PB96-916201

NTSB/HAR-96/01

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT

HIGHWAY/RAIL GRADE CROSSING COLLISION

NEAR SYCAMORE, SOUTH CAROLINA

MAY 2, 1995

6596A
Abstract: On May 2, 1995, a truck consisting of a tractor and a lowbed semitrailer became

lodged on a high-profile (hump) railroad grade crossing near Sycamore, South Carolina. About

35 minutes later, the truck was struck by southbound Amtrak train No. 81 en route from New

York City to Tampa, Florida. No deaths resulted from the accident, but 33 persons sustained

minor injuries. Combined property damage to the truck and train exceeded $1 million.

The following issues in grade crossing safety are discussed in this report: identification

and warnings of hump crossings, emergency notifications at grade crossings, and adequacy of

training for commercial drivers.

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued

recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation; the Federal Highway Administration; the

American Public Transit Association; the American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators; the American Trucking Associations, Inc.; the American Short Line Railroad

Association; Operation Lifesaver, Inc.; all Class I railroads and railroad systems; and O&J

Gordon Trucking Company.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to

promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety.

Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents,

issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety

effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its

actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety

recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(202) 382-6735

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 487-4600
HIGHWAY/RAIL GRADE CROSSING

COLLISION

NEAR SYCAMORE, SOUTH CAROLINA

MAY 2, 1995

HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: March 11, 1996

Notation 6596A

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20594
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iii

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................... v

INVESTIGATION

The Accident ................................................................................................................................... 1

Pre-Accident.............................................................................................................................. 1

Collision .................................................................................................................................... 5

Emergency Response................................................................................................................. 5

Injuries............................................................................................................................................. 8

Damage............................................................................................................................................ 8

Truck ......................................................................................................................................... 8

Train .......................................................................................................................................... 8

Truck Information ........................................................................................................................... 9

Train Information ............................................................................................................................ 9

Personnel Information ................................................................................................................... 12

Truckdriver.............................................................................................................................. 12

Traincrew ................................................................................................................................ 13

Engineer ............................................................................................................................ 13

Assistant Engineer ............................................................................................................ 13

Conductor and Assistant Conductors ............................................................................... 13

Toxicological Testing.................................................................................................................... 14

Accident Site Information ............................................................................................................. 14

Roadway and Grade Crossing ................................................................................................. 14

Track, Wayside, and Crossing Signals.................................................................................... 15

Carrier Information........................................................................................................................ 16

O&J Gordon Trucking ............................................................................................................ 16

CSXT Operations .................................................................................................................... 18

Amtrak Operations .................................................................................................................. 18

Meteorological Information .......................................................................................................... 19

Survival Aspects............................................................................................................................ 19

Tests and Research ........................................................................................................................ 20

Locomotive Event Recorders .................................................................................................. 20

Train Stopping Distance.......................................................................................................... 20

Track........................................................................................................................................ 21

Additional Train Tests............................................................................................................. 21

Sight Distance ......................................................................................................................... 21

Truck Lamp Examination........................................................................................................ 21

Emergency Notification Time ................................................................................................. 22

Other Information.......................................................................................................................... 22

Hump Crossings ...................................................................................................................... 22

Standards and Guidelines........................................................................................................ 25

Warning Signs......................................................................................................................... 25

U.S. DOT/AAR Inventory....................................................................................................... 26

Relationships Between Public Entities and Railroads............................................................. 28

Emergency Notification........................................................................................................... 29
iv

Texas ................................................................................................................................. 29

Delaware............................................................................................................................ 30

Connecticut........................................................................................................................ 30

Canada............................................................................................................................... 30

Norfolk Southern Corporation .......................................................................................... 30

Santa Fe Railway Company .............................................................................................. 30

CSXT................................................................................................................................. 31

Other U.S. Railroads ......................................................................................................... 31

Foreign Railroads .............................................................................................................. 31

Commercial Driver Training and Education........................................................................... 31

Grade Crossing Safety............................................................................................................. 33

ANALYSIS

General .......................................................................................................................................... 35

Exclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 35

The Accident ................................................................................................................................. 37

Truckdriver Issues ......................................................................................................................... 38

Driver Fatigue.......................................................................................................................... 38

Driver Training and Experience.............................................................................................. 39

Driver’s Actions After Becoming Lodged .............................................................................. 40

Motor Carrier Involvement ........................................................................................................... 41

Grade Crossing Safety................................................................................................................... 42

Hump Crossings ...................................................................................................................... 42

Emergency Notification........................................................................................................... 43

Commercial Truckdriver Training, Education, and Testing ................................................... 44

Emergency Response..................................................................................................................... 46

CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................... 47

PROBABLE CAUSE .................................................................................................................. 48

RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................................ 49

APPENDIXES

Appendix A--Investigation...................................................................................................... 53

Appendix B--Injury Information ............................................................................................. 55

Appendix C--Existing Grade Crossing Emergency Notification Systems.............................. 57

Appendix D--Safety Board Findings, Recommendations, and Responses Regarding

 Tractor-Lowbed Semitrailer/Train Collisions..................................................................... 65

Appendix E--Accident Summaries: Lowbed Vehicle/Train Collisions Investigated

 by the Safety Board ............................................................................................................. 71

Appendix F--U.S. Department of Transportation-Related Items on Emergency

 Notification Systems ........................................................................................................... 95
v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About 2:35 a.m. on May 2, 1995, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

train No. 81, the Silver Star, on its southbound run from New York, New York, to Tampa,

Florida, struck an O&J Gordon Trucking Company tractor-lowbed semitrailer combination that

had been lodged for 30 to 35 minutes on a rural, high-vertical-profile (hump)1, passive2 grade

crossing about 1 mile north of Sycamore, South Carolina. At the time of the accident, the train

was using a single main line track belonging to CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). The two

locomotive units and 14 cars of the 16-car consist derailed. The tractor and semitrailer were

substantially damaged. No fire ensued.

The train was carrying 279 passengers, 9 service crewmembers, and 5 operating crew

members. Thirty-three persons sustained minor injuries. Combined property damage to the train

and truck exceeded $1 million.

The Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the motor

carrier's failure to provide to the driver appropriate guidance to respond to emergency situations.

This led to the truckdriver's failure both to understand that the substandard profile of the

Boogaloo Road grade crossing was incompatible with the truck he was operating, and to notify

the appropriate railroad and emergency personnel of the blocked crossing. Contributing to the

accident was the absence of emergency notification information that the driver may have used to

notify the railroad of the blocked crossing. 

In its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board addressed the following issues in

grade crossing safety: identification and warnings of hump crossings, emergency notifications at

grade crossings, and adequacy of training for commercial drivers.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the

Secretary of Transportation; the Federal Highway Administration; the American Public Transit

Association; the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators; the American Trucking

Associations, Inc.; the American Short Line Railroad Association; Operation Lifesaver, Inc.; all

Class I railroads and railroad systems; and O&J Gordon Trucking Company.

 

1

A grade crossing where the railroad tracks are significantly elevated above the approaching roadway,

creating a “hump” profile. 2

A grade crossing with passive devices such as signs but lacking other visual or audible signaling devices or

gates that automatically activate when a train approaches.

1

INVESTIGATION

The Accident

Pre-Accident -- About 7:00 a.m. on May 1, 1995, a truckdriver reported for work at O&J

Gordon Trucking Company (O&J) in Estill, South Carolina. During the day, he made several

local trips hauling logs. About 5:00 p.m., the truckdriver’s employer called him on the two-way

radio and dispatched him to Walterboro, South Carolina, where he was to pick up a lowbed

semitrailer and haul some logging equipment.

The truckdriver stated that, upon arriving in Walterboro, he hooked up his tractor to the

semitrailer and cranked the trailer’s landing gear fully upward until it locked. As he was directed

to do, he then loaded a Timberjack (a piece of logging machinery) onto the semitrailer and took it

to Steedman, South Carolina, arriving about 9:00 p.m. He said that after unloading the machinery

at Steedman, he drove to Lexington, South Carolina, where he was to pick up another

Timberjack and return it and the semitrailer to Walterboro.

The driver said he arrived in Lexington about 11:00 p.m. He said he attempted to load the

Timberjack onto the semitrailer, but the Timberjack’s engine would not start. About midnight, he

decided to return to his residence near Sycamore, about 75 miles away, to get some sleep. He

said he did not consider staying in Lexington because he had no money for a motel. He said he

decided against unhooking the semitrailer and leaving it in Lexington because he thought the

trailer would not be secure there.

From Lexington, the driver traveled southeast on I-26 to U.S. 321, then drove south

toward Sycamore. (See figure 1.) He said he stopped in Neeses, South Carolina, for a short nap,

and that it was about 2:00 a.m. when he turned right off of U.S. 321 onto the unpaved roadway

leading to his residence. He said that, after making the turn, he drove in first gear about 100 feet

to an unlighted, passive, hump grade crossing located about 300 feet east of his residence and

about 1 mile north of Sycamore.

The truckdriver stated that when he reached the grade crossing, he stopped and looked

both ways before crossing. He said he continued forward over the tracks, looking in his side

mirror at the semitrailer side marker lights, until he heard something scraping and felt the truck

stop suddenly. He tried to back up, but the truck would not move. He said he got out of the

tractor and saw that the semitrailer had about 2 to 3 inches of ground clearance. He did not notice

that the semitrailer’s landing gear, which protruded below the frame rails of the semitrailer, had

become embedded in the crossing’s asphalt surface. (See figure 2.)
w

‘1.

.

Figure 1-- Location of the accident

4

He got back into the tractor and again tried, without success, to move the truck either

forward or backward off the crossing. He said he engaged the rear axle differential to supply

power to all four rear wheels, but the wheels simply spun without moving the truck. Unable to

move the truck, the truckdriver said he tried unsuccessfully to uncouple the semitrailer.

The truckdriver stated that, while he was unaware of the train schedules at the crossing,

he was concerned about getting the truck off the tracks. In fact, at about 2:14 a.m., while the

truckdriver was attempting to move his lodged vehicle, Amtrak train 81, with 16 cars and 279

passengers, departed Denmark, South Carolina, on CSXT single main line track southbound

toward the blocked crossing. The truckdriver said he tried to use his two-way radio to contact the

carrier’s office; however, the office was closed and no one responded. Also, he stated that during

the previous day he had tried several times to use the cellular telephone in the tractor, but that

each time the phone indicated that it was out of its service range.

The truckdriver went to his brother’s house about 200 feet from the crossing, awakened

him, and requested his assistance. The truckdriver’s brother drove his pickup truck from his

house to the crossing, where the two men attempted, without success, to use the truck to pull the

semitrailer rearward off the track.

About 2:30 a.m., a cousin to the brothers, who lived about 100 feet from the crossing,

was awakened by his dog barking. He said he saw the truck at the crossing, got dressed, and

when he walked outside to see what was happening, he saw his truckdriver cousin trying to free

the truck. He stated that within two minutes of coming out of the house he saw the headlight of a

train coming from the north, and he yelled to the truckdriver that a train was coming. The

truckdriver stated that he asked his cousin for a flashlight so he could look in his truck for

reflective triangles, which he said he intended to place 10 to 20 feet apart on the tracks in an

effort to stop the train. Unable to locate the triangles and hearing the train’s horn, the truckdriver

began waving his arms and running down the middle of the tracks toward the train. The

truckdriver’s brother said he heard his cousin’s yell and ran across the highway to safety.

According to the train’s assistant engineer, who was operating the train immediately prior

to the accident, Amtrak train 81 was approaching Sycamore at about 79 mph with its headlights

in the bright position and its ditch lights on. The assistant engineer said that as the train

approached a whistle post (which was located 1,335 feet from the crossing), he sounded the horn.

He said he then noticed someone waving his arms and saw a semitrailer on the tracks ahead. He

placed the brakes in emergency application and continued to sound the horn until impact

occurred. The force of the impact knocked him to the floor.

The engineer, who was sitting on the opposite side of the locomotive cab, said he also

saw the semitrailer blocking the tracks. He said he pulled the emergency brake handle on the

right side of the engine compartment about the same time the assistant engineer placed the train

into emergency braking; he then went to the floor, bracing himself for the imminent impact.

The conductor and assistant conductors aboard the train said that they were in the dining

car when they heard and felt the train brakes go into emergency. Eight on-board service (OBS)
5

crewmembers were in the slumber coach, and one was in the sleeper car. The conductor said that

when the impact occurred, he noted that the time was 2:35 a.m.

Collision -- Amtrak train 81 struck the right side of the semitrailer. The impact caused both

locomotives and 14 of the 16-car consist to derail. The lead locomotive came to rest on the west

side of the track about 1,200 feet from the point of impact. (See figure 3.) The tractor and

semitrailer separated, the tractor rotating clockwise about 260 degrees and coming to rest about

19 feet southwest of the crossing. The semitrailer rotated counterclockwise about 285 degrees

and came to rest about 43 feet southeast of the crossing. (See figure 4.) No fire ensued.

Emergency Response -- After the collision, the engineer got off the lead locomotive to

assess damage to the train. He said he noted the milepost just beyond the derailed train and

directed the assistant engineer to notify the CSXT dispatcher of the accident. According to the

assistant engineer, he switched to the CSXT emergency channel, and within seconds the

dispatcher responded. The assistant engineer said he relayed the train’s location and indicated

that his train needed help.

At 2:35 a.m., a resident nearby made a call to 911 reporting the accident. The caller stated

that there had been a passenger train wreck about one mile north of Sycamore, that a train had hit

a tractor-semitrailer crossing the tracks, and that there may be casualties. According to Allendale

County Central Dispatch records, at 2:35 a.m., an Allendale County deputy sheriff was

dispatched to the scene, arriving about 2:59 a.m. When the deputy sheriff arrived, he saw the

truckdriver walking around unhurt, and he made minimal observations of the train. He told his

dispatcher that the truckdriver was not hurt and that CSXT should be notified of the derailment.

The deputy was asked by the dispatcher if emergency medical services (EMS) were needed, and

he responded “negative.”

At 3:05 a.m., a dispatched South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) trooper arrived on the

scene. He said he interviewed the deputy sheriff and the truckdriver, and when he saw white

bedding sheets lying on the ballast, he concluded that there may be injured passengers aboard. He

contacted the SCHP dispatcher, who, at 3:17 a.m., called the Allendale County dispatcher and

requested an ambulance. At 3:25 a.m., the SCHP trooper asked the dispatcher to send the fire

department with ladders to help passengers out of the overturned cars. Between 2:35 and 3:17

a.m., no EMS assistance was requested or dispatched.

The Allendale County Emergency Operations Plan was initiated at 3:43 a.m. by the firstarriving Allendale County paramedic. At 3:45 a.m., a paramedic supervisor established a

command center at the accident site. Mutual aid was requested for ambulances and fire units

from neighboring counties. Three area hospitals were alerted that they may receive patients from

the train accident. Forty-seven persons were transported to the three hospitals. School buses were

used to transport uninjured passengers to shelters. By 4:00 a.m., responders had evacuated all

persons from train 81, and by 6:19 a.m. the last passenger had been transported to an area

hospital. About 7:00 a.m., the Allendale County fire chief, who was the incident commander,

turned the scene over to CSXT.

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Injuries

No fatalities or serious injuries resulted from this accident; however, 29 passengers and 4

OBS personnel sustained minor injuries. Most of the injured persons were located either in the

coach or sleeper cars. Three passengers with preexisting conditions were admitted to area

hospitals. The train operating crew and truckdriver were not injured. An injury table based on the

Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine is

shown at appendix B.

Table 1 -- Injury table3

Damage

The truck combination unit, both locomotives, three mail-handling cars, the sleeper car,

both baggage cars, the lounge and dining cars, and six passenger coaches were damaged in the

accident. About 690 feet of track were damaged or destroyed. O&J estimated repairs to the

tractor and replacement cost for the semitrailer at $60,000. Amtrak estimated damage to the

rolling stock at $1,018,500. CSXT estimated damage to the track at $50,000, with cleanup

costing an additional $154,000. Total damage estimates for this accident thus were about

$1,282,500.

Truck -- The tractor’s engine compartment fiberglass cover tilted upward during the

collision. The right steering axle tire, both left drive axle outside tires, and the right rear drive

axle outside tire were deflated. Both frame rails were displaced to the left, causing the front and

rear drive axles to be misaligned. The tractor cab protection rack separated from the tractor

frame. During impact, the lowbed semitrailer separated from the tractor at the fifth wheel, with

the fifth wheel remaining attached to the semitrailer. The right side of the semitrailer was bent

inward to a maximum displacement of 40 inches. The left landing gear leg was bent rearward,

and the right landing gear foot had rotated upward to a vertical position.

Train -- The lead locomotive sustained damage to its front plow and right-side ladder, and

its rear truck derailed. The trailing locomotive derailed. No interior damage was noted in either

locomotive. The three mail-handling cars behind the locomotives derailed but remained upright;

the 4th through 7th cars derailed and overturned or tipped to varying degrees on their right sides;

 

3

Table 1 is based on the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which the Safety

Board uses in accident reports for all modes.

Injury Type Operating Crew Service Crew Passengers Others Totals

Fatal 0 0 0 0 0

Serious 0 0 0 0 0

Minor 0 4 29 0 33

Total 0 4 29 0 33
9

the 8th through 14th cars derailed but remained upright and parallel to the track; and the 15th and

16th cars remained on the rails. A post-impact inspection revealed that the emergency windows

had been removed from the lounge and several coach cars; both automatic brake valves

(controlling the train’s brakes) on the lead locomotive were in the emergency position; the

independent brake handle (controlling the locomotives’ brakes) was in the fully applied position;

the front headlights were on dim; and the ditch lights were off.

Truck Information

The truck consisted of a 1986 Freightliner 3-axle conventional tractor and a 1994 Evans

two-axle semitrailer. The tractor was owned by O&J; the semitrailer was owned by Pioneer

Machinery, Inc. (Pioneer). The tractor had a diesel engine coupled to an 11-speed manual

transmission. At the time of the accident, the tractor’s odometer registered 511,250 miles.

Lowbed or low clearance vehicles vary greatly in their physical characteristics, primarily

because most trucks are customized for special operational conditions. Typical wheelbases for

lowbed vehicles range from 25 to 40 feet, and ground clearances can be as little as 3 inches. The

Pioneer semitrailer was approximately 48 feet long. It had an unloaded ground clearance of 12

inches on a level surface. All tractor and semitrailer axles were equipped with standard s-cam air

mechanical service brakes. The truck had a overall length of approximately 61 feet. (See

figure 5.)

A commercial inspection performed on the tractor in 1995 by the SCHP revealed several

out-of-service violations. (See “Motor Carrier Information” section for details.) A postaccident

examination of the semitrailer’s landing gear revealed that it was partially retracted and was

protruding about 3 inches below the bottom of the semitrailer. The landing gear was damaged

during the impact sequence, but there was no evidence of preexisting problems. Lamps from both

the tractor and semitrailer were removed and sent to the Safety Board’s materials laboratory for

further examination. (See “Tests and Research” section for findings.)

Train Information

Amtrak train 81, the Silver Star, was a regularly scheduled passenger train operating from

New York City to Tampa, Florida. On the day of the accident, the train consisted of two

locomotive units, three mail-handling cars, two baggage cars, one sleeper car, one slumber coach

car, one Amlounge II car, one dining car, and seven coaches. The locomotive units were built by

General Motors Electric-Motive Division and were equipped with 3,000-hp engines and 2-axle

trucks. The locomotives were equipped with a 97-channel radio, airbrake equipment, and Pulse

“dash 5” event recorders. The sleeper car was manufactured by Heritage, and the other 8 coach

cars were Amtrak Amfleet II cars. (See table 2 for consist of train.)
*

61.5’ P

12’

4 36’ +

Figure 5-- Schematic of accident truck (not to scale)
11

Table 2 -- Train consist and estimated damages

Consist

Position

Amtrak Car

Number

Type Usage Postaccident

Condition

Estimated

Damage

, 372 Locomotive PH 40 Damaged, rear

truck derailed

$125,000

, 340 Locomotive PH 40 Derailed 85,000

1 1567 Car Mail Hand Derailed 10,000

2 1425 Car Mail Hand Derailed,

tipped

12,000

3 1471 Car Mail Hand Derailed,

tipped

27,500

4 1268 Car Baggage Derailed,

overturned

42,000

5 1135 Car Baggage Derailed,

overturned

68,000

6 2457 Car Sleeper Derailed,

overturned

270,000

7 25047 Car Coach Derailed,

overturned

47,000

8 25020 Car Coach Derailed,

tipped

100,000

9 25004 Car Coach Derailed,

tipped

80,000

10 25029 Car Coach Derailed,

tipped

45,000

11 28010 Car Lounge Derailed,

tipped

60,000

12 8501 Car Diner Derailed 13,000

13 25040 Car Coach Derailed 18,000

14 25065 Car Coach Derailed 16,000

15 25068 Car Coach Unaffected 0

16 2088 Car Coach Unaffected 0

Total $1,018,500
12

Personnel Information

Truckdriver -- The truckdriver, age 40, had a valid South Carolina commercial driver’s

license (CDL). He said that he had driven trucks for about 14 years. He said he had driven

various farm trucks, a sand dump truck, a cement truck, and an asphalt truck. He said he had also

driven trucks with log semitrailers and wood chip semitrailers. He received his CDL in February

1992 after attending a CDL course.

The truckdriver’s driving record indicated that since 1988 he had received six citations

for speeding violations, one license suspension for failure to pay a ticket, and one suspension for

driving without a valid license. He had been involved in three reported accidents during that

period. Two of the citations were received and all three accidents occurred while the truckdriver

was operating a commercial vehicle. He attended a defensive driving course after receiving

points on his license for the above violations. In the 6-month period following this accident, the

driver received two citations for speeding and one suspension for failure to pay a fine previously

imposed for violations noted during a commercial vehicle inspection. Both speeding violations

occurred while the driver was operating a commercial vehicle.

At the time of the accident, the truckdriver did not have a required medical certificate,4

although he later obtained one. In February 1994, he was diagnosed with non-insulin-dependent

diabetes. His condition was controlled by diet and with the medication Glynase.5 He took one pill

each day, and he did so on the morning of the accident. His personal physician stated during an

interview with Safety Board investigators that he had not observed, nor had the driver

complained of, any side effects from the medication. The driver was not asked to submit to a

physical examination either for his CDL or as a condition of his employment with O&J.

The truckdriver had been regularly employed by O&J since March 1995, and had worked

part time for the company since November 1994. The truckdriver stated that he was paid $.40 per

mile, but only when his truck was loaded; he received no pay for driving without a load. Each

week he supplied his employer with a work sheet showing the number of miles driven, where

loads (usually logs) were obtained, where they were delivered, the weight of the loads, and

delivery ticket numbers. Since the driver was not paid by the hour, neither he nor his employer

kept records showing his number of on-duty hours each day.

The driver said he pulled his first lowbed semitrailer “about a year or two ago.” He stated

that, since that time, he has pulled lowbed semitrailers for several employers, including O&J,

without ever becoming stuck. He said he had pulled the Pioneer-owned accident semitrailer

several times previously, but not over the accident crossing. He said he was aware that it was

longer and that it had different end ramps than the O&J semitrailers.

 

4

A certificate required by Federal Motor Carrier Regulations (Section 391.45) acknowledging that the

truckdriver is physically qualified to operate a commercial vehicle. 5

Glynase is an orally administered blood-glucose-lowering drug.
13

The truckdriver acknowledged that he had occasionally gotten “bogged down” in the

woods while pulling a semitrailer, but he said there had always been equipment and people

available to assist him whenever help was needed. He said he had heard about lowbed

semitrailers having difficulty traveling over grade crossings, but that he had not heard about any

semitrailer actually becoming stuck on a crossing.

Because of the varied locations of his work assignments, the truckdriver said he brought

the truck home after work 2 to 3 times a week and parked it in front of his brother’s house where

it would be secure. He stated that he had driven over the same crossing on other occasions

without difficulty, whether pulling a log semitrailer or the lowbed semitrailer leased to O&J, both

of which had higher ground clearances than the accident semitrailer.

The truckdriver was off duty on April 29 and 30. On May 1, he said he awoke between

6 and 6:30 a.m., and reported for work at 7:00 a.m. At the time of the accident, he had been

awake 20 hours and on duty about 19 1/2 hours. He reported that he had not experienced any

mechanical problems with the truck while on duty. Based on his statement regarding the time and

distance he traveled on his way home, the Safety Board estimated that the driver had rested about

1/2 hour in Neeses while en route to Sycamore.

Traincrew -- The train 81 operating crew consisted of an engineer, an assistant engineer, a

conductor, and two assistant conductors. The OBS crew consisted of an on-board crew chief and

8 crewmembers. Amtrak personnel records indicated that each operating crew member was

qualified to operate on the CSXT Jacksonville Division.

The operating crewmembers were based in Jacksonville, Florida. The crew had worked

on northbound train 82, arriving on schedule in Southern Pines, North Carolina, on May 1 at 4:35

a.m. They reported for duty on southbound train 81 at 9:33 p.m. on May 1 and boarded the train

for the return trip to Florida at about 10:00 p.m. The engineer and assistant engineer were in the

operating compartment.

Engineer -- The engineer was promoted to engineer in March 1975 and was hired by

Amtrak on March 11, 1987. His most recent physical examination had been on August 26, 1994,

and he stated that he was in good health. He wore glasses and was wearing them at the time of

the accident. His engineer’s certification was issued on April 15, 1994, with an expiration date of

April 15, 1997. He had passed his most recent rules examination on October 24, 1994.

Assistant Engineer -- The assistant engineer was promoted to engineer on July 17, 1978,

and was hired by Amtrak on December 21, 1988. His most recent physical examination had been

on April 27, 1995. He indicated that he was in good health. His engineer’s certification was

issued on March 9, 1994, with an expiration date of March 9, 1997. He had passed his most

recent rules examination on April 27, 1995.

Conductor and Assistant Conductors -- The conductor was hired on August 20, 1986. His

most recent physical examination had been on May 4, 1993, and his most recent rules

examination on April 27, 1995. One assistant conductor, who was hired on August 20, 1986, had
14

had his most recent physical examination on April 28, 1993, and had taken his most recent rules

examination on April 21, 1995. The other assistant conductor was hired on May 2, 1987, had had

his most recent physical examination on September 1, 1994, and had taken his most recent rules

examination on April 27, 1995.

Toxicological Testing

The truckdriver was not tested for alcohol or illegal drugs. Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) regulations requiring postaccident drug and alcohol testing (49 CFR

382.303) did not apply in this case, since the accident did not result in a death or a citation.

Nevertheless, Safety Board investigators telephoned the Allendale County Sheriff’s Department

and requested that the truckdriver be asked to voluntarily submit blood and urine specimens for

postaccident testing. That request never reached the investigating officer; however, the

investigating officer, who knew the driver, interviewed the driver some 35 to 40 minutes after the

accident. He said that he had detected no odor of alcohol and that, while the driver acted nervous

and very concerned, he did not display any behavior that would lead the officer to suspect that he

was impaired.

Amtrak did not have the train’s operating crew toxicologically tested after the accident,

because 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 219.201(b) provides as an exception that “no

[toxicological] test shall be required in the case of a collision between railroad rolling stock and a

motor vehicle or other highway conveyance at a rail/highway grade crossing.”

Accident Site Information

Roadway and Grade Crossing -- The accident grade crossing was located on an unnamed,

unpaved roadway known to locals as Boogaloo Road. The road provided access across the CSXT

right-of-way and extended from U.S. 321 westward to an unpaved county road. It varied from 10

to 16 feet in width, and was open to the public. Beginning at the west edge of U.S. 321, the

road’s westbound approach to the track had a slight vertical sag before ascending toward the

crossing. The eastbound approach also ascended toward the track. The 111-foot-long westbound

approach to the east rail had an average ascending grade of 5.28 percent. At 30 feet out from the

east rail, the approach had a rise of 2.87 feet, for an average ascending grade of 9.97 percent. The

30-foot-long eastbound approach to the west rail had a rise of 1.06 feet, for an average ascending

grade of 3.5 percent.

No speed limit signs were posted on the roadway. A stop sign was located on the

eastbound approach of Boogaloo road at the U.S. 321 intersection. There were no pavement

markings at the crossing approaches. There were no signs warning motorists driving low-groundclearance vehicles of the hump crossing, nor were such signs required.

The grade crossing road surface was constructed of asphalt and crossing planks. A 4-inchthick by 10-inch-wide crossing plank lay on each side of the rails, with asphalt material in the

center of the track and on the outside of the rails extending 15 feet beyond the crossing plank.
15

The CSXT right-of-way generally extends 50 feet to either side of the main track centerline. The

crossing was re-tied and resurfaced by CSXT in February 1993.

The U.S. Department of Transportation/Association of American Railroads (DOT/AAR)

National Rail/Highway Crossing Inventory designates the Boogaloo Road grade crossing as

634810U. The crossing has been listed in the DOT/AAR inventory since the mid-1970s as a

public crossing.6 However, the county engineer for Allendale County stated that he was not

aware that the east-west trafficway known as Boogaloo Road had ever been considered or

maintained as a County roadway. Safety Board investigators researched county documents and

found neither records relating to this roadway nor right-of-way agreements relating to the

crossing. While the DOT/AAR inventory showed an estimated average daily traffic count of 25

vehicles at the Boogaloo Road grade crossing, neither Allendale County nor the South Carolina

Department of Transportation (SCDOT) had traffic count data for the crossing, nor did the South

Carolina Department of Public Safety have accident records for Boogaloo Road.

A postaccident examination of the roadway revealed two tire marks just west of the track.

The marks were characteristic of tire marks produced by forcible lateral movement. The tire

marks extended about 4 1/2 feet west of the track. Another tire mark extended about 16 1/2 feet

west of the track in the north portion of the roadway. From that tire point, the arc-like tire mark

extended in the southeast direction across the roadway.

About 1/2 mile south of the accident crossing was another passive grade crossing, and

about 1 mile south of the accident crossing was a crossing with active warning devices7

 installed.

About 1/2 mile north of the accident crossing was another passive grade crossing. All of these

crossings were on the same CSXT main line, but only the Boogaloo Road crossing was a hump

crossing.

The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) has

published standards for roadway vertical profiles at railroad/highway grade crossings that are

applicable to newly constructed crossings. These standards and guidelines are discussed in the

Other Information section of this report under “Hump Crossings.” The Safety Board is not aware

of any standards that are applicable to existing crossings.

Track, Wayside, and Crossing Signals -- The grade crossing was located at railroad mile post

429.6 on the Columbia Subdivision of the CSXT Jacksonville Division. CSXT had maintained

the track to meet or exceed Class 4 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) track safety

standards. Passenger trains were authorized to operate over this line at a maximum speed of 79

mph.

 

6

A location open to public travel where railroad tracks cross a road that is under the jurisdiction and

maintenance of a public authority, as defined in Rail-highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 14,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, p. A-4. 7

A warning system comprising gates, flashing lights, highway signals, wigwags, and/or bells and activated

automatically by an approaching train.
16

In the accident area, the track was constructed of continuous welded rail. The rails lay on

14-inch double shouldered tie plates, which lay on 7-inch by 9-inch creosote-treated timber

crossties 8 feet 6 inches in length. The ties rested on 12 inches of number 4 crushed granite stone.

The accident grade crossing had reflectorized railroad crossing (crossbuck) signs at each

approach to the crossing. There were no railroad advance warning signs in place on Boogaloo

Road, on U.S. 321, or on the adjacent county road.

Carrier Information

O&J Gordon Trucking -- O&J was owned and operated by Mr. and Mrs. (Orin and Justine)

Gordon. O&J owned two tractors and leased three semitrailers, including one lowbed semitrailer.

The company had operated as a for-hire carrier of logs, wood chips, and logging machinery and

related equipment since 1990. Mr. Gordon, who had a valid medical certificate, said that he

regularly drove one of the company’s tractors and that the accident driver had driven the other

since November 1994. O&J usually confined its motor carrier operations to a 100-mile radius of

its principal place of business. Mr. Gordon reported that he performed the majority of inspection

and maintenance operations on the O&J vehicles, and he had inspection and maintenance records

for the accident tractor available at the company’s office.

Mr. Gordon had known the truckdriver for several years, and had previously worked with

him at Gordon Logging Company. He said he was aware of the driver’s medical condition, but he

did not attempt to determine if the driver had a valid medical certificate at the time he was hired.

Mr. Gordon said he had briefly discussed the operating limitations of the Pioneer semitrailer with

the accident driver before the accident. He also said the driver had been given a credit card to use

for fuel, and he stated his belief that if the accident driver’s vehicle ever became disabled, the

driver would not call for a tow truck without first contacting Mr. Gordon for approval.

At the time of the accident, O&J was performing contract work for Pioneer, which had a

main office in Lexington and a branch office in Walterboro. Pioneer officials in Walterboro

reported that O&J performed occasional transportation services for the company as a motor

carrier for hire, using Pioneer’s lowbed semitrailer to transport Pioneer logging machinery and

equipment to the company’s customers between Walterboro and Lexington.

The accident driver and motor carrier engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce and

were therefore subject to both Federal and State motor carrier safety regulations. As a motor

carrier engaged in interstate commerce, O&J was subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations8

 (FMCSR), to include:

Section 391.45, requiring that drivers be medically examined and certified as physically

qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle;

 

8

Title 49 CFR Parts 390-399.
17

Section 391.51, requiring that an employing motor carrier retain a qualification file at the

motor carrier’s principal place of business for each driver used;

Section 395.3, prohibiting a motor carrier from requiring or permitting a driver to drive

,more than 10 hours since his last 8 or more hours off duty,

,after having been on duty 15 hours since his last 8 or more hours off duty, or

,after having been on duty more than 60 hours in the last seven consecutive days; and

Section 385.8, requiring a motor carrier to ensure that its drivers prepare and submit a

record of duty status. Section 395.1(e) exempts from this requirement drivers used within a 100-

air-mile radius of the normal work reporting location if

,the driver’s tour of duty does not exceed 12 hours followed by a minimum of 8

consecutive hours off duty,

,the driver does not drive more than 10 hours during any 12-hour duty tour, and

,the motor carrier retains records for 6 months showing the time each day the driver

reported for work, the time the driver was released from work, and total number of

hours the driver was on duty each day.

O&J was the subject of a U.S. Department of Transportation safety review in June 1993,

which resulted in the assignment of a “satisfactory” compliance rating9

. As a result of this

accident, on May 5, 1995, the FHWA’s Office of Motor Carriers, in cooperation with the State of

South Carolina, conducted a compliance review of O&J’s motor carrier operations. This review

disclosed several violations of the FMCSR, including failure to use properly qualified drivers,

failure to subject all drivers to appropriate drug testing, failure to keep accurate records of driver

duty status and vehicle maintenance and inspections, and failure to ensure that vehicles were

systematically maintained and repaired. As a result, O&J was given a rating of “unsatisfactory.”

South Carolina has adopted the FMCSR and, with the exception of the insurance

requirements10 and the hours-of-service regulations, has made the regulations applicable to

intrastate motor carriers. South Carolina code was amended to prohibit South Carolina intrastate

commercial vehicle operators from driving:

,more than 12 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty;

,for any period after having been on duty 16 hours following 8 consecutive hours off

duty;

,after having been on duty 70 hours in 7 consecutive days; or

,more than 80 hours in eight consecutive days.

 

9

See 49 CFR Part 385.

10See 49 CFR Part 387.
18

On April 3, 1995, while on a trip for O&J from Savannah, Georgia, to Estill, South

Carolina, the accident driver and a different tractor-semitrailer combination were the subject of a

South Carolina Department of Public Safety driver-vehicle examination that disclosed numerous

vehicle violations, to include inoperative horn, turn signals, stop lamps, and side marker lamps;

oil leaks from the engine and power steering unit; cracks in the frame crossmembers and fifth

wheel; and chaffed or leaking brake system air lines. As a result, the vehicle was placed out of

service, and the driver was issued a citation for violations of South Carolina’s vehicle code.

CSXT Operations -- The single-track CSXT main line that passes through Sycamore carried

approximately two freight trains and two scheduled Amtrak trains each day, and nearby residents

would have been aware that those trains often ran during the night. CSXT employed a centralized

traffic control signal system to control train movements over this track. Train 81 approached the

accident crossing operating on a clear signal, indicating there was no rail traffic in the block and

that all switches were properly lined. The train was authorized to proceed at the maximum speed

of 79 mph.

While operating on CSXT track, Amtrak crews were subject both to Amtrak’s Manual of

Instruction for Transportation Department Employees and CSXT’s operating rules, timetable,

and practices. The CSXT timetable in effect for the Jacksonville Division on the day of the

accident imposed no special restrictions in the area of milepost 429.6.

Amtrak Operations -- Amtrak operates approximately 200 passenger trains daily across the

United States. Each day, six Amtrak trains (three northbound and three southbound) operate on the

Washington-to-Florida routes.

Amtrak’s annual ridership is about 22 million passengers. Annual ridership figures for

Amtrak’s major corridors are as follows:

• Northeast Corridor (NEC): 10.5 million

• Washington, D.C.-Florida: 0.8 million

• Santa Barbara-L.A.-San Diego: 1.5 million

• New York City-Buffalo (Empire):0.9 million

Amtrak speeds generally are limited to 79 mph on most of its operating territory, with the

exception of the Northeast and Empire corridors. Trains can operate at speeds up to 110 mph on the

Empire Corridor and up to 125 mph (the Metroliner) on the Northeast Corridor.

The total number of private grade crossings on Amtrak routes could not readily be

determined using data available either from the DOT/AAR inventory or from Amtrak sources. A

recent report on high-speed passenger operations11 offers some information on the number of grade

crossings on Amtrak routes between Washington, D.C., and Florida; however, the information may

not reflect every private crossing. This report indicates that on the Washington to Richmond

 

11See High Speed Passenger Trains in Freight Railroad Corridors: Operations and Safety Considerations,

Report No. DOT/FRA/ORD-95/05, issued December 1994.
19

segment there are 64 grade crossings (0.59 grade crossings per route mile); on the Raleigh to

Charlotte segment there are 260 grade crossings (1.5 per route mile); and on the West Palm Beach

to Miami segment, there are 73 grade crossings (1.03 per route mile). This compares to zero grade

crossings on the Northeast Corridor and 37 grade crossings (0.22 grade crossings per route mile) on

the Empire Corridor. This report also calculates that motor vehicle-train collisions occur at

rail/highway grade crossings at a rate of about one in every 6.3 million train crossings.

CSXT representatives said their records showed a total of 202 grade crossings on the CSXT

main line through South Carolina, including 90 crossings with active warning devices and 112 with

passive devices. These records also indicate a total of 50 private grade crossings on this main line.

Train 81 was a regularly scheduled Amtrak revenue run originating daily from New York

City with a final destination of Tampa, Florida. Amtrak operating crews receive special notices,

bulletins, or messages about events that affect the movement of their train, but the crew of train

81 on May 2, 1995, did not receive any special notices regarding the area near milepost 429.6.

Meteorological Information

Allendale County police officials who arrived on the scene the morning of the accident

reported that the weather was mild and dry, and skies were overcast. Although there was no

ambient lighting, visibility along the track was unrestricted.

An Allendale County police official reported that the weather conditions during the

Safety Board tests on May 3, 1995, were similar to the conditions at the time of the accident,

with no ambient lighting and no visibility-limiting conditions present.

Survival Aspects

Forty-seven train occupants were taken to three area hospitals for possible treatment.

Three passengers with preexisting illnesses,an 89-year-old passenger with pneumonia, a 51-yearold passenger with asthma, and an 82-year old passenger with chronic anemia,were admitted to

local hospitals.

Twenty-nine passengers and four OBS crewmembers were treated for minor injuries such

as muscle strains, contusions, and abrasions. All 33 of the injured were treated by hospital

emergency room staff and released.

The Safety Board sent written surveys to the 47 train occupants who were taken to local

hospitals. The surveys asked these individuals to recollect events shortly before and after the

accident. Of those receiving the survey, 13 responded. Most of them stated that they were

sleeping when the cars derailed and that they were awakened either by the jolt of the impact or by

the sound of the cars derailing. The majority of the responding passengers stated they were

injured when they were thrown out of their seats and struck other seats, the floor, the wall, or

interior furnishings. Respondents stated that the traincrew and emergency response personnel
20

assisted passengers in getting off the train, walking to the buses, locating personal belongings,

and finding temporary shelter.

The chief deputy for the Allendale County Sheriff’s Department said that his department

had a longstanding, though unwritten, policy regarding incidents such as the Sycamore accident.

He said the policy required deputies to call for emergency personnel, without hesitation, in the

event of a train derailment. He said this policy was in effect at the time of the Sycamore accident,

but he acknowledged that the deputy who responded to the accident did not make the appropriate

determination in a timely manner.

Tests and Research

Locomotive Event Recorders -- The lead and trailing locomotives were equipped with Pulse

MTR 48H8C-5 event recorders. Investigators found the seal on the lead locomotive’s event

recorder cut and lying on the machine. A CSXT road foreman told Safety Board investigators

that he had inadvertently broken the seal but that he had not disturbed the media. The seal on the

event recorder for the trailing locomotive was removed under the Safety Board’s supervision in

the presence of representatives from the FRA, Amtrak, and CSXT. Both tapes were removed and

sent to the Safety Board’s Vehicle Performance Division laboratory in Washington, D.C., for

readout and evaluation. Although the trailing locomotive derailed, the axle generator for the

event recorder was located on the lead locomotive front truck, which remained on the tracks.

Laboratory personnel determined from the event recorder that the lead locomotive throttle

was at position 8 (the maximum) and that the train was traveling between 80 to 81 mph when the

brakes were placed into emergency. FRA regulations at 49 CFR 229. 117(1) require that a

locomotive built since December 31, 1980, be equipped with a speed indicator that is accurate to

within ± 3 mph for speeds of 10-30 mph and ± 5 mph for speeds in excess of 30 mph. The

assistant engineer stated that he and the engineer had checked the locomotive speed indicator

against a trackside defect detector while en route to Sycamore and had noted that the locomotive

speed indicator reading was 2 mph faster than the defect detector reading.

Laboratory personnel were able to determine from the event recorder tapes that the train

traveled a minimum of 1,651 feet and a maximum of 2,229 feet during the 26 seconds that

elapsed from the time emergency braking was first applied until the train came to a complete

stop.

Train Stopping Distance -- Safety Board investigators calculated the distance within which a

train configured similar to train 81 and traveling between 79 and 81 mph could reasonably be

expected to stop. The calculations, based on a train length of 1,388 feet and a brake pipe12 length

of 1,504 feet, indicated that the braking deceleration rate would likely be about 4.08 feet per

second2

 with a stopping distance between 2,015 and 2,111 feet ± 15 percent.

 

12Brake pipe refers to the compressed-air line that extends from the locomotive, through each car, to the end

of the train. The engineer applies and releases the train’s brakes by varying air pressure in the brake pipe.
21

Track--The track was checked for level, gauge, and line, and all were within the required

standards for FRA class 4 track.

Additional Train Tests -- At the request of the Safety Board, the FRA performed air-brake

system and safety-device testing on the train. No air leakage was observed on the locomotives or

on the four undamaged passenger cars. Because of extensive damage to the brake systems on the

remaining passenger, baggage, and mail cars, no tests were performed on those cars. The

emergency-channel radios were tested by the Safety Board, and no abnormalities were found.

Sight Distance -- Safety Board investigators conducted three on-site tests to determine the

distance at which Amtrak operating personnel could detect the presence of a large object on the

accident grade crossing. The tests were conducted at 3:00 a.m. on May 3, 1995. The locomotive’s

headlights were illuminated on bright, and its ditch lights were oscillating on both sides. A

tractor-lowbed semitrailer combination similar to the accident vehicle (the test lowbed

semitrailer was yellow; the accident semitrailer was dark green) was parked on the grade

crossing. The tractor headlights and hazard warning flashers were turned off.

In the first test, the locomotive was backed northward from the crossing. At a distance of

1,479 feet from the crossing, the test engineer could see the test vehicle, but he could not identify

it as a truck.

In the second test, the locomotive was moved further northward. At a distance of 1,953

feet from the crossing, the locomotive was at the bottom of a 1-percent grade, and the test

engineer could not see the test vehicle at all.

In the third test, the locomotive was moved southward toward the crossing to determine

the distance at which the engineer could see a person waving his arms. That distance proved to

be 686 feet.

Truck Lamp Examination -- Accounts differed regarding the lights on the accident truck. The

truckdriver stated that the truck headlights were on and the four-way warning flashers were

activated while he was attempting to dislodge the vehicle. The driver’s cousin corroborated the

driver’s statement regarding the headlights, but he said he did not see the four-way flashers

activated. The train operating crew said they saw no lights at all on the accident vehicle;

however, because of the truck’s orientation over the crossing, the lights may not have been

visible to the traincrew in any case.

Because of the varying accounts, Safety Board investigators decided to examine the lights

on the accident truck in an attempt to determine if they had, in fact, been turned on at the time of

impact. Three headlights and four tail lamps/warning flashers were removed from the accident

tractor, and five amber side marker lamps were removed from the accident semitrailer. All were

examined by the Safety Board’s materials laboratory. The examinations disclosed that although

the filaments in some of the side marker lamps were broken, none of them showed any evidence

of the hot stretching or deformation that typically occurs when illuminated lamps are subjected to
22

impact forces. Although not conclusive, these examinations suggested that the side marker lights

on the accident semitrailer were not illuminated at the time of the collision.

Emergency Notification Time -- The Safety Board reconstructed the time required for a

citizen in Allendale County to advise the appropriate CSXT officials, through the local

emergency response agency, of a stalled/lodged vehicle on CSXT tracks. Based on transcript

records of Allendale County Central Dispatch, it typically takes less than 1 minute for the 911

operator to transfer a caller to Allendale County Central Dispatch. The Allendale County

dispatcher, having appropriate telephone numbers to reach CSXT, should be able to reach the

railroad within 2 minutes. Thus, the total time required for a typical call to reach the appropriate

CSXT officials was estimated to be no more than 3 minutes.

The Safety Board also contacted CSXT officials regarding the average time it would take

a CSXT dispatcher, after being notified of a stalled/lodged vehicle on the tracks, to contact a

train operating crew and have them stop their train. They advised that, on average, it would take

about 1 minute to reach the crew and instruct them to stop the train. Consequently, the total time

needed for a 911 call to reach CSXT officials and for those officials to stop a train was estimated

to be no more than 3 to 4 minutes.

Other Information

The Safety Board has had a longstanding objective of improving safety at highway/rail

grade crossings. Since 1976, the Safety Board has investigated more than 300 grade crossing

accidents and has focused on the many safety issues involved at intersections where the paths of

motor vehicles and trains meet. The Board has issued some 190 safety recommendations to

Federal and State agencies, railroads, and safety organizations in an effort to have deficiencies

corrected. Although the number of accidents and deaths at grade crossings has been reduced

dramatically, grade crossing accidents continue to be the largest single source of fatalities and

injuries involving railroad operations.

Hump Crossings -- Safety Board investigators searched FRA accident data bases to

determine how frequently accidents like the Sycamore accident occur nationwide. The FRA

grade crossing accident/incident data base contains information on about 65,000 impacts between

trains and highway vehicles that occurred during the 10-year period from 1984 through 1994.

Although the FRA accident data base does not specifically indicate which of these

accidents occurred at hump crossings, possible hump crossing accidents include those accidents

in which (1) a truck or truck-trailer was stopped or stalled on a grade crossing, (2) the driver was

not in the vehicle, and (3) the vehicle was struck by a train.

Safety Board investigators searched the FRA data base and found that about 1,900 of the

crashes that occurred between 1984 and 1994 met the aforementioned criteria. Of those

accidents, 36 involved a derailment, 56 involved at least one injury, and 8 involved at least one

fatality. Amtrak was involved in 141 of these accidents. Of these 141 accidents, 11 involved

derailments, 4 resulted in at least one injury, and 2 involved at least one fatality.
23

Since 1983, the Board has investigated at least 16 accidents in which lowbed vehicles

lodged on grade crossings and were struck by trains. (See appendix E for a detailed summary of

each case.) Two of those 16 accidents occurred during the investigation and report preparation

process for this accident. The 16 accidents, all of them non-fatal, resulted in 296 injuries and

more than $19 million in property damage. (See table 3.)

Table 3 -- Lowbed vehicle/train collisions investigated by the Safety Board

Relevant information drawn from these 16 accident investigations is summarized below:

• At none of the accident crossings were signs posted warning operators of lowbed

vehicles of the hazard of becoming lodged on the crossing.

CASE DATE LOCATION TRAIN TYPE

Freight (F)

Passenger (P)

DEATHS REPORTED

INJURIES

ESTIMATED

PROPERTY

DAMAGE

1 8/25/83 Rowland, NC P 0 29 $623,399

2 11/30/83 Citra, FL P 0 59 200,119

3 9/4/85 Schriever, LA P 0 0 40,000

4 10/30/86 Gary, IN P 0 32 110,000

5 11/12/86 College Park, GA F 0 0 90,000

6 12/22/86 Winlock, WA P 0 3 252,000

7 1/15/87 Canby, OR P 0 1 49,022

8 11/12/87 Halifax, NC F 0 0 266,130

9 11/25/87 Seffner, FL P 0 17 336,349

10 10/3/90 Encinitas, CA P 0 13 285,000

11 5/11/92 East Patchogue, NY P 0 28 173,837

12 6/30/92 Orange Park, FL F 0 0 169,000

13 11/30/93 Intercession City, FL P 0 59 14,000,000

14 5/2/95 Sycamore, SC P 0 33 1,000,000

15 5/10/95 Graysville, GA F 0 1 1,000,000

16 10/3/95 Devon, CT P 0 21 500,000

TOTAL 296 $19,094,856
24

• Four of the cases (5, 8, 12, and 15) involved freight trains; the remaining 12 cases

involved passenger trains.

• Ten of the accidents occurred in states that required operators of certain lowbed

vehicles to provide advance notification to the railroad of their intent to travel over a

grade crossing. The laws in those states were similar or identical to section 11-703 of

the Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance (Florida, cases 2, 9, 12, and

13; Indiana, case 4; Louisiana, case 3; North Carolina, cases 1 and 8; New York, case

11; and Washington, case 613).

• In four cases, the truck was being operated in violation of laws or ordinances

prohibiting the operation of that type vehicle over the crossing. In one case (case 1)

the driver was attempting to bypass weighing stations because his gross vehicle

weight exceeded that authorized by his permit. In two cases (cases 5 and 10) the

drivers failed to heed signs prohibiting truck traffic over the crossing. In case 16, the

truck was being operated off its permitted route.

• In only one case (case 13) was the crossing configured in substantial compliance with

the AASHTO standard. (See “Standards and Guidelines” section below.) In all other

cases, the tracks were at the high point of the crossing.

• The period of time that the lowbed vehicles were lodged on the tracks before being

struck varied from 1 minute (case 9) to 35 minutes (the Sycamore accident, case 14).

The average time the vehicles were lodged on the tracks before being struck was

about 11 minutes.

• In 12 cases the truck operator did not attempt to contact either the police or the

railroad before the collision. In six of these cases (3, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 16) the truck was

lodged over the crossing for 5 minutes or less, and attempts to radio the train or

change the signals in time to prevent the collision may not have been successful in

any event. In the other 6 cases (1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 14) the times the lowbed vehicles

were lodged over the tracks ranged from a low of about 5 to 10 minutes (cases 1 and

8) to a high of 35 minutes (case 14), with an average time lodged over the crossing of

about 15 minutes.

• In case 10, the police were notified via a 911 call that a vehicle was lodged over a

grade crossing. The police agency was unable to find the toll-free number to call the

railroad before the collision, which occurred three minutes after the 911 call. When

the police did find the number, they got a busy signal on their first two attempts to

telephone the railroad because the telephone line, which did not have a rollover

feature, was busy with routine railroad communications.

 

13For more information on which States have this requirement, see Collision of Amtrak Train No. 88 with

Rountree Transport and Rigging, Inc., Vehicle on CSX Transportation, Inc., Railroad Near Intercession City, Florida,

November 30, 1993 ( NTSB/HAR-95/01).
25

• In case 12, one police agency notified the railroad of a blocked crossing in its

jurisdiction. A second police agency in a neighboring jurisdiction then received

another report of a blocked crossing via a 911 call, but the location the caller gave for

the blocked crossing was incorrect. After checking crossings in its jurisdiction, the

second police agency notified the railroad that all crossings in its jurisdiction were

clear. The railroad then issued an all-clear signal to the train, which struck the lodged

vehicle about 7 minutes later.

• In case 15, the police were on the scene within 1 minute of the vehicle’s becoming

lodged on the crossing. A passerby also called 911 and notified the authorities.

Although the police reached the railroad before the collision, there was not enough

time to stop the train.

Standards and Guidelines -- The American Railroad Engineering Association (AREA)

guideline and the 1990 edition of the AASHTO standard for roadway vertical profiles at

railroad/highway grade crossings state, in part:

Acceptable geometrics necessary to prevent drivers of low-clearance vehicles

from becoming caught on the tracks would provide the crossing surface at the

same plane as the top of the rails for a distance of 2 ft. outside of the rails. The

surface of the highway should also not be more than 3 in. higher nor 6 in. lower

than the top of the nearest rail at a point 30 ft. from the rail unless track

superelevation dictates otherwise . . . .14

Warning Signs -- In 1986, as a result of its study of grade crossing accidents,15 the Safety

Board issued Safety Recommendation R-86-50 asking the FHWA to require that warning signs

be installed at hump crossings. The FHWA responded that, in its view, changes to the Manual on

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) were not warranted at that time. Based on this

response, the Safety Board classified the safety recommendation “Open--Unacceptable Action.”

In a 1988 study of 189 heavy truck accidents,16 the Safety Board reiterated this recommendation,

prompting the FHWA to respond that because problems remained with resolving when and

where such signs should be placed, the recommended requirement would be “premature, if not

infeasible.” Based on this response, the Safety Board, on May 22, 1991, reclassified Safety

Recommendation R-86-50 “Closed--Unacceptable Action.”17

 

14A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials (AASHTO), 1990, pp. 842-843, adopted as a Federal Highway Administration standard in

April 1993 at 23 CFR 625.4. 15Safety Study--Passenger/Commuter Train and Motor Vehicle Collisions at Grade Crossings (1985)

(NTSB/SS-86/04). 16Safety Study--Case Summaries of 189 Heavy Truck Accident Investigations (NTSB/SS-88/05). 17See appendix D for a summary of Safety Board recommendations and responses regarding collisions

involving trains and lowbed semitrailers.
26

On June 12, 1995, the FHWA published a notice of proposed amendments (NPA) to the

MUTCD requesting comments on, among other changes, a proposed warning sign for

“substandard vertical profiles” at railroad crossings. Request II-120(c), “Standard Warning Signs

for Substandard Vertical Profile at Railroad Crossings,” stated that the MUTCD national

committee proposed a new section entitled “Humped Crossings,” which the FHWA further

proposed be included in the next edition of the MUTCD. No diagram of the proposed sign was

included in the NPA. Request II went on to state that the North Carolina Uniform Traffic Control

Device Committee is developing a sign as well. When that sign is finished, the request said, the

“FHWA will include both the text and the sign in a future notice of proposed rulemaking.” The

American Trucking Associations, Inc., (ATA) responded to the rulemaking and agreed with the

“need for an appropriate sign.” On September 15, 1995, the FHWA extended the comment

period for this NPA to March 11, 1996.

The U.S. DOT Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook states:

Drivers of low clearance vehicles can be warned regarding crossings that have a

profile insufficient for a certain combination of wheelbase and underclearance.

However, presently no nationally accepted criteria, procedures, or signing have

been adopted to accomplish this.

Six states have been identified as having some form of hump crossing warning sign.

Florida and North Carolina have installed signs throughout their respective states, but neither

State has records that show the number of signs currently in place. There has been no evaluation

by either State of the effectiveness of the signs. (See figure 6.)

U.S. DOT/AAR Inventory -- The DOT/AAR National Rail/Highway Crossing Inventory is a

computerized data base designed to catalog all railroad public crossings, grade separations,

private crossings, and pedestrian crossings throughout the country. The inventory consists of four

data elements: Part I lists the geographic locations of the crossings; Part II provides information

about public vehicular crossings and includes train movements; Part III contains physical data

about each crossing; and Part IV, titled “Highway Department Information,” addresses

classifications and traffic volumes. Vertical alignment data on grade crossings is not included in

any of the parts of the inventory, nor in any other data base known to the Safety Board.

The FRA is the custodian of the inventory data, which are kept current by updates

received voluntarily from the States and railroads. The FRA has required that a systematic and

uniform procedure be developed to assist it in processing the data. Under current updating

procedures, individual states and railroads enter changes into a computer using a prescribed

format. The 1994 U. S. DOT Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan in its summary states

that ”[a]ccess to valid data is key to good decision making.” To meet that objective, the action

plan recommended promoting “more systematic updating of the U.S. DOT/AAR National

Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory.”

28

Relationships Between Public Entities and Railroads -- Through its investigations and liaison

activities with the parties responsible for grade crossings, the Safety Board has become aware

that communication and coordination between and among those parties are often loosely defined

and are in some instances almost nonexistent. Local public officials have complained that they

are given no notice when track maintenance is performed at a grade crossing. Some have said

that when notice is given, it is usually because the maintenance to be performed involves several

crossings where closure may be required. A CSXT railroad official said in an interview with

Safety Board investigators that the same lack of communication applies when local entities work

on public right-of-way approaches to the carrier’s tracks.

In December 1995, Safety Board investigators interviewed several traffic and highway

engineers attending a DOT Grade Crossing Task Force meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina. The

engineers were asked to comment on the extent of official railroad communication and

cooperation with highway jurisdictions. The engineers advised the Safety Board that in cases of

new construction projects involving considerable planning, funding, and work scheduling, they

generally received excellent support and cooperation from railroad officials; however, for routine

and general maintenance of grade crossings, communication and cooperation were usually

inadequate. They said that railroad officials would sometimes notify them of upcoming

maintenance, but that such notification would typically be in general terms with no specific

information on locations, dates, and times. They said highway officials most often become aware

of crossing maintenance work through complaints received from private citizens.

As noted previously, the Allendale County engineer indicated that he did not know if

Boogaloo Road was a County road. After an unsuccessful search for a right-of-way agreement

covering the accident crossing, the engineer acknowledged that, although no records were kept,

occasionally the County had performed minor maintenance on the roadway. Shortly after the

accident, CSXT barricaded the crossing approaches, in effect closing it to motor vehicle traffic.

When questioned by a Safety Board investigator, CSXT officials stated that they had cleared the

closure with DOT representatives in Columbia, South Carolina. The County engineer stated he

was not consulted, but he expressed no concern that the crossing was closed. He added that his

office had no agreement or other mechanism for establishing a relationship with the railroads that

traversed Allendale County. The accident crossing was subsequently reopened.

The U.S. DOT Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing Handbook addresses situations like

this in its chapter on “Identifying of Alternatives.” The book states:

Proper liaison should be established between railroad and highway authorities so

that plans and scheduling of work can be coordinated to avoid the planning or

execution of work on either the highway or railroad that might adversely affect the

grade line of the other.

and
29

The maintenance of track and highway should be coordinated between the railroad

and the highway agency. In this manner, the crossing approach can be maintained

to present a smooth transition to the crossing.

Emergency Notification -- The accident crossing had no signs that would inform the public

of steps to take or phone numbers to call in the event of problems at the crossing. There was no

indication of which railroad was responsible for the crossing, nor was there any unique name or

number posted that would have made it possible for anyone reporting a problem to have readily

identified this particular crossing to the operating railroad.

The absence of emergency information at grade crossings is a serious safety issue that the

Safety Board addressed in its study on grade crossing safety. As a result of that study, the Safety

Board issued Safety Recommendations R-86-48 and -55 to the FRA and the FHWA,

respectively, asking that those agencies work together to develop and require the implementation

in each state of a grade crossing emergency notification system similar in concept to the State of

Texas’ public and toll-free 1-800 system. (See appendix C for a more detailed discussion of the

Texas system and the other systems highlighted below.)

These safety recommendations were classified “Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action,”

based on replies dated September 4, 1990, from the FRA and February 22, 1991, from the

FHWA. The FRA replied that the agency had taken a number of actions addressing emergency

notification systems similar to the Texas system. For example, the agency undertook a study of

the Texas system and gave it a positive assessment.18 The FRA indicated that it would take a

proactive role in promoting the concept and stated that some States have adopted or were

considering variations of the Texas system. The FRA indicated it would support these State

initiatives to implement 1-800 systems. The FHWA replied that it had distributed the FRA’s

assessment of the Texas system to its field offices and State highway agencies. The FHWA

indicated that it supported the concept and that it would work closely with the FRA to promote

some form of public toll-free system.

In addition to the Texas system, the Safety Board reviewed toll-free emergency

notification systems currently operating in two other states and Canada that permit the general

public to report problems at grade crossings. Also, the Safety Board reviewed five domestic and

two foreign railroads that have emergency notification systems in operation. The salient details of

each of these systems are highlighted below:

Texas -- The Texas system applies to all highway/rail crossings that are equipped with

train-activated warning devices and are located on State- or county-maintained roadways. The

law requires that each such crossing be posted with signs indicating the crossing’s unique

DOT/AAA inventory number and providing a 1-800 number to be used to report problems at the

crossing. Calls go to operators at the State’s Department of Public Safety, who relay the

information to the railroads, if appropriate. The system was designed to be a mechanism for

reporting malfunctions of active crossing warning devices, but it has become an around-the-clock

 

18See An Evaluation of the Texas 1-800 Program, completed by Texas Transportation Institute and Richards

and Associates for the Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, June 1989.
30

clearinghouse for telephone messages relating to problems of any kind at grade crossings.

Operators said they receive three or four calls daily reporting blocked crossings. While most of

these involve trains blocking the crossing, some calls have reported blockages by highway

vehicles. About 4,600 of the state’s 18,000 grade crossings have the 1-800 number posted.

Delaware -- A 1988 agreement between the Delaware Department of Transportation and

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) initiated a program whereby Conrail would establish

and maintain a toll-free number posted at Conrail’s public grade crossings and available for use

by the public and local agencies to report problems at the crossings. Calls were to go to Conrail’s

communications and signals trouble desk in Columbus, Ohio. The program was funded by the

State until 1993; since that time, the program has been funded by Conrail. Delaware

transportation and railroad officials reported that they would like to reactivate the program at the

State level and expand it to include the five other railroads operating in the state. Of the state’s

451 public grade crossings, 183 (41 percent) have the 1-800 number posted.

Connecticut -- In 1990, Connecticut enacted a law requiring railroad companies

operating trains that exceed 25 mph to erect emergency notification signs at all their grade

crossings having gates or signals. The signs are to advise the public to use the 911 emergency

number to report malfunctioning gates or signals. The 911 operator forwards reports to local

police, who, in turn, notify the railroads. Each railroad company must report to the local

municipality all actions taken as a result of these calls. About 150 (28 percent) of the state’s 530

grade crossings have signs installed.

Canada -- Canadian National Railway Company developed and implemented an aroundthe-clock 1-800 emergency notification system in its Southern Ontario District in 1994. All

public crossings, active and passive, within the district were posted with signs providing the

emergency number and the crossing location. Calls go to railroad police, who relay the

information as necessary. The Canadian National is undergoing a merging and reforming of its

various districts, and railroad officials indicated that they expect all the new districts to move

toward implementing the 1-800 system.

Norfolk Southern Corporation -- In 1994, the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)

implemented a 1-800 Crossing Hotline program to facilitate notification of crossing signal

malfunctions. The calls go to NS police, who relay the information to chief train dispatchers. NS

officials reported that signs are in place at the 7,000 NS grade crossings where active warning

devices are installed. Since the signs are intended primarily for use in reporting signal

malfunctions, the company has not signed passive grade crossings. The company reported that

the system in several instances has already been effective in safely stopping trains, and that the

NS manager of grade crossing safety is studying the application of the program to passive

crossing locations.

Santa Fe Railway Company -- The Santa Fe railroad established a 1-800 emergency

telephone system in 1991. Officials reported that about 3,000 grade crossings are signed with the

railroad’s name, street address, milepost location, the DOT/AAR inventory number, and the

1-800-number. The signs are visible not only to the public, but to the crews of passing trains who
31

may need to report problems at grade crossings. Calls go to railroad police. Santa Fe officials

reported that they have averted some blocked-crossing accidents because of timely reports made

using the system.

CSXT -- On July 12, 1995, Safety Board staff met with officials of CSXT who reported

that the company is establishing a 1-800 emergency telephone number for public use. The

telephone call-in system began operating in February 1996. CSXT representatives said they do

not plan at this time to install appropriate signage at all crossing locations on their system, but

they do plan to publicize the notification telephone number.

Other U.S. Railroads -- The Burlington Northern Railroad Company and the Union

Pacific Railroad Company have 1-800 emergency notification systems that are available only to

law enforcement and other public officials in the areas served by those railroads.

Foreign Railroads -- The French National Railway emergency notification system

employs telephone call boxes installed at 9,400 (83 percent) of the country’s 11,300 active grade

crossings. The railroad reported that, while no logs are kept of the calls received by this system,

there have been emergency trains stops made as a result of such calls.

The Japanese system for emergency notifications incorporates emergency buttons located

at many of the country’s grade crossings. The button is intended for use by motorists in the event

a vehicle blocks a crossing. The button activates a wayside signal system that alerts train

operators of a problem at the crossing.

Commercial Driver Training and Education -- As a result of its investigation of a 1983 collision

of an Amtrak passenger train with a truck lodged on a hump crossing in Rowland, North

Carolina,19 the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation H-84-66 asking that the FHWA

issue an “On Guard” bulletin alerting motor carriers and warning truckdrivers of the hazards of

driving over hump crossings. The FHWA complied with this recommendation in 1984 and again

in 1989 when the Safety Board reiterated the recommendation as part of it efforts to highlight the

continuing hazards of hump crossings.

A recent edition of the Truckdriver’s Handbook published by the American Trucking

Associations, Inc., includes the following:

Railroad crossings with steep approaches can cause your unit to hang up on the

tracks. The danger is greatest when using a single-axle tractor to pull a long

semitrailer with the landing gear set back to accommodate a tandem tractor, or

when pulling a low-slung semitrailer with limited ground clearance. If your truck

does hang up on the tracks, immediately call the authorities, give the crossing

location, and ask that the railroad be notified. (Page 27)

and:

 

19Railroad/Highway Accident Report--Collision of Amtrak Train No. 88 with Tractor Lowboy Semitrailer

Combination Truck, Rowland, North Carolina, August 25, 1983 (NTSB/RHR-84/01).
32

When driving equipment with low ground clearance, such as drop-frame or

lowbed semitrailers, avoid places with changes in the grade of the road which may

cause the unit to hang up in a dangerous place, cause damage, and require

assistance to free the unit. (Page 29)

The Truck Trailer Manufacturer’s Association (TTMA) also advised the Safety Board

that it will issue a technical bulletin to its membership regarding hump grade crossings. The

bulletin will include definitions for “lowboy” and “lowbed” semitrailers, suggest decal placement

on low-ground-clearance semitrailers, and advise members as to what actions should be taken if a

vehicle becomes lodged on railroad tracks.

The model Commercial Driver License Manual addresses grade crossing safety in

Section 2.12, as well as the topic of hump crossings. This information, however, was taken, in

severely abbreviated form, from the ATA Truckdriver’s Handbook. Furthermore, none of the

questions on the CDL test relate to grade crossing safety or specifically to the hazards of hump

crossings.

Safety Board staff held a meeting on October 10, 1995, with industry representatives from

the ATA, the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, the National Automobile

Transporters Association, the TTMA, and Operation Lifesaver, Inc.20 The purpose of the meeting

was to discuss potential ways of informing truckdrivers of the hazards of hump crossings. The

following was suggested by industry participants at the meeting:

• Truckdrivers can be alerted to the hazards of hump crossings, but no universal set of

instructions can be developed to guide them through every crossing.

• Hump crossings should be identified and signed accordingly.

• Operation Lifesaver can, and will, be more proactive in addressing the hazards of

hump crossings and low-ground-clearance vehicles in its truckdriver grade crossing

safety education efforts for trucking groups.

• The hazards of hump crossings and recommended actions to take when a vehicle

becomes lodged are currently addressed in at least two industry publications for

truckdrivers. Such industry efforts will continue.

 

20Operation Lifesaver is an ongoing public education program designed to reduce the number of crashes,

deaths, and injuries at highway-rail intersections. To meet its goals, the program strives to increase public awareness of

the highway-rail crossing environment and to improve driver and pedestrian behavior at these intersections by

encouraging observance of traffic laws relating to crossing signs and signals. Also, the program emphasizes the

enforcement of existing traffic laws and promotes engineering improvements at grade crossings, to include installation

and upgrade of warning devices and signs.
33

• The implementation of a 1-800 emergency telephone notification system at both

passive and active-warning-device-controlled crossings would enhance the likelihood

of railroads being warned of a blocked crossing.

Grade Crossing Safety -- Since 1974, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office,

approximately $4.9 billion has been appropriated by Congress to address the improvement of grade

crossings through the Rail-Highway Crossing Program (Section 130 of the Highway Safety Act of

1973). This program provides grant money to States that agree to conduct and maintain a survey of

grade crossings that may require improvement, establish and implement a schedule of safety

improvement projects, and undertake crossing improvements according to a State priority list.

For the period from fiscal year 1974 through fiscal year 1994, almost $3 billion in Federal

funds was allocated for 29,500 grade-crossing-improvement projects. Most of the money, about 56

percent, has been used to install active warning devices at grade crossings. Other funds have been

used for grade crossing separations, grade crossing eliminations, safety demonstration projects, or

other purposes. In fiscal year 1995, about $149.5 million was appropriated for this program,

according to the FRA.

The national responsibility for grade crossing safety is split within the U.S. DOT. Four

agencies have responsibilities for grade crossing safety,the FRA, the FHWA, the National Highway

Traffic Safety administration (NHTSA), and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). At the State

level, the responsibility for grade crossing safety is generally distributed throughout a variety of

agencies, including State regulatory agencies and State transportation departments. Some states, for

example, have public service or utility commissions that have this responsibility. In other states,

some safety decisions are left up to local governments.

The U.S. DOT, recognizing that grade crossing safety needed a guiding document, issued

the 1994 Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan, which included 55 proposals. Safety

improvements for passenger or commuter train routes were not specifically targeted in this plan.

In October 1995, the Secretary of Transportation created a Grade Crossing Safety Task

Force to conduct a review of national highway/rail grade crossing design and construction safety

countermeasures. The task force, which was designed to complement the ongoing work of the

action plan and to further DOT goals, addressed issues beyond the scope of the action plan.

Through the task force, the DOT investigated and assessed the decision-making, coordination

processes, and safety aspects pertaining to the planning, design, construction, maintenance,

operation, and inspection of highway/rail grade crossings. The task force developed

recommendations and submitted them to the DOT Secretary. Those recommendations were

released to the public on March 4, 1996.
34

The task force evaluated problems in the following areas: interconnected (pre-empted)

signals; storage; high-profile (hump) crossings; light rail transit crossings; and inclusion of grade

crossing information in the permit process for slow, low, and special vehicles (including

oversized and overweight vehicles whose routes take them over grade crossings).
35

ANALYSIS

General

In the following analysis, the Safety Board will identify those factors that created the

accident scenario, exclude those factors that did not influence the accident outcome, and

determine which factors did influence or contribute to the accident. Discussion will focus

specifically on why the truckdriver became lodged on the grade crossing and why he took the

actions he did after becoming lodged. Among the issues addressed will be driver fatigue, driver

training and experience, and motor carrier involvement during the accident sequence of events.

The actions of the truckdriver will be evaluated in the context of other, similar accidents the

Safety Board has investigated. Finally, the analysis will address both short- and long-term

measures that could be taken to prevent similar accidents in the future.

Exclusions

The Amtrak crew were qualified to perform their duties and were fit for duty. The

traincrew were in compliance with the hours-of-service requirements, and the train was being

operated in accordance with both CSXT and Amtrak operating practices. Safety Board

investigators were able to exclude as factors contributing to this accident the condition of the

track, the operation of the wayside signals, the mechanical condition of the train, and the

weather.

Train 81 approached the accident crossing operating on a clear signal. According to event

recorder data, the train traveled between 1,651 and 2,229 feet after emergency braking was

applied. The Safety Board calculated the stopping distance for a train operating between 79 and

81 mph to be between 2,015 and 2,111 feet.

Although the event recorder data reflects, within a range, the actual stopping distance for

train 81 during the accident, these distances are not representative of the stopping distance that

would be expected in a non-accident situation. During the impact sequence, the train struck the

semitrailer, which in turn caused the locomotives and 14 of the 16 cars to derail. The impact and

the derailments created a significant drag on the train, reducing the stopping distance. Moreover,

the event recorder data were generated based on a sampling rate of once every 2 to 3 seconds,

which could have introduced some degree of error in the distances recorded for the 26-second

braking sequence.
36

The braking distances calculated by the Safety Board, which were based on an industryaccepted formula derived for train brake engineering,21 represent stopping distances required in a

non-accident situation. Thus, the calculated stopping distances of 2,015 to 2,111 feet would be

more appropriate than the distance shown by the event recorder for determining the distance the

operating crew would have needed to stop in time to avoid the collision.

Safety Board investigators estimated that it would have taken a minimum of 1.5 to 2

seconds for the train assistant engineer to perceive the hazard and react by applying the train’s

emergency brakes. Thus, under optimum conditions, the assistant engineer would have had to

have seen the truck or some other stimulus somewhere between 2,191 and 2,346 feet from the

crossing in order to have had a chance to stop in time to avoid a collision.22

It should be pointed out, however, that in order to avoid injuries to passengers and

unnecessary damage to rolling stock, passenger train engineers will not usually activate

emergency braking at the first sign of a potential hazard; instead, they will wait until they have a

reasonable certainty that the hazard is real,for example, that the truck is not going to move off the

crossing. This delay could add several seconds to the optimum reaction time. In this accident,

because of the low ambient light, brake application could have come as much as 4 seconds after

the traincrew first saw the semitrailer. Consequently, when reaction time is considered, the

traincrew would have needed between 2,484 and 2,580 feet23 to perceive the semitrailer, realize it

was a hazard, and bring the train to a stop short of the crossing.

The sight distance tests conducted by the Safety Board revealed that the track geometry

made it impossible for the traincrew to see the crossing at night beyond about 1,953 feet. Further,

though the test engineer could see something on the crossing at 1,479 feet, he could not

distinguish it as a truck. Because both of these distances are substantially less than the minimum

of 2,484 feet the Safety Board determined would be required for the traincrew to perceive,

realize, and respond to the hazard, the Safety Board concludes that even if the train operating

crew had seen the truck on the crossing at their first opportunity, they would not have had

sufficient distance to stop the train and avoid the collision.

The above analysis is consistent with the traincrew’s statements regarding sight distance

to the accident crossing. During the accident sequence, the first indication the traincrew had of

the hazard came at 1,335 feet from the crossing (near the whistle post) when they saw the driver

running along the track waving his arms. Almost immediately they saw the lodged vehicle, but it

was obviously too late at that point to avoid the collision.

 

21Braking formula from Engineering and Design for Railway Brake Systems, Air Brake Association, 1984

edition, p. II-16. 22At train speeds reported/recorded between 79 and 81 mph, averaging 80 mph:

Best case stopping distance: 1.5 sec. x 80 mph (88/60) = 176 ft. + 2,015 ft., or 2,191 ft.

Worst case stopping distance: 2.0 sec. x 80 mph (88/60) = 235 ft. + 2,111, or 2,346 ft. 23At train speeds reported/recorded between 79 and 81 mph, averaging 80 mph:

Best case stopping distance: 4 sec. x 80 mph (88/60) = 469 ft. + 2,015 ft., or 2,484 ft.

Worst case stopping distance: 4 sec. x 80 mph (88/60) = 469 ft. + 2,111, or 2,580 ft.
37

The truckdriver was qualified to operate the truck. He had a valid CDL and had operated

commercial vehicles about 14 years and lowbed vehicles for 2 years. Although he engaged in

interstate operations and was therefore subject to certain Federal and State motor carrier

requirements, he did not have a medical certificate or maintain daily logs for all applicable trips.

When the truck became lodged on the crossing, he had been on duty for about 19 1/2 hours,

which exceeded the number of hours allowed under the Federal and State hours-of-service

regulations. (The issue of truckdriver fatigue is discussed in more detail later in this analysis.)

On the other hand, even though the truckdriver did not have a medical certificate and was

a non-insulin-dependent diabetic, his physical condition did not disqualify him from driving a

commercial vehicle. In fact, he obtained a medical certificate shortly after this accident. The

truckdriver was very familiar with the roadway, the grade crossing, and the equipment he was

operating. It is therefore highly unlikely that, had the truckdriver been in conformance with the

medical and driver log requirements, he would have done anything different to change the

outcome of this accident.

The truckdriver indicated that he had not experienced any mechanical problems with the

truck before the accident. Although several vehicle violations were noted in April 1995, none of

those violations would have caused the truck to become lodged. Also, a post-impact inspection of

the truck did not reveal any preexisting mechanical problems that would have caused the truck to

stall or become inoperable on the railroad tracks. Physical evidence did indicate that the

semitrailer’s landing gear, which protruded some 3 inches below the semitrailer frame rails,

became embedded in the asphalt surface at the crossing before impact occurred. Although the

landing gear was damaged in the impact, there is no indication that it was defective or had

malfunctioned.

No postaccident toxicological tests were performed on the truckdriver or traincrew. State

and federal law did not require such testing under the circumstances surrounding this accident.

On-scene observations by the responding emergency personnel of the behavior of the driver and

traincrew after the accident did not suggest drug or alcohol use by any of the operators.

Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that there is no evidence to indicate that either the

truckdriver or Amtrak crewmembers were impaired by alcohol or other drugs.

The Accident

The accident truck became lodged because of the truck configuration and the accident

crossing geometry. The longest span between the five axles of the accident truck was about 36

feet from the center of the tractor tandem axles to the center of the first axle on the semitrailer.

The minimum ground clearance for the frame rails of the semitrailer was about 12 inches, and

minimum ground clearance for the landing gear was about 9 inches.

The westbound approach to the crossing ascended to about a 10-percent grade. The

AASHTO standard for roadway vertical profiles recommends that highway surfaces not exceed a

2-percent ascending grade 30 feet out from the rails, meaning that the accident crossing grade

was almost 5 times over the recommended allowance. Taking into account this profile and the
38

accident truck configuration, Safety Board investigators calculated that the semitrailer would

have needed a minimum ground clearance of 16 inches to successfully negotiate the crossing.24

Consequently, the semitrailer would have become lodged even if the landing gear had not first

struck the crossing asphalt surface. Thus, the Safety Board concludes that the truck, as

configured, could not safely travel over the crossing because of the crossing’s substandard

geometric characteristics.

Truckdriver Issues

Driver Fatigue -- It is possible that at the time of the accident the driver was fatigued from a

lack of sleep, since he had been on duty for 19.5 hours and awake for about 20 hours. In order to

assess whether fatigue influenced the driver’s behavior before or after his truck became lodged

on the crossing, Safety Board investigators examined the driver’s sleep/wake cycle, as well as his

training and experience.

In the Safety Board’s recent Safety Study Factors that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck

Accidents (NTSB/SS-95/01), three critical measures were identified as predictors of fatiguerelated accidents. One of those measures,the amount of sleep a driver has obtained in the past 24

hours,suggests a potential for fatigue with this driver. The Safety Study found that drivers in

fatigue-related accidents had had an average of 6.9 hours’ sleep in the 24 hours preceding the

accident. In comparison, the driver in this accident had had only 3.5 to 4 hours’ sleep in the 24

hours before the accident, well below the Study’s average. Such limited sleep and long hours

suggest the driver may have been fatigued.

Moreover, the driver was operating at a time of night (about 2:00 a.m. when he got stuck)

when he would normally have been asleep. This would have created some disruption in his

personal circadian cycle, which could have led to fatigue. When these two aspects of the driver’s

sleep/wake cycle are taken in the aggregate, it appears likely that he was fatigued when the

accident occurred.

Some indication of fatigue was also supplied by the driver himself. He reported that when

he was not able to get the logging equipment started in Lexington, he wanted to go home and get

some sleep. While en route home and within an hour of the accident, the driver stopped for a 30-

minute nap in his truck, further suggesting that he was fatigued.

The Safety Board recognizes that the effects of fatigue range from relatively subtle

impairment to overt incapacitation. Where this driver fell on that continuum before his nap is

unknown. What is known is that napping can be an effective countermeasure to fatigue and can

enhance alertness and improve performance. A recent National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) study of the effectiveness of napping during flight operations25 revealed

 

24The Safety Board used “HANGUP” software developed at West Virginia University (R. Eck and S. Kang) to

simulate the movement of large trucks over grade crossings and to predict where hang-up problems will occur for lowground-clearance vehicles. 25Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Connell, L.J., Co, E.L., Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness

Management in Flight Operations, NASA Technical Memorandum (DOT/FAA/RD-93/18), December 1994, p. 45.
39

that naps of similar duration to the one this driver took were “demonstrated to be effective acute

fatigue countermeasures.” Consequently, although the driver may have been fatigued from a lack

of sleep, it is likely that the driver suffered less from the effects of fatigue than would be implied

by the number of hours he was awake.

Driver Training and Experience -- In order to further determine the role driver fatigue may

have played in this accident, it was necessary for investigators to evaluate his behavior in light of

his training and experience with respect to the compatibility of hump crossings and lowbed

trailers. The driver had no formal training that addressed the compatibility of hump crossings and

lowbed trailers; most of his knowledge came from on-the-job experiences. His employer reported

that he had talked to the driver about the difficulties associated with operating lowbed trailers in

logging areas and on highways. The employer advised the driver to find an alternate route if at

any time he felt he may become stuck in the woods or on a grade crossing.

In this case, however, the driver was very familiar with the accident grade crossing and its

humped profile, having lived near it much of his life. He had gone over the crossing without

difficulty innumerable times before while driving a variety of vehicles. Not only had he never

experienced a problem at this crossing, or any crossing, he was unaware that anyone else had

ever become hung up on a grade crossing.

In the 5 months preceding the accident, while he was living with his father about 100

yards from the crossing, the driver had had occasion to drive the accident tractor and his regularly

assigned log trailer over the crossing two to three times per week, to and from work, and had

never experienced any difficulty. Moreover, he had traversed the crossing with his employer’s

lowbed trailer, which had a ground clearance of 24 3/4 inches, with no problems. He had not

pulled the accident trailer over the accident crossing, but he had pulled it without difficulty over

another crossing in Sycamore. Consequently, the driver’s experience in traversing this and other

grade crossings gave him no reason to be concerned about becoming lodged.

Unfortunately, the majority of the driver’s experience involved pulling trailers

significantly different,particularly in ground clearance,from the accident trailer. During the 3

months preceding the accident, he had pulled a lowbed trailer about 15 times. The lowbed trailer

he usually pulled was the one leased to O&J, although he had also pulled the accident lowbed

trailer 3 or 4 times previously. He was probably not aware of the fact that, because the accident

lowbed trailer was longer and lower than the O&J trailer, it was much more susceptible to

becoming lodged on hump crossings.

Another relevant aspect of the driver’s experience concerns the physical environment in

which he often operated lowbed trailers. The driver’s job required that he pull a lowbed trailer

only when he needed to deliver or pick up a logging vehicle at an off-road logging site. Such offroad locations, typically in the woods, greatly increase the likelihood that a truck will become

stuck. In fact, the driver reported he had occasionally gotten “bogged down” in the woods, but

there had always been equipment there to pull his truck/lowbed trailer clear of any obstruction.

Again, like other parts of the driver’s experience, the off-road aspect gave him little reason to be

concerned about becoming lodged with a lowbed trailer.
40

Based on the driver’s relevant training and experience, he had little, if any, reason to

believe the accident trailer and the hump crossing were incompatible. Consequently, he would

have had no concern about traversing it, even if he had been fully rested. Therefore, while it

appears likely that the driver was fatigued from lack of sleep, his actions in attempting to traverse

the crossing were entirely consistent with his experience.

Driver’s Actions After Becoming Lodged -- The fact that the driver did not notify anyone in

authority after his vehicle became lodged was also a function of his training, his experience, and

the circumstances rather than an indication of fatigue. After he became stuck, his focus was

entirely on removing the truck rather than stopping a train. Since he had no training on what to

do once he was stuck, and since no emergency notification information was posted near the

crossing advising him to contact the railroad, he acted in accordance with his experience by

asking his brother to try to pull him off the crossing with a pickup truck. In postaccident

interviews, the driver said it had not occurred to him that he should call the police or any other

authority to notify them of his situation. Even if it had occurred to him to call someone, he would

not have tried to call the railroad to stop the train, because he was not aware that this could be

done.

It is clear that the driver’s experience provided him with only one way to address the

problem, which was to move the truck. In fact, everything the driver did from the time he

realized that he could not complete his assigned work at Lexington until his truck was struck by

the train was totally consistent with his training and experience. The Safety Board therefore

concludes that although the driver may have been fatigued at the time his truck became lodged on

the crossing, fatigue did not influence the decisions he made or the actions he took before or after

his truck became lodged on the crossing.

This driver’s actions after becoming lodged were not unique, but rather were typical of

what other drivers have done in similar accidents. Of the 16 lowbed vehicle/train collisions

investigated by the Safety Board, 12 cases involved no attempt by the drivers to contact

appropriate authorities before the collision occurred. In six cases, trucks were lodged, on average,

about 15 minutes before the collisions occurred. The Safety Board thus concludes that, like many

truckdrivers, this driver was untrained in grade crossing safety and emergency notification

procedures and was therefore unprepared to react appropriately to this situation.

In a meeting held in October 1995 concerning this accident, industry representatives

stated that after becoming lodged on a crossing, a driver should notify authorities of the potential

hazard and proceed to dislodge the vehicle. This position is reiterated in the American Trucking

Associations’ manual, which states that drivers operating lowbed trailers should avoid places–

like—hump crossings—where there are significant changes in road grade. The manual further

advises that if a driver becomes lodged on a crossing, he should call authorities, give the crossing

location, and notify the railroad.
41

The Safety Board believes that the truckdriver should have contacted the local police

immediately after becoming lodged. Although it appears he did not have a working telephone

available in the tractor, he could have walked to either his brother’s or his cousin’s house nearby

and used the telephone there. If he had contacted the local police or dialed 911, the railroad could

have been notified.

Because time is critical when a vehicle becomes lodged on a grade crossing, it is

imperative that a railroad be notified as soon as possible to allow them the greatest opportunity to

notify any trains en route to the blocked crossing. In this accident, 30 to 35 minutes elapsed

between the time the vehicle became lodged and the train reached the crossing. The Safety Board

reconstructed the time that it likely would have taken for a call to 911 to have reached CSXT,

and for a CSXT dispatcher to reach the train crew. The reconstruction suggested the process

would take no more than 4 minutes. That would have been sufficient time for the train to have

stopped short of the accident crossing. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that had the

driver taken the appropriate action and notified authorities shortly after becoming lodged, this

accident would probably not have occurred.

It is possible that, had emergency notification information been posted prominently at the

crossing, the driver would have seen it and would have reacted differently. If the driver had seen

such information, he would have known immediately that he should notify someone of the

hazard after he became lodged, and he would have known whom to notify. Thus, the Safety

Board concludes that, had emergency notification information been posted at the accident

crossing, the truckdriver may have used it to notify the railroad, thereby avoiding the accident.

Motor Carrier Involvement

As shown by this accident, the motor carrier did not properly manage its driver’s

activities on job assignments performed after normal business hours. The carrier dispatched the

driver on a job without knowing exactly what the job entailed or how long it would take the

driver to complete the job, which made it difficult to ensure conformance with applicable hoursof-service regulations. Compounding the problem, it was difficult for the driver to reach the

carrier after normal business hours: No one was available in the carrier’s office, and the driver’s

cellular phone provided only limited service in remote areas.

Further, the carrier had no contingency plan in place to deal with driver emergencies; in

fact, the motor carrier was not aware of this accident until 4 hours after it occurred. The carrier

had not provided any formal or informal training to the accident driver regarding what to do in

emergency situations. The Safety Board thus concludes that the carrier did not properly manage

the driver’s job assignments after normal business hours or provide any training for emergency

situations.
42

Grade Crossing Safety

Although this accident raised important issues involving passenger train safety, similar

accidents involving freight trains also represent a significant threat to public safety. For that

reason, this analysis will address countermeasures in grade crossing safety that apply to railroads

in all modes of service.

Hump Crossings -- The Safety Board looked at several potential countermeasures that

would improve driver awareness of hump crossings and possibly reduce the likelihood of

collisions between trains and lowbed trucks. The only countermeasures that would be totally

effective in preventing hump crossing accidents in the future would be to permanently close,

correct, or eliminate (through such means as overpasses or tunnels) all hump crossings.

Unfortunately, such countermeasures are not always feasible, meaning that other, more realistic

or more readily achievable measures for reducing hump crossing accidents must be considered,

such as:

• Installing appropriate signs at hump crossings to warn lowbed vehicle operators of

potential hazards;

• Educating lowbed vehicle operators and other motorists on the dangers of traveling

over hump crossings, and advising them of what to do when vehicles become

lodged/stalled; and

• Implementing emergency notification systems.

Currently, no national data base identifies hump crossings. A review of the DOT/AAR

inventory on grade crossings revealed that it does not include vertical profile information, nor is

this information documented in any other existing data base. The Safety Board believes that the

DOT/AAR inventory can be expanded in a cost-effective manner to include vertical profile data.

The survey teams that currently collect state grade crossing data for inclusion into the DOT/AAR

inventory could easily be trained to make vertical profile measurements and record this

information. This would allow the identification of existing crossings that do not meet the

AASHTO standards for highway vertical profiles. Thus, the Safety Board believes that the

DOT/AAR inventory should be upgraded to include vertical profile data, which would permit

States and local agencies to readily identify potentially hazardous crossings.

If a grade crossing has a high vertical profile and there are no immediate plans to close or

correct the crossing, then advisory warning signs are warranted as an interim measure until a

permanent solution is available. The purpose of any advisory warning sign, according to Part II-C

of the MUTCD, is to “warn traffic of existing or potentially hazardous conditions on or adjacent

to a highway or street. Warning signs require caution on the part of the vehicle operator and may

call for reduction of speed or a maneuver in the interest of his own safety and that of other

vehicle operators and pedestrians.”
43

On June 12, 1995, 9 years after the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation R-86-50

asking the FHWA to require that warning signs be installed at hump crossings, the FHWA

published a notice of proposed amendments to the MUTCD requesting comments on a proposed

warning sign for substandard vertical curves over railroad crossings. In light of the fact that so

much time has already elapsed since this issue was first presented to the FHWA, and since the

need for effective warnings at hump crossings has not diminished, the Safety Board believes that

the proposed changes to the MUTCD to include warning signs for hump crossings should be

implemented without further delay.

Recent interviews and previous accident investigations conducted by the Safety Board

have revealed that the degree of communication and cooperation between railroads and public

entities regarding grade crossing activities varies widely. Railroad and public officials tend to

communicate more on activities that involve funding of active crossings or the installation and

maintenance of active warning devices, or that are likely to generate public complaints. The same

level of communication does not exist when it comes to other crossing maintenance activities,

particularly as they relate to passive crossings. CSXT, which operates more than 20,000 miles of

track, performs crossing profile maintenance to ensure track vertical and horizontal alignment

and adequate drainage, while State, local, and sometimes private entities are responsible for

maintaining the alignment of the crossing approaches. When crossing maintenance is performed,

CSXT does not always advise respective entities of these activities. By the same token, in some

cases local entities perform work to realign crossing approaches without informing the railroads.

Thus, the Safety Board concludes that railroads and public entities do not routinely communicate

with each other on grade crossing maintenance activities.

This is an important issue, since the Safety Board believes that when tracks and/or

roadway approaches are realigned, adjacent roadway approaches and/or tracks also should be

realigned (raised) commensurately; otherwise, a hump crossing is created. The Safety Board

believes that railroads and public entities should work more closely with each other on crossing

maintenance activities to prevent the creation of hump crossings. When problem crossings are

identified, railroad and highway entities should coordinate efforts to close or take appropriate

corrective action to eliminate those crossings. Until that can be achieved, those entities should

post warning signs and provide emergency information at all hump crossings. Further, they

should consider using other alternatives, such as education programs, to enhance hump crossing

awareness among commercial vehicle drivers and other motorists.

Emergency Notification -- In 1986, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations

R-86-48 and -55 asking that the FRA and the FHWA work together to develop and require a

system in each state similar to the State of Texas’ toll-free emergency notification system. After

5 years the Safety Board classified these recommendations “Closed--Acceptable Alternate

Action,” recognizing that some promotional activities had been undertaken by the two Federal

agencies. Unfortunately, the implementation of emergency notification systems has been slow; in

the past 9 years, only two other States (Delaware and Connecticut) have introduced grade

crossing emergency notification systems. The Safety Board notes that several railroads have

recognized the value of the toll-free emergency notification systems and have developed their

own systems for use either by the public or by law enforcement or other public officials.
44

The most striking aspect of all the public systems is the fact that the general public has

welcomed them and has readily used the systems to report problems at grade crossings. Thus, the

Safety Board believes that existing emergency notifications systems have proven their value and

should be implemented nationwide. Each new system should, at a minimum, contain the

following:

• A toll-free telephone number directed to a communications center that is staffed at all

hours during which trains are operated;

• Permanently posted signage located at each grade crossing providing information on

the railroad, the toll-free telephone number, the crossing DOT/AAR inventory

number, and the name of the road or street on which the crossing is located; and

• A program to inform appropriate law enforcement and emergency response agencies

of the availability of the system and to advise them on its use.

Most existing systems service active crossings, the theory being that (1) active crossings

are more heavily traveled and (2) the primary purpose of the public notification system is to

allow the timely reporting of malfunctioning signals. The fact is, however, that a blocked

crossing represents a hazard fully equal to that of a malfunctioning signal. Further, crossing

blockages or similar problems are as likely to occur at passive as at active crossings, and they

represent a similar potential risk in terms of injuries and property damage. The Safety Board

therefore believes that emergency notification systems should service passive, as well as active,

crossings.

To make countermeasures effective in the shortest possible time, the Safety Board

believes that emergency notification systems should be developed and implemented by all Class I

railroads26 and railroad systems on all their crossings. The Safety Board also recognizes that

similar systems may be appropriate for some of the smaller railroads and transit systems and

believes that associations representing these entities, such as the American Short Line Railroad

Association and the American Public Transit Association, respectively, should encourage their

memberships to develop and implement similar notification systems.

Further, the Operation Lifesaver program should work with the Class I railroads and

railroads systems and with the smaller railroad and transit systems to increase public awareness

(including awareness among trucking groups) of these systems, and to advise law enforcement

and the applicable emergency response communities of relevant emergency telephone numbers.

Commercial Truckdriver Training, Education, and Testing -- Several industry training manuals

and advisory programs address hump crossings. Specifically, the ATA and the TTMA in their

training manual and technical bulletins have published information that provides some guidance

on hump crossings. In response to Safety Board recommendations, the FHWA, in 1986 and again

in 1989, published and disseminated “On Guard” bulletins to alert truckdrivers to the problem of

 

26A railroad with an annual gross operating revenue in excess of $50 million based on 1978 dollars.
45

high-profile grade crossings. Although this material may be widely distributed amongst larger

motor carriers who actively participate in the national industry groups, it is unlikely that the

information receives wide distribution among the smaller, local carriers like O&J that are

engaged in interstate and intrastate operations but are not members of these groups. Thus, many

truckdrivers employed in smaller operations may not be aware of the consequences of driving

low-ground-clearance vehicles over hump crossings.

There are at least 168,000 public and 108,000 private grade crossings nationwide. Large

commercial vehicles use these crossings frequently in the conduct of business. Clearly, all

truckdrivers should be educated on the hazards of grade crossings in general and hump crossings

in particular. They need to be advised on how to avoid these crossings, and on how to notify

police and/or railroad officials when emergencies occur. One approach to doing this, which will

reach all new drivers, is through the CDL program. All commercial operators of large trucks

(over 26,000 pounds gross vehicle weight) must obtain a State-issued CDL by taking an

examination that tests their knowledge and skills in motor carrier operation and safety. The CDL

manual does contain some information on hump crossings; however, current CDL tests

administered by the States do not ask questions about grade crossing safety.

The Safety Board believes that the CDL manual should be expanded to include more

specific information on the operation of lowbed vehicles over hump crossings, including

avoidance techniques, and should provide information on making emergency notifications to

police and railroad officials when commercial vehicles become stalled or lodged on crossings.

Further, the Safety Board believes that CDL tests administered by the States should include

questions that test truckdrivers on their general knowledge of grade crossing safety, their

awareness of the hazards of hump crossings, and their knowledge of related emergency

notification procedures.

The Operation Lifesaver program has been successful in educating the general public

about grade crossing safety. Recently OL officials have directed significant attention to trucking

groups. Representatives of OL stated that they will include awareness of hump crossings in their

truck program. The Safety Board commends the efforts of OL, and believes that it should not

only expand its educational program to include hump-crossing awareness, but should also target

the expanded program to groups that are not exposed to industry programs. The Safety Board

further believes that OL should expand the North and South Carolina initiative that provides

emergency personnel with railroad industry telephone numbers to use when vehicles become

lodged or stalled on crossings.

The Safety Board further believes that the ATA can play a significant role in enhancing

grade crossing safety for all drivers by highlighting the hazards presented by hump crossings in

ATA in-service training programs. This in-service training should also address emergency

notification procedures to be used in the event of a grade crossing emergency. Drivers who

become lodged at a grade crossing should be instructed to look first for any posted emergency

notification information. If such information is not available, those drivers should be advised to

dial 911 or contact the local police and ask that the railroad be notified.
46

Emergency Response

The Allendale County deputy sheriff was the first official to arrive on the scene. He

interviewed the truckdriver, made minimal observations of the train, and advised the dispatcher

that emergency medical assistance was not needed. Later, a South Carolina Highway Patrol

trooper arrived on the scene and, seeing bedding sheets lying in the ballast, called to request

medical assistance. Approximately 42 minutes elapsed between the 911 call reporting the

accident and the first request for medical help. If any of the train occupants had sustained serious

injuries, their outcomes may have been adversely affected by this delay.

When grade crossing accidents occur, particularly involving derailed passenger trains,

responding law enforcement officers should immediately make detailed observations and

inquires about possible injured passengers. This is standard procedure among law enforcement

agencies, and while the Safety Board has found that it is followed in most cases, in this accident,

it was not. If the initial responding police officer had made a proper assessment of the

seriousness of the accident and the potential for injuries, he would have determined immediately

that medical help was needed. Thus, the Safety Board concludes that the initial responding police

officer made no effort to assess possible injuries among train passengers and crew before

informing the dispatcher that medical assistance was not needed.

The Allendale County Sheriff’s Department had a longstanding policy requiring deputies

to immediately request that the appropriate emergency response units be dispatched when

incidents such as train derailments occur. Although this policy was not adhered to in this

accident, the Allendale County Sheriff’s Department has assured Safety Board investigators that

this policy will be followed for future incidents involving potential mass casualties.

After being notified, the Allendale Fire Department and County Emergency Services

responded appropriately, quickly administered medical treatment to injured persons, and

evacuated the train occupants in a timely manner.
47

CONCLUSIONS

1. The truckdriver and the traincrew were qualified and were not suffering from any

contributory medical problems, and there is no evidence to suggest that they were under the

influence of alcohol or other drugs at the time of the accident.

2. The condition of the track, the operation of the signals, the mechanical condition of the

train and truck, and the weather were not factors in this accident.

3. The initial responding police officer made no effort to assess possible injuries among train

passengers and crew before informing the dispatcher that medical assistance was not

needed.

4. The Allendale Fire Department and County Emergency Services responded appropriately,

quickly administered medical treatment to injured persons, and efficiently evacuated the

train.

5. Even if the train operating crew had seen the truck on the crossing at their first opportunity,

they would not have had sufficient distance to stop the train and avoid the collision.

6. The truck, as configured, could not safely travel over the crossing because of the crossing’s

substandard geometric characteristics.

7. Although the driver may have been fatigued at the time his truck became lodged on the

crossing, fatigue did not influence the decisions he made or the actions he took before or

after his truck became lodged on the crossing.

8. Like many truckdrivers, this driver was untrained in grade crossing safety and emergency

notification procedures and was therefore unprepared to react appropriately to this situation.

9. Had the driver taken the appropriate action and notified authorities shortly after becoming

lodged, this accident would probably not have occurred.

10. Had emergency notification information been posted at the accident crossing, the

truckdriver may have used it to notify the railroad, thereby avoiding the accident.

11. The carrier did not properly manage the driver’s job assignments after normal business

hours or provide any training for emergency situations.

12. Railroads and public entities do not routinely communicate with each other on grade

crossing maintenance activities.
48

PROBABLE CAUSE

The Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the motor

carrier’s failure to provide to the driver appropriate guidance to respond to emergency situations.

This led to the truckdriver’s failure both to understand that the substandard profile of the

Boogaloo Road grade crossing was incompatible with the truck he was operating, and to notify

the appropriate railroad and emergency personnel of the blocked crossing. Contributing to the

accident was the absence of emergency notification information that the driver may have used to

notify the railroad of the blocked crossing.
49

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board

makes the following recommendations:

--to the Secretary of Transportation:

Amend the Department of Transportation/Association of American

Railroads Grade Crossing Inventory data base to include vertical profile

information on all highway/rail grade crossings in the United States. (Class

II, Priority Action) (H-96-1)

Encourage and coordinate efforts between the railroad industry and State

and local highway transportation officials to identify substandard grade

crossing profiles (hump crossings) and close or take appropriate corrective

action to eliminate them. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-2)

Encourage States to post warning notices at hump crossings where high

profiles present potential hazards for highway vehicles and where such

hazardous profiles cannot be corrected in a timely manner. (Class II, Priority

Action) (H-96-3)

Develop procedures and processes that will facilitate improved

communication and coordination between the railroad industry and State and

local highway transportation officials regarding crossing maintenance

activities so as to prevent the creation of hump crossings. (Class II, Priority

Action) (H-96-4)

--to the Federal Highway Administration:

Adopt the proposed changes that are published in the notice of proposed

amendments to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices regarding

warning signs for substandard vertical profiles at railroad grade crossings.

(Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-5)

--to the American Public Transit Association:

Encourage your members to develop and implement, without delay, a

24-hour toll-free emergency notification telephone system for use by the

public in promptly reporting emergencies at all your members’ highway/rail

grade crossings, both active and passive, and provide information at each
50

crossing to inform the public of the 24-hour telephone system. (Class II,

Priority Action) (R-96-1)

--to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

Revise the commercial driver’s license manual to include specific

information on hump crossings, and ensure that truckdrivers are tested on

their knowledge of grade crossing safety, with special emphasis on hump

crossings. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-6)

Revise the commercial driver’s license manual to include information on

grade crossing emergency notification procedures, and ensure that

truckdrivers are tested on their knowledge of these procedures. (Class II,

Priority Action) (H-96-7)

--to the American Trucking Associations, Inc.:

Advise your membership of the circumstances of this accident, and during

in-service training for all drivers, highlight the potential hazards associated

with moving lowbed trailers over hump grade crossings. Include specific

instructions for notifying authorities when emergencies or hazardous

conditions exist at grade crossings. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-8)

--to the American Short Line Railroad Association:

Encourage your members to develop and implement, without delay, a 24-

hour toll-free emergency notification telephone system for use by the public

in promptly reporting emergencies at all your members’ highway/rail grade

crossings, both active and passive, and provide information at each crossing

to inform the public of the 24-hour telephone system. (Class II, Priority

Action) (R-96-2)

--to Operation Lifesaver, Inc.

In conjunction with appropriate trucking industry groups, expand your

existing programs to educate truckdrivers who are not exposed to industry

programs on the hazards of hump grade crossings. (Class II, Priority Action)

(H-96-9)

In cooperation with the Class I railroads, railroad systems, the American

Short Line Railroad Association, and the American Public Transit

Association, expand your existing programs to inform the general public and

law enforcement and emergency response agencies of grade crossing

emergency notification programs within their respective States. (Class II,

Priority Action) (H-96-10)
51

--to Class I railroads and railroad systems:

Develop and implement, without delay, a 24-hour toll-free emergency

notification telephone system for use by the public in promptly reporting

emergencies at all your highway/rail grade crossings, both active and

passive, and provide information at each crossing to inform the public of the

24-hour telephone system. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-96-3)

--to O&J Gordon Trucking Company:

 Establish a program than ensures driver conformance with hours-of-service

and medical certification requirements. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-11)

Establish a contingency plan that addresses on-the-road emergencies and

that provides drivers with guidance in dealing with potentially hazardous

situations such as having a vehicle stall or become lodged on a grade

crossing. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-96-12)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, Jr.

Member

March 11, 1996
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53

APPENDIX A

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of this accident at 4:20 a.m. on

May 2, 1995. Accident investigators dispatched from the Safety Board’s Atlanta, Georgia,

regional office arrived at 10:00 a.m. on May 2, and investigators from the Safety Board’s

headquarters in Washington, D.C., arrived on scene at 11:00 a.m. A 13-person team conducted

the on-scene investigation, concluding the on-scene work on May 4, 1995.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of O&J Gordon Trucking; CSX

Transportation, Inc.; the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); the Allendale

County sheriffs department, fire department, rescue service, and police department; the Federal

Railroad Administration; and the Federal Highway Administration.

Hearing/Deposition

The Safety Board did not hold a public hearing or deposition proceedings in conjunction

with this investigation. On May 2, 1995, the Safety Board obtained sworn testimony from the

engineer, the assistant engineer, the conductor, and the assistant conductor.
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55

APPENDIX B

Injury Information

Injuries in this accident have been coded to the revised 1990 Abbreviated Injury Scale of

the American Association for Automotive Medicine, which is a standard system of assessing

injury severity.

Abbreviated injury scale

Injuries Truckdriver Traincrew Train Passengers Total

AIS-1 Minor 0 4 29 33

AIS-2 Moderate 0 0 0 0

AIS-3 Serious 0 0 0 0

AIS-4 Severe 0 0 0 0

AIS-5 Critical 0 0 0 0

AIS-6 Unsurvivable 0 0 0 0

AIS-0 None 1 5 250 256

AIS-9 Unknown 0 0 0 0

Total 1 9 279 289
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57

APPENDIX C

Existing Grade Crossing Emergency Notification Systems

Texas

In 1983, the State of Texas, with the support of the major railroads operating within the

state, enacted the “Railroad Grade Crossing Information Act” (the Act). The Act directed the

Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) to establish a toll-free telephone service for the

reception of calls reporting malfunctions at highway/railroad grade crossings.

The State Department of Highways and Public Transportation (SDHPT)1

 was required to

attach a sign displaying the toll-free telephone number and the DOT/AAR inventory number to

each train-activated grade crossing active warning device on the State-maintained highway and

road system. This Act was later amended to include train-activated grade crossings on county

roads as well. One unique outcome in the implementation of the Act was that SDHPT employees

were allowed by the railroads to enter their private property and post the information signs.

The Act contained a series of legal protections as described below:

A court may not hold the State, an agency or subdivision of the State, or a railroad

company liable for damages caused by an action taken under this Act or failure to perform a duty

imposed by this Act.

No evidence may be introduced in a trial or judicial proceeding that such service exists or

is relied upon by the State or railroad company.

A State agency is not required to make or retain permanent records or information

obtained in implementation of this Act.

The Texas 1-800 system is basically a clearinghouse for telephone messages relating to

problems at grade crossings. DPS emergency operators staff this system 24-hours a day. Any

information received by the DPS operators through this system is forwarded to the appropriate

railroad within a matter of minutes. DPS operators indicated that they receive three or four calls

on blocked crossings daily. The majority of the blockages are rail cars blocking the grade

crossing; however, they have received calls where motor vehicles were blocking grade crossings.

Signal malfunctions represent most of the reported calls to the system.

In 1989, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) completed an evaluation of the

Texas 1-800 system. A review of crossing problems highlighted in 47 months of calls reported

indicated the following:

 1

The Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation (SDHPT) is now known as the Texas

Department of Transportation (TXDOT).
Appendix C

58

Crossing Problem Number of Reports Percent of Total

Warning devices 8446 92.7

Signs and markings 13 0.1

Crossings blocked/other

highway problem near

crossing 125 1.4

Track and structure 321 3.5

Trespassers 7 0.1

Sight distance 12 0.1

Train operations 29 0.3

Other 166 1.8

Total 9119 100.0

About 4,600 active grade crossing locations in Texas are signed; approximately 14,000

grade crossings are not signed. The Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) reported that

the signs are made in the Texas penal institutions at a cost of $22 per sign. Two signs are placed

at each grade crossing location, and installation takes approximately 1/2 half hour. The civil

engineer responsible for this program at TXDOT indicated that vandalism of the signs is rare.

The TXDOT also includes information on the 1-800 system in their newly issued

application and permit form for oversized and overweight vehicles. The Texas permit regulations

issued September 1995 explain the use of the railroad grade crossing emergency hotline,

including the requirement for commercial vehicle operators to immediately call the 1-800

number if their vehicle is lodged on railroad tracks.

Delaware

In 1988, the State of Delaware Department of Transportation (DELDOT) and

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) initiated an agreement that the railroad would maintain

a toll-free telephone emergency notification system available to the public with signs at Conrail’s

public grade crossings. The stated purpose of this system was to provide the public as well as

local agencies a means to immediately report a crossing problem that could otherwise go

unreported for an excessive period. The 1-800 emergency number dials directly to Conrail’s

communications and signal trouble desk in Columbus, Ohio. Should the problem be a

malfunctioning signal, the trouble desk dispatches a signal maintainer to the location and logs the

call and the response time. Originally, the agreement was tied to funds provided by the DELDOT

if Conrail maintained and repaired malfunctioning grade crossing signals within a specified time.

The agreement terminated in 1993 due to funding limitations. The State paid $1 million to

Conrail during the 5-year period. Currently, Conrail is providing funding to maintain the 1-800

toll-free system in operation.
Appendix C

59

Of Delaware’s 451 public grade crossings, 183 (41 percent) have emergency notification

signs installed. Two of the involved agencies (DELDOT and the Delaware Transit Corporation)

reported they would like to reactivate the program and expand the 1-800 system to the other five

railroads operating within Delaware. The previous Delaware Railroad Administrator, in a

memorandum to the DELDOT Transportation Trust Fund Administrator dated June 16, 1994,

stated the benefits with continuing the maintenance agreement with Conrail would include

more efficient reporting of defects;

reduced malfunctioning time of signals;

increased confidence in warning signals;

reduced liability;

improved relations with the public;

an improved DELDOT and railroad(s) working relationship.

The Delaware Railroad Administration (and its successor, the Delaware Transit

Corporation) endorsed the continuation and expansion of the funding for the 1-800 program.

The 1-800 system concept is supported by Conrail. Although the State of Delaware has

not funded the program since 1993, Conrail continues with the program because the railroad does

not want the public to lose confidence in the signal systems at grade crossings. Although no

records have been kept on accidents prevented by this system, Conrail has some records

indicating, in broad categories, the types of calls received. For example, in 1993, 326 calls were

made to Conrail’s trouble desk. Of these, 170 (52 percent) were the result of a signal component

failure. For 84 calls (26 percent), Conrail arrived at the location and there was no cause found for

the report. Another 72 calls (22 percent) were the result of reported vandalism, weather, or

accidents.

DELDOT makes the crossing signs at a cost of $22.40 per sign. Two signs are installed at

each of Conrail’s active-warning-device grade crossings in Delaware. Conrail’s engineer

responsible for this program indicated that reported damage to the signs on location was

minimal. This also was confirmed by officials in the Delaware Transit Corporation and

DELDOT.

Connecticut

In 1990, Connecticut enacted Public Act 90-329 requiring railroad companies to erect

signs with the 911 emergency telecommunications number at all grade crossings with gates or

signals. The Act specified that the provision did not apply to any railroad company operating

trains that do not exceed 25 miles per hour. The purpose of the sign is to advise the public to call

911 upon the malfunctioning of any grade crossing gates or signals. Connecticut Department of

Transportation (CTDOT) requires each railroad company to maintain logs, subject to the

inspection of the Department, listing all reports of the malfunctioning of grade crossing gates and

signals. The 911 operator forwards the telephone reports to local police, who notify the railroad

of the reported condition. The railroad company must document all investigations and actions

taken by the company to repair malfunctioning gates or signals. Each railroad company must

report to the local municipality all actions taken as a result of these calls.
Appendix C

60

Currently, about 150 (28 percent) of the 530 grade crossings in Connecticut have signs

installed. The CTDOT estimates that the cost of the signs and the bracket are about $15 each.

There are two signs at each grade crossing location. The railroad is responsible for installing the

signs.

Although there has been no evaluation of the 911 emergency telecommunication system

for grade crossings, CTDOT indicates that an evaluation is planned in the near future.

Canada

Canadian National’s (CN) Signal and Communications Department of the Southern

Ontario District (SOD) developed and implemented a 1-800 24-hour emergency notification

system in July 1994. This effort was also supported by SOD’s Safety and Loss Control

Department and CN police, who established the communication center. The stated objectives of

the 1-800 system are to document safety issues at grade crossings, enhance the safety level of the

railroad, and foster a closer relationship with the general public and employees.

There are about 2,000 grade crossings in the SOD; all public active warning deviceinstalled crossings and passive crossings are signed with the emergency number and crossing

location. The oldest of the signs have been in place for 2 years, and CN staff indicated that these

signs are still serviceable. They are visible and have not been tampered with or destroyed by

vandals. The SOD signs are computer generated, cost about $5 each, and are installed by a signal

maintainer . At active-warning-device locations, the sign is placed on the bungalow (the case that

holds the electrical panel for the crossing). At passive crossings, the emergency signs are placed

on the back of the crossbuck. SOD’s district engineer estimated that the total cost to sign his

entire District at all crossings was about $20,000.

CN Police are responsible for incoming calls. The police dispatchers directly contact the

Ontario Provincial Police or CN’s chief dispatcher if a call is received with life-threatening

possibilities. Trains are halted, if such action is warranted. Malfunctioning signal calls result in

the signals being checked by CN’s signal maintainers. CN Police have not yet assessed the

number and type of calls received, but an evaluation is planned in the future. The majority of

calls the police believe are malfunctioning signal reports or blocked crossings. CN reports that

the railroad does not have hump crossing problems similar to those in the U.S.

On August 1, 1995, CN’s Southern Ontario District and Northern Ontario District merged

to become the Great Lakes District. The Great Lakes district engineer reported that an additional

500 grade crossings of about 1,000 in the old Northern Ontario District have the emergency

information posted. He also noted that the Maritime and Laurentian Districts have merged into

the Champlain District, and he said he fully expects that this new district will move toward

application of the 1-800 emergency system soon.
Appendix C

61

The Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)

In December 1994, NS developed and implemented its 1-800 Crossing Hot Line. The

communication center for the Crossing Hot line incoming calls is manned by the NS Police.

NS has approximately 27,000 grade crossings of which 17,000 (63 percent) are public

grade crossings, and 10,000 (37 percent) are private grade crossings. Of the 27,000 grade

crossings, 7,000 (26 percent) have active warning devices. NS officials stated that all active

warning device locations have two installed retro-reflective decals: One is placed 5 feet above

ground level on the flashing light crossing signal mast, and the other is placed approximately 5

feet out from the mast on the white section of the grade crossing gate arm. The decals are quite

visible, and the NS manager of grade crossing safety reported that the decals have not been

tampered or destroyed by vandals. The cost of the NS’ signing program for all active warning

device locations has been $16,395. Because signs primarily are used to report signal

malfunctions, NS has not signed passive grade crossing locations. The decals are installed by

signal maintainers as adjunct duties.

NS Police are responsible for incoming calls on this 1-800 system. The police dispatchers

directly contact division chief dispatchers. The NS Police do not try to screen the calls; this is the

responsibility of each division chief dispatcher’s office. The dispatcher notifies local crossing

and signal maintainers and logs all telephone messages into a computer system. The 1-800

Crossing Hotline during the period January through July 1995 received 1,061 calls. NS reports

that its dispatch offices have reported this system has already been successful in many instances

in safely stopping trains. The NS manager of grade crossing safety has requested information

from NS personnel on the possible application of the 1-800 Crossing Hotline decal at passive

crossing locations.

Santa Fe Railway

Since 1991, the Santa Fe Railway has had a 1-800 toll-free emergency telephone

notification system. Currently, about 3,000 grade crossings across the Santa Fe system have had a

stencil applied to the grade crossing’s cabinet (bungalow). The out-of-pocket cost for this system

was $20,000, or about $6.67 per grade crossing location. The labor cost for applying the stencil

to the bungalow is not included in this reported expense, primarily because the installation is

done as adjunct duty. Information provided by this stenciled application includes the railroad’s

name, the street address, the milepost location, the DOT/AAR Inventory number, and the 1-800

toll-free telephone number. The stenciled lettering is large enough for engineers on passing trains

to provide reports of unusual problems at grade crossings.

Calls made to the 1-800 emergency telephone number go directly to Santa Fe’s police

communications center. The calls are screened by police dispatchers. The railroad reports that it

does not keep separate logs on the types of calls it receives, and no evaluation of the system has

been made. If a call reports a serious condition, such as a motor vehicle blocking a grade

crossing, police dispatch immediately reports such information to the railroad’s chief dispatcher

so that any train near that grade crossing will be notified. Santa Fe reported that they have averted

some blocked crossing accidents because of timely reports through the 1-800 toll-free emergency

telephone system.
Appendix C

62

CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT)

On July 12, 1995, Safety Board staff met with officials of CSXT, who informed Safety

Board staff that they are establishing a 1-800 toll-free emergency telephone system for public

use. The system became operational in February 1996. Also, CSXT representatives indicated that

they intend to install appropriate signage at all crossing locations on their system.

Other U.S. Railroads

Two domestic railroads have 1-800 emergency toll-free telephone numbers that are not

posted at grade crossing locations. The Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BN) has a 1-800

number; however, the number is only provided to law enforcement officers and public officials

for use in emergencies. A serious grade crossing accident could be reported by local officials on

the BN number. The Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) also has a 1-800 toll-free emergency

telephone system, but the number is not posted at grade crossing locations. Since 1992, the UP

has distributed about 15,000 cards announcing the number to local law enforcement and public

officials. Calls to this system are forwarded directly to a trouble desk at UP’s central dispatch

location, Harriman Center. This desk is staffed 24-hours a day by a trained signal technician who

screens the calls. This system is called the “Grade Crossing Emergency Hot-Line.”

Foreign Railroads

The Safety Board reviewed the French National Railway (SNCF) emergency notification

system. Emergency telephone call boxes are used on the SNCF system. The SNCF reported that

9,400 (83 percent) of the country’s 11,300 active-device grade crossing locations are equipped

with the call boxes. There are a total of 21,200 grade crossings on the SNCF system.

The SNCF keeps no log of the calls received by this system; however, the railroad

reported that there have been emergency train stops made after calls were received through the

system. The SNCF indicates that there have been some limited cases of vandalism of the call

boxes.

The Safety Board also reviewed the Japanese system for emergency notifications. Many

of Japan’s grade crossings include an emergency button intended for use by motorists in the

event a vehicle stalls or is otherwise disabled on a crossing. The button activates the wayside

signal system that alerts the train operator of a problem at the grade crossing.

Operation Lifesaver (OL)

After meetings with the Safety Board, both the North Carolina and South Carolina

Operation Lifesaver coordinators developed and distributed a flyer that clearly informed

emergency personnel of how and whom to telephone in the event a vehicle becomes lodged on a

crossing. A copy of the flyer was sent to every law enforcement agency in each state.
Appendix C

63

At meetings with the Safety Board on October 10, 1995, and October 21, 1995, Operation

Lifesaver officials expressed their intent to expand the successful programs implemented in

North and South Carolina, and to develop others to insure that emergency notification of

problems at grade crossings becomes a national project.
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65

APPENDIX D

Safety Board Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Regarding Tractor-Lowbed Semitrailer/Train Collisions

On August 23, 1983, Amtrak Train No. 88 struck a tractor lowbed-semitrailer that had

become lodged on a grade crossing on the single-track main line grade crossing of the Seaboard

System Railroad in Rowland, North Carolina. On November 30, 1983, Amtrak Train No. 98

struck a tractor lowbed-semitrailer that had become lodged on the Seaboard single-track main

line grade crossing in Citra, Florida.

In January 1984, the Florida Department of Transportation convened an internal

committee to study the problem of hazardous grade crossing profiles as illustrated by the

Rowland and Citra accidents. The formation of the committee followed the Safety Board’s

investigation of the Citra accident and discussions held by Board investigators with local and

State officials.

The committee was mandated to pursue an aggressive program of corrective action. Its

proposed actions included:

1. Developing a standard roadway (profile) design for grade crossings;

2. Identifying crossings currently not in compliance with the standard;

3. Encouraging local governments to bring crossings into compliance;

4. Suggesting to the railroads that they develop and implement a procedure for

coordinating and cooperating with local and State governments to ensure the

integrity of the geometric profiles at grade crossings where maintenance has been

performed on the track;

5. Developing and implementing a program to install warning signs at crossings

identified as having hazardous surface hump profiles; and

6. Encouraging the Florida Truck Association to inform its membership of the

hazards of hump crossings.

On August 29, 1984, as a result of its investigation of the Rowland and Citra accidents,

the Safety Board recommended to the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials (AASHTO):

H-84-69

Review the State safety program dealing with hazardous grade crossing profile

conditions now underway in Florida, and promote the adoption within each State

of this program or a comparable program developed by an appropriate AASHTO

committee.

On March 20, 1989, AASHTO responded to Safety Recommendation H-84-69, advising

that when initially considering the recommendation, AASHTO was aware that the Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA) at that time had a project underway to revise the 1978
Appendix D

66

Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook. The revision, completed in November 1986,

included a section on vertical alignment that outlines problem areas and several alternative

approaches in use by the States, including the Florida program, to deal with those problems.

Safety Recommendation H-84-69 was placed in a “Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action” status

on July 14, 1989.

The Safety Board also found that there was a need to consider vehicle ground clearance

when designing and maintaining roadway profiles, and that there was a need for coordination

between railroads and highway departments concerning railroad/highway grade crossing

maintenance. On August 29, 1984, the Safety Board issued two recommendations to the

Association of American Railroads (AAR):

R-84-35

Establish the specifications stated in Section 1.2, “Profile and Alignment of

Crossings and Approaches,” of the “Manual for Railway Engineering” of the

American Railway Engineering Association as the minimum acceptable

specifications for railroad\highway grade crossings.

R-84-36

Encourage all member railroads to coordinate activity related to track maintenance

with local and State governments to preserve the integrity of the profiles at

railroad/highway grade crossings.

Regarding Safety Recommendation R-84-35, on September 19, 1984, the AAR

responded:

. . . [W]e agree with the substance or thrust of your recommendation, but must

point out that it should have been directed to the appropriate state or federal

government highway agencies. . . . [S]tate highway agencies and the Federal

Highway Administration should develop such grade crossing profile designs and

adopt them, for instance, as AASHTO standards.

The AAR also stated that it believed the FHWA should mandate, by regulation, a

minimum road clearance in the design and manufacture of all highway vehicles, and that

government highway agencies at all levels must ensure that all new and reconstructed grade

crossings reflect a profile that would accommodate vehicles having this minimum road clearance.

It went on to say that government highway agencies should also identify all crossings that do not

meet the standard profile design, erect and maintain appropriate advance warning signs on

crossings having a non-standard profile, and prohibit access thereto by low clearance vehicles.
Appendix D

67

On January 10, 1985, the Safety Board responded that it believed the railroads’ active

participation was necessary to effect improvements in hazardous grade crossing profiles and

urged the AAR to reconsider the intent of Safety Recommendation R-84-35. The Safety Board

placed that recommendation in an “Open--Unacceptable Action” status.

On February 14, 1985, the AAR responded:

The construction and major reconstruction of public highway-railroad grade

crossings is today conducted almost exclusively under the authority, direction, and

funding of government highway agencies. The (AAR) would never prescribe or

dictate design criteria for highway projects implemented under a public highway

program, neither would the involved public highway agency permit such

interference by the railroad industry. . . . The railroads would certainly be eager to

participate and assist appropriate government highway agencies in the

development of any such grade crossing profile designs, but it would be totally

inappropriate for the (AAR) or its members to attempt to impose such standards

on government agencies.

On June 10, 1985, the Safety Board advised the AAR that the Board believed that AAR’s

participation in development of grade crossing profile designs with government highway

organizations would be welcomed rather than interpreted as interference, and urged the AAR to

reconsider its position. After receiving no further response, on June 23, 1987, Safety

Recommendation R-84-35 was classified “Closed--Unacceptable Action.”

On July 27, 1987, the AAR advised the Safety Board that, although the AAR neither

develops or adopts engineering standards and that such responsibility rests with the American

Railroad Engineering Association (AREA), the AAR is a strong supporter of grade crossing

safety and the then-planned National Conference on Highway-Rail Crossing Safety, pointing out

that the conference agenda included a session devoted to the engineering relationship between

the roadway and the railroad at or near grade crossings. The AAR requested that the status of

Safety Recommendation R-84-35 be reclassified “Closed--Alternate Acceptable Action.” The file

does not include a Safety Board response to this letter.

Regarding Safety Recommendation R-84-36, on November 5, 1984, the AAR urged the

chief operating officers of the member railroads to coordinate track maintenance activity with the

appropriate government agencies in order to preserve the integrity of the profile at

railroad/highway grade crossings. Safety Recommendation R-84-36 was thus classified “Closed--

Acceptable Action” on June 13, 1985.

In its study of 1985 grade crossing accidents1

, the Safety Board concluded that improved

advance warning signs could be developed to indicate a variety of hazardous grade crossing

situations, particularly limited sight distance, difficult crossing approaches (such as high crossing

 1

Safety Study Passenger/Commuter Train and Motor Vehicle Collisions at Grade Crossings (1985)

(NTSB/SS-86/04).
Appendix D

68

profiles), and high-speed train operations. As a result of the study, on January 13, 1987, the

Safety Board recommended that the FHWA:

R-86-50

Develop and require the use of advance warning signs that clearly inform motor

vehicle drivers of particular dangers at grade crossings, including the warning of

limited sight distance and high hump profiles.

On May 11, 1987, the FHWA responded to Safety Recommendation R-86-50, advising

that changes to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) were not warranted at

that time. The Safety Board responded, advising the FHWA that in view of the number of

accidents investigated by the Safety Board in which a limited sight distance or a high-humpprofile surface had been factors, the Board believed that, at a minimum, the MUTCD should

indicate specifically that these two warning signs may be warranted at certain locations. Safety

Recommendation R-86-50 was classified “Open--Unacceptable Action” on October 2, 1987.

Five accidents involving trucks lodged on hump grade crossings were discussed in the

Safety Board’s 1988 study of 189 heavy truck accidents2. As a result of its investigations, on

February 21, 1989, the Safety Board reiterated Safety Recommendation R-86-50, and also

recommended that the FHWA:

H-89-223

Identify design criteria to determine what geometric conditions on approaches to

grade crossings would create a hazard to low-clearance vehicles and develop

geometric design criteria and traffic control systems for mitigating hazards.

On May 27, 1993, the FHWA advised the Safety Board that pages 842-843 of the

AASHTO revised railroad grade crossings section of its 1990 edition of AASHTO’s A Policy on

Geometric Design of Highways and Streets included vertical alignment criteria for low-clearance

vehicles. On September 16, 1993, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation H-89-22

“Closed--Acceptable Action.”

Regarding Safety Recommendation R-86-50, on February 22, 1991, the FHWA advised

the Safety Board that, although States had been testing the use of warning signs at the approaches

to hump crossings, problems regarding when and where such signs should be placed had not

been resolved. The FHWA stated:

A vehicle standard is essential for any uniformity (such as the 1/2 inch clearance

per foot of axle spacing, 9 inch minimum in the Uniform Vehicle Code), but

allowed variations and special permitting are frequent. Reasonable design criteria

will not catch the special users most prone to hangup (e.g., lowboys on rural

roads, special auto carriers on urban streets), while strict criteria would

 2

Safety Study--Case Summaries of 189 Heavy Truck Accident Investigations (NTSB/SS-88/05). 3

This safety recommendation was originally and erroneously numbered H-89-6, and it may be cited by that

number in some of the literature relative to this issue.
Appendix D

69

unnecessarily limit or divert regular vehicles. Adding the uncertainty on where

such signs should be placed (last turnaround in rural, every intersecting street in

urban?) and the predominance of such crossings on local roads and streets, such a

requirement would be premature, if not infeasible. At present the burden must be

on the special carriers themselves to identify and only use routes that can

accommodate the special or unique vehicles they choose to operate.

The Safety Board responded that it continued to be concerned about and would monitor

the issue of high crossing profiles in future grade crossing accidents. Safety Recommendation

R-86-50 was classified “Closed--Unacceptable Action” on May 22, 1991.
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71

APPENDIX E

Accident Summaries

Lowbed Vehicle/Train Collisions Investigated by the Safety Board

CASE NO. 1

Safety Board Investigation Number: N/A

Accident Location: Church Street, Rowland, North Carolina

Date and Time: August 25, 1983, 1:10 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: S. L. Balogh Trucking Company Inc.

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

Train Involved: Amtrak, Train No. 88 (Silver Meteor)

Railroad Involved: Seaboard System Railroad

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: N/A

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Red flashing Lights, gates

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 29

Estimated Property Damage: $623,399

Summary:

Northbound Amtrak train No. 88 was operating at an engineer-reported speed of about 65

mph as it approached the Church Street grade crossing in Rowland, North Carolina. The engineer

reported that about 1,200 feet from the crossing he saw a semitrailer blocking the crossing, and

he applied the train’s brakes in emergency. The lead locomotive struck the semitrailer, derailed,

overturned on its right side, and slid along the ground. After colliding with and uprighting the

lead locomotive, the second locomotive unit and the following mail and baggage dormitory cars

were derailed upright.

The collision separated the tractor from the lowbed semitrailer and its cargo, a pavement

profile. The gross weight of the highway vehicle and its cargo was 105,820 pounds, and the

profile was being transported from Stanhope, New Jersey, to Hialeah Gardens, Florida.

Although the motor carrier had obtained special permits from New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, the North Carolina

permit authorized a maximum gross weight of 103,000 pounds and required that the load be

transported only during daylight hours and only on Interstate 95. The motor carrier had instructed

the truckdriver to avoid North Carolina scales, and the truck was traveling off its authorized route

when it became lodged on the humped grade crossing.

The distance between the semitrailer’s kingpin and the first semitrailer axle was 36 feet, 4

inches, and in this configuration the underside of the semitrailer’s cargo bed cleared a level
Appendix E

72

roadway by about 7 inches. The 35-foot-wide elevated hump developed a 207.30-foot radius

vertical curve profile in the roadway at the crossing.

The 27-year old truckdriver had driven similar equipment for 3 years, mostly transporting

heavy equipment in southern Florida. He reported that after becoming lodged on the crossing he

attempted to raise the semitrailer frame by operating the hydraulic rams on the semitrailer

gooseneck, but was unsuccessful in these attempts in the 5 to- 10 minutes before the collision. He

did not attempt to contact the police or the railroad before the collision.
Appendix E

73

CASE NO. 2

Safety Board Investigation Number: ATL-84-M-R004

Accident Location: Citra, Florida, County Road 318

Date and Time: November 30, 1983, 2:45 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: C & A Earthmovers, Palatka, Florida

Train Involved: Amtrak, Train No. 98 (Silver Meteor)

Railroad Involved: Seaboard System Railroad

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 625030V

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Cantilevered red flashing lights, gates,

gong.

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 59

Estimated Property Damage: $200,119

Summary:

Northbound Amtrak train No. 98 was operating at about 79 mph rounding a curve about

4,000 feet south of the Seaboard System Railroad’s main track intersection with Marion County

Road 318 in Citra, Florida, when the engineer observed a man on the railroad right-of-way

waving his arms and saw a tractor-lowbed semitrailer lodged on the County Road 318 grade

crossing. The train’s engineer applied the brakes in a service application, and as the train drew

closer, he made an emergency application.

The train’s speed had been reduced to about 35 mph when it collided with the

tractor/semitrailer. The collision separated the tractor from the semitrailer and its cargo, a piece

of earth-moving equipment. The collision forced the west rail to tip outward, and the locomotive

and the first four cars of the eight-car consist derailed, coming to rest upright, in line, and still

coupled.

The earth-moving equipment was being transported under a special permit issued by the

Florida Department of Transportation. The gross weight of the vehicle and its cargo was about

150,000 lbs. Investigation indicated that the distance between the semitrailer’s kingpin and the

first semitrailer axle was 31 feet, 9 inches, and in this configuration the underside of the

semitrailer’s cargo bed cleared a level roadway by about 9 1/2 inches. The crossing had an

average 3-percent upgrade for 100 feet to the track centerline east of the track, and had an

average 4-percent downgrade for 100 feet from the track centerline west of the track.

The 31-year-old truckdriver reported that he had taken delivery of the lowbed semitrailer

the day before the accident. The semitrailer had been lodged over the crossing for about 15

minutes, during which time the driver and a helper had attempted to use the hydraulic lift on the

semitrailer to get it off the crossing. They did not attempt to contact the police or the railroad

before the collision. When they heard the train approaching, the helper ran down the tracks and
Appendix E

74

attempted to stop the train while the driver entered the cab and made a last attempt to move the

unit. He jumped from the cab immediately before the collision and was not injured.
Appendix E

75

CASE NO. 3

Safety Board Investigation Number: FTW-85-F-X025

Accident Location: Deadwood Road, Donner (Schriever),

Louisiana

Date and Time: September 4, 1985, 4:06 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Sampey Brothers, Ltd., Morgan City,

Louisiana

Train Involved: Amtrak, Train No. 1

Railroad Involved: Southern Pacific Transportation

Company

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 758075V

Train-Activated Warning Devices: None (crossbucks and stop sign only)

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 0

Estimated Property Damage: $40,000

Summary:

Amtrak train No. 1 was traveling southbound about 70 mph when the engineer and the

fireman on the lead unit noticed a lowbed semitrailer on the Deadwood Road grade crossing. The

train’s engineer initiated an emergency application of the brakes, reducing the speed of the train

to about 40 mph when it struck the semitrailer. The semitrailer was propelled about 150 feet and

struck a parked, unoccupied pickup truck. The train did not derail, and only the front end of the

lead unit was damaged. The crew members and 93 passengers onboard were not injured.

The 42-foot long semitrailer, transporting a bulldozer, had hung up on the hump crossing

as the vehicle was traveling east on Deadwood Road about 5 minutes before the train arrived.

The truck tractor had begun descending a 5.8-percent downgrade while the lowbed semitrailer

was still on a 13.5-percent upgrade, and the semitrailer lodged on the crossing. After becoming

lodged, the driver had detached the tractor, unloaded the bulldozer, and was attempting to use the

bulldozer to free the semitrailer when the collision occurred. The nearest phone was four miles

away, and the driver made no attempt to contact the police or the railroad before the collision.

The distance between the rear axle on the tractor and the first axle on the semitrailer was

28 feet, and the vehicle had a ground clearance of 8 inches between these axles. According to a

Louisiana State statute, the ground clearance should have been 14 inches for that configuration.
Appendix E

76

CASE NO. 4

Safety Board Investigation Number: CHI-87-H-TR04

Accident Location: Clay Street, Gary, Indiana

Date and Time: October 30, 1986, 6:40 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Diamond Bell Express, Inc.

Train Involved: Commuter Rail Passenger Train No. 119

Railroad Involved: Chicago, Southshore, and South Bend

Railroad

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 870879M

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Red flashing lights, gates

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 32

Estimated Property Damage: $110,000

Summary:

An eastbound Chicago, Southshore, and South Bend Railroad electric passenger train was

operating at an engineer-reported 45 mph approaching the Clay Street grade crossing in Gary,

Indiana, when the engineer saw a truck blocking the tracks. He applied the brakes but was unable

to stop in time to avoid the collision. The collision separated the tractor from the semitrailer and

its cargo, and the semitrailer came to rest 232 feet east of the crossing. At impact, the 38,190-

pound steel coil the truck was transporting penetrated the head end of the first car in the train

consist and rolled down the center aisle of the car, coming to rest about 1/2 way through the

occupied car.

The semitrailer was designed with a hydraulic cargo bed which, after being positioned

under a cradled steel coil, was raised, lifting both the coil and the cradle off the ground about 8

inches for transport. The distance between the semitrailer’s kingpin and the first semitrailer axle

was about 31 feet, 9 inches.

The 52-year-old truckdriver had 2 1/2 years experience driving this type vehicle. He

reported that the drive shaft snapped when he tried to drag the semitrailer over the hump crossing

and that he had been stopped on the crossing 10 to 15 minutes when the collision occurred.

While lodged on the crossing, he was clearing traffic so that another Diamond Bell unit he knew

was traveling behind him could tow him off the crossing. When the warning devices activated, he

tried to use a flashlight to signal the approaching train to stop, but was unable to prevent the

collision.

The motor carrier was using this humped crossing in place of another level crossing in

order to avoid confrontations in crossing a Steelworker’s Union picket line. The carrier had

experienced problems in clearing the accident crossing in the recent past, and had equipped its

lowbed vehicles with two-way radios to reach the carrier’s dispatcher in case a vehicle fouled

this crossing so that the dispatcher could call the railroad. The radio was found to be inoperative
Appendix E

77

after the accident, and the driver made no attempt to contact the police or the railroad by

telephone before the collision.
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78

CASE NO. 5

Safety Board Investigation Number: ATL-87-H-TR02

Accident Location: Fellwood Road, College Park, Georgia

Date and Time: November 12, 1986, 7:22 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed auto transporter

Motor Carrier: Pensacola Auto Auction, Pensacola,

Florida

Train Involved: CSXT Freight Train No. M-615-12

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: N/A

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Flashing lights, gates, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 0

Estimated Property Damage: $90,000

Summary:

CSXT train No. M-615-12 was traveling southbound at an engineer-reported speed of 48-

50 mph. When the lead unit was about 1,500 feet north of the Fellwood Road grade crossing, the

engineer noticed a truck on the crossing and began sounding the horn. When the lead unit was

about 900 feet from the crossing, the engineer determined the truck was lodged on the humped

crossing. He stopped sounding the horn, applied the brakes in emergency, and he and the

brakeman then lay on the floor until the crash occurred. The train did not derail and stopped with

the first freight car across Fellwood Road.

The 26-year-old truckdriver had been driving the accident vehicle for about 10 months.

While en route to make a delivery, he had turned onto westbound Fellwood Road and failed to

heed a sign prohibiting trucks over 30 feet in length on that roadway. After the center of the

semitrailer became lodged on the humped grade crossing, he spent 20 minutes stopping passing

motorists and using his CB radio in an attempt to get a tow truck to pull him off the crossing. He

made no attempt to contact the police or the railroad by telephone before the collision.

After receiving notification on his CB that a freight train was traveling toward the

crossing, he saw the headlight of the approaching train. He then ran north along the track and

attempted to flag the train down, but the train passed him. He then saw the crossing warning

devices activate and witnessed the collision.

The distance between the semitrailer’s kingpin and the first semitrailer axle was about 31

feet. There was 10 inches clearance between a level roadway and the underside of the

semitrailer’s cargo bed.
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CASE NO. 6

Safety Board Investigation Number: LAX-87-F-XO06 / SEA-87-H-TR03

Accident Location: Walnut Street, Winlock, Washington

Date and Time: December 22, 1986, 1:30 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: M&M Transport Company

Chehalis, Washington

Train Involved: Amtrak Train No.11

Railroad Involved: Burlington Northern Railroad Company

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: (BN milepost 71.43)

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Crossing gates, flashing red lights, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 3

Estimated Property Damage: $252,000

Summary:

Amtrak train No. 11 was traveling southbound when the engineer in the lead unit noticed

an eastbound tractor-semitrailer stopped over the double-track main line at the Walnut Street

grade crossing. He made an emergency brake application and sounded the horn before striking

the left side of the tractor at the fifth wheel. The lead locomotive event recorder indicated that the

speed at impact was 51 mph.

The impact derailed the two locomotives and four of the thirteen coaches. The diesel tank

on the second locomotive unit was punctured. The semitrailer was torn in two, spilling its cargo

of wood chips. The tractor and the front portion of the semitrailer were pushed 168 feet down the

track and came to rest upright, blocking the northbound main track. The rear portion of the

semitrailer knocked over the crossing signal southwest of the crossing and came to rest 50 feet

south of the point of impact. Two train passengers and one traincrew member sustained minor

injuries.

The 36-year-old truckdriver had 7 months’ experience driving the unit. The driver stated

he stopped before the crossing, shifted into second gear, and increased engine speed to 1,800 rpm

to get over the humped tracks. He also stated that after becoming lodged on the crossing, he tried

unsuccessfully to move the vehicle for about 2 1/2 minutes until he saw the train approaching. He

did not attempt to contact the police or the railroad before the collision.

Walnut Street (State Route 603) on its western approach to the grade crossing had a

14-percent ascending grade beginning 64 feet west of the most western rail which continued to 5

feet west of the rail where the grade transitioned to a 5-percent ascending grade. The semitrailer

had a ground clearance of 12 inches.
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CASE NO. 7

Safety Board Investigation Numbers: DEN-87-F-X005/SEA-87-H-TR04

Accident Location: East Territorial Road, near Canby,

Oregon

Date and Time: January 15, 1987, 1:00 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Grey’s International of Oregon, Inc.

Train Involved: Amtrak Train No.14

Railroad Involved: Southern Pacific Railroad Company

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: (SP Milepost 748.70)

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Crossing gates, flashing red lights, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 1

Estimated Property Damage: $49,022

Summary:

Amtrak train No. 14 was traveling northbound at 65-70 mph when the engineer noticed

an object ahead over the tracks at the East Territorial Road grade crossing. He made an initial

speed reduction, and then went to emergency braking when he saw a man waving his arms and

running down the tracks toward the train. The engineer estimated that the train’s speed had been

reduced to about 35 mph when the collision occurred.

The collision caused the rear wheels of the second locomotive unit to derail, and the train

pushed the tractor and semitrailer more that 400 feet down the track. The semitrailer’s load of

crane parts was knocked off the semitrailer at impact and dragged along with the vehicle. The

front of the lead locomotive came to rest approximately 595 feet north of the crossing. One of the

207 passengers sustained a minor injury. The truckdriver was not injured.

The 52-year-old truckdriver had 20 years’ experience driving this type vehicle. After the

vehicle had lodged on the track for about 2 minutes, the crossing warning devices activated, and

the driver exited the vehicle and tried to flag the approaching train. The tractor was equipped

with a two-way radio which he could have used to reach the motor carrier’s office, but the driver

did not use it before the collision.

The eastbound approach to the crossing at East Territorial Road had a 5.8-percent

ascending grade for 40 feet, transitioning to a 12.6-percent ascending grade the final 3 feet to the

tracks. Westbound, the roadway has a 3.2-percent descending grade for 42 feet. The semitrailer

had a ground clearance of 7 3/4 inches.
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81

CASE NO. 8

Safety Board Investigation Number: ATL-87-H-TR03

Accident Location: State Road 125, Halifax, North Carolina

Date and Time: November 12, 1987, 1:50 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Daniels Transfer Company, Inc.

Franklin, Pennsylvania

Train Involved: CSXT Freight Train R460

Railroad Involved: Seaboard System Railroad

(Operated by CSX Transportation, Inc.)

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 629659J

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Flashing lights, gates

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 0

Estimated Property Damage: $266,130

Summary:

CSXT freight train R460 was traveling northbound on the Seaboard System Railroad

when the engineer observed an eastbound lowbed semitrailer over the North Carolina S.R. 125

and a person waving his arms and running toward the train. The engineer initiated an emergency

brake application, but the train struck the right side of the hung-up semitrailer. The train had no

speed recording equipment, but the engineer estimated that the speed of the train was about 50

mph at the time of the collision.

The impact caused the lead engine of the train to derail several yards north of the

crossing, and 8 of the 134 freight cars also derailed. The track sustained extensive damage. The

semitrailer and its cargo, a Caterpillar excavator, were thrown to the northeast quadrant of the

crossing. The semitrailer and the excavator were extensively damaged, and the excavator

separated from the semitrailer’s cargo deck.

 The semitrailer had been lodged over the crossing for 5 to 10 minutes before the

collision. During that time, the driver attempted to drive the unit from the crossing, but was

unsuccessful. Another truck had stopped behind the lodged semitrailer, and the two truckdrivers

were discussing the possibility of pulling it off the crossing when they noticed the approaching

train. The truckdriver ran south and attempted to flag the train, but was unsuccessful. He did not

attempt to contact the police or the railroad before the collision.

The truckdriver had 29 years’ over-the-road truckdriving experience, including

considerable experience operating lowbed semitrailers.
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CASE NO. 9

 Safety Board Investigation Number: ATL-88-F-FX007

Accident Location: Lenna Avenue, Seffner, Florida

Date and Time: November 25, 1987, 10:25 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: U. S. Boring and Tunneling, Bartow,

Florida

Train Involved: Amtrak, Train No. 81 (Silver Star)

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 624349X

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Flashing lights, gates, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 17

Estimated Property Damage: $336,349

Summary:

Amtrak train No. 81 was traveling westbound at a reported speed of 70 mph when it

rounded a curve and the engineer and fireman observed a northbound tractor-lowbed semitrailer

transporting a backhoe stopped over the Lenna Avenue grade crossing. The engineer made a

service brake application, then made an emergency brake application when he determined that

the truck was not moving off the crossing. The engineer and the fireman evacuated the cab into

the engine room.

The engineer estimated the train was traveling about 40 to 50 mph when it struck the

semitrailer. The locomotive derailed and overturned onto its right side, and a baggage and

sleeping car derailed. The tractor was damaged and the semitrailer and backhoe were destroyed.

The 28-year-old truckdriver had 7 1/2 years’ experience in operating commercial

vehicles, including tractor-lowbed semitrailer combinations. At the time of the accident he was

traveling over the crossing at the direction of his foreman, who was on the ground north of the

crossing directing the truck’s movements.

The truckdriver stated that as he drove over the crossing he felt a rocking motion and the

tractor’s engine stalled. He restarted the engine, heard the crossing bells activate, and attempted

to back off the crossing, stalling the engine again. He restarted the engine again, locked the

differential, and noted that the tractor’s drive wheels were spinning. He then exited the cab

immediately before the collision.

Postaccident tests indicated the vertical road clearance of a similar unloaded semitrailer

was 9 inches. This dimension decreased to 5.25 inches at maximum rated load of 35 tons.
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CASE NO. 10

Safety Board Investigation Number: WRH-91-F-H001

Accident Location: Leucadia Boulevard, Encinitas,

California

Date and Time: October 3, 1990, 2:44 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/auto transporter semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Time Auto Transport, Troy, Michigan

Train Involved: Amtrak Train No. 576

Railroad Involved: Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe

Railway Company (ATSF)

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 026827V

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Crossing gates, flashing red lights

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 13

Estimated Property Damage: $285,000

Summary:

Amtrak train No. 576 was traveling southbound at 90 mph on the ATSF single-track

main line en route to San Diego from Los Angeles when the engineer saw something across the

track at the Leucadia Boulevard grade crossing. Seconds later, he realized that it was a tractorauto transporter semitrailer and that it was not moving. The engineer sounded the horn, and about

1,000 feet before the crossing he began an emergency brake application. He then exited the cab

of the control car (the locomotive was at the rear of the consist, in the push mode). The train

struck the semitrailer at about 65 mph.

The collision caused the cab control car to derail, but it remained upright. The front

section of the cab control car was damaged substantially, and 13 of the 71 persons aboard the

train were injured. The truck tractor was not damaged, but the auto transporter semitrailer was

severed. The front portion of the semitrailer rotated about 90 degrees and came to rest upright,

and the remainder of the unit came to rest south of the crossing. Five of the eight vehicles on the

semitrailer were torn from it, and two of those were destroyed. Three vehicles remained on the

semitrailer and were not damaged.

The combination unit had been traveling westbound on Leucadia Boulevard when the

bottom of the semitrailer had become lodged at the crossing. The driver attempted to dislodge the

vehicle, but his efforts failed. He and his co-driver exited the vehicle, and they walked to a

convenience store about 200 feet away to call for help. While he was on the phone, the driver

heard the train’s whistle. He left the store and saw the train strike the semitrailer. He estimated

the semitrailer had been lodged over the track for 10 to 13 minutes before the collision.

The 27-year-old driver of the auto carrier failed to heed a sign indicating that no trucks

were allowed which was posted for westbound Leucadia Boulevard vehicles 3/8 mile before the

crossing. He stated he did not see the sign. Alternate approved truck routes existed at crossings
Appendix E

84

north and south of Leucadia Boulevard. Westbound Leucadia Boulevard at the crossing had a

2-percent ascending grade that begins 13 feet 7 inches east of the track centerline. The tracks

were level. Beginning 4 feet 7 inches west of the track centerline, the roadway descended at a

9-percent grade for 4 feet 6 inches, then descended at a 7-percent grade for 32 feet. The

semitrailer manufacturer advised that the as-built clearance of the cargo deck on a level roadway

was about 7 1/2 inches.

The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department first received notice of the vehicle lodged on

the track via a 911 call at 2:41 p.m. The collision occurred 3 minutes later while the sheriff’s

office was looking up a toll-free emergency number previously supplied to the office by the

ATSF and listed in its computerized records. After the accident had occurred, the sheriff’s office

placed two calls, at 2:49 and 2:50 p.m. respectively, to the ASTF toll-free number; however, the

line was busy both times because the toll-free number was also being used for general railroad

business, and it did not have the roll-over capability to handle additional incoming calls. When

the sheriff’s office did establish contact with ATSF, at 2:51 p.m., the ASTF’s Regional

Operations Center at San Bernardino, California, had already been notified of the accident via

radio by the conductor on the train.

After this accident, ASTF changed its telephone system so that incoming calls to the

emergency number would roll over when the line was busy to a red phone located between two

supervisors on duty. No outgoing calls could be made on this red phone. Also after the accident,

the City of Encinitas posted signs reading “Railroad Emergencies Call 911” east and west of the

Leucadia Boulevard crossing.
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CASE NO. 11

Safety Board Investigation Number: NYC-92-F-RO21

Accident Location: Orchard Road, East Patchoque, New

York

Date and Time: May 11, 1992, 6:35 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Pilato Trucking, Massapequa, New York

Train Involved: Long Island Railroad Passenger Train

No.11

Railroad Involved: Long Island Railroad, Montauk Branch

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 3380596 (?)

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Gates, bells, flashing red lights

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 28

Estimated Property Damage: $173,837

Summary:

Long Island Railroad passenger train No. 11 was traveling at 55 to 60 mph westbound on

the Montauk Branch en route to Babylon, New York, when the engineer observed a tractor

semitrailer combination unit loaded with four concrete sewer vaults lodged on the track at the

Orchard Road grade crossing. He sounded the horn several times. When the lead unit was about

600 feet away from the crossing, the engineer noted that the truck was not moving, and he made

an emergency brake application. At about the same time, he saw a man running toward the train

waving his arms. The train was unable to stop before it struck the semitrailer at an estimated

speed of 45 mph.

The lead locomotive derailed as a result of the impact, coming to rest north of the tracks

about 300 feet from the crossing. The locomotive sustained extensive damage, as did the signal

and crossing protection devices. The semitrailer was shoved to the south of the track, and two of

the four concrete units on the semitrailer were shattered. The truck tractor came to rest north of

the crossing 25 feet west of the point of impact. Minor injuries were sustained by 24 passengers

and the train’s crew of 4.

The truckdriver stated he came to a full stop at the track, and then proceeded to cross.

When the combination unit was about halfway across the track, the semitrailer became lodged on

one of the rails. The driver had spent about 4 minutes attempting to move the vehicle when he

noticed the crossing protection being activated by the approaching train. He abandoned the

vehicle and ran towards the train, trying to flag it down. He did not attempt to call the police or

the railroad before the collision.

The southbound approach to the crossing had a 4-percent upgrade, while the north side of

the track has a 0.3-percent downgrade. The semitrailer had a ground clearance of 7 inches.
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CASE NO. 12

Safety Board Investigation Number: SRH-92-F-HO21

Accident Location: Woodland Drive, near Orange Park,

Florida

Date and Time: June 30, 1992, 12:15 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/household goods van semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Suddath Van Lines, Jacksonville, Florida

Train Involved: CSXT Freight Train No. N00129

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 620906T

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Flashing lights, gates

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 0

Estimated Property Damage: $169,000

Summary:

CSXT freight train No. N00129 was proceeding southbound around a 3-degree right

curve when the engineer observed a moving van blocking the track at the Woodland Drive grade

crossing. Sight distance to the crossing from where the engineer could have first observed the van

was about 1,000 feet, and the engineer reported he rounded the curve at about 40 mph. The

engineer reported he made an emergency brake application. The train struck the midsection of the

van semitrailer, tearing it in two. The front of the semitrailer remained coupled to the tractor, and

the rear section came to rest south of the crossing and west of the track. The semitrailer’s cargo

of used household goods was strewn along the track south of the crossing and were mostly

destroyed. The train remained in line and on the track, and the lead unit stopped 1,080 feet south

of the crossing. The three occupants of the tractor semitrailer combination unit and the three

crewmembers onboard the train were not injured.

The moving van had become lodged on the humped crossing at 11:45 a.m., some 30

minutes before the collision. The tractor-semitrailer had an overall length of 59 feet, a distance of

32 feet 3 inches between common suspension points, and a ground clearance of approximately 14

inches. The tractor began descending a 7.3-percent downgrade while the semitrailer was still on a

5.3-percent upgrade., causing the semitrailer to lodge over the tracks.

After the semitrailer hung up, the three occupants, a driver and two passengers, exited the

vehicle and made a brief inspection before beginning efforts to contact the police to obtain

assistance in moving the lodged vehicle from the track.

The Clay County Sheriff’s Office received notification of the lodged vehicle at 11:50

a.m., and dispatched a deputy who arrived on-scene at 11:59 a.m. At 12:00 p.m., the sheriff’s

office notified CSXT central dispatch in Jacksonville, Florida, of the vehicle lodged at the

Woodland Drive crossing.
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87

Meanwhile, the proprietor of a local business, based upon erroneous information received

from a customer, called the Orange Park Police Department (OPPD) and advised there was a

truck lodged on the tracks at Kingsley Avenue, 2.5 miles north of Woodland Drive, within the

City of Orange Park. At 12:02 p.m. the OPPD dispatcher telephoned this information to CSXT in

Jacksonville. The CSXT dispatcher asked the police dispatcher if the call was about the truck

lodged on a crossing. The police dispatcher responded affirmatively, and the CSXT dispatcher

advised “We already know about it.”

An OPPD officer traveled to the Kingsley Avenue crossing. Finding it clear, he checked

and determined that the other four grade crossings in the City of Orange Park were also clear. At

12:08 p.m. the OPPD telephoned CSXT Jacksonville and advised there was no truck hung up at

the “Kingsley Avenue crossing or any other grade crossing in Orange Park.”

After receipt of this telephone call, CSXT issued an “all clear” signal to train N00129.

The collision occurred about 7 minutes later.
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CASE NO. 13

Safety Board Investigation Number: DCA-93-M-HO02

Accident Location: Kissimmee Utility Authority (KUA)

Power Road, Intercession City, Florida

Date and Time: November 30, 1993, 12:40 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed modular unit semitrailer

Motor Carrier: Rountree Transport and Rigging, Inc.,

Train Involved: Amtrak Train No. 88, (Silver Meteor)

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 643879N

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Flashing lights, gates, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 59

Estimated Property Damage: $14,000,000

Summary;

Amtrak train No. 88 was traveling eastbound at an engineer-reported speed of 79 mph

rounding a 1-degree curve to the right when the engineer observed a large object ahead. As the

train approached the KUA Power Road grade crossing and the object came into clear view, the

engineer saw that the object was over the tracks and he made an emergency brake application.

The engineer and the assistant engineer evacuated the locomotive’s control compartment through

the auxiliary engine compartment door.

The object over the tracks ahead was a lowbed semitrailer loaded with a turbine generator

that was being transported to an electric generating plant under construction. The turbine itself

was 57 feet long and 17 feet high, and its 13-axle transport vehicle combination was 184 feet

long. The gross weight of the transport vehicle and its cargo was 291,000 pounds. The vehicle

had been stopped while over the tracks and its three-person crew was raising the cargo deck to

clear the hump in the road about 34 feet north of the tracks.

The locomotive collided with the center of the turbine and the vehicle’s cargo deck at a

speed calculated to be about 54 mph. The locomotive and the first four cars of the eight-car

consist derailed, and the train continued eastward about 344 feet, carrying parts of the transport

vehicle and the turbine with it. The locomotive overturned, came to rest on its left side, and

sustained extensive damage. Three railroad cars were extensively damaged, and the turbine,

transport vehicle, and track and signals east of the crossing were destroyed. The engineer,

assistant engineer, truckdriver, and 56 of the train’s passengers and on-board service

crewmembers were injured.

The north rail on the railroad was superelevated 3 inches above the south rail, and the

tracks were above the surrounding terrain. To cross the tracks at grade, the KUA Power Road

was constructed in the summer of 1993 with an average 3.8-percent ascending grade beginning

about 87 feet south of the south rail. North of the tracks, the roadway continued to ascend for
Appendix E

89

about 34 feet to the high point of the roadway. North of the high point the roadway had an

average 4.4-percent descending grade back to the level of the surrounding terrain.

The hump in the roadway was located more than 30 feet north of the tracks to prevent

most lowbed vehicles from becoming lodged on the hump while part of the vehicle was still over

the tracks. This method of construction is in substantial compliance with guidelines established

by the American Railway Engineering Association (AREA) and the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) which were adopted as construction

standards for public roads by the Federal Highway Administration effective June 1, 1993.

Because of the unusual configuration of the modular transport vehicle, with a span of 83

1/4 feet between axles 7 and 8 and with a normal ground clearance of about 8 inches over that

distance, the cargo deck between axles 7 and 8 could not clear the hump north of the tracks, and

the vehicle had to be stopped with the cargo deck and the turbine over the tracks while the cargo

deck was raised to clear the hump.

While efforts were being made to raise the cargo deck, the supervisor in charge of the

modular transporter made several attempts to telephone the railroad using his cellular phone. He

reported that about 7 minutes before the collision he attempted to contact a CSXT trainmaster,

but the phone was not answered. He then attempted twice to reach the railroad at another number

and received only a pre-recorded message. Neither number was suitable for calling the railroad to

report an emergency, and he was still attempting to telephone the railroad when he heard the

whistle of the approaching train.
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90

CASE NO. 14

Safety Board Investigation Number: SRH-95-MH-026

Accident Location: Boogaloo Road, near Sycamore, South

Carolina

Date and Time: May 2, 1995, 2:35 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: O&J Gordon Trucking, Estill, South

Carolina

Train Involved: Amtrak Train No. 81 (Silver Star)

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 634810U

Train-Activated Warning Devices: None (crossbucks only)

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 33

Estimated Property Damage: $1,000,000

Summary

Amtrak train No. 81 was traveling southbound at an engineer-reported speed of 79 mph

when the engineer, who was riding on the left side of the lead locomotive, reported he first saw a

person on or near the west track waving his arms, and then immediately thereafter saw a

semitrailer over the tracks. He made an immediate emergency brake application and then he fell

to the floor.

The lead locomotive struck the right front of the semitrailer, separating the semitrailer

from the tractor. The assistant engineer, who was operating the train at the time of the accident,

was thrown to the floor of the control cab at impact. The impact rotated the semitrailer

counterclockwise, and the rear of the semitrailer collided with the second truck on the lead

locomotive. The 2 locomotive units and first 14 cars of the 18-car consist then derailed. The

semitrailer came to rest southwest of the crossing with the front facing north. The tractor and

semitrailer were substantially damaged.

The truckdriver reported that, while he had towed the accident semitrailer before this trip,

he had never driven with it over this crossing. He had previously traveled over the accident

crossing towing another lowbed semitrailer with no problems, but the accident semitrailer had

less road clearance than the lowbed he usually towed. After the semitrailer lodged on the

crossing, the driver tried to pull forward and backward, and tried to uncouple the semitrailer, but

was unsuccessful in these efforts. He reported he had been lodged on the crossing for about 35

minutes when he saw the headlight of the approaching train.

The westbound approach to the humped crossing has an average 9.9-percent ascending

grade over the last 30 feet before reaching the east rail, and after crossing the tracks the

westbound roadway has an average descending grade of 3.5-percent over the first 30 feet of

roadway west of the west rail.
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91

CASE NO. 15

Safety Board Investigation Number: SRH-95-F-HO27

Accident Location: Graysville Road, Graysville, Georgia

Date and Time: May 10, 1995, 8:58 p.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: JWT, Inc, Chattanooga, Tennessee

Train Involved: CSXT Freight Train No. R58310

Railroad Involved: CSX Transportation, Inc.

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 340584H

Train-Activated Warning Devices:

Flashing lights, gates, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 1

Estimated Property Damage: $1,000,000

Summary:

CSXT Freight train No. R58310, consisting of four locomotives and 110 cars, was

traveling southbound about 45 mph en route from Chattanooga, Tennessee, to Atlanta, Georgia.

The conductor, seated on the east side of the control cab, stated that as the train came out of a

right-hand curve about 750 feet from the crossing, both he and the engineer saw a semitrailer

across the tracks. At that point, the engineer made an emergency brake application and yelled for

the conductor to hit the floor. After impact, the conductor checked to see if the engineer was hurt

and then attempted to contact the dispatcher via radio, but could not do so because of static on

the radio. Both he and the engineer were covered with fuel from the ruptured fuel tanks of the

locomotive. The conductor sustained minor injuries.

The truckdriver stated he was stuck on the crossing 5 to 10 minutes before the collision.

As soon as he got stuck, his passenger got out of the truck to see where they were hung up.

Within 1 minute of the time the truck became stuck on the crossing, a Catoosa County sheriff’s

deputy arrived on the scene. advised that a train was coming, and urged the driver to expedite

efforts to get the truck off the crossing. The deputy then parked his cruiser behind the truck and

alerted motorists to stay clear of the area. As the deputy was talking on the radio to his

dispatcher, the dispatcher could hear the train horn in the background. A passerby also dialed 911

on his cellular telephone, reaching the Chattanooga Police Department, who also relayed

information about the lodged truck to the Catoosa County dispatcher.

Although the sheriff’s dispatcher reached the railroad before the collision, there was

insufficient time to stop the train. The 60,000 lb. backhoe the truck was transporting was

destroyed.

Eastbound Graysville Road passes over two tracks, the main line track and a passing

track. The roadway is a 3-percent ascending grade to the main line track at the high point of the
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92

crossing, then the roadway begins an average 8-percent descending grade for 30 feet. The passing

track is about 18 inches lower than the main line track.
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93

CASE NO. 16

Safety Board Investigation Number: SRH-96-MH-001

Accident Location: Plains Road, Milford, Connecticut

Date and Time: October 3, 1995, 7:13 a.m.

Motor Vehicle Type: Tractor/lowbed semitrailer

Motor Carrier: J. D. C. Trucking, Inc., Newington,

Connecticut

Train Involved: Metro North Commuter Train No. 1933

Railroad Involved: Metro North Railroad

U.S. DOT/AAR Crossing Number: 503877P

Train-Activated Warning Devices: Red flashing lights, gates, bells

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 24

Estimated Property Damage: $500,000

Summary:

A Metro North Railroad Commuter Train consisting of a control car, a passenger car, and

a locomotive operating in the push mode was traveling southbound on the Metro North

Waterbury Branch at an engineer-reported speed of 59 mph. As the train traveled around a lefthand curve, the Plains Road grade crossing came into sight about 1,800 feet ahead and the

engineer in the control car noticed an eastbound tractor-semitrailer over the crossing.

The engineer initiated a braking action, and seconds later when he determined that the

truck wasn’t moving, initiated an emergency brake application. He then exited the control cab,

warned the passengers in the lead car of the impending collision, and braced himself.

The lead car in the consist struck the lowbed semitrailer and the excavator it was

transporting. The collision separated the tractor from the semitrailer and its cargo, an excavator.

The first truck of the lead car overrode the semitrailer, pushing the excavator off the semitrailer

and east of the tracks. The lead car then carried the semitrailer with it as it traveled south of the

crossing where it came to rest with its lead truck derailed.

The gross weight of the highway vehicle and its cargo was 110,000 pounds. The

excavator was being transported from Newington, Connecticut, to a job site in Milford,

Connecticut. Although the motor carrier had obtained a special permit from Connecticut, the

truck was traveling on an unauthorized route when it became lodged on the hump crossing.

The eastbound approach to the crossing had an average 9.1-percent ascending grade

beginning 28 feet from the west rail, and the eastbound departure had an average 3.7-percent

descending grade from the east rail.

The 30-year-old truckdriver reported that after becoming lodged on the crossing he

attempted to raise the semitrailer frame by operating the hydraulic ram on the gooseneck, but was
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94

unsuccessful in this attempt in the 3 to 4 minutes between his becoming lodged on the crossing

and the approach of the train. Neither the driver nor any other passersby or witnesses attempted

to contact the police or the railroad during this time, although the crossing was posted with signs

advising the public as follows:

TO REPORT MALFUNCTION

OF SIGNALS

CALL 911

CROSSING

I.D.#503877P

PLAINS RD
95

APPENDIX F

U.S. Department of Transportation Related Items

on Emergency Notification Systems

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA): In October 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the

High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994 ( the Swift Rail Development Act). Title III, Section

301 of the Swift Rail Development Act included a provision for a pilot automated emergency

notification system.1 Section 301 provides that the Secretary of Transportation shall conduct a

pilot program to demonstrate an emergency notification system utilizing a toll free telephone

number that the public can use to convey to railroad carriers, either directly or through public

safety personnel, information about malfunctions or other safety problems at railroad-highway

grade crossings.

Congress set as a minimum that the program should:

include railroad-highway grade crossings in at least two states;

include provisions for public education and awareness of program; and

require information to be posted at the railroad-highway grade crossing describing the

emergency notification system and instructions on how to use the system.

No appropriations were authorized to pay for this demonstration.

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT): In 1994, the DOT released an action plan that

addresses improving highway/rail crossing safety. One area of this plan called for improved

research and data. Under this broad area, the DOT included a proposal for a 1-800 Computer

Answering System stating “...an automated telephone answering and message forwarding system

will be developed for handling calls concerning malfunctions or problems at highway/rail grade

crossings.”

The plan goes further in proposing that the FRA will hold an informal safety inquiry to

consider requiring the display of the U.S. DOT/AAR Inventory number and a toll free phone

number at all crossings to facilitate emergency notification.2

Currently, the FRA project manager is attempting to secure funding and identify two

States willing to undertake the demonstration program stipulated in the Swift Rail Development

Act and the DOT Action Plan. The estimated start-up costs for this fully automated 1-800

Automated Crossing Trouble Report System are estimated at $750,000. To date, funds have not

been secured, and only one State, Minnesota, has indicated a willingness to install a statewide

system if funding becomes available.

 1

Public Law 103-440 enacted November 2, 1994, 108 STAT.4626, 103rd Congress.

2

See Conceptual Design and Implementation Plan for an Automated 1-800 Crossing Trouble Report System,

prepared by AMB Associates, Inc., under contract DTFR53-92-C-00047, Modification #13, dated May 19, 1995.
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96

Actual implementation of the FRA system will entail entering the DOT/AAR inventory

and integrating contact data consisting of railroad and public safety telephone numbers.

Currently, this system’s proposal includes an interactive voice response feature that will handle

automated telephone answering functions and unattended interactions with callers, capture and

process information provided by callers, and generate and fax “trouble reports” to railroads

and/or public safety officials. It also is proposed that a supplemental system allowing callers to

interact with a live attendant be made available, particularly for an immediate emergency.

A major component of this system will be signs posted at grade crossings. The FRA plans

to have signs posted at all public grade crossings (active and passive) and at private grade

crossings with active warning devices. These signs will prominently display a 1-800 toll-free

telephone number that individuals can use to call and report signal malfunctions or other crossing

problems. The grade crossings will be identified by the DOT/AAR inventory number.

The FRA anticipates that this pilot project will lead to a fully operational national system

with States being gradually included into the system at their option. This recognizes that some

States, such as Texas, Delaware, and Connecticut, may have their own systems and may not wish

to join the national network.

In a separate action, the FRA has requested that the FHWA amend Part VIII of the

Manual of Uniform Control Devices standards for the design and placement of a DOT/AAR

inventory plate. FRA’s proposal specifies the sign size, the material to be used, and the location

of the plate at the crossing.3

An upcoming Safety Board study on passive grade crossings will address these issues

from a global perspective. In 1996, the Board will conduct a safety study on passive grade

crossings. Staff will investigate about 60 accidents at grade crossings that are not equipped with

train-activated warning devices. The study will document the current state of safety at passive

grade crossings and explore ways in which collisions between highway vehicles and trains can be

prevented at these crossings. The study will document ways to reduce the number of accidents

through regulatory initiatives, educational programs, new technology, and low-cost physical

improvements to the crossing.

 3

See DOT, FHWA, 23 CFR Part 655, [FHWA Docket No. 95-8], National Standards for Traffic Control

Devices; Revision of the Manual on Traffic Control Devices, Notice of Proposed Amendments, 60 FR 31035-31036

dated June 12, 1995.