lanes, where it collided head on with a 1986 Ford Taurus traveling in the left 

northbound lane. The Mercedes rolled up and over the Ford and landed on its roof. The Mercedes slid 

approximately 80 feet across the northbound lanes and struck a wooden utility pole next to the east side of 

the roadway, where it came to rest straddling the right northbound lane and the grassy area to the east of the 

roadway. Following the collision, the Ford remained upright, rotated about 163 degrees counterclockwise, 

and slid about 50 feet, where it came to rest in the right northbound lane. The Ford was occupied by a 

33-year-old driver and four passengers ranging in age from 18 to 31. The drivers of both vehicles and three 

of the four Ford Taurus passengers died at the scene. The fourth Ford passenger died several hours later in 

a hospital.

Major safety issues identified in this report are alcohol impairment, speed enforcement, and evaluative 

criteria for median barrier installation. As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board makes safety 

recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the city of Linden, and the American 

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. The Safety Board also reiterates a previously 

issued recommendation to the State of New Jersey.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, 

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board 

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study 

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board 

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and 

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also 

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Records Management Division, CIO-40

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To 

purchase this publication, order report number PB2006-916202 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports 

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Preaccident Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Emergency Response and Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Toxicological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Physical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Awake/Asleep Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Mercedes Benz CLK320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ford Taurus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Roadway Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Speed Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Average Daily Traffic Count on U.S. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Accident History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Pavement Friction Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Video Surveillance Tape and Logs From Gas Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Alcohol Impairment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Speed Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Median Barrier Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Mercedes Speed Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Mercedes Driver Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Response to Another Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Alcohol Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Operator Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Roadway Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Vehicle Speed and Speed Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Median Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Reiterated Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Appendix A 

Investigation and Public Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

ADT average daily traffic

AERF Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Fund

ASOS Automated Surface Observing System

ATTF Auto Theft Task Force

BAC blood alcohol concentration

CAMI Civil Aeromedical Institute

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DWI driving while impaired/intoxicated

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

Green Book A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets

IDRC Intoxicated Driver Resource Center

I-278 Interstate 278

LPD Linden Police Department

MP milepost

NHS National Highway System

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NIAAA National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism

NJDOT New Jersey Department of Transportation

U.S. 1 U.S. Route 1
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On May 1, 2003, about 2:11 a.m., eastern daylight time, a 1998 Mercedes Benz 

CLK320, driven by a 34-year-old off-duty police officer, was traveling southbound on 

U.S. Route 1 through the city of Linden in Union County, New Jersey. The vehicle was 

traveling in the right lane of a six-lane divided highway. The weather was clear, and the 

roadway was dry, except for a puddle of water adjacent to a service station on the west 

side of the roadway.

Near milepost 41.4, the Mercedes, traveling 48 to 62 mph, hit the curb on the west 

side of the road and swerved to the left. The Mercedes crossed the other two southbound 

lanes; mounted and crossed an 11.5-foot-wide, 6-inch-high raised concrete curb median; 

and entered the northbound lanes, where it collided head on with a 1986 Ford Taurus 

traveling in the left northbound lane. The Mercedes rolled up and over the Ford and landed 

on its roof. The Mercedes slid approximately 80 feet across the northbound lanes and 

struck a wooden utility pole next to the east side of the roadway, where it came to rest 

straddling the right northbound lane and the grassy area to the east of the roadway. 

Following the collision, the Ford remained upright, rotated about 163 degrees 

counterclockwise, and slid about 50 feet, where it came to rest in the right northbound 

lane.

The Ford was occupied by a 33-year-old driver and four passengers ranging in age 

from 18 to 31. The drivers of both vehicles and three of the four Ford Taurus passengers 

died at the scene. The fourth Ford passenger died several hours later in a hospital.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the Mercedes driver’s loss of control of the vehicle due to alcohol 

impairment. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the lack of barriers 

separating traffic in the northbound and southbound traffic lanes and the failure of the 

Mercedes driver to wear his seat belt.

Major safety issues identified in this accident are alcohol impairment, speed 

enforcement, and evaluative criteria for median barrier installation. As a result of this 

accident, the Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Federal Highway 

Administration, the city of Linden, and the American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials. The Safety Board also reiterates a recommendation to the State 

of New Jersey.
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

On May 1, 2003, about 2:11 a.m., eastern daylight time, a 1998 Mercedes Benz 

CLK320 (Mercedes), driven by a 34-year-old off-duty police officer, was traveling 

southbound on U.S. Route 1 (U.S. 1) through the city of Linden in Union County, New 

Jersey. The vehicle was in the right lane of a six-lane divided highway. The weather was 

clear, and the roadway was dry, except for a puddle of water adjacent to a service station 

on the west side of the roadway.

Near milepost (MP) 41.4, the Mercedes, traveling 48 to 62 mph,1

 hit the curb on 

the west side of the road and swerved to the left. The Mercedes crossed the other two 

southbound lanes; mounted and crossed an 11.5-foot-wide, 6-inch-high raised concrete 

curb median; and entered the northbound lanes, where it collided head on with a 1986 

Ford Taurus (Ford) traveling in the left northbound lane. The Mercedes rolled up and over 

the Ford and landed on its roof. The Mercedes slid approximately 80 feet across the 

northbound lanes and struck a wooden utility pole next to the east side of the roadway, 

where it came to rest straddling the right northbound lane and the grassy area to the east of 

the roadway. Following the collision, the Ford remained upright, rotated about 163 degrees

counterclockwise, and slid about 50 feet, where it came to rest in the right northbound 

lane. (See figure 1.)

The Ford was occupied by a 33-year-old driver and four passengers ranging in age 

from 20 to 31, who were returning home from work at a local restaurant. The drivers of 

both vehicles and three of the four Ford passengers died at the scene. The fourth Ford 

passenger died several hours later in a hospital.

Preaccident Events

On Monday evening, April 28, the driver of the Mercedes played in a softball 

game that ended at about 9:00 p.m.2

 According to the driver’s brother, he remained at the 

softball field for about an hour following the game and then went to his girlfriend’s house. 

The driver’s girlfriend said the driver left her residence at 2:00 a.m. and then called her at 

2:15 a.m. on Tuesday, April 29, from his residence.

1 The vehicle’s speed was calculated based on the roadway pavement surface, pavement age, and 

roadway usage. Additional information on speed calculation is contained in the “Analysis” section of this 

report.

2 Information detailing the activities of the Mercedes driver before the accident was obtained from 

interviews conducted with family members, the driver’s supervisor, softball teammates, and a friend.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

Figure 1. Linden, New Jersey, accident scene.

Beginning of tire mark 

Utility pole

 Light pole

Driveway

 Mercedes at final rest

 Ford at final rest

0

N

Driveway

Driveway

30 60 90

 Area of impact

Driveway

to gas station

Driveway

to gas station

FEET

Area of

standing water

Mercedes engine

and transmission

Mercedes exhaust
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

According to his family, the Mercedes driver had originally been scheduled to 

work his assigned shift from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. at the Union/Essex Auto Theft Task 

Force (ATTF)3 on Tuesday, April 29, and Wednesday, April 30, but took the days off 

from work to replace or repair a damaged contact lens. The driver’s girlfriend said he 

visited her at her workplace during the day on Tuesday and left about 5:30 p.m. to run 

some errands. His family said he stayed overnight Tuesday night at a friend’s house.

On Wednesday, April 30, the Mercedes driver’s sister-in-law said she saw the 

driver at home sometime in the morning, as she was leaving to run errands, and again 

at 3:00 p.m., when she returned home. At 6:30 p.m., the driver and his brother left in 

separate cars for a softball game. Before arriving at the game, the Mercedes driver 

stopped at a local bar and bought a round of drinks for the bar; the bartender/manager 

stated that the driver did not drink at this time. The Mercedes driver played in a 

softball game that began about 7:30 p.m. and ended about 9:30 p.m. Following the 

game, he stayed at the field with several teammates. Although some team members 

said that they drank beer after the game, none said that they remembered seeing the 

driver consuming alcohol. The bartender/manager said the driver returned to the local 

bar between 11:00 p.m. and midnight but was not sure whether the driver had any 

alcohol during this visit.

About 2:00 a.m. Thursday morning, May 1, the Mercedes driver left the bar and 

was driving toward U.S. 1, when he met a friend. The Mercedes driver and his friend 

stopped to talk; they were about 850 feet from the bar. The friend said the driver did not 

appear intoxicated and that the driver told him he was heading home. The driver 

traveled about 3.35 miles before the accident occurred at 2:11 a.m. Figure 2 shows the 

location of the accident site, the driver’s home, the softball field, and the local bar 

visited by the Mercedes driver; table 1 provides approximate distances between 

locations.

3 Essex and Union County police officers rotate into the task force for 30 to 60 days and then return to 

normal duty.
Figure 2. Locations of interest.

LOCAL

BAR

SOFTBALL

FIELD

ACCIDENT

SITE

DRIVER’S

HOME

95

95

278

Garden Sta

278

te Parkway

1

1

1

Linden

Rahway

Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

Table 1. Approximate distances between locations of interest.

From To Distance

Driver’s home Softball field 7.44 miles

Softball field Local bar 1.44 miles

Local bar Accident site 3.35 miles

Accident site Driver’s home 2.79 miles

Local bar Driver’s home 6.14 miles

Injuries

According to the Union County Medical Examiner, the 34-year-old driver of the 

Mercedes died from multiple blunt-force injuries. The driver sustained blunt-force trauma 

to the head, chest, abdomen, and lower-left extremity. He was partially ejected from the 

vehicle. 

All four occupants of the Ford were fatally injured. The 33-year-old male driver of 

the Ford died of multiple blunt-force injuries to his head, blunt-force trauma to his chest 

and abdomen, and fractures to his left arm and leg. The 20-year-old female front-seat 
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

passenger sustained injuries to her head, chest, and abdomen. The left-rear passenger was 

a 31-year-old male, who sustained blunt-force trauma to his head, neck, and abdomen and 

fractures to his ribs, arms, and legs. The 20-year-old male seated in the center-rear seat 

sustained blunt-force trauma to the neck and face. The 22-year-old male right-rear 

passenger was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead approximately 

3.5 hours after the accident. He sustained multiple blunt-force trauma injuries to the head, 

chest, abdomen, and lower extremities.

Table 2 is based on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s injury criteria, 

which the National Transportation Safety Board uses in accident investigation reports.

Table 2. Injuries.*

Injury type Drivers Passengers Others Total

Fatal 2 4 0 6

Serious 0 0 0 0

Minor 0 0 0 0

None 0 0 0 0

Total 2 4 0 6

*Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death within 30 days of 

the accident. It defines a serious injury as an injury that requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing 

within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of the 

fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or 

involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

Emergency Response and Survival Aspects

The Linden Fire Department arrived at the accident scene at 2:15 a.m. At 2:19 a.m.,

the Rahway Volunteer Ambulance responded to the scene and transported a Ford 

passenger to the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Newark campus.

The Mercedes sustained extensive contact damage to the right front and left rear of 

the vehicle. The driver’s seat was equipped with a three-point restraint system, which was 

found in the retracted position. When extended, the belt webbing was clean and without 

visible evidence of loading. Dirt was found within the driver’s seat belt latchplate and 

latchplate receiver. Dirt was also found within the occupant compartment, which 

investigating law enforcement personnel believed to have entered the vehicle during the 

rollover. The driver-side air bag deployed.

Restraint usage for the driver and the four passengers of the Ford is unknown; 

lap/shoulder belts were available at four seating locations, and a lap belt was available at 

the rear-center seat. The Ford did not have air bags.

Toxicological Information

The New Jersey State Toxicology Laboratory and, at the request of the National 

Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Civil Aeromedical 
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

Institute (CAMI), conducted toxicological testing on the driver of the Mercedes. Two 

samples were collected from the driver postmortem by the Union County Medical 

Examiner and transferred to the New Jersey State Toxicology Laboratory and CAMI, 

which reported, respectively, blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) of 0.351 and 0.326.4

(See table 3 for test results.) In New Jersey, drivers with a BAC of 0.08 or greater are 

considered impaired.

Table 3. Toxicological information for the Mercedes driver.

New Jersey State Toxicology 

Laboratory CAMI

Blood Ethanol (alcohol), 0.351 percent; 

pseudoephedrine, 0.27 mg/L.

Ethanol (alcohol), 326 mg/dlL, 

mg/hg (0.326 percent); 

pseudoephedrine detected.

Urine None of tested drugs detected.a Ethanol (alcohol),379 mg/dL, 

mg/hg (0.379 percent); 

acetaldehyde, 8 mg/dL, mg/hg. 

Vitreous humor Ethanol (alcohol), 0.268 percent. Ethanol (alcohol), 210 mg/dL, 

mg/hg (0.210 percent); 

acetaldehyde,1 mg/dL, mg/hg. 

Brain Ethanol (alcohol), 0.287 percent. Not tested.

Liver Pseudoephedrine, 11.0 mg/kg. Not tested.

Stomach 

contentb

Ethanol (alcohol), 0.680 percent; 

pseudoephedrine, 110 mg/kg; pill 

containing phenmetrazine.

Fexofenandine, in a brown tablet 

marked “Allegra D”; 

pseudoephedrine, in a brown 

tablet marked “Allegra D.”

Nasal swab None of tested drugsc

 detected. Not tested.

a

Tested for barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine metabolites, methadone, opiates, 

phencyclidine (PCP), phenytoin, propoxyphene, and TCAntidepressants. b

The Union County Medical Examiner found two tablets marked “Allegra” in the driver’s stomach. c

Tested for cocaine metabolites and opiates. 

Toxicological tests for the driver of the Ford, conducted by the New Jersey State 

Toxicology Laboratory, were negative for alcohol and illicit drugs.

Physical Evidence 

Safety Board investigators observed multiple tire scuff marks and scrapes along 

both the vertical and horizontal faces of the concrete curb on the southbound side of the 

median.5

 An additional tire scuff mark and scrape were noted on the top of the concrete 

curb adjacent to the northbound side of the roadway. The diagonal distance between the 

4 Differences in testing equipment, specimens, or procedures could account for the discrepant results. 

This report uses the more conservative BAC of 0.326 reported by CAMI.

5 The Linden Police Department (LPD) documented two tire marks in the southbound lanes of the 

roadway, which were not visible when Safety Board investigators arrived at the accident location because, 

before the roadway reopened, a motorized street sweeper had cleaned the area. The Safety Board 

incorporated the evidence previously mapped by the LPD on May 1 into its documents. Assisted by the 

LPD, Safety Board investigators electronically mapped additional points at the accident location on May 4.
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

last tire scuff mark on the southbound side of the median and the tire scuff mark adjacent 

to the northbound side of the median was about 23 feet. 

During its investigation, the LPD observed a puddle of water adjacent to the north 

driveway of the gas station that was not present when Safety Board investigators arrived at 

the accident location. Using LPD postaccident photographs,6 Safety Board investigators 

estimated that the area of water extended from a point about 1 foot north of the curb of the 

gas station’s driveway to an area about 34 feet south of the curb. (See figure 1.) A drop 

inlet7 was located north of the puddle. The water was primarily contained along the west 

curb of the driveway. At the driveway, the water extended about 2 to 3 feet into the right 

southbound lane and tapered off toward the curb as it transitioned to the south. The water’s 

depth was not measured. The puddle may have resulted from a hosing down of the gas 

station driveway by an attendant before the accident. The puddle that appeared in 

postaccident photographs may have been larger than the one encountered by the Mercedes 

driver due to rainfall or water applied by fire and rescue equipment. In addition, Safety 

Board investigators noted one scar at the nose of the driveway curb and another that started 

about 3 feet south of the first one. Both scars were adjacent to the tire mark produced by 

the Mercedes as it struck the curb and veered across the two southbound lanes.

Driver Information

General 

The driver of the Mercedes was a 34-year-old male. At the time of the accident, the 

driver held a valid class “D” New Jersey driver’s license with no endorsements and a 

corrective lenses restriction. The National Driver Register showed no current or pending 

suspensions for the Mercedes driver. The driver’s motor vehicle history showed three 

accident reports (July 9, 1988; July 25, 1993; and July 31, 1993), a report of consuming 

alcoholic beverages as a passenger in a motor vehicle (November 26, 1993), and failure to 

appear for unpaid parking tickets (April 16, 1995).

The Mercedes driver was a Union County police officer. About 3 weeks before the 

accident, the Mercedes driver had been assigned to the ATTF. He had been driving for about 

1 week with the ATTF since completing his training. The driver’s supervisor described the 

driver as being “very sharp” and characterized his attitude as “positive” and “upbeat.” The 

supervisor did not know whether the driver was experiencing personal problems.

The driver’s family said that the driver was in “good health.” The family further noted 

that the driver suffered from allergies but did not know whether he was taking medication. 

The family indicated that the driver did not regularly take prescription or over-the-counter 

6 Since the original photographs did not allow for sufficient examination of the scene details, the 

brightness and contrast of the photographs were digitally enhanced.

7 A drop inlet is a heavy steel grid or grate flush with the roadway’s surface. Located at a low point 

along the road, it is intended to collect and drain storm water from the roadway surface.
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

drugs, did not smoke, and only drank “socially” (with his brother, on weekends, or when not 

working). The family said the driver was “upbeat” and described him as “strictly business on 

duty, focused on friends when off duty.” According to medical records, the driver had a left 

knee injury in 2000 and a right knee injury in 2002. His 1998 preemployment physical 

showed that he had 20/20 vision in his right eye and 20/30 vision in his left eye when wearing 

contacts. The preemployment physical also indicated he had no hearing problems.

Awake/Asleep Schedule

Information on the Mercedes driver’s sleep schedule for the 72 hours before the 

accident, developed from interviews conducted with members of his family, his supervisor, 

softball teammates, and friends, is shown in figure 3. During this period, the Mercedes driver 

slept for at least 17 hours; the driver’s sleep activities the day before the accident are unknown.

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

Mercedes Benz CLK320

The 1998 Mercedes Benz CLK320 coupe, 2-door model, was 180 inches long, 

68 inches wide, and 54 inches tall, and had a curb weight8

 of 3,240 pounds. The Mercedes 

had a manual 5-speed transmission. It did not have event-recording capabilities.

The vehicle sustained extensive contact damage, which was concentrated in the right 

front and left rear of the vehicle (see figures 4 and 5). The right-front body panels and hood had 

been crushed diagonally in the direction of the vehicle’s left rear. An indentation matching the 

shape and dimension of the Ford’s A-pillar9

 was located on the side of the right-front fender, 

about 1 foot forward from the Mercedes’ firewall. The hood had fully opened and had been

Figure 3. Mercedes driver’s awake/asleep schedule. 

8 Refers to the weight of a vehicle without passengers or cargo but including all fluids (oil, gas, and 

coolant) and equipment specified as standard.

9 A slender vertical structure supporting an automobile’s roof. The A-pillar is located on both sides of 

the windshield; the B-pillar is located between the front and rear windows; and the C-pillar is located on 

both sides of the trunk. 

12

a.m. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 

p.m.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 

4/28 

4/29 

4/30 

5/1 Accident occurs at 2:11 a.m. 

Legend Awake

Asleep

Unknown
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Figure 4. 1998 Mercedes Benz CLK320.

Figure 5. Crash profile of 1998 Mercedes Benz CLK320.

0 20 40 60 80 100

INCHES

Area of impact 

with utility pole 

Left-rear tire 

B-pillar 

Left-front tire 

 Right-rear tire

 B-pillar

 Opening in

 sunroof

 Hood panel in 

 final position

Sunroof 

interior 

panel 

Contact damage 

to windshield 

from hood panel 

 Engine

 compartment
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

driven into the windshield. The impact to the left rear of the vehicle resulted from the 

subsequent collision with a wooden utility pole. The contact damage was semicircular in 

shape and extended about 2 feet into the trunk. In addition to the heavy contact damage, the 

roof of the Mercedes sustained some deformation, scrapes, and multiple scratches.

During the accident sequence, the right-front wheel and related suspension 

components became detached from the vehicle. The vehicle’s engine and transmission 

became detached, as well, and were found in the southbound lanes approximately 77 feet 

from the Mercedes’ final resting place. The exhaust system also became detached and was 

found approximately 92 feet from the Mercedes in the northbound lanes. Postaccident 

examination of the Mercedes detected no mechanical deficiencies.

Ford Taurus 

The 1986 Ford Taurus, 4-door model, with automatic transmission, was 189 inches 

long, 71 inches wide, and 54 inches high, and had a curb weight of 2,865 pounds. 

Postaccident examination of the Ford detected no mechanical deficiencies.

Contact damage to the Ford was observed along the left side of the vehicle 

beginning on the left side of the front grill assembly (see figures 6 and 7). Additionally, the 

radiator core support was pushed in, and components on the top and left side of the engine 

also received contact damage. The most substantial impact to the left front was in the area 

of the wheel assembly. The entire left-front tire had been displaced rearward about 2 feet, 

and the wheel assembly had a circumferential indentation resulting from contact.

The contact damage along the left side extended across both doors and terminated 

just forward of the left-rear wheel. Deformation to the A-pillar was semicircular and 

directed inward toward the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The leading edge of the 

roof panel was pushed rearward and crushed down into the passenger compartment. The 

steering wheel received substantial deformation damage, and the steering column was 

Figure 6. 1986 Ford Taurus.
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

fractured. In addition to the contact damage from the accident, the vehicle had extensive 

damage and other contact damage resulting from extrication efforts.

Highway Information

Design 

The accident occurred on U.S. 1 near MP 41.4 in the city of Linden, Union County, 

New Jersey. This section of U.S. 1 is a divided, two-way, six-lane asphalt-paved roadway 

(three lanes designated for northbound traffic and three lanes designated for southbound 

traffic), extending in a northeast/southwest direction. Slightly north of the accident site, 

the southbound lanes transitioned from four lanes to three.

White retroreflective lane lines mark the individual travel lanes. The left edges of 

the northbound and southbound travel lanes are marked with solid, yellow, retroreflective 

Figure 7. Crash profile of Ford Taurus.

0 20 40 60 80 100

INCHES

 A-pillar

 B-pillar

 C-pillar

 Right-front tire

 Right-rear tire

B-pillar 

C-pillar 

Left-front tire 

Left-rear tire 

Lower control 

arm assembly 

 Right-side

 upper strut

 mounting point

Left-side 

upper strut 

mounting point 
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

edge lines delineating the median boundaries. The width between the yellow line in the 

northbound travel lane to the yellow line in the southbound travel lane is 13.5 feet. 

Roadway dimensions are provided in table 4.

Table 4. U.S. 1 lane width (measured near MP 41.4).

Left lane Center lane Right lane

Northbound 10.23 feet 10.45 feet 12.35 feet 

Southbound 14.48 feet 11.77 feet 12.50 feet

The northbound and southbound lanes are divided by an 11.5-foot-wide raised 

median with 6-inch-high Portland cement concrete curbing. (See figure 8.) The median is 

backfilled with asphaltic concrete. The distance from the face of the vertical curb wall to 

the yellow edge lines is 1 foot. The cross section consists of a curb and gutter.

There was no median barrier at the accident site. A New Jersey-type median 

barrier10 begins about 200 feet north of the accident site and continues north toward the 

Interstate 278 (I-278) interchange. This barrier was installed during the construction of the 

I-278 interchange in the late 1960s. Another median barrier was installed south of the 

accident location beginning at MP 39.4 in the town of Rahway. Black tire rubber smears 

and metallic scrapes were found on both median barriers during the Safety Board’s 

Figure 8. Raised curbed median near accident location.

10 Refers to a barrier wall cross section developed by the State of New Jersey for use on its facilities. 

Widely used in the United States and other countries for median and roadside barriers, it is commonly 

referred to as a New Jersey barrier.
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

investigation. The segment of U.S. 1 that passes through the city of Linden is the only 

segment of U.S. 1 without a median barrier from Newark Airport to the Garden State 

Parkway, a distance of about 11 miles. The New Jersey Department of Transportation 

(NJDOT) offered a number of possible reasons for the lack of a median barrier at the 

accident site: the segment’s straightness, the difficulty in safely terminating the segment’s 

barrier ends, and the lack of recent reconstruction projects in the area.

Roadway Classification

The NJDOT describes the accident segment of U.S. 1 as a “land service 

highway.”11 It is also a part of the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) National 

Highway System (NHS).12

Construction

The NJDOT built the accident segment of U.S. 1 in 1960. NJDOT records indicate 

a gradual upgrading of the original roadway through a sequence of reconstruction 

projects; the last project completed was one for pavement rehabilitation in September 

1991. Several reconstruction projects involved changes to the median islands.

Speed Limit

According to the construction plans, the design speed for the accident segment of 

U.S. 1 was 45 mph. The posted speed limit is 40 mph; 40-mph signs13 were placed on both the 

northbound (near MP 41.2) and southbound (near MP 41.6) approaches to the accident area.

Other than a 1965 NJDOT memorandum authorizing the 40-mph speed limit, the 

NJDOT had no records regarding speed limits on U.S. 1 in the city of Linden or any 

record indicating that a speed survey had ever been conducted in that area. The month 

after the accident, Safety Board investigators recorded the speeds of 102 vehicles on 

U.S 1, MP 41.4, from 9:45 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. The 85th percentile speed was 72 mph, and 

the median speed was 62 mph. Of the 102 vehicles measured, only 2 were traveling at or 

below the posted speed limit and 6 were measured to be traveling at speeds of 80 mph or 

greater, more than twice the speed limit. Seventy percent of the vehicles were traveling 

between 50 and 70 mph. At the request of the Safety Board, the NJDOT conducted two 

spot-speed studies near the accident location. Those studies, conducted during daytime 

hours for northbound vehicles only, yielded 85th percentile speeds of 58 mph and 52 mph.

Traffic signals along the entire accident segment of U.S. 1 are coordinated with a 

progression speed of 40 mph. In areas where traffic signal frequency is high, running 

11 An arterial or collector highway on which access to abutting property is permitted. On arterial 

highways and major collector roads, such access is usually regulated to protect the public safety and 

maintain the efficiency of the highways.

12 The NHS comprises approximately 160,000 miles of roadway important to the Nation’s economy, 

defense, and mobility.

13 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform 

Traffic Control Devices, Section 2B-10, Speed Limit Sign (R2-1) (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003).
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

speeds are consistent with the posted and signal progression speeds. Vehicles traveling 

southbound on U.S. 1 encounter a traffic signal 1/2 mile north of the accident location. 

The next signal is a “stop and go” signal slightly less than a 1/2 mile south of the accident 

location. Thus, vehicles can travel approximately 1 mile without encountering a traffic 

signal. Additionally, traffic from I-278 exits onto U.S. 1 just before the signal north of the 

accident location. The speed limit on I-278 is 50 mph.

LPD officials noted that they were aware of the high frequency of speeding on U.S. 1 

in the vicinity of the accident but had not conducted directed speed limit enforcement there 

because of limited resources.14 The LPD was unable to provide the number of traffic citations 

issued on U.S. 1 because the department’s database could not accommodate such a query.

Lighting

During nighttime hours, artificial lighting illuminated the roadway. Thirteen 

overhead streetlights were located in the vicinity of the accident: seven on the eastern 

right-of-way and six on the western right-of-way. During the on-scene investigation, none of 

the lights on the west (southbound side) of the roadway were working, and three of the seven 

lights on the east (northbound side) of the roadway were working. The gas station located on 

the western right-of-way provided additional lighting. According to NJDOT officials, on 

State routes, the local power company maintains street lighting mounted on timber poles.

Average Daily Traffic Count on U.S. 1

Over the course of a year, the NJDOT conducts traffic counts at 1,000 selected 

sample sites on all types of public roads for a 48-hour period. In 2003, the average daily 

traffic (ADT) count at MP 41.85 of U.S. 1 was 69,635. Table 5 shows ADT counts for 

1998 through 2003.

Table 5. Average daily traffic counts for U.S. 1 between MPs 41 and 42.

Year Count Distance from accident location

2003 69,635 0.45 mile north

2002 66,238 0.05 mile south

2001 50,531 0.66 mile south

2000 Not available —

1999 82,014 0.45 mile north

1998 48,836 0.25 mile south

Accident History

Table 6 presents the accident history for U.S. 1 between MPs 41 and 42.15 In 2001, 

one nonfatal median crossover accident occurred on U.S. 1 near the accident location. A 

review of LPD reports revealed that of the fatal accidents that occurred on U.S. 1 in Linden 

from 2000 through 2003, only the accident discussed in this report involved a median 

14 As of August 18, 2005, the LPD consisted of some 136 officers. The patrol division is responsible for 

traffic law enforcement.

15 NJDOT Crash Records and Statistics <www.nj.gov/transportation/refdata/accident>.
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

crossover. The 2003 accident rate for the accident segment of U.S. 1 was 2.25 per 1 million 

vehicle miles driven, as compared to the Statewide accident rate for that period of 3.73 per 1 

million vehicle miles driven on urban arterials with four or more lanes and raised medians.

Table 6. Accident Information for U.S. 1 between MPs 41 and 42.

Year Total accidents Fatal Injury Property damage

2003 154 2 53 99

2002 144 2 44 98

2001 147 1 56 90

2000 192 1 62 129

Inspection of the Linden segment of U.S. 1 revealed little or no evidence of vehicle 

incursions on the barrier curb faces or on the asphaltic concrete backfill forming the 

median.16 There was evidence of run-off-the-road events.

Meteorology

The Newark Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) is located 

approximately 6 miles northeast of Linden, and the Somerville ASOS is about 22 miles 

west of Linden. Neither station reported the presence of rain, mist, or fog during the 24 hours

before the accident.

Other Information

Pavement Friction Tests 

Skid resistance tests were conducted at the accident location to determine the 

pavement friction on the northbound and southbound travel lanes of U.S. 1 between 

MPs 41.3 and 41.9.17 A trailer-mounted friction-testing device was towed behind a vehicle

in each of the three northbound and southbound dry traffic lanes.18 Southbound lanes had 

an average skid number of 78, and northbound lanes had an average skid number of 80.19

16 Such evidence would include tire rubber scrub marks on the vertical faces of median curbs and tire 

marks on the median’s top surface.

17 Skid resistance tests were conducted on May 4, 2003, by NJDOT personnel from the Pavement 

Management Division in Trenton.

18 American Society for Testing and Materials standard E274-97 utilizes a measurement representing the 

steady-state friction force on a locked test wheel as it is dragged over a wetted pavement surface under constant 

load and at a constant speed while its major plane is parallel to its direction of motion and perpendicular to the 

pavement. Because it was known the accident occurred on a dry roadway, a dry surface was tested.

19 A skid number represents the frictional properties of the pavement. These numbers are used to 

evaluate the skid resistance of the pavement relative to other pavements and/or to evaluate the change in skid 

resistance of the pavement with time. Skid numbers of 78 and 80 are considered high, indicative of new 

pavement in good condition.
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

Video Surveillance Tape and Logs From Gas Station 

The gas station located on the western right-of-way operated 24 hours per day. The 

gas station had a surveillance system consisting of four cameras, a multiplexer, and a 

recorder. One of the cameras was positioned so as to capture a partial view of U.S. 1. No 

imagery of the accident sequence or potential witness vehicles could be identified.

The gas station logs record all sales and significant events, such as safe drops, 

vendor payouts, and driveaways. The logs show no activity between 1:33 a.m. and 5:28 a.m.

on May 1, 2003.

Alcohol Impairment 

After alcohol is consumed, it passes from the stomach and the intestines into the 

blood.20 The alcohol is then metabolized.21 Most of the alcohol consumed is metabolized in 

the liver; however, a small amount of alcohol escapes metabolism and is excreted in the 

breath and urine. Until all of the alcohol is metabolized, it is distributed throughout the body, 

affecting the brain and other tissues. The liver can metabolize only a certain amount of 

alcohol per hour, regardless of the amount that has been consumed. Alcohol is metabolized 

more slowly than it is absorbed;22 therefore, consumption must be controlled to prevent 

accumulation in the body and intoxication. In general, after the consumption of one standard 

drink,23 the amount of alcohol in the drinker’s blood (BAC) peaks within 30 to 45 minutes.24

Reductions in attention, judgment, and control can be observed at a BAC as low 

as 0.02, and many individuals with a BAC of 0.25 or greater experience confusion, 

vomiting, loss of consciousness, and even death.25,26 Driving performance is 

substantially impaired in almost everyone at BACs of 0.08 or greater, but impaired 

driving behaviors can be seen at lower BACs.27,28

Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data show that, in 2004, 58,156 

drivers were involved in fatal accidents on U.S. roadways. About 25 percent (14,259) 

of those drivers had a BAC greater than 0.01. Specifically, 2,264 drivers involved in 

fatal accidents (3.9 percent) had a BAC between 0.01 and 0.07; 4,062 drivers (7.0 percent)

20 This process is referred to as absorption.

21 Metabolism occurs when the body converts ingested substances to other compounds. Metabolism 

involves a number of processes, one of which is oxidation. Through oxidation, alcohol is detoxified and 

removed from the blood, preventing the alcohol from accumulating and destroying cells and organs.

22 Several factors influence alcohol absorption, including gender and the presence of food in the stomach.

23 A standard drink is defined as 12 ounces of beer, 5 ounces of wine, or 1.5 ounces of 80-proof distilled 

spirits, all of which contain 1 ounce of alcohol.

24 National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), 

Alcohol Metabolism, Alcohol Alert No. 35, PH 371 (Washington, DC: NIAAA, 1997).

25 K.M. Dubowski, Acute Alcohol Influence, National Commission Against Drunk Driving 

(Washington, DC: NHTSA, 1997).

26 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The ABCs of BAC, A Guide to Understanding Blood 

Alcohol Concentration and Alcohol Impairment, DOT HS 809 844 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005).

27 H. Moskowitz and D. Fiorentino, A Review of the Literature on the Effects of Low Doses of Alcohol 

on Driving-Related Skills (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2000).

28 DOT HS 809 844.
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

had a BAC between 0.08 and 0.14; 7,195 drivers (12.4 percent) had a BAC between 

0.15 and 0.29; and 737 drivers (1.3 percent) had a BAC greater than 0.30 (see figure 9).29

Drivers With High BACs. In 2000, the Safety Board released a report on the hard 

core drinking driver.30 In its report, the Safety Board defined a hard core drinking driver as 

a repeat offender (that is, an offender with more than one conviction or arrest for driving 

while impaired/intoxicated [DWI] within the past 10 years) or a high BAC offender (BAC 

of 0.15 or greater).

Although impairment from alcohol is pronounced in most individuals at a BAC of 

0.15 or greater, some can function and even drive a vehicle at higher BAC levels.31 In a 

study32 of 81 drinking drivers in Sweden with high BACs (BAC greater than or equal to 

0.400), it was concluded that attempting to drive a motor vehicle with a high BAC 

indicates “an exceptionally high cellular tolerance to the impairment caused by this drug. 

The alcohol burn-off rate was relatively high in these heavy drinkers (0.023 percent per 

hour),[33] which probably reflects the development of metabolic tolerance as well.”

Figure 9. BACs of drivers involved in fatal accidents (FARS 2004).

29 Numbers and percentages were calculated using imputed data.

30 National Transportation Safety Board, Actions to Reduce Fatalities, Injuries, and Crashes Involving 

the Hard Core Drinking Driver, Safety Report NTSB/SR-00/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000).

31 DOT HS 809 844.

32 A.W. Jones, “The Drunkest Drinking Driver in Sweden: Blood Alcohol Concentration 0.545 Percent 

w/v.,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1999): 400-06. (Abstract only.)

33 According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the average 

metabolism rate for moderate drinkers produces a 0.017 per hour decline in BAC level. For further 

information, see National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Computing a BAC Estimate (Washington, 

DC: NHTSA, 1994) <www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/BACreport.html>.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.49

Blood alcohol concentration (BAC)

Number of drivers involved in 

fatal accidents
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

Individuals who are able to function at high BAC levels, which in others would 

be incapacitating or even fatal, have very likely developed a tolerance to alcohol. 

Tolerance to alcohol can be displayed in two ways: the effect of a given dose of alcohol 

decreases as tolerance develops, and a greater dose of alcohol is required to produce a 

given effect. Consuming alcohol in the same environment or under the same cues can 

develop or accelerate alcohol tolerance.34 Learned tolerance, where the repeated practice 

of a task in association with alcohol consumption leads to the development of tolerance, 

can reduce the alcohol-induced impairment that would ordinarily accompany the 

performance of that task.35 However, the tolerance acquired in a certain environment or for 

a specific task is not readily transferred to new or different situations. A driver who has 

developed behavioral tolerance to driving a familiar car over a particular route under 

routine circumstances may drive without being involved in an accident despite the 

consumption of substantial amounts of alcohol. However, a driver who encounters a novel 

environment would be at the same elevated risk for an accident as a new driver with the 

same BAC because of the lack of prior learning opportunities for the new situation.36

Several studies show that the drivers with high BACs are at a greater risk of being 

involved in a fatal accident than zero-BAC drivers.37 The 2000 Safety Board report cited 

research by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety that estimated the relative fatality 

risk for drivers in single-vehicle accidents with high BACs to be 385 times that of a zeroBAC driver. The Traffic Injury Research Foundation estimated that high-BAC drivers 

were more than 200 times more likely to be involved in a fatal accident than a nondrinking 

driver.

NHTSA research shows that some impaired drivers may not be arrested or 

involved in an accident. NHTSA reports that “on average, a driver can drive [impaired] 

5,000 miles before being arrested for a DUI [driving under the influence] offense.”38 Other 

research found that, on average, 1 arrest occurs per 88 episodes of driving over the legal 

limit and per 6 stops for suspicion of driving under the influence.39 More recent research 

has shown that drivers with very high BACs were far more likely to be described as 

having histories suggestive of problem drinking than other fatally injured drivers; 

nonetheless, a substantial proportion were not described as having drinking histories.40

34 National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Alcohol and 

Tolerance, Alcohol Alert No. 28, PH 356 (Washington, DC: NIAAA, 1995).

35 National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Drinking and 

Driving, Alcohol Alert No. 31, PH 362 (Washington, DC: NIAAA, 1996). 

36 Alcohol Alert No. 31.

37 NTSB/SR-00/01.

38 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Alcohol and Highway Safety 1984: A Review of the 

State of the Knowledge (Washington, DC: NHTSA, n.d.) 56.

39 P. Zador, S. Krawchuck, and B. Moore, Drinking and Driving Trips, Stops by Police, and Arrests: 

Analyses of the 1995 National Survey of Drinking and Driving Attitudes and Behavior, DOT HS 809 184 

(Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2001).

40 S.P. Baker, E.R. Braver, L.H. Chen, G. Li, and A.F. Williams, “Drinking Histories of Fatally Injured 

Drivers,” Injury Prevention, Vol. 8 (September 2002): 221-26.
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board concluded in its 2000 report41 that the elevated accident risk and 

potential for recidivism of high-BAC (0.15 or greater) drivers constitute a safety problem 

that warrants State legislation to create a high-BAC “aggravated” alcohol offense. The 

Safety Board outlined a model program (see figure 10) to reduce hard core drinking 

driving that incorporates several elements, including vehicle sanctions to restrict or 

separate hard core drinking drivers from their vehicles, and frequent, well-publicized 

sobriety checkpoints. The Safety Board model program also recommends that the States 

pass legislation that defines a high BAC (0.15 or greater) as an “aggravated” DWI offense 

requiring strong intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat DWI 

offenders.

State Laws. In all 50 States and the District of Columbia, a driver with a BAC 

level of 0.08 or greater is considered to be impaired. A majority of States have also 

established laws that reflect the need for additional penalties or countermeasures when 

drivers have BACs of 0.15 or greater.42

In New Jersey, effective January 20, 2004, a person with a BAC of 0.08 or greater 

who operates a vehicle is considered to be driving under the influence.43 New Jersey’s law 

pertaining to drivers with a 0.10 BAC, which was the legal limit before 2004, also remains 

in effect. Penalties for driving while impaired in New Jersey are shown in table 7.

41 NTSB/SR-00/01.

42 For higher BACs, the following States mandate education, assessment, and/or increased penalties or 

consider the BAC an aggravating factor: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 

Maine, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, for a BAC of 

0.15; Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 

Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah, for a BAC of 0.16; Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, for a BAC of 

0.17; Kentucky, Nevada, and North Dakota, for a BAC of 0.18; and Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, 

Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee, for a BAC of 0.20. For further information, see the 

Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) Web site: <www3.madd.org/laws/law.cfm?LawID=HBAC>.

43 The Department of Transportation Appropriation Act for fiscal year 2001 (H.R. 4475) included a 

provision that the States must enact 0.08 BAC per se laws by 2004 or begin losing Federal highway 

construction funds. 
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

Figure 10. National Transportation Safety Board model program to reduce hard core 

drinking driving.

Model Program Elements 

1. Frequent and well-publicized statewide sobriety checkpoints that include checking 

for valid driver’s licenses. Checkpoints should not be limited to holiday periods. [P]

2. Vehicle sanctions to restrict or separate hard core drinking drivers from their 

vehicles, including license plate actions (impoundments, confiscation, or other 

actions); vehicle immobilization, impoundment, and forfeiture; and ignition 

interlocks for high-BAC first offenders and repeat offenders. [P]

3. State and community cooperative programs involving driver licensing agencies, 

law enforcement officers, judges, and probation officers to enforce DWI 

suspension and revocation. [P]

4. Legislation to require that DWI offenders who have been convicted or 

administratively adjudicated maintain a zero BAC while operating a motor vehicle. 

[P]

5. Legislation that defines a high BAC (0.15 or greater) as an “aggravated” DWI 

offense that requires strong intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for 

repeat DWI offenders. [P]

6. As alternatives to confinement, programs to reduce hard core drinking driver 

recidivism that include home detention with electronic monitoring and/or intensive 

probation supervision programs. [S]

7. Legislation that restricts the plea bargaining of a DWI offense to a lesser, 

non-alcohol-related offense and that requires the reasons for DWI charge 

reductions be entered into the public record. [S]

8. Elimination of the use of diversion programs that permit erasing, deferring, or 

otherwise purging the DWI offense record or that allow the offender to avoid 

license suspension. [P]

9. Administrative license revocation for BAC test failure and refusal. [P]

10. A DWI record retention and DWI offense enhancement look-back period of at least 

10 years. [S] (Note: When determining whether a person is a repeat DWI offender, 

States establish look-back periods. Offenses that pre-date the look-back period will 

not be considered.) 

11. Individualized sanction programs for hard core DWI offenders that rely on effective 

countermeasures for use by courts that hear DWI cases. [S]

To determine a State’s progress in addressing hard core drinking drivers through the 

hard core model program, staff has prioritized the above elements as follows:

Primary elements [P]. Elements that research indicates will directly reduce fatalities 

such as sobriety checkpoints (1), vehicle sanctions (2), “hot sheet” programs (3), zero 

BAC restrictions (4), increased penalties for high-BAC offenders (5), diversion 

elimination (8), and administrative license revocation (9). 

Secondary elements [S]. Elements that staff concludes will help the DWI 

countermeasure system function more efficiently such as alternatives to jail 

incarceration (6), plea bargaining restrictions (7), 10-year look-back and records 

retention period (10), and individualized sanction programs (11). 
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

Table 7. New Jersey penalties for impaired driving (alcohol or drug related).

BAC greater than 

or equal to 0.08 

but less than 0.10

BAC greater than 

or equal to 0.10

Second offense 

within 10 years of 

first offense

Third offense 

within 10 years of 

second offense

License loss 3 months 7 months–1 year 2 years 10 years

Fines, fees, and 

surcharges

-$250–$400 fine

-$75 per day IDRC 

fee

-$100 drunk driving 

fund

-$100 Alcohol 

Education and 

Rehabilitation Fund 

(AERF)

-$1,000 a year for 3 

years surcharge

-$75 Safe 

Neighborhood 

Services Fund

-$300–$500 fine

-$75 per day IDRC 

fee

-$100 drunk driving 

fund

-$100 AERF

-$1,000 a year for 3 

years surcharge

-$75 Safe 

Neighborhood 

Services Fund

-$500–$1000 fine

-$100 per day 

IDRC fee

-$100 drunk driving 

fund

-$100 AERF

-$1,000 a year for 3 

years surcharge

-$75 Safe 

Neighborhood 

Services Fund

-$1,000 fine

-$100 per day 

IDRC fee

-$100 drunk driving 

fund

-$100 AERF

-$1,500 a year for 3 

years surcharge

-$75 Safe 

Neighborhood 

Services Fund

Prison term Up to 30 days Up to 30 days 48 hours to 90 days 180 days

Community 

service, 

Intoxicated Driver 

Resource Center 

(IDRC), or 

detainment

12–48 hours IDRC 12–48 hours IDRC -30 days 

community service

-12–48 hours IDRC

-Up to 90 days 

community service, 

which can reduce 

period of 

imprisonment

-12–48 hours IDRC

Operator Fatigue and Alcohol. Operator fatigue factors, including sleep loss, 

the time of day at which the accident occurred, and shiftwork have been implicated as 

causal or contributing factors in several Safety Board investigations.44,45 Reduced sleep 

can magnify the effects of low doses of alcohol.46 Alcohol use also can impact sleep and

44 (a) National Transportation Safety Board, Motorcoach Run-off-the-Road and Overturn, Victor, 

New York, June 23, 2002, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-04/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2004). 

(b) National Transportation Safety Board, 15-Passenger Child Care Van Run-off-Road Accident, 

Memphis, Tennessee, April 4, 2002, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-04/02 (Washington, DC: 

NTSB, 2004). (c) National Transportation Safety Board, Single Vehicle Run-off-Road Rollover, U.S. Route 

101, San Miguel, California, January 2, 2001, Highway Accident Brief NTSB/HAB-02/01 (Washington, 

DC: NTSB, 2002). (d) National Transportation Safety Board, Greyhound Motorcoach Run-off-the-Road 

Accident, Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania, June 20, 1998, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-00/01 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000).

45 (a) National Transportation Safety Board, Motorcoach Run-off-the-Road Accident, Tallulah, 

Louisiana, October 13, 2003, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-05/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

2005). (b) NTSB/HAR-04/03. (c) National Transportation Safety Board, Single-Vehicle Motorcoach 

Rollover Near Interstate Highway 24, Pleasant View, Tennessee, April 19, 2001, Highway Accident Brief 

NTSB/HAB-02/18 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002). (d) National Transportation Safety Board, Collision 

With School Bus, Chappell Hill, Texas, April 7, 1998, Highway Accident Brief NTSB/HAB-02/16 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002).

46 T. Roehrs, D. Beare, F. Zorick, and T. Roth “Sleepiness and Ethanol Effects on Simulated Driving,” 

Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January/February 1994):154-58.
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

sleep quality, leading to daytime fatigue and sleepiness.47,48 Alcohol consumption by 

nonalcoholics can induce sleep problems by disrupting the sequences and duration of 

sleep states and by decreasing total sleep time. It also has a sedating effect in that it 

decreases the time required to fall asleep. A 2000 poll conducted by the National Sleep 

Foundation shows that about 19 percent of individuals have taken alcohol to induce 

sleep, acknowledging the sedating effect of alcohol. Over time, with continued 

consumption of alcohol just before bedtime, alcohol’s sleep-inducing effect decreases. 

Alcoholics experience problems falling asleep, frequent awakenings, and a decreased 

total sleep time, and are more likely to suffer from certain sleep disorders, including 

sleep apnea.49 

Alcohol Use and Seat Belt Use. Since 1999, restraint usage increased from 

67 percent to 82 percent nationwide and from 63 percent to 86 percent in New Jersey. 

Seat belt use among drivers involved in fatal accidents is substantially lower for drivers 

impaired by alcohol.50 Safety belts were used by only 28 percent of fatally injured 

drivers with BACs of 0.08 or greater, as compared to 41 percent of fatally injured 

drivers with BACs between 0.01 and 0.07, and 57 percent of fatally injured drivers with 

0.00 BACs.51

Lap/shoulder belts, when used, reduce the risk of fatal injury to front-seat passenger 

car occupants by 45 percent and the risk of moderate-to-critical injury by 50 percent.52

Additional occupant protection is provided by air bags.53 NHTSA analyses indicate that 

air bags reduced fatalities by 14 percent when no safety belt was used and by an additional 

11 percent when a safety belt was used with air bags.54

47 T. Roehrs and T. Roth, Sleep, Sleepiness, and Alcohol Use, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 

Alcoholism <www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-2/101-109.htm>.

48 National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Alcohol and 

Sleep, Alcohol Alert No. 41 (Washington, DC: NIAAA, 1998).

49 (a) K. Brower, Alcohol’s Effects on Sleep in Alcoholics, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 

Alcoholism. <www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-2/110-125.htm>. (b) NIAAA Alcohol Alert No. 41.

50 (a) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2004 Data: Occupant 

Protection, DOT HS 809 909 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005). (b) National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Seat Belt Use in 2005—Use Rates in the States and Territories, DOT HS 809 970 

(Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005).

51 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2004 Data: Alcohol, DOT HS 

809 905 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005).

52 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Sixth Report to Congress, Fourth Report to the 

President, The National Initiative for Increasing Safety Belt Use, DOT HS 809 823 (Washington, DC: 

NHTSA, June 2004).

53 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Third Report to Congress, Effectiveness of 

Occupant Protection Systems and Their Use (Washington, DC: NHTSA, December 1996) 

<www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/Index_occupprotect.html >.

54 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2003 Data: Occupant 

Protection, DOT HS 809 765 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2004).
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

Alcohol Use and Speeding. In 2004, 40 percent of drivers with a 0.08 or greater 

BAC who were involved in fatal accidents were speeding, as compared to 15 percent of 

drivers with a 0.00 BAC.55

Speed Management 

Speeding56 contributed to 30 percent of fatal accidents in 2004,57 resulting in

nearly 13,192 lives lost. Slightly less than 12 percent of all fatalities in New Jersey are 

speeding related.58 Speeding reduces a driver’s ability to steer safely around curves or 

objects in the roadway, extends vehicle stopping distance, and increases the distance a 

vehicle travels while the driver reacts to a dangerous situation.59

Speed limits are set to improve safety by reducing the risks imposed by drivers’ 

speed choices. Generally, a balance between safety and travel efficiency (that is, 

minimizing travel time) is sought. Speed limits establish an upper bound on speeds, 

reducing the probability and severity of accidents. They also reduce speed disparities 

among vehicles. Established speed limits determine an enforcement standard, and 

effective enforcement deters unwanted driving behaviors.60

Typically, speed limits are enforced using traditional methods such as patrol cars 

with radar or other vehicle-speed measuring devices. The increasing number of 

vehicles, drivers, and vehicle miles driven, combined with competing demands for law 

enforcement personnel, have made traditional patrol car enforcement less practical and 

efficient; therefore, other methods of speed management and enforcement, such as 

speed cameras or photo radar, variable message signs, and roadway design, are being 

implemented. 61

Speed cameras use radar to trigger a camera that photographs a vehicle and its 

license plate when the vehicle’s speed exceeds a preset limit. Violation notices are 

usually sent to the vehicle owner.62 Speed cameras have been successfully used in a 

55 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2004 Data: Speeding, DOT HS 

809 915 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005). 

56 NHTSA considers an accident to be speeding related if the driver was charged with a speedingrelated offense or if the officer indicated that racing, driving too fast for conditions, or exceeding the posted 

speed limit contributed to the accident.

57 DOT HS 809 915.

58 C. Liu, C. Chen, R. Subramanian,, and D. Utter, Analysis of Speeding-Related Fatal Motor Vehicle 

Traffic Crashes, DOT HS 809 839 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005).

59 DOT HS 809 915.

60 (a) National Research Council, Transportation Research Board, Managing Speed Review: Current 

Practices for Setting and Enforcing Speed Limits, Special Report 254 (Washington, DC: National Academy 

Press, 1998). (b) U.S. Department of Transportation, Speed Management Strategic Initiative (Washington, 

DC: DOT, June 2005).

61 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Q&A: Speed—Law Enforcement

<www.iihs.org/research/qanda/speed_lawenf.html>.

62 The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances has developed a model law for 

automated traffic law enforcement that includes a civil fine for violations.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

few States63 and in the District of Columbia, where, for example, average speeds 

declined 14 percent and the proportion of vehicles exceeding the speed limit by more than 

10 mph declined by 82 percent.64 Speed cameras are more widely used in countries outside 

of the United States as a means of speed enforcement.65 New Jersey statute prohibits the 

use of speed cameras.66 In 2004, legislation67 was proposed to authorize the use of photoradar devices for enforcement purposes on certain local streets. The legislature did not act 

on this bill.

Variable message signs that show the speed of a traveling vehicle or alert a driver 

to an upcoming safety situation (such as a work zone or fog) have had limited 

effectiveness. For example, the variable message signs or speed feedback indicators that 

are intended to increase awareness of excessive speeds and encourage drivers to slow 

down showed a 7- to 10-percent decrease in speeds in the presence of the indicator. After 

the indicator was removed, the speed reduction disappeared. Traffic enforcement activity 

prolonged the effectiveness of the indicator. 68

Roadway design measures such as speed humps, traffic circles, and roadway 

markings have reduced the incidence and severity of accidents.69 The FHWA also notes 

that such traffic calming projects result in reduced traffic volume, diverting potential 

accidents to other locations.

Median Barrier Guidelines

National Guidelines. The American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO’s) Roadside Design Guide70 defines median barriers as 

“longitudinal barriers that are most commonly used to separate opposing traffic on a 

divided highway.” According to the Roadside Design Guide, median barriers should be 

installed only if the consequences of striking a barrier are expected to be less severe than if no 

barrier existed. Guidance contained in AASHTO’s Roadside Design Guide for the installation

63 According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, speed cameras are used in Arizona, 

California, Colorado, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and the District of Columbia 

<www.iihs.org/research/topics/sc_cities.html>.

64 (a) Insurance Institute for Highway Safety <www.iihs.org/research/qanda/speed_lawenf.html>. (b) 

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “Cameras Reduce Speeding on D.C. Streets,” Status Reports, Vol. 

37, No. 5 (May 2002).

65 M. Peden, R. Scurfield, D. Sleet, D. Mohan, A. Hyder, E. Jarawan, and C. Mathers, eds., World 

Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004).

66 New Jersey Statute 39:4-103.1.

67 Assembly Bill No. 2369, February 23, 2004.

68 S.M. Casey and A.K. Lund, “The Effects of Mobile Roadside Speedometers on Traffic Speeds,” 

Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 25, No. 5 (1993): 627-34.

69 Federal Highway Safety Administration, Synthesis of Safety Research Related to Speed and Speed 

Management, FHWA-RD-98-154 (Washington, DC: FHWA, 1998).

70 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Roadside Design Guide

(Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2002).
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

of barriers on high-speed,71 controlled-access roadways that have relatively flat, 

traversable medians is based on a combination of ADT and center median widths. The 

Roadside Design Guide suggests that the need for median barriers be evaluated on 

roadways where the ADT is at least 20,000 vehicles and the median width is less than 

10 meters (32.8 feet). Barriers are optional for roadways where the median width is less 

than 10 meters and the ADT is 30,000 or fewer vehicles. Barriers are also considered 

optional for median widths between 10 and 15 meters (41.2 feet), regardless of the ADT. 

Barriers are not normally considered for medians 15 or more meters wide.

The Roadside Design Guide states that median barriers are sometimes used on 

high-volume, non-access-controlled roadways. It also notes that terminating such barriers 

can be difficult, and sight distance may be a significant problem at intersections. 

AASHTO’s A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (Green Book) further 

explains, 

Careful consideration should be given to the installation of median barriers on 

multilane expressways or other highways with partial control of access. Even 

medians that are narrow permit inadvertent encroachments with a chance of 

recovery and can also include geometric features to accommodate crossing or leftturn traffic. With the addition of barriers, barrier ends at median openings present 

formidable obstacles. Crash cushions, although needing maintenance and 

imposing a high initial cost, may be needed to shield an errant motorist from the 

barrier ends. Consequently, an evaluation of the number of median openings, 

crash history, alignment, sight distance, design speed, traffic volumes, and median 

width should be conducted prior to installation of median barriers on non-freeway 

facilities. 72

AASHTO’s Green Book states that on low-speed urban arterial streets, a raised 

curb median may be used. The Roadside Design Guide defines a vertical curb as a curb 

having a vertical or nearly vertical face of 6 inches or higher. These types of curbs are 

intended to discourage motorists from deliberately leaving the roadway. 

The Green Book73 notes that raised curb medians are desirable for preventing 

midblock left turns and can also provide a refuge for pedestrians and space for signs and 

other appurtenances. However, the same guidance warns that raised curb medians do not 

prevent pedestrian or cross-median accidents unless a median barrier is present, noting the 

raised curb may cause drivers to lose control of their vehicles if struck. The Roadside 

Design Guide states that raised curb medians are generally not desirable for high-speed 

roadways because, if an errant vehicle became airborne, the change in the bumper height 

71 Both AASHTO’s A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets and the FHWA’s Manual 

on Uniform Traffic Control Devices use the terms “low speed” and “high speed” but do not define them. 

Interviews with veteran traffic engineers indicate that 45 mph is widely considered to be the boundary 

between low- and high-speed facilities. For further information, see American Association of State Highway 

and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (Washington, DC: 

AASHTO, 2004) and U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual on 

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003).

72 A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 2004, chapter 4.

73 A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 2004, chapter 7. 
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

could become crucial if a secondary accident occurs. The Green Book further notes that 

these types of medians can be difficult to see at night without appropriate lighting or 

delineation.74

New Jersey Median Barrier Guidelines. The NJDOT has adopted AASHTO 

median barrier warrants as part of the State’s Roadway Design Manual. However, 

AASHTO guidelines do not always accommodate New Jersey requirements; where 

discrepancies exist, the NJDOT guidelines are followed for all roadways except interstate 

highways. NJDOT guidelines state that the number of crossovers, accident history, 

alignment, sight distance, design speed, traffic volume, and median width should be 

evaluated before median barriers are installed on noninterstate highways.75 As a practice, 

the NJDOT does not place median barriers on nonfreeway roadways that permit left turns.

The NJDOT’s Roadway Design Manual also suggests that a number of factors be 

considered before installing median barriers on highways with partial control of access, in 

part, because of potential problems at each intersection or median crossover where the 

median barrier must be terminated. Safety Board staff observed numerous median barrier 

wall terminations on U.S. 1, which varied from elaborate crash cushions to no end 

treatment.

In October 2002, the NJDOT developed the “Cross Median Crash Reduction 

Program,” which evaluates the accident history of roadway segments to help determine 

where to install median barriers. The program identified an initial list of freeway segments 

for further consideration. Because the program did not evaluate nonfreeway segments, 

U.S. 1 was not considered as a possible location to place a barrier. The NJDOT expects the 

program to be expanded, pending future funding, to include the entire State roadway 

network.

74 A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 2004, chapter 7. 

75 New Jersey Department of Transportation, Roadway Design Manual, Section 8, “Guidelines for 

Guide Rail Design and Median Barriers.”
27 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

This analysis first discusses the factors and conditions the Safety Board was able 

to exclude as neither causing nor contributing to the accident. It then provides a brief 

overview of the accident events and discusses the safety issues relevant to this accident: 

alcohol impairment, speed enforcement, and evaluative criteria for median barrier 

installation.

Exclusions

At the time of the accident, no rain or fog was reported and the roadway was 

dry, except for the puddle of water in the right southbound lane of U.S. 1 observed by 

the LPD. Mechanical inspection of both vehicles failed to detect any mechanical 

defects that would have affected the drivers’ ability to control their respective 

vehicles. The damage to the vehicles was consistent with impact. The Linden Fire 

Department arrived at the accident site in about 4 minutes, and an ambulance arrived 

approximately 8 minutes after the accident. The roadway was appropriately marked 

with maximum speed signs (40 mph), and the travel lanes of the roadway were well 

marked with solid, yellow, retroflective lines designating the edges of the travel lanes 

and dashed, white, retroflective lines indicating individual travel lanes. Although the 

roadway lighting was in poor condition, it was supplemented by lighting from the gas 

station.

The Union County Medical Examiner’s report on the Mercedes driver noted two 

intact tablets in the driver’s stomach marked “Allegra.” Testing conducted by the CAMI 

indicated the tablet was composed of pseudoephedrine (a nasal decongestant) and 

fexofenadine (an antihistamine), a combination commonly known as “Allegra-D.”76,77

Pseudoephedrine is a mild stimulant that is not typically expected to result in impairment.

76 Allegra-D is a prescription drug used to relieve the symptoms of seasonal allergic rhinitis in adults 

and children over 12.

77 Toxicological testing performed by the New Jersey State Toxicology Laboratory reported 

phenmetrazine in a pill in the Mercedes driver’s stomach, but the autopsy report noted that tablets removed 

from the driver’s stomach were marked “Allegra.” The toxicological report notes only pseudoephedrine, 

alcohol, and acetaldehyde (a metabolite of alcohol) in the driver’s blood and tissues. Phenmetrazine was 

marketed in the United States under the brand name Preludin as a weight control pill, which the 

manufacturer ceased making in 1991. Chemically, phenmetrazine and pseudoephedrine are similar 

substances. The tablets in the driver’s stomach were most likely Allegra-D (pseudoephedrine and 

fexofenadine), not phenmetrazine.
Analysis 28 Highway Accident Report

Fexofenadine has been demonstrated to be free of performance impairment during 

psychomotor tests and actual driving performance, when taken at typical doses, alone or 

with alcohol.78

The Safety Board therefore concludes that the weather, the mechanical condition 

of the vehicles, the roadway markings, the roadway lighting, and the driver’s use of 

prescription drugs neither caused nor contributed to the accident. The Safety Board further 

concludes that the emergency response was timely and adequate. 

LPD officers noted that, upon arriving at the accident scene, they observed a 

puddle of standing water, 2 to 3 feet at the widest part, which extended about 35 feet in the 

right southbound traffic lane adjacent to the north driveway of the gas station. (See figure 1,

top-right corner of diagram.) A drop inlet located north of the puddle and intended to drain 

that area did not function as designed because it was no longer at the lowest point in the 

gutter, allowing a pool of water to collect. Variances in the thickness of the asphaltic 

concrete surface quite likely occurred the last time the roadway was resurfaced. The LPD 

accident report indicated that the puddle could have caused the vehicle to hydroplane.79

However, the Safety Board’s analysis of the physical evidence shows that hydroplaning 

was not a factor in the accident sequence. 

The origin of the tire marks produced by the Mercedes indicates that the vehicle 

was already traveling toward the west curb of the roadway as it approached the area of 

standing water. The scars and scuff mark observed on the nose of the curb were most 

likely produced by the right-front tire and wheel rim of the Mercedes. Given the diameter 

of the tire, as the leading edge made contact with the curb, the portion of the tire in contact 

with the pavement would have been trailing behind and would not yet have entered the 

water adjacent to the curb’s nose. In other words, the front of the tire would have struck 

the curb before any other portion could have encountered the puddle. The impact of the 

tire and wheel rim with the curb would have contributed to the vehicle’s loss of control.

As the vehicle’s right-side tires departed the curb, the limited amount of water on 

the roadway would have precluded more than one tire at a time from rolling through the 

water. With one tire in the puddle and three tires on dry pavement, the vehicle would have 

78 (a) F. Ridout, Z. Shamsi, R. Meadows, S. Johnson, and I. Hindmarch, “A Single-Center, 

Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled, Crossover Investigation of the Effects of Fexofenadine 

Hydrochloride 180 mg Alone and With Alcohol, With Hydroxyzine Hydrochloride 50 mg as a Positive 

Internal Control, on Aspects of Cognitive and Psychomotor Function Related to Driving a Car,” Clinical 

Therapeutics, Vol. 25, No. 5 (May 2003): 1518-38. (b) P.C. Potter, J.M. Schepers, and C.H. Van Niekerk, 

“The Effects of Fexofenadine on Reaction Time, Decision-Making, and Driver Behavior,” Annals of Allergy, 

Asthma, and Immunology, Vol. 91, No. 2 (August 2003): 177-81. (c) J.M. Weiler, J.R. Bloomfield, G.G. 

Woodworth, A.R. Grant, T.A. Layton, T.L. Brown, D.R. McKenzie, T.W. Baker, G.S. Watson, “Effects of 

Fexofenadine, Diphenhydramine, and Alcohol on Driving Performance, A Randomized, Placebo-Controlled 

Trial in the Iowa Driving Simulator,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 132, No. 5 (March 2000): 354-63. 

(d) A. Vermeeren and J.F. O’Hanlon, “Fexofenadine’s Effects, Alone and With Alcohol, on Actual Driving 

and Psychomotor Performance,” The Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, Vol. 101, No. 3 (March 

1998): 306-11.

79 Hydroplaning refers to the separation of a tire from the road surface by a layer of water, which 

reduces available friction, causing the tire to slide.
Analysis 29 Highway Accident Report

maintained its frictional adhesion to the roadway, and the small amount of water would 

have had no significant effect on vehicle control. Moreover, given the size of the puddle 

and the vehicle’s speed, the tire would have been in contact with the water for less than 

one wheel revolution and for only a fraction of a second—approximately 0.005 second—

further supporting an insignificant impact on vehicle control. Therefore, the Safety Board 

concludes that the Mercedes’ contact with the puddle in the southbound lanes of U.S. 1 

was of insufficient extent and duration to have caused the vehicle to hydroplane and did 

not contribute to the accident. 

Accident

On April 30, 2003, the driver of the 1998 Mercedes left his house about 6:30 p.m. 

for a softball game. On the way to the game, the driver stopped by a local bar and bought a 

round of drinks for the patrons. He played in a softball game, which began about 7:30 p.m. 

and ended at 9:30 p.m. The driver and several teammates remained at the field after the 

game, and some of the players consumed alcohol. About 11:30 p.m., the driver returned to 

the local bar, which he left about 2:00 a.m. As he left the bar, he met a friend and stopped 

to talk for a few minutes.

The Mercedes driver drove about 3.35 miles in the southbound lanes of U.S. 1 in 

Linden before the accident. Near MP 41.4, as indicated by the tire marks, the vehicle was 

traveling between 48 and 62 mph,80 hit the curb on the west side of the road, swerved to 

the left, crossed the other two southbound lanes, mounted and crossed the 11.5-foot-wide, 

6-inch-high raised curb median, and entered the northbound lanes, where it collided head 

on with a 1986 Ford. As the Mercedes crossed over the raised center median, the vehicle 

had rotated about 71 degrees counterclockwise from its original orientation in the right 

southbound traffic lane. (See figure 1 for a diagram of the accident scene.)

As evidenced by the vehicle damage, the initial contact between the two vehicles 

occurred between the right front of the Mercedes and the left front of the Ford. The 

Mercedes most likely began to rotate clockwise about its longitudinal axis, rolled up and 

over the Ford, landed on its roof, and slid about 80 feet into a wooden utility pole on the 

east side of the roadway. The Ford remained upright and rotated counterclockwise about 

163 degrees, and then slid about 50 feet to its point of final rest in the northbound lanes of 

U.S. 1.

Mercedes Speed Calculation 

LPD investigators documented two tire marks observed in the southbound lanes of 

the roadway and classified them as critical curve speed scuff marks. The properties of 

these marks were used to calculate the speed of the vehicle as it traversed the southbound 

80 See speed calculation section that follows.
Analysis 30 Highway Accident Report

lanes of the highway. Using 78, the skid number obtained by the NJDOT for the 

southbound lanes, calculations showed that the vehicle’s speed would have been 62 mph 

as it traversed the southbound lanes.

However, this skid number was probably too high, given that the NJDOT 

conducted its testing on a dry road surface, whereas the testing standards are for wet 

surfaces. Based on the physical examination of the pavement surface, as well as 

consideration of the roadway’s usage (ADT between 48,000 and 82,000 vehicles) and the 

pavement age (most recent paving project was in 1991), the traffic lanes were determined 

to be traffic polished. In this condition, typical skid numbers would be in the range of 45 

to 65,81 not the friction value of 78 reported by the NJDOT. Using these typical values, the 

Mercedes’ speed was calculated to range from 48 to 57 mph.

Mercedes Driver Actions 

The Safety Board’s accident investigation indicated that the Mercedes was already 

traveling toward the curb before it approached the water puddle. The roadway and median 

scuff marks also showed that, after hitting the west curb, the vehicle swerved to the left 

across the other two southbound lanes on U.S. 1. The scuff marks at the scene suggest that 

the Mercedes driver initiated a significant steering maneuver to swerve the vehicle to the 

left across the two southbound lanes on U.S. 1. The Safety Board considered several 

possible explanations for the steering maneuver.

Response to Another Vehicle

Although the video surveillance tape from the gas station was not usable, gas 

station logs showed no activity at the pumps for approximately 30 minutes before the 

accident, reducing the likelihood that the Mercedes driver’s maneuver was in response to a 

vehicle leaving the gas station.

Alcohol Consumption

CAMI testing82 showed alcohol in the Mercedes driver’s blood (0.326 percent) and 

other bodily fluids.83 In the hours before the accident, the driver was at two places where 

alcohol was being consumed. Although no one reported seeing the driver drinking 

alcoholic beverages at the softball field or local bar, the driver’s BAC level indicates that 

he had consumed significant amounts of alcohol before the accident. Several possible 

scenarios could explain the driver’s high BAC level. In one such scenario, the driver, after 

having consumed alcohol most of the day, would have had a drink at the bar, followed by 

a couple of beers at the softball game, and then returned to the bar and continued to drink 

81 L.B. Fricke, Traffic Accident Reconstruction, Volume 2 of the Traffic Investigation Manual 

(Evanston, IL: Northwestern Traffic Institute, 1990).

82 Testing was also performed by the New Jersey State Toxicological Laboratory, which found a 0.351 

BAC. The more conservative CAMI results are used here.

83 According to CAMI, 0.379 percent in urine and 0.210 percent in vitreous humor.
Analysis 31 Highway Accident Report

until leaving, thus consuming enough alcohol to increase his BAC before the accident. 

However, because the driver’s specific drinking behavior—that is, what he was drinking 

or the time at which he started drinking—is not known, the Board calculated84 the amount 

of alcohol that a sober, 230-pound male would have had to drink to reach a 0.326 BAC 

under various conditions.85 Based on those calculations, a prototypical male who began 

drinking about 7.5 hours before reaching a 0.326 BAC (about the time the driver made his 

first trip to the bar) would have had to consume approximately twenty-seven 12-ounce 

beers.86 The same person who began drinking about 5 hours before reaching a 0.326 BAC 

(about the time the driver’s softball game ended) would have had to consume twenty-five 

12-ounce beers or, if he began drinking about 3 hours before reaching a 0.326 BAC, 

twenty-three 12-ounce beers.

At a BAC of 0.326, most individuals would experience dizziness; impaired 

muscular coordination, including an inability to stand or walk; reduced perception and 

visual functions; vomiting; and, possibly, loss of consciousness. However, the driver of 

the Mercedes was able to talk with friends and drive for approximately 3.35 miles before 

becoming involved in an accident. Individuals who are able to function with high BACs 

have very likely developed a tolerance to alcohol and therefore need to drink more alcohol 

than others to produce the same effect. Practicing the same task while under the influence 

of low doses of alcohol can lead to successful performance of the task by such individuals, 

unless they encounter something unusual. The Safety Board concludes that the Mercedes 

driver’s ability to function (that is, to talk with friends and drive his vehicle for 3.35 miles) 

after consuming amounts of alcohol that would have incapacitated a nontolerant 

individual indicates that he had probably developed a tolerance to alcohol. 

In most individuals, driving impairment can appear at a BAC of 0.02. Driving 

performance is impaired in almost everyone at a BAC of 0.08 or greater. At a BAC of 

0.08, most drivers experience increased distractibility, steering difficulties, reduced visual 

acuity, and affected coordination. An alcohol-tolerant driver who might otherwise be able 

to drive successfully at these BAC levels still has degraded driving skills and can exhibit 

impaired performance if something beyond his practiced behavior occurs. An 

unanticipated situation can place the alcohol-tolerant driver at the same risk for an 

accident, due to lack of prior learning opportunities for the unexpected event, as a novice 

driver who has the same BAC.87 Although the Mercedes driver had very likely acquired a 

tolerance to alcohol, the unexpected occurrence of drifting over and hitting the curb 

exceeded his ability to compensate for his high BAC level. His performance would then 

have been comparable to that of a non-alcohol-tolerant driver in that his level of 

distractibility, ability to steer the vehicle, visual acuity, coordination, and reaction time, 

among other abilities, would have been affected. The Safety Board concludes that despite 

84 Safety Board calculations followed the guidelines contained in: Computing a BAC Estimate 

<www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/BACreport.html>.

85 According to the autopsy report, the driver weighed between 220 and 230 pounds.

86 The Safety Board stresses that these are estimates based on drinks containing 1 ounce of alcohol. 

Calculations also show the driver would have had to consume twenty 5-ounce glasses of wine or nineteen 

1.5-ounce liquor drinks to achieve a 0.326 BAC.

87 (a) NIAAA, Alcohol Alert No. 28. (b) NIAAA, Alcohol Alert No. 31.
Analysis 32 Highway Accident Report

the Mercedes driver’s apparent alcohol tolerance, he exhibited alcohol-impaired 

performance in allowing his vehicle to drift over and strike the curb, steering abruptly 

after hitting the curb, and crossing the three lanes of traffic and the median. 

The Mercedes driver’s driving record did not indicate any previous violations of 

DWI laws. However, NHTSA research has shown that drivers can drive impaired for 

thousands of miles and on several occasions before being arrested for a DWI offense.88

The Safety Board concludes that although the Mercedes driver had no record of impaired 

driving penalties or violations, it is very likely that a driver with such a high BAC had 

previously driven impaired.

The Mercedes driver’s BAC indicates the driver consumed significant amounts of 

alcohol before the accident. It is also very likely that the driver had a problem with alcohol 

for a substantial period of time because his behaviors indicate he had developed a tolerance 

to alcohol. However, few people appeared to be aware of the driver’s problem with alcohol. 

The driver’s family and friends said that he was a social drinker, yet no one indicated that 

the driver was a problem drinker. Additionally, the driver of the Mercedes was a police 

officer and associated with other law enforcement personnel socially (for example, softball 

games) and through work. Drivers’ histories are not always indicative of problem drinking, 

and people are not always aware of or do not want to acknowledge a drinking problem.89

However, unlike the general public, police officers are responsible for enforcing impaired 

driving laws and frequently receive training in detecting impaired driving behaviors and 

signs of alcohol or drug use.90 Some States, such as New York, provide impaired driving 

detection training for all of their officers; others, such as New Jersey, conduct training on 

this topic as requested (about a half-dozen courses each year). The Safety Board concludes 

that as a police officer, the driver of the Mercedes associated with and worked with other 

police officers who should have been able to recognize signs of excessive alcohol use and 

impairment. The Safety Board will inform the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, and the Fraternal Order of Police of the 

circumstances of this accident and encourage law enforcement organizations to conduct 

refresher training on recognizing signs of excessive alcohol use and impairment. 

The Safety Board’s model program to counter the hard core drinking driver, which 

targets drivers with a high BAC as well as repeat offenders, has several elements, 

including frequent and well-publicized sobriety checkpoints, vehicle sanctions to restrict 

or separate hard core drinking drivers from their vehicles, State and community programs 

to enforce DWI suspensions, legislation that defines a high BAC (0.15 or greater) as an 

“aggravated” DWI offense, administrative license revocation for BAC test failure and 

refusal, and individualized sanction programs for repeat DWI offenders.

88 (a) Alcohol and Highway Safety 1984: A Review of the State of the Knowledge, 56. (b) DOT HS 809 184.

89 Injury Prevention, Vol. 8 (September 2002): 221-26.

90 NHTSA has developed standards for training on detecting impaired driving: DWI Detection and 

Standardization Field Sobriety Testing Basic Course, DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety 

Instructor Training, DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Refresher Training, and Drug 

Recognition Expert Training. 
Analysis 33 Highway Accident Report

In 2000, the Safety Board recommended that the States and the District of 

Columbia establish their own DWI programs:

H-00-26

Establish a comprehensive program that is designed to reduce the 

incidence of alcohol-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by hard 

core drinking drivers and that includes elements such as those suggested in 

the National Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. 

On July 5, 2005, the State of New Jersey responded to Safety Recommendation 

H-00-26, indicating that it had passed legislation in 1999 giving the courts discretion to 

order that an interlock device91 be installed on the motor vehicle of a first-time DWI 

offender and requiring that an interlock device be installed for second or subsequent 

offenders. New Jersey law also authorizes the arresting law enforcement agency to 

impound a vehicle operated by a person arrested for DWI for up to 12 hours following 

the arrest, if the agency determines that releasing the vehicle to the person arrested 

represents a threat to public safety. New Jersey permits sobriety checkpoints and, 

according to the New Jersey Division of Highway Traffic Safety, Linden received 

$10,000 in drunk driving prevention funds in 2004 (of which, $4,600 was spent on 

checkpoints) and $14,000 in drunk driving prevention funds in 2005. New Jersey also 

has alternatives to confinement, restricts plea-bargaining, and has a look-back period of 

at least 10 years. 

However, New Jersey has not initiated many of the other elements of the model 

program: laws addressing administrative license revocation, zero BAC restriction for DWI 

offenders, elimination of diversion programs (such as education, counseling, or 

community service), or specialized DWI courts. Finally, New Jersey does not have 

legislation defining a high BAC (0.15 or greater) as an “aggravated” DWI offense 

requiring strong intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat DWI 

offenders.92 Because New Jersey has implemented only one of seven of the model 

program’s primary elements, Safety Recommendation H-00-26 was classified “Open—

Unacceptable Response” on September 20, 2005. The Safety Board concludes that New 

Jersey lacks a comprehensive approach to preventing hard core drinking driving, 

including legislation that defines a high BAC (0.15 or greater) as an aggravated DWI 

offense; therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation H-00-26 to the 

State of New Jersey. 

Operator Fatigue

The Safety Board also explored the role operator fatigue may have played in the 

accident. Alcohol consumption can disrupt sleep and lead to decreased total sleep time, 

91 Device attached to a vehicle’s ignition system that prevents the vehicle from being started if a 

driver’s breath alcohol concentration (as measured by blowing into the device) is above an established level.

92 In May 2005, the New Jersey Senate proposed legislation to increase penalties for drunk drivers with 

BACs of 0.15 or higher (Senate Bill No. 2469, May 5, 2005), but no action has been taken on the bill.
Analysis 34 Highway Accident Report

thereby contributing to impaired performance.93 Alcohol consumption and sleepiness can 

also combine to impair driving performance.94 In the 72 hours before the accident, the 

Mercedes driver slept at least 17 hours; however, the driver’s sleep activities the day 

before the accident are unknown. The Mercedes driver had been working a nontraditional 

schedule (8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) for approximately 1 month and, according to his family, 

attempted to maintain that sleep schedule on his days off. However, the driver’s sleep 

schedule showed that on Monday, April 28, he slept from 1:00 a.m. to about 11:00 a.m. 

and on Tuesday, April 29, he slept from 4:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., times covering periods 

that he would normally have been awake and on duty. Furthermore, the accident occurred 

at 2:11 a.m., a time at which the body is predisposed for sleep. 

Although information on the amount of sleep the Mercedes driver received in the 

24 hours before the accident is limited, sufficient information exists to suggest the 

combined effects of alcohol consumption and reduced, low-quality sleep may have 

impaired the driver’s performance. The driver’s sleep schedule, the time that the accident 

occurred, and the consumption of alcohol all could have contributed to the driver’s 

impaired performance. The Safety Board, therefore, concludes that although it cannot be 

determined conclusively whether the driver of the Mercedes was fatigued at the time of 

the accident or whether he fell asleep, sufficient evidence exists to suggest that impaired 

performance due to the combined effects of alcohol consumption and operator fatigue 

possibly contributed to the accident. 

Survival Aspects

The drivers of both vehicles and three of the four passengers in the Ford died at the 

accident site. The fourth passenger died about 3.5 hours later at the hospital.

Contact damage to the Ford was along the left side of the vehicle. It began at the 

front grill assembly, continued across both the driver and left-rear passenger doors, and 

ended just before the rear left wheel. The left side of the vehicle and the roof panel were 

pushed into the passenger compartment. The Safety Board concludes that the intrusion 

into the occupant compartments of the Ford rendered the vehicle occupant space 

unsurvivable.

The Mercedes sustained extensive contact damage, which was concentrated in the 

right front and left rear of the vehicle, providing survivable space in the Mercedes. 

Further, the driver’s air bag deployed during the accident. However, the seat belt was 

found in the retracted position, and the belt webbing did not show signs of stress. The 

driver did not sustain any injuries over the abdomen or pelvis that would have been 

consistent with seat belt wear at the time of the accident. Further, the driver of the 

93 (a) Sleep, Sleepiness, and Alcohol Use <www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-2/101-109.htm>. 

(b) Alcohol Alert No. 41. (c) Alcohol’s Effects on Sleep in Alcoholics <www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-

2/110-125.htm>.

94 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January/February 1994): 154-58.
Analysis 35 Highway Accident Report

Mercedes was partially ejected from the vehicle. The Safety Board concludes that had the 

driver of the Mercedes been restrained, the seat belt, in conjunction with the air bag and 

the survivable space in the Mercedes, would have reduced his risk of ejection and fatal 

injury. 

Lap/shoulder belts reduce the risk of injury, and air bags provide supplemental 

protection to lap/shoulder belts.95 Restraint use is lower for those impaired by alcohol and 

at night.96 NHTSA is initiating a demonstration project of seat belt enforcement at night 

that will include a component of restraint use and alcohol impairment.97 The project was 

awarded in September 2005 and is currently under development. The Safety Board looks 

forward to reviewing the results of this demonstration project.

Roadway Issues

Vehicle Speed and Speed Enforcement

U.S. 1 in the vicinity of the accident is considered a low-speed urban arterial 

roadway. It was designed for a travel speed of 45 mph and has a posted speed limit of 40 

mph. The Safety Board calculated the travel speed of the Mercedes to have been between 

48 and 62 mph. The driver of the Mercedes was thus speeding, which is more prevalent 

among alcohol-impaired drivers, and a Safety Board speed survey also showed that few 

other drivers were complying with the posted speed limit. According to this survey, the 

85th percentile speed was 72 mph, and the median speed was 62 mph. Further, survey 

results showed only two vehicles were traveling at or below 40 mph, and six were 

traveling at 80 mph or greater. Two additional spot-speed studies conducted by the 

NJDOT yielded 85th percentile speeds of 58 mph and 52 mph. The widespread disregard 

for the speed limit suggests a low level of speed enforcement on this stretch of U.S. 1. 

LPD officials stated that the department was aware of the high frequency of speeding on 

U.S. 1 in the vicinity of the accident but had not conducted directed speed limit 

enforcement there because of limited resources. The Safety Board concludes that drivers 

are not complying with the posted speed limit of 40 mph on U.S. 1 in the vicinity of the 

accident and that the apparent lack of traffic law enforcement in this area may contribute 

to the higher travel speeds. As noted earlier, speeding contributed to 30 percent of fatal 

accidents in 2004,98 resulting in nearly 13,192 lives lost. Further, speeding reduces a 

driver’s ability to steer safely around curves or objects in the roadway, extends vehicle 

stopping distance, and increases the distance a vehicle travels while the driver reacts to a 

95 Third Report to Congress, Effectiveness of Occupant Protection Systems and Their Use

<www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/Index_occupprotect.html >.

96 (a) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Restraint Use Among Fatally Injured Passenger 

Vehicle Occupants by Time of Day, DOT HS 809 817 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2004). (b) National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2002: Alcohol, DOT HS 809 606 (Washington, 

DC: NHTSA, 2003).

97 NHTSA contract number DTNHT22-05-Z-05094, “Develop and Evaluate Nighttime Belt 

Enforcement.”

98 DOT HS 809 915.
Analysis 36 Highway Accident Report

dangerous situation.99 Consequently, the Safety Board believes that the city of Linden 

should develop and implement a speed enforcement plan for U.S. 1. 

Median Barriers

The Mercedes was traveling between 48 and 62 mph in the southbound lanes of 

U.S. 1 just before the accident occurred. When the Mercedes lost control, it swerved to the 

left, mounted a 6-inch curb, crossed an 11.5-foot-wide median, and entered the 

northbound lanes, where it collided head on with the Ford, killing the driver of the 

Mercedes and the five occupants of the Ford. During the accident sequence, the Mercedes’ 

contact with the raised median caused the vehicle to rotate about its longitudinal axis. A 

postaccident examination of the vehicles revealed that the right-front fender of the rotating 

Mercedes made contact with the Taurus’ driver-side A-pillar. As a result, the crash forces 

were primarily directed into the passenger compartment of the Taurus, dramatically 

increasing the severity of the accident.

The accident segment of U.S. 1 had only a 6-inch-high raised concrete curb 

median to separate northbound and southbound traffic, for reasons that the NJDOT was 

unable to document. Consequently, no barrier was in place that could have prevented 

vehicles traveling in the southbound lanes from veering into the northbound lanes (or vice 

versa). However, median barriers were located north and south of the accident site. 

Physical evidence found on these median barriers, such as the black tire rubber smears and 

metallic scrapes, suggests vehicle contact with these taller structures.

AASHTO guidelines, which the NJDOT has adopted, suggest that raised curb 

medians, such as the one present at the accident site, are best used on low-speed urban 

arterial roadways to prevent midblock left turns and provide a place for pedestrians and 

signs.100 The AASHTO guidelines also note that on high-speed roadways, striking a raised 

median curb can cause a driver to lose control, with the vehicle contacting the curb 

tripping, overturning, or becoming airborne, as was the case in this accident. Although the 

portion of U.S. 1 where the accident occurred had a posted 40-mph speed limit, traffic 

surveys showed that vehicles routinely traveled at substantially greater speeds.

The Safety Board concludes that a raised curb median, such as the one on U.S. 1 in 

the vicinity of the accident, is not sufficient to prevent crossover median accidents and can 

cause a vehicle to become out of control or airborne at the speeds at which vehicles travel 

on that segment of roadway. The Safety Board further concludes that had a median barrier 

been present at the accident site, the Mercedes probably would not have crossed from the 

southbound lanes into the northbound lanes and collided with the Ford. 

Following the accident, the NJDOT evaluated the accident site for the installation 

of a median barrier. For several reasons, including the low occurrence of median crossover 

accidents and the straight alignment of the roadway segment, the NJDOT determined that 

a median barrier was not needed for this segment of U.S. 1. 

99 DOT HS 809 915.

100 A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (2004) and Roadside Design Guide (2002). 
Analysis 37 Highway Accident Report

Determining whether a median barrier should be installed on roadways that have 

relatively flat, traversable medians, such as the accident roadway, is difficult because 

AASHTO guidelines for median barrier installation do not provide clear guidance. 

AASHTO’s Roadside Design Guide provides guidance for the installation of median 

barriers on high-speed, controlled-access roadways based on a combination of ADT and 

center median widths. Because the section of U.S. 1 where the accident occurred had an 

estimated ADT exceeding 66,000 vehicles and a median width of 11.5 feet, the Roadside 

Design Guide would suggest that the roadway be evaluated as to the need for a median 

barrier. However, these guidelines do not state how to conduct such an evaluation or 

suggest specific information to consider. Additional guidance in the Roadside Design 

Guide states that median barriers are sometimes used on high-volume, non-accesscontrolled roadways but provides no specific guidance about median barrier installation 

other than information pertaining to the potential hazards in terminating barrier ends and 

sight distance. For such roadways, AASHTO’s A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways 

and Streets (as adopted by New Jersey) suggests several factors to consider in installing a 

median barrier on multilane expressways or other highways with partial control of access: 

the number of median openings, accident history, alignment, sight distance, design speed, 

traffic volumes, and median width. However, specific guidance is lacking concerning the 

conditions warranting the installation of median barriers, such as the level of traffic 

volume, number or rate of accidents, sight distance, or median width measurements.

The Safety Board has previously asked the FHWA and AASHTO to revise the 

median barrier guidelines to reflect changes in the factors affecting the probability of 

cross-median accidents.101 Specifically, the Safety Board recommended that the FHWA, in 

conjunction with AASHTO (Safety Recommendation H-98-24):

H-98-12

Review, with the American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials, the median barrier warrants and revise them as 

necessary to reflect changes in the factors affecting the probability of crossmedian accidents, including changes in the vehicle fleet and the percentage 

of heavy trucks using the roadway. 

AASHTO has informed the Safety Board that it is revising the guidance for 

median barriers. When completed, it is expected that the guidance will be released as an 

updated chapter in the Roadside Design Guide.

102 The Safety Board looks forward to the 

opportunity to review this additional guidance; until then, Safety Recommendations 

H-98-12 and -24 remain classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” 

101 (a) National Transportation Safety Board, Ford Explorer Sport Collision With Ford Windstar 

Minivan and Jeep Grand Cherokee on Interstate 95/495 Near Largo, Maryland, February 1, 2002, Highway 

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-03/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2003). (b) National Transportation Safety 

Board, Multiple Vehicle Crossover Accident, Slinger, Wisconsin, February 12, 1997, Highway Accident 

Report NTSB/HAR-98/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1998).

102 AASHTO plans full review of the Roadside Design Guide, culminating in a fully updated guide, 

possibly in 2008 (March 16, 2005, e-mail from the Associate Program Director, Engineering, AASHTO).
Analysis 38 Highway Accident Report

 As traffic, congestion, and vehicle speeds increase on roadways similar to the 

accident roadway, the probability of a median crossover accident also increases. The 

Safety Board recognizes that the installation of median barriers on roadways entails a 

complex decision-making process involving a number of roadway characteristics, a 

process made more difficult by the fact that the current median barrier installation 

guidelines are inadequate for determining when to install a median barrier. The Safety 

Board concludes that the AASHTO guidelines for the installation of a median barrier are 

inadequate because they do not include specific guidance on how to evaluate highway 

factors, such as accident history, sight distance, and vehicle type or speed, to determine 

whether a median barrier is necessary. The Safety Board believes that AASHTO and the 

FHWA should work together to establish evaluative criteria for determining when to 

install median barriers on high-volume, high-speed roadways, regardless of access type. 
39 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The following elements neither caused nor contributed to the accident: the weather, 

the mechanical condition of the vehicles, the roadway markings, the roadway 

lighting, and the driver’s use of prescription drugs. 

2. The emergency response was timely and adequate. 

3. The Mercedes’ contact with the puddle in the southbound lanes of U.S. Route 1 was 

of insufficient extent and duration to have caused the vehicle to hydroplane and did 

not contribute to the accident. 

4. The Mercedes driver’s ability to function (that is, to talk with friends and drive his 

vehicle for 3.35 miles) after consuming amounts of alcohol that would have 

incapacitated a nontolerant individual indicates that he had probably developed a 

tolerance to alcohol. 

5. Despite the Mercedes driver’s apparent alcohol tolerance, he exhibited 

alcohol-impaired performance in allowing his vehicle to drift over and strike the curb, 

steering abruptly after hitting the curb, and crossing the three lanes of traffic and the 

median. 

6. Although the Mercedes driver had no record of impaired driving penalties or 

violations, it is very likely that a driver with such a high blood alcohol concentration 

had previously driven impaired. 

7. The driver of the Mercedes associated with and worked with other police officers who 

should have been able to recognize signs of excessive alcohol use and impairment.

8. New Jersey lacks a comprehensive approach to preventing hard core drinking driving, 

including legislation that defines a high blood alcohol concentration (0.15 or greater) 

as an aggravated DWI offense.

9. Although it cannot be determined conclusively whether the driver of the Mercedes 

was fatigued at the time of the accident or whether he fell asleep, sufficient evidence 

exists to suggest that impaired performance due to the combined effects of alcohol 

consumption and operator fatigue possibly contributed to the accident. 

10. The intrusion into the occupant compartments of the Ford rendered the vehicle 

occupant space unsurvivable. 
Conclusions 40 Highway Accident Report

11. Had the driver of the Mercedes been restrained, the seat belt, in conjunction with the 

air bag and the survivable space in the Mercedes, would have reduced his risk of 

ejection and fatal injury. 

12. Drivers are not complying with the posted speed limit of 40 mph on U.S. Route 1 in 

the vicinity of the accident, and the apparent lack of traffic law enforcement in this 

area may contribute to the higher travel speeds. 

13. A raised curb median, such as the one on U.S. Route 1 in the vicinity of the accident, 

is not sufficient to prevent crossover median accidents and can cause a vehicle to 

become out of control or airborne at the speeds at which vehicles travel on that 

segment of roadway. 

14. Had a median barrier been present at the accident site, the Mercedes probably would 

not have crossed from the southbound lanes into the northbound lanes and collided 

with the Ford.

15. American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials guidelines for 

the installation of a median barrier are inadequate because they do not include 

specific guidance on how to evaluate highway factors, such as accident history, sight 

distance, and vehicle type or speed, to determine whether a median barrier is 

necessary.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the Mercedes driver’s loss of control of the vehicle due to alcohol 

impairment. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the lack of barriers 

separating traffic in the northbound and southbound traffic lanes and the failure of the 

Mercedes driver to wear his seat belt.
41 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the 

following safety recommendations: 

New Recommendations

To the Federal Highway Administration:

Work with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials to establish evaluative criteria for determining when to install 

median barriers on high-volume, high-speed roadways, regardless of 

access type. (H-06-12)

To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Work with the Federal Highway Administration to establish evaluative 

criteria for determining when to install median barriers on high-volume, 

high-speed roadways, regardless of access type. (H-06-13)

To the city of Linden:

Develop and implement a speed enforcement plan for U.S. Route 1. 

(H-06-14)

Reiterated Recommendation

The National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following previously 

issued recommendation:

To the State of New Jersey:

Establish a comprehensive program that is designed to reduce the 

incidence of alcohol-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by hard 

core drinking drivers and that includes elements such as those suggested in 

the National Transportation Safety Board’s Model Program. (H-00-26)
Recommendations 42 Highway Accident Report

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARK V. ROSENKER

Acting Chairman

DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Member

ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS

Member

KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS

Member

Adopted: February 7, 2006
43 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Linden, New Jersey, 

accident on May 1, 2003. Investigative team members were dispatched from the 

Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, offices. Groups were established to investigate 

human performance, highway, and vehicle factors.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of the Federal Highway 

Administration, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the Linden, New 

Jersey, Police Department.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.