PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS 

INSTITUTE

AND

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISOR:

DEALING WITH SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS 

IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Michael J. Metrinko

August 2008

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in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the 

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*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

*****

The author is grateful to all his military and civilian colleagues 

who offered comment and advice on this effort. They have served 

as diplomats, soldiers, and advisors in critical times and in a wide 

variety of conflict zones, and the impact of their role is seldom fully 

appreciated. His thanks goes especially to Ambassador (Ret.) Ron 

Neumann, Ambassador (Ret.) Marisa Lino, Ambassador (Ret.) 

John Limbert, Ambassador Mike Malinowski, Professor Richard 

Smyth, Professor Clementine Fujimura, Professor Hekmat Sadat, 

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Drabik, Colonel Michael G. Clark, 

Colonel Mike Moon, Colonel Tom Pope, Ms. Susan Merrill, and 

Mr. Bruce Boevers.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available 

on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies 

of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s 

homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

PKSOI’s website address is https://pksoi.army.mil

*****
iii

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ISBN 1-58487-361-2

v

CONTENTS

Foreword ......................................................................vii

Biographical Sketch of the Author..............................ix

Summary .......................................................................xi

I. Introduction ...........................................................1

II. What Is an Advisor? .............................................6

 Definition ............................................................6

 Differences in Perception..................................8

 Differences in Time Frame .............................11

 The Local Calendar Takes Precedence..........14

III. Selection and Qualifications of the Advisor....17

 Assigning the Right Person or the 

 Right Team .......................................................17

 Rank, Gender, and Age ..................................19

IV. The Advisor’s Tools for Success .......................22

 Professional, Academic, 

 and Life Experience .........................................22

 The Advisor’s Personality ..............................26

 Personal Flexibility ..........................................27

 Knowing the Local Culture ............................28

 Knowing American Culture 

 and History .......................................................34

 Knowing the Terrain .......................................35

 The Hypocrisy Factor ......................................37

V. The Language Problem ......................................40

 Use of Interpreters ...........................................41

 Using “Basic” English .....................................45

 Using a Third Language .................................47

 Understanding What Is Heard and What 

 Is Said.................................................................48

 Non-verbal Communication ..........................51
vi

VI. The Office as Battle Space .................................52

 The First Who in Who’s Who ........................52

 Foreign Officials’ Sources of Income ............55

 Local Perception of Government Service......57

 The Trap of Personally Identifying with 

Foreign Officials ..............................................59

VII. Other Players on the Field .................................63

 The U.S. Government Writ Large .................63

 The Country Team ..........................................65

 Other International Players ...........................66

 The Domestic Constituency ...........................67

 The Media ........................................................67

VIII. Military Assistance Available 

to the Advisor .....................................................70

 Essential Services ............................................70

 Personal Risk: A Cost-Benefit Analysis .......74

IX. Preparation and Coordination— 

Approaching the Job...........................................76

The Preparation Checklist .................................76

X. Departing the Country .......................................81

Endnotes ..............................................................83
vii

FOREWORD

This publication is the first in a new series, entitled 

PKSOI Papers, being published by the Strategic 

Studies Institute and the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute. This paper will 

be followed on a periodic basis with publications 

focused on peacekeeping and stability operations. 

Future papers will include scholarly articles on issues 

of interest to civilian and military practitioners from 

the international community, U.S. Government, and 

nongovernmental organizations. Our intent is to 

maintain the focus at the strategic and interagency 

level in an effort to inform individuals responsible for 

establishing policy as well as senior level practitioners 

of stability operations.

This introductory paper concerns the role of the 

American military advisor. Military officers have 

frequently been called upon to serve as advisors 

to foreign officials and to play seminal roles in the 

political and development realms overseas. Lawrence 

of Arabia’s work with Arabs attempting to build a 

nation-state during World War I and the role of military 

advisors in post-World War II Japan and Germany 

are well-known examples of the impact that officers 

can have on political evolution and strategic success 

in areas of conflict. In today’s Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the role of the military advisor has expanded greatly, 

and the relationships established by American officers 

at the strategic level with local Governors, Cabinet 

Members and other civilian policymakers are easily 

as important as any strictly military officer to military 

officer role. The advisory function traditionally has 

not been part of military preparation and training, yet 

the consequences of failure or success on the part of 
viii

American military advisors are far-reaching for the 

United States.

Based on the experience of diplomats and military 

officers who have served in many zones of conflict, 

and whose duties meant daily interaction with senior 

foreign officials, this guide describes the preparations 

that an advisor should make, illustrates the questions 

he should ask, and explains the political and cultural 

complexities that affect his mission. Although most 

of the examples are drawn from Islamic countries, the 

precepts and advice apply broadly.

JOHN A. KARDOS

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
ix

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MICHAEL J. METRINKO is a retired Foreign Service 

Officer with extensive experience in the Islamic world, 

a region with which he has been dealing for almost 40 

years. He was a Peace Corps volunteer for 5 years in 

Turkey and Iran, and State Department assignments 

took him back to Turkey and Iran, as well as Poland, 

Syria, Yemen and Israel for another 14 years. Mr. 

Metrinko was a member of the Tehran Embassy 

staff taken hostage in 1979 and spent 14 months as a 

prisoner in Iran. His assignments in Washington DC, 

included 2 years as Deputy Director of the Iran-Iraq 

Desk and 3 years as an Office Director in the Bureau 

of Population, Refugees, and Migration, where he 

had oversight responsibility for refugee programs in 

Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. Mr. Metrinko 

returned to active government service after the events 

of September 11, 2001, with assignments to Yemen, 

Iraq, and 4 years in Afghanistan at U.S. and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRTs) and at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. His 

last posting was as the Advisor on Parliamentary 

Affairs for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, where he 

spent more than 1 1/2 years dealing directly with the 

new Afghan National Assembly. Mr. Metrinko now 

serves as Ministry Reform Advisor at the U.S. Army 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, based 

at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

xi

SUMMARY

The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior 

Foreign Officials in the Islamic World is a comprehensive 

guide for American military officers assigned as 

advisors to regional officials in places very different 

from the United States. Starting with a definition of 

terms and a brief description of the advisory role, it 

brings the reader into today’s Islamic political and 

social context, pointing out the complexities inherent 

in the advisory position, as well as the tools an advisor 

must use in order to perform successfully. The precepts 

and examples in the text are based on the personal 

experiences of a number of diplomats and military 

officers who have seen extensive service in the Islamic 

world and in many conflict zones. The text is not a 

simple list of do’s and don’ts, but rather it explains 

the type of questions that an advisor should ask, the 

preparations he should make, and the characteristics 

he should display in order to complete his advisory 

mission successfully. 

The advisory role is at best loosely defined in 

military career terms, and realities on the ground 

further complicate the advisory mission. These include 

differences in American and foreign perception of the 

advisory position, differences in the way Americans 

and host country officials view time lines, the impact 

of the local calendar on the advisor’s work, and the 

importance of cultural adaptation and intellectual 

openness. In the end, establishing personal rapport 

with a host country official is the basis for success as an 

advisor, and the qualities in an advisor’s personality 

that allow for such a relationship are difficult to 

quantify.
xii

Assigning advisors poses a challenge to the military 

personnel system because of age, gender, and cultural 

values in the Islamic world, and the characteristics 

that help make an advisor successful—his personality, 

openness to new cultures, and flexibility in dealing in 

uncharted areas—are not normally considered by the 

military selection process. A good advisor’s skill set 

includes language ability, cross-cultural adaptation 

and knowledge, and a solid foundation in American 

history and politics, as well as expertise in his particular 

military field. Normally an advisor will be partnered 

with an interpreter, and understanding this relationship 

is vital, just as studying and understanding the new 

terrain to which the advisor is assigned and the foreign 

officials with whom he will be working. How the host 

country views the United States and how its citizens 

regard their own officials affect the advisor’s role. 

The advisor is never alone in his new environment, 

and a variety of other players, from the American 

Embassy, international organizations, the media, 

nongovernment agencies, and the local populace 

affect the advisory mission as well. Understanding 

the roles played by this variety of actors is essential 

to the advisor, since they can provide support and 

cooperation as well as hinder his mission. 

Although difficult to define and open to change as 

time at the job passes, the advisor’s role is nonetheless 

essential in today’s American political and military 

environment. The advisor is placed squarely in the host 

country’s decisionmaking process, and his skill and 

ability impact directly on overall American interests in 

the Islamic world.
1

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISOR:

DEALING WITH SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 

Another reality the uniformed forces must accept culturally is that, like it or not, until further notice the U.S. government has decided that the military largely owns the 

job of nation-building. Although the Nation, its political 

leadership, and its military have routinely dismissed this 

mission since the end of the Cold War, we have repeatedly decided to commit our national power to it. Today 

the U.S. military is the only national organization able to 

conduct some of the most critical tasks associated with 

re-building war-torn or failed nations.

 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli

 Military Review, September-October 2007

I. INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and 

subsequent U.S. military and political operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq have changed American militarycivil relations throughout the region, generating 

relationships between American military officers 

and senior foreign officials in ways never envisioned 

in traditional training manuals. American military 

officers now serve as advisors to senior foreign officials 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other countries. 

There is little in military doctrine that addresses such 

relationships, or in regular training that equips officers 

to serve as advisors to foreign Cabinet Ministers, 

Governors and, at times, even Heads of State. The 

problem is compounded by profound differences in 

background, culture, and mindset between American 

officers and foreign officials.
2

The role of advisor is a complex one, and not easy 

to categorize. Even the terminology commonly used 

to describe the function is not perfect. For example, 

although often used in discussion, the word “mentor” 

is not a good choice to describe an American officer’s 

advisory role vis-à-vis a senior foreign official, since 

mentoring implies a relationship between a superior 

and someone younger, or inferior in status and rank. 

In the world of strategic partnerships, and in a setting 

where expertise, experience, social status, political rank, 

and financial resources can be more heavily weighted 

on the foreign official’s side, “mentor” is a misnomer. 

Even the word “advisor” can be misleading, but there 

is, however, no perfect word to use. The function goes 

far beyond merely advising a foreign official on military 

tactics or logistics, often spilling into the political sphere 

and blurring the lines between the officer’s core duties 

and the responsibilities of State Department, U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

other civilian officials. It touches the realm of nationbuilding, affecting the relationship that the foreign 

official has with the American government, and the 

relationship between his country and the United States. 

The advisory role can bring the American officer into 

political realms that traditionally are distant from his 

reach, and be more of a learning experience for the 

American than it is for the senior local official. As such, 

it has value in itself. 

Advising foreign officials in a conflict or postconflict situation is not a new phenomenon for 

military officers, and the classic example of “Lawrence 

of Arabia” comes immediately to mind. American 

military officers have had such responsibilities in postWorld War II in Europe and Japan, and more recently 

in Korea, Vietnam, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
3

and Iraq, but in general, their responsibilities have 

been at the tactical level. There have been American 

advisors at the highest levels, particularly in Germany 

and Japan, when high-level restructuring of those 

governments was done by American military officers, 

but unfortunately this competency within the military 

structure has diminished or not been formalized and 

passed to succeeding generations. Yet mid- and seniorlevel officers have a productive and often vital role to 

play as advisors in a wide variety of areas.

 In the post-9/11 world, an advisory position at 

the political and strategic level in the Islamic world 

can have great and immediate consequence for U.S. 

interests, and can make the American advisor a prime 

figure in the decisionmaking process of foreign leaders. 

The advisor is as likely to be dealing with a civilian 

counterpart as he is with a foreign military officer, and 

the range of duties will go far beyond mere military 

tasks. The position has become a critical one in today’s 

world, where stability, peacekeeping, and obtaining 

civil support are considered equally important to 

kinetic offensive and defensive operations, and where 

“nation-building” has become a de facto and integral 

part of the military mission. 

The guidance herein is based predominantly on 

experience in the Islamic world of the Middle East 

and Afghanistan, in areas that are generally (but 

not completely) Muslim, conservative, and very 

traditional. These are also countries in flux, with 

rapidly changing political and military realities that 

pose a challenge to local mores and tradition, and affect 

the way that America is viewed by the populace. All 

of the countries cited are strategically important to the 

United States, and even routine events and decisions 

in these places can directly affect America’s security 
4

and political interests. Media portrayal of events in 

these countries can resonate throughout a large part of 

the Islamic world, and the American military advisor’s 

role can be pivotal in determining policy and affecting 

the country’s development. While most examples 

cited in this handbook are based on service in the 

Islamic word, many of the principles and lessons have 

universal application.

Even within the Islamic world, great disparities 

exist in socio-economic conditions, traditions, and 

behavior. Some countries are wealthy, with national 

income guaranteed by natural resources and business 

development, and some are so poor that their very survival as political entities can be at risk. Sunni Muslims 

differ from Shi’ite Muslims, and each of these major 

groups has internal ethnic and religious components 

that differ from one another as well. Life in Turkey 

is quite different from Yemen, and Algeria is not the 

same as Indonesia. The sophisticated Shi’ite Persian 

socialite in Tehran may have nothing in common with 

a Sunni tribesman from the Maghreb, and a young 

Pashtun Afghan member of the Wahabbi-influenced 

Taliban lives in a very different spiritual world than a 

moderate Sunni Turkish businessman from Istanbul. A 

wealthy Arab Muslim entrepreneur from Dubai with 

a household staff of Indian or Filipino servants lives 

very differently than a Bedouin nomad. 

This diverse world is often further complicated by 

the presence of large Christian and other non-Muslim 

religious communities which claim long histories and 

economic and social prominence, by large western 

expatriate communities, and by a wide variety of 

domestic tribal and ethnic groups whose traditions 

color their customs and their behavior. This presence 

and role of sub-cultures and diverse ethnic, cultural, 
5

and regional groups are not unique to the Islamic 

world, but can be found in almost every society and 

country. 

Although Muslim countries and cultures differ from 

one another, and methods of approach will change 

depending on locale, there are certain generalities that 

define the relationship of an advisor to foreign officials 

in this world:

1. The advisor can assist and consult, but he cannot 

command. It is, after all, not his house and not his own 

country. He is a counselor, not a colonial administrator.

2. The advisor should have expertise, but he does not 

have the last word. Policy direction and limits are set by his 

commander and by the American Ambassador, and policy 

will shift to conform to political shifts within the United 

States, the local population, and among local elected officials. 

Final decisionmaking is in the foreign official’s hands.

3. The advisor must cooperate with other players, both 

foreign and American. Working alone does not mean being 

alone. The other players can enhance—or dilute—the officer’s 

influence. 

4. The advisor must be a true American, but not an 

Ugly American. Whatever his own religious and political 

convictions, the advisor must show respect for local culture 

and tradition to be successful. He is not a judge.

5. The advisor should not be a hypocrite. If he is not 

prepared to live by his own advice, he should not expect 

others to follow it.

6. The advisor should be humble. He should always 

remember that his audience may not have his resources, 

his background of living in a peaceful, orderly society, or 

his confidence in a good future and a guaranteed pension 

following retirement. 

7. And finally, the advisor must be helpful, but also 

credible. He should never promise what he cannot deliver. 
6

II. WHAT IS AN ADVISOR?

The academic definition of the term “advisor” 

changes in practice because of historic and regional 

differences, and the advisor’s role and responsibilities 

are ultimately determined on the ground. The 

American and his counterpart bring their own cultural 

differences and life experiences to bear on their roles. 

Definition.

The dictionary definition of “advisor” is succinct: 

An “advisor” is a “person who offers advice, especially 

in an official or professional capacity.” And “advice” 

is “opinion from one not immediately concerned as to 

what could, or should be done about a problem.” In the 

present political and military world, however, the role 

of advisor is a complicated, sophisticated, and sensitive 

one, usually involving dangerous environments and 

the potential for great success or even greater loss.

In today’s reality, the American advisor serves an 

essential role. A U.S. military advisor for a senior foreign 

official is part of an American military structure with 

a defined chain of command and clearly delineated 

responsibilities. His assignment will change with 

circumstance, but is usually to advise the official on 

military and other matters, to act as liaison between 

the U.S. military hierarchy and the senior official, 

and to effect action by the official which will be in the 

interests of the United States. How he does his task will 

depend on his personality and that of the senior official 

whom he is advising, on conditions in the country, 

and on American domestic political considerations. 

The U.S. presence in the host country, the resources 
7

the United States brings to meet the country’s needs, 

and the security and political relationship the United 

States offers may be vital to the country’s survival and 

prosperity.

The advisor interprets the American viewpoint to 

the official and helps him avoid misunderstandings 

that can affect both countries. He can reach back to 

the U.S. government on the official’s behalf to harness 

and help direct resources—in training, material, and 

financial terms—that will have great impact on the 

country’s stability and prosperity. It is only when 

he learns to trust his American advisor that a foreign 

official, in quiet, private conversations, may ask the 

American to explain the personalities or the real status 

of the American political figures the official must deal 

with, or ask advice on the best way to approach the 

U.S. government bureaucracy on official matters. By 

being sensitive to the official’s concerns, and by giving 

credible and honest advice when both can speak in 

full confidence, the advisor directly affects the two 

countries’ relations.

The foreign official is also in a chain of command, 

and it is possible that U.S. political and military 

priorities differ from those of the official’s service, 

agency, or country. The official may also have 

advisors and consultants from other countries and 

other organizations, and his actions may be affected 

by a range of factors that far outweigh the American’s 

advice.

The advisor’s success depends both on himself as 

well as external factors over which he has no control. 

As Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic notes in his article 

“The Advisory Challenge,” 
8

the amount of influence an advisor attains will be 

directly proportional to the sum of three factors: the 

rapport between the advisor and the host-nation 

commander or counterpart; the credibility of the 

individual advisor; and the perception by host-nation 

forces of the continued value of the relationship.1

Ultimately, the core skills necessary for a successful 

advisory role are the same from the tactical to the strategic level, involving the combination of personality, 

credibility, and perception of value. These factors hold 

true for the junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 

and junior company grade officers assigned to provide 

training to the lowest level of foreign army recruits, as 

well as to the general who is sitting in a meeting with a 

foreign head of state.

Differences in Perception.

The concept of the advisor’s role may be very 

different in foreign versus U.S. military eyes, and the 

advisor should understand that he may not always 

be welcome. A senior foreign official may not see 

any need for an American advisor, no matter what 

agreements have been made between his president 

and the American military commander or ambassador. 

The result may be the isolation of the advisor, simply 

sending him off to a remote desk with no access to the 

official’s person or activities. The advisor must remember that the perception of American influence is a twoedged sword. If the foreign official is personally sensitive to his country’s weakened status or to the 

implication that the U.S. advisor is a “watchdog” or 

a “spy” with authority over the official’s activities, he 
9

will resent the American’s presence, and others in the 

office will be certain to feed the official’s paranoia by 

slanted reports of what the American is doing and who 

he is seeing.

The advisor must be sensitive to the burden of 

historic precedence. In Afghanistan, for example, 

anyone serving as a military advisor today might 

remind Afghans of the onerous presence and heavy 

hands of Soviet military advisors in the 1980s, when the 

country was occupied by force by the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR). While the North American 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and American presence 

in Afghanistan today is a far cry from the Soviet 

occupation, a significant percent of the population, 

including senior members of the government and 

power structure, object to any foreign military presence. 

For this reason, an official who utilizes a foreign 

advisor may be regarded by some of his countrymen 

as a collaborator with a foreign occupying force. 

*****

Local reaction to the presence and activities of American 

soldiers can range from welcoming to the intense and hostile, 

even from ostensibly “friendly” counterpart officials. In the 

summer of 2002, an Afghan who was driving two American 

officers in Kabul tried to evade a police checkpoint at the 

officers’ instruction. Forced to a stop by the local police, he 

was pulled out of the vehicle. When he explained that he was 

driving American officials, the police called him a “pimp for 

the Americans,” slapped him, then finally let him reenter the 

car.

*****
10

In the past few several years, many Afghan and Iraqi 

civilians have been threatened or even murdered by 

insurgents, with the reasons cited being their cooperation 

with the United States. Collaboration and even simple 

employment are often viewed as treason.

*****

The American advisor must take care not to let 

himself be regarded as just another person who has 

come to pass out gifts in order to curry favor. He must 

not be regarded as simply a source of material assistance, 

supplies, high tech presents, and trips abroad under the 

rubric of training. In resource-strapped Afghanistan, 

for example, local and even senior officials became 

accustomed to requesting telephones, office furniture, 

office supplies, security accessories and equipment 

of all sorts, vehicles, and a wide variety of other 

items from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

commanders, American officials, and other foreign 

visitors and donors. On many occasions, the Afghans 

would request the same items from multiple sources. 

The advisor must look at himself through local eyes 

and the local culture. If the American officer’s “can do” 

attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem illmannered and abrasive to the official and his staff, 

who often operate at a different tempo than that in 

U.S. military circles. If he appears to be too young and 

lacking in authority, the American may be regarded 

simply as a decorative foreign staff aide who tags along 

to add luster of the official’s entourage.

*****

Age is important in many parts of the traditional Islamic 

world. For example, the term “white beard” is commonly 
11

used in Afghanistan as a term of respect, implying that 

only someone who has grown old has experience and 

expertise. Tribal and village elders are the source of advice 

and authority, not the younger generation, and young men 

attending a major meeting or assembly are expected to sit 

silently and listen to the older generation.

*****

The American advisor and the senior foreign 

official will come to their own understanding of an 

appropriate scope of responsibility and access. The 

initial arrangement will probably change over time. 

There are no fixed parameters, and personalities and 

local reality will be the deciding factors in determining 

what the advisor is supposed to do and how he will do 

it. 

Differences in Time Frame: 

When “Tomorrow” Really Means “Never.”

The senior foreign official and the American advisor 

may have very different concepts of the time necessary 

to complete an action. Some cultures do not place value 

on undue haste, and the smart advisor soon learns that 

“bukra” or “fardo” (“tomorrow” in Arabic and Farsi) 

or “inshallah” (“God willing” in Farsi/Dari/Turkish 

and Arabic) often mean that action has been relegated 

to some other time and place, but probably not any 

time soon or any place near.

Ignoring the local cultural concepts of timeliness 

will simply lead to frustration and ultimate failure 

for the advisor, and cause hidden discomfort and 

annoyance in his local counterpart in response to his 

frustration. In the Islamic world, religious holidays 
12

and daily prayer times will take precedence over 

scheduled meetings, and decisions may be made in 

loose gatherings with endless cups of tea rather than at 

official conference tables. A meeting may break, even 

at a critical moment, so that participants can pray as a 

group. Much of this world falls more into the “Haste 

Makes Waste” category rather than “The Early Bird 

Catches the Worm,” with many meetings, programs, 

and social events only drifting towards a start when 

the senior official arrives.

*****

Everything takes time. A newly assigned advisor to 

an Afghan Cabinet Minister was at first unable to achieve 

his Commanding General’s directive to be present in every 

meeting, obtain unlimited access to the Minister, and be able 

to get the Minister’s schedule changed at a moment’s notice. 

At first, the advisor was often relegated to a waiting room 

and only had limited entrée to the Minister’s office. Within a 

few months, the advisor had gained the Minister’s confidence 

to the point where he could sit in on all his meetings and 

could obtain immediate appointments for American VIP 

visitors. The advisor’s impact on the Minister was publicly 

demonstrated when the foreign official asked the advisor to 

extend his tour, and the advisor was also accorded a medal 

through the Minister’s efforts. 

*****

An American officer assigned as an advisor normally knows how long his tour of duty will be. From 

the day that he arrives in-country, he hears a clock 

ticking off the days left in his assignment, and he may 
13

feel a subconscious compulsion to complete a check 

list of “things to do” in order to satisfy performance 

goals. His starting point for action is the date of his 

arrival at post. The U.S. government’s fiscal year, his 

own evaluation report and upcoming meetings, official 

visits, American holidays, and the normal needs of 

his family in the United States can all be markers that 

affect his timing. Looking at his new environment, 

the advisor may feel that action is vital and should be 

immediate.

The foreign official, on the other hand, has a 

different view of time and a different perspective. His 

focus is indefinite, and he will not be rated on one year’s 

performance. He has been a player in the long process 

that brought local conditions to their present state and 

assumes that he will be in power for a long time to 

come, so he generally will not share the American’s 

sense of urgency. He probably does not share the 

Puritan work ethic either, and will see little reason to 

change his habits or his work environment in order 

to fit a foreigner’s conception of what is appropriate. 

And the official has probably seen a large number of 

foreign advisors come and go, their names long since 

forgotten, and their presence leaving only minor or no 

impact on local conditions. 

By the same token, the foreign official’s tenure is 

ultimately uncertain. Because he owes his position to 

local politics in what is probably a volatile environment, 

he can be reassigned, disgraced, promoted on a whim, 

or assassinated. In Afghanistan or Iraq, any senior 

official will have had many friends and colleagues 

who were victims of political violence because of their 

leadership positions, and he himself may have been 

the target of assassination attempts or have sought to 

remove others that way in his rise to power. Despite 
14

all this, the official may possess a sense of personal 

surrender to such events or an acceptance of his danger 

that the advisor will find disconcerting. In the Islamic 

world, bowing to fate runs deeply throughout society. 

Risk aversion may be seen as cowardice and lack of 

honor by many local leaders.

The Local Calendar Takes Precedence.

The advisor should know the local calendar 

and understand the ramifications of holidays, local 

weekends, etc. These can change from country to 

country and even from region to region. For example, 

in Afghanistan and Iran, No Ruz, which falls during 

the third week of March, is widely celebrated as a 

happy, family-oriented holiday. Children are often 

given gifts, picnics are held outside, and many people 

pay congratulatory calls on their relatives, colleagues, 

and superiors. This can be a several-day period, and 

the savvy advisor will not try to arrange meetings for 

American delegations or expect his local colleagues to 

give up their family time. It would be akin to asking 

an American official to give up his Christmas. 

In Shi’ite areas, the period commemorating Ashura, 

the day that the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson 

Husayn was martyred at the Battle of Kerbala, can 

be especially sensitive. Shi’ite schools and mosques 

organize religious ceremonies that come out onto public 

streets, and may involve crowds of many thousands 

of men who are in a heightened state of religious 

emotion. If the local Shi’ite and Sunni communities 

do not have good relations, this can end up in violence 

and property destruction. It is not a time for foreign 

advisors to wander the local streets, arrange for 

visiting American delegations, or assume “business as 
15

usual.” Even in the most peaceful areas, the focus is on 

religious martyrdom, with an increase of tension in the 

streets.

The period of Ramadan is especially difficult in all 

Muslim countries because many people fast, refraining 

from all food and drink, even water, during daylight 

hours. If Ramadan falls within the summer months in 

a hot climate, this can be debilitating for people who 

get no sustenance from dawn until dusk. It affects 

the entire society, from the traffic policeman to the 

young soldier to the Head of State. The fast is broken 

at the beginning of the evening, and many observers 

will wake up in the pre-dawn hours for a light meal. 

This means that the advisor’s Muslim colleagues and 

visitors will be unusually tired from lack of sleep, that 

driving (especially as the evening hours approach and 

many people rush home to break their fast) can be 

erratic and dangerous, and that decisionmaking can be 

affected by frayed tempers and simple thirst, hunger, 

and exhaustion. Colleagues may arrive late to work, or 

depart very early.

Ramadan is also a time when social life becomes 

very active, with large numbers of banquets and 

gatherings held to celebrate the evening breaking 

of the fast. The advisor must take this into account, 

because during Ramadan (the dates change according 

to the lunar calendar) it will not be “business as usual.” 

The incessant series of evening social events adds to 

the general exhaustion. The non-Muslim advisor is 

not expected to observe the fast personally, but should 

refrain, out of respect and consideration for his Muslim 

colleagues, from smoking, eating, or drinking in public 

or in front of his colleagues during daylight hours.

Just as other countries have their own holidays, 

do not expect foreign officials to take the American 
16

calendar into account. The Saturday/Sunday weekend, 

the anniversary of 9/11, Thanksgiving, Christmas 

and New Year’s Eve may have no meaning at all to 

them, and the advisor should not take it personally 

when major American observances pass without any 

mention at all.

The bottom line is to know the local calendar well 

in advance, and refuse official American requests for 

meetings and visits that affect important observances. 

The local officials will be frustrated at not being able to 

properly host foreign delegations, and while they may 

put up a good front, everyone from the servant staff to 

the senior official will be annoyed, ill at ease, hungry, 

thirsty, tired, tense or just want to be home with their 

families. This will seriously damage the advisor’s 

plans for a successful meeting or visit.
17

III. SELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS 

OF THE ADVISOR

Proper selection of an advisor is complex, because 

the required skills and knowledge are intangible, and 

not those of the normal soldier. Knowledge of the 

human terrain, and the abilities to work independently 

in a foreign environment and to negotiate are vital 

traits. An advisor’s personality and qualifications will 

be scrutinized and judged by his foreign counterparts 

who use different criteria than the U.S. military personnel system. 

Not only is the military situation strange, but the human 

milieu—the psychological and social context in which he 

works—is also foreign and makes unexpected demands 

on the knowledge, patience, and practical wisdom of the 

advisor. His counterpart and co-workers speak a different language and have different customs and preferences—external differences which can be easily observed 

and described. Their very obviousness, however, often 

obscures more subtle differences in patterns of thought 

and modes of action, and in concepts about the world 

and experience, which affect the interaction of the advisor and his counterpart.2

Assigning the Right Person or the Right Team.

Selecting the right individual to become an advisor 

is not a simple paperwork assignment process, and 

involves far more than his having rank and military 

knowledge. In the bureaucratic world, how-ever, 

such selection criteria may not be addressed or 

even understood, and advisors are often chosen 

for the wrong reasons. In addition, it may be more 

appropriate to assign an advisory team rather than a 

single individual, especially if the foreign official heads 
18

an agency or ministry whose work has a significant 

impact on the country’s security or economy. Additionally, a position which is not advertised or regarded as an advisory slot may turn into just that if the 

American officer’s personality is appropriate, or as 

work conditions evolve. At senior levels, position 

descriptions are never static, and a good advisor must 

be flexible as changes in his assignment occur.

Not every American officer is suited to be a 

good advisor for a foreign official. More than any 

other position in the military structure, the role 

implies a relationship between two individuals, 

and that relationship depends more on personality, 

psychology, and intangible factors than it does on an 

officer’s personnel record or his technical expertise. 

While cultural and political knowledge can be gained 

through study and observation, the advisor must have 

the personality, patience, savvy, background, and 

interests which allow him to be open to such study, 

and open to the foreign environment in which he will 

find himself. The advisor should be comfortable with 

ambiguity, and willing to act based solely on higher 

intent, purpose, and policy objectives rather than a 

hard and fast list of instructions. He may be part of 

an advisory team, or he may be a solitary figure who 

acts without the immediate support or company of any 

other U.S. military or interagency colleagues. In either 

case, he must be able to adjust to this environment, 

absorb a vast amount of new information, and then act 

confidently, possibly without being able to consult his 

colleagues in advance. 
19

Rank, Gender, and Age.

A young male captain or major may be the best 

soldier in the world and a great teacher. A female of 

any high rank may be a paragon of military ability 

and experience. In foreign eyes, however, they face 

great initial obstacles, and have a serious disadvantage 

compared to an older male officer of colonel to general 

officer rank.

Many foreigners do not accept contemporary 

American views about rank, gender, age, or race. 

Insisting that they do so will hinder or doom the 

advisory mission. It took the United States hundreds 

of years to reach today’s stage in political and social 

sophistication, and it is counterproductive and illogical 

to insist that foreign cultures and foreign histories 

evolve the same way that America has. 

The United States has made great strides in ensuring 

that gender, age, and racial considerations are not 

used to bar qualified applicants from employment or 

assignments. In the government and military services, 

men and women work side by side. Cabinet level and 

command positions in the military are routinely filled 

by women, and both law and custom now enshrine the 

principle that men and women are equal in every legal 

respect. This is not the case in many other countries, 

however, where gender and age are important considerations in selection for assignments, and where they are 

essential considerations in assessing someone’s professional merit. In a traditional Muslim country, for 

example, the advice of a young female officer would 

not have the importance of a male’s advice, no matter 

what her experience or credentials were. And the 

words of a young male officer would not be considered 

nearly as valuable as those of an older man of higher 
20

rank. Ethnic background, skin color, and religious faith 

also play a role, based on local society and tradition. 

The result may translate into what Americans consider 

prejudice and discrimination. A good advisor will set 

a personal example of fairness, but cannot impose his 

standards on his foreign counterparts. 

In traditional Muslim societies, a senior male 

foreign government official might find it unacceptable 

to be advised by a foreign female advisor. He might 

tolerate it on the surface, but would be unlikely in 

the initial stage to pay serious attention to her advice 

and might not be comfortable in her presence. The 

female advisor would find it difficult to accompany 

the official to many events, and being alone with him 

would be improper culturally. No matter how moral, 

professional, and correct she might be, an American 

female officer assigned such duties would have to 

overcome certain negative assumptions in foreign 

eyes. The female advisor may be able to overcome 

these cultural inhibitions against her success by force 

of personality and professional competence, but it will 

be a difficult uphill battle, consuming inordinate time 

and energy and possibly detracting from the advisory 

mission. 

A lower ranking male or a female officer’s expertise 

can break down these culturally inhibiting barriers 

over time, but it will also require an open attitude on 

the part of the foreign official. Possible techniques for 

success are to partner a junior officer or a female with 

a higher ranking advisor for the initial stage until their 

advisory chemistry clicks with the foreign official, or to 

incorporate them into a larger team. 

Rank is real, whether earned or bestowed as a gift. 

Rows of medals carry weight in foreign eyes, and 

until proven otherwise, ribbons, medals, and insignia 
21

connote gravitas, intelligence, experience, entree, and 

authority. While it is not necessary to display these 

awards routinely, their ownership will be noted and 

judged. In traditional societies, they are signs of high 

rank, and an advisor of high rank is (initially, at least) 

much more acceptable to a foreign official and much 

more likely to command the official’s attention and 

esteem. Rank introduced by insignia must also be 

reinforced in other ways, with the senior U.S. official 

in-country reminding the foreign official from time to 

time that the American advisor has his full confidence 

and that he relies on the advisor’s counsel himself. This 

ongoing process of enhancing the advisor’s legitimacy 

is important for all three parties, the senior American 

commander, the advisor, and the foreign official, since 

it confirms that the flow of information, decisions, and 

advice are valid and trustworthy. 
22

IV. THE ADVISOR’S TOOLS FOR SUCCESS

Successful counsel is based heavily on both personal 

mindset and professional ability. The advisor must be 

ready to play the roles of both teacher and student, 

be open to an unfamiliar cultural environment, have 

evident interest and respect for unusual people and 

places, and be willing to subject his own comfort, 

preferences, and timing to those of a foreigner. 

A good advisor will adjust to foreign culture and 

habits in order to enable his message and guidance 

to be presented effectively. He must be intellectually 

curious, and also be able to keep silent and just listen. 

It is also essential that an advisor have the professional 

and personal qualifications to perform his duties. 

However engaging his personality though, technical 

expertise in his field is an absolute requirement.

Professional, Academic, and Life Experience.

Being qualified does not just mean that the 

proposed advisor has attended a series of training 

courses, but touches on his personality, his social skills, 

his real world experience, his language fluency (or his 

dedication to learning the local language), and his 

professional credentials. The advisor’s background and 

skills will be quickly judged by his foreign counterpart, 

and a senior foreign official is often highly trained and 

experienced in his own right. The official may also have 

high professional standing in his country and abroad.

The U.S. military system, on the other hand, does 

not normally generate national level expertise in 

any sector of study. If an individual had advanced 

university degrees in the energy field, for example, and 

had years of experience at progressively higher jobs in 
23

the U.S. energy sector, he would almost certainly not be 

an Army officer available to be assigned as an advisor 

to the local Minister of Energy in a foreign country. 

The real expert in a technological or other field is more 

likely to be a civilian contractor attached to the advisory 

team rather than the military officer, and collegiality 

and collaboration will be vital for success.

There are other criteria for success in the advisory 

mission. Does the advisor measure up to the local 

official enough in other ways to make his advice useful 

and acceptable? 

In a foreign country which has gone through a 

lengthy period of war and political violence, anyone 

who has attained a senior position has undoubtedly 

seen many of his friends and relatives killed, has killed 

people himself, has led men into battle, and has possibly 

made life and death decisions repeatedly. Does the 

advisor’s background or age give him credibility in 

the official’s eyes? This is not just a question of what 

university degrees he possesses, but refers to an 

assessment the foreign official will make based on his 

own life experience.

If the advisor does not measure up in one aspect, 

he must recognize and acknowledge his limitations 

and give advice in that context. Some of this falls into 

the area of “how he advises” rather than “what he 

advises.” The advisor must play to his strengths when 

opportunities arise and conditions permit, and look 

for ways that demonstrate his particular expertise and 

talents.

*****

It is difficult to know by what standards a foreign leader 

will judge an American. In an introductory conversation 
24

with a major and much feared Pashtun warlord in 

Afghanistan, an American diplomat began by listing the 

war zones and hardship assignments he had had, tying his 

life abroad to what hostilities were taking place at the time. 

But the warlord was oblivious to other countries’ conflicts. 

Then the diplomat noted that over the course of his life he 

had been held by security officials in the United States and 

two foreign countries, eventually spending well over a year 

in prison abroad.

The warlord’s single question was about the incident 

in America, and when told it involved a death, said simply 

“then I can talk to you.”

*****

It is possible that a foreign official will have 

an advanced degree, significant experience in 

administration or another field, fluency in English, a 

second citizenship from a western country in addition 

to his birth country, and extensive professional and 

social ties to the United States and the greater world. 

Even if he does not have a university degree or 

speak English, the official might be fluent in several 

regional languages. Although he may not have 

attended a military academy, the official could be a 

veteran of decades of battle, fighting in the trenches 

and commanding units while the advisor was still a 

child. Even without a college degree in business or 

administration, the official could be a tribal or regional 

leader accustomed to administering vast areas of land, 

significant budgets, and large numbers of people. 

He might sit on the floor, wear a turban and flowing 

robes, and eat with his fingers, but his position of 

power is prima facie evidence that he has noteworthy 

experience, as well as social and political clout. In 
25

addition, the military advisor is highly unlikely to be 

the first American he has met, and he may already have 

extensive contacts with American and other foreign 

VIPs involved with his country. 

At the most basic level, whatever the senior foreign 

official’s exotic clothing or lack of Western polish, he 

has survived to exercise power when people with more 

exalted academic credentials, higher rank, and more 

important lineage have ended up dead or in prison. 

Understanding how this happened and analyzing the 

official’s history can be an invaluable lesson for the 

American advisor in his efforts to develop a relationship 

and package his advice for success.

*****

Do not confuse paper with qualifications. Many 

American officials have “I love me” walls covered with 

framed academic degrees, innumerable commendations, 

and photos of themselves standing with VIPs. The wealthy 

and the educated have personal libraries and collections 

of antiques and art. But then there has not been a conflict 

on American soil since the Civil War. In Afghanistan, for 

example, the period beginning with the coup in 1973 and 

continuing through the Taliban era was one of house arrests, 

bombings, and armed attacks on government buildings 

and private homes. Photographs, art work, books, and 

documents were hastily abandoned as their owners fled to 

escape imprisonment or bombs. Confiscation, looting, and 

war damage took an immense toll on personal property, 

and there was a massive destruction or dispersal of family 

mementoes and cultural and historic items. 

In politically unstable countries, the display of degrees 

or commendations issued by one regime can mean a jail 

sentence or execution under its successor. Shrewd officials 
26

are survivors, and more likely to keep such personal items 

safely out of sight.

*****

The advisor must show that he has qualifications 

that complement the official’s skill set, and that he can 

add value to the official’s performance and provide 

useful advice and assistance. If he cannot show he is 

of value, he will be ignored, relegated to the role of 

foreign staff aide, or at best be only a liaison between the 

official’s office and the local U.S. military bureaucracy. 

How he does this will differ with time and location, 

but it is a challenge that he must analyze and meet in 

order to accomplish his mission. 

The Advisor’s Personality.

Providing counsel is not a 9 to 5 position, just as 

being a Cabinet member or a Governor is not a 40- 

hour-a-week job. Advisors are on call 24/7, and a 

good advisor will be an accepted and expected presence at any and all times. The advisor who has to make 

an appointment through a secretary and wait hours or 

days to see his counterpart official may already have 

failed in his job.

*****

A recent American Political Advisor to a non-U.S. 

NATO PRT Commander, for example, shared a tent with the 

Commander, ate breakfast with him every day, accompanied 

him to a variety of external meetings throughout the day, 

participated at all evening staff meetings for the PRT’s 

leadership, often joined the Commander for dinner, and 
27

sometimes ended with an informal conversation at night. It 

was the informal contact at meals or in the late evenings, 

when both could speak frankly, that the best opportunities 

came to discuss modes of action or offer advice, not at the 

official meetings. 

*****

Personal Flexibility.

There is a difference between the activities of a 

Governor or a Cabinet Minister and those of a PRT 

Commander. The two former have provinces or the 

whole country as their domains, while the latter’s life 

is circumscribed by the perimeter of the base and a 

limited area of operations. The life styles of top-level 

officials make it less likely that advisors will have or 

even want to have constant access. The Governor and 

Minister, after all, will have family, social, and political 

worlds, as well as future agendas which are closed to 

the advisor. However, the advisor must be willing and 

able to relegate his own schedule and preferences to 

those of the senior official. 

For most senior officials, there is no demarcation 

line between work and down-time. Whether the official 

gets up before dawn to pray and eat breakfast, or does 

his best thinking and makes decisions at midnight 

with a bottle of whisky, the advisor should be known 

to be available. If the Governor or Minister prefers to 

sit on the floor, thumb his prayer beads, and listen to 

flute and drum music, the advisor should be adept at 

taking his boots off and resting cross-legged for a few 

hours at a time. In many parts of the Muslim world, 

privacy is not a value or even much of a concept, and 

the American advisor should be willing to adapt to 
28

discussions held in loud social settings, or to talking 

with the official while 10 or 20 or even 50 others are 

sitting in the room and listening silently. The locations 

may range from quiet, private meetings to crowded 

public affairs where the proceedings are all captured 

by the local TV cameras, and the advisor will need 

to adjust to the social venue and show himself to be 

comfortable in it.

Knowing the Local Culture.

The American advisor should seek local guidance 

on cultural and social custom and etiquette, watch 

others around him, and ask questions about proper 

norms of behavior from local sources. He cannot 

assume that what goes for his home region in America 

is appropriate in Iraq, Yemen, Israel or Pakistan. 

No “one size fits all” book on etiquette and culture 

encompasses the wide variety of the Islamic world. 

Every country has its own set of “do’s and don’ts,” 

and various practices or prohibitions may even change 

from town to town. Differences between foreign and 

American etiquette are endless, and ignorance of local 

customs will harm the advisor’s effectiveness. No one 

can possibly know everything about a foreign culture—

or even his own culture—but some basic humility, 

an open mind, intellectual curiosity, and the ability 

to laugh at himself will carry the advisor a very long 

way. He must be aware of what is merely permissible, 

what is recommended, and what is prohibited in the 

local environment, because if local norms are not 

respected, the advisor’s best efforts to present ideas 

and influence foreign officials will be frustrated or 

even counterproductive. 
29

The learning process can be a lengthy one, and 

everyone makes mistakes along the road, but the more 

an advisor is versed and feels comfortable in the foreign 

social setting, the more effective his presentation of 

advice will be. Some social settings may be difficult for 

the advisor, but he will adapt quickly if he wants to be 

successful. After all, decisionmaking is a continuous 

process, and final decisions are often made far from 

the office setting.

Even informal social settings can be a minefield for 

the unwary, and what is normal and ordinary in the 

United States might be considered rude, embarrassing, 

and very detrimental to the advisor’s mission. For 

example, concepts of personal space are different in 

many Muslim countries, and the American may find 

himself far too close physically to other men to be 

comfortable, with guests leaning against him while 

everyone is eating or simply sitting down to talk. It 

is not unusual for Muslim men to walk hand in hand, 

or to hold hands far longer than a quick American 

handshake would allow. In the United States, men and 

women will shake hands or possibly even kiss cheeks 

on first meeting, an act that would be inconceivable 

by conservative Islamic norms. For example, blowing 

one’s nose in public is regarded as repulsive in Iran 

and Afghanistan, as much a turn-off as picking one’s 

nose in public would be in the United States. Asking 

personal questions about an official’s wife or daughter 

(or describing one’s own) might be absolutely routine 

and acceptable in a western meeting, but would be 

considered insulting in a conservative Muslim setting. 

And in these settings, the American officer who tries 

to show a foreign counterpart personal photos of 

female relatives in order to display a common bond of 

“family” would immediately lose face in conservative 

Muslim eyes. 
30

A foreign official in Afghanistan may simply 

take one’s hand and clasp it for long periods during 

a conversation, or want to walk arm in arm, which 

can cause angst and discomfort for many American 

men, especially if the media is filming the event and 

it is likely to appear in the American press. Removing 

boots and shoes is absolutely necessary in many Middle 

East and South Asian settings, especially in private 

homes. Keeping them on per U.S. military regulations 

marks the offender as uncouth. Wearing body armor 

or carrying a weapon into homes and office settings 

shows clearly that the American does not trust his hosts 

and will cast an unwelcome pall over any conversation, 

or alternatively, imply that the American is afraid of 

his surroundings. The American habit of chewing 

tobacco and spitting the remnants into a water bottle is 

considered disgusting in most cultures, but on the other 

hand, in Yemen men spend hours every day chewing a 

narcotic leaf called “qat,” spitting green liquid residue 

directly into convenient bowls. Participating in these 

lengthy and drowsy sessions is often the only way to 

accomplish one’s work.

Orders of precedence are essential to understand. In 

Afghanistan and Iran, for example, a host will always 

gesture for a guest to precede him through a door. This 

is acceptable and expected in an informal setting, for 

example at the official’s home. In the office, however, 

or at any official meeting or inspection where walking 

together in public is in order, the advisor’s going first 

would be considered a sign of boorish behavior and 

lack of respect for the foreign official. 

The protocol of eating is profoundly important 

in many places, and ignoring it can sink a mission. 

Taking refreshments like coffee and tea, or eating 

local food are essential for the advisor to establish a 

relationship with the official or any host. Foreigners 
31

are watched carefully and judged by their willingness 

to partake in proffered hospitality, and in some areas 

they might actually be at risk until they have shown 

they are friendly by accepting refreshment (e.g., in the 

Pashtun tribal belt). Refusing food and drink will chill 

the atmosphere and put up obstacles to an advisor’s 

relationship with any official. Pulling out an MRE after 

refusing local food is an extreme insult.

*****

On a trip in a remote part of Afghanistan’s Ghor Province, 

a PRT Commander and his Political Advisor stopped at a 

small road side tea house to talk to the villagers gathered 

there. The Commander, who really did not want to drink 

anything, politely turned down the offered tea. Turning to 

the local villagers, the tea house owner said in Dari, “These 

foreigners think what we eat and drink is dirty.” If the 

POLAD had not understood the comment and quietly told 

the Commander to accept the tea, the atmosphere would have 

turned very cold very quickly.

*****

Sometimes hospitality can be carried to extremes. At a 

Pashtun banquet in northern Pakistan when an American 

diplomat was guest of honor of a large group of clergy at 

a refugee camp, a whole roast sheep was carried in on a 

tray. The bearded host reached his hand under the sheep’s 

tail and pulled out a large wad of semi raw fat, holding it 

up to the American official’s mouth and saying, “Eat. It’s 

the best part.” Swallowing the suet directly from his host’s 

hand with a nod of thanks was the only way to continue the 

momentum of the conversation.

*****
32

Expecting every Muslim to follow every rule expressed in the Quran is like expecting every Christian 

to obey every stricture laid down in the Bible. It is 

not going to happen in this world. For example, 

despite Islamic prohibitions, some people in Muslim 

countries—including high officials—drink alcohol. 

And no culture has ever managed to completely 

outlaw sexual misadventures. If alcohol flows too 

freely or prostitutes are brought in after dinner, the 

American advisor may wish to excuse himself, but 

he must do so in a way that does not detract from the 

official’s standing in front of other people or denigrate 

the proffered hospitality. Including the American 

in such entertainment can be a sign that he has been 

accepted as a trusted advisor, but it can also be a sign 

that the official wants to entangle him in his personal 

corruption. There is no hard and fast rule for telling 

the difference, and the advisor must make on-the-spot 

decisions based on his own knowledge of local norms 

and his own perception of what is right. 

Advisors are human, and there will be a line beyond 

which one cannot go, foods one cannot eat, gifts that 

one cannot accept, and behavior that one cannot 

tolerate. Personal principles and standards of integrity 

should not be sacrificed, and it is always acceptable to 

just say “no,” as long as it is done politely, firmly, and 

with no hint of condemnation. A simple explanation 

of “why”—an explanation that should never become a 

self-righteous sermon—is perfectly acceptable in most 

cases. 

Remember that a foreign advisor is always under 

observation, from servants, other guests, and the eyes 

of scores of nameless security guards, drivers, other 

staff, and even the beggars sitting outside along the 
33

road (who may be reporting his activities to the local 

security service). His reputation and his actions will be 

discussed and analyzed in circles of whose existence 

he is not even aware. He will be tested repeatedly to 

gauge his reactions and standards, and his character 

and professionalism judged accordingly. People 

he has never met will judge him from afar, and be 

ready to deal with him or refuse him access based on 

word on the street about his behavior. In some ways 

the new advisor is fortunate, because if he had been 

born in the country where he is assigned, his father’s 

and grandfather’s reputations would also have been 

factored into this equation.

It is not possible to describe the cultural and 

etiquette niceties in all parts of the Islamic world in 

a single document. As simple an act as drinking tea 

can have endless variations, sometimes within the 

immediate vicinity. Is it herbal tea from an unfamiliar 

plant, mint tea, red cinnamon tea, yellow cardamom 

tea, black tea, or green tea? Is there a tea bag, or are 

there fresh leaves floating in the water? Is it served in 

a porcelain cup, a bowl, or a glass? Does it come to the 

guest already (and heavily) presweetened, or mixed 

with milk? Is it presented with an elaborate service of 

china and silver, from a plastic thermos, from a brass 

samovar, or straight from the fire in a blackened and 

battered tea kettle? Is the sweetener a piece of wrapped 

candy, a sugar cube, rock sugar on a swizzle stick, or 

granulated sugar? Is there a spoon to mix the sugar, 

or is the guest expected to hold a sugar cube in his 

mouth and let the tea pass through the cube as he sips? 

How does one indicate that he does not want a refill? 

Placing a spoon across the tea glass? Turning the glass 

over? Lifting the eyebrows to indicate “no, thanks”? 

Experience is the best teacher for the advisor—and 
34

simply watching what others around him are doing 

and being flexible and adaptable are the only realistic 

guides to understanding and appreciating the local 

culture.

What is the bottom line? Social customs and 

behavior differ from one place to another, and the 

advisor will have to put this into perspective and 

practice some degree of flexibility. A successful advisor 

will study and ask about local social norms, and adjust 

in an appropriate way to the setting while maintaining 

his personal principles and standards. If he cannot 

adapt physically and psychologically to the foreign 

environment, it is likely that his advice and expertise 

will also not be adaptable to the foreign reality. 

Knowing American Culture and History.

Advisors serve as a quick reference for any and 

all questions that foreign officials have about the 

United States, ranging from etiquette points to serious 

discussions about American history, religion, politics, 

and policy. An advisor who cannot intervene in a 

meeting to correct misconceptions, or who cannot 

explain the U.S. political system, the basics of 

democracy, the concept and practice of rule of law, 

the history of race relations in American society, 

the meaning of the President’s latest speech shown 

that morning on local television, general U.S. policy 

towards the host country, and myriad other questions 

will quickly lose credibility. And the questions may 

be tough, coming from unexpected sources. A senior 

official might be polite and sophisticated, but the local 

high school students or congregants at a local mosque 

that the advisor is visiting with his foreign colleagues 

may be blunt and merciless when they ask an American 
35

advisor “Why the American Army has invaded their 

country” or “Why does the United States persecute 

Muslims”? Remember that an advisor is more than a 

technical assistant: he may be the only representative 

in many settings of America writ large, and can win 

friends or make enemies for the United States based on 

his knowledge of his own country. 

Knowing the Terrain.

Advice is useless if given in a vacuum. In theory, 

the advisor must know everything possible about the 

history, society, culture, economy, and politics of the 

country to which he is assigned if his advice is to have 

any connection to the reality of the foreign official’s 

world. In fact, however, the advisor will rarely have 

had the luxury of years of study about the country, and 

so the process of knowing in itself becomes important. 

He should strive to learn as much as he can, and show 

interest, enthusiasm, and commitment to the learning 

process, because knowledge of the local human 

terrain will determine the nature of his advice, the 

way it is presented, and the likelihood that it will be 

received and implemented. It will impact directly on 

the relationship between the advisor and the foreign 

official, and make all the difference between success 

and failure in his mission.

This knowledge has no substitute, and it can only 

be acquired by watching, listening, and studying 

over time. However, a senior official has the right to 

assume from the first meeting that his advisor has at 

least a general background in the country’s history and 

politics, and that the advisor’s questions are based on 

existing knowledge of the region and the country. Being 

totally ignorant is an insult to the foreign official and a 
36

waste of his time. More importantly, the official may 

logically conclude that the ignorance of the advisor on 

human terrain issues is a reflection of ignorance of his 

purported speciality.

*****

An Afghan VIP recently noted that he refused to deal 

with anyone from International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) Headquarters in Kabul because all too often the ISAF 

representatives were unprepared for the meetings and wasted 

his time. He expressed his vexation by saying “They don’t 

know anything about Afghanistan. They were even asking 

me the names of our former Presidents.”

*****

On another occasion, a very senior American official 

visiting Afghanistan had been fully briefed about the 

new Afghan Parliament and had been provided extensive 

background material well in advance of his meeting with the 

Parliamentary leadership. However, instead of discussing 

policy issues with national-level leaders, he spent the meeting 

asking very basic questions about the numbers of members, 

the mechanics of the election process, etc., indicating to the 

senior Afghan officials present that he knew very little about 

the country or its government, and missing the opportunity 

for a political discussion at the strategic level.

*****

The advisor must understand American policy, 

and know the limits of what he can and cannot say 

or do. He cannot exceed the parameters established 

by his commander or the Ambassador. Exceeding his 
37

authority may leave the advisor in a position where his 

credibility disappears, and thus he will no longer be 

able to perform his duties.

The Hypocrisy Factor.

The advisor must remember that his foreign 

audience may see him differently than he views 

himself, and will react to his advice accordingly. If the 

American government or the local command and/or 

embassy disregard international norms of behavior or 

human rights, for example, the advisor’s best advice to 

a foreign official may be met with disdain. The advisor 

will be judged by his audience as the representative of 

a larger power, and seen in the light of that power’s 

own actions.

Sometimes the physical circumstances of the 

advisor’s presentation may negate his message as 

well, causing an unwelcome reaction in his listeners, 

especially if they become embarrassed or insulted. 

*****

An American Task Force Commander in Afghanistan 

made an unannounced visit to a remote district of Herat 

Province, accompanied by an Afghan General and several 

civilian visitors as well. They traveled in a large convoy 

of more than 20 vehicles filled with well-armed American 

and Afghan soldiers, about 100 in all as a display meant 

to cow the district officials. The district administrator was 

summoned to appear before the colonel and his entourage, 

and subjected to a long public speech by the American officer 

about the necessity of collecting all the weapons held by the 

district residents. The Afghan administrator waited until 

the colonel was finished, and then said simply:“There are 
38

more than 200 villages in this district, and every house has a 

weapon. We have almost no police enforcement here. If you 

promise me that every time a village family has a problem 

you will come immediately from the capital to solve it, I will 

happily collect all the weapons. But Colonel, come unarmed 

and not with all these soldiers. You shouldn’t tell us to get 

rid of all our weapons unless you are brave enough to come 

alone and unarmed to talk about it.”

*****

Despite their good intentions, many foreigners 

are perceived as hypocrites by Muslim audiences, 

and their message met with annoyance or even anger 

because of the manner it is presented. A highly paid, 

expensively dressed American who arrives in a costly 

armored vehicle and is accompanied by well-armed 

security guards will not win votes of confidence or 

brotherhood from villagers who make a pittance, live in 

mud houses, and are overwhelmed by the daily grind 

of sheer physical survival. The very concept of the nonMuslim American trying to lecture such village crowds 

about proper Islamic teachings or moral behavior is 

ironic, but unfortunately a common occurrence. The 

normal reaction is indignation, politely disguised by 

the listeners, but sometimes the response can be far 

stronger.

*****

In a speech before a Pashtun audience, a senior American 

official in Afghanistan decided to lecture them about the 

error of their ways in continuing to raise opium poppies. He 

pointed his finger at the crowd and told them harshly that 

they should be ashamed of their behavior. Instead of winning 
39

the crowd to his point of view, the reaction was one of anger 

and extreme resentment, rising all the way to the top level 

of the Afghan government and resulting in very negative 

publicity. In the Afghan culture, pointing fingers and using 

the word “shame” are considered as personal insults.

*****
40

V. THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM

The ideal advisor should be fluent in the local 

language, but this ideal is rarely met. Professional 

relationships, accuracy, and security will all be 

affected by the advisor’s inability to speak the 

language. Most advisors use interpreters, making it 

difficult to establish a truly effective relationship with 

the senior local official they are advising. The proper 

use of interpreters is often difficult in itself. Even if 

everyone speaks English, the advisor must be sensitive 

to differences in understanding which are caused by 

differences in background and life experience. None 

of this is impossible, but language is a complicating 

factor in relationships and requires close attention.

The history of language training for American 

diplomats and military assigned to post-war Iraq and 

Afghanistan has been problematic. The more senior the 

American advisor, the less likely it is that he will have 

had time for intensive language study or been able to 

absorb what he was taught. Even the junior officer who 

studies Arabic, Dari, or Pashtu in the United States may 

find that he has little opportunity to immerse himself 

in the language within the host country because his 

contact with native speakers may be very limited. 

The present security practice of restricting personal 

movement outside American compounds means that 

day-to-day dealings with the local populace are often 

very limited, and thus the American officer may not 

make much language progress while actually assigned 

to the country. In many cases, language fluency 

actually decreases once the officer arrives at his post. 

If the foreign official does not speak fluent English, 

it is far more likely that the advisor will communicate 

(1) through an interpreter, (2) through a simplified 
41

version of English which appears comprehensible 

to the official, or (3) through a third language which 

the advisor and the foreign official share. All of these 

have pros and cons, and directly affect the advisor’s 

effectiveness.

Use of Interpreters.

The perfect interpreter is impossible to find, but 

the advisor must cope nonetheless. Who is an ideal 

interpreter? It would be someone who can accurately 

and quickly translate nuanced meaning, be thoroughly 

versed in both countries’ history, literature, culture, 

and politics, as well as in the technical subjects under 

discussion, and yet not allow his personality to shade 

the interpretation. This paragon does not exist, and if 

he did, the advisor would not be able to afford him. 

In the real world, the interpreter is more likely a local 

citizen who left his country decades in the past and has 

only returned on a contract, or someone whose parents 

are from the country in question and who learned the 

language from his family while growing up in America, 

or a local citizen who studied English in school. None 

of these is likely to be a formally trained interpreter, 

and, at best, the American advisor will be provided 

translation which will only be approximately correct. 

Facts, figures, and details will often be mistranslated, 

and nuances of meaning may be totally lost.

If the interpreter is from a different religious or 

ethnic group than the official, there may be mistrust 

and bias on both sides. If the interpreter is seen as 

having abandoned his native country for a better life 

in America, there may be resentment against him from 

officials who stayed and fought through the hard times 

in the country’s history. At worst, the interpreter will 
42

have such heavy emotional baggage, prejudice, or 

personal political motivation that conversations will 

be twisted in a way not intended by either advisor or 

official, leading to distrust and mission failure. All of 

this adds immeasurably to the advisor’s burden.

Dealing with interpreters is a skill which a 

surprisingly large number of senior officials and 

advisors completely lack, but not having this skill is 

like not knowing how to fire your weapon. Common 

mistakes by American officers are to subject the 

interpreter to long, rambling philosophical perorations 

which no one—sometimes even other Americans—

could easily understand; to assume that the interpreter 

can memorize long paragraphs of convoluted speech; 

to assume that the interpreter can understand obscure 

metaphors, regional American dialect, professional 

jargon, slang, and acronyms; and to assume that the 

interpreter actually intends to translate everything 

rather than simply giving a synopsis of the conversation. 

The only way to avoid these pitfalls is to speak 

slowly, clearly, and succinctly, to rehearse key points in 

advance with the interpreter, and to check and recheck 

the interpreter’s accuracy with figures and other data. 

Even then, however, no translation will be completely 

correct, and inaccuracies and bias on the interpreter’s 

part may color the advisor’s intended statements.

The advisor can improve his message by avoiding 

military jargon and abbreviations. “Military-speak” 

can be so heavily laden with acronyms and special 

vocabulary that it is even incomprehensible to 

American civilians. Metaphors, similes, and humor 

are difficult to translate well into other cultures. If 

the advisor has studied a foreign language, he will 

remember how difficult it is to articulate concepts and 
43

specifics. This simple consideration is a crucial lesson 

in understanding the burden placed on an interpreter, 

and the necessity of helping prepare him to accomplish 

his job.

*****

Any comment about a Muslim female’s physical 

attributes can be a precept for disaster. Her male relatives 

might consider it an insult to the family honor.

*****

Telling a Turk or an Iranian that he is “working like a 

dog” or is “as stubborn as a donkey” can be fighting words, 

because comparisons to animals are considered insults.

*****

Asking an interpreter to repeat back what you have 

said or plan to say improves the chances of accuracy. 

The advisor should avoid analogies, and recognize 

that an interpreter may drop a point, or guess at it, if 

he has not fully understood the concept. Most of all, 

the advisor should not surprise the interpreter with 

unusual vocabulary or new subjects of discourse. 

Arcane references to American history will be lost on 

both the interpreter and the audience, and university 

level lectures on political development or philosophy 

should be left in the university, not addressed to tribal 

leaders.

Privately reviewing what you plan to say with the 

interpreter before a meeting allows him to understand 

the new vocabulary and concepts before he has to 

explain them to the senior official. An interpreter who 

may know every word necessary to discuss al-Qaeda 

or taking apart an M-4 may not have any vocabulary 
44

at all in other fields the advisor wants to discuss. The 

interpreter’s fluency in one subject should not be 

confused with vocabulary expertise or familiarity with 

other topics.

An interpreter is always pulled between two 

worlds, and it may place him in personal danger. If 

there is an active opposition to the presence of U.S. 

forces in the country, an interpreter’s life and his 

family’s security can be at stake. Interpreters might be 

regarded as traitors by their neighbors or opposition 

groups, and their activities will be monitored. They 

may be susceptible to threats if they do not pass on 

information to opposition groups or insurgents, or to 

death if the opposition has declared that collaboration 

with U.S. forces is a crime. Unlike the advisor, whose 

family is safely out of reach in the United States, the 

interpreter must take his extended family’s security 

and future into constant consideration. In Iraq, for 

example, there is a clear security threat to interpreters 

because they enable U.S. military forces to function 

with local leaders. The interpreters become primary 

targets.

 By extension, the advisor’s behavior and activities 

will also affect his interpreter’s personal and family 

security. In one case in Herat, Afghanistan, for example, 

an Afghan guard force chief previously employed at 

the PRT was killed along with his entire family when 

gunmen broke into their residence. Coincidence or 

political retribution? In another case, an interpreter in 

Kabul was asked to stay late one evening. He agreed, 

but asked that he be allowed to sleep at the base that 

night, because “going home so late in the evening will 

make my neighbors think I have a different job than the 

story I told them.” His neighborhood was conservative 

and anti-western, and gossip about his work with the 

Americans would have posed a danger to his family.
45

It is not only political sensitivity that makes going 

home late difficult. In Kabul, Afghan employees who 

had to stay at work far into the night had to face the 

dangers of road blocks and robbers if they traveled 

home on the empty, dark streets. Even if there was 

good security, the lack of street lighting, proper 

sidewalks, and paved roads made night-time travel 

physically difficult.

In recognition of the security threat to military 

interpreters, programs are now in place to allow them 

to obtain special immigration visas to the United States. 

An advisor should learn about these programs from 

the Embassy consular section and be willing to give 

honest answers to an interpreter when he asks about 

the possibility of leaving his country.

Using “Basic” English.

Problems are also associated with reliance on the 

foreign official’s knowledge of English. Unless the 

official is very fluent, the advisor may be misunderstood 

even while both assume they understand each other 

perfectly. Pigeon English and mime are fine in a bar 

or restaurant; they do not work well when the subjects 

are politics, strategy, and security issues. 

Even when both parties speak English well, 

differences exist between American usage and 

British/Australian/other usage which can lead to 

misunderstandings. These differences can be the more 

treacherous because they are totally unexpected, and 

each side of the discussion assumes that the other 

understands him perfectly.

The same can be true of Arabic from country to 

country, of Turkish, Persian, and so on. Because dialects change from region to region, what one assumes 
46

is mutual understanding can instead be mutual 

incomprehension.

*****

At the entrance of the teachers’ room for the English 

Language Department at Haceteppe University in Ankara, 

Turkey, a box was once placed to collect the blackboard 

erasers used by the language instructors returning from 

classes. The department’s British secretary wrote a very 

clear instruction sign for the British, American and Turkish 

teachers--all of whom shared the English language, which 

had a very different meaning for the British/Turks than it 

did for the Americans. The sign read, “Teachers, please put 

your used rubbers in this box.”

*****

At a dinner in the Iranian Province of Azerbaijan, an 

American Peace Corps volunteer who spoke the Turkish of 

neighboring Turkey tried to thank his hostess and turn down 

offers of another full plate by saying that it was “too much” 

and he had already eaten “too much.” He emphasized the 

Turkish word for “too much” by pointing at his dish. The 

host family reacted with stunned silence, and only after 

an English-speaking participant asked what the volunteer 

really meant, did the group dissolve into laughter. The word 

for “too much” in Ankara’s Turkish meant “mouse shit” in 

the local dialect. The American guest had been telling his 

hostess that there were feces on his plate.

*****
47

Using a Third Language.

Using a language which the advisor and the official 

share, but which is not the mother language of either 

one, can also compound the possibilities for error and 

misunderstandings. An added dimension is that it 

may be a language which has unwelcome political 

overtones. Languages are tools of communication, but 

they also carry historic and cultural connotations of 

which the advisor must be aware. For the American 

who learned a language during an idyllic stay abroad 

as a student, a second language may bring memories 

of only good times and youthful adventure. For a 

foreign official or others who hear the same sounds, 

that language may be an unpleasant subconscious 

reminder of death and injury to family and friends.

*****

Hearing Americans speak Russian with Afghan officials 

can be an unpleasant subconscious reminder to Afghans of 

the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Was 

Russian the language heard by the official as a child when 

orders were being given to arrest his father? Even if the 

official was once on the side of the Soviets, others in his 

entourage may have served painful times in prison being 

mistreated by Russian-speaking guards and interrogators.

*****

Sometimes the language spoken inside the house is not 

the official language of the country. Using one or the other 

can build imperceptible walls between people, especially if 

the official language implies social or political dominance 

by another ethnic group. An American once assigned to 

Iran realized that speaking Farsi with ethnic Turks from the 
48

Iranian province of Azerbaijan placed social barriers between 

them, just as his speaking Turkish with Kurdish friends in 

Turkey did. Both the Turks of western Iran and the Kurds 

of Turkey felt discrimination and pressure as members of 

minority groups, and part of the ongoing ethnic tension 

involved the choice of which language to use.

*****

Understanding What Is Heard and What Is Said: 

When the Advisor’s Terms of Reference Are Not 

Those of the Foreign Official.

Understanding the differences in connotation of 

words and differences in concepts is essential for the 

advisor if he is to communicate effectively.

Even though a word may be found to translate a concept 

from one cultural pattern to another, there is no assurance that an accurate and viable concept has been chosen 

in the second pattern that is equivalent to the original 

one. When two cultures are not parallel in their focal 

points, misunderstandings can occur and inaccuracies 

can be perpetrated by the application of familiar concepts in a foreign environment. Americans and other 

Westerners have taken political and social concepts such 

as nationalism, militarism, and the democratic system 

of elections, which are native to Western countries, and 

have attempted to apply them to underdeveloped countries where they have different meanings.3

 

Originally written about the work of advisors in 

Vietnam in the 1960s, this is true as well in today’s 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. The word “crime,” for 

example, is easily translated into Dari, but the average 

Afghan has a very different concept of what constitutes 

crime than an American.
49

In the United States, there is no legal problem (or 

even any legal implication) in converting from one 

religious faith to another, while in Afghanistan, and the 

larger Muslim world, conversion from Islam to another 

religion is considered a serious crime. When national 

identity, family identity, and Islam are inextricably 

connected, apostasy is equivalent to treason and 

betrayal of one’s kinfolk.

In the United States, killing one’s wife, sister, or 

daughter for having an extra-marital relationship 

would be a crime, but not doing so in some parts of the 

world shows one as weak and dishonorable, with no 

regard for family, clan, or tribal honor codes. Taking 

justice into one’s own hands and killing someone who 

had insulted or badly offended you would be a crime 

in America, but in other places might be considered 

natural and even necessary. Not to retaliate might 

show you as weak and feckless, and thus place you 

and your family in greater danger.

Even perceptions of historic events are affected 

by geography. In the west, the names “Attila” and 

“Genghis” might conjure images of Attila the Hun and 

Genghis Khan, regarded as blood thirsty conquerors 

who ravaged vast areas and almost brought an end 

to western civilization. In Turkey and other Asian 

countries, they are often seen as national heroes. In the 

west, the word “crusade” has a positive connotation, 

while in the Muslim world it is a reminder of 

European invasion and the attempted destruction of 

Islamic civilization by western armies. By the same 

token, a devout Muslim sees a religious and positive 

connotation in the word “jihad,” while an American 

thinks of suicide bombers and terrorism when he hears 

it.
50

The list of conflicting concepts goes on and on. 

“Rule of law,” “democracy,” “extending the reach of 

the central government,” “Hamas,” “football,” “the 

Taliban,” “honor,” “tomorrow”--all of these are easy to 

translate or may even sound the same in other languages, 

but the very words used for these and many more 

concepts may have radically different connotations for 

the American advisor and the senior official with whom 

he is talking. Is football a game where the players use 

heavy padding and throw the ball, or one where they 

wear shorts and kick the ball? Is “Hamas” a terrorist 

organization, or a charitable institution which brings 

help to needy communities? Is “tomorrow” what 

occurs after midnight, or a hazy, indeterminate time 

in a possible future? Are the Taliban the insurgents so 

demonized in American political rhetoric and the U.S. 

media, or a movement which brought stability to an 

Afghanistan reeling from civil war. Does “extending 

the reach of the central government” mean to bring 

much needed services and stability to remote areas, or 

is it just a way to send strangers from the capital city 

to the provinces so that rural areas can be looted and 

abused more easily?

This does not mean that communication is impossible, or forever part of the Tower of Babel. What it 

does mean is that communication is not always easy, 

and the advisor must take special care to ensure that 

he really understands what he hears, and that his own 

meaning is conveyed accurately when he speaks.

There are ways to minimize the difficulties and 

achieve the advisor’s goals. Beginning to learn the 

local language—or at least the minimal expressions of 

courtesy and greeting—is an important first step. Selfstudy and help from interpreters can assist the advisor 

in this. Even learning one or two new words a day 

can lead to an extensive working vocabulary in a short 

time. 
51

Non-verbal Communication.

Paying close attention to facial and body language 

and other forms of nonverbal communication is also 

important for the advisor, and allows him to gauge 

reaction before the words are translated. Over time, as 

the advisor and the senior official become familiar with 

one another, and as the advisor works to understand the 

language, gestures, and local customs, communication 

will become easier.

Signs, facial expressions, and physical gestures 

that Americans take for granted and routinely use 

while talking may have far different meanings in 

other cultures, and an advisor must be very careful to 

understand the signals he is sending. For examples, 

lifting the eyebrows signifies “no” in Turkey, and 

may not necessarily be accompanied by the spoken 

word, and the “thumbs up” gesture so commonly 

used by Americans to signify “good work” or “ O.K.” 

has a sexual connotation in some Muslim areas, and 

congratulating a local soldier by the thumbs-up gesture 

may cause the advisor unwanted speculation or 

ridicule from the group of young men who return the 

gesture with laughter. Ditto for holding the thumb and 

forefinger together in a circle to signal that something 

is, or tastes, good. In Turkey it was used as a signal for 

the sex act. 

No one expects a foreigner to understand everything 

about a new culture immediately, but the advisor is in 

a public position and should ask his foreign colleagues 

to point out any obvious nonverbal mistakes. If he sees 

that laughter or embarrassed smiles break out when he 

makes a gesture, it is a sign that he should quietly ask 

someone if there was a problem.
52

VI. THE OFFICE AS BATTLE SPACE

The advisor must study his counterpart, learning 

his history and his cultural and social milieu. He must 

come to understand what affects the official’s thought 

process and decisionmaking, and learn the local factors 

that determine the senior foreign official’s ultimate 

success. While much basic information about a foreign 

official can be obtained from Google, news accounts 

on the internet, and intel sources prior to beginning an 

assignment, the best way for an advisor to understand 

his counterpart comes through physical proximity and 

observation over time.

The First Who in Who’s Who.

Knowing as much as possible about his counterpart 

is imperative for the advisor. Learning the truth, however, is a subtle and time-consuming process. If the 

foreign official has come to public attention before, 

there will be miscellaneous information on Google 

about him. He may have an official biographical page 

to give to foreign visitors, and there is presumably 

information available through intelligence sources as 

well. Over time, the official will also share personal 

information about himself, but he will undoubtedly 

have a negative reaction if he feels that he is being 

interrogated about his private life. 

The questions to be answered are legion. What is the 

official’s history and lineage? His religion? His ethnic 

background? How did he get his senior position? Was 

he chosen by merit or based on political/ethnic/family 

patronage? To whom is he married, and what does his 

wife’s family do? Is he personally close to the Head of 

State? Is he a relative? If so, by blood or by marriage? 
53

Is he related to other members of the government, 

to Cabinet officials, to Parliamentarians, to leading 

security officials? Does he have ties through family, 

residence abroad, schooling, or business interests to 

other countries? What is his general reputation? While 

no single answer to any of these questions in and of 

itself will determine the official’s receptivity to the 

American advisor, the answers will predispose him to 

certain paths of action. 

Understanding the nature and structure of the senior 

official’s office and agency is as important as knowing 

a battlefield before an engagement. The organization, 

the staffing, the place in the government structure, and 

the duties and responsibilities of the official and his 

colleagues are all essential knowledge for an advisor.

Knowing who is who, and who is related to 

whom, is vital. In less-developed countries, it is likely 

that many (or all) office positions are filled based on 

political, ethnic, regional, or family patronage. This is 

neither good nor bad, but simply a fact which reflects 

local social and political realities. It is generally not 

something within the advisor’s purview to change, but 

he should understand these connections in order to 

make them useful for his own mission.

In the U.S. government, relatives rarely work in the 

same offices, and it would be highly improper for a 

supervisor to have a close family member in his chain 

of command. In a more traditional country, a minister 

or governor may have a close relative—a brother, 

nephew or brother-in-law—working in his immediate 

office, and this individual has access to the official in a 

way that no stranger ever could. 

While Imam Khomeini ruled Iran, for example, 

his son Ahmad served the function of “gatekeeper” to 

his father, controlling entrée to the Supreme Leader. 
54

Advice, recommendations, or information given 

informally to someone in this position will reach the 

senior official privately and allow him time to reflect 

before making a public decision. It is often far easier—

and more acceptable culturally—to be frank with such 

an individual when it would not be possible to be so 

direct with a top official. A bad message will still get 

through, but in a way that saves face for everyone. In 

addition, it is possible that VIPs in the country are related 

through marriage, and that they have placed blood 

relatives in one another’s offices to strengthen their 

political relationships and ease their communications 

with one another. The American advisor’s words to 

one senior official will thus reach other senior officials 

as well.

There is a corollary to this placement. Relationships 

to high officials are not always apparent or disclosed. 

Even brothers might have different family names 

in some Muslim countries, making it difficult for an 

American to link counterparts to one another. For 

example, in Afghanistan, senior officials sometimes 

use their own younger brothers or nephews—people of 

rank themselves—to act as servants at social gatherings, 

in much the same way that medieval lords used their 

squires. Never assume that the silent young man who 

bows while offering you water to wash your hands 

is only a humble servant. He could be a governor-intraining and a trusted confidant of the senior official, 

and thus the American advisor’s best bet for having 

unimpeded and immediate contact with the senior 

official.
55

Foreign Officials’ Sources of Income.

It is not normally within the military advisor’s 

scope of duties to try to transform the whole economic 

and financial basis of a country, or to reconstruct the 

bureaucracy or the retirement system. It is, however, 

in his interest to know the nature of the local system 

in order to tailor his advice and his expectations to 

reality. Knowing how local officials and bureaucrats 

are paid is essential to the advisor, because income 

sources directly affect decisionmaking.

In the underdeveloped regions of the Muslim 

world, the disparity between rich and poor may be 

severe, with both extremes reflected in the bureaucracy 

of the senior official’s agency. The marble clad homes, 

gilt furniture, chandeliers, and fully-packed SUVs or 

luxury cars of the top staff will stand in stark contrast to 

the crowded adobe mud structures inhabited by lowranking workers. 

People require services from their government, and 

services—and the officials who provide them—require 

funding. If a country has no noteworthy natural 

resources to export for income (e.g., the way that Saudi 

Arabia has oil) and if the inhabitants do not routinely 

pay taxes (e.g., Afghanistan), the funding must be 

obtained somehow, and there is a certain efficiency 

in simply demanding that people who want services 

performed directly pay those who perform them. 

Sources of national income at all levels may have 

little relationship to what the Budget Office has in its 

ledgers. Is the salary structure set by regulation, or is 

it based on fees for service, on the order of American 

waiters and waitresses who receive only a token salary 

from the restaurant owner and make their real income 

in tips from customers? Is taking a gift or bribe the 
56

normal state of affairs? How large can bribes be and 

still be acceptable, or is it full no-holds-barred in the 

bribery arena? Is there a well-understood and expected 

“payment for service” that satisfies both officials and 

the public—say 10 to 40 percent over and above the 

published fee—and on which government bureaucrats 

rely to supplement meager official salaries? 

Is it really corruption for a low level worker, 

policeman, or soldier to ask for a few dollars as a gift 

when he would otherwise not have enough income to 

feed his family? Do workers in the agency have to pay 

off more senior officers in order to get a job? Is acquiring 

an office a one-time purchase, or a percentage of the 

official’s salary every month to those higher up the 

chain? Does anyone in the hierarchy actually receive 

a living wage, or are they all expected to supplement 

their incomes by demanding additional money from 

people who need their service (e.g., contractors or 

supplicants) or from people who want to get promoted 

or get better assignments within the official’s agency? 

In much of the developing world, the western 

concept of “conflict of interest” is incomprehensible. 

Senior officials do not place their assets into a blind 

trust when they assume office. Rather, many assume 

office in order to get rich, and paying for office can be a 

normal procedure at all levels of the bureaucracy, just 

as enriching their families and friends through their 

office can be regarded as normal behavior. 

It is highly unlikely that a senior foreign official is 

living on his salary alone, and the real sources of his 

income may predispose him to courses of action that 

may not be in the American advisor’s interests. In a 

country (e.g., Afghanistan) that is corrupted by the 

narcotics trade, for example, senior security or civil 

officials may be taking in such large amounts of drug 
57

money that an American advisor will find it very 

difficult to realistically influence security policies. If 

the official’s children study abroad thanks to foreign 

government scholarships, and his business interests 

are tied to contracts from other countries, it is also less 

likely that the American advisor’s words will have 

much clout.

The system becomes somewhat more understandable when one realizes that many in the bribe-paying 

public often do not pay income tax to the government, 

paying unofficial fees (bribes?) instead when they 

actually require a government service. It also becomes 

more understandable when a government has no 

realistic retirement system. Since they know they 

cannot rely on receiving a pension once they retire, 

police, military, and civil service bureaucrats have to 

earn money for their retirements while they are actually 

working. 

Local Perception of Government Service.

The advisor must understand where his ministry 

or government agency fits in the popular mind, and 

whether it has a popular constituency and support. 

While the local populace may fully understand the 

role and importance of a Police Commander, the work 

of the “Director of the Anti-Corruption Commission” 

may be unknown and/or completely disregarded by 

the man on the street. 

In the United States there is an assumption that 

government officials, police and military are basically 

service-oriented, professional, educated and honest. 

Exceptions occur, of course, but the general view of 

the American public towards government is positive. 

This is not true in many other countries, and knowing 
58

how the public regards senior officials and/or their 

bureaucracies is important for the American advisor. 

Is there an overall feeling of respect and satisfaction, or 

do ordinary people think of the official and his staff as 

corrupt and inefficient? Is there popular resentment? 

Does the senior official have a history of war crimes, 

human rights abuse, theft, etc? Have the official and 

his staff been vetted for human rights violations by 

the appropriate organizations to allow them to receive 

security assistance and training in accordance with 

American regulations? 

Expectations are important as well. What does 

the local populace expect of the official and his staff? 

Conducting surveys in Afghan villages in 2003, for 

example, the U.S. Civil Affairs team in Herat Province 

soon learned that local villagers had little or no contact 

with government authorities. Officials did not visit 

the villages, and the rural population held minimal 

expectations of services from provincial or Kabulbased officials. Many of the villagers were more 

accustomed to non-government organizations (NGOs) 

providing occasional services and development 

projects rather than the Afghan government’s doing 

so. Unlike the United States, where citizens pay taxes 

and vocally express demands for services because 

they are taxpayers, citizens of many less developed 

countries pay no income tax and thus have less sense 

of “ownership” of the government bureaucracy.

The corollary to how the populace feels about the 

government bureaucracy is how the senior official 

feels about the populace. Does the official have a real 

concept of public service, or is he in office solely to 

enrich himself and his friends? If the latter, then the 

advisor might have to tailor his advice to areas that are 

both in the U.S. government’s interests and will also 
59

incidentally add to the official’s personal wealth. Or 

perhaps the advisor may be forced to simply limit his 

mission to “Do no harm.”

The Trap of Personally Identifying with Foreign 

Officials.

In many countries, especially those which are 

coming out of recent conflict, senior officials have 

controversial histories. War is never one-sided, and 

the official may have enemies with blood feuds against 

him as well as loyal friends. Both may be powerful, 

and identification and companionship with the official 

will necessarily reflect on his American advisor. This 

means that the American advisor may inherit friends 

and enemies whom he has never met, giving him both 

entrée as well as putting barriers in front of him.

Any intelligent official—especially a shrewd 

and sly one—will make use of his American advisor 

as a scapegoat for his own misdeeds and mistakes, 

claiming that assignments, appointments, or allocation 

of resources are being forced on him by the American. 

The official will do so on the assumption that the 

American advisor will (1) never find out; or (2) will 

only be in country for a limited time, and can carry 

the onus of the senior official’s mistakes out with him 

when he departs.

The official’s claims that his hands are tied by the 

American advisor can make perfect local logic for a 

foreign populace that only sees the American advisor 

from a distance, regards the United States as a source 

of wealth and power, and is imbued with conspiracy 

theories that define foreigners as responsible for all evil 

that befalls their nation. The advisor will have to find 

local sources—perhaps a friend willing to be frank with 
60

him, perhaps his interpreter or other colleagues—who 

can keep him informed of what the official is claiming, 

and how others view the advisor and the minister. 

On the other hand, the senior official might use 

his relationship with his American advisor to enhance 

his personal power. The advisor might be misused 

to inadvertently channel U.S. government-supplied 

resources to the official’s friends, to recommend 

courses of action that will directly benefit the official, 

or even be misled by the official’s slanted information 

to attack his enemies for him because they are allegedly 

“terrorists.” The official might strengthen his power 

base by claiming to have personal support from “the 

Americans” or the international community, a claim 

that can have great resonance in a cash-strapped 

country that needs U.S. government assistance. Since 

the senior official will undoubtedly have higher 

political ambition, he can misuse the advisor’s presence 

to imply that he has direct support from America, and 

thus build himself up at the expense of rivals who do 

not have American or other international advisors to 

enhance their prestige.

There are, of course, corollaries to this cycle of 

“use.” If the American advisor has no resources or 

tangible benefits to offer the foreign official, he may be 

regarded as useless and simply discarded or isolated. If 

the foreign official seems to be reaping too much benefit 

from his association with the advisor, he may develop 

a reputation for being corrupt and “on the take” from 

foreign interests. If the senior official blames too much 

on the American, his own compatriots may start to 

view the official as weak and powerless. 

Just as hostages sometimes display symptoms of 

the “Stockholm Syndrome” and begin to identify and 

sympathize with their captors, some advisors begin 
61

to identify with the ambitions of personable foreign 

officials. It is not the American advisor’s role to help 

the official gain higher office or more power. Trying 

to groom the senior official for advancement is very 

likely to earn the Ambassador’s displeasure or the 

unwanted attention of the official’s own boss. While 

many American officers have tried to dabble in local 

politics by selecting a nominee for advancement, they 

rarely do it with full knowledge of his attributes or 

full understanding of the potential consequences. The 

results can be disastrous.

In a world very different from what is familiar to 

the American, and in a confusing, complex, and volatile 

environment, a local source who can provide meaning 

and structure to otherwise bewildering events and 

practices can be seized upon as a cultural life preserver. 

However, if the single-source’s interpretation is 

flawed, self-serving, speculative, or simply nonfactual, 

the American advisor’s credibility and effectiveness 

will suffer. For this reason the advisor must always 

avoid becoming too reliant on his counterpart’s—or 

any other single source’s—explanation of events or on 

his information. The advisor must take care to obtain 

his own advice and information about local conditions 

from multiple sources, to listen more than he talks, and 

to make final judgments with all due deliberation. 

At the other extreme of possible advisor-senior 

official relationships, there are foreign officials who are 

so incompetent, so corrupt, or so personally unpleasant 

that working with them in an advisory capacity may 

simply be impossible. Dealing with this situation is 

difficult and sensitive, requiring serious consultation 

with the U.S. military command and the Embassy. 

There are no black and white rules for these situations, 

and much depends on the individuals involved. In the 
62

end, however, it is counterproductive to remain in a 

relationship which is so sour that the American advisor 

is ignored, disregarded, or seriously misused. Breaking 

the relationship with U.S. mission concurrence is not a 

sign of failure on the advisor’s part, but a sign of good 

sense. 
63

VII. OTHER PLAYERS ON THE FIELD

In any country where there is an American military 

officer assigned to advise a senior foreign official, there 

is certain to be a large number of individuals, offices, 

agencies, and organizations, both foreign and domestic, 

which will also have an interest or a need to influence 

and advise the same official. Some will be hostile to 

the American advisor and some will be friendly and 

cooperative, but each one will have his own agenda. 

These include the American Embassy, other embassies 

and international organizations, NGOs, the foreign and 

domestic media, and local interest groups covering a 

wide spectrum.

The U.S. Government Writ Large.

In addition to his own U.S. military organization in 

the country, the advisor may have to deal with various 

members of the American Embassy’s Country Team 

or any number of American representatives. In many 

cases, these organizations’ functions will be carried out 

by contractors who are hired to implement development 

programs, and perform specific training, logistics, or 

advisory functions. These implementers may include 

such private U.S. firms as Research Triangle, Inc., the 

Academy for Educational Development, Bearing Point, 

etc., as well as American NGOs, which may or may 

not have U.S. government funding. Private security 

firms such as Blackwater, Dyncorp, and many others 

are used extensively, especially in conflict regions. The 

list of contractor companies who may be dealing with 

the central government, or with a Cabinet member or 

Governor, is almost endless. Visitors from Congress 

(CODELs and STAFFDELs) will undoubtedly meet 
64

with the senior official as well. All of these organizations, companies, and groups will have an impact on 

senior foreign officials and their offices. 

Every American who deals with him will regard 

the senior official in a slightly different light, and 

conflicts may arise within the official U.S. government 

community’s perception of the foreign official which 

will directly affect on the advisor’s mission. Except for 

the conduct of military operations, the senior American 

official in-country will always be the Ambassador, who 

directly represents the President of the United States. 

In general, the senior official with whom the advisor 

deals may also be routinely meeting with the American 

Ambassador or other members of the Country Team 

(see below), and the advisor may never learn what 

is discussed in private between the Ambassador and 

the senior official. The advisor must understand that 

the Ambassador’s word is the final one, and that the 

Ambassador sets American policy towards the official 

and his ministry.

Various other Americans may see the senior official 

less often than the advisor does, but if they are directly 

providing financial assistance to him or are perceived 

as trusted and discreet partners, they may have far 

more influence than the military advisor. USAID, for 

example, will be involved with nation-state building 

programs such as democracy and governance, elections, civil-society development, and construction and 

development projects that affect the official’s regional 

base of power or his personal prosperity, and thus also 

have influence with him. 

In general, it is very conceivable that various other 

American government actors will have different 

agendas than the military advisor, and it is in his 

interests to know all the official American actors in the 
65

area; and, to the extent possible, cooperate with them 

in dealing with the senior official.

The Country Team.

Every American Embassy has a Country Team, 

composed of senior American staff of the various U.S. 

government agencies and military units represented 

in the Embassy. An advisor will probably not be a 

member of the Country Team, but he will certainly 

be called on to brief officials who are, and he will also 

routinely report through his chain of command to 

senior military officers who are members.

In theory, the Country Team meetings or smaller 

gatherings chaired by the Ambassador or his Deputy 

Chief of Mission (DCM) will determine and/or 

articulate U.S. government policy which may directly 

affect the senior official with whom the advisor works. 

In fact, there are often wheels within wheels, and 

competing agendas and agency interests are carried 

out by members of the Country Team who represent 

different U.S. government agencies. The advisor must 

establish a working relationship with the members 

of the Country Team, but must be aware that he 

will not always receive assistance, full disclosure, or 

cooperation from all members of the Country Team. 

Misunderstandings and problems in cooperation 

can easily occur where there is a communications 

gap or when U.S. advisors or maneuver forces do not 

understand that their actions can impact negatively 

on overall American policy. For example, in a recent 

incident in Afghanistan, the residence compound 

of a very senior Member of Parliament with close 

ties to the American Embassy was raided by Afghan 

security forces who were accompanied by American 
66

security advisors. The consequence was an uproar in 

Parliament, hostile media reaction, and a feeling within 

the Afghan political structure that American policy 

was inconsistent and confused. 

Other International Players.

Conditions change from country to country, but it is 

certain that some combination of international agencies 

and advisors will also be dealing with and trying to 

influence the senior official. The United Nations (UN) 

may have a significant presence in the host country, 

and the UN is composed of a wide variety of different 

agencies. International organizations like the Red 

Cross and the World Food Program may be very active, 

and there are certain to be a number of NGOs that 

are in-country. Other countries will have embassies 

and visiting delegations that affect the senior official’s 

decisionmaking as well.

If the number of such organizations, agencies, 

NGOs, and all of their employees, contractors, and 

advisors were limited and cooperative, and if they had 

a single agenda, the advisor’s life would be a simple 

one. The reality, however, is that there may be myriad 

foreign disparate groups, offices, and individuals, 

all with some claim to legitimacy and resources, that 

want to influence the senior official in different ways. 

What is absolutely certain is that some—or many—of 

these entities will be hostile to the American advisor’s 

presence. Also certain is that some of these will have 

much better access—even if it is hidden from view—to 

the official than his American advisor will.
67

The Domestic Constituency.

“All politics are local.” No matter what the American advisor says or does, it is still the domestic constituency which has the greatest impact on the senior 

official’s decisionmaking, and the advisor’s best recommendations will only be applied if they happen to 

coincide with the goals and interests of the official’s 

local supporters. The advisor must know who the 

official’s constituency is and where its interests lie.

Ultimately the senior official will have to serve 

both the interests of his own country and respond to 

his local constituency. When the advisor, the American 

military commander and the Ambassador are longgone, the local constituency will still be there. The 

senior official’s relationship with this constituency is 

likely to be more intense than would be the case for 

an American or other western official, with personal 

security and even his life depending on it. 

The local constituency may be a general regional 

populace, a collection of ex-commanders and soldiers 

from the same side of the country’s last war, a religious 

group, a business consortium, the local version of 

the Mafia, or the members of a particular family 

clan, but this is the group to whom the official owes 

final allegiance if he is to survive and to whom he is 

accountable.

The Media.

The advisor should not shy away from the media. 

Journalists and cameras will be omnipresent around a 

senior leader, and can be useful and positive factors in 

the advisor’s mission.

Local and foreign media are certain to note the 

advisor’s presence, and their reaction to it will vary 
68

from the positive to the poisonous. Even the American 

media will view the advisor’s role in different ways, and 

he can envision publicity that might not be acceptable 

for viewing on the Armed Forces Network. However 

low key or discreet the advisor may be, details of his 

record and his activities will now be in the public 

realm and thus subject to question. This is not a matter 

of choice on the advisor’s part, but simply a reality. 

Media attention on the advisor will also be affected by 

the importance and performance of the senior official 

he is advising.

Media outreach by the advisor, on the other hand, 

can be a very useful tool in his mission. If a public affairs 

officer is attached to the team of advisors, so much the 

better. Positive outreach can forestall criticism, explain 

issues and problems, and provide a realistic picture of 

progress and goals to the public, all of which enhance 

the chances of a successful advisory mission. 

Unless the advisor is located on a secure base or 

in a controlled-access facility, the media may have full 

access to his work area, and may be closely following 

the daily activities of the senior official he is advising. 

Ignoring the media or trying to brush them off is 

usually not an option and will only make them portray 

the advisor’s role in a negative way.

At a minimum, the advisor should establish a good 

relationship with both embassy and military Public 

Affairs officers. They are professionals who know the 

ins and outs of media relations and can offer guidance, 

expertise, and information that will help the advisor. 

Using their guidance and advice, the advisor should 

also establish a personal relationship with appropriate 

media representatives who can serve as a source of 

information and support in their own right. Local or 

international journalists can be excellent resources for 
69

the advisor to learn more about his counterpart senior 

official, pointing out aspects of the official’s past or 

present behavior that explain his actions, and giving 

a heads up on political minefields that may pose 

challenges to the advisor’s role. 

Most importantly, however, the advisor must follow Country Team and military command guidelines 

in any contact with media. Facing a camera is not the 

time to freelance.
70

VIII. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO 

THE ADVISOR

There are resources available from the Department 

of Defense and Department of State to assist the 

advisor’s mission. In many cases these resources will 

be crucial for the advisor’s mobility and his ability to 

function in a country with a collapsing infrastructure. 

However, if he is not wearing a uniform and not 

directly attached to a military unit, obtaining these 

services can be a complex and frustrating process 

within the military system. Even if the advisor wears a 

uniform, attempting to obtain assistance from the local 

U.S. Embassy can bring him face to face with obstacles 

which may be more civilly presented but equally 

frustrating. 

Essential Services.

In order to be effective, the advisor must have 

reliable transportation that will allow him to move 

freely to ministerial, regional, or provincial offices, to 

meeting locations, and even to areas across the country 

that the foreign official would like to visit. The advisor 

may lose face if he is late to meetings or cannot be 

present due to transportation issues. The military 

possesses numerous tactical vehicles, but these require 

a trained and licensed operator and often require a 

force protection component to travel away from the 

Forward Operating Base. Depending on the situation, 

this type of transportation may be the only option 

available and will require significant coordination to 

ensure that transportation is arranged on time. Due 

to the advisor’s critical role, this bureaucracy can 

sometimes be mitigated by coordinating requirements 
71

with the military hierarchy. Leasing civilian vehicles 

which are more in keeping with the vehicles driven by 

the local population may be a possibility. One of these 

vehicles could be assigned to the advisor and should 

belong exclusively to him or the advisory team.

Local conditions are not always peaceful and may 

require the advisor to move through an unsafe area. In 

these situations, the advisor should be familiar with the 

rules for requesting force protection. This will normally 

entail the assignment of a group of armed military 

personnel to escort the advisor to his work place and 

remain in the vicinity until the advisor finishes his 

duties. The procedures to request this support can be 

time consuming and should be coordinated well in 

advance with the base defense operations center or the 

base military police. Another consideration involves the 

impact of this force on the foreign official’s perceptions 

and his willingness to continue to invite the advisor 

into his office or compound. In some cases, the foreign 

official may view an armed American presence as an 

occupation force, placing him at risk because of his 

collaboration with foreign military forces.

Radios and cell phones are essential for the 

advisor’s tasks and are typically plentiful. They allow 

him to relay information from the foreign official and 

can be a visible sign of the advisor’s importance and 

usefulness if it allows him to keep his counterpart in 

touch with foreign VIPs. The advisor should take care 

to always have extra batteries, a charger that works on 

the local electrical current, and an appropriate number 

of payment cards. All of these can be typically obtained 

from the military communications or logistics officers. 

Lacking the ability to communicate externally at a 

moment’s notice will diminish the advisor’s usefulness 

and affect his mission. Cell phones can frequently be 
72

out of range, so radios are important to provide quick 

connectivity to security forces when travelling to and 

from the foreign official’s workplace, to the locations 

of external meetings, and to visits in other provinces or 

regions.

*****

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, cell 

phone cards, which provided a quantifiable number of 

minutes, were in great demand. Although the cards could 

be commonly purchased on the streets of Afghanistan and 

there was apparently no shortage of them, within the U.S. 

military a rationing system was implemented. Under this 

system, various sections received a different quantity of cell 

phone cards each month. Without available minutes, cell 

phones were useless. Toward the end of the month, soldiers 

could be found going from office to office looking for spare 

cards to provide them an extra hour or two of cell phone 

coverage. For the astute advisor, one of the greatest rewards 

that could be given to a young Afghan policeman or soldier 

was a 20-minute “Roshan card.” 

*****

Another asset available to advisors is a plethora of 

country studies and intelligence, both unclassified and 

classified. Information available typically includes 

population studies, ethnographic studies, terrain 

studies, key personnel assessments, and reports from 

military units operating in the area. Other assets include 

studies about senior foreign officials developed by 

various agencies. This information is especially crucial 

as it may clarify what makes a foreign official “tick.” 

Such reports are difficult to access, but they are available 
73

and will help the advisor develop an understanding of 

the terrain. Information of this nature can be obtained 

from both the military headquarters and from the local 

U.S. Embassy. A wise advisor should seek out the 

military intelligence officer or Defense Attaché at the 

Embassy, explain his upcoming task, and ask for all 

information that is available. 

Common to military operations is a component of 

civilian contractors who are hired to provide continuity 

during enduring operations. These individuals act 

across the operational continuum, and the duration 

of their contract will often exceed the duration of the 

advisor’s assignment. Their personal knowledge and 

tendency to document their work plans, goals, and 

accomplishments can provide the advisor with a wealth 

of information. Many of the contractors working to 

establish institutional processes and functionality are 

required to maintain long-term, detailed plans which 

delineate a series of quantifiable objectives, and these 

are often tied to one-on-one interactions with foreign 

officials and large forum meetings. Tapping into the 

knowledge and written products maintained by U.S. 

government contractors will help to educate the advisor on what has been done previously, on future projects that may directly involve the senior foreign official, and on potential future contacts that the advisor 

can help to coordinate. 

Military bases offer a significant number of facilities 

and services, to include meeting rooms and dining 

facilities. After establishing his relationship with the 

senior foreign official, it can be useful to invite him to 

the base and host him for a meal in conjunction with a 

meeting. However, there are numerous pitfalls to avoid 

in such hospitality. These include ensuring that the 

official is not subjected to security screening, making 

certain his vehicles are allowed onto the compound 
74

or base, and arranging a welcome by an appropriate 

level of official. A photographer should be present to 

document the event, and the foreign official should 

be invited to speak first at the meeting. Refreshments 

and food should be culturally appropriate. A reliable 

and proficient interpreter must be present, even if the 

official speaks English, because many foreign VIPs will 

insist on speaking their own language at a formal or 

public event. Based upon the facilities and support 

available, an American military base may also be a 

logical location to hold meetings with other parties and 

agencies who influence the foreign official. However, 

the advisor must always avoid being seen as arrogant 

or expecting other parties to come to him, balancing 

the use of American facilities against the potential 

negative perception.

Personal Risk: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.

Although personal safety is important, the wearing 

of protective gear and the requirement to be armed 

warrant discussion. An advisor entering a foreign 

official’s office with a Kevlar helmet, body armor, and 

a weapon will transmit the wrong message to a local 

official dressed in traditional clothing or a western 

suit and tie. If the advisor participates in meetings in 

such battle gear, it will provoke an even more negative 

reaction, and is likely to negate his ability to influence 

anyone. In Afghanistan, for example, foreign soldiers 

who come armed and in full protective gear to civilian 

events are often regarded as cowards by the local 

populace. Ultimately, the advisor must weigh the 

risks against the benefits, determine his own level of 

comfort, and then dispense with personal protective 

gear inside the workplace. The advisor should also 
75

consider wearing civilian clothes in place of a uniform, 

especially in an office setting. 

Traveling with a senior foreign official is another 

situation requiring consideration. If the advisor is 

asked to travel in host nation transportation and 

instead insists on using American military vehicles, 

he may be disinvited, because the foreign official 

can determine that he is at greater risk by including 

readily recognizable military assets in his delegation. 

The advisor should consult with his military and 

civilian chain of command to determine the feasibility 

of travelling with a foreign official and only using 

host nation support. If an advisor travels in a heavily 

armored SUV while the rest of the party is using 

normal sedans, it sends the message that he is afraid 

of his surroundings, or does not trust the official and 

other members of the local entourage. 
76

IX. PREPARATION AND COORDINATION—

APPROACHING THE JOB

The advisor’s best weapon is knowledge, and 

gaining proficiency starts with the day he learns of 

his assignment and continues until his departure from 

the position. Knowing the facts about the country, the 

legal framework for his own presence, and meeting the 

people who will support his mission are all essential as 

he begins his duties. He should go forward steadily and 

with patience, always remembering that the advisory 

role is not a zero-sum game, but a process of shaping 

both the senior foreign official as well as the advisor in 

order to help both do a better job.

The Preparation Checklist.

1. Develop Historical/Situational Awareness of the 

Country. Query academic institutions, knowledge 

centers, trade journals, and government and international organizations. Look for books available on 

Amazon.com, and check the shelves at Borders and 

Barnes & Noble. Spend time on Google, Wikipedia, 

and the Internet in general. Useful sites include 

www.amazon.com, www.barnesandnoble.com, www.state. 

gov, www.usaid.gov, www.cia.gov, www.defense.gov, 

www.smallwarsjournal.com, www.csis.org, www.usip.org, 

www.mideasti.org, www.carnegieendowment.org, www.

wilsoncenter.org, www.brookings.edu, www.Strategic 

StudiesInstitute.army.mil, www.effectivestates.org, www.

carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters, and many, many 

more.

2. Obtain Practical Knowledge of the Country. Read 

commonly available treaties and country studies, visit 
77

cultural portals, and talk to people previously assigned 

to the area. Search the embassy (both American and 

host country) websites of the country to which you are 

being assigned. (American embassy websites overseas 

can be accessed through www.state.gov, and foreign 

embassy websites can be obtained through a quick 

Google search.) Know how your own country and its 

history and institutions relate to the host country. 

3. Develop and Employ Personal Contacts. Use officers 

at the U.S. Department of State, the military service 

war colleges, academic institutions, and think tanks 

to get advice and direction. Try to attend appropriate 

lectures and conferences sponsored by academic and 

government agencies, because one timely conference 

can introduce you to a network of people dealing with 

your country. 

4. Understand Local and National Holidays.

Understand the national importance of the country’s 

holidays and their impact upon work. Remember the 

time-honored maxim of never arriving at your new 

post on a holiday. Learn which actions are appropriate 

to demonstrate a deeper understanding of local 

holidays (e.g., if, how, and when to send congratulatory 

messages). 

5. Know and Understand U.S. and International 

Policy towards the Region. Contact Department of 

Defense and Department of State regional bureaus to 

obtain official policy guidance. Check the local U.S. 

Embassy website for the nation to which you will be 

deploying to access recent speeches. 
78

6. Read Essential Documents. Read the host nation’s 

constitution, and be familiar with the American 

constitution as well. Read any Status of Forces 

Agreements (SOFA) that explain the U.S. military 

presence. Study international (UN or NATO) declarations involving the intervention or situation within the 

nation. Read any treaties and agreements to which 

the host country is a signatory. Know the relevant 

strategic and policy documents which the host country 

and the United States have jointly produced or signed 

(bilateral agreements). 

7. Be Conversant in the Local Governmental Structure.

Understand the type of government and its basic 

structure. Study the structure of the specific ministry 

to which you are assigned.

8. Know the Basics of the Language. “Hello, goodbye, 

thank you, yes, no”—the basic terms of politeness—are 

mandatory. Learn one or two new words every day.

9. Recognize Nonverbal Communication. Learn the 

physical signals and gestures that convey meaning in 

the local culture, and stop using American gestures 

that send unwanted meanings.

10. Understand and Apply Cultural Knowledge. 

Learn the basic etiquette that is used locally. Identify 

a colleague, interpreter, or local friend who can guide 

you on points of etiquette and culture. 

11. Seek Knowledge from Your Predecessor. Contact 

the person you are replacing. Determine what preparations can be made to make transition easier on both 

sides.
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12. Research the Foreign Official. Learn the name of 

the person you will be advising. Do a name search on 

Google. Read any articles about him and anything that 

he has written. Coordinate with appropriate agencies 

to get a briefing on him. 

13. Understand the U.S. Command Structure. Learn 

who you will work for while serving as an advisor. 

Contact this individual(s), and identify any issues and 

agendas prior to deploying. Schedule a meeting with 

him as soon as possible when you arrive in country. 

14. Understand the Key Individuals in the Chain of 

Command. Immediately after arrival at your post, 

schedule meetings to introduce yourself at the U.S. 

Embassy (Office Directors, Deputy Chief of Mission, 

and even the Ambassador), Military Headquarters 

(Commanding General), or International Assistance 

Mission Headquarters (Special Envoys, others). 

15. Coordinate In-country Logistics Support. The 

Embassy or military unit will have its own check-in 

list, but be certain to include the following: 

• Arranging daily transportation;

• Cell phones/radios/chargers;

• 24/7 contact information of the interpreter;

• Force protection; and,

• Key personnel contact numbers.

16. Meet Your Interpreter. Before you begin to use 

him as a translator, spend a significant amount of time, 

one on one, understanding this individual. Make sure 

he understands you. 
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17. The Current Advisor. Spend as much time as 

possible with him in order to learn procedures and 

practices that have worked in the past, things to avoid, 

office practices, and other helpful information. 

18. Ask For an Introductory Meeting with the Foreign 

Official. This should be a long session that the departing 

advisor attends. Discuss his departure timing, and 

when you will assume your responsibilities. Be certain 

the senior official agrees to the timing.

19. Observe the Current Status Quo. Shadow the 

current advisor and simply watch what he does. 

Observe office protocol and best business practices. 

20. Take Charge. Establish a transition date and when 

you will assume your primary duties. The previous 

advisor should not interact with the foreign official 

once you have taken charge. 
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X. DEPARTING THE COUNTRY

The advisor’s main goal should be to work himself 

out of a job and make the advisory role unnecessary in 

the country. By passing his experience on to a successor 

and, more importantly, to local leaders, he improves 

his chance of a successful mission. 

A good advisor is both a teacher and a student. 

His relationship with a foreign official may—or may 

not—result in influencing the official to act in ways 

that will benefit both the country of assignment and 

the United States. At the very least, however, it is an 

educational process for the advisor himself, and he will 

leave his post with a much greater appreciation for a 

different culture and a different military and political 

reality. This provides immediate benefit for him, his 

chain of command, and the overall interests of the U.S. 

government.

Every assignment comes to an end, some according 

to a time line that simply ordains the number of months 

in advance, some when a project is complete, some when 

circumstance—wars, changes in national policy—no 

longer permit an American to remain at his posting. 

While the period of time spent at an assignment is by 

no means the only factor for evaluating the advisor’s 

success, it is an important one. Becoming familiar and 

confident in the environment, developing personal 

relationships with the senior official and those around 

him, watching the seeds of an idea germinate in the 

new environment, knowing that one’s ideas and advice 

are being tested and applied—all these are difficult to 

measure by standard metrics or to regulate by routine 

assignment procedures.

A major part of the advisor’s departure is preparing 

the way for his successor. Because the assignment 
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bureaucracy can be impersonal and remote, he must 

stress to his leadership the date of his departure to ensure 

that his successor is identified and provided a period 

of training and overlap in order to effect a seamless 

transition. Records, accomplishments, failures, a wish 

list, and as much information as possible should be 

passed to the incoming advisor and his team. A senior 

official from the Presidential Palace noted that not 

doing this was a consistent failure of foreign advisors 

departing Kabul. 

There are ways to prepare a successor. If there is a 

full advisory team, departure dates can be staggered to 

ensure that the new personnel have time to learn their 

duties while some members of the old team are still 

in place and available for guidance. This is especially 

important for the head of the team and his deputy, and 

consideration should be given to having staggered 

assignments so that one or two of the top echelon of 

advisors remain to serve with the new team. Email 

contact between an advisor and his successor well in 

advance of departure is important and fairly easy, and 

every effort should be made to prevent gaps in the 

advisory presence. 

The advisor should leave time for farewells. To 

depart precipitously will be an insult to his foreign 

colleagues and friends and place his successor in an 

awkward position. Even after leaving, he should 

remember to maintain social contact with friends and 

colleagues, but in a way that does not detract from his 

successor’s official role. Today’s foreign Governor or 

Colonel can be tomorrow’s Head of State or Minister 

of Defense, and the relationship will bear fruit in the 

future. 

As he analyzes his own performance, the advisor 

should not be overly harsh on himself. His duty, after 
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all, is to advise and consult, and not to be a colonial 

administrator. The advisor cannot—and should not—

do “everything.” That is the responsibility of the 

country’s officials and citizens, not the American officer. 

The advisor must always remember that he can make 

a significant and long-lasting contribution, however, 

and that there is great value in his efforts for both the 

United States and the host country. His advice may 

save American and host country lives, improve living 

conditions for many people, and foster good relations 

and a more hopeful future for both countries.

In the end, the personal nature of the advisory 

relationship will also affect the assignment timetable. 

An advisor should stay long enough to have an impact, 

but from the beginning must try to do his job well 

enough to make himself unnecessary and dispensable. 

Influencing and advising the foreign official to the 

point where he no longer needs an American advisor 

is the true mark of success.

ENDNOTES

1. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, “The Advisory 

Challenge,” Special Warfare, January-February 2008, p. 23.

2. Edward C. Stuart, “American Advisors Overseas,” Military 

Review, February 1965. Cited in Robert D. Ramsey III, Advice for 

Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, 

Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper, GWOT OP#19, Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, p. 17.

3. Ibid., p. 23.