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JPRS-SSA-87-002

7 JANUARY 1987

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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JPRS-SSA-87-002

7 JANUARY 1987

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Efforts Underway To Halt Erosion Threatening West Coast

(Sory Bälde; AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, 15 Oct 86) 1

Study Examines Two Alternative Trading Routes for Southern Region

(John D'Oliveira; THE STAR, 20 Nov 86) 4

Beira-Mutare Route Vital to SADCC 4

Experts Confident About Tazara's Future 5

CAPE VERDE

Farming, Anti-Desertification Projects Described

(Evelyne Sylva; AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, 29 Oct 86) 7

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

EPRP Sends Envoys to U.S., Canada, Europe

(THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, 8 Nov 86) 11

Controversy Surrounds Proposed Constitution Amendments

(DAILY NATION, various dates) , 12

Provisions Slated for Amendment Outlined, by Mutegl Njau 12

Council of Churches Warns on Changes, by Mutegi Njau,

Pius Nyamora 14

Backbencher Rubia Demands Clarification, by

Mutegi Njau, et al. 15

- a -
Moi on Supremacy of Kanu Party

(THE WEEKLEY REVIEW, 21 Nov 86) 19

Cotu Elections: Pro-Government V. Pro-Worker Line Up

(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 14 Nov 86) . 21

Briefs

Journalists Sentenced for Mwakenya Activities 25

LIBERIA

Ministers Examine Economic Problems, Liquidity, Privatization

(Paul Jeffy, Amelia Ward Interview; X-RAY, Nov 86) 26

MOZAMBIQUE

Fight Against Hunger First Priority of Chissano Regime

(Jose Rui Cunha; 0 JORNAL, 7 Nov 86) 37

Briefs

North Koreans To Combat RENAMO 41

British Technical Assistance Program 41

Soviets Moved to Maputo 42

NIGERIA

Briefs

Former GNPP Politician Quits Politics 43

SOMALIA

Clan Affiliations of Military, Police Analyzed

(AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 29 Oct 86) 44

UGANDA

Musevini Outlines Measures To Boost Agricultural Production

(NEW VISION, 7 Nov 86) 48

Mutebi on Political Role of Baganda

(Joseph Mokokha; SUNDAY NATION, 9 Nov 86) 49

NRM Plans To Secure, Integrate Karamoja Described

(Cathy Watson; NEW VISION, 4 Nov 86) ... 51

Rehabilitation of Kilembe Copper Mine Approved

(AFRICA DIGEST, 22 Nov 86) 56

- b
ZIMBABWE

Mugabe Addresses Internal, Regional Issues, Relations With RSA

(Robert Mugabe Interview; LEADERSHIP, No 5, 1986)........ 57

Nation's Efforts To Attain Non-Racial Society Explored

(Marshall W. Murphree; LEADERSHIP, No 5, 1986) 63

Briefs

Work on Irrigation Dam 67

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER/GOVERNMENT

Ranks of Police To Be Extended by 60 Percent

(Louis Smit; THE CITIZEN, 29 Nov 86).... 68

BLACKS

Buthelezi Discusses Black Political Prospects, Onset of Sanctions

(Mangosuthu Buthelezi Interview; FINANCIAL MAIL,

14 Nov 86) 69

Percy Qoboza Deplores Death of Former Lesotho Minister

(CITY PRESS, 23 Nov 86) 71

Outgoing NECC Secretary Discusses Value of School Boycotts

(Molefe Tsele Interview; THE WEEKLY MAIL,

28 Nov-4 Dec 86) 73

Briefs

32 Apply for TSA Citizenship 76

SOCIOPOLITICAL/OTHER

10 Durban Beaches To Be Integrated

(Richard Compton; THE DAILY NEWS, 21 Nov 86) 77

NGK Moderator Explains Church's Attitude Toward Apartheid

(Johan Heyns Interview; LEADERSHIP, No 5, 1986) 78

Expert Discusses Government's Commitment To Separate Education

(Ken Hartshorne; LEADERSHIP, No 5, 1986)... 84

UCT Councillor, Businessman Propose Far-Reaching Federal Options

(Hans Middelmann; LEADERSHIP, No 5, 1986) 89

- c -
ECONOMIC

Gerhard de Kock Gives Broad View of State of Economy

(Gerhard de Kock Interview; FINANCIAL MAIL, 14 Nov 86)... 96

Krogh Describes New Position as Anti-Sanctions Policy Coordinator

(FINANCIAL MAIL, 14 Nov 86) 99

Harry Schwarz Discusses PFP's Economic Policy

(Harry Schwarz Interview: FINANCIAL MAIL, 21 Nov 86) 101

INDUSTRIAL/S&T

Hunting Rifle, Several Military Weapons Discussed

(SALVO, Jul/Aug 86) 103

Musgrave Hunting Rifle Described, by Lucas Potgieter 103

Review of Littleton Products 105

Artillery, MG's Described 107

/12223

d -
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO HALT EROSION THREATENING WEST COAST

Dakar AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 15 Oct 86 pp 22-23

[Article by Sory Bälde; "The Sea Against Africa"]

[Text] For centuries uncounted, the coast of West Africa has

been slipping into the Atlantic Ocean. The phenomenon was first

reported by the colonial authorities and, today, almost nobody

talks about it. In Senegal, for instance, Rufisque, Yoff, St.

Louis, Joal, and a lot more segments of the shoreline'are yielding a few meters each year to the hungry sea. Not so long ago,

people still remember, a great many houses in the Yoff section

of town had simply slipped into the sea in the course of a single night.

At Rufisque, for some 30 years and more, the people who live here

have been struggling against this erosion. The young people are

not quite so keenly aware of what is happening as are their elders. Their parents, those who are very old and those who are

not so very old, remember that there used to be a broad beach

between their houses and the shoreline, a beach where, for years

on end, they had played soccer. The young ones have seen that

beach disappear, and their elders, despite their many efforts

and their fervent prayers, have watch the (inexorable?) inroads of the threat.

In Togo, too, since 1980 the sea has advanced at least 135

meters toward the interior of the continent. Palm-groves have

vanished, and so have tourist attractions such as the city of

Aneho, the ancient capital of the country—all victims of erosion. The road that runs along the shore has twice been abandoned, while several villages, to avoid being drowned out, have

already had to pull back from the advancing tides, and to do so

repeatedly. In the capital, Lome, close to the phosphate enrichment plant, 15 meters of the shoreline have been swallowed up.

In Ghana, the city of Keta, which was home to at least 10,000

souls, has slipped into the sea. In Guinea, even though the
damage has not been devastating, the Atlantic has mounted onslaughts on Touguiwondy and Corinthit (conakry neighborhoods).

Benin's coast is also under attack, and that is something that

must inevitably worry Lagos, which is only a few tens of kilometers from this "cancer of the continent." To put it bluntly,

the entire region, from the Gulf of Guinea to San-Louis in Senegal, is affected. The littoral regions of 6entralaAfrica, too,

must start preparations now, because the symptoms of the disease

are beginning to be felt.

This erosion is the inevitable and predictable result of man's

wanton exploitation of the environment. It is,however, and at

the same time, the result of several natural phenomena, such as

the inexorable battering of the great swells from the sea, the

rains, and the waves. For these natural causes, littoral erosion generally occurs only during the rainy season that lasts

from July through September, especially along the Senegal coasts,

It is during this season that runoff from the torrential rains

mixed with the high surf, devastate all the sandy portions of

the shore.

Today it would be no exaggeration to say that it is, more than

anything else, the behavior of people that encourages the sea's

inroads into the continent. First of all such destructive behavior is negligence: people are not given to face up to danger until it is about to strangle them. Next, and perhaps most

of all, is the removal of sand from the beaches for use in

building houses, which has marked the path of erosion. Lastly,

in the cases of Togo and Ghana, it needs to be pointed out that

construction of Ghana's hydroelectric dam across the Volta at

Akossombo is the prime cause of erosion in the region.

This dam holds back most of the sediments which, in the old days,

used to be deposited along the Atlantic coast where they halted

all erosion. To put it another way, there are development problems which were sloppily conceived and which trigger other even

bigger problems. Lastly, it must be noted that, in our countries, the habit of expecting "somebody else" to bail us out of

our troubles is not very helpful in coping with our difficulties. If indeed, once the erosion problem was identified, efforts to counter it had been undertaken, we should perhaps

never have come to this tragedy now being played out with a cast

of thousands along our Atlantic coasts.

Now that the powers that be are trying to treat this "cancer,"

they are once again faced with a disconcerting finding: yet

another priority we had forgotten. What is it? The fact that

in order to cope efficaciously with this disease, they must come

up, right now, with some painfully large sums of money to treat

an illness that, while it was not yet this severe, would have

called for only a small investment.
In Togo the government has applied to the UNDP, the World Bank,

and the European Economic Community, all of which have financed

studies. We are still stuck in this stage, even though the

scourge has been eating away at the country for at least 15

years- True, we have done better than some other countries

where the issue is given the silent treatment. The authorities

are aware, though, that there is no more time to waste, they

say, because, "if we don't do something about it, within the

next year, the phosphate storage and loading docks (phosphate

accounts for 50 percent of the country's exports) as well as

the processing plant, will have been engulfed."

A race against time will start within the next few months. Already the idea of erecting breakwaters perpendiculat to the

coast to catch and retain the runoff sediments has been approved

to halt the erosion. It will be a herculean undertaking in which

countries such as Mali, Burkina, and Niger, which depend for a

major portion of their supplies on the Port of Lome, should support. None of these states, though, seems to be aware of the

enormity of the destruction of the Togolese littoral by erosion.

In Senegal efforts are already under way to combat erosion.

The trouble with all this is that the continent has not stopped

inching into the sea. The state of emergency was decreed long ago

by the Public Works Directorate, which is leading the fight all

along the Senegalese coast against the advancing sea- As for

the special case of Rufisque, the zone hardest hit by the invading waters, a number of projects have already been completed.

Even today, to continue with its program, the Public Works Directorate will shortly issue a call for bids for a new section

of dike extending along 400 meters.

The first portion, 930 meters in length, which cost more than

400 million francs, has enabled the people of Roufisque to look

forward with high hopes to what their future will be.

At Public Works headquarters they feel that "the ball is in the

government's court now- "' and that it must make the wherewithal

available to us, "Our plan,"adds Yaya Badiane, an engineer xn

Public Works, "will not be operational until we get help from

the government." Pursuit of the Public Works project at Rufxsque will take only a trifling 400 million francs. If we put xt

off, it will certainly cost more and, furthermore, xt wxll come

too late to save the houses, schools, mosques, and government

offices in the prefecture which could not even contemplate standing up against the breakers.

6182

CS0: 3419/33
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

STUDY EXAMINES TWO ALTERNATIVE TRADING ROUTES FOR SOUTHERN REGION

Beira-Mutare Route Vital to SADCC

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by John D'Oliveira]

[Text]

If Zambia and Malawi can use the Mozambican port of Beira for all their imports and

exports, .they will save almost R600 million

in vital foreign exchange.

This, in turn, will mean an equivalent loss

of earnings by the South African transport

system.

These points are made in the latest month-:

ly bulletin of the Africa Institute of South

Africa by one of the AI researchers, Mr

. Andre Wilsenach.

He points out that the Beira Corridor —

between Beira and the Zimbabwean town of.

Mutare — is vital to the interests of Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

Both the Mutare-Beira railway and thei

port of Beira are handling only a small proportion of their traffic potential.

However, should both be rehabilitated and

developed, the route will offer massive savings for Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, all

three of which are now heavily dependent

on South African railways and harbours.

Whereas Durban is 2 065 km from Harare,

2 571km from Lusaka and 3 658 km from

Blantyre, the distance from these capitals to

Beira is 600 km, 1050 km and 649 km respectively.

Based on the amount of traffic which

moves through South Africa from Malawi

and Zambia, these countries will save

R598 million if they can use Beira instead of

Durban.

Mr Wilsenach says that Zambia (40 percent

of exports and 70 percent of imports), Zimbabwe (between 65 and 90 percent of exports and between 65 and 80 percent of imports) and Malawi (50 percent of exports and

60 percent of imports) are forced to use South

African railways and ports.

However, Beira harbour is delapidated and

ineffective, the railway line is unsafe, freight

and insurance rates are high and the movement of ships through Beira is erratic. j

This is largely due to the civil war between i

Mozambican Government troops and Mo-1

zambique National Resistance movement!

rebels during the course of which large sec- j

tions of the Beira-Mutare railway line have ;

been destroyed and Beira harbour installations damaged.

Troop protection

As a result, only one train a day in each

direction can use the line under the protection of an estimated 4 000 Zimbabwean

troops who have been sent to protect the corridor from the MNR.

In 1984, Beira harbour could handle only

1,3 million tons of cargo.

Finally, the line from Beira to Blantyre is

totally inoperative, and Mr Wilsenach says

experts believed that it will be impossible to

rehabilitate the line for as long as the war

continues.

It is against this background that a massive/international effort is being made to reconstruct, rehabilitate and develop both the

Beira-Mutare railway and the port installations at Beira.

In April, a conference was held in Maputo

at which a 10-year plan aimed at increasing
the traffic through Beira from 1,3 million

tons a year to 5,1 million tons a year by

1995. v

The three-phase plan would have cost almost Rl 500 million.

In order to raise money for the scheme,

SADCC held a conference in Beira recently

during which 63 separate projects were presented to a group of "donor" countries and in- •

ternational organisations. Of the 63 projects,

40 involving a total expenditure of almost

R600 million were identified as "priority

projects".

After two days of discussion, the conference adopted a package of 26 projects which

will cost an estimated R350 million.

Finally, representatives from the European Community, the World Bank and the

African Development Bank agreed to become involved in the 26 "priority projects"

and said they could raise R290 million of the

R350 million required.

The SADCC said it would not be a problem

raising the additional R60 million.

The most urgent of the projects involves

the rehabilitation of Beira harbour where 11

berths will have to be rebuilt at a cost of

about R136 million.

The 314 km railway from Beira to Mutare

will have to be relaid and its various attendant facilities will have to be rehabilitated and improved.

Major rehabilitation

Once this work has been done, more than

five million tons of goods can be moved

through Beira every year.

Apart from this major rehabilitation

sceme, the Nordic countries have announced

that they will become involved in a R450 million project to rehabilitate both the harbour

and the railway.

The Reagan Administration has also said

that it is considering a Rl 300 million development grant for the SADCC countries,

aimed mainly at improving the region's

transport infrastructure.

Mr Wilsenach says this indicates that the

Beira corridor can be developed into a shortcut for Southern Africa.

However, much will depend on how effectively the different contributions can be coordinated and whether Mozambique can resolve the military and political differences

within that country.

Experts Confident about Tazara'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by John D'Oliveira]

[Text]

Despite the many, varied and serious problems which have plagued

the so-called Great Freedom Railway from Dar es Salaam to Zambia,

experts seem "generally confident" , about its future.

Writing in the latest monthly bulletin of the Africa Institute of South

Africa, Mr Andre Wilsenach says

that the Tazara railway has shown

that it can be run profitably — and

that this has eliminated much of the

scepticism over the line.

First conceived in 1924, it was not

until Rhodesian UDI threatened

Zambian trade links with the south

that the project got under way.

In 1967 Zambia and Tanzania

signed a joint agreement with China

in terms of which China would cons Future

struct the railway, provide the locomotives and rolling stock and supply the necessary money by way of

a R300 million interest-free loan.

Repayments would be stretched

over 30 years, starting in 1983.

Construction of the Great Freedom Railway (as it was dubbed by

the Chinese) by more than 5 000 Chinese workers started in 1970 and, by

1973 it had reached the Zambian

border. Two years later, the line

linked up with Zambia's existing

rail system.

Workers had laid 1 860 km of

track, built 147 stations and 300

bridges, constructed 26 tunnels and

dug more than 2 200 cuttings i

through Tanzania's southern highlands.
* The line was designed to carry a!

freight load of 2,5 million tons a

year, including almost all of Zambia's precious copper exports.

However, right from the time the

first freight train ran in 1976, the

railway was beset with problems.

In 1984 it had to be closed for a

period of four months and it has

never been able to carry more than

65 percent of Zambia's exports and

35 percent of its imports.

Capacity

Nor had it been able to handle

more than about 1,2 million tons of

freight — less than half its designed

capacity — a year.

One of the major problems had

been Dar es Salaam's inability to :

Jiandle_ZambianJreight quickly and'.

effectively. Äs a result, storage faci- j

lities had to be constructed for Zam- '!•

bian goods and a complaining Zam- i

bia was expected to foot the bill

As a result of the Dar es Salaam

inefficiency, Zambian foreign earnings dropped and Zambia' was unable to pay for the use of the railway line and of the harbour facilities.

This led, in turn, to serious friction between Zambia and Tanzania

and between Zambia and the Tazara Railway Authority.

Apart from anything else, it resulted in Zambia's increased use of

/9274

CSO: 3400/569

the" longer, more expensive (but

much more efficient) South African

transport system. This further incensed Tanzania and the Tazara

Railway Authority, which saw the

Zambian use of South African facilities as a Zambian admission that

the Tazara railway had failed in its

major goal.

Another serious problem was the

constant.shortage of operational locomotives.

From the beginning the Chinese

locomotives had proved underpowered for the gradients in Tanzania's southern highlands. Locomotives frequently broke down in remote places and in May 1978, for

instance, only 48 of the 85 locomotives supplied by China were operational.

Of the locomotives provided by

China between 1976 and 1979,35 had

broken down completely and were

believed to be unrepairable. Another 18 have had to be fitted with

rebuilt engines instead of the Chinese engines.

Problems

Tazara officials believed they

needed a minimum of 52 locomotives which had had their engines

replaced. Alternatively, Tazara

could enlarge its fleet of 14 powerful German locomotives to 20.

Apart from these problems, the

Tazara authority's rolling stock

dwindled from 1 997 wagons in 1976

to 1 750 in 1984, largely because of

ineffective maintenance.

During the rainy season, long sections of the track were washed

away because of dubious construction methods. Problems had also

Jbeen experienced with^ bridges weakened by termites"

However, despite these setbacks,

Tazara turned its first profit in

1981/82 and the arrival of the 14

West German locomotives in June,

1983, meant a significant improvement in the railway's operations.

Improvements were made at the

Dar es Salaam harbour and, between October 1983 and December

1983 Tazara and the harbour increased the flow of cargo from

50 000 tons to 100 000 tons a month.

In 1984 China sent a team of experts to help with the management

of the railway line.

In December 1984, Tazara announced a 10-year development

plan involving 22 projects which

would cost about R350 million. Emphasis was placed on 15 projects

which would be implemented over

the first fiVe years at a cost of

R105 million.

Mr Wilsenach says that, if Tazara

can manage within the next few

years to get sufficient funds for the

improvement of the railway, it is

expected that the Tazara line will,

increasingly, provide Southern Africa with an alternative to South Africa's transport infrastructure.
CAPE VERDE

FARMING, ANTI-DESERTIFICATION PROJECTS DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 29 Oct 86 pp 22-23

LArticle by Evelyne Sylva: "A Challenge to Nature"]

LTextj It certainly takes real valor to make an

arid rock pile productive» This permanent battle

has become a daily and community effort» This is

the price of survival»

People are often surprised to hear about farming in Cape Verde after

years of drought and, moreover, that there are vegetable, fruit and

even grain harvests»

Is it just a pretense of production since it is far from meeting

the country's needs? Yes, it is» Nevertheless, the markets are full

of vegetables, fruits, corn, beans and other cereals»

How does Cape Verde do it, which, with its most unpredictable rainfall,

poor soil caused by overuse, unbalanced ecosystem and continuing

drought, looks like one of the most desolate landscapes of the

Sahelian countries?

The answer is certainly found in this sentence of French agronomist

Rene Dumont, "In other countries of the Sahel, people talk about the

drought; in Cape Verde, people work to fight it without needing to talk»"

The battle against the drought on the archipelago, a real challenge to

nature, is made up of several parts» It begins with the protection

and restoration of ground cover and pastures. Thus, a large

reforestation effort has been made» At the time of independence

that were only 3,000 hectares of forests out of a total 400,000

hectares. In 1985, 10 years later, nearly 27,000 hectares were

reforested with 13 million trees» Between now and the end of the

second development plan, Cape Verdian authorities plan to reforest

more than 60,000 hectares» The forest species selected for reforestation
are eucalyptus, pines, cypress for high elevations, prosopis,

parkinsonia for ground covering and Angolan peas which have certain

drought-resistant qualities.

Water has long been a precious liquid here because of the unevenly

distributed, unpredictable and limited rainfall, and many efforts have

been made to collect and conserve it.

For example, on the Island of Fogo, the community or individuals dug

wells to collect and conserve the limited rain water.

At this level, the main difficulty lies in retaining the water.

Studies are under way about providing more drinking water.

Similarly, the country has become involved in the restoration and

diversification of water facilities. More than 14,000 dikes were

built across the islands to conserve water from torrential rains which

otherwise washes much sediment to the sea and impoverishes the soil

still more. To save the available water, there are about 642 wells,

dozens of canals were dug and efforts were made to desalinate sea

water for farming and drinking purposes.

The MDR IRural Development Movement] officials explained the limited use

of fertilizers by the high cost of chemical fertilizers (for the

peasants) and their recent introduction into farming. Currently

cow and chicken droppings are mainly used.

Scientific research is not ignored. The National Center for

Agricultural Research has projects involving varietal improvement

(in other words, the development of strains of corn and beans, the

basic foods of the people, which are more resistant to climatic

conditions).

Quality seed production goes on. There is a 5-year project to improve

and increase potato production while decreasing hard currency expenses

for the import of seeds. Over 120 hectares are farmed.

If MDR officials are to be believed, truck garden farming is doing well

in Cape Verde. "We could even be self-sufficient in vegetables,"

one of the two told us. The land allotted for this is certainly

considerable--300 hectares of tomatoes, pimentos, cabbages, lettuce

and cucumbers, and 250 hectares (Santiago, San Antao) for sweet

potatoes and manioc. Some islands supposedly even produce a surplus

of vegetables. Exportation from one island to another is the

bottleneck; it is not always easy and, unfortunately, there are still

no real refrigeration facilities for produce. Produce sometimes even

spoils in the markets.
This fight against nature is a struggle for survival« Agriculture

employs more than 65 percent of the total population. Most of the

latter are semi-urbanized and farm during the rainy season« Moreover,

as everywhere else, women represent 30 percent of the work force in

this sector»

Various types of crops are cultivated on the islands to make these

arid lands productive. More than 35,000 hectares, 58 percent, are

devoted to non-irrigated crops on the island of Santiago, More than

95 percent of the land is allocated for corn and beans.

Some 200 hectares are irrigated. The farming islands (Santiago and

San Antao) split 40 percent of the space. Sugar cane and

bananas (for export) take up the most land there, followed by sweet

potatoes, manioc and vegetables.

The challenge is far from being won since the country's production is

clearly less than the consumers' needs. The food deficit in 1986 was

around 13,675 tons of corn and 4,000 tons of beans.

The corn and bean harvests were disastrous in 1985—1,323 tons of

corn and 2,130 tons of beans while total consumption needs in 1986

amounted to 43,600 tons of corn and 7,300 tons of beans.

Fortunately, food aid (29,300 tons of cereals, for example) helps

reduce food imports which account for an average of 40 percent of the

total imports.

The other sector of Cape Verdian agriculture is stock breeding.

Curiously, it does not seem much affected by agricultural problems.

The advantage lies in the fact that harvest by-products are used for

livestock—the white tips of sugar cane, corn husks, dried sweet

potato vines and agro-business by-products (the flour mill of

San Vincente makes mixed feed for pigs and milk cows).

Finally, agriculture, with its problems, is starting enterprises and

production units. The ENAVI LNational Poultry EnterpriseJ raises and

markets chicks, chickens and eggs; the Enterprise for the Development

of Farming and Stock Breeding produces and markets farm products and

livestock. There is also an agro-business complex (Justino Lopes)

in JPraia which deals in fruit and vegetable production, farm food

processing and meats.

This effort to give proper importance to Cape Verdian farming,

particularly to raise the people's nutritional standard is embodied

in the Monte Gelnebra (Fogo Island) farm. Initially, the purpose was

to collect and use spring water (Nona Senhora do Socorro) which

flowed to the sea, in the context of an integrated development project

on the islands of Fogo and Brava,
Today this farm with a total surface of 60 hectares (16 irrigated)

has a considerable fruit and vegetable harvest. Monte Genebra sells

70 percent of its crop directly to the people of Fogo. However, the

limited buying power of the people, the lack or inefficiency of

refrigeration and transportation facilities and farm-related problems

(weeds, fertilizer shortage) limit production. With the coming of the

rams this year, the Cape Verdian peasants are confident.

In spite of everything, farming remains the principal resource in

Cape Verde for the moment. For this reason, many projects are

centered around it.

9479

CSO: 3419/38

10
ETHIOPIA

EPRP SENDS ENVOYS TO U.S., CANADA, EUROPE

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Nov 86 p 4

[Text] For the first time since it was formed in 1975 the Ethiopian People's

Revolutionary Party, the most secretive of the Ethiopian opposition groups,

has sent two of its leaders to the United States, Canada and Europe for a

public campaign of propaganda and contact. After a two-month tour of North

America, the two delegates of the 23-member EPRP Central Committee, who called

themselves Marsha and Fisha, spoke to THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER on November

4. They said the movement was now military active in five districts (awraja)

of Gondar and Gollam regions, east of Lake Tana. They said their forces

numbered "fewer than 3,000 armed men", but said the present economic and

political situation favoured the EPRP, given the enormous discontent of the

rural population.

At the same time, the EPRP leaders said, the political alliance which the

party had formed with the Ethiopian Democratic Union after its 1984 congress

had begun armed operations four months ago. The EDU, which up till then had

no fighters inside Ethiopia, had launched a guerrilla campaign in Gondar

region.

/13104

CSO: 3400/53*

11
KENYA

CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS PROPOSED CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

Provisions Slated for Amendment Outlined

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 15 Nov 86 pp 1, 24

[Article by Mutegi Njau]

[Text] A bill seeking to amend the Constitution to abolish the office of the

Chief Secretary and to increase the number of electoral parliamentary seats

from 158 to 168 has been published.

Appearing in a special issue of the KENYA GAZETTE published yesterday, the

Bill also seeks to amend the Constitution to remove the security of tenure for

the holders of the office of the Attorney-General and the Controller and

Auditor-General.

The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment Bill) 1986, will be tabled in Parliament

next week and, if passed, will come into operation on a day to be named by the

President through KENYA GAZETTE notice.

According to the Bill, section 22(1) of the Constitution establishing the

office of the Chief Secretary will be repealed and replaced by a new section.

The new section 22(1) gives the President powers to appoint a number of

Permanent Secretaries that he may determine.

Section 22(2) establishes the office of the Permanent Secretary to the Office

of the President who "shall be the Head of the Public Service."

The older section 22(1), which has been delted, stated: "there shall be a

Chief Secretary who shall be the Head of the Public Service and who shall

exercise supervision of the Office of the President and general supervision of

and co-ordination of all departments of Government."

12
Section 111 of the Constitution

has also been amended in the new

Bill by deleting the words "Chief

Secretary."

To increase the number of electoral parliamentary constituencies, the new Bill seeks to amend

section 42 of the Constitution.

The new section 42 (2) states:

"Parliament may prescribe the

minimum number of constituencies into which- Kenya shall be

divided (which shall not be less

than 168) and the maximum

number of constituencies (which

shall exceed the minimum

number by at least 20) and until

Parliament has so prescribed, the

minimum number of constituencies shall be 168 and the

maximum shall be 188."

To remove the security of

tenure for the holder of the office

of the Attorney-General, the new

Bill seeks to amend section 109 of

the Constitution. •

Sub-section (2) of section 109

has been amended by deleting

subsection (4), (6) and (8) and

insertinga new sub-section (4).

The new sub-section (4) states:

"Subject to this section, the

Attorney-General shall vacate his

office when he attains such an age

as may be prescribed by

Parliament."

The Bill also seeks to delete

sub-sections (5), (6), (7) and (8)

ofsection 109 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (5) of that section

will be deleted. It stated that the

Attorney-General may be

removed from office only for

inability to exercise the functions

of his office (whether from infirmity of body) or for

misbehaviour.

Also to be deleted is subsection (6), which stated that the

A-G may be removed from office

by the President if the question of

his removal has been referred toa

tribunal appointed under subsection (7), and the tribunal has

recommended to the President

that the A-G ought to be

removed.

Sub-section (7) which will also

be deleted, stated: "If the President considers that the question

of removing the Attorney-General

under this section ought to be

investigated, then;

Selected

"The President shall appointa

tribunal which shall consist ofa

chairman and not less than two

other members selected by the

President from among persons

who hold or have held office asa

judge of the High Court having

unlimited jurisdiction in civil and

criminal matters in some parts of

the Commonwealth ora court

having jurisdiction in appeals

from such court.

'The tribunal shall inquire into

the matter and report on the facts

thereof to the President and

recommend to him whether the

A-G ought to be removed under

thjs section."

Sub-section (8), also to be

deleted, required that if the question of removing the A-G had

been referred to the President

anda tribunal appointed to

inquire into the matter, the President may suspend the AttorneyGeneral.

If the Bill goes through Parliament, the President does not

have to appointa tribunal before

removing the Attorney-General.

To remove the security of

tenure for the holder of the office

of the Controller and AuditorGeneral, the new Bill seeks to

amend section 110 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (2) deletes subsections (3), (5) and (7) and a

new sub-section (3) is inserted.

The new sub-section (3) states:

"Subject to this section, the Controller and Auditor-General shall

vacate his office when he attains

such an age as may be prescribed

by Parliament."

As is the case with the office of

the Attorney-General, the

sections deleted are those requiring that before the Controller and

Auditor-General was removed

from office, the President had to

appointa tribunal to investigate

the question of whether or not to

remove him or her.

According to the memorandum

of objects and reasons, the enactment of the Bill will involve

additional expenditure of public

funds, but the amount cannot be

estimated.

The Bill is signed by the

Attorney-General, Mr Matthew

Muli. A Bill amending the Constitution to establish the Office of the

Chief Secretary was published on

June 4, 1982. It „was later tabled,

in Parliament where it sailed

through.

The first holder of the office

was Mr Jeremiah Kiereini, who

retired from the Civil Service in

July, 1984. Before then there used

to be only the office of the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the

President who was the Head of

the Civil Service. The present

Chief Secretary is Mr Simeon

Nyachae.

13
Council of Churches Warns On Changes

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 25 Nov 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mutegi Njau and Pius Nyamora]

[Text] The National Council

of Churches: of Kenya

(NCCK> said yesterday it was "deeply

concerned" about the

proposed, changes- in

Kenya's- -Constitution

"to removerthe security

of tenure of the office»

of the AttornejyGeneral and the Controller and AuditorGeneral.

And as the NCCK was

"keenly studying" the

implications of the Bill the

Minister for Labour, Mr Peter

Okondo, rebuked the

Law Society of- Kenya for

trying-to create false alarm

that Kenya's democracy

would- be in danger if the

Bill is passed in- Par- liament.

In a statement read out to the

Nation by Bishop Alexander

Muge' of the Church of the

Province- of Kenya+s Eldoret

Diocese the NCCK'. said- the'

Church was "Keenly studying the

implications' the proposed

changes would have on the constitution and issue another statement to declare the Church's

stand".

Bishop Muge was- reading the

statement on behalf ofthe NCCK

general secretary, Mr John

Kamau, and the Presiding

Bishop of the. Methodist Church

of Kenya, The Kt. Kev Lawi

Imathiu — who had signed it —

followinga meeting in Nairobi.

The statement said in part:

"The NCCK notes that the

Bill publised in the

November 14 issue of the Kenya

Gazette seeks inter alia to amend

the Constitution to remove the

security of tenure of both the

offices of the Attorney-General

and the Controller and AuditorGeneral."

It said the NCCK was "deeply

concerned" about the proposed

changes and was studying their

implications to the Constitution.

The statement saidthe NCCK

however; was "pleased" that the

Bill also seeks to increase the

number of constituencies propor-'

tionaily so. as to ensure wider

representation of wananchi in.

Parliament. ~" "

The NCCK statement did' not

mention the proposal in the Bill

to abolish the post of the Chief

Secretary. ...

Rebuking: the' Law' Societyyesterday for its' opposition to the

clauses of: theBill which intend to

remove security of tenure of the

offices, of the Attorney-General

and' that of the Controller and"

Auditor-General, „Mr Okondo said

that security was demanded by

colonial settlers who. were not

sure about their future when

, Kenya became independent.

"The recent history of Kenya

from independence has- misled

the public to think that the A.G.

is permanet, it is not," he said.

"The A.G. was made permanent

as a bargaining- point for independence at Lancaster House.

Mr Okondo said the security of

tenure had beeiv demanded_ at

independence by colonial settlers

to protect their own: future

interests.^

"The A'-G, was- made permanent as a bargaining point for

independence - at Lancaster

House.- . '

"The reason was that the

settlers, who were here, were,

afraid that 'if these savages get

independence'.— that is.-, what

they thought of Africans — if

Africans got independence,..they

would not rule by any law.

"Ahdj therefore, the compensation which the British Government had promised them fortheir'

farms would not be paid:

"So they wanted an (English)

. Attorney-General who. could not

be removed except by a very com-:

plicated process. And-that is how

we got Mr Griffith-Jones ar the

first A-G.

- "The idea was that, because he

was British, we could not remove

him without a complicated

system. Therefore,- he would- give

security to the settlers after

independence. This is. why the

A-G's- post was: made- so

complicated;

'" "And because we' wanted

-independence; we were not going

to allow a small thing like that to

hold'it out. So we agreed. And for,

lack bf action, we left the. thing,

going forsome time."

14
"But in political theory, it is

wrong. The A-G cannot be permanent; He holds office only at

the- pleasure- of the Head- of the

Government."-

On. Saturday, the Law Society

strongly opposed the Bill and

appealed to Members of Parliament to reject it as "being against

the pubiieintefest".

The society's chairman, Mr G.

B. M. Kariuki, said that if the

security of tenure of the office of

the Attorney-General was

removed^ "his independence will

come to an end and there will be

no guardian ofthe public interest

from factional interests"

He said the "abolition of the

Controller and Auditor-General's

security of tenure will considerably weaken the accountability ofourGovernment??.

,5The offices of the AttorneyGeneral and the Controller and

ABd1tor-GeheraI,'*'headdedr''äre

part and parcel of the scheme of

checks and balances (between the

three Government organs — the

Executive, the Legislature and

the Judiciary)."

Mr Ukondo responded yesterday: "The Law Society's opposition to the proposed changes in

the Constitution is inept, foreign

in concept and 'ignorant of

history." ;

He said; the A-G's post, was

entrenched in the Constitution at

independence on the insistence of

the settlers "to allay their own

fears of thedangers they thought

an"African majority government

presented.

"We in turn- accepted that

entrechment to expedite independence whichwas our main goal.

"We cannot live with

expediency for ever, especially

since itwasunfounded."

Addressing' the Fresst in his

Nairobi- office, the Minister said5

that' in all- democracies, the

Attorney-General was a? political

appointee ofthe party in power to

act as the government's legal

adviser andlawyer. '

"Obviously' the tenure of such

an adviser holds onlyas theparty

in power : wants him,' - theMinister said:

"Nowhere in- the world is the

A-G's post permanent. He ia

only a government-lawyer, he is

not a judge. He must hold office

only, as long as-hi» employer,

the party power; wants him.

'The idea- of' a- permanent

Attorney-General is- alien, to

democracy," Mr Okondo said. "K

shows how- far ignorance: can

mislead an earnest person,to look

like charlatan," he said.

He reiterated: "Whether in the

US pr in the UK or in other

Anglophone democracies, the

A-G's post is held by a DOüV

tical appointee... Mr Kariuki

' should stop misleading the public

and giving false alarms."

' As for the Controller and

AuditorrGeneral, "he cannot holdoffice when he lose» favour with

the Government," said Mr

Okondo. "Allthat is important in

his auditing job is that he report

to Parliament and' not to the

Government.

'"'•'"As long as he retains nis

professional integrity and reports

to Parliament, 'there: is ho

. danger."

. On Sunday, Sheriff Nassir, the;

Mombasa branch chairman of

the ruling; party, criticised „the,.

LawÜöciety for its.opposition.

Backbencher Rubia Demands Clarification

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 28 Nov 86 pp 4-5

[Article by Mutegi Njau, Pius Nyamora, Job Githinji and Irungu Ndirangu]

[ Text ] The MP for Starehe,

Mr Charles Rubia,

yesterday expressed

strong opposition to

the Constitution of

Kenya (Amendment)

Bill.

Contributing to the debate

on the Bill in Parliament, Mr

Rubia accused the AttorneyGeneral,-Mr Justice Matthew

Muli, of: failing to explain to

the House why he wants to

delete sections of the Constitution requiring that before

the Attorney-General or the

Controller and Auditor15
neral is sacked » tribunal

suould, be appointed to

investigate his activities. *

But Mr Rubia's views on the

Amendment- Bill'were vehemently opposed by a number of

Cabinet Ministers, Assistant

Ministers and MPs who contributed to the debate, -

: The controversial sections that

the Bill seeks to-delete are 109-

(5), (6), (7) and (8>V the samesections which the Law Society of

Kenya and the National Council of

Churches of Kenya (NCCR)

have criticised. ,.-

Amid foot-thumping by

backbenchers,"Mr Rubia said the

A-G had not made any attempt to

explain why hewants the sections

deleted.

Mr Rubia — a former Cabinet

Minister — said MPs should not

.insinuate any ill motive in his

opposition to the BUK He said the

' Constitution was a great* document that could "lead Kenyans

to great heights". ' ' '-.' .-,;,

- "What is the good reason being

forwarded for removing the

sections?" he asked. .-.

Why was it difficult to remove

the Attorney-General?.

Mr Rubia said a former Ä-G,

.Mr .Joseph Kamere, had been

removed from office without anv

difficulty. The MP, therefore*

could not see any explanation for

removing the clauses.

He said Kenya was. lucky in

having President Moi as its

'S*,?61/ He «rid the clauses the

Hill, is deleting would remain

in operation long after

his presidency. ' »

"\VVare all human beings. We

asked Mr Justice Muli to justify

why he was asking Parliament to

remove the security of. tenure of

the offices, ofthe A-G-and the

bontroUer and Auditor-General

He praised the Law Society

chairman for doing much to

explain the meaning of the controversial clauses.

. '*? *!& to« House should not

he bultdozed into accepting to

remove those clauses without any

reasons being given.

- "t plea* with them (the

J*.vernment) not to do things

U^^havetoregretinthe

He was genuinely pained to

nave to, raise the issues with the

possibility of being branded this

or that, he said, and declared;

>or goodness sake, I belong here.

Hleasu" do not let us do things that

we may regret in the future so

llfi w^J

murh^b6forFfd

what fo ask did we- do m the Nyayo

era*" he said.

He said he was disturbed bythe unwarranted criticism*

'•veMed against theLSK and the

NOLK for voicing their; views

wftile during? the debate otf the

Law of Succession Act, nobody,

including Shariff Nassir,; had1

objected> when Muslims'opposed

the Bill.

Mr Rubia said he hoped Mr

Justice Muli would clarify thost

points when he:: replies to the

debate; He said in- his contribution» Mr Justice Muli had- acted

as if there was a crisis in the

ijovernment and that he was

defending it from something that

he (Muli) did not make clear.

~Are we. amending the Constitution simply because it i» 23

years after independence?*? he

asked. -..- , .-.

Ite agreed that-the office ofthe

•''hier Secretary should be

abolished' and that constituency,

boundaries should bd increased.

But he-asked why it had taken 20

years to review the boundaries

and said theA^G had not told the

House why: . Mr Rubia furtheraaid:Whatwaj

important was not the titleof the

post of Chief Secretary but the

• Junctions. The Head of State was

the symbol of Kenyans unity and

democracy, he said, and asked

why; the. post (Chief Secretary's)

was being abolished now

*nd xl there had arisen

. a question ofloyalty.

Mr- Rubia warned politicians

against inviting political

turmoil.: by condemning

organisations voicing their viewson national issues.

.,

M? said Mr Justice! Matthew

Muli had made a brilliant speech

when moving the Bitt-but ended

by creating more confusion as to

why it was necessary to bring the

amendmentsin the House.

Mr Rubia said he was disturbed by the fact that most ofthose

debate had taten time to

condemn and rebuke the Law

Jwciety of; Kenya chairman- Mr

v\- •,,Kariuki and the National Council'of Churches of

Kenya- (NCCK) for voicing their

views aboufrthe Bill.

He stressed that the basic

human rights and freedoms were

enshrined in the Constitution and^

politicians should not condemn

people for expressing those

treedoms.

He said it was disturbing that

Mr Kariuki had done much more

to explain the sections that the

AG wanted to delete in the Bill

without giving the reasons why

they should be deleted.

haying that Kenya was lucky in

having President Moi-as its

leader, Mr Rubia.asked why

Parliament was being asked to

delete the clauses that require the

appointment of a tribunal before

the two officers were removed.

"We are all human beings, and

we don't live for ever," he said,

adding: "What are the good

reasons that are being forwarded

tor deleting those clauses? What

ihas been the difficulty in removing an Attorney-General? We had

Kamere (Mr Joseph Kamau

Kamere a former A-G who was

removed in 1983) and he was

removed." ■■;;

He quoted-sections 77 and78 of

the Constitution which provide

for the freedom of expression and

conscience to remind. MPs,that

they were wrong in condemning

. the NCCKand the LSK..

Conscience

Mr kubra reminded the MPs

that they had taken, an oath to

protect and uphold the Constitution and that included the

freedom of conscience arid the

freedom ofexpression. '

He said MPs-" and the. frontbeck might disagree with the

LSK and the ttCCK,. but they

..should, allow them to air their

•views*. "• '

"We are inviting trouble irtthis

country if-we muzzle andSuppress'

those'freedoms," he said, adding?,

that he. was worried that -the-'

President was possibly, being fed

with wrong advice simply

because some people held differ

ring opinions.

: "I plead on behalf of everybody

.that people should be allowed to

express their political opinions, if

we are to avoid political trouble."

At that juncture, the Minister

for Energy and Regional Development, Mr Nicholas Biwott,

interrupted Mr Rubia to ask if: it

was true that the Government

had suppressed the freedom»:of'

.expression or any otherfreedom.

Mr Rubia retorted: that He had

not said: any freedom had been

muzzled and said MrBiwott was

trying to put words irr hi» mouth;

„When Mr Rubia finished, the

Ministen for Education, Science

and-technology,- Mr Peter Oloo

Aringo, rose- and said the constitutional amendment has not

been brought about-by a crisis

either in Government or in

1'arliainent. .,

Rather, it had been brought*

about by a need to make the con:

stitution more Kenyan and

indigenous. He said this should

lie done-in a democratic manner

' that includes dialogue and

respect of freedom of expression

and ^conscience as stipulated in

the Constitution".

But Mr Aringo charged that

some,MPs, including Mr Rubia,

16
had. undertaken to harass the

Government. He said this could

not be allowed to go on. N

But this was met with»' '*.

barrage of points of order by.

Members', asking him to substantiate his claim.

The'MP for Lurambi North,

Mr Joshua Angatia, asked him to

define what constitutes an

harassment of Government.

"When was the Government

harassed and by whom?" Mr

Angatia asked.

Mr Aringo stood up and said:

"If you read between the lines of

what Hon Rubia said, you will

understand that his perception of

Government... is- to constantly

harass Government."

The MP forButere, Mr Martin

Shikuku, OH a point of order,

said: "He is wrong! Who is

harassing who? The National

(Jhrjstian Council of Kenya or the

lawyers? Who is harassing who?"

Mr Aringo seemed to ignore the

question. He urged the Speaker

to allow him to continue with his'

contributions. He said the Lancaster House constitution was a

compromise constitution; He said

this had to be so because the.

Africans wanted to get independence. The compromise was

necessary to take care of the

various interests represented at.

Lancaster House, Mr Aringo said.

The- .VIP for Wundanyi,. Mr

Mashengu wa Mwachofi, rose oh

a point of order, saying: "He-has

repeated, constant harassment of

(iovemment. Can he- substantiate?" . ' ' An Impatient Mr Aringo- this,

time- shot back,- saying: "The

utterances of Rubia; «re tantamount tbv harassment: of

Government".

, Mr. Shikuku then rose on- a

point of order and said:'"We have

a- standing order-which says you

do not impute'-improper motives:

in an MP's speech. Is he (Aringo)

in order to impute improper

motives on the MP?" '

, .iir. Aringo: Mr'Shikuku is

raising points of arguments. He

will have ample time to raise

those-point»,

..Iriuikukur Standing Order

Nutnberrö8< demands that he

substantiate. Can he substantiate there .is constant- harassment of Government? In which

way was Hon Rubia harassing the

Government? '.

.vriugo: Mr Speaker, I an* art

equally elected Member of

Parliament. He makes claims

and counter-claims; The Lancaster House constitution was a

compromise constitution. It had

to take care of the interests of the

British Government, the interests

of settlers, and the interests of the:

African- nationalists. All of these

had to be protected. In the line of

compromise we had- to suffer aconstitution that did not serve our

interests as we wished them.

..Ir Shikuku: He is wrong. The

constitution we have ,has been

amended before. It was amended

when the Minister for Constitution and Justice was the. late Tom

Mboya. This is not the

original constitution we

brought from London.

•>fi* Aringo: Mr Speaker, the

capacity to listen is very important; I only expressed a historical

perspective. I nut-yit in

historical context... I want to say

this is not the/ first, time we

are amending the constitution. We

amended it to :bring, about a

unitary state and bring (about)

an republican' constitution with

an executive presidency.'All we

have here is heckling.... like the

honourable..; I should be

protected from hecklers.

The Speaker, Mr Fred Mati,

intervened: "You are making....

interruptions when Mr Aringo js

speaking...,"

. Mr Aringo said politics of

harassment and confrontation would fail. He said the

Government was as popularly

elected as those MPs harassing it.

He had-been elected three-:times

to represent Alego constituency

withlandslide victories, he said..

The Minister said, all the MPs

had been popularly elected, and

.the; nominated ones have been

chosen- byjhe President who had'

a nationwide mandatetodoso.

Mr- Aringo said Kenya had

more than 20 million people other

than Mr Rubia'. He said Mr

liubia was enjoying the benefits

of an open and free society

because of the Kenyan tradition.

.He said the Government.had not

suppressed the.'alternativ» view.

I'he Minister said the media had

carried allthe alternative views.

Heckling

This proved that Kenya was»»

democratic society protecting the

freedom of ,expression and

dialogue, he said. : . V' • He said "constant harassment

of Government" cannot be the:

basis of democracy. Democracy

was consensus of opinion, he

said. "We ( have never suppressed attemDts to arrive at as.

consensus."' ... /

The Minister warned' against

"the introduction of heckling, in

the House". He said introducing

heckling in the chamber would^

reduce the dignity of Parliament;

There was nothing new in

amending the- constitution,'he

saie^.Uyerthe last.23 years, there

had been a series ofamendments--

to the constitution, he said. Hecharged that Mr Rubia wai!

deliberately ignoring these

amendments in his contribution»,

lie said the. amendments had'

been, brought in a unicameral.

parliament. "We. used' to have a

senate and a lower house. We

have unicameral system,-" he

said.

He said the 'amendments

brought in an executive

. presidency. He said- this was

because the African' tradition

demanded that the father be. at.

the centre of- things'at home. Hie

said the President was central to

ail that happens in a country and.'

was the most important person ina state. -. ' He said the country,has mandated the President to appoint

all public servants "and we

should not limit his powers at'

all".

The. Minister said security of

the jobs being amended did not

lie in the constitution. Rather it*

lay in the political culture being,

developed in the country. He said

that in Britain the chairman of a

pafty who had a scandal resigned

because the political culture

there demanded so.

Mr Aringo said that at one time

someone tried to usurp the powers

of the presidency by creating "an

alternative centre of power.

Thank God his schemes failed. If

you looked at the powers of the

Chief Secretary, they were like

those of a prime minister. We

cannot have a situation with

alternative centres of power. Look

at the Miller Commission to see

what happened when someone

attempts to usurp power. Some

called it the Njonjo Commision of

Inquiry. _•»»' "ft shows what can happen.

The Minister said, that as a

result ofthe creation of centres of

power, there was stagnation. No

one wanted* to make a decision.

"When decision making is

protracted we can move .; .. Do

not limit the powers of the President, since he hai powers pfstate".

He said the Government was

the most important organisation

in a state, over-riding ail the

other organisations "like the

CPKr scientific unions, chambers;

of commerce and the like".

The Minister said some

churches, hadchosen to constitute

ah opposition. He said these

churches preached confrontation..

"I am worried about a few

specific churches. Thev seem to

defend particular, especially

.certain,, ethnic interests. When

17
there- were financial problems,

they did not raise a finger. The

same churches spoke at Rungiri.

Why did they not talk when

there- were financial problems? At-. Rungiri theyrdeferided so and so.

When it comes to the life of so

and so they are silent. 1 do hot

want to-say unkind words, at the

moment about the need for those

churches to identify wjth the

common aspirations."'

Mr Aringo said the; Bill also

intended to raise the number of

constituencies. He wondered why

nobody was saying: it was

unconstitutional: to- add the-'cjpn9bItiUtfllVICS. ... ^

This;; like the amendments on

the. Chief'Secretary's and the

Controller and Auditor General'»

offices, had been brought about

by public opinion;'he said.

He said there were good reason«

to<- strengthen- the offices of theAttorney-Generafc at the tun* of

independence but these had^how

been oyertajcenby events.

The Minister commended the

Controlled and Auditor-General

for the goad job/he had done. He

said the- work of the officer hasshowh that Kenya was committed to the rule of law. "What will

hold Kenya together is the evolution of the political" culture -and

also a code of ethics to judge the

quality of leadership".' .Thesematters had been discussed in the

Kanu Parliamentary Group,

"where it was agreed the constitution needs amendments," he

said.

The Minister for Planning and

National Development, Dr

Robert Ouko, Criticised Mr Rubia

for giving "us a lecture on the

need for us to tolerate views".

He said the Law Society of

Kenya and the NCCK had no

•authority to speak for people who

had parliamentary representatives.

' "It is wrong for them to direct

Parliament on what to. do," Dr

Ouko said. .

"Those who are elected and'

those who are nominated by His

Excellency- the President are the

only ones who can speak for

others The rest can only speak

for themselves," said the'

Minister.

Dr Ouko said Parliament was

not discussing whether or not the

President could remove the

Attorney-General. "We are discussing.- the methodology of

removing the A-G, The power of

the President is absolute. He has

the power to hire and the power tö

fire."

Answering a point oforder from

the'MP for Lurambi North, Mr

Joshua -An'gatia, on why the

security of tenure of the offices of

the A-G and the C&A-G were

being removed, Dr Ouko said

there was nothing in the constitution to prevent the President

from sacking the officers.

' Responding to another similar

point of order from Mr Rubia, Dr

Ouko said: "Even, if he (the

President) sets up a tribunal, no

one will challenge his authority."

Responding to Mr Rubia's.

comment that "we should no*

invite trouble", Dr Ouko said: "K

would be unfortunate and unwise

as' leaders in this House always or

often to cry 'wolf!' or talk about

trouble-when there is no trouble."

Borrowing a Unesco quotation

to end his speech, Dr Ouko said:

"Wars start in the minds of men,

and it is in the minds of men that

search for peace should begin."

The Minister challenged the

MPs to tell him in how many

countries freedom of expression

was thriving as in Kenya. He said

the. Bill had been discussed

openly and none should claim

that freedom of expression was

not being tolerated.

Interfering

The Minister for Water

Development, Mr Paul Ngei, told

the Law Society of Kenya, to

mend its ways before interfering

with parliamentary issues.

Mr Ngei said lawyers.should be

mindful of the welfare of their

clients and take, care of their

money without overcharging1

instead of meddling with issues

that did not concern them.

Referring to-the comments ofthe NCCK over the Bill, Mr Ngei

said he had personal experience

that prayers could be used to

incite the people.

He said that during the

struggle for independence he conducted a prayer in Nyeri when

the colonialists refused him to

address a rally.

The Minister for Finance,

Professor George Saitoti,

attacked the Law Society of

Kenya and the NCCK "for misleading the public over the Bill".

He said that 23 years after uhuru

it was necessary to amend some

rules-and procedures. . . Prof Saitoti said it was a pity

that religious leaders had made

such utterances about the Bill yet

they, were Held with respect by

the public. ,'

"The .statement by the NCCK

leaves us wondering why they

were misleading Kenyans;" said

Prof Saitoti.

Imaginary

If Mr Kariuki (LSK chairman)

was not speaking on behalf of the

LSK* on- whose behalf was he

speaking? ProfSaitoti asked. He

accused theCSK>and the NCCK

of rushing to thei Press to create

imaginary crises. - ;,',

An Assistant--1Vfmister for

Lands and Settlement,, Mr

Joseph* Miituria, criticised» the

NCCK saying: "The NCCK has

annoyed wananchi because of

giving a misleading statement

that the- amendment would:

endanger our Constitution."

Paying* tribute to President

Moi, he said.*: "There is no any

other President in thewwld who

lives with people and who helps

to build churches except our

President. What does NCCK

want?"

He said the NCCK should not

expect the country to continue

having outdated and irrelevant

laws.

The Minister for Energy and

Regional Development, Mr

Nicholas Biwott, said the clauses

of the Constitution which were

being amended were cumbersome. • He accused newspapers and

'alarmists'* of causing false

alarm, that the amendment would

makefhe holders of the offices of

the.Attomey-General and thatrof.

the Controller and: Auditor-,

General insecure. -

The Minister said the appointment of the two public officers

, was done by the President who is

i also entitled to fire them. He said

there w?s- nothing, new-

' Referring co a clause which was

being amended concerning, the'

appointment of a tribunal to'

report to the President and"

.recommended whether or not an

AG or CAG should be removed;

Mr Biwott said that if the

President appointed such a

: tribunal, "do you think their

verdict would be substantially

different than the intended

one?"

He said that in the past;

holders of the office of the

Attorney-General had been

removed, sometimes, on the

request of MPs, and no tribunal

ihad been appointed to Save them

removed.

.An Assistant Minister for

[Energy and Regional Development, Mr George Mwicigi^ said

, the amendment was. necessary to

make the;'work of the President

easier.

Supporting, the amendment,

'Mr Mwicigi said the President

|was- the executive with powers to

Ihire and should also have powers- N» fire without any complications.

[ -The Assistant Minister said it

waa not true, a» stated by some

'people, that the amendment-was

tampering with the Constitution.

. The MP for Kwale East, MrAli,

Mwakileo said the amendment

was important as the constitution*

was made during the colonial

days.

He said the NCCK was beingused as a political weapon by

.some people. [

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18
KENYA

MOI ON SUPREMACY OF KANU PARTY

Nairobi THE WEEKLEY REVIEW in English 21 Nov 86 p 7

[Text] President Daniel arap Moi last week brought to an end the recent

debate over whether the ruling party Kanu, or parliament is supreme. When

addressing a fund-raising meeting at the Senior Chief Koinange High School in

Kiambu District on Saturday, the president ended speculation when he stated

that the ruling party has supremacy over parliament. He went even further to

say that the party is also supreme over the High Court.

The question of supremacy arose three weeks ago when an assistant minister for

lands and settlement, Mr. Shariff Nassir, called for an amendment to the

parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act to reflect the supremacy of the party.

Nassir's suggestion drew some opposition in parliament, including a warning

from the speaker for Nassir's having discussed parliamentary matters outside

the house, but the question of which of the two institutions was supreme

remained unanswered for the time.

Nassir's suggestion was prompted by a difference that had arisen between him

and the MP for Mombassa West, Mr. Kennedy Kiliku. Kiliku had complained in

parliament that the Mobassa district Kanu branch, of which Nassir is chairman,

had threatened to discipline him for criticising in parliament the condition

of roads in Mombassa town. When Nassir tried to justify the branch's

intentions by saying that the branch had a right to correct Coast MPs who were

off course, he was reminded by the deputy speaker, Mr. Samuel arap Ng'eny,

that, according to the Powers and Privileges Act, it is illegal to challenge

an MP for anything said in parliament. Nassir's response was to tell a public

rally in Mombassa that the act should be amended to allow the party to

discipline MPs who talk loosely in the house. In that way, he said, the

supremacy of the party would be reflected.

Nassir found himself under attack when parliament resumed. The issue was that

he had discussed parliamentary matters outside the house but the MP for

Butere, Mr. Martin Shikuku, made it quite clear that he did not like the idea

of Nassir's suggesting that parliament was not the supreme body in the

country. Shikuku said that the house should be protected against moves by

people like Nassir to "castrate" parliament, adding that Kenyans and the

president had full confidence in the parliamentary system.

19
The issue was not discussed further but, last week, the president noted that

some people thought that the party was not supreme over parliament or the High

Court. But he himself was, he said, elected as president through the party.

As president of the party", he said, "I appoint High Court judges, provincial

commissioners, district commissioners, the vice-president and others." He

added, "The party is supreme," giving an example of how this was also the case

in Britain, where an MP had filed a court injunction against his party,

President Moi said, but the injunction failed because the court ruled that it

had no jurisdiction over the party.

The president's statement must have been good news for Nassir, coming only a

few days after he had been reprimanded by the speaker of the national

assembly, Mr. Fred Mati, for taking parliamentary issues outside the house.

Following Shikuku's protests, the speaker had promised to make a ruling on the

issue and, when he finally did, he said that Nassir did not seem to have

distinguished between the separate roles assigned to the party and parliament.

It was a form of contempt of the house, he said, for members to continue with

debates outside the house, either by discussing matters which are the subject

of a pending debate or by answering outside the house specific remarks which

have been uttered by members of the house. Such conduct, he said, was

detrimental to the dignity of the house and the discipline that members must

impose on themselves.

According to the speaker, however, there was no regulation in the Powers and

Privileges Act allowing the speaker to demand an apology for such misconduct.

He said it was merely his advice to members that it was their responsibility

and in their interests to conduct their affairs with courtesy for each other.

The speaker did not address himself to the question of the supremacy of either

the party or parliament, as he had been asked merely to make a ruling on

whether or not Nassir had contravened standing orders by discussing

parliamentary matters outside the house. Mati's warning to Nassir was rather

mild, however, compared with several instances of sharp criticism by him of

MPs who have made similar mistakes in the past. His apparent caution may have

arisen from the sensitivity of the issues that Nassir had raised concerning

parliament and the party and Mati probably did not want to appear to be taking

a stand on an issue that was likely to be addressed at a higher level.

The matter has now been settled, however, even though it had become quite

obvious in the recent past that the party enjoyed supremacy over parliament.

Nassir's suggestion that the Powers and Privileges Act be amended so that the

party could discipline wayward MPs is still pending but, juding from the

manner in which the party has continued to stress its supremacy, it will not

come as much of a surprise is Nassir's wishes were eventually realised.

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20
KENYA

COTU ELECTIONS: PRO-GOVERNMENT V. PRO-WORKER LINE UP

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 14 Nov 86 pp 12-14

[Text] The allegation by the Bahati MP, Mr. Fred Omido, in parliament last

week that some trade unions had colluded with the attorney-general's office to

frustrate, delay and sabotage the forthcoming Central Organisation of Trade

Unions (Cotu) elections, and the subsequent reaction by some six unionists,

gave a pointer to the form which the campaigns for the Cotu polls are likely

to take. With the day of reckoning already fixed, this latest war of words

could be a start of the traditional trade union campaigns, which have often

been characterised by serious verbal wars.

As soon as the elections in affiliated unions came to a dramatic end after a

presidential directive barring six or so unions, which had not met the end of

October deadline, from participating in the Cotu elections, Omido, who is also

the secretary-general of the Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers (AUKMW)

and a former chairman-general of Cotu, claimed in parliament, on a point of

order, that "there are manouevers in the trade union movement to delay,

frustrate and sabotage the presidential directive on the elections deadline.

Omido claimed that since the presidential directive was issued, there had been

circulars from the attorney-general's office extending the deadline. He

demanded that the minister for labour and the A-G issue a statement to clarify

the situation. Omido's statement drew heavy support from his colleagues with

some asking for adjournment so that the issue could be discussed as a matter

of national importance under Standing Order No. 20, but the labour minister,

Mr. Peter Okondo, challenged Omido to identify the people behind the sabotage

plot. Okondo termed the allegation as very serious and asked Omido to give

information to the police, himself and the attorney-general about the

saboteurs. Okondo explained to the house that the unions which had not

conformed to the deadlines had done so due to court cases. Okondo even went

to the extent of announcing that the unions which had not yet held their

elections should do so by December 30, before the Cotu executive board had

decided on its own elections date. As it turned out, however, the Cotu

executive board fixed is elections for December 29.

The matter came to an end in the house when the speaker, Mr. Fred Mati, asked

Okondo and the office of the A-G to discuss the matter and issue a statement

on Tuesday of this week. Outside the house, Omido's statement drew a tough

rebuttal from six unionists: Mr. Pious Masika - Electrical Trades and Allied

21
Workers Union; Mr. Joseph Akhonya - Kenya Chemical Workers' Union; Mr. Wafula

wa Musamia - Kenya Quarry and Mine Workers Union; Mr. George Muchai - Kenya

Union of Bakers and Confectioners; Mr. Charles Natiri - Kenya Engineering

Workers' Union and Mr. Isaiah Kubai - Banking, Insurance and Finance Union.

The six said they had not received any other circulars regarding the elections

apart from three given by the office of the registrar of trade unions and a

directive from the president. They challenged Omido to produce the circulars

he had alleged were issued after the presidential directive. They accused

Omido, Mr. Rajab Mwondi of the Printing and Paper Manufacturers' Union and Mr.

Joseph Ojiem of the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union of misleading the country

and workers over the forthcoming Cotu polls. The six said they were aware

that campaigns had already begun but felt those vying for positions should not

make wild statements as a means of gaining support.

One interesting fact about the verbal war on Cotu polls, though not altogether

strange, is that those who have taken sides in the war have not declared their

interests in the coming elections. The six unionists avoided making their

stands clear when asked whether their reaction had been prompted by some

interest in Cotu leadership. The issue at stake, they said, was not who is

seeking election in Cotu but to ensure that workers were not misled by

"self-seekers who were out to exploit the workers for their own selfish ends".

But the fact that nobody has stated his interest, apart from the Cotu deputy

secretary-general, Mr. J.J. Mugalla, who has said he will try to dislodge the

incumbent Cotu secretary-general, Mr. Justus Mulei, is not strange. Past

experiences in trade union elections have shown that people who vie for

leadership at Cotu usually set their supporters in the open to fight it out

while the candidates control the game from the background. Sources close to

Cotu said that one reason why nobody has come up to declare his candidature is

because the affiliated unions are regrouping their supporters following the

recent national elections In these unions. According to these sources, as

soon as the unions have submitted the lists of their delegates who will attend

the Cotu polls, to be held at Tom Mboya Labour College in Kisumu, the

candidates will emerge. Mulei has asked the affiliated unions to submit the

names of the delegates by November 15.

Other sources said that the candidates are already being identified as lineup

for Mulei and Mugalla are being identified. These sources argue that in trade

union elections in Kenya, what matters is not the person who declares the

candidature, but what group he belongs to. The two groups, the sources said,

are being dubbed "pro-government" and "pro-workers". The Mulei group has

identified itself as the pro-workers group while the Mugalla group is seen as

the pro-government group. The Mulei group argue that Mugalla has sought the

support of the government and politicians for his bid to oust Mulei and that

Mulei is counting on the workers in the race to retain his seat. The

anti-Mugalla campaign is reportedly mounting mainly because of his open boats

about his presidential pardon, after a pro-Mulei group unsuccessfully tried to

bring his trade union career to an end. Mugalla is reportedly exploiting this

to claim that he is the government candidate and therefore the issue of who is

the next Cotu secretary-general is as good as decided. But the Mulei group

has reportedly taken Mugalla's claim seriously and has gone out with full

22
force to convince delegates that the government is the biggest employer and

therefore anybody who claims to have government support would not defend

workers' interests effectively.

Another element that has been brought to the campaign is the tribal issue.

Mugalla is understood to be relying on the Luhya unionists, who form the bulk

of the trade union leadership in affiliated unions. Ironically, however, most

Luhya leaders in the trade union movement have openly expressed their

opposition to Mugalla. Wa Musamia for instance, who was quoted recently to

have expressed his support for Mugalla, told THE WEEKLY REVIEW this week that

he was solidly behind Mulei and that no amount of coercion would change his

stand. Wa Musamia did not, however, disclose the forces that were pressuring

him to change his stand. Other prominent Luhya unionists who are behind Mulei

include Masika, Akhonya, Natiri, and Mr. Wasike Ndombi of the Local Government

Workers' Union. Added to this list of the Mulei group are several unionists

from other tribes who include Kubai, Muchai, Mr. Walter Adell of the Kenya

Union of Sugar Plantation Workers, Mr. Ali Mohammed of the Kenya Union of

Posts and Telecommunications employees, Mr. George Odiko of the Kenya Union of

Journalists who is also the assistant secretary-general of Cotu, Mr. David

Matheu of the Kenya Timber and Furniture Workers Union, Mr. Abdalla Mwaruwa of

the National Union of Seamen of Kenya and Mr. James Awich of the Kenya Shoe

and Leather Workers' Union. Although these are individual secretary-generals

of their respective unions, they are instrumental in determining who should be

supported by the delegates from their unions when it comes to voting in Cotu,

which is based on block rather than individual voting. Each delegate is

however, free to vote for the candidate of his choice.

Mulei's group is expected to find opposition in the Cotu chairman-general, Mr.

Philip Mwangi, who has made it quite clear that he is for Mugalla. In this

camp are the Cotu treasurer, Mr. Were Ogutu, Mr. Johnson Ogendo of the

Tailors' and Textile Workers' Union, Mr. Yunis Ishmael of the giant Dock

Workers* Union, Mr. Sammy Muhanji of the Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and

Allied Workers, Mr. George Ochino of the Kenya Petroleum Workers' Union, Omido

and Mwondi. Out of those who have openly supported Mugalla, only Omido,

Muhanji and Mwondi are Luhyas like Mugalla. Apart from this tribal element,

the campaigns are also expected to bring in the performance of Mulei in the

last two years that he has been secretary-general. His detractors have

already criticised his style of leadership claiming that Mulei has ignored the

Cotu constitution which requires that he convene the executive board meeting

once a month and the governing council once every year to administer and

review Cotu policies. But Mulei's supporters argue that Mulei, who assumed

office following the death of the Incumbent, the late Mr. Juma Boy, should be

given an opportunity to prove his worth. They say that for the two years that

Mulei has been at the helm of Cotu, industrial relations have been relatively

calm. His opponents, however, blame Mulei for the spate of strikes, lock-outs

and confusion that greeted the five-day working week which he requested on

Labour Day and which was granted by President Daniel arap Moi on the same

occasion. The move, which received approval by Kenyan workers, however, led

to a chain of strikes when employers and employees tried to adjust their

working hours to accommodate the five-day week.

23
One thing that is unlikely to feature prominently in this year's Cotu

campaigns is the issue of minimum wages, which has been an important factor in

past Cotu campaigns. So far, no unionist has brought up the issue. What will

likely be brought up is the issue of banking institutions which have sunk with

millions of shillings belonging to workers and the question of whether or not

foreign institutions which have interest in Kenya's trade union activities are

likely to interfere in the elections. In March of this year, the former

secretary-general of Cotu and the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity

(OATUU), Mr. Dennis Akumu, charged that Kenya's trade union movement has been

infiltrated by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As soon as the

claim was made, Mugalla issued a statement in which he said that if the CIA

had made such a move it was upon the Kenya government to find out.

On Tuesday, Omido was suspended from parliament for three days after he failed

to substantiate his sabotage claim and for using the president's name as an

authority for making false claims. In a ministerial response to Omido's

claims, the attorney-general, Mr. Mathew Muli, said Omido's claim has been

based on "distortion of facts and was aimed at misleading and even causing

unwarranted panic, apathy and discontentment". Omido found himself in more

trouble from the front bench than he has expected when the minister for energy

and regional development, Mr. Nicholas Biwott, suggested that it was

treasonable to sabotage a presidential directive and demanded that Omido

substantiate his claim. BIwott was supported by the vice-president, Mr. Mwai

Kibaki, who is also leader of government business in the house. Omido totally

failed to support his allegation and was thrown out.

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24
KENYA

BRIEFS

JOURNALISTS SENTENCED FOR MWAKENYA ACTIVITIES-The head of the Nakuru bureau

of the daily newspaper, THE STANDARD, Hugo Thauri Wanderi, ^as sentenced

on November 8 to four years in prison for membership of an underground

movement," apparently Mwakenya. He admitted having given mf^ *

e

movement after meeting several of its members. According to a report in the

London publication INDEX ON CENSORSHIP o£ last October 28»Jhe^Kenyan press

has been barred since last July from reporting political trials, or arrests

whicn are »increasingly arbitrary and based on hearsay •" ^J^^°^

longer has the right to mention Mwakenya by name. INDEX ON CENSORSHIP puts

atfoO the number of people arrested since the beginning of the year,

includinril writers, journalists, and publishers, in connection with the

camjaign8against Lakenya. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWS LETTER

in English 15 Nov 86 p 3] /8309

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25
LIBERIA

MINISTERS EXAMINE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, LIQUIDITY, PRIVATIZATION

Monrovia X-RAY in English Nov 86 pp 15-18, 41

[Interview with Paul Jeffy and Amelia Ward, minister and deputy minister of

planning and economic affairs; date and place not specified]

(Text]

X-RAY- Mr. Minister, please summarize

the major reasons for the present economic problems facing

Liberia.

MPEA - Over the past ten-year period fron 1974

to 1984, total annual Gross Domestic

Product (GÜP) at factor cost in 1971

dollars, fell from $428 million to $410

million, a fall of $15 million or 3§-

During the sane period, the annual GDP

of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector rose by $33 million and Government services GDP increased by $20

million, while mining and quarrying GDP

fell by $54 minion or by 40%. Ibis

clearly shows that the fall in value

of mining and quarrying production is

the main underlying cause of the downturn in the economy between 1974 and

1984. And, since this fall nay well

continue in the future, due to decreasing world export demand for iron ore

and the depletion of high-grade iron

ore deposits in Liberia, it is imperative to replace this source of national

income with a major and continuing increase in the value of production in

the agriculture, forestry and fishing

sector of the economy, especially since

this sector will have to become the

26
country's main source of export earnings and import savings, thus providing

the future solution to the country's

balance of payments and foreign debt

arrears problems.

During the 1974-1979 period, the performance of the Liberian economy was

sluggish and total real GDP grew at a

rate of only 1.7% a year. This was due

to the impact of the rapid increase in

world oil prices on the cost of iron

ore mining, power generation, and transport in Liberia; the depressed world

demand for the country's main exports,

iron ore and rubber; the narrow export

base of the economy; and expansionary

policies pursued by Government services.

All of these 1974-1979 constraints

to economic growth contijiued to apply

during the 1979-1984 period, resulting

in a steadily deteriorating climate for

private sector investment and growth

in manufacturing, construction and services. In addition, cannereial forestry

and fishing production declined rapidly

and caused a fall in the average annual

growth rate of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector GDP, from 4% a

year during the 1974-1979 period to

1.3% a year during the 1979-1984 period. At the same time, expenditures

on Government services continue to

grow. These factors caused the total

average annual real GIF to decrease at

a rate of 2.4% a year, falling to $410

million in 1984, compared to 462 million in 1979 and $425 million in 1974.

As a result of all of these factors,

business confidence dwindled, capital

flight occurred, a liquidity sequeeze

developed, and the public sector balance of payments position deteriorated.

X-RAY - What can you attribute the current liquidity problem to? How

can this problem be solved?

MPEA - The liquidity problem can be attributed primarily to two factors: (a) the

27
methods used to finance Governmant budget deficits; and, (b) the growing

backlog of public sector debts, requiring offshore payments. The first factor resulted from the fact that Government had been unable to sufficiently

reduce its overall budget deficit, that

is to reduce the excess of its expenditures over its revenues, and therefore used alternative methods of financing Government expenditures. Such methods included forced borrowing from

various sectors of the economy; promissory notes; 1PA checks; issuing new

coins; circulation of discounted claims

on Government; caimerciaL bank excess

reserves, etc.

The second factor resulted from a

rapid growth in the annual value of

principal and interest payments due to

the IMF, the World Bank, the IDA, the

USA, West Germany, Japan, and other

foreign loan sources, on loans made to

Liberia throughout the 1970's. This,

coupled with substantial annual Government budgetary deficits during the

1979-1985 period, has now resulted iA

a growing accumulation of substantial

debt arrears, which has brought about

the postponement of disbursements of

loan funds for development programs

and projects and disbursements to meet

balance of payments needs.

Solutions to these problems are not

easy to ccme by, but Government has

already taken steps to address them.

Government has reduced, and is continuing to reduce, its budget deficits

- the difference between what it spends

and what it receives as revenue - through various austerity measures, such

as increased taxes on imports; special

taxes on salaries, wage earners and

self-employed persons; the introduction

of a freeze on public sector employment; and, a reduction in public sector

salaries and public sector employment.

In addition, to restore business confidence in the domestic banking system

and enable businessmen to transfer

28
money out of the country through foreign exchange mode available by the

Bank of Liberia (Government), the Government has gigppd a manoranduai of

understanding with the commercial

banks, and is also requiring all exporters to deposit 25% of their foreign

exchange earnings with the National

Bank of Liberia, in exchange for LLberian coins or local currency.

X-RAY - Liberia now seems to have a de

facto currency in the form of

the five dollar coins. What are

the implications for the country>s economy? What is the

basis for issuing these coins?

MFEA - The continued issuance of de facto currency, in the form of LLberian five

dollar coins, suggests that, at least

for an interim period, Liberia can be

described as being partly on a U.S.

dollar standard and partly on a LLberian dollar standard. Vhile the U.S.

dollars in circulation can be readily

used for foreign txansactions, the Liberian coins can only be used within

Liberia. Thus, the system no longer

allows external payments to be made as

freely as in the past, and ccnmercial

banks now operate an informal allocation system, due to an unsatisfied demand, a parallel market has developed,

in which the U.S. dollar attracts a

premium when it is exchanged for LLberian coins. In addition, cxmnercial

banks now charge excessively high commissions for their sales of foreign

currencies or U.S. dollars.

The basis for issuing more LLberian

coins was to help solve the liquidity

problems mentioned above. Faced with

this problem, the National Bank of Liberia had no option other than to issue

coins, without U.S. dollar backing, to

finance Government deficits and meet

Government payrolls, and to ease the

shortage of cash for private transactions.

29
X-RAY - The President of Liberia recently expressed optimism that

the Liberian economy would improve during the second half

of this year. Could you elaborate on the basis of this optimism. What is your Ministry

planning or doing to make this

optimism a reality?

The basis for the optimism expressed

MFEA " by the President recently, that the

Liberian economy will improve during

the second half of this year, stems

from the fact that measures and forces

are at work which have already begun

to reduce some of the causes of the

present economic crisis, and the economy has already begun to respond by

showing signs of improvement. As I

mentioned earlier, Government has introduced measures which are already

reducing the budgetary deficits. And,

the retention of 25% of all export

earnings is now permitting both the

Ministry of Finance and the National

Bank of Liberia to meet some of Government's and private business's off-shore

cnmritments.

With the future privatization of selected public corporations, it is expected that their operational efficiency and effectiveness will improve, thus

reducing their dependence on Government

revenues and subsidies, which in turn

should reduce Government budgetary deficits.

'Ihe fall in the world price of oil,

and the expected real growth of GDP of

about 3% a year in many developed countries in 1967 and 1988, should result

in a rise in the demand for steel and

automobiles, including tires, which

should in turn lead to an increase in

Liberia's main exports, iron ore and

rubber. Likewise, with the fall of the

U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the currencies

of our other major trading partner

countries, the U.S. dollar value of

Liberia's exports should increase and

the dollar cost of imports into Liberia

30
should also increase, thus encouraging

the growth of LLberian exports, as well

as the growth of import substitution.

Finally, to further make this optimism a reality, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the

Ministry of Agriculture, and other

Ministries, the IMF, the World Bank,

and other foreign aid and foreign loan

sources, is currently in the process

of preparing an Economic Recovery Program for the nation. This Program will

cover the next tv*> years. Perhaps its

most important contribution will be to

introduce, and to start implementing,

a new Government policies for the development of the private sector and for

the control of revenue and expenditures

in the public sector. The Program will

also include development programs and

projects in each of the following

areas: agriculture, forestry and fishing; industry, energy; transport and

caimuniations; water and sewerage; re-

= gional and urban development; education

and training; manpower development;

health and social welfare; housing;

and State Enterprises. In selecting the

programs and projects, the strategy

will be to concentrate the limited financial resources available for development upon those programs and projects that premise to have a good rate

of economic and financial return and/

or a short payback period.

X-RAY - Some observers believe the lack

of coordination among government agencies connected with

the economy is one of the biggest problems. What specific

problems have you observed in

this area? What kind of coordination should exist?

MPEA - Those observers are totally wrong. like

all countries in the world, and Liberia

is no exception, functions and responsibilities of Government Ministries and

Agencies overlap, and many times, due

31
to the lack of camunication, information flows are not always efficient and

effective. This is especially true for

developing countries like Liberia. As

such, there is sometimes a breakdown

in coordination. But, for anyone to

portray this as a policy, or as antagonism among Ministries or Agencies, is

very untrue. For example, in practically all of our financial and economic

discussions, both internal and external, at least the Ministry of Finance,

the Ministry of Planning and Ebcocmic

Affairs, the Budget Bureau, and the

National Bank of Liberia are present,

and among these agencies, the position

of Government is organized. True, there

is always room for improvement, and so

the coordination among Government Agencies connected with the economy could

be improved. But certainly the lack of

such coordination among Ministries and

Agencies is not one of our biggest economic problems.

X-RAY- Mr. Minister, what do you think

are the implications for privatizing relatively viable public corporations such as LPRC,

LPMC,v, Telecommunications and

LEC?

MFEA - Before looking at the implications of

privatizing certain public corporations

such as LPRC, LHC, LIC and LEG which

you indicated are viable, let us see

what the record shows at this point in

terms of the operations of public corporations generally. Available data

show that the performance of state enterprises in recent years has been very

poor due mainly to the inadequacy of

arrangement; the lack of technical

skills' excessive staffing; interference in management dec.is3.on-making;

and the existence of unauthorized practices. These and other problems affect

inter-enterprise and Government/enterprise short-term indebtedness. This

state of Affairs of Public Corporations

contributes to the current economic

32
crisis. When privatized, it is expected

that these public corporations voll

attract funds through private investments in them, thereby providing the

liquidity they need to keep them more

efficient and productive. This will aid

in reducing staffing and management

problems. This will also reduce their

dependency on Government revenues/subsidy; thereby reducing Government's

budgetary deficit.

X-RAY - The Business Community is complaining about the Ten Percent

surcharge levied on imported

goods indicating that this has

helped to slow down the pace

of import. Can business people

look forward to a solution of

these problems in the next few

months?

MPEA - Universally, not only the Business Community, but all taxpayers always complain about paying taxes. Even when

taxes are reduced, taxpayers will claim

that the reduction is insufficient. Government is looking into the matter of

taxes generally, including the Ten Percent Surcharge. However, Government has

no evidence at all at this moment in

time that the Ten Percent Surcharge is

one of the causes of the slow-down in

the pace of imports. As of now, indications are that the slow-down in the

pace of imports is due primarily to the

lack of foreign exchange for businessmen to pay for their imports.

X-RAY - There are reports of global oil

glut and drop in the price of

crude oil. But gasoline prices

in Liberia seems not to be affected why? Is it true that

LPRC levies a tax of $1.50 on

every gallon sold to the public, which is supposed to be

passed on to government? Is

this tax burden justifiable?

MPEA - It is true that there is a current

oversupply of crude oil on the world

33
market, and as a consequence the price

of crude oil on the world narket has

fallen by about $14 a barrel. It is

also true that the price of gasoline

in Liberia seems to have not been affected by the fall in the price of

crude oil internationally. But let me

point out, that the price of gasoline

in almost all countries, including Liberia, is not influenced by the price

of crude oil alone. We are aware of no

country as yet where the change in the

price of -crude oil has produced an

equal and proportionate change in the

price of gasoline. There have been

changes, but not equal and proportionate. There are several other factors,

such as local taxes like excise, and

local and international transportation

costs. In any case, it is expected that

this matter will be further studied

when the LPRC operation is being audited.

X-RAY - What role has curruption played

in bringing about the current

economic hardship?

MPEA - I cannot answer this question as I have

no knowledge of the extent of corruption in our economic system. What I do

know is that our Government has made

a policy of eradicating corruption in

our society, whether it be economic,

political, etc. In addition, I outlined

in my replies to your previous questions, the causes and reasons for the

present economic situation in Liberia

and I did not mention corruption as one

of these causes.

X-RAY - What is the status of government's relationship and prospects for aid with bilateral

and international financial

sources?

MREA - IXie to the economic problems existing

in 1984, Government was in arrears in

respect of many of its loan and interest payments with several bilateral

34
and multilateral international organizations such as the World Bank, United

States, IMF, QB, AUB, etc. However,

as the economic situation is now improving, Government has commenced

clearing these arrears, and as a result, new financial assistance has

begun coming in. In short, the Governnent 's relations with bilateral and

nuLtilateral international financial

organizations is improving steadily.

X-RAY - What new approaches should government adopt to solve the

current problems? What role do

you see private sector development and consultancy playing

in helping to find solutions

to the problems?

MPEA - Government is in the process of preparing a two-year Economic Recovery Progran, to start solving the current economic problems. This Program will involve a mixture and combination of policies, strategies, and programs and

projects, in both the public and the

private sectors external and internal,

fiscal and monetary, etc. This is so

because the reasons for the current

economic problems are mixed and varied,

and no one approach can hope to solve

them. In addition, as I stated earlier,

Government has introduced several austerity measures. These include: increased taxes on imports; special taxes

on salaries, wage earners and self-employed persons; the introduction of a

freeze on public sector employment; a

reduction in public sector salaries and

employment; and, the introduction of

a new Reconstruction Tax. With respect

to the role which private sector development and consultancy agencies

should play in helping to find solutions to our economic problems, you

will recall that I referred earlier to

the decision of Government to privatize

public corporations. In this exercise,

Government will encourage the private

sector, foreign and/or local, to take

35
over the ownership and management (In

part or in whole) of Government parastatals, of Government furnished services, and of Government agencies by

Investing funds in them vdth a view*to

making them operationally effective and

efficient. Both the private sector development and consultancy agencies can

play jtajjoitant roles in the implementation of this exercise as well as provide further studies of possible solutions to our economic, problems.

/9274

CSO: 3400/563

36
MOZAMBIQUE

FIGHT AGAINST HÜNGER FIRST PRIORITY OF CHISSANO REGIME

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Nov 86 pp 36, 37

[Article by Jose Rui Cunha]

[Text] "The fight against hunger" was one of the highest priorities elaborated

by Joaquim Chissano, the new president of FRELIMO and of the Peoples'; Republic

of Mozambique, in his speech given in Maputo minutes after his name was

announced as the top figure in the Party and the State. A tremendous amount

of public enthusiasm, which exploded in the streets of the capital when the

decision by the Central Committee of FRELIMO was made known, is based upon

this great hope. People remember Chissano from his activities in the transition government which followed the Lusaka accords.

Reality is, however, totally different. Samora Machel's charisma is followed

by Joaquim Chissano's pragmatism. But can Chissano, in the current critical

state of the Mozambican economy, bring about the miracle? Obviously not, if

only because in politics there are no miracle workers. But the new leader

knows that something must change in Mozambique as soon as possible, and that

that will inevitably involve the economic situation. The people yearn for a

real offensive, with visible results, against the hunger that now affects

almost 5 million inhabitants. The problem is in knowing how to effect these

changes in a race against time.

The decision by the FRELIMO Central Committee to designate Chissano as

president coincided with popular opinion. Chissano's prestige across the

entire country would not have admitted many other solutions. Mozambicans

wanted Chissano. They have Chissano. But is it possible that the image that

has been created of him really exists? It is asking too much of a man who

assumes the leadership in the most critical period for the economy, at a time

when "armed bandits" are spreading terror and destruction, and when the powerful neighbor South Africa threatens to play its decisive trump card: the

return of 60 thousand Mozambican miners. Considered a "moderate," Chissano

is, above all, a man who has always assumed a visible role in FRELIMO, the

man whom the country has chosen to delineate Mozambique's political image overseas, the politician who is the most widely accepted by the West.

37
Chissano is, in fact, a man tested in armed struggle, a defender of the

political ideals that guide FRELIMO, a cornerstone of the strategy defined by

Samora Machel. He is not a politician given to compromising on fundamentals,

but he uses diplomacy as a weapon and is capable of achieving his objectives

using means more acceptable to the leaders of the great Western nations. It

is during this difficult phase that even stronger efforts must be made, in an

appeal to the international community to provide essential goods as urgently

as possible to a country in need.

"Let us carefully study the economy of our country, so that we may participate

more effectively in the work of our development," the new president stated,

adding further, "We must know the history of our country and our society in

order to reap the lessons from it that will strengthen national unity."

Chosen for FRELIMO by the prime minister of the transition government during

the period spanning the signing of the Lusaka accords and the proclamation

of independence, Joaquim Chissano was a man who undoubtedly filled the role

which fell to him in exemplary fashion. Extremely capable, he reduced

tension, was energetic in containing abuses, and in the end was as agreeable

to the colonizers as to the colonized—and all this during a period of upheaval

in Mozambique, when the hopes of a people emerged from secular lethargy.

That was the climate during Chissano's transformation. Today, the climate is

characterized by renewed hope, and expectations are too high in an environment

which has nothing in common with the previous situation. The country is at

war, the economy is in danger and reconstruction is lagging behind, because

internal and foreign enemies are aware that the economic cycle represents

the possibility of concessions. It is difficult, however, for FRELIMO to

turn aside from the program to which it has remained faithful, and for its

model of socialist society to be called into question.

In a society in which rumors assume an inordinately large degree of importance

it is curious to note that, besides Chissano, another name was put forward as

probable successor to Machel. Within the capital city Armando Panguene,

the former Mozambican ambassador to Lisbon, was pointed to as the alternative.

Justification for the Panguene candidacy, in popular terms, was similar to

that of the pragmatic image constructed around Chissano. Apart from the

pragmatism common to both figures, other factors, at first glance minor, but

important in the context of Mozambican society, were outlined: Chissano is

from the south, but is married to a northern woman; Panguene is descended

from a southern family, but was born in the north.

In any case, reality has shown that Armando Panguene is a rising star within

the RPM. Although it has not yet been announced, he could be the new FPLM

Chief of Staff, as a result of a reorganization of the military leadership

which took place days before the death of Samora Machel. Panguene is also

pointed to as one of those who could succeed Joaquim Chissano for responsibility for the foreign affairs protfolio. During the current period of

increasing hostilities, however, it seems more likely that responsibility

for Mozambican diplomacy will be given to Pascoal Mocumbi, or even to Oscar

Monteiro, the two figures who, a priori, are pointed to as the most experienced

in the back-room ways of international politics.

38
The rise of Joaquim Chissano to leadership of the Party, the State and the

Armed Forces will obviously lead to changes in the Maputo government. It

seems certain, however, that Mario Machungo will continue to fill the recently

created position of Prime Minister. Alberto Chipande will remain as Minister

of Defense and the number three man in the Party, and Armando Panguene will

lead the Armed Forces, the great prestige he enjoys among veterans of the

armed struggle and as Political Commissariat of the Peoples' Liberation Forces

virtually assuring him of his appointment to this position. For the transport

portfolio, which Engineer Alcantara Santos, killed in the plane crash, held

uncontested, there appears to be only one choice: Tenreiro de Almeida, who

would transfer to that position from his current one of Secretary of State for

Fisheries, where his work has been highly praised.

The New Leader's First Hours

Joaquim Chissano began his first day as leader of FRELIMO by paying homage to

Samora Machel at the Monument to Mozambican Heroes, and by appearing at the

residence of Graca Machel, with whom he declared solidarity.

Even earlier, in the speech following his election, Chissano guaranteed

the family of the former President of the Republic the support of FRELIMO

in raising and educating the children. It was, however, the incidents that

took place at the representations of South Africa and Malawi in Maputo that

most characterized the new president's first day. Mozambican authorities

vehemently condemned the destruction of the Embassy of Malawi on Avenida

Kenneth Kaunda, and the stoning of the South African trade office on Avenida

Julius Nyerere, in front of the Portuguese Embassy building in this capital.

Six people were injured in the incident, including a member of the police

force that rushed to the scene of the disturbances. Minister of Security _

Sergio Vieira declared at the South African trade office, where he appeared m

order to disperse a gathering of people, "Do you want to throw rocks? Do so

at the border. Do you want to fight the enemy? Go give your names to the

Mozambique Youth Organization [OJM] so you can be mobilized. He added, To

break windows and to roll cars is not to be revolutionary.' My question at

this time is whether this was not a provocation. There are signs here of

provocative agents bent on sullying the name of Mozambique. Agents who create

disturbances so that tomorrow it will be said in other countries that

Mozambique is a country of rioters. He who wishes to fight the enemy should

follow me to the OJM."

The "peaceful" demonstration was organized by the OJM as a form of protest

against South African and Malawi support for RENAMO and occurred without

incident, until the point at which a group of people resorted to violence.

Afterwards, security measures were taken at other facilities belonging to the

two countries in the Mozambican capital.

A press release by OJM distributed later lamented the occurrences and affirmed

that "they were not representative of the objectives of the demonstration

which was organized to call attention to the death of President Samora Machel.

39
The government newspaper NOTICIAS, in an editorial, called for watchfulness

stating specifically that "to be vigilant means, in situations like those '

which occurred yesterday in the country's capital, to be alert and to prevent

agitators from achieving their objectives, which are not shared by the majority

of the people, nor by our leaders. To be vigilant means also to act immediago unpunished "^ ^ ^ ^

Vandalism'beca"se they are crimes and must not

South Africa's Most Powerful Weapon

South Africa recently announced that it would not renew labor contracts with

Mozambican miners and would not resort to importing labor from the RPM.

The South African government knows that the threat constitutes a powerful

weapon pointed at the debilitated economy of its neighbor.

Since 1970 the number of Mozambican workers demanding the "Jone" has been

diminishing. Originating from the Sul do Save region, the "Magaicas," as the

miners are called here, have not yet found an alternative to South African

gold mines in their own country. In 1982 the number of Mozambican miners

working legally in South Africa was approximately 45 thousand. The number

has been decreasing, which has a serious effect on financial remittances to

Mozambique. At the same time, the growing strangulation and the armed

attacks which destroy locomotives, railroads, bridges, power lines, vehicles

and equipment has made the economic structure even more dependent upon foreign

T

Untl\tS

-,

A(T^ding to ^f

i8"res, direct and indirect damages amount to

iZt J ;LT '// mUCh aS thS t0tal Value of the country's exports in ±yö2 and 1983. In addition, there are other damages which are difficult to

value, particularly lower production, lack of output, lost harvests, production

stoppages and loss of lives.

After floods drought and war, South Africa knows that cancelling the miners'

contracts will cause economic and social convulsions. The number of unemployed

7? , -,i°IaVe T

b6en increasinSand ^ has not been possible to create the

/i to 76 thousand new jobs needed immediately, with 70 thousand needed in

future years. The reduction in the number of miners has resulted in a loss

of financial remittances on the order of $568 million since independence.

Today the RPM is facing the threat of the return of thousands of miners. But

up to what point can South Africa afford such a massive release of such an

important supply of labor? Time will tell whether the fatal shot will

actually be fired, or whether the threat will merely remain hanging as a form

of pressure. The precendents, however, are not mere fiction, and the return

frJ^iT***,, f

b

^

n a Constant worr

y- UP to what point the international

community will be able to meet the needs of Mozambique in this critical

juncture is a question that only time can answer. Because in Mozambique the

time is one of hope, and that hope has a name: Chissano.

13026/9738

CSO: 3442/35

40
MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NORTH KOREANS TO COMBAT RENAMO—London—From what is known in this city among

those connected to specialists in African affairs, the number of North Koreans

in Angola and Mozambique is increasing, with those in the latter countryentering through Zimbabwe. Within the next month another military contingent

of 3 thousand men is expected to arrive in Zimbabwe to reinforce the troops

of that country who are fighting RENAMO in Mozambique. [Excerpts] [Lisbon

TEMPO in Portuguese 6 Nov 86 p 23] 13026/9738

BRITISH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM—The British government in September made

available more than 819 pounds (some 46 million meticals) for a program of

technical assistance to Mozambique. This fact was revealed last month by

technical engineer.Tim George to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM) in

the British city of Preston, 384 kilometers north of London, the capital. The

amount, George revealed, will be used primarily to rehabilitate 300 Land

Rovers and 37 Leyland trucks in the city of Maputo. George stated that as part

of the technical assistance program, seven Leyland technicians are already in

Maputo, two of them rehabilitating the Land Rover jeeps and the other five

working at CODAUTO. Leyland, he said knows Mozambique's needs in terms of

transport. He pointed out that this is the most problematic area for the

South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states, of which

Mozambique is the coordinating member for Transport and Communications. The

program also includes supplying major parts for Leyland trucks and Land Rover

jeeps, and training Mozambican personnel. Tim George stated that the decision

to send the team of technicians to Maputo follows a previous program in which

the firm sent 10 technicians to Mozamgique in 1983 to spend 3 years. "We

want to continue providing technical assistance to Mozambique because we

know the difficulties the country is facing," George emphasized. The team

was involved in technical assistance for rehabilitation of the cars of the

TPU company in Maputo and Beira. It was also involved in the training of

Mozambican personnel, with a training school for Mozambican technicians having

been created for that purpose in Maputo. AIM was informed that Leyland had

provided 100 half-ton trucks over the last two years to the Department for the

Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN). Leyland, one of the

largest automobile concerns in Europe, has 60 years of experience in Africa

and in its technical cooperation programs. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in

Portuguese 14 Oct 86 p 3] 13026/9738

41
SOVIETS MOVED TO MAPUTO—Soviet military and civilian personnel living in

Maputo suburbs have been evacuated to the capital. The Soviet Embassy fears

reprisals on the part of RENAMO and has instructed its officials and personnel

to restrict their nocturnal activities in Maputo. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO

in Portuguese 1 Nov 86 p 56] 13026/9738

CSO: 3442/35

42
NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FORMER GNPP POLITICIAN QUITS POLITICS—The chairman and presidential candidate

of the proscribed Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim,

returned to Maiduguri on Monday after a 34-month self-exile and said he was

through with politics. Alhaji Waziri whose philosophy was "Politics without

bitterness" met reporters at the Maiduguri Airport but declined to comment

on current national issues such as SFEM, the ten-year ban on second republic

politicians and the just concluded political debate. He said he did not run

away from the country following the 1983 coup which terminated the second

republic but that he went abroad on business to bring money into Nigeria.

Alhaji Waziri said he would invest the money in agriculture and industries

so as to contribute to the economic development o£ the country. He revealed

that he was now realising about 1.6 million Naira every month from his frozen

fish business in Port-Harcourt. Alhaji Waziri said he single-handedly spent

about 20 million Naira to finance the GNPP during the 1979 elections. [By

Abdullah! Idris] [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 22 Oct 86 pp 1, 3]

/8309

CSO: 3400/527

43
SOMALIA

CLAN AFFILIATIONS OF MILITARY, POLICE ANALYZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 29 Oct 86 pp 1, 2

[Text] Africa Confidential has acquired documents from

sources close to the Somali government which detail

the names and clan affiliations ofthe leading military

and police commanders. Analysis of these military

dispositions throws new light on the country's political future, which remains unstable as a result of

President Mohammed Siad Barre's continuing ill

health.

On 15 November the congress of Somalia's ruling

party, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

(SRSP), is scheduled to meet and ratify the choice,

made at the end of September by the Central Committee, of Barre as the party's single candidate for

the forthcoming presidential election. The congress

will no doubt endorse the president despite his failure

to recover fully from the car accident of last May.

We understand the president does much less work

than before and finds it difficult to speak for any

great length of time. According to some reports he

can work no more than a couple of hours a day; he

is still under close medical attention and there are

persistent reports that the doctors would like him to

go abroad for further treatment. It is widely believed

in Mogadishu that he will in any case retire within

months of being re-elected. Certainly it is unlikely

that he will be able to survive to the end of another

seven year term.

Political wheeling and dealing in anticipation of

the President's disappearance has inevitably intensified. There is considerable speculation that the president will make it clear during the party congress if

he is really prepared to support the efforts of his

brother, the foreign minister, Abdirahman Jama

Barre, to succeed. A preliminary step in this direction

would be to appoint Jama Barre to the party's

Politburo. It has also been suggested that he might

be made prime minister and that another relative

might be added to the politburo - the president's

44
eldest son Colonel Masleh, the wealthy head of the

army's construction department.

A considerable section of the president's immediate family, and of his Marehan clan, has been trying

to push the ailing leader in this direction. But there

would be great opposition to any such appointments,

headed by the first vice-president, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Ali Samatar, and the minister of

interior, General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla, one of

the presidential sons-in-law. They are the two members of the politburo most likely to be affected

adversely by any such promotions. We understand

they have been co-operating to try and ensure that

the president's immediate family, and the Marehan,

do not manage to retain the virtually complete hold

on power they currently enjoy. General Samatar is,

of course, the legal successor as first vice-president

but he comes from a despised 'untouchable' clan

and has no real clan support. Ahmed Suleiman is

from the Dolbahante, which in the past supported

President Siad Barre, but is unlikely to offer similar

support to his brother or son. Both sides are trying

hard to gain support among the major clans - the

Isaaq, Hawiye, Dolbahante, Majerteen, Ogaden and

Marehan, - and sub-clans. Equally critical will be

what support they can muster among the armed

forces and police; and to what degree this is likely

to depend, as always in Somali politics, upon clan

loyalties.

As might be expected after 17 years of President

Siad Barre in power, the Marehan hold a very

substantial number of top posts as Africa Confidential"s documents reveal. These include the critical

ones of commanders of the second tank brigade and

the second artillery brigade in Mogadishu - these

are a separate command outside the normal structure

of the military establishment, reporting direct to the

president - and the commanders of all three of the

reserve brigades in Hargeisa in the north of Somalia -

the seventh tank brigade, the 11th artillery brigade

and the 24th infantry brigade. It is these forces

which control the two main towns in the country.

Marehan officers also command another 10 of the

army's brigades as well as two divisions (the 11th

and the seventh), and the 54th sector. The commander there, Colonel Xuseen Axmed, recently replaced

the Brigadier General Hussein Hassan, a Dolbahante, who was sent off to the United States for

training earlier this year. In all, about one third of

the army's brigade commanders are Marehan.

The next largest element among senior commanders comes from the Ogaden, who until Barre's talks

45
with Ethiopia's head of state, Col. Mengistu Haile

Mariam, in January, and the attempted rapprochement with Addis Ababa, had been among Barre's

strongest supporters (it is his mother's clan). There

are still some 11 brigade commanders from the

Ogaden as well as two divisional commanders and

the heads of the two smallest sectors, the 60th and

the 43rd sub-sector at Kismayu.

Of the other main clans, the Majerteen have the

commander of the important 26th sector in the

north, General Mohamed Siyad 'Morgan', another

presidential son-in-law, as well as the naval commander at Berbera, the main naval base, a divisional

commander and four brigade commanders. There

are eight Dolbahante brigade commanders and the

commander of the 21st sector which is the strongest

sector, facing the Ethiopian troops at Balamballe,

with two reinforced divisions of five brigades

apiece - the 11th and the 8th divisions. The 11th

division is one of those with a Marehan commander

and two of its brigades, the 35th and the reserve,

have Marehan commanders as well.

Of the major clans it is noticeable that neither the

Isaaq nor the Hawiye are well represented - this is

in part presumably because of Isaaq involvement in

the Ethiopian based opposition, the Somali National

Movement (SNM). Recently there have been growing

signs of Hawiye interest in the SNM, though it still

remains largely Isaaq based. There are in fact only

two senior Isaaq commanders, the head of the naval

base at Kismayu and a brigade commander in the

fourth division at Galkayo. There are two Hawiye

brigade commanders, one in the fourth division and

one in the ninth division based at Las Anod; and a

divisional commander (the sixth division in the 60th

sector). Another six brigades and five divisions are

commanded by people from small uncommitted

groups, Shekhaal, Barwane, Akishe and so on.

The pattern among the police force is more even.

Indeed the Isaaq provide more regional and local

commanders than any other major clan - some 24%.

Of the others, 15% come from the Majerteen; 12%

from the Dolbahante; 12% from the Ogaden; 10%

from the Marehan and 9% from the Hawiye. Of the

regional police commanders a surprising number

(over 25%) come from the Warsangeli, a small clan

close to the Majerteen.

Several of the major clans belong to the Darod

confederacy, the Marehan, the Dolbahante, the Ogaden and the Majerteen. And certainly the Isaaq

see the Darod as a united force opposed to them

politically. On that basis the Darod provide over

50% of the police commanders and nearly 80% of

the army's sector, divisional and brigade comman46
/13104

CSO: 3400/536

ders. If the Darod were a united organisation this

would be overwhelming. However, this is not the

case. The Darod are divided over policies, including

the attempt to talk to Ethiopia, and even more

seriously over the plans of Barre's immediate family

to try and perpetuate their power. Indeed if they

persist in this the Marehan run the risk of setting in

motion a process that might lead to civil war.

It is a policy that also might have the effect of

bringing together a much broader based coalition of

interest than the external opposition have yet been

able to do, and one that might be able to provide

sufficient military strength to offset Marehan control

of the armoured units in Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

If the latter are prepared, as they apparently were

immediately after the President's car accident, to

make their own bid for power, civil war becomes a

real possibility.

All this presupposes that army commanders will

always operate by clan allegiances. This is of course

not necessarily the case. The government certainly

keeps a close eye on some senior officers such as

Gen 'Morgan' (Majerteen) the 26th sector commander. He only moved to his present sector this year but

he has already won a good reputation for pragmatic

common sense (by contrast with his predecessor,

Major General Mohamed Hashi Gani, a Marehan,

regarded as tough, ruthless and ambitious. In Hargeisa, General Morgan may be rather distant from

Mogadishu, but his previous posting was the important 21st sector much closer to the capital and which

deploys a very considerable part of the army's firepower and armour. And there is no doubt that he

remains popular among his former troops as well as

those he now commands. •

47
MÜSEVINI OUTLINES MEASURES TO BOOST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Kampala NEW VISION in English 7 Nov 86 p 20

UGANDA

[Text]

PRESIDENT Yoweri Museveni has disclosed that plans

are underway to start

assembling tractors from

Finland in Uganda.

There are also plans to

import 300 trucks through

the Ministry of Co-operatives

and Marketing and 300

lorries from. Sweden.

The President was speaking to the Kabale District

Team and Planning Committee earlier this week. He

was returning from a oneweek visit to Rwanda and

Burundi.

Mr Museveni said the

Government is concentrating

on boosting agricultural

production by bulk importa- '

tion of implements and the

rehabilitation of local factories which produce necessary inputs.

He added that the whole

transport system in the country will be rationalised to the

nearest railway station with

truck transport which will

increase effeciency and save

costs.

On shortage of essential

commodities, President Museveni said that this would

have been considerably alleviated if some officials handling the trade arrangements

followed them up vigorously.

The President was dismayed to learn that security organs like the Police

in Kabale District are also

involved in smuggling.

He was also disappointed

by reports that weaknesses

in the judiciary had led to

over-accumulation of

detainees in prison and the

release of well-known criminals which incites the public

to take the law into the'ir

own hands.

In their memorandum to

the President, the District

Team and Planning Committee called for the revival

of resettlement schemes to

ease overpopulation in

Kabale district.

They also suggested that

the customs department be

strengthened by equipping

it with transport and communication facilities to stamp

out smuggling in the District. They further suggested

the setting up of more

customs posts at Kamwezi,

Rwene, Bigaya and on Lake

Bunyonyi.

The meeting was also

attended by the ministers of

Health Dr Rugunda, and of

Constitutional Affairs Mr

Sam Njuba. While ir

Kabale, the President also

met members of Resistance

Councils in the district.

He assured them that essential commodities will be

available once bad planning

which is escalating scarcity

is done away with.

On the question of high

interest rates on loans from

the bank, the President

advised the people to opt

for agricultural and industrial loans whose interest:

rates are lower than those

for commercial loans.

The President confirmed

that the Kabr.le-Kisoro

road will be graded.

On the issue oflhe people

of Kisoro ferrying their

produce across the border

because of having nowhere

else to sell it, the President

agreed to the opening up of

a small branch of the Produce Marketing Board in

Kisoro town.

/9274

CSOJ 3400/540

48
UGANDA

MUTEBI ON POLITICAL ROLE OF BAGANDA

Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English 9 Nov 86 p 13

[Article by Joseph Makokha]

[Text] It must not be seen as a case of the Baganda versus the rest because

we all suffer when there is no peace - Prince Mutebi]

Question: Your return to

Uganda almost two months ago

was widely reported in the

Press and to the surprise of

most observers, you are once

more on your way out. What are

your plans?

Answer: My plan is to go to

Britain where I should continue

with a law degree which I had

started in 1984. The course was

interrupted in July 1985 by the

lengthy peace process in Nairobi

and which 1 attended. There was

therefore no way I could have

finished my course. 1 therefore

decided to drop it and pick it up

later. This is precisely why 1 am

£3ing back to Britain.

Mind you, I am not the only

!bne whose studies were interrupted by the Ugandan peace process

because a lot of young Ugandans

were forced to abandon their

studies to link up in one way or

the other, with the Ugandan

historical process of liberation.

Q: What length of time are

you left with to complete your

law degree?

A: Just over a year. However,

what needs clarification here is

that this time span should not be

seen as another exile as I will be

coming home frequently during

this period of studies.

Q: Prince Mutebi, itwill certainly be of interest to our

readers if, by way of summary,

you could give an account of

some of your experiences,

iiavnig left the country many

years ago and now returning as

heir to the abolished Kabaka

throne. How do you plan to perpetuate your role as the

"Sabataka" (leader of clan

leaders)?

A: 1 should begin by saying

that 1 was in Uganda much

earlier this year in January

towards the end of the resistance

war when NRM (the National

Resistance Movement) was controlling most of the southern

parts of Uganda. What struck me

then was the discipline prevailing

within the movement and its

army's humane interaction with

the people residing in areas it had

liberated.

After so many years of complete turmoil under the rule of

incompetent politicians and

corrupt soldiers, one came across

a group of people who were not

only highly motivated but also

' highly educated for the role of

leadership.

As far as the institution 1

inherited is concerned, it is

important to point out that,

whereas so many people wanted

to create the impression that the

Baganda institution cannot in

fact operate or thrive within the

new nation-state of Uganda, that

is plainly out of the case.

It is perfectly possible to have a

constitutional or social arrangement that would make it possible

for this institution, like any other

traditional one, to operate in

Uganda.

That is perfectly obvious and

there should be no debate about

it. My impression is that most

people who believe in Uganda's

future as a heterogenous society,

also accept this can happen. This

is more so, when one is dealing

with a reasonable government, a

government which understands

Uganda's future. Basically, this is.

the impression 1 got in my two

months tour back home.

Q: To what extent did you put

this point across to the transitional government of President Yoweri Museveni either as

the Sabataka or together with

the Baganda elders, and how

was this received?

A: The situation at the

moment in Uganda is that

anybody can put across, his or her

ideas on anything within the constitutional process. As vou mav.

know, the NRM is an interim

administration as it paves the

way to a constituent assembly

and constitutional conference.

In this regard, anybody who

has any ideas on this or how

Uganda should operate in future

can contribute. 1 now know that

the Baganda clan elders, for

example, did this in September

this year and as a result of which

i lie President accepted to set up.

a committee'to-review all issues

pertaining to the Baganda institutions. That was one aspect of

the democratic process that is.

going on now. There are also

proposals and memorandums

to be put • to the

Ministry of Home Affairs and

Local Government!. As you can

see, therefore, there are several

ways by which these issues are

being put across to the relevant

authorities for discussion and

review.

Q: Are there signs that ideas

and proposals on the Baganda

institution which you head will

be embraced by the general

consensus when it comes to the

constitutional conference?

A: It is a fairly complicated

issue. The Baganda traditional

cultural systems and structures

have always been there. They

49
have survived the entire 20 years

of turmoil. Clan structures were

always there and so were their

heads. This explains why me as

the inheritor of the Säbataka

(leader of clan leaders) was

recognised as such though 1 was

out of the country for so long.

What else emerges over and

above that and around it, is

something to be seen within this

constitutional mechanism. So

one expects that in this

democratic atmosphere that has

been created by the current

regime pending a constitutional

conference, these issues will be;

debated and thrashed out. It is *

new atmosphere of democracy in;

Uganda. ;

Q: Some observers have'

argued that Uganda's political

problem revolves around the

Baganda. Their premise is that

this community was the most

developed and politically

organised before and after

independence and unless there

ia a division of political roles

that favours this-group,

problems will always persist in

Uganda.

A: I do not agree with that

assessment of the situation at all.

Basically people have had to

adopt this kind of thinking as ai

result of the muddle-headed and

tribal policies of the Obote

regime. What we should not

forget is that there was a time

immediately after independence

when Uganda was a very

politically workable country until

Obote got rid ofthe independence

constitution and imposed his

own. Krom there on, divisions

were emphasised and for political

reasons that suited him. He

employed what'you might call a

"divide and rule" style of

leadership. This comprised

clashing one tribe against the

other to satisfy his political man'

ouevres. Phis created all these

political divisions that now make

it so easy for some to say that it

was the Baganda who were a

stumbling block to peace.

*i: Oo you, therefore, dismiss

suca analyses that see Baganda

as a stumbling block to finding

a solution to the Ugandan

political problem?

A: Don't get me wrong7l think

it can be made to be that way

borne people have made it out to

appear so, reducing the Ugandan

problem to that of the Baganda

versus, the rest. This is the bad

politics Uganda has inherited

«on» the past 20 years. Why

should we carry on this kind of

jwliti«? After all, the Baganda,

Batoro, Bateso, Baiango and the

others have all suffered during

this time of turmoil. Why should

we lean back to this kind of bad

politics? - ,

vt: And this is precisely

the question, Prince Mutebi.

yne is currently faced with

treason cases in Uganda hardly

a year since the NRM brought

U> a slop the muddle-headed

politics you are talking about.

The unfortunate thing about

muse cases is that almost all the

accused belong to the Baganda

tribe. How do you explain this?

A: It is difficult to comment on

mis as it is a court case.

Q: And there are those

suggesting, during this interim

administration, that the future

constitution of Uganda should

he a federalist one, where

regional autonomy would be

enhanced. Does this approach

th»£ t,J?f- the, .

rec°Wition of their traditional institutions?

A: 1 don't think that the issue

of the preservation or otherwise of

Vf %?nda 8,

cultural traditions should be confused with the wider

issue of establishing Uganda as a

federalist state. Buganda's

heritage has always survived on

its own. However, whether

Uganda should go federalist or

not is out of my perview. It is'for

the people to decide. But one can

say that the federalists do have a

case. It was under the federalist

constitution in the sixties that

Uganda ever experienced peace

WDM. then do vou v«ew NRM s new policy of political

education through seminars

and village committees. Is there

not a likelihood that such

education will clash with

cultural identities such as the

onus the Buganda traditional

institutions advocate?

A: Cultural education or identities and political education

should not be.mutually. exclusive

In fact one hopes that the current

exercise of mass mobilisation

through political education will

take into account the cultural

diversities of UgarMa

/13104

CSO: 3400/586

50
UGANDA

NRM PLANS TO SECURE, INTEGRATE KARAMOJA DESCRIBED

Kampala NEW VISION in English 4 Nov 86 pp 6, 7

[Article by Cathy Watson]

[Text]

It's the dry season now in Karamoja. The

tr «»"%« « but many «r. ra.d,»g m

eastern Uganda and southern Sudan. I

It is the season for raids.

The warriors can walk

quickly through the dry grass,

leaving no tracks and often

covering more than 100 miles

a day. But while the raids cause

suffering along Karamojas

borders, Karamoja itself is

safer and more peaceful

than it has been for years.

For. now and for at least

two reasons the Karamojong

are not raiding each other.

With the NRA occupied

with the rebels in the north,

the Karamojong can raid

their • neighbours with relative impunity. Also the

Karamojong agreed not to

raid each other at peace

talks in 1982 and since then

have more or less kept their

word.

The guns which were once

so visible in Karamoja have

been put away. "Since the

NRA "arrived in March,

said one aid worker, "the

Karamojong have really

cleaned up their act. You

don't see guns ^ or hear

shooting anymore."

The fringes of Karamoja

remain dangerous - raiders

shot and killed two oomali

traders at Iriri on October

25, when they were unlucky enough to run into a

returning raiding party. But

there are no reports of

recent attacks on travellers

in the internal areas of

Karamoja. "You can walk or

drive around at night with

no problem now," said a shopkeeper in Kabong.

Despite this, there is a

feeling that trouble could be

just around the corner. Certain precautions are being

taken. For example, NRA

soldiers guard the Stirling

Civil Engineering team repairing., the road between

Moroto and Kotido.

"The Karamojong are

heavily armed and they know

that the NRA plans to get

tough with them.' said one

Karamojong. "The witchdoctors are telling the warriors to raid now while

the NRA is busy with

the rebels. They say that

when the rebels are finished,

the NRA will crackdown on

the Karamojong.''

Douglas Mande. the bUA

for Kotido and an NRA

commander, confirms that a

firm policy is on the way.

"We're going to cool down

the Karamojong. I think it

will take us about two

years."

The NRM's recipe for Karamoja seems to be threefold: political, military and j

economic. i

"The political problem with . Karamoja has been the absence of good government, >

says Mande. "We need resistance committees and a ;

dedicated local administra- ;

tion." '. I

The military solution is j

ambitious and potentially '.

explosive, but everyone — .

from NRA commanders to , missionaries to educated Ka- ,

ramojong — says it is ;

essential. "We will disarm .

the Karamojong completely," .

says Mande. "Then we will .

seal off the region's internal

and external borders — to

' ttoD the Karamojong from

raiding and to shield them

from their traditional

enemies, the Turkana of

Kenya and the Didinga of

southern Sudan."

Once security is good,

economic develonment can

start. "The NRM is going

to give the Karamojong

some productive enterprise.

Right now the young men

have nothing to do except

drink and raid — nowhere for that energy to

go," said Mande.

The first RCs were formed

in Karamoja on October

22. Mande praised the cadres

51
who prepared the villages ,

for the elections. "I've six

cadres who have" been to thej

political school, all Karamoj

jong. They're "fantastic They ;

walk everywhere and never ' complain. They just say

'we're going' and off they

walk."

The cadres have visited

on foot every village in

Dodoth and Jie counties

and half the villages in

Labwor. They withdrew from

Labwor last month when

rebels disrupted the area.

Mande says that only

cadres who are Karamojong

can do this work. "I had

four cadres from the south.

They took one to look at the

place and said they had to

go back to Kampala for their

belongings.I never saw them

again!"

Mande and his team have

been going to the villages,

or manyattas, for the first

RC elections. In Lonyerep,

the first village, the people

were doubtful and slow to

come forward. At first only

four elders gathered. Then the

cadres drummed up more

people. Another 40 men came

but no women. Finally women

came but only hesitantly

They sat apart from the

men, dressed in goat skins,

decorated with anklets, bracelets and necklaces, and some

with their faces painted.

The men were also dressed

in the traditional way—

with justa sheet knotted

over one shoulder. Some had

lip plugs and feathers in

their hair. Others had the

Turkana helmet-like hair

style, made high and stiff

with mud and pieces of

metal.

The meeting began slowly.

The Karamojong, with their

experience, shared with other

Ugandans, of brutality at the

hands of soldiers, were

nervous about Edward and

Patrick, Mande's kadogos.

Patrick, who was standing

almost to attention behind

Mande had to be told to sit

down and take it easy.

Then the nominations could

begin. At first it went well,

with Sampson Ilukori,

Maude's special assistant and' a graduate of the political

_ school at Wakiso, running

the meeting. But then another

snag arose, the post of

secretary for youth. No one

wanted it. The warriors

laughed and grumbled among

themselves and one by one

got up and walked away.

This post and the post of

secretary for_ defence werea

problem ina good number'

of villages. The warriors

do not want to be involved

witha structure which will

tie them down and, in

particular, stop their raiding.

In several villages old men

were elected as secretaries

for youth, because all the

young men declined.

But eventually in Lonyerep

a suitable secretary for youth

was found, and Mande and

his team could move on. In

the next villages, the elections

went on smoothly. Word had

spread that Mande and his

team_werg well intentioned.

RCs have now been formed

in the following villages in

Kotido district in Karamoja:

in Nakapelimoru subcounty

in Jie county, Lonyerep,

Kalogwang, Poet, Kalogola,

Kaiwata, Lomukura, Lokore,

Nasinyon, Mazula, Kolabur,

Oyapuwa, Nyakwae, Loriu,

Kadocha, Potongar, and in Panyangara sub county in Jie

county, Lopedot, Ngoletur,

Nutumpool, Nalikeret, Rikitae, Naregae, Lopotha,

Nakadelio, Lopothat, NawiiEjok, Ilaa, Rukuruk, Nabilielet, Lorengeawat, Naitakwae, Lojom and Kalosarich. A total of 15 RC I's

have been set up. Many

villages had to join with

others to create big enough

resistance councils. Often too

one village would have no one

who could read or write

well enough to be secretary, — so villages had to

join forces to finda secretary.

"The good thing about the

Karamojong is that there

is no politics," says Mande.

And indeed at the RC

elections the queries and

comments were all practical

and simple. "Does the RC

chairman need to be an

educated man?" 'No, said

Sampson Ilukori," as long as

you respect him."

In one village they invented

a song in praise of President

Museveni. "They think Museveni is tough and good.

The others, Amin and Obote,

were tough and bad," Ilukori

explained.

But the main worry in

every village was water. At

only the beginning of the

dry season, it is already

running out. By March the

lack could be acute. Seventyfive per cent of the boreholes in Kotido are out of

..order. The water development

teanThas the pipes "to repair

them but no transport. The

team tells the Karamojong,—

you carry the pipes, and we'll

walk with you to the village.

Now the Karamojong are

carrying the pipes on their

heads, the water team

striding along beside them.

•The crisis of water in

Kotido was not helped by

the disappearance two months

ago of the head of the waterdevelopment team with 2.2

million

1' shillings.

It is not clear how well

the RCs will work in Karamoja, but just two days

after the first had formed,

RCs were bringing problems

to the SDA. One RC reported

that the warriors in their

village had kidnappeda ten

year old boy from near Lira

and were keeping him to

tend cattle.

Graduates of the political ,

school at Wakiso are also

helping to improve politics

in Karamoja. Almost all the

top officials in Kotido

district have attended the

course at Wakiso, and

another six are joining the

new intake which begins

this week.

The round-up of guns in

Karamoja began in August,

but was suspended in

September when the NRA

was forced to move troops

across to Kitgum and Gulu

to contain the rebels. Nevertheless over 1000 guns were

gathered, some handed in

voluntarily» others taken by

force by the NRA.

One missionary, Father

Peter Premarini, who has

lived in Karamoja for 16

years, said he thought these

represented only5 per cent

of the guns in Karamoja.

He also believes that the

warrior.« will not give up

their guns easily.

"We have never thought

it would be easy," says

Mande. The Karamojong are

reported to have self-loading

rifles, sub-machine guns, and

grenade and mortar launchers. Guns began proliferating in Karamoja in 1979

after the fall of ldi Amin,

when the Karamojong raided

the barracks at Moroto and

52
also seized weapons from

Amin soldiers, who used the

route through Karamoja to

reach West Nile and Sudan.

The same happened this year,

although this time the Karamojong were more prepared.

They mounted roadblocks,

stripping the UNLA soldiers

of their uniforms and guns

and killing many of them.

The frenzy of this year's'

raids may in part be due

to the new influx of arms.

Buta military operation

to disarm the Karamojong

will not be started until the

NRA can muster the troops

to carry it out efficiently.

At present there are two

battalions in Karamoja—

the 23rd based at Moroto

and the 31st at Kotido.

The main concern of both

seems to be the rebels and

not the raiders. One NRA

soldier explained why: "The

raiders are just after cattle,

but the rebels are after the

government."

The rebels entered Karamoja in September from their

base in Kidepo National -Park.

They reached the towns of

Karenga and Kapedo, where

they burnt houses, killed

civilians, spoiled ' boreholes

and kidnapped young men

to act as porters. According

to SDA Mande, their aim

was to capture Kotido, but the

NRA drove them away. Most

appear to have returned

to southern Sudan as Kidepo

National Park is now almost

completely secure.

Small groups of rebels

remain active in eastern

Karamoja, however, and the

NRA has made the area

15 miles to the east of

Kotido off limits to traffic.

The economic solution to

Karamoja's problems is obviously a long-term undertaking. Always a harsh

environment and neglected

by all previous regimes,

starting with the British,

Karamoja has slipped deeper

and deeper into poverty

since 1979. That year Idi

Amin's soldiers destroyed the

animal health checkpoint at

Iriri, which cleared all cattle

for sale outside Karamoja.

The government promptly

quarantined Karamoja. the

cattle markets collapsed and

the people lost their only

source of income.

The daily market at Kptido.

which once boomed with

cattle sales and others, is now

shrunk to4 or5 vendors,

sellinga handful of Bails here,

a small pile* of salt there.

Where oncea Karamojong

could sell 150 animals in a day to a trader from

Kampala, he is now hardpressed to sell one and must

sell it within Karamoja, says

Terence Okoth, an animal

health officer in Kotido.

The NRM intends to reopen the Karamojong cattle

markets as soon as animal

health can be assured, but

that will take some work.

Several diseases, most importantly contagious pleural

pneumonia, are ravaging

Karamoja's goat and cattle

population, brought in by sick

animals raided from southern

Sudan.

The animal heaKh team has

the vaccines against the

pneumonia as well as rinderpest but has no transport.

Its vehicle was stolen in 1983.

In general the facilities

for animal health have deteriorated since the 1970s.

The two dips' in Kotido

district, at Abim and Naka- ;

pelmoru, have been out of

order since 1977, and their :

iron roofs were looted in I

1979. Dips are essential to ;

control four serious diseases j

carried by ticks.

The alternative to dipping I

is spraying but there is ;

only one spray pump in

Kotido district for its

300,000 heads of cattle. Okoth

estimates that only 1000

animals are sprayeda "f****".

Lack of water is an sr

problem for the livestock.

"We used to have so many

dams. But most are silted

up now. The International

Labour Organisation wanted

to help but withdrew its

staff to Kampala in August

because it feared the rebels."

says Okoth.

Okoth says that the i'aramojong could clear the dai.-

themselves but they need t.n;

tools. He also stresses th.u

the Karamojong worrv

greatly about the health

of their animals. "They come

in everyday saying, our

animals are dying. They

want to buy antibiotics, but

we have none to sell."

Agriculture has fared

poorly as well. Major projects at Labwor, Karenga.

Iriri and Namalu were destroyed by raids and government armies. Crops in Karamoja usually fail every

4 to5

years due to lack of rain

Agriculture among the Karamojong is purely women's

work. In fact, the word UKcrops is 'Women's cows'. So

efforts to increase agricultural output must focus on

women's needs, something

that has not always happened

in the past.

-The Karamojong derive

most of their nutrition from

the cereals grown by the

women and relatively little

from livestock products.

When there is famine, as

there was in 1980, it is because crops fail and only

secondarily because cattle die.

Human health has also been

neglected in Karamoja. with

ituDerculosis, maiaiia ana

gastroenteririts common. The

health centre at Kotido lacks

food, mattresses, lamps and

an ambulance. The ambulance

was stolen by fleeing UNLA

soldiers in February, says

John Bosco Angello, the

medical assistant in charge.

"I had to take my last

emergency case to the hospital in a tipper truck."

The lack of food means

he can accept no in-patients.

The lack of light means work

at night is difficult and

hazardous..

Kotido has no generator, "We were

meant to get one

but it was diverted," says Mande,

The hospital at

Kabong is an oasis

amid these troubles.

Run by Dr Forni,

district medical

officer for Kotido,

it providesa full

hospital service

as well as community schemes including one for TB

patients and

another for traditional birth attendants ,

The hospital is ..I most

self-sufficient It grows its

own food.A forest of 7000

trees, planted by the hospital

staff, provides all the wood

it needs for fuei

53
Forni says that the Karamojong are extraordinarly

healthy, despite their poverty. •

For example, veneral disease

is almost unknown among

them.A chronic shortage. . of food is their main health

risk. This shows UD most

clearly in pregnant, women.

Whereasa normai woman

gains about 11 kg during

pregnancy, Karamojong

women gain on average

only2 to3 kg and many

lose weight. Karamojong newborns weigh on average

2.495 kg, on the borderline of being dangerously

underweight.

Probably the most acute.

obstacle to plans to help

the Karamojong in Kotido

is the total lack of transport.

Every vehicle in the district

was stolen during the last

two regimes. "I think most

of our vehicles are in soutnern

Sudan now," says Mande,

although the former district

commissioner's car has been

sighted near Gulu.

SDA Mande's pick-up is the

only government vehicle in

the district. It never stands

still: it is used as an

ambulance, to bring veterinary drugs from Kampala, to

carry district staff to the

villages. Even it, however, is

unsuitable for Karamoja. It

lacks four wheels drive and

hasa low clerance.

On this score the NRM

appears as neglectful of

Karamoia as any other

regime, particularly in light

of the number of vehicles

some ministers have been

allocated.

Traditionally Karamojong

men raid for cattle, for

status and to pay ihe brideprices of the numerous wives.

Dan N-mgole,a Karamojong

book keeper explains- "These\

guys are thirsty for cattie '

because of the bride price.

Also with more cattle youclimb the ladder of honour."

The Karamojong further

believe that all cattle belong

to them by divine decree.

The pressure to acquire

cattle is still strong. An average dowry calls for 50 animals and The tamily ot an exceptionally sought after

woman can ask for over

100. But the causes of cattle

raiding are now more

complex. They include

poverty, boredom, too many

guns and the violence of

Uganda's past which has

criminalised some Ugandans.

Many people believe that

criminal or 'bad' elements

are to blame for the violence

of today's «-aids. One missionary described the raiders

she meets as "ex-UNLA

soldiers whose villages no

longer want them" and "semieducated thugs"

She believes that those

-Karamojong who joined

Amin's army and the UNLA

were brutalised by the atrocities those forces meted out

and are now corrupting

the traditional warriors. The

Karamojong were particularly heavily recruited by

the Lutwa regime which

lured them with promises

of cattle in Buganda and

Ankole.

Other people explain

today's . raiding by saying

it isa traditional custom

turned nasty by guns and

that the Karamojong are an

inherently violent people who

now have access to lethal

weapons.

There is.a leftist analysis which says that many

Karamojong want peace and

that the raids only benefit a minority who get rich ;

while most get poorer. There

is data to show that in

some villagesa few individuals own unusually large

herds while moVe people

than before have no animals

at all. But this trend is not

seen in Karamoia asa whole.

mere is alsoa tneory

which links the raids to a business which smuggles

cattle through Kenya to

Somalia and then to Saudi

Arabia. But while some raided

cattle may .leave Uganda,

many remain in Karamoja.

Counties like Dodoth last year

were almost without cattle

but are now well stocked.

When gold and missionaries

are added to this theory,

it turns into an international

conspiracy. There are reports

that the NRA caughta helicopter attempting to fly

Karamoja gold to Kenva

and that it also found gold

hidden in sacks of seeds

being sent by the Church

of Uganda seeds project to

southern Sudan. Here there

could bea link with the

rebels. Perhaps the gold

was point; to them Or perhaps

foreign gioups are selling

the gold to arm the rebels

andthe raiders.

in Karamoja, however, all"

sources denya link between

the rebels and the raiders.

They point to the longstanding enmity between the

Karamojong and the Acholi.

They also say that unarmed

Karamojong flee when they

see the rebels, and that

raiders have been known

to fight pitched battles with

them.

But it, 'is clear that the

rebels benefit from the cattle

raids in that they stretch

the . NRA's logistical and

political resources. The people

of eastern Uganda may eventually feel abandoned by the

NRM which promises them

protection from the raiders

but cannot, because of its

commitments in the north,

provide it in sufficient

strength.

Commander Badru Kiyingi

of the 31st battalion believes

this is part of the rebels

plans. He believes that the

rebels waited until the cattle

raids were well underway

before launching their first,

attack in August.

But whatever the correct

analysis of cattle raiding,

revenge is clearlya strong

motive for the Karamojong.

Since 1971 when Idi Amin

launcheda crash programme

to make the Karamojong

wear clothes, directing his

soldiers to beat those who

went naked, the Karamojong have suffered at the

hands of armies.

Under Obote's second

regime soldiers killed many

Karamojong, including

women and children, twice

using helicopter gunships

against them. The UNLA

also used Karamoia asa private meat store, and warriors

npw raiding villages in Kitgum and Gulu often say

they are simply going to get

their cattle back.

The warriors also seek

revenge on the civilians of

the districts bordering Karamoja, who in 1979 formed

an armed militia which killed

many Karamojong. It was

disbanded in 1983 but last

week after raids in Mbale

there were .calls to restart

it.

A final bitterness for the

Karamojong was their betrayal at peace talks in 1982

with the Itesot at Soroti.

54
They killed several of the

Karamojong delegation and

wounded the senior politician

in the group, Joshua Akol,

then an UPC MP and the

deputy minister for transpot

The NRM would do well

to note this vicious cycle

of revenge and retaliation. It

must be broken. The Karamojong must be disarmed,

but the steps the NRM

takes to do this must be

swift, effective, wellresourced and/ understood

by the Karamojong. And

as the Karamojong are disarmed they must be helped

out of their poverty. Otherwise it will be just another

bitter chapter for the Karamojong, and the violence

will continue. More guns can

always be found.

/9274

CSOs 3400/540

55
UGANDA

REHABILITATION OF KILEMBE COPPER MINE APPROVED

London AFRICA DIGEST in English 22 Nov 86 p 6

[ Text] Thegovernment is going ahead with the

partial rehabilitation ofthe Kilembe copper

mine in the west, despite doubts about its

commercial viability.

Water & Mineral Resources Minister

Chango Macho recently announced plans

for government investment of $20 million in

Kilembe. The rehabilitation will have three

phases: restoration ofthe mine's

productivecapacity, rehabilitation ofthe

concentrator and erection of a new

smelter; erection of new plants to produce

cobalt and sulphuric acid, and refining of

copper and manufacture of such products

as copper wire and cable.

Macho gave no cost estimate. However,

total capital costs were put at $53.6 million

in afeasibility study done by the UK's

Seltrust Engineering in 1982. At current

prices, the cost is put at $100 million.

Additional financing will be difficultto

raise, sources say. The project failed to

attract external financing in 1983, when the

government initially announced a $20

million investmentto re-open the mine. The

lack of interest was caused by depressed

world commodity prices and the stateof

insecurity during the five-year civil war.

Prospects for attracting external

financing in the near future remain poor,

The world pricefor copper has stagnated

in 1986 and there is little chanceof a rise,

given producers' overcapacity. World

cobalt prices have also plummeted this

year.

Macho says the decision to goahead with

the projectis based on a need to diversify

exports away from coffee and to stimulate

local industry, including development of

small implements industries to produce

hammers, nails, beds, bolts and nuts.

Kilembe has been on a care-andmaintenance basis since production

ceased in 1979. Four years earlier, the

mine was taken over by the government

after former presidentAmin expelled

Canada's Falconbridge, which had

managed the mine since it was opened in

the mid-1950s. Outputtotalled 8,900

tonnes in 1975, compared with 17,000

tonnes in 1970.

Seltrust put Kilembe's proven and

probablecopper ore reserves atjust over 4

million tonnes, with an average content of

1.75 per cent copper, and possible

reserves at 1.8 million tonnes, with an

averagecopper content of 1.39 per cent.

Cobalt reserves have yetto be evaluated,

but there is an estimated 1.1 million tonnes

of cobalt pyrite concentrate, with a 1.35 per

cent cobalt content, stockpiled at nearby

Kasese.

Given these figures, Seltrust said the

mine could produce504,000tonnes of ore

annually for eightto nine years. It

recommended rehabilitating the Kilembe

concentratorto produce28,000 tonnes of

copper concentrates and 36,000 tonnes of

cobalt pyrite concentrates a year, as well

as reconstructingthe filter plant at Kasese

and installing equipmentto enablecopper

concentrates to be loaded into railway

wagons for export overseas.

Seltrust also suggested a cobalt

processing and a sulphuric acid plant be

built at Kasese. Theformer would process

94,050tonnes of cobalt concentrates a

year to produce2,380 tonnes of cobalt

carbonateforfurther processing overseas

in Canada or Europe. The latter would

produce 102,700tonnes a year of 98 per

cent acid, transported by rail for export.

Seltrust estimated that the project would

take 32 months to complete and"require an

operating staff of 2,700.

/13104

CSO: 3400/586 56
ZIMBABWE

MUGABE ADDRESSES INTERNAL, REGIONAL ISSUES, RELATIONS WITH RSA

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 16, 18, 20, 21

[Interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Frederik van Zyl Slabbert;

date and place not given]

[Text]

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is no stranger to Leadership

magazine. He was interviewed by publisher and editor Hugh Murray in

this journal's inaugural edition nearly five years ago -the first time Mr

Mugabe had allowed a South African journalist access since becoming

prime minister.

The interview on these pages represents another "first". Some four

years ago, a ban was slapped on prime ministerial interviews with publications and journalists operating out of South Africa. Former PFP

leader Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and David Goldblatt (who also took

the photographs for the first interview), were granted the interview

Leadership really wanted to celebrate its fifth birthday.

At the beginning of 1982, a somewhat terse Mr Mugabe talked to

Leadership about the need for "national reconciliation". In his later discussion with Slabbert, the level tone suggests that he is much more confident

now about his ability to meet this tough objective.

And a separate article on improving race relations in the country (see

page 24), written by Professor Marshall Murphree of the University of

Zimbabwe in Harare, would seem to bear out such an assessment.

Says Murphree: "In the first five years ofindependence, the salience of

race has declined significantly although the evidence of a residual white

racism and its reactive black response remains.Given the contradictions

and constraints involved, Zimbabwe is a success story, achieved by a

combination of statesmanship, favourable economic conditions and a

balance of principle and pragmatism."

There is an important matter with which Leadership would liked to

have dealt in the interview: the impact on the region of President Samora

Machel's death.

57
Slabbert conducted the interview before the tragic air crash and the

Prime Minister's press office made it clear that a further discussion was

out of the question.

Nevertheless, it is certain that Mr Mugabe will take a long time to get

over the death ofhis "bosom friend" and comrade-in-arms. It can safely

be forecast that the disaster will impact seriously on efforts to sustain

peace in the region.

The destinies ofZimbabwe and South Africa are inter-linked to a

very large extent How

do you see the major

similarities and differences in the conflicts in

South Africa and the

former Rhodesia?

Rhodesia was a kind ofSouth African microcosm, with a smaller population than that

ofSouth Africa, but with the same racial pattern - whites on the one hand were a minority and still are a minority; blacks on the

other were the majority. Here we had the

policy ofsegregation, racial segregation. At

one time, during the Federation and before,

they tried to call it the policy of "two

pyramids". So you had racial separation, and

the two races were meant to develop along

their own routes upward, with very little

inter-action. You had land for the whites,

and land for the blacks - and the land for the

whites was more fertile, and per capita, much

more than that of the blacks; African education and European education; African health,

European health, and with social separation

as well. The races were not legally prohibited

from inter-acting, but socially it was regarded

as taboo for whites to mingle with blacks,

until the time of the Federation.

Then we had some modification, here and

there - where hotels like the Jameson were

set aside as multi-racial hotels, and the rest,

like Meikles, remained strictly and exclusively white. That pattern you also get in

South Africa. But perhaps in South Africa

what has really heightened and aggravated

things, is the fact that segregation was then

embodied and incorporated in law and therefore, by law, Africans may not, say, have the

same rights as the whites. And of course, recently they have ameliorated that position

in regard to marriages and things like that.

But the pattern is the same -residential

separation, agricultural separation, and then

you have Bantustans. Here, of course, we

had Native Reserves, later Tribal Trust

Lands. Now we call those communal lands,

but anybody can live in those areas. The

fact, however, is that whites really live in

urban areas and in commercial farming areas.

So you have the same pattern and, in my

view, the remedy could be the same as here.

I don't see South Africa escaping the same

democratic solution that we have had to resort to here.

Given your experience in Zimbabwe/

Rhodesia, what is your message to black

and white South Africans who are locked

in conflict?

From my experience here, the fears of the

whites in the country were more psychological than anything else. But, of course, when

a group has entrenched itself in power, then

it regards its rights and privileges as sacrosanct. Then itseeks to make them permanent,

one way or another, and raises them above

the purely psychological sphere and it wants

to build in a kind of heritage for the future.

So, what South Africans really are facing is

what we faced here. But there is no need

for whites to fear that they will be discriminated against if democracy is established.

Naturally, there will have to be some giving, and much more giving by whites than

by blacks. Giving and taking will have to

take place. There will have to be equal rights

to the acquisition of property; equal opportunities in respect ofsuch social services as

education and health. A non-racial pattern

must evolve. It may, for a start, be repulsive

to whites that their children should go to the

same schools as blacks. Here it took some

doing and we are still getting over the

psychological difficulties. But our whites are

now used to it and, more and more, we see

parents being willing and amenable to their

children mixing, even socially, with blacks.

So, that is not a matter that should be feared

by whites, that blacks will, perhaps, pursue

a vengeful policy. But, of course, it depends

on how the solution is achieved. If it is

58
achieved by way of

a political solution in

which all parties evolvea democratic order,

thenI don't see the whites losing by it. If

anything, they will gain by it. They will gain

in the sense that psychologically they will

have rid themselves of their sense ofracial

superiority and their fear of being overwhelmed by blacks.

Those who favour sanctions against the

South African government believe they

will either bring that government to its

senses, or to its knees. What is your view?

Sanctions certainly cannot have the effect

of bringing the apartheid regime to its knees.

But they are under the additional pressure

of the political struggle being waged by the

people of South Africa in general.A combination of these forces is what will yield the

solution in the end, notjust sanctions alone.

What will be the impact of retaliatory sanctions by the South African government

against Zimbabwe?

We expect that if we impose sanctions, or if

the international community imposes sanctions, South Africa will retaliate. We know

they are thinking ofit, and one way in which

they are going to retaliate is precisely by

doing what they demonstrated they could

do- imposea blockade and, therefore, prevent the transportation of our goods, imports

and exports, through South Africa. That is

obviously going to affect us, because all

along South Africa has not allowed us to divert our goods on the Mozambican routes.

They have supported the MNR in attacking

our Mozambican routes on which most of

our goods should go. Ian Smith used those

routes, by and large, and onlya trickle of

goods went through South Africa. So, if we

hada situation where South Africa blockaded us, we would have to move heaven and

earth to get our goods, most of our goods, if

not all, through Mozambican routes. Nacala

is alsoa possibility. These are being worked

on and we would have to ensure that the

Maputo line works.

The Beira corridor isa feasible proposition

only to the extent that it can absorb part of

the volume of our exports and imports that

today pass through South Africa. But the port

has limited facilities. It does not matter how

much dredging is done, and how much expansion of the harbour facilities is undertaken, there is still a limited extent to which

it can accommodate most of our goods. We

would still have to use Maputo.

You have just been elected chairman ofthe

Non-Aligned Movement. How do you see

NAM makinga contribution to bringing

about stability in Southern Africa?

The Non-Aligned Movement is not an organisation with a given structure as such, so

its platform is mainly political. It is this political platform which it utilizes to bring pressure to bear on situations where solutions

are much needed. And hence, in respect of

Southern Africa, that is, in respect of apartheid in South Africa and the occupation of

Namibia by South Africa, NAM urges sanctions; urges the adoption of a sanctions package, and perhaps a comprehensive and

mandatory package of sanctions by the international community. It appeals not only

to its members, but also to the international

community. Therefore, it isa complementary organization to the United Nations. It

hasn't got the structure which enables it to

urge action and supervise it in the same way

as perhaps the United Nations which isa

well-established organization.

What has been your experience ofthe relationship between government and business in Zimbabwe?

Private enterprise was initially rather suspicious of government and they did not know

whether they would be allowed to survive

for another five years. Now five years have

gone by- they have survived, they are more

confident now. But we are aware they are

still suspicious. But we say to them: "Go

ahead, continue, expand"; if it is agriculture,

we say: "Well, there are the incentives given

you by government, continue to produce

and contribute to the volume of production

of commodities that we need in the country,

and that we need to export also." And so,

there is greater confidence now on the parr

of business. Obviously we are still committed to our policy ofsocialism, but we have

said to business that our socialism takes into

account our own history

and circumstances, and

it is obvious that we cannot transform the country overnight. And to

the extent that we are

not able to transform it

overnight, we say to

59
business: "These are

the goals of our nation;

these are the targets. Work towards them and

we will assist you as much as we can to

achieve those targets." Where we undertake

to transform the socio-economic system along

socialist lines, and should we decide to participate in any enterprise, we discuss this with

the relevant enterprises, and obviously we

pay compensation for any enterprises that are

taken over by government. But sometimes,

of course, we also purchase shares in the

particular enterprises. However, our mode

of operation towards socialism has been by

way of creating co-operatives in agriculture,

in mining, in industry and in establishing

new enterprises. Then, State enterprises

work alongside private enterprise and naturally we have gone about this process cautiously, because we need to train people for

management. We need also the necessary

inputs, technology and so on- and these are

not things that you can hope to get overnight. This slows the process, and, to the

extent that that process is slow, we must accept co-existence with private enterprise.

How close are you to achieving the goal of

national unity as far as the Matabele/Shona

issue is concerned?

We have never looked at the difference between ZANU and ZAPU as basically a

Ndebele/Shona issue. True, Nkomo is the

Ndebele leader andI ama Shona leader. But

the break occurred not because Nkomo isn't

Shona, and he would be the last man to

admit thatI quit ZAPU because he is

Ndebele.I quit becauseI did not agree that

he was effective asa leader.I wanteda much

more effective organisational instrument to

bring about change. We were more for the

armed struggle at the time than ZAPU was,

but, of course, eventually ZAPU also

adopted the armed struggle. This was the

basic difference. But, of course, in our establishing ZANU, more Ndebele's remained with Nkomo and this made the division much more tribal than it really is.

ZAPU also has many Shonas as its followers,

and we have some Ndebeles as followers and

also in the leadership. So the difference

should not be looked at as basically Ndebele

and Shona, that is, asa tribal issue.

However, ZANU and ZAPU have started

conferring and we believe that unity is

within sight. But, ofcourse, we had to define

certain parameters and certain fundamental

principles. What the main cause of difference was, or rather the main difficulty in

achieving unity, was the view of ZAPU that

we forma completely new party and relegate

both ZANU and ZAPU to the archives.

And those are Nkomo's words- relegate

ZANU and ZAPU to the archives. They

have played their part in the history and let's

have their names only in the archives. And

we said, in retort, that only last year in June

we went to the electorate and we got 80%-

do you expect us to go back to our constituents and say: "You did well, but the

time has now come for us to relegate your

votes to the archives?" We couldn't doa

thing like that and so it was that area that

needed discussion. We have since discussed

it, and we are happy that we are moving towards unity, but unity within the framework

ofthe ruling party.

Has the revolution in Zimbabwe benefited

women as much as men?

Yes, it has benefited women. You see,

women have been subject to more oppressive structures in our society, colonial or

traditional, than have men. During settler

rule, women suffered the same disabilities

as men under colonial rule— they were discriminated against educationally. But within

their own society, African women still suffered discrimination by men. We have discriminated against them by virtue ofthe fact

that by tradition they were regarded as inferior and dependants - men's dependants.

They are still that, but the war raised the

status ofwomen considerably. We had

young women in the struggle, some ofwhom

became commanders and members of the

General Staff and one or two in the High

Command. After Independence, we, ourselves, adopted as a party (and this is also in

our two manifestos, the 1980 and 1985 election manifestos) the policy of equality, equal

wages, equal opportunities anda commitment to improving the status of women

within custom and within the law. This has

not been achieved yet.

But across the board now you have young

women occupying equal positions with men,

with the same salaries, in the civil service

and also in private enterprise.I was amused

that when we took over, European women

in the public service were receiving lower

salaries than men, and we abolished it. We

found it absolutely unbearable and we did

away with it. At the same time, of course,

we also raised the status of the African

woman, and to us, therefore,a woman can

60
be

a permanent secretary as much asa man.

But, because ofthe handicap they had

through custom and tradition, anda slower

start in education, there are fewer highly

educated women than men. And so, at the

moment, you have only one woman permanent secretary, but a number are assistant

secretaries. One hopes that as time goes on

they will move upwards and therefore help

us to correct the present imbalance.

But this is not to say that all is well.

Women are still inferior to men by virtue of

our system of marriage and custom. We pay

lobola, and this means, naturally, thata

woman becomes the man's possession. It

doesn't matter what we try to say, how we

try to euphemistically put it, the issue is-if

you have paid lobola fora woman, then she

becomes "yours" and she bears the children.

She must bear the children for your family.

And the children must bear your name. They

are your children. And so what she brings

into the family isa womb, as well as her

labour. She isa housewife; she is the keeper

ofthe children; she is also the main agricultural worker, and so she still has that burden.

ButI wouldn't mind that,I don't thinkI

would ever come toa position whereI will

agree that men and women must be equal

cooks in the home.I believe that the woman

isa better cook than the man, although, of

course, having beena bachelor fora long

time,I can cook for myself delicious food as

much as my wife can cook it. SoI pride myself on that one, but the issue is: I think the

woman isa better nurse for the child. She is

closer to the child than the father and one

would want to see that continue.I think she

also makesa better housekeeper. But the

man must also accept his own responsibilities and must not desert the wife and

leave her to do, in addition to housework,

arduous agricultural tasks, such as weeding

the fields. I am now talking of the traditional woman.

So there is that aspect that must be corrected.

Then, of course, there is the question ofinheritance. We have problems there because

of our system of marriage. Ifthe woman

comes to your home and she is not really

rooted in it legally, then she is not entitled

to inherit from you- your children are. She

is entitled perhaps to inheritance from her

own family, to the extent that she is recognized as the inheritor there, but even in her

own home, it is more the men, the brothers,

who will inherit. And so this is what we are

trying to look at at the moment.

What are your views on such organisations

as the African National Congress and Inkatha? I do not recognize that there is any validity

toa political organization or movement

which is based on tribe.

And soI do not acceptthe criteria ofa Zulu

tribe, ora Xhosa tribe ora Sotho tribe ina

context where you are forging national unity.

We accept that this is your history, like we

accept here, that we have Shonas, Vendas,

Ndebeles, Shangani and the various subtribes in the country, that this is what we

have inherited. But accepting that does not

mean accepting that these tribal entities

must continue to exist entirely as they are

and be accorded political rights on the basis

that they are tribes. I think that is backward thinking, and so to

me, Inkatha really should not exist as such.

What Chief Buthelezi ofInkatha should do is

to cut across. If he had an organization which

included Zulus, Xhosas and Sothos,I would

be the first to accord him recognition asa national leader. But at the moment he is a tribal

leader and it is primitive reckoning on our part

ifwe recognize that he hasa political role to

play ina situation where the interaction ofthe

tribes towards the creation of national unity,

anda South African nation, is of paramount

importance.

And this also is true of Afrikaners. They

have tried to retain their unity as Afrikaners.

One does not want to go beyond that and

accord it the right, the political right, to existence. I feel that there has to be an endeavour by all entities in South Africa to

createa national entity to which everyone

will belong, to which everyone will owe allegiance and of which, therefore, everyone

will bea member. So the ANC havea much

more correct and valid message than Inkatha.

So has the PAC, (Pan Africanist Congress)

the UDF (United Democratic Front), and

perhaps, AZAPO (Azanian People's Organisation). These are political organizations that

are based on the fact that membership is

open to all South Africans.

Inkatha is probably just for the Zulus.I

may be wrong, butit would appear to be just a Zulu organization. And to really enhance

its status is to createa potential situation of

conflict in South Africa.

So,I believe that ifthe people ofSouth

Africa want to be effective, they have to belong to a national organization which recognises that they all belong to South Africa,

61
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that they are all one, that they are all equal

and that South Africa, as a whole, is their

motherland. Ifthey do that united, and

avoid tribalism, then they lend efficacy to

their struggle. Otherwise, really, they are

going to be divided and this will rebound to

the benefit of those who would want to see

them divided and who would want to see

the policy ofBantustans enhanced. And so

we are full ofpraise for organizations like the

ANC, PAC and UDF, because ofthe national approach that they have adopted.

Ifyou had three weeks in which to totally

relax, what would you do?

I would certainly not relax in the sense of

doing nothing. I cannot do without reading

and writing, and so ifI had three weeks of

relaxation, I would use that to do my own

writing, to recapitulate, as it were, past

events and therefore to write a bit of history

-which I can't get time for at the moment.

That would really be relaxation by my standards - away from routine.

62
ZIMBABWE

NATION'S EFFORTS TO ATTAIN NONJRACIAL SOCIETY EXPLORED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 24, 26, 27, 28

[Article by Marshall W, Murphree]

[Text]

No single topic has featured more prominently as a dominant issue in the ordering of human affairs in Africa than

race. A variety ofvoices have attempted to deny this,

from the apologists ofcolonial regimes who have rationalised their racism as cultural distinctiveness to the

theoreticians who argue that race is nothing but disguised

class. Such arguments have engendered fierce and protracted debates in academic circles, but they are in effect futile attempts to declare as trivial what the general

public - both black and white - know to be decisive in

everyday life, namely race.

Equally, no mode of human conduct has come under

more universal opprobrium than that ofracism. Racism

is currently recognised as being divisive, exploitative

and morally repugnant. In international circles the judgement is uniformly hostile; racism is intolerable and any

country permitting its ostensible existence within its

borders finds itself a global pariah. Clearly for Africa to

live with the rest of the world and with itself, racism

must be eliminated from its shores.

Almost without exception, the independent governments of post-colonial Africa have adopted the principle

of non-racialism as a fundamental aspect oftheir policies.

In part, this espousal stems from a cultural heritage to

which racism is foreign. More fundamentally, it arises

from a reactive repugnance to the white racism ofthe

colonial era, a repugnance with emotive depths which

whites find difficult to appreciate since they have never

experienced it.

The espousal of a principle and its implementation

in practice are, however, two different things. Independent Africa's attempts to implement non-racialism

have had their share of failures and this gap between

rhetoric and reality has been grist for the mills of their

cynical detractors.

However, the real lessons to be learned from these

discrepancies between principle and practice are how

deeply ingrained the salience ofrace is in the structures

and cultures of our societies and how the racism ofone

society can spill over into the racial consciousness of

another. Neither national autonomy nor majority rule

are sufficient conditions for the abolition ofracism, nor

can racial salience be diminished solely by legislative

fiat or political will.

The endeavour requires a sustained exercise in social engineering carefully orchestrated to achieve

cumulative results over time. Undersuch conditions

success is measured by a decline in the significance of

race rather than by the absence of any episodic evidence

of persistent racism.

Zimbabwe, Africa's youngest independent nation, is a

case in point. In the first five years ofindependence, the

salience of race has declined significantly although the

evidence of a residual white racism and its reactive black

response remains. Given the contradictions and constraints involved, it is a success story, achieved by a

combination ofstatesmanship, favourable economic

conditions and a balance of principle and pragmatism.

On its assumption of power in 1980, the ZANU-PF

government set as its first and most immediate priority

the attainment of a unity which would make the previously divided Zimbabwean state a nation. The party's

manifesto made this clear in stating: "ZANU believes

that the principle ofthe paramountcy ofthe people demands thatthe national concept and the sense ofnational

belonging be made a dogma thatshould submerge and

destroy tribal, regionalistic and racial animosities."

Consistent with this stance, Prime Minister Robert

63
Mugabe, in one ofhis first public statements, announced

a policy of reconciliation which sought to incorporate

whites into the new national unity. There were to be

no reprisals for the racist past, no expulsions ofracially-defined groups and no expropriations of property on

racial grounds. Whites were invited to participate in

the building of a new, non-racial Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's whites, who had until then held the reins

of economic and political power through racially determined mechanisms, reacted with surprise, pleasure and

considerable caution. In some circles, a naive optimism

prevailed, with the expectation that things would remain

much as they were with the exception that government

now had a black face and that racial discrimination in

public was no longer acceptable.

This naivety failed to grasp the importance of two

imperatives under which the new government had to

act, and act quickly. One was the imperative to reassert

an essentially African cultural sovereignty in what was

after all an African country. Zimbabwe could no longer

be a little England on the highveld; it had to be an African nation with an African ethos. The resultant change

in prevailing ideological perspective and symbolic

statement made whites nervous and insecure, uncertain

as to whether they could find a sense of genuine identity in the new cultural milieu.

The other imperative was for the new government to

fulfil its promises to its black constituency and to ensure

that national resources were redistributed, and seen to

be redistributed, in a manner correcting the racial imbalances of the past. The principal focus was on land,

employment, education, health and social services.

In respect to education, this meant that whites could

no longer expect their children's education to be provided by the State in a privileged and segregated system

which in 1975, for instance, had expended $287 on each

white child in primary school and only $19 on their black

counterparts. The system was integrated. Inevitably,

and in spite of a tremendous expansion in education's

share ofthe national budget, this meant that per capita

expenditure for white children in the system was reduced. Racial integration in the schools did not in itself

present great problems and generally proceeded

smoothly. What bothered many white parents was what

they perceived to be a drop in the quality of education

provided. In the case ofsome formerly all-white schools,

this perception was undoubtedly correct. However, the

new system is itselffar from homogenous, and many

government schools currently provide quality education

of a high standard. In addition, private and quasi-private racially integrated schools exist and are widely patronized by whites. Zimbabwe's educational policies

are still evolving and exhibit the conflicts found in many

countries which seek to simultaneously provide both

quality and egalitarianism in educational provision on

limited budgets.

In the provision ofhealth services the picture is similar. Much ofthe country's health budget has been shifted

to primary health care, as being a rational and more effective disposition of limited resources. At the same

time, high quality professional therapeutic services

continue to be provided, especially in the urban centres,

through a combination of government and private services. These are available on a non-racial basis; the difference for whites is that they now have to pay more for

these specialist services instead ofrelying on heavy State

subsidies to cater for their health needs on a segregated

basis.

Land was a major issue in Zimbabwe's struggle for

independence, and many whites anticipated large-scale

expropriations ofwhite-owned agricultural land for black

resettlement after independence. This has not in fact

happened, for a combination of reasons. Government's

adherence to a "willing-seller-willing-buyer" principle,

combined with limited finances for land purchases has

restricted its ability to make large-scale acquisitions of

this type. A phenomenal increase in agricultural production in the communal lands has been another factor

in diminishing pressures for the acquisition of commercial farming land, gross output rising from $102m in

1979 to $271 m in 1982. Finally, generally good relations

between both government and the commercial farming

community, coupled with a government concern to

maintain output from this sector, have meant that productive agricultural land in the private sector has largely

been left alone. In 1980, there were 6 034 large-scale

commercial farms in the country; by 1983 this number

had dropped to 5 481, that is, by 9%. As with other

sectors ofthe economy, commercial agriculture has been

formally de-racialised, and a growing number of black

farmers are moving into large-scale commercial agriculture. Their presence in this sector has important longterm implications for commercial agriculture since they

will form an increasingly important segment ofgovernment's political constituency.

Thus, on the issues of land, health and education

government's policy has been one of de-racialisation

coupled with a gradualism and evolutionism which has

meant that whites have lost the special privileges formerly accorded to them, but without suffering any critical deprivation by virtue of their racial location The

transition to non-racialism has, however, been more difficult and traumatic for them on the issue of occupational placement, since this was an area in which government could not afford a policv of gradualism The

imperative was for a rapid transformation of the racial

composition of the occupational spectrum in its higher

echelons with its skewed bias in favour ofwhites. A slow

64
evolution towards this goal through non-racial recruitment in the lower ranks was not enough; some Zimbabwean variant ofTanzania's policy of "affirmative action"

was required. Ten years earlier President Nyerere had

articulated this policy in respect to the Tanzanian public service in the following words: "At the same time, a

deliberate policy of Africanisation of the public services

was being pursued in the full recognition that this was

itself discriminatory. For, before all citizens could be

treated equally, it was necessary to rectify the position

in which the nation's civil service was dominated by

non-Africans, and to make it reflect in some measure

the composition of the society."

Zimbabwe followed the same road, not only with the

public service but also in respect of all middle and high

level occupational placement. Government directives

were issued to implement the policy directly in regard

to the public service, and indirect pressures were brought

to bear on commerce and industry to act similarly.

Three categories ofwhites were hit particularly hard

by this policy. White civil servants were an immediate

target and a rapid exodus ofwhites from this sector ensued. Whites in the clerical, production, sales and service categories were similarly affected since these were

positions into which young blacks could be slotted relatively easily. Thirdly, a trend to emigrate among white

youth, particularly those without professional prospects,

became apparent.

Statistics suggest that from 1981-1985 there was a net

emigration (from a base-line population in 1980 of ±

180 000) of 41 262 whites. This figure must, however,

be seen in the context of the fact that the net emigration

of whites in the previous five years (1976 - 1980) was

49 279. In other words net emigration totals for these

two five-year cohorts were of roughly the same magnitude. The significant difference, it is fair to suggest,

lies in the reasons for emigration, the uncertainties and

insecurity of a war situation dominating in the first

period, and the occupational insecurities described

above, dominating the second.

Affirmative or redressive action policies such as those

followed in Tanzania and Zimbabwe carry with them a

host of potential problems relating to issues ofimplementation and performance. They also pose problems of

principle since they are, as Nyerere admits in the statement quoted above, a suspension of the principle of

non-racialism to achieve immediate and necessary goals.

This dilution of principle with pragmatism must

therefore, ifit is not to become the base for a new order

of discriminatory behaviour, be implemented within

specific time horizons and with a vigilance to ensure

that the means does not distort the goal and that the

expedient does not become the principle. Redressive

action tends to be occupation-specific, as I have indicated. It is also time-specific, relating to periods of

transition.

In Tanzania, four years after its implementation,

Nyerere was able to suspend the "Africanisation" policy in the public service and revert to, in his words, "a

policy of priority to citizens regardless oftheir racial origin". There are some indications that in Zimbabwe the

same reversion is taking place in occupation-specific

contexts where racial ratios have been radically altered.

An example is the recent appeal by the Minister of

Home Affairs to young white Zimbabweans to join the

Zimbabwe Republic Police, a force which has become

almost entirely black in the past five years. His appeal

was based on the argument that the ZRP should contain some whites in order to be truly representative of

the larger Zimbabwean population.

There is also some indication that whites are beginning to show more confidence in their occupational futures in Zimbabwe. The statistic quoted earlier ofa net

emigration of 41 262 between 1981 and 1985, conceals

the fact that while net emigration in the first four years

of the period was in an order of magnitude of ± 10 000

a year, in 1985 it dropped to 1 447. Indeed, provisional

figures for the first six months of 1986 indicate a small

net gain in migration figures for whites.

This analysis has focused on the structural imperatives

which have both impelled and constrained Zimbabwe's

government in its programme to create a non-racial society and which have created in varying degress an "insecurity quotient" in Zimbabwe's whites. But what of

the more subjective dimensions ofthe impact ofblack

rule on white attitudes? Do whites retain their racial

prejudices in the new context?

In answer it should be said, first, that whites generally

have adapted quickly to the new rules of public social

conduct, a confirmation of the old sociological insight

that people adjust rapidly to modes of behaviour perceived to be normatively appropriate. Attitudes are far

more resistant to change, and many whites continue to

exhibit the prejudices of an older era. Public behaviour

and private opinion are therefore often at variance. A

stroll through public functions in Harare gives the impression that integration is proceeding smoothly and

harmoniously. Attendance at private functions in many

white homes will give the impression that racism is

alive and well.

This does not, however, mean that attitudes are not

changing, or prove the old liberal perspective that attitude change must precede behavioural modification.

In Zimbabwe, slowly perhaps, the opposite causal sequence is taking place. By being forced to interactwith

blacks on the basis of equal status, whites are becoming

less Stereotypie and more individualistic in their evaluation ofblacks. In Zimbabwe, behaving differently has

65
more often preceded thinking differently than vice

versa. And, for those whites subjectively equipped to

benefit from it, Zimbabwean independence has meant

a psychological liberation from the demeaning restraints

of racism.

The psychological pilgrimage of the Zimbabwean

white has another dimension, relating to his cultural

identity. Zimbabwe has chosen a policy of pluralism

within a national unity which gives scope for diversity.

The ruling party's manifesto, quoted earlier, goes on

to say: "The People as a Nation cannot necessarily be

homogeneous in respect oftheir cultural or racial backgrounds, but this diversity of background should become more a source ofour cultural wealth than a cause

of division and mistaken notions ofgroupistsuperiority

philosophy." The cultural identity of the white is

therefore not under serious threat. The danger is rather

that this identity will be allowed to remain an exclusionary mechanism, shutting the white offfrom a full participation in the new dynamic national culture that is

evolving in Zimbabwe.

Another danger to whites is that their cultural distinctiveness will reinforce their image as members of a racially-defined interest group. Given their basic social

location, relatively high on the socio-economic scale,

whites are highly vulnerable to potential black animosities as long as they are seen to be a discreet, racially organised power bloc within the larger society, acting

collectively to further their own interests.

One factor in the contemporary Zimbabwean situation acts in particular to reinforce this image. This is

the provision ofseparate voters' rolls and parliamentary

seats for whites, the one residual item of racial legislation which persists in Zimbabwe, forced upon it by the

Lancaster House constitution. The segregation of the

white electorate carries with it a built-in tendency for

whites to act politically in a sectionally defensive manner, as critics of, rather than participants in, the development process in Zimbabwe. The record shows that

white interests have not been served by this mechanism.

It has given them no substantially effective political voice

or veto and has prevented them from contributing as

Zimbabweans, rather than as a racially defined constituency, to the Zimbabwean political process. Many

whites now perceive this, and there are indications that

this vestige of racism will shortly disappear from the

Zimbabwean scene.

The disappearance ofseparate voters' rolls will reinforce a trend which has been the theme ofthis analysis

- the declining significance of race in Zimbabwe.

Clearly, and for the reasons stated, race is still a significant factor in Zimbabwe society. But as formal nonracialism progressively finds substantive implementation in the structures of Zimbabwe society - health,

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education, employment, agriculture, industry and politics -the interests of individuals are being defined less

in the context ofracial membership and more in terms of

other aggregations of interest. These aggregations of

interest cut across racial boundaries and will increasingly

form the basis for the creation of multi-racial interest

groups involved in the promotion ofa variety ofregional,

professional, residential, political, economic and other

concerns. And as black and white Zimbabweans find

common interests in these concerns, race will increasingly lose its salience since it is no longer coterminous

with these concerns.

This is the clearly discernible trend, lying beneath

the surface of popular perceptions which rely on the

presence or absence of episodic expressions of racial

sentiment as indices of racial harmony. Such indices

are unreliable and contribute to the tendency, particularly prevalent among Zimbabwean whites, to emotionally oscillate between optimism and pessimism regarding their own futures.

At the same time, these indices are important as a reminder that race is a highly volatile issue in Southern

Africa, with emotive roots in a racist past. They are also

a reminder that the effects ofracism transcend national

boundaries and that until racism is eliminated everywhere, no society will be free from its impact.

In this respect, whites in Zimbabwe are rendered

particularly vulnerable by the racial conflict in South

Africa. As these pages have been written, black demonstrators in Zimbabwe have rioted in the aftermath of

President Samora Machel's death in a plane crash in

South Africa. Although the focus of protest arises from

South Africa's racial conflict, the emotive salience of

the event has spilled over into the Zimbabwean context and taken, at least in the minds ofsome ofthe demonstrators, the form of a "black backlash" against

whites. One banner waved carried the words "reconciliation is dead".

Reconciliation is not, however, dead in Zimbabwe.

It is alive in part because itis an essential componentin

a deep-seated commitment to non-racialism by Zimbabwe's leadership. It is also alive because it is an imperative for national unity which transcends racial issues, to cover other divisions in the fabric ofZimbabwe

society.

There is thus both an imperative for, and a trend towards, the diminished salience of the racial factor in

Zimbabwe. An imperative can, however, be ignored,

and a trend can be reversed. It is therefore incumbent

on Zimbabweans, both black and white, to maintain the

current momentum towards non-racialism by the way

they act and think. The costs in terms of abandoned

patterns of thought and behaviour may be painful, but

the prize of a democratic nation freed from the prison of

personal and institutional racism is worth the price.

66
ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

WORK ON IRRIGATION DAM—International Construction were recently awarded the

contract for the construction of the Manyuchi dam, which provides water for

irrigation for the proposed palm oil project in the Mwenezi area. Work has

already commenced on the site establishment and housing for the construction

personnel, the access roads to the site, and the drilling and blasting of

rock for the dam foundations. Specialist equipment for the construction work

is also on order and should arrive in Zimbabwe by the end of December. The

work comprises the construction of: —The main double arch concrete dam,

280m, long by 45m high, requiring 46,500 cubic metres of concrete. —Six

earth saddle dams involving 260,000 cubic metres of earth fill. —A concrete

spillway. .«-Roadworks, Work is scheduled for completion at the end of 1988.

The dam, when filled, will stretch back approximately 15km from the wall.

[Text] [Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 14 Nov 86 p 29] /9274

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67
RANKS OF POLICE TO BE EXTENDED BY 60 PERCENT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 29 Nov 86 p 4

[Article by Louis Smit]

SOUTH AFRICA

[Text]

THE ranks of the

South African Police

are to be extended by

more than 60 percent,

Mr Louis le Grange,

outgoing Minister of

Law and Order, said in

Pretoria yesterday.

Speaking at a passingout parade of the Police

College, which was also a

farewell parade for him,

Mr Le Grange said the

force would be expanded

to 96 300, compared to its

present strength of

56 316, to cope with the

increasing workload. This

would give a ratio of 2,79

policemen for every 1 000

citizens.

Mr Le Grange said statistics for the year ending

June showed that there

had been an increase of

7,3 percent in murder incidents, 14,4 percent in

robberies, 18,2 percent in

motorcar thefts, 15,5 percent in burglaries and 6,4

percent in stock thefts.

Drug abuse skyrocketed

so that for the same

period 35 000 people had

been charged with dealing

in dagga and 2 000 people

were charged with offences related to other habit forming drugs like

Mandrax, cocaine, opium

and LSD.

Against this increased

rate of crime, he said, the

expansion of the police

force was of paramount

importance.

As the force is expanded, the various riot and

crime prevention units,

along with the Criminal

Investigation Department, will be extended to

meet the existing needs.

Mr Le Grange said the

police force had to be applied to the maximum of

its ability to combat terrorism and other forms of

crime.

He added that the

sharp increase in crime

was as a result of various

factors, such as the rapid

population growth, prevailing unrest, the weak

economic situation and

unemployment.

"In 1960 South Africa's

population totalled 16

million; in June 1985

(with an average annual

growth rate of 2,1 percent) it totalled 32,5 million," Mr Le Grange said.

- "Despite this 'population explosion' the police

are expected to perform

their duties."

He said the SAP faced

an unenviable, difficult

task for which is received

little praise and appreciation, and it was a pity that

the force which faced

such a demanding task

should be subjected to

constant adverse criticism

and attack. Little was

ever said about the excellent work done by the

SAP.

"I call on the public of

South Africa to refrain

from unnecessarily criticising our police and

other security forces and

not let them be influenced

by false accusations and

propaganda by those hostile to the country."

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68
SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI DISCUSSES BLACK POLITICAL PROSPECTS, ONSET OF SANCTIONS

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 p 75

[Interview with KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi; date and place

not given]

[Text]

The FM spoke to

KwaZulu ChiefMinister Mangosuthu

Buthelezi about black

political prospects and

the onset of economic

sanctions against SA.

FM: Are there grounds for hope, especially

following the National Party congresses, that

government will start talking to black leaders

about a new constitution?

Buthelezi: Quite clearly the issue of fundamental change in the country didn't seem to

be a priority, both at the congresses and the

federal congress. I personally have defined

terms on which I am prepared to negotiate

within the National Statutory Council

(NSC). I said a non-negotiable was the' release of Dr Mandela and Mr Motppheng and

other political prisoners. So it seems government is not in the mood to look at that.

What scenario do you have for political

change and developments within SA during

1987?

I am a little concerned because it seems to

me the relinquishing by the State President

of his position as leader in the Cape seems to

be a hint that he may well be thinking of

retiring, maybe in the next year or so. It

seems very likely. If you think that Malan,

who was his teacher and mentor, backed out

in this way, it would not surprise me if he

takes the same route. If he retires, my concern is: is there anyone in the Cabinet more

innovative than he? The fact that he has

abolished the pass laws, scrapped the Immorality Act, and allowed black participation in

the trade union movement, has shown he is

very innovative. Any man who can rise above

his background like that should be given

credit — even if he has failed at the same

time to take his courage in both hands, come

out boldly and bring about fundamental

change in this country.

Government has said that it is already negotiating with a number of prominent black

leaders. Are you involved?

I'm so visible in SA that if I was involved,

surely it would be known. I don't think I

could do this privately. Clearly, there are no

negotiations. There are ministers in my government and Mr Botha's government wno

are very concerned about the fact that he and

I have not even come to sit, let alone talk,

around the conference table.

Even so, is the NSC a suitable forum for this?

Yes, if it was taken to be an interim thing

and if it was understood that the tricameral

parliament would have to go. I don't think we

can participate in the NSC if it is going to be

an instrument, or a ruse, to legitimise the

tricameral parliament. If this is understood,

it could provide such a forum because, in

terms of its objectives, I see nothing repugnant in South Africans of all races sitting

down to try and work out a constitution for

the country.

Do you think it is possible that Nelson Mandela could be released soon?

As I have already said, one is very pessimistic at present. One must also take into

account that P W Botha was the first head of

State to even offer his release. In the past, I

argued about the release of Dr Mandela with

Mr Vorster and he used to tell me pointblank, with a deadpan face, that he was not

69
prepared to release him as long as he was

PM. One must appreciate that Mr Botha is

perhaps more flexible on this matter — even

though he stated conditions (Mandela's renunciation of violence) which are impossible

to fulfil. However, I do believe one cannot

say it is impossible. After all, he has been

more flexible than his predecessor on this

issue.

Do you support the idea of a referendum to

determine who legitimate black leaders are?

I do think that there are too many people

who claim to be leaders. However, I do admit

that any black person, even without a constituency, has a right to speak out, expressing

black aspirations and black grievances. At

the same time, the term leader has been

thrown around loosely, to the extent that it is

beginning to lose all meaning. Any strident

voice by any person, without any constituency, without any mandate, is taken to be a

voice of a leader. I don't know whether I

would accept it is the government's right to

establish who speaks for which constituency.

But I personally wouldn't mind if my own

constituency was tested. It is, in any case,

tested as I am elected as President of Inkatha

and Chief Minister of KwaZulu and chairman of the Black Alliance.

What do you think will happen now that

sanctions are upon us?

I can see all the tricks that were learnt

during the Smith regime in Rhodesia being

perfected and used with more sophistication

by South African businessmen. I can see a

lot of sanctions-busting taking place, but at

the same time I cannot minimise the suffering this is going to cause — especially in

those labour-intensive industries like agriculture and mining. I think we can expect

thousands of black people are more likely to

lose jobs, both South Africans and Diaviu.

from neighbouring states. I am very concerned because already many black people

have lost jobs and there is a lot of unemployment.

Ifthis is going to worsen, a person with my

responsibilities has every reason to be concerned.

Are you hopeful that the Natal/KwaZulu

Indaba's unified government proposals will

ultimately be implemented?

Government, which has refused to participate officially, has nominated observers to

the Indaba and has already sanctioned a

joint executive authority. So there is no reason not to be hopeful. At the same time, one

can never predict what may happen because

it seems to me government tends to take

more seriously than it should some of the

noises that are made on its rightwing. Personally, I see the Indaba as a fire escape for

the South African government and the country because if it were to be implemented, it

would defuse the present sanctions moves. I

think there are many people in the West who

support the idea of a get-together between

KwaZulu and Natal to form a unified region

which is multi-racial; where power is shared

by all race groups.

The emergency appears to have brought

about a superficial calm to the country. What

is necessary for a lasting peace?

First of all, I believe, must come the release

of all political prisoners.

You cannot rule through an emergency

indefinitely. That is not acceptable to us as

blacks. But if the government were to release

political prisoners, sentence to death the tricameral parliament, the Group Areas Act,

the Population Registration Act, I would say

.that this would be very good foundations for

a lasting peace.

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70
SOUTH AFRICA

PERCY QOBOZA DEPLORES DEATH OF FORMER LESOTHO MINISTER

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 23 Nov 86 p 8

[Commentary by Percy Qoboza in "Percy's Itch" column]

[Textl

SO they have finally silenced Desmond Sixishe.

The flamboyant and certainly most

charismatic former Information Minister in the deposed government of Chief

Leabua Jonathan was a man of exceptional qualities.

He did not have an academic outlook to life, but was a down to earth

politician - who played his cards so

well, it sometimes left his opponents

gasping for breath.

He was a man of the people.

Not only did he leave his internal

opponents frustrated, but he evoked

extreme anger from the likes of President PW Botha and his Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

He was perceived by Pretoria as the

major stumbling block to normalising

relations with the Basotho kingdom.

He was most vehement and uncomEromising on the issue of apartheid and

e publicly campaigned against SA on

all points.

His hatred for apartheid was in

many ways understandable - he was a

product as well as a victim of the

system.

He was a South African by birth and

Mosotho by a strange set of circumstances.

Before venturing into Lesotho, Des

was a colleague on the now banned

World.

As a reporter and as a colleague, I

found him most dedicated and talented

in whatever story he worked on.

He was never one to adopt a high

and mighty stance to his colleagues, in

spite of his obvious talents.

He was one of the boys. Many a

night we spent crawling around Soweto's shebeens - always on the lookout

for a benefactor or a well-disposed

^hebeen queen to give us someting on

tick, payable hopefully on the next

payday.

Then came the fateful day. Des was

assigned to cover a story in Maseru. He

did that all right - with the efficiency

we always admired in him.

After phoning through his story we

didn't hear from him again.

Weeks later, you could have

knocked us out with a feather when we

learned he was attached to Lesotho's

Information Department.

Later, he climbed the ladder as that

department's director.

And before we could catch our

breath, Des emerged as personal secretary to former Prime Minister Chief

Leabua Jonathan.

In that position he became the PM's

trusted confidant and personal advisor

- and they formed a formidable team.

Then came the time when the chilly

winds of conflict blew from Pretoria

across Lesotho.

At the height of Pretoria's insistence

on the removal of political refugees

from the tiny kingdom, it was Des who

spearheaded the resistance to the pressure.

Believing as he did in the sanctity of

the Geneva Convention on the status of

political victims of conscience, he rallied for the right of Lesotho to give

protection to those refugees.

71
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. SA's reaction to this position is now

a matter of history. Lesotho paid a

heavy price. But Des always believed

in the morality of the country's stand -

and he carried that stamp with him

until the time of his death.

Now he is no more. A victim of the

vilest of brutal attacks - that saw his

wife mercilessly" cut down by assailants' bullets. Their asassins may never

be known.

Such foul acts are never ever detected - because they are thedeeds of

faceless men bought with 30 pieces of

silver, who jealously guard the identity

of the perpetrators as they sip their

beer bought with evil money.

Fare thee well, pal.

Another of your friends wept bitterly on the phone when he asked me if I

had heard. His name is Desmond Blow.

I know the two of you had some

roaring times together in Maseru.

God will one day come back and

bring a smile to the faces of the Basothos when a government of the people is once more restored in that kingdom.

Pula, Khotso, Nala will have true

meaning again one of these days. J

72
SOUTH AFRICA

OUTGOING NECC SECRETARY DISCUSSES VALUE OF SCHOOL BOYCOTTS

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 28 Nov-4 Dec 86 pp 17, 18

[Interview with outgoing NECC publicity secretary Rev Molefe Tsele by Sefako

Nyaka]

[Text]

FOR three years how there have

been no exams in some areas. What

effect do you think this will have on

the future generation?

With thousands of students in detention, and

more and more joining the militants' ranks,

one can only conclude that the stage is set for

another cycle of challenge and confrontation

which may subside after a long period.

This obviously bodes ill for the future of

our country. For one thing, the student leaders

are being schooled in a way that no other

system could teach them. They mature

instantly and learn to skilfully lead.

We are producing leaders who have little

respect for rhetoric and artistic speeches.

They are strategists, planners, executors.

However, their followers are affected

differently by these conditions. They

overreact, TaxftcaKse and often step out of the

line set by their leaders.

The other long-term effect of this crisis is

that by the time this group enters the labour

market, in four to five years' time, we are

going to witness a new era in labour history.

They will enter the market conversant with

trade unionism, fearless and sure of their

power.

The short-term effect of the situation,

however, presents nightmarish probabilities

for all parents. These students are going to

plunge the community into action, whether it

is ready or not. There could be internecine

attacks, with parents resisting being involved

or involving their children. There may be

vigilante groups against the students.

The call for solidarity from students in

other education centres will be strengthened

and the result will be heightened conflict

within the community.

There is talk that the class boycott

has been a waste. Have there been

any gains to justify it?

Any boycott of education is very costly,

both in time and money. A boycott of

education is a self-infliction of pain.

Any gains that have been made must be

viewed in the context of the sacrifices made.

The only gain that can be said to have been

made in terms of the demands is the supply of

free text books and the abolition of school

fees. More than that, the boycott has not made

any gains in terms of correcting

administrative structures at schools by

introducing Parent-Teacher Associations and

SRCs. We failed to have Cosas (Congress of

South African Students) unbanned, and we

failed to have detained students released.

In short, none of the demands have been

met. However, the gains achieved in terms of

advancing the struggle against apartheid and

exposing the fraud in the current system are

worthwhile.

Therefore, the boycott was not a waste, nor

was it in vain. It has achieved something. The

clock cannot be turned back. The DET knows

that their system is being rejected. No amount

of protestation over the past 30 years has been

able to communicate that fact.

There are parents who earn very

little and keeping a child at school is

for them a real sacrifice. Is the

boycott not going to lose credibility

for your organisation in the eyes of

such people, and in the community

as a whole?

The NECC has never called for a schools

boycott in its history. It has threatened to call

for a united community action.

The difference is that with school boycotts,

only students are involved in action. With

73
community action; not only students but

unions, civic associations, mothers and the

entire community gets involved in action.

The NECC has, however, not ruled out the

boycott strategy for students. It has only

insisted that student structures and then the

entire community must be consulted. The

NECC will not support any boycott call that is

sectional and undemocratically called. The

NECC is not concerned about loosing

credibility with parents and the community, as

long as that call has community support.

If some parents choose to defya democratic

call, they will not enjoy the support of the

NECC. In the same way, if students make

unilateral calls, they will not be supported by

the NECC.

Obviously very few parents will support any

boycott of schools. But faced with the reality

of the crisis, like the mass detention of 14-

year-olds, the closure of schools and the

occupation of classrooms by theSA Defence

"Force, no parent can remain indifferent.

What has been the effect of the

State of Emergency on the

education situation?

The State of Emergency has severely:

effected student structures. They can. no

longer meet, their leadership is either in

detention or in hiding. Most SRC leaders are

not back at school because they fear being

arrested by the ever-present army.

The harassment of the student leadership

has resulted in student masses engaging in

action with no reflection or analysis. There isa

temptation amongst the masses to equate

political relevance with radicalism.

With the student leadership, not all

radicalism is taken at face value. What counts

is the impact of that radicalism in the broader

struggle. The student leaders have also tended

to become suspicious of those students who

become militant and radical for its own sake.

They believe that is the sign ofa police agent

who has been instructed to pose as radical and

relevant.

However, without this leadership, especially

when it operates from underground, we find

the student body taking unilateral decisions

and implementing them without consultation

and reflection.

How do you hope to stop this type

of action? ,p

The only way to stop this type of action is to

begina process of reproduction of leadership

and responsible positions. Out of every

three students, let one becomea leader. In that

way, it will be easy to replace leaders the

moment they are taken.

How do you justify the fact that in

some areas students have been

writing their exams undisturbed

since the boycott started? Doesn't

this sow division?

The sad thing about the struggle is that not

all people pay their dues to the same extent.

The same is true with the education struggle.

It should be noted that students in effected

areas had no option but to lose the opportunity

of writing. Most of them would sit for exams,

but they are prevented by prevailing

conditions. If no solution is forthcoming, and

if they realise that they are going to be faced

with another lost year, they are going to

demand that, in solidarity, other students from

other areas join them.

So far there has not been division amongst

students. For instance, students in the western

Cape resolved to continue with the exams this

year, even after they understood that students

in the Transvaal (especially Soweto) were not

going to write. Students in Soweto understand

that east Rand students will sit for exams, even

though they themselves won't.

However, there is going to comea time

when practical expressions of solidarity will

be called for.

Also, the exams have not been boycotted as

such, but appeals were made for them to be

postponed for those students who were not

ready. This means those who are ready are

allowed to write.

In the final analysis, however, it means that

once one area is affected,a call will be made

for others to join in. As the students say,

"Write one, write all; fail one, fail all."

Does the armed disruption of

exams in Soweto carry the support

of the majority of students and

parents?

The majority of students were surely in

favour of the disruption of exams by whatever

means. The majority of students demand

simple justice: "An injury to one is an injury

to all."

However, their leaders dissociated

themselves from methods that led students to

fight one another. They said that what they

need in these times is maximum unity. They

condemn the authorities who disregarded

their appeals and promised protection to those

who dissented.

Parents were on the whole opposed to armed

disruption. It is unacceptable fora single child

to lose his or her life because he or she wanted

to sit for exams.

While parents of hundreds of detained

Children may support the boycott of exams,

they oppose armed disruption against fellow

students. They believe various methods of

persuasion should be used.

What effect do you think the

armed disruption of exams

will have on parents?

The community needs to be jolted

out of its sleep. Parents need to be

challenged ina very special way. They

can reprimand the students over their

74
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CSO: 3400/572

behaviour only when they merit that

role.

Schools were closed in Soweto and

all that parents did was protest in the

press. The army moved into the

schools and the parents did nothing.

The children-were forced to carry ,-

"passes"'and parents made! verbal

protestations. They need to be jolted

out of their big sleep Of indifference,

apathy and servility.

Maybe these actions by students will

achieve that. 1 personally think it is

necessary. Students are desperate.

; What they are doing-should be takenas a deep cry of anguish.

The parents need to interpret these;

semi-suicidal actions by students as a

desperate call to thenrto resume their

role. I personally believe the students

are achieving their goals. Every

parent is. now asking himself what is

wrong with this education system.

That is the starting point for

galvanising their support. Initially

they might alienate themselves from

the children, but the students are not

some alien visitors you can choose to

ignore. They are our children. In the

<nd, their death is bur death.

' So the recent actions are a reminder

to parents that you cannot expect

decency; .in a time.of ä State of

Emergency. That you^cahn'ot expect

modesty in an oppressive society, that

you cannot rationalise' in a

:

violent

.society^

The fact "that 'children "have not

written their exams this year is surely

a national tragedy/And the fact that

the situation may continue into the

<?new>year means1-the nation must stop

and think and act anew, for once.

75
SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

32 APPLY FOR RSA CITIZENSHIP-^mabatho-~Thirty--two Bophuthatswana residents

have renounced their citizenship and applied for South African citizenship

since the pass laws were scrapped and new identity cards introduced, according to Bophuthatswana's Secretary for Internal Affairs, Mr SI Tire. Asked

what would happen if such people were rejected by South Africa, Mr Tire said

the law allowed for anybody who renounced Bop citizenship and failed to acquire another citizenship to apply for their local status to be renewed.

[Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Nov 86 p 5] /9274

CSOj 3400/568

76
10 DURBAN BEACHES TO BE INTEGRATED

Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English 21 Nov 86 p 15

[Article by Richard Compton]

SOUTH AFRICA

[Text]

TEN beaches stand

between Durban becoming an integrated

municipality and a

city with patches of'

"local" apartheid left

intact.

This is all that remains of petty apartheid

in Durban, although ob-,

viously there are areas

of "grand" apartheid,

such as a whites-only

municipal voters roll, the.

Group Areas Act and

separate education that,

remain in force.

But these areas lie

outside the control of the

Durban City Council.

However the council

recently voted in favour

of asking the Government to allow the city to

scrap the Group Areas

Act completely or at

worst to allow it to scrap

it in stages.

Yet the integration of

the Blue Line (white) bus

service last week symbolised the near total collapse of petty apartheid

in the city — 12 years

after the first moves

were made by the city in

this direction.

And it is almost certain that the remaining

racially exclusive

beaches will become

multiracial in the first

half of the new year.

These beaches are:

North Beach, Addington,

South Beach, Brighton1

and Ansteys (whites

only), while there are

two beaches which are

for blacks only (African

1 and 2), two for Indians

and one for the Coloureds.

Embarked

In 1974 the theu

mayor, Mr Ron Williams,

embarked on a campaign

to abolish petty apartheid in the city highlighting the issue of integrated buses, freedom of social contact between

races and equal pay for

equal work as the first

issues to be dealt with.

(Ironically the first of

Mr Williams's aims, the

integration of the buses,

became the last pillar of

petty apartheid to fall.)

By the end of 1974, the

first tentative steps were

taken by the council

when the City Treasurer

abolished separate

queues for whites and

non-whites in the ground

floor banking hall of

Martin West building.

This was followed by "integrating" queues at the

City Licensing office and

the abolition of separate

elevators for whites and

blacks. |

In what was then described as a bold step,

the city decided in 1975

to desegregate public

benches and shortly afterwards racial signs designating whites-only

parks were taken down.

One of the most controversial debates in

council focused on the

question of integrating libraries and allowing

black bus drivers to

drive Durban's whitesonly Blue Line buses.

Opposition to the former was enormous.

Warnings

"I was mayor at the

time and I can't tell you

the number of telephone

calls and letters that I

got. There were warnings that if the libraries

were opened to all races

whites would catch

strange and terrible diseases such as syphilis

and diptheria," said Mrs

Sybil Hotz, presently

chairman of the Management Committee.

The reference library;

was the first to drop its

racial clause before the

rest opened to all races

in 1979.

Another highly contentious issue was the proposal by Mr Williams in

1976 to make Battery

Beach 2 a multiracial

beach.

It was only six years

later in 1982, after a

fierce public protest,

that the Province's Executive Committee

(Exco) gave its consent

and the beach was open

.to all races.

The opening of one

beach soon brought further demands for other

facilities on the beachfront to be integrated.

Following another

public meeting, Exco

turned down the city's

request and it took another year, in 1983, before Province agreed to

it-.__.

But since then reform

has continued, and with

less public protest.

Toilets, municipal

swimming pools, three

main Durban beaches —

Snake Park, Bay of Plenty and Dairy Beach —

and both the Green and

Blue Line bus services

have since been "deracialised".

This leaves the remaining beaches as the

last racial obstacle for

the council to overcome.

Scrapping

Referring to the future

Mrs Hotz said: "Scrapping petty apartheid

does not just mean

changing whites-only facilities to multiracial

ones. It also means

'black' facilities have to

be open."

But as change accelerated in Durban she

said the level of protest

had receded.

/927A

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77
SOUTH AFRICA

NGK MODERATOR EXPLAINS CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD APARTHEID

Cape Town LEADERSHIP In English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 46, 47, 48, 50

[Interview with NGK moderator Johan Heyns by Martin Schneider; date and place

not given]

[Text]

Itis a reflection on mud of whitesociety thatin these

lastdays of1986 a church professingChristianity

shouldstillbe debating, amidconsiderable division

among members, whether or not apartheidis a sin.

The largest Afrikaans church, the Nederduitse

Genformeerde Kent (NGK), still finds difficulty in

expressing itselfin so many words, butits Synodin

Cape Town recently was nevertheless a breakwith

thepast. Cast out by the world reformedchurch

movement and increasingly isolated athome, the

NGK has cautiously, and with qualifications,

opened its doors to people otherthan whites; and

ithas urgedits membersto "confess theirparticipation in apartheidwith humility andsorrow".

But on anotherlevel, too, the church has broken

with tradition. Ithas elected as its moderatorfor

the next fouryears a man ofexceptionalgoodwill.

Johan Heyns says he neversoughttheposition. His

past outspokenness had alienatedhim from the

church establishment andhe seemedto have accepted

a lesser role. Hisfirst days in office were marked

by the most conciliatory statements in the longhistory ofa church which has been viewedas nothing

less than theNationalParty atprayer. Ofcourse,

itremainsto be seen whethertheNGK, with aggressive andpoliticallyfrustrated hardliners in its

congregations, can match words with deeds.

Heyns (58) is head ofthe Department ofDogmatics andEthics atthe University ofPretoria and

is moderator ofthe NGK's Northern Transvaal

Synod. Among the many challenges hefaces is the

forging ofcloserrelationships with whattheNGK

describes as its "young" churches -the Sendingkerk

with a largely colouredmembership, andits black

andIndian sisterchurches. As he himselfsays: the

NGKhas to cross the apartheiddivide andcome to

termswith thepeopleatthe receivingendof the system. He was interviewed by Martin Schneider.

What is, in your view, the significance of

the October NGK Synod?

There are two particularly important aspects.

The first is our relationship with our young

churches, the second is our relationships

with reformed churches outside the country.

We decided that the NGK and our three

young churches are in fact one church and

that through discussions and negotiations,

structures should be established in which to

express this unity. We decided not to prescribe the form the structures should take

because such an action would simply be

another piece of paternalism.

Regarding our position in the world, we

are, of course, completely isolated. We are

no longer members of the South African

Council ofChurches and ofthe World Council ofChurches and a few years ago, we were

forced out ofthe World Alliance ofReformed

Churches. This is the sad story of our withdrawal from the ecumenical movement. So

we have decided that we must now attempt

to restore our relationships.

The Synod has, among other things, urged

its members to "confess their participation

78
in apartheid with humility and sorrow" and

it has expressed strong opposition to racism. What does this imply in practical

terms?

What is very important is that we did in the

past give to apartheida theological, ethical

justification. We have completely abolished

that andI believe that isa tremendous step

forward.

These decisions tell members that the

church is the church of the Lord Jesus

Christ, that it is not the church of the Afrikaner volk or ofthe white man. These decisions say the church is an open church, that

it cannot be closed to people of other cultures. They tell the ordinary church member

that there is no such thing as white superiority or black inferiority. They say that all

people are equal before God. They say that

there may not be under any circumstancesa

political policy based on oppression, discrimination and exploitation. We must move

towards the creation ofa community based

on the principle ofjustice. The memberwho

sits in the church and who hears this message, must go out and apply justice in all his

relationships. The man who hasa domestic

servant must ensure that she hasa decent

place in which to live, that she hasa decent

wage. The politician must know that he may

not enact laws which are not based on the

fundamental principles ofjustice.

And ifthe politician does pass unjust laws,

what must the church do? I don't think it is the task of the church to

campaign against any laws, even if they are

unjust. The task ofthe church is to protest

against unjust laws. And the protest must

be based on the scriptures. It is also not the

task of the church to suggest any form of

political structure. It's the task ofthe church

only to emphasize and elaborate on the basic

religious, ethical principles in scripture

which are applicable in the political field.

The church is only responsible for propagating certain theological, ethical and moral

principles which should form the basis fora

political system. And the reason for that is

very simple. The Bible is nota political

handbook. The Bible does notlay down the

necessity for apartheid, or segregation or integration. That is not part of the message of

the Bible because the bible is nota political

handbook.

How does the church then ensure thatits

beliefin justice is expressed in the country's

political life?

The NGK functions in various ways. The

first is at the local level where the church

minister sets out the Word ofGod for His

people and where the fundamental moral

principles are enunciated and explained.

Then the church functions and acts through

its various meetings like this, Synod where

certain decisions are made. But there isa

third level and that involves our personal relationships with government and members

of government.

You must appreciate that about 80% of

all cabinet ministers and about 70% ofmembers ofParliament are members ofthe NGK.

This isa unique situation in which we have

direct access. Therefore, we havea church

commission responsible for communications

with government.

Commissioners can go to the offices of

government members and they can point

out where they have problems with government policies. This is not all that well known

and that is indeeda pity because this often

creates the impression that the NGK is not

involved. That is not true. The NGK is involved. But as a reformed church, the NGK

does not believe in public demonstrations and

campaigns. On the other

hand,I do believe the

NGK should do more.

We live ina fragmented society. Everyone lives on his own island. The NGK lives

on its own island, too.

It does not know enough about what is

happening elsewhere. People who live in

Johannesburg don't know how people live

in Soweto and people who live in Pretoria

don't know how people live in Mamelodi.

This isa tragedy in the South African

community. We are all islands, the Afrikaners, the Portuguese, the Germans, the

Jewish community, the black communities.

This is one ofthe deepest tragedies in our

land.

That is whyI have said so often: we must

not build any more walls around the islands.

We must build bridges in South Africa, we

must link communities and, of course, the

NGK is part of this new structure.

One ofthe islands you talk about is the coloured NG Sendingkerk which is part of

79
your family ofchurches. It is becoming strident and highly politicised and it recently

elected as its moderator the Reverend

Allan Boesak who doesinfact leadprotests

and marches. How do you propose to build

bridges linking your two islands?

We will have to appreciate fully that members ofthat church exist on the otherside of

apartheid. Whites have implemented apartheid; the Sendingkerk and its people are on

the receiving end. Those of us who have implemented apartheid are not always aware

ofthe pain and suffering caused by apartheid

with all its discriminatory laws and decrees.

We must therefore have intensive contact

with them and engage them in dialogue. At

the recent Sendingkerk Synod, Boesak

asked us to send out signs of hope. And, indeed, that is what we must do. We must say

to them that we are aware, that we do understand something oftheir pain, that we

do want to work with them to improve the

situation so that we can all live ina normal

society. Our society is not normal. It is

drenched with blood and tears. There is

great heartsore, and we know this is not

God's intention. God wants happy, prosperous people. So we must do everything to

builda bridge here, and one thattakes traffic

in two directions. Then we can go to them

and they can come to us and we can clasp

hands and work together to normalise the

situation.

Does that imply you will have to become

more actively involved in political reform

in order to createa spirit ofunity and

partnership with the Sendingkerk?

If political involvement to which you are referring implies that we should act as a sort

of political pressure group, thenI emphatically say that is not the task of the church.

The church must not bea political party.

The church must bea force which inspires

new norms and structures. It is not ina position to prescribe what political structure

should be established. Thatis precisely what

unfortunately happened in the past when

the NGK said the political structure which

would solve this country's problems should

be apartheid. That was wrong and the NGK

Synod has acknowledged that. We are not

going to try to give to apartheida theological,

ethical justification. That is completely

wrong.

By the same token, if it is wrong to give

to apartheida theological, ethical justification, then it is also wrong to give to antiapartheid a theological, ethical justification.

As far as we are aware, the NGK hasn't

expressed an opinion about the State of

Emergency which was imposed earlier this

year. What is your view?

It is tragic when any government has to resort

to such measures because it indicates that

there must be something radically wrong in

society. SoI regret it. On the other hand, if

circumstances justify it, then it seems to me

the State has the right to take such action.

The State hasa duty to maintain law and

order but, of course, to simply maintain law

and order doesn't mean that you are making

peace. Certain laws are suspended and ifyou

don't obey, then you are taken away and put

in jail.

You don't changea man's heart ifyou take

him out ofthe community and lock him up.

And that brings me to the role ofthe church.

The church is there to bring abouta change

of heart among people. There can be no

political solution withouta change

of heart.

I'm not ina position to evaluate the whole

situation, but obviously the State of

Emergency will harden attitudes.I can only

hope and pray that the State of Emergency

will be lifted as soon as possible, that we can

return to normality. We are living in abnormal circumstances.

ButI must repeat,I am nota politician

and the church does not have the information and insight, nor is it competent, to judge

whether there should bea state of

emergency because that is completely the

task of the State. We can only say we hope

that it will end as soon as possible.

Given what you described as the NGK's

unique accessto government, are the politicians carrying out their responsibilities as

you would expect them? I think it is fantastic that the same government which constructed apartheid from

1948, which promulgated so many apartheid

laws, should come to the conclusion that it

has erred, that it cannot carry on as it was.

And they had the courage of their convictions to the extent that they actually did

change. Perhaps they should be moving faster, perhaps they could be more effective,

butI have the greatest admiration fora government which realises its mistakes, acts on

its decision and tries to broaden democracy,

80
to grant rights to people who had none.

Who cannot be thankful for that? However, once again, perhaps the tempo should

be faster. Yet, who am I, asa theologian, or

who are we, asa church, to say that the

tempo must be faster?I can only say that the

sooner we establisha normal society, the

better for us all.

The new constitution whichestablishedthe

tricameral Parliament for whites, coloureds and Indians has been widely criticised for excluding blacks. Do you share

that criticism?

The new constitution isa start,a meaningful

beginning for further development.I can't

say how it should be developed further and

precisely how blacks should be included,

but it seems to me that efforts are being

made to give blacksa form ofrepresentation.

Certainly, the form of guardianship ofthe

past must end. We are now enteringa new

era of partnership in which all people are regarded as citizens of this country with the

right to participatem affairs. ButI am not

sure about what type ofstructure should be

established to make this possible in sucha

way that you can still be yourself, that you

can still maintain your identity if you so

wish.

Does your statement about maintenance

of "identity" mean that you favour the retention ofsuch laws as the Group Areas

Act?

You must appreciate that the church only

suggests basic principles. The Bible does

not say there should or should not be group

areas, but the Bible also says you should use

your common sense. Iftension between

groups can be removed by having different

residential areas, then that is desirable.

Now if the State considered it desirable

to repeal the Act prohibiting mixed marriages, then it seems the State is morally obliged to make provision for people who do

marry across the colour line. Where must

they live? So it seems to me that serious attention should be given to the issue ofgroup

areas because,I believe, we must move towards the development of a society based

on freedom of association.

If people are serious about living together

and making their suburb exclusive, they

should have the right to do so. Ifpeople want

to builda school and make it exclusive, they

should also have that

right. That isa basic

right. And, of course,I

must emphasise that

freedom ofassociation

also implies freedom of

dissociation. It isa question of a delicate balance between people

who want to coexist

ina racially integrated atmosphere, and

people who want to coexist ina racially exclusive atmosphere.

With four years ahead ofyou as moderator

ofthe NGK, what are your priorities?

The first, ofcourse, is to build bridges which

can link the many islands in this country. But

another priority is to improve relationships

with the various churches in South Africa,

and perhaps even to work towards the establishment of a South African ecumenical

council ofchurches in which all churches can

be members, particularly the reformed

churches, including the Angticans, the

Methodists and so on.I also have no objection whatsoever to working towards a more

definite relationship with the Roman

Catholic Church.

Will you formally approach these

churches?

Initially,I will make personal contact.I

think this is very important becauseI believe

that what is endangered in our country is not a particular church, but Christianity itself.

We should try to acknowledge that and

accept our mutual responsibility for defending the moral values ofChristianity. These

are under great strain at the moment.

Your hopes for the future depend on Afrikaner nationalists' willingness to change

fundamentally their approach to politics

and society. Won't the right-wing within

the church and government scuttle reform?

Since July 1985 South Africa has been under a State of Emergency for all but three

months. Ostensibly, the regulations are

aimed at curbing revolt and suppressing violence. However, the vast majority of Afrikaners must eventually perceive that the

true significance of the State of Emergency

is more than that.

81
At its deepest level it signifies the birthpangs of a new South Africa, and thus also

the birth ofa new Afrikaner. The changes

against which people protested- even with

violence- and which necessitated the proclamation of the State of Emergency have '

brought the Afrikaner face to face with one

of the greatest crises in his history.

Certainly, in Afrikanerdom's far right

group there are already disturbing signs of

political extremism. These groups show no

appreciation of the legitimate aspirations of

the non-white peoples, neither do they have

any idea of the necessity fora new political

dispensation in South Africa and the demands such a new political order will make

on the Afrikaner. Part ofthe far right has little if any contribution to offer: these people

concentrate ona policy of restoration which

actually amounts to nothing more thana kind

of reiteration of the past. Their views, then,

need not be taken too seriously.

Another segment of the far right hasa

clearer vision of the future. They believe

the principle of partition must be universally

applied as this offers the Afrikaner his only

defence and protection. Here, the ideal is

an Afrikaner national state situated in its own

geographical area, governed by white Afrikaners, with no power-sharing of any kind.

Thus the current reforms area serious threat

to the Afrikaner's white exclusiveness and

so he is urgently summoned to fight for his

freedom.

This fight for freedom is to be waged, not

with military weapons, but by subtle

methods of infiltration and indoctrination.

To this end, true Afrikaners are called on to

penetrate existing cultural organisations to

gain control of them and to influence their

members. The control ofschools and parents' organisations is particularly important,

to ensure that the children are educated in

the right political climate and idiom.

This counter-reformation is not restricted

to adults- the youth is regarded asa vital

sphere of concentration which involvesa

lengthy process of preparation and indoctrination. In every town and every region

spiritual forces will have to be united while

there must bea clear realisation that the Afrikaner economy must not be controlled by

alien groups or constructed on foreign

labour.

Clearly, this section ofthe Afrikaner rightwing will not disappear. Without doubt it

will continue and, dependent upon the dogged persistence of its members and the success they may achieve, perpetuate restlessness, tension, and internecine conflict

among Afrikaners.

Naturally, the question is what influence

this will have on the nature and tempo ofreform. To my mind it would be fatal if these

people were to determine either the type or

pace of reform. None the less, their very

presence and the way they operate will cause

wide divergence of opinion in the ranks of

those responsible for reform. Some will want

to ignore them; others will feel they ought

to be heard, which will seriously inhibit the

reform process. YetI believe that the impulse for fundamental reform will be so

strong that the right's political influence will

not adversely affect its progress to any great

extent.

From the Afrikaner's history it may be deduced that he wants to live, and ifsurvival

means re-casting basic political ideology he

will do so. He is nota slave to his policy, for

he realises that there are values greater and

more important than political policy. Nor is

he enmeshed ina static pattern ofsocial existence, for he knows that Afrikanerdom is a

living, dynamically developing organism. It

is nota building which is repaired and restored as the years pass, but a tree which

grows new branches, flowers and fruit, yet

remains essentially the same.

We are now witnessing the most exciting

event in the history ofthe Afrikaner: the

birth of the new Afrikaner.

The new Afrikaner is engaged in conquering his exclusivism. Political power is increasingly being shared with people ofother

cultures; protective legislation is being repealed, and patterns ofsocial co-existence

changed. The ward is emancipated, and the

guardian becomes the partner of the liberated. The age-old guardian-relationship is

being transformed without traumatic upheaval into a relationship of partners. In

political, economic, and social spheres this

is evident every day.

But will the Afrikaner survive as an independent group in such an integrated society?

At present, whites comprise about 16% of

the population. By the year 2000 this percentage may dwindle to 12% or even less,

of which the Afrikaans-speaking section will

probably amount to halfora little more. Seen

against those statistics, can the Afrikanersurvive? Undoubtedly, because his history has

demonstrateda will to survive.

Yet, he must finda cultural home that will

unite him asa people. By "culture"I mean

82
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all the material and mental creations, the language, the songs, the art, the games, the

politics and the social institutions that distinguish one community from another. It is

in these cultural creations that the Afrikaner

will have to find his home if he wishes to remain independent and make his contribution to the development of South Africa.

There are already signs that the Afrikaner

understands thoroughly the truth that he

must have a substantial cultural home. Only

once he has discovered his strength and

power there, will he face the challenges of

the new dispensation. Then this new Afrikaner will not only speak his own language,

but the other's language as well. He will listen to the other's music, play with him, admire his art, worship with him and work with

him towards a new future.

In all this he will not merely make his own

contribution. He will himself be enriched,

without losing anything of his own identity

as a person, an Afrikaner or a Christian. The

new Afrikaner will seek a future South Africa

where a variety of people enjoy their own

cultures within an all-embracing nation with

a common national culture.

83
SOUTH AFRICA

EXPERT DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO SEPARATE EDUCATION

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,

80

[Article by Ken Hartshorne, former state education planner, consultant at the

University of Witwatersrand]

[Text]

Assessing education in South Africa today is a risky endeavour because ofthe extreme complexity ofthe social,

economic and political context, the unresolved and unstable nature of that context, and the rapidity with which

situations change.

Education is taking place within an untidy ma/e of

interactions that themselves are volatile and unpredictable and which differ radically from place to place, from

situation to situation, often at the whim ofState officials,

the local security apparatus or youthful activists. In the

face of the complexities a neat analysis of the state of

affairs is not possible. What can be done is to identify

some broad tendencies and to indicate the stances of

some of the main actors in the drama, perhaps even

tragedy, that is being played out.

In the first place, it is clear that government shows no

signs of giving way on the principle ofsegregated education systems: this is a basic tenet that has been reiterated again and again at the highest levels. It will be more

difficult for government to change on this than to free

Mandela, negotiate with the ANC or repeal the Group

Areas Act, because it lies at the heart ofthe ideology of

separate development. It is no accident that such concepts as "identity", "diversity", "self-determination" are

being stressed so strongly.

In recent months the full force of the security apparatus has been brought to bear on buttressing the crumbling ediface of black education in the urban areas. It is

ironic that in a system in which there is no statutory compulsory education, the attempt is now being made to

force children to school and "make them learn". Efforts

have also been made to crush all opposition to the system

through the detention of those voicing it: the latest estimates, in the absence of hard information, suggest that

over 700 persons connected with education -teachers,

students and pupils- have been detained. Among them

have been the leaders ofthe National Education Crisis

Committee (NECC) and the secretary-general ofthe

African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA),

since released.

In the face of an absolutely clear rejection ofthe education system by a wide range of community organisations, from conservative to radical, the claim is still

made that protest is the work of activists or agitators:

there is little understanding on the part of government

that where children are attending school, this is not a

signal of acceptance of the system but rather an indication ofthe strength ofthe community's need for education, even if it is not ofthe kind they wish, and oflack of

viable alternatives for their children.

What is known ofgovernment's 10-year plan for education suggests that it is based on the principle of "equal

but separate", on the assumption of the continuation of

segregated systems and that it is concerned principally

with issues of numbers, finance and provision. It proposes a real increase in total education expenditure of

4,1 % a year leading to an annual expenditure in 1996 of

RIO 000m (in 1986 rand terms). Priority is to be given

. to those departments with the biggest backlogs and the

major part of additional expenditure is to be spent on

increasing the qualification level of teachers, on improving the pupil-teacher ratio and on accommodating the

increase in pupil numbers in these departments, including those of the "national states".

84
In introducing this matter in the House of Assembly,

the Minister of National Education, F W de Klerk, said,

however, that "the setting ofspecific target dates and

rigoristic norms to obtain this objective (equal educational opportunities) should, however, not be insisted

upon" and that the objective could not be fully achieved

in the space of 10 years. As a member ofthe opposition

pointed out, this is understandable ifone white college

of education is to cost R85m at an average capital cost

per student place of R38 636, while in the same three

years, six black colleges are to be built at a total cost of

R42m at an average capital cost per student place

of RIO 606. It is extremely doubtful whether the

real issues of segregation, isolation, relevance and quality are to be addressed in this 10-year plan, although

clearly there is to be an improvement in material

resources and in the financial position of black teachers.

Perhaps the best illustration of the so-called "nonnegotiable" ofsegregated systems and separate schools is

what is happening in the field of white education at

present. With the destruction of even the limited

democratic base that existed in the provincial system of

government, all white education is now controlled very

firmly by the central Department of Education and

Culture (DEC) (House of Assembly), which has fallen

into the hands of ex-Transvaal education administrators

fully committed to the tenets of Christian National

Education, separate development and fundamental

pedagogics. The tensions between this department and

National Education are already becoming clear, as the

doctrine of "education as own affairs" (sic) is pushed hard

by the former, as in the very recent decision to apply a

rigorous permit system to the admission ofChinese and

Japanese children to white schools.

Of all the debates on education votes in the first session ofthe 1986 Parliament, that on the DEC (House of

Assembly) was without doubt the most discouraging and

lacking in reality, certainly from the government side,

for anyone concerned with negotiating a positive future

for education. The major thrust of the Minister's contribution was to attack the concept ofa single department

of education and to attempt to prove that "own affairs

education" was essential for the preservation of "culture", the rights, identity and self-determination ofthe

white group. When faced with statistics arising from

Parliamentary questions showing thatthere were 205 000

vacant places in white high and primary schools (the

equivalent of 5 800, 35-pupil classrooms) and nearly

3 000 in teachers colleges, he replies that policy could

not be adapted "solely for that reason, because the

principle of education as an own affair, as stated in the

Constitution ... is being impaired".

In looking at the next five years it is absolutely clear

that no fundamental changes within the systems can be

expected: segregated, divisive education is to remain.

However, there is a greater acceptance for private

education, which is to be partially subsidised and allowed

more freedom to experiment with forms of education not

approved within the formal systems.

Turning to the schools, in particular those ofthe Department of Education and Training (DET), the picture

is one of continuing deterioration in relationships between the department and its teachers and pupils, exacerbated in July 1986 by the introduction ofnew security

controls on the schools, particularly as this was done without any consultation with community, teacher and

student bodies or with the NECC. The closing down of

schools in the eastern Cape (September9,1986) suggests

that desperate control'measures have not succeeded and

that the DET is rapidly losing any authority to influence

situations in the black urban townships. Many urban

schools have become "no-go" areas for departmental

officials. Responsible estimates indicate that at least

250 000 pupils enrolled at the beginning of the year, are

now out ofschool. The re-registration of pupils in July

has been described variously by the black Press as "inventive bookkeeping" or "creative administration"

aimed at covering up the serious breakdown in attendance.

While over-all in black schools there is a slow but

steady improvement in the teacher-pupil ratio and in the

drop-out rate, the latter has worsened in DET secondary

schools. At the standard 10 level, the position is likely to

be as bad as, or worse, than in 1985, when, ofthe 25 584

pupils enrolled at the beginning ofthe year, 24 231 registered for the senior certificate examination, but only

10 523 wrote and 4 807 passed (19,1% of the original

enrolment). DETenrolments atstandard 10 level formed

less than a quarter of the total in all black schools, but

accounted for 70% of the total drop-out over the

year.

More disturbing even than the serious fall-off in attendance at black urban schools, certainly for the longer

term well-being of education, is the breakdown ofthe

learning environment in the schools. An official record

of 80% attendance in an urban school is no guarantee

that learning is taking place: teachers are dispirited,

pupils are restless and disturbed by what is going on

around them and the general environment is not conducive to learning.

Regular learning habits are breaking down, pupils do

not bring books to school, are not prepared to do homework or have their work evaluated by means oftests or

examinations. There is considerable lack of trust, for

example, in the reliability ofthe senior certificate examination, and even suggestions in some cases that invigil85
ators at examinations are afraid to exercise the control they should.

Pupils have experienced the heady feeling of power

over their teachers and, as with all power that is not accountable, this has sometimes led to youthful arrogance

in speech and action. Under the present social, political

and educational arrangements it is understandable that

a growing breakdown in the learning environment is

taking place, but it holds grave dangers for the future.

There can be no guarantee, and it is improbable, that

even a radical change in the political dispensation in

South Africa would restore a positive learning environment in which post-apartheid education could develop.

As Lebanang Sebidi has so rightly said: "However

instant political coups d'etat may be, they cannot bring

about instant radical educational changes. . . there are

no educational coups ifetat".

A further disturbing factor, which is generally not

treated with the seriousness it deserves, is the influence

in education ofthe young people not in school: here one

is talking not of the active "boycotters" only, but also of

those who have dropped out, failed, and in one way or

another been rejected by the system. Included in this

group, for example, would be the roughly 250 000 pupils

between 1976 and 1986 who completed a full secondary

education and then failed the final senior certificate

examination.

If one takes in conjunction with this a recent market

research survey which indicated that only 16% of urban

black youth between the ages of 16-24 were in full-time

employment, then the magnitude ofthe educational and

social implications must be apparent. In the urban townships there is anew and different generation of "street

children" led by young adults, rejected by the education

system, disillusioned by failure and lack of work opportunities, exercising pressures on those who are at school

or are using other educational alternatives, pressures that

range from those ofbrothers and friends ("what's the use?

where is it going to get you?") to straightforward, organised intimidation. One has to ask in all seriousness

whether the schools can succeed, under any dispensation, unless something is done to help these youngsters

find their way, through "second-chance", alternative

forms of education and training.

In the middle of the ground contested by, on the one

hand, the State and, on the other, by pupils, parents and

community, stand the teachers, atone and the same time

employees ofthe State and members ofthe community.

The generally negative image ofthe teacher, to be found

even among teachers themselves, is no small contributor

to the breakdown of the learning environment. Pressured and criticised from all sides, often for inadequacies

for which they are not to blame, treated often bv departments, not as professionals, but as instruments of

policy (as in recent instructions on security in the

schools), it is not surprising that in many areas the

morale, confidence and self-image of teachers is at a

low ebb. They are in an unenviable position and, that

so many, in spite of all the personal and external constraints, still care about their pupils and do their best for

them, speaks well of the teachers and the profession

to which they belong.

The professional associations, such as ATASA and the

Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA), are

under pressure, particularly from their younger members, to take up a more militantstance ofthe kind adopted

. by the newer associations, such as the non-racial National

Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA).

Involvement in the NECC movement has also

brought about a review of relationships with State departments, and during 1986 both ATASA and the "coloured" teachers association have withdrawn their representatives from the SA Council of Education (SACE)

and from all departmental committees. The associations

have exercised moderation, patience and courtesy over

a period of at least 50 years, but are now clearly moving

away from the employing departments and much closer

to the communities they serve, in the process taking a

much firmerstand on the social and political issues that

are bedevilling education.

Attitudes on both sides are likely to harden in the next

five years, with the position ofthe teacher in the urban

school particularly becoming increasingly difficult. In

coping with this situation, teachers' associations will

need to strengthen both their links with the NECC

movement and with their colleagues in othersectors of

education, through renewed efforts to bring about

greater unity in the profession as a whole.

Community responses to the continuing education

crisis have begun to crystallise in the main around the

NECC movement, which developed out of the conference called by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee

(SPCC) at the University of the Witwatersrand in December 1985. The NECC movement, in spite of the

difficulties surrounding its first meeting at Durban in

March 1986 and the later detention of many ofits leaders, is of positive significance for two major reasons.

Firstly, in bringing together community, political and

educational leaders, trades unions, parents, teachers,

students and pupils, it has created a powerful negotiating force that government, in spite ofits attempt to remove its leadership through detentions, will have to

listen to and take into account, principally because, as

the DET progressively loses control ofthe urban schools,

the NECC movement offers communities a possible

alternative mechanism for running schools and continuing with some form of education.

86
In the second place, the NECC has moved away from

what had become a rather barren exercise, the recapitulation of the failures of "Bantu Education", to a consideration both of the alternatives now and the form and

character of a longer-term post-apartheid education system. This thinking has emerged under the banner of "people's education", which has both political and educational content and significance. In the

former sense it can be regarded as an expression ofthe

educational consequences of the Freedom Charter, in

which it is inextricably bound up with the concept of

"people's power". It's broad goals are the setting up of

a "free, compulsory, unitary, non-racial and democratic system of education, for all sections of our people",

which would be so organised that students, teachers,

parents and workers would be able "to participate actively in its initiation and management".

The values to be promoted in people's education

would be "democracy, non-racialism, collective work

and active participation". The educational objectives, to

be reached through the stimulation ofcritical and creative

thinking, analysis and working methods, are:

G The elimination of illiteracy, ignorance, capitalist

norms ofcompetition, individualism, stunted intellectual development and exploitation;

D To enable "the oppressed to understand the evils of

the apartheid system" and to prepare them "for participation in a non-racial, democratic system";

D To equip and train "all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain

people's power in order to establish a non-racial,

democratic South Africa".

People's education has brought a new emphasis to the

crisis of 1986 compared with that of 1976: its message,

particularly in the voices of younger people, is rooted in

perceptions ofsocialist principle. Various free enterprise

surveysin recentyears have documented black scepticism

as to the benefits of capitalism and disbelief in the

inevitability ofthe rewards of economic growth "filtering

down" to those economically as well as politically disenfranchised. Even the recent public statements by

powerful private sector interests, in which much clearer

pressures for change in society and in education are evident, have been received at best with cautious "waitand-see" attitudes.

The rise ofthe trade union movement, with its own

special feeling for the crucial importance of education,

has also led to a greater awareness of the economic, as

well as the political factors involved in societal change.

Economic as well as political reconstruction is now on the

agenda and any consideration ofthe present or future of

education has to take this into serious account.

In people's education, as it is articulated at present,

there is the clear presence of an underlying tension between the statements on critical and creative thinking,

active participation and democratic practices on the one

hand, and implied alternative ideological pressures,

educational controls and "power" issues on the other. It

is, for example, crucial that the phrase "our people" in

people's education documents should not come to be

interpreted in the sense of "dievolk" ofAfrikaner nationalism, as expressing a new sectional nationalist ideology.

As South Africa goes through the inevitable process of

moving towards a post-apartheid society, the great issue

is whether a new education dispensation can respond

to broad social, economic and political goals without

continuing to be "politicised", in the sense of being

committed to and controlled by a particular political

parry ideology, not necessarily shared by all the members of the society served by the education system,

which is our past and present experience. Will South

Africa learn from the lessons ofthe past? Or is the past

so painful and hurtful that it can be exercised only by

repeating it under a different ideological banner?

At the same time, it is the height of naivety to expect

that "politics can be kept out of education". Education

policies, systems and values in any country reflect its

political options, its history and traditions, its values and

mores and, most importantly, its conceptions of the

future. The trap has to be avoided ofsearching for a

purely educational answer to a problem that has social,

economic and political as well as educational dimensions.

Education systems are most effective and relevant

when they have the acceptance of the user (learner,

teacher, parents, community), when the user is involved

and participates in the education decisions that are made,

and when the user is in broad agreement with the view of

man and society that informs the philosophy on which

the education system is based. Itisthis "broad agreement"

which has to be sought and negotiated in South Africa, a

commitment to a common purpose in education and

society, without which, questions of control, power and

"excess ideological baggage" will continue to dominate

education, to its detriment and that of its users.

It is to this search for "broad agreement", "common

purpose", that the proponents of people's education are

beginning to make such an important, positive contribution. There is a growing realisation that, in addition to the

important issues of philosophy, goals, structures and

control, there is no certainty that changes in government

and political structures, even if they were democratic in

nature, would necessarily lead, for example, to the

"democratisation" of education. As Franz Auerbach has

pointed out recently, authoritarianism in the schools

"reflects ancient and deep-seated authoritarian childrearing patterns in the homes of all sectors ofSouth African society". These patterns have carried over into the

schools, where learning styles will have to change from

87
passive, rote learning, single textbook, examination

oriented approaches, to creative learning and problem

solving, through the active participation and involvement of pupils in the learning process, to hands-on experience in the laboratory and workshop, self-study in

the library, questioning, discussion, and cooperative

working together in groups.

It is therefore significant in people's education statements that emphasis is being laid on "critical and creative

thinking, analysis and working methods", "active participation", "collective work", "democratic practices,

in the generating and development of knowledge and

in its implementation".

New curricula have their part to play in the search for

quality and relevance, as people's education concerns

with history, economics and English, for example, indicate; but new content can still be taught by authoritarian methods rather than learnt by democratic approaches. There is still the danger ofputting new wine

into old bottles.

The emergence of people's education has provided a

new opportunity -far more powerful, because ofbroad

community involvement, than thatlost atthe rime ofthe

De Lange Report in 1980-'83 - to debate the realities,

the relevance, quality and style of education and to

negotiate its future for aHthepeopleofthis country. The

common ground, now and in the future, must be a commitment to a non-racial, democratic, equitable and

just society, in both the political and economic sense, of

the parties to the debate and negotiation.

The process is likely to be painful and laborious in

society, because, as Van Zyl Slabbert, has said: "Jygum

nie 'n demokrask soos 'n stuk band-aid op hierdie samekwing

vasplaknie." ("You're not going to be able to stick democracy on to this society like a piece of band-aid"); and

in education, because many of the main actors, pupils

and teachers, have seen the learning environmentcollapse

around them and the education system disintegrate.

The hurts are deep, emotions run high and the obstacles to understanding and shared debate are massive;

but there is also hope, because in spite of the slogans

and the rejection ofmuch ofwhat at present is schooling.

there is a common appreciation of the fundamental

importance of education and what it could contribute to,

and in, a regenerated society.

Both the debate on, and the process leading to, postapartheid education are well under way: they are loaded

with complexities, uncertainties and risks, because they

are taking place in an unstable and unresolved context,

which changes from day to day, from place to place.

In this context, the barriers against fundamental

change, in both society and education, are formidable.

Some ofthe alternatives that are canvassed are equally

daunting to the educator. Butto stand back from either

the debate or the process, because of this, would be

particularly barren and irresponsible. The choice is not

whether it can be stopped or not: the debate on the nature of post-apartheid education and the process leading

to its particular character in the future are realities ofthe

present. The choice is rather to hold on to the past and

to abdicate from the future, or to enter the debate and

commit oneself to the process that will determine the

nature and character of both society and education in a

transformed South Africa.

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88
SOUTH AFRICA

UCT COUNCILLOR, BUSINESSMAN PROPOSE FAR-REACHING FEDERAL OPTIONS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP tn English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 77, 78, 79, 80, 83

[Article by Hans Middelmann]

[Text]

Ifthe nature ofthepost-apartheidsociety could be convincingly

clarified, apocalyptic fantasies andillusions wouldgiveway

to realistic hope . . . once a nonracial vision with concrete

merits grips the imagination of whites and blacks alike, its

difficult implementation willhave begun. Betterthan moral

indignation, blind belief in coercive power or illusionary

racial deals, a creativepolitical realism willfree South Africa

from its moralparalysis.

From South Africa Without Apartheid by H Adam and K

Moodley, 1986.

South Africa is in a deep political and economic crisis.

The crisis is not due to external forces over which we

have no control; it is self-inflicted. It has come over us

because we have neglected to come to terms with ourselves in the changing circumstances ofthis century.

Our options are now heavily circumscribed by escalating violence on the one hand and by our inflexible

political structure on the other. We are in a truly vicious

circle.

The government, in its natural desire to put off the

day when it ceases to be in sole power, retards and

obscures the reform process it has initiated.

The masses in their frustration have added the appalling dimensions ofbombs, murder, boycotts and internecine strife.

The resultant lack of confidence in our future, internally and externally, has undermined our economy and

the value ofthe rand more disastrously than any effective

sanctions ever will.

The drama unfolding on the South African political

stage now threatens to turn into lingering, terrifying

tragedy. This can be averted only ifthe vast majority of

South Africans who support neither violence nor government's policies find a common denominator, allowing

them to live together in peace and to pursue their own

aims with minimum interference by any government.

The common denominatorlies in the understanding

that a new basis is required for South Africa's post-apartheid political structures and institutions. We must set

ourselves free as othersuccessful countries have done.

Instead of participating in the present hopeless power

struggle between competing political groups, thinking

South Africans need to identify and agree on the nature

of the laws and organisations that can give «//citizens

equal opportunities in a just and open society. Instead

ofinstitutionalising the negative factors that divide us,

it is better to use well tested methods to facilitate interaction on an equal basis for the common good.

In recent years I, like others, have felt compelled to

make a contribution towards achieving these aims. In

discussing and writing about applying the principles and

structures ofthe open society to the South African situation I have had a rewarding response, including encouraging help and criticism from leading academics and

many persons of standing in their respective communities. It is clear to me that, overreaching all the factors that are said to divide South Africans into separate

groups with irreconcilable objectives, by far the largest

constituency is made up of those who share common

interests, a love ofour country and the wish to see it respected among the nations of the world.

The members of this silent majority of all colours

range from the humblest, possibly illiterate, probably

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91
underpaid, workers to highly successful professional and

business people. They include wives, mothers, teachers,

policemen. . .They work for their own benefit and wish

to improve their own and their families' position in life.

They create the country's wealth, which also supports

those who cannot look after themselves. They are

Christians, Jews, agnostics, Moslems, blacks, whites;

they speak Afrikaans, Xhosa, Portuguese; they are rugbv

fans or music lovers - collectively they have more common interests than separate ones and they constitute the

rich fabric of our society.

The task is to reflect on the interdependence, now

and even more in the future, of all these 30m people -

and to make a new start by institutionalising what they

have in common.

The challenge is to design the framework ofour laws

and institutions in such a way that all our people, without

sacrificing language, religion and culture, can freely interact to mutual benefit. There is no room any more for

the artificial distinction between "own" and "general"

affairs in South Africa. During the last few years we

have in fact overcome the artificial division in many

professions and business undertakings, in churches and

voluntary associations - even on the beaches. What was

thought to be impossible became, sensibly handled, a

success or a non-event.

Such a society would flourish under a federal constitution which followed the well-tested structures of the

world's leading democratic countries. Undersuch constitutions majority rule is not unfettered and, in terms

of enshrined civil rights, discrimination as between different population groups is unlawful.

The constitution and the administrative, judicial and

economic structures are so designed that neither the

majority nor a minority can arbitrarily change basic

rights. These include common citizenship, equality

under the law and the universal franchise. They also

incorporate the right of freedom of movement, and of

association and expression, including the pursuit by individuals of their cultural, language and religious preferences in the company of like-minded people.

A rigid constitution protects the institutions thatsecure those individual rights and guarantees the independence of the judiciary.

While it is essential that South Africa remain a unified

country, it is desirable that government be decentralised with formal checks and balances by way of a federal

structure. This would accommodate the wide variety of

regional differences of language, religion and ways of life

in our vast country and curb the tendency of central

government to interfere in local issues.

The government in its own constitutional reform efforts is not prepared to discuss universal franchise and

equality before the law of all citizens. Private attempts to

initiate a National Convention movement have failed in

our present state ofpolarisation. But it became clear from

my discussions that a draft of a model South African

constitution, based on Western democratic open society

principles, could be very helpful in coming to grips with

our problems.

What follows, therefore, is such a model for which I

accept full responsibility. In drafting it I have had the

generous assistance and criticism of many others whose

concern for the future of South Africa is deep and

genuine. In expressing my gratitude to them all, I

should like to single out Professor Marinus Wiechers,

whose experience in constitutional matters is probably

unrivalled in South Africa.

I envisage a constitution that is rigid. The territorial

unity ofthe State and its federal and democratic nature

are entrenched and cannot be amended. Otherwise,

amendments require prior sanction by the constitutional

council, approval by three-quarters of the members of

both houses of the federal legislature and ratification

by the legislatures of the federal states. Amendments

affecting the boundaries and powers ofthe component

states require ratification by three-quarters of the members of each of the State legislatures involved.

The constitution contains a Bill ofRights which protects individual rights and liberties and secures democratic freedoms such as freedom of expression, association

and movement, and safeguards due process of law, independence ofthe judiciary, free party-political formation and principles of non-discrimination, while also

stating the concomitant duties and obligations to respect

and obey the rights and liberties of others. It is enforced by a federal supreme court (or a separate constitutional court), charged with the duty ofannulling laws

and administrative acts of the federal and State legislature if these infringe the Bill of Rights.

The constitution prescribes universal suffrage and

entrenches the right to representation and access to office of all adult South Africans without any distinction

based on sex, colour, creed or race.

The federation is composed of at least eight, but not

more than 10 component states, as constituted by a

boundary commission. Each state has its own constitutional dispensation, subject to a basic conformity in the

appointment of a governor and a legislative structure

consistent with that of the federal legislature. State

constitutions can be changed only in terms of the particular state's dispensation and not by the federal legislature.

Component states are territorially integrated and

consolidated; under no circumstances will enclaves of

one state be found in other states.

The federal legislature is composed of a Senate and a

House of Representatives.

92
Each federal state is represented in the Senate by six

senators. A senator must be at least 40 years of age.

Election takes place in accordance with the procedure

laid down in the State's constitution, which may provide

for a special ballot of voters, or indirect election, or a

combination ofthese procedures. Each senator is elected for six years and two of each state's six senators retire

every two years. (Initially two senators will be elected for

two years, two for four years and two for the full term.)

The House of Representatives has 300 members

elected for four years. Half ofthese members are elected by voters in geographical constituencies as demarcated by a federal commission; the remaining half are

elected by proportional vote on a state basis, provided

that a political party must obtain at least 10% of the

total votes cast in the relevant election in order to qualify for proportional representation.

Legislation may be initiated by either House and requires assent by simple majority, except as otherwise

provided, in each House. In the event of deadlock,

special combined committees of the Senate and the

House of Representatives may attempt to resolve the

deadlock, failing which the House of Representatives

may override the deadlock by a vote of three quarters of

its members.

The presidency consists of a president and two vicepresidents, no two of whom shall be members of the

same political party. They are elected by the federal

legislature for three years and each member ofthe presidency acts as president for one year. (A Swiss-type

executive is proposed in order, on the one hand, to

embody the federal diversity and, on the other hand, to

avoid too large a measure of power concentration in the

hands of the executive.)

Ministers are independently appointed by the presidency for three years subjectto ratification by the Senate.

They need not be members of the federal legislature.

They can be dismissed individually by simple majority

vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Ministers collectively constitute the minister's

council and the presidency acts on its advice.

There is one judicial system for the federation; judges

are appointed by the presidency and their appointment is ratified by the Senate. Judges are dismissed by

the presidency only on the recommendation of the

Senate and House of Representatives.

All bills dealing with the appointment offederal funds

to State units, including the federal budget proposals,

are referred by the presidency to a council for social and

economic reconstruction and development for its consideration and report before submission to the federal

legislature.

The council of 15 members is chaired by the governor

of the Reserve Bank. The members, who may not hold

any state office nor be members of any legislature, are

appointed by the presidency for five year terms in their

individual capacities from a list of names submitted by

the various private sector organisations, including trade

unions.

A national emergency may be declared only by the

presidency, for a period not exceeding 60 days, subject

to ratification by both the Senate and the House of

Representatives within one week. Renewals are subject to the same limitations. War may be declared only

by the presidency, subject to ratification by both the

Senate and the House of Representatives.

A constitutional council is established under the

chairmanship of the chiefjustice of South Africa consisting of former presidents of the federation and six

members appointed by the Senate and the House of

Representatives. The council has the following duties:

D To advise on the constitutionality ofbills before the

federal legislature if such advice is requested by

either House;

D To perform a similar function in respect of proposed

state legislation; and

D To make proposals for constitutional reform submitted to it by competent authorities.

To keep this constitutional outline as briefas possible,

only the basic principles and main provisions have been

covered. They include, although they have not all been

spelt out specifically, regular elections and representation based on the principle of a free mandate, free association and popular leadership, all of which are sustained and supported by freedom of expression and,

more particularly, by a free Press.

Unfortunately, there is also no room here to outline

the important steps required to make South Africa a

federal state: decisions on the most appropriate geographic building blocks to form the federation; how the

federal states reach their own constitutional settlements;

and how the federal states reach agreement on the federal constitution. Some of these constitutional phases

will proceed side by side at the same time.

The actual entrenchment ofthe federal constitution

would consist of two steps: first, popular approval by

means of referenda in the various states, and, second,

empowerment by the present Parliament of the federal

constituent body to adopt the federal constitution (after

which the present Parliament will finally dissolve itself).

The final mechanism to put the new constitution into

operation in the proper sequence will be possible only if

the population at large can be convinced that the resulting benefits are clearly more desirable than the present

dispensation.

All the provisions follow well-known and established

methods of organising State institutions and distributing

State powers, which rest on centuries of common ex93
perience, shared values and well-tried mechanisms.

Eventually, the terms ofthe constitution, to command

maximum consent, will have to be negotiated by delegates of the main, presently antagonistic groups.

It is abundantly clear that, at present, such negotiations are impossible to conduct. Before considering the

way in which a new initiative could be developed, and

who could be involved in it, it is necessary to clarify

another important issue.

Socialism and capitalism are popularly seen as politically alternative economic systems. This simplistic view

is based on the perception that whites are rich and

capitalist, while blacks are poor and must look to a

socialist dispensation for their salvation. Graffiti which I

see on my way to town succincdy proclaims "Fight poverty - build socialism", while a Soweto scholar is

reported to have said: "We want everything the whites

have." Is it any wonder that large numbers ofSouth Africans express their vision of the future in such slogans,

when they are voteless and subjectto arbitrary laws not of

their own making?

Our present political structure is seen by many merely

as an extended capitalist device to keep the masses

permanently oppressed. This is coupled with the widelyheld beliefthat only majority rule would setthe people

free, making them also materially better off through the

redistribution ofwealth.

A quick glance around the world confirms, however,

that nations ruled under arbitrary power structures,

whether in the name ofa minority or the majority, or in

the name of socialism or capitalism are, as a rule, impoverished. Their contacts with the outside world are

severely limited. On the other hand, material wealth and

also cultural qualities oflife coincide on the whole with

conditions where State power is limited and decentralised and all citizens are equal under the law - where

everyone's freedom is circumscribed only by the need for

equal freedom of one's neighbours.

For South Africans to achieve that position would entail equal rights of access to education and training to be

able to earn a livelihood; job opportunities open to all;

and universal freedom ofmovement, ofresidence, and

of ownership of property anywhere in South Africa.

In an open society, freedom of association guarantees

workers the right to form trade unions whose membership cannot, however, be made compulsory as a condition of employment. Employers, similarly, are not allowed to combine to impose employment conditions on

workers throughout an industry. Wage levels and working conditions can be determined only by free bargaining procedures in terms of universally applicable labour

laws.

Only the free interaction of the complex components

of the economy determines prices and wages in an open

society. There is no better way to achieve the continuous

adjustments in production and distribution required to

assure the optimum creation of new wealth. No committees, cabinet ministers or top civil servants, however

able and well meaning, can ever hope to obtain the information that the market provides continually, or equal

its decision-making ability.

It is the duty of the State, in the interests of its citizens, to ensure thatthisfree interaction ofall economic

factors in the market is facilitated and not hindered

cither by State manipulation or by power groupings of

employers or employees who wish to promote their sectional interests.

In ideal conditions the observance of these general

rules, stated here in broad outline, will bring about a far

greater creation and equitable distribution ofwealth than

pertains at present.

However, conditions are rarely ideal. Furthermore, in

South Africa in particular, the burden of present and

past race legislation and arbitrary State control of the

economy have left a heavy legacy of unemployment,

inflation and uneconomic activities.

In the circumstances, the State, in an open society,

has a second important function, namely to supportthose

who are disadvantaged or have been deprived and to

improve their earning capacities. In carrying out this

second function any direct State intervention in the

economy would be harmful as it distorts and delays the

continuous adjustment process indicated through the

market. Assistance has to be given by the State directly

to those in need.

This support must be financed from general revenue,

necessarily obtained by taxation of those who create the

wealth ofthe country. The legislature decides only on

the priorities and relative amounts ofsupportto be given.

The social assistance has a twofold purpose: to alleviate

distress and suffering, and to help those affected to become productive and self-supporting members of the

community.

Regrettably, the State's function of helping the disadvantaged and deprived is limited by the availability of

funds for this purpose. By not observing this simple

truth, many governments around the world, socialist and

capitalist alike, have been distributing wealth that did

not exist, and have tried to pay for it by inflation, causing impoverishment to the point of bankruptcy.

It is essential, therefore, to be clear on the objectives

and limitations of economic policy in an open society.

The creation of wealth must precede the distribution of

wealth.

To sum up: government makes its greatest economic

contribution by upholding and encouraging individual

freedom and enterprise, by ensuring that civil law

which regulates relationships between contracting par94
ties is universal, clear and enforceable. Furthermore, it

is government's duty to ensure stability ofthe currency

and the avoidance ofinflation. Only in this way can one

foster the formation ofsavings and capital, which is so

vital to all new enterprise. Finally, it is also the State's

function to create and maintain fair bargaining procedures between employees and employers as the basis of

good labour relations.

Having described the constitutional and economic

principles of a new South Africa on the lines of an open

society, let us look at the alternatives. Maintenance of

the present dispensation is unlikely ever to command

the consent of the majority of South Africans and is

likely to increase political instability and lack of confidence. The alternative attempt at some kind of forcible

take-over is unlikely to succeed; and ifit did, it would

be equally daunting, because winners of a revolution

or coup are people who mostly exercise their forcibly

acquired powers even more arbitrarily than those they

have replaced. Thatleaves the option ofthe open society, the principles of which have been outlined here.

There is evidence that in the unique atmosphere of

South Africa today, in spite ofmany appearances to the

contrary, there are vast numbers of people of goodwill

and integrity in all sections of the population, political

and non-political, who wish to get together to achieve

this common objective ofworking towards purposeful,

peaceful change.

How to mobilise this large constituency is the question. A handful of patriotic South Africans could initiate

this process now.

Let us remind ourselves that in our present sad state

there are still favourable circumstances, such as:

D A basically strong economy which, given free rein,

could generate increasing income for all;

D Good communication channels between different

groups;

D Compassion and generally harmonious relations in

public places;

D A proven capacity among people without formal

training to generate their own opportunities in the

informal sector;

D A virile trade union movement; and

D Strong religious movements that are tolerant ofone

another and, within their respective churches, no

longer have racial divisions.

Let us remind ourselves also that the rise of a new

South Africa would turn our economy round as no other

event could. Ifthe Western world could see that we had

restructured our society on open society lines, the flow of

capital, so much needed for our development, would

revive strongly.

The basis for a total reversal ofour deadlocked situation is within reach. It needs no more than 10 South Africans of undisputed stature - outside politics -to bind

themselves together for this task: to agree on an open

society policy and to propagate it. This small group of

men and women would come from the diverse backgrounds of, say, trade unions, churches, business and

the professions - across the colour line. What would bind

them together in their task would be a commitment to

the goal of achieving a South Africa in which the

people, while retaining theirseparate language, ethnic

and other identities, would be able to work and live

together as a nation with a great and humane future.

The persons who could start this task probably already

know and respect each other. While holding different

views they are cooperating on many issues now. It would

need one or two telephone calls between them to begin

the process. They all have resources at their disposal

that would facilitate agreement on the common objective

and how to propagate it. As Heribert Adam says in his

recent book: "Once a nonracial vision with concrete

merits grips the imagination ofwhites and blacks alike,

its difficult implementation will have begun."

Let us hope that someone will soon take the initiative

and pick up the telephone as a first move to put before

us all the overwhelming case for a free new South Africa.

/9274

CSO: 3400/570

95
SOUTH AFRICA

GERHARD DE KOCK GIVES BROAD VIEW OF STATE OF ECONOMY

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 pp 38, 39

[Interview with Reserve Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock by Michael Coulson; date

and place not given]

[Text]

lms wee» Reserve nan* governor uernara

de Kock, as usual, gives the opening address

at the FM Investment Conference. His subject: Financial Sanctions and the South African Economy. This discussion with Assistant

Editor Michael Coulson takes a mach

broader conspectus of the state of the economy.

FM To what extent can we still claim that

political factors are responsible for the

steady downgrading of growth forecasts for

this year, or are there basic economic weakDe Kock: Economics and politics are now

so closely intertwined that it's impossible to

separate them. Take disinvestment: it's partly political, but it's true that some foreign

firms weren't making high enough profits to

justify expansion here. That in turn reflected

general lack of confidence and uncertainty.

A lot of economic indicators have turned

positive, but businessmen don't have a clear

enough vision of the medium term to invest

in new plant and equipment on any large

scale. Instead, many investors are buying

shares on the stock exchange to protect

themselves against the erosion of their capital. And they've done well in the past few

years, even in real terms.

In the third quarter we grew at an annual

rate of about 3%, but we'll only show 1%

growth for the year overall. We should get

3% growth next year — which is what I was

originally hoping for this year!

Sorely, until we get a revival of domestic

fixed investment even the little recovery we

have seen will not be sustained?

Absolutely. There can be no real growth

until real fixed investment picks up. We had

a period like this after Sharpeville in the

early Sixties. I remember the FM had an

editorial in George Palmer's days called

"The reluctant boom." That was exactly

what it was. But then suddenly, two or three

years later, real fixed investment jumped by

nearly 20% a year two years running as

confidence returned.

I don't see that happening again for the

moment, because people still don't have

enough confidence. It's wrong to think that

no entrepreneur ever invests in new plant

until he's used up all existing surplus capacity; successful entrepreneurs have always

been ones who've anticipated upswings. But

for that you need some confidence.

Do you consider the high level of government

spending a positive factor?

Yes, in the present abnormal circumstances. You know my view thatin the longer

term we must curb government spending as a

percentage oftotal domestic spending, and in

1983-1984 excessive government spending

was a major cause of our problems. But at

the moment, as private consumption isn't

rising rapidly and private investment is falling, it's just as well that the government is

buying goods and services.

Wouldn't it be even better if government

spending was devoted to capital and infrastructure items?

Certainly. This is a Keynesian approach,

but I still believe in it, though the danger is

that in practice, as we all know, governments

find it very difficult to stop spending when an

economy picks up again and is threatened

with overheating.

96
In the third quarter we saw

a 20% increase in

GDE, but only 2%-3% in GDP. What are

the implications of this?

Those quarterly figures can be misleading.

GDE really just recovered aftera sharp

decline in the second quarter. But it does

includea swing from inventory accumulation to accumulation. I don't know how long

this will last, and there was also an element

of buying in anticipation of sanctions, but

clearly there has been restocking. Interestingly, in the third quarter government consumption spending declined in real terms.

Given the present gold price and exchange

rate, what are you now projecting for the BoP

for this year and into 1987?

At the moment we're thinking in terms of

a R5 billion-R6 billion current acount surplus for this year. While it's very early to talk

about next year, we think it will be of similar

proportions if gold stays above $400 and the

oil price stays low.

How much of that will go in debt repayments?

In terms of the existing debt arrangements, repayments up to the middle of next

year are not substantial. We've just made the

last of four repayments of the IMF loan for

1986, of about $100m, and there'll be four

more next year, starting in February. This

loan was denominated in SDRs, so the dollar

amount fluctuates, but they will be similar.

Outside the net the amounts are not excessive in relation to the current account surplus. So a lot depends on the new arrangements with the creditor banks, in the second

quarter of next year. At the moment we're

more comfortably placed than at any time in

the past few years. We've just released our

October reserve figures, which show an increase of well over R2 billion since April.

We've even been able to unwind some of the

gold swaps. We have adequate dollars for the

first time ina long while.

But won't the rand basically remaina weak

currency?

We now have enough dollars to intervene

more actively in the market and support the

rand if we want. We were right in^the past

not to waste our dollar reserves in trying to

maintain an artificial value for the rand,

because we didn't have the resources. I'm

glad to say that the IMF supports that view.

But now it'sa different story: touch wood!

We've repaid debt, the current account is

still in surplus, and the gold price has gone

up, so we can exerta greater influence on the

exchange rate. We allowed the rand to move

up from its low of US37c to US43c-45c, as

well as against the D-Mark and the yen. We

could have allowed it to go up even more,

maybe to 50c; but we decided we would

rather manage the float to ensurea gradual

appreciation and at the same time replenish

our reserves. We've also started to get complaints from manufacturers and exporters

that the rand was moving up too rapidly. We

would like to see the rand strong to curb

inflation, but if the priority is growth and job

creation— which means manufacturing investment — we don't want the rand to move

up too sharply.

Isn't the argument that the weakness of the

rand wasa major cause of our high inflation

rate wearinga little thin now the rand has

recovered so much?

We've underestimated the time lags. We

got it right when the rand fell so much in the

second half of last year, and we expected

inflation to peak in the first few months of

1986. When the inflation rate fell below 13%

annualised in the second quarter and the

rand stopped depreciating, we thought, excellent, this is good news. So we were very

disappointed when the inflation rate shot up

again in the third quarter. We've been trying

very hard to get to the bottom of this. Obviously we don't have either demand or wagepush inflation; we still tend to think it's

largely the delayed effects of depreciation.

The impact on motor car prices, for instance,

came late. But there were also other factors.

What about administered prices and food

prices— which are falling in most of the

world?

There are special factors, like the drought.

And administered prices are also affected by

the rand depreciation.

Has the dual exchange rate policy proveda

flop?I wouldn't say

that, though it's very difficult to administer a dual exchange

rate when the one isa 53% discount to the

other! But that doesn't mean that the answer

is to abolish exchange controls on non-residents. It would be highly inflationary, for

one thing. I have no affection for exchange controls,

but in the present circumstances if you had

only one exchange rate, with non-residents

seeking to take capital out rather than bring

it in, the rand would fall. This would be

stimulatory, but the inflationary cost would

be too high. Incidentally, we have tighter

exchange controls now than ever before in

our history.

Finally, monetary targeting. The British are

about to scrap it asa policy, largely because

M3 is such an imperfect measure. With monetary growth so far below the bottom of the

target range, has it not become an exercise in

futility here too?

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We had the benefit of the British experience. I spent some time in the Bank of

England and it was because of their and the

US experience that we recommended lowprofile monetarism. We made it very clear

that our target is a rough guide which will

not be taken all that seriously, but we did see

some merit in having guideline targets and I

still believe they serve a purpose. When

month after month we saw money growth

falling below the bottom range, that was one

of the reasons we saw fit to reduce Bank rate

progressively.

By about February, when we get the December figures, we will set the new targets

for 1987. It's too early to be sure, but my

guess is we'll set them slightly lower than the

1986 range of 16%-20%. The true test will

come when the economy moves up so rapidly

that money supply tends to overshoot. But

we're a long way from that!

98
SOUTH AFRICA

KROGH DESCRIBES NEW POSITION AS ANTI-SANCTIONS POLICY COORDINATOR

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 p 86

[Text]

"My appointment as an 'adviser' to the minister of finance is a non-event," claims Dr

Desmond Krogh, the man who says he is not

Pretoria's newly appointed sanctions buster.

Officially, the former Governor of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank is currently deputy

chairman of Lifegro and will retain this post

until the end of December.

"I can't talk about a position I haven't got;

it would be singularly irresponsible," Krogh

(55) says. "But if I were a sanctions buster,

I'd be in the private sector offering my services and advertising in the newspapers.

What I can do is advise government on how

best to counter sanctions in terms of general

policy, trade, fiscal developments, and monetary policy. For me to pose as a sanctions

buster would be misleading and a deliberate

lie. I'm not a guy for lies and I've got nothing

to hide."

He defines the role more closely: "I'll be

co-ordinating anti-sanctions policy, which

includes non-conventional trading policy,

but not practice, and I won't be dealing with

individual members of the private sector."

Clearly, Krogh has good reason to choose

his words carefully. As one merchant banker

put it: "If the guy sticks his nose out of SA

now, his every movement will be watched.

But most people who know his background

aren't in the least bit surprised at government's choice. He's the obvious man; he's got

the experience."

Krogh admits that most of his career has

been spent "playing behind-the-scenes roles"

—and that he's been helping government for

some time. His position, he says, is "on a

temporary and renewable contractual basis.

If sanctions don't increase, my job will become redundant."

How does he see SA

.coping? "Like anyone

else," is his curt reply. He

refuses to discuss the lessons he learnt in the seven

years he spent in Rhodesia running an "illegal

bank" — from 1973-

1980 — through three

changes in government,

in an era dominated by

sanctions and war. "The

relationship between

Zimbabwe and SA is far

too touchy today," he

notes.

What he will say,

though, is that living

through the abolition of

sanctions is probably more challenging and

difficult than living with sanctions: "When

sanctions are lifted — and all sanctions are

eventually lifted — it happens very fast,

whereas the imposition is gradual and takes

place over a couple of years."

Krogh angers quickly when pressed on

details about his new appointment. "Sanctions are not an important issue right now

and have just been blown up by the press," he

says aggressively. "They're way down the list

of government priorities.

"I've lived through monetary sanctions

imposed by the whole world as well as physical policing. And there isn't any comparison

between the Rhodesian and South African

situation. Government's priorities now are to

get inflation under control, to get investment

opportunities exposed and exploited, and to

engender confidence in the economy.

99
"Politics and business are related," he

reflects, "but both are specialised skills. I

don't think politicians make good businessmen and good businessmen usually make

atrocious politicians. But talking to each

other is what is really important. When I was

director ofthe FCI from 1969-1973,1 moved

the head office from Johannesburg to Pretoria to make people who didn't want to talk to

each other, talk. My greatest contribution as

FCI director was in bringing people together

who didn't want to talk."

Ironically, Krogh says that today he finds

the relationship between politicians and

businessmen too close. So perhaps he will be

able to apply his skills to bringing together

parties who do not wish to do business.

But, he says, "I make enemies wherever I

go; that's my unfortunate way oflife. I ruffle

feathers." As FCI director, Krogh concedes,

he made "some real enemies." And earlier

this year, as the man responsible for "strategic issues and shareholder relations," he had

to bear the brunt of shareholders' anger at

the controversial issuing ofLifegro preferential shares to a number of journalists and

certain members of government.

Some policyholders who were unable to

secure any of the heavily oversubscribed

shares felt that the manner of the allocation

made a mockery of Krogh's statement at the

time: "It is a gross misrepresentation to claim

that our board have not

favoured our policyholders. Policyholders

were deliberately favoured as a matter of

policy — each and every

policyholder who applied

received an allocation."

A graduate of the universities of Amsterdam,

UCT, and Pretoria, the

Windhoek-born Krogh

has a BComm degree

and an MA in economics.

He lectured at the universities of the OFS and

Pretoria before heading

Unisa's economics department and working part-time for the

South African Reserve Bank on financial

flow analysis.

He spent a year as economic adviser to

Hendrik Verwoerd and from 1968-1969 was

seconded as a full-time adviser to the South

African Commission on Fiscal and Monetary policy. From 1967 to 1973, he was a

member of the PM's Economic Advisory

Council and a member of the Private Sector

Industrial Advisory Committee to the Minister ofEconomic Affairs in 1971 and 1972.

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100
SOUTH AFRICA

HARRY SCHWARZ DISCUSSES PFP'S ECONOMIC POLICY

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 21 Nov 86 p 60

[Interview with PFP finance spokesman Harry Schwarz; date and place not given]

[Text] PFP finance spokesman Harry Schwarz

describes himself as a

"social democrat with

some old-fashioned

Keynesian ideas which

will come back into

vogue." He does not

believe in "unrestricted jungle-type economics."

FM: Many people are unclear about the Progressive Federal Party's (PFP's) economic

policy. Could you outline it?

Schwarz: The reason some people seem

unclear is that they haven't studied it — or

perhaps we haven't marketed it adequately.

Our policy document is called "Economic

Democracy." Its fundamental concept is

that we need both economic and political

reform hand in hand. If they are not, one will

hinder the other's progress.

Entrepreneurship should be rewarded. We

believe in free enterprise in our definition of

the term. It can produce the wealth needed

for the social services a country should have.

Other forms of activity, such as communism,

cannot generate sufficient wealth.

We also believe that the marketplace, if

left entirely to itself, can degenerate into a

kind of jungle. You do need protection to

ensure equality of bargaining in the marketplace, particularly in a society like ours

where some participants are disadvantaged.

The means of production should not be

owned by the State, but by private enterprise. There should be incentives for workers

to participate through share ownership, profit-sharing and so on. We do not believe

share option schemes should be virtually

pushed out of existence by taxation. On the

contrary, we'd like to see a broad spectrum of

the society involved.

On the one hand, we support free enterprise in the true sense of the word, but we're

not prepared to abandon the necessity to

provide social services in a society like ours.

So we believe the State has a role, even if not

the major role.

Do you see a trade-off between unemployment and inflation?

It's a fallacy that you can cure unemployment only if you're prepared to let inflation

run amuck. It depends on the economic system you apply. In any case, the kind of

system which fights inflation at all costs,

allowing millions to be unemployed, has not

even a remote possibility of being applied in

SA. It can have a measure of success (and

that is open to debate) only in highly developed countries with a social system to look

after the unemployed. Ours is inadequate. So

to suggest that we could have those policies

in SA verges on national suicide.

How would you tackle the problem?

I would like to see instituted in SA a

programme I call 'employment to improve

the quality of life.' We should plan to employ

people not only to build houses, but also the

infrastructure — like sewerage, lights and

water; and to build parks, clinics and all the

amenities white SA takes for granted.

That needs encouragement and money

from government. But it also means you're

employing private firms to do most of the

work. So private enterprise has a major role.

Two purposes are served: creating jobs,

and making people feel they are working to

improve their own lot. There are other byproducts. Money earned is spent on essentials and is, in the main, directed at South

African enterprises which will be revived.

101
You can get a spiral of economic activity

going, with little imported inflation.

Do you believe in a minimum wage?

I do personally. But I don't think in the

present situation in SA we can have a minimum national wage. It will have to vary from

region to region and from industry to industry.

I recognise the argument that it is better to

earn something than nothing at all, but I

think there's an answer to that: in a competitive world, if the only way entrepreneurs can

be in business is on the basis of paying

exploitative wages, I'm not sure they should

be in business. And if it is an industry with a

social purpose that should exist, then the

State should play a role.

After all, if the social product is divided

into the returns on capital, entrepreneurship,

and labour, why should labour make the

greatest sacrifice? This is a matter of contention, even within the party. The last PFP

congress saw a division of opinion: some felt

there should not be a minimum wage since

its absence would create more jobs.

What is your attitude to privatisation?

The means of production should, wherever

possible, be owned by private enterprise as

opposed to the State. Therefore, if there are

activities which can reasonably be privatised,

I'm in favour.

However, you have to bear in mind certain

services, including for instance hospitalisation for lower-income groups. I am very

concerned that services — which the white

community has for decades received from

the State either at very low cost or for nothing — should suddenly not be available to all

on the same basis now that there are moves

towards a non-discriminatory society. And I

am a bit fearful that privatisation could be

used to avoid the cost of social services to

which the community as a whole is entitled.

We have to start with what is easiest. For

example, the Industrial Development Corporation owns and controls the majority

shareholding in two investment companies

quoted on the JSE. I see no reason why these

should not be privatised. A variety of activities carried on by the private sector in other

countries are in the public sector here, and

should be privatised.

But it does not solve the privatisation

problem to take away a major enterprise

from the State and give it to a private monopoly — unless there's universal public participation, as was tried in Britain.

You've been described as a hawk in defence

matters. Do you think defence spending is

excessive?

If I am a hawk, I'm a hawk with the heart

of a dove. I believe that for peaceful change

and reform, there must be social stability.

And whether you are white or black, you are

entitled to be protected against crime. Protection of the individual has been inadequate in SA, particularly in regard to crime.

If I want expenditure in order to keep crime

to a minimum, that doesn't make me a hawk.

I see defence as necessary to maintain the

territorial integrity of the country against

aggression. That doesn't need vast expenditure. We should not confuse defence with

combating unrest inside SA. Unfortunately,

because of the level of unrest, which I think

will continue for quite some time, security

expenditure will increase.

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102
SOOTH AERICA

HUNTING RIFLE, SEVERAL MILITARY WEAPONS DISCUSSED

Musgrave Hunting Rifle Described

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans, Jul/Aug 86 pp 8,9

[Article by guest writer Dr Lucas Potgieter: "Sideline Comments on Armscor

Commercial11]

[Text] Our ordinary people — the man in the street or the farmer on his farm

— are not exactly acquainted with Armscor. The little that we do know we pick

up from the press, hear on the radio or see on the tube whenever Commandant

Piet Marals decides every now and then to tell us about some gun or other or

about an Armscor achievement. Our only contact with Armscor is thus through

the media or through Armscor*s commercial products which we buy at the gun

shops. Of course we are also proud when we read that Armscor's G6 shoots

further than the Russians1 endeavor, but ... but our ordinary people view such

achievements from the sidelines, for we do not exactly have room for a 155 mm

alongside our 6 mm's. We get very impressed if we hear about one of our own

rockets with which you can shoot a cat out of a tree from many kilometers

away, but our actual interest is in a .243 cartridge with which you can

repeatedly hit a dime at 100 meters. Whenever we see our own helicopters on

TV, then we say: "Now our Defense Force is going to shoot the you know what

out of them," but actually we don't feel really involved because there are but

few people who go hunting in "choppers" in our country. We measure Armscor's

achievements by its 9 mm's and not by its 90 mm's. If we can't connect that

on the moon" advertising program will not convince us that that 155 mm will

hit Table Mountain at five kilometers. But fortunately Armscor has also been

walking a proud path in the commercial sphere. I am glad that I can tell

about this.

South Africa's new Musgrave hunting rifle was introduced on 29 May 1970. The

prime minister at that time received the Vrystaat No 1 while the then minister

of defense, Mr P.W. Botha looked on. The public waited in suspense to see

what the Musgrave was going to look like. We waited for 12 months. I heard

of the Musgrave for the first time again on 19 May 1972 when Dr (now Judge)

Henk van Dyk wrote an article about the weapon in the "Jaarboek vir Hengel en

Skiet" ["Year Book for Fishing and Shooting"]. I also went and bought me a

Musgrave in 30-60 [sic] caliber. The sales brochure made me smile. The

rifle's barrel, the brochure said, was 660 mm long and "it is of steel." I

103
wondered if the Free Staters wanted to insinuate that other barrels were

perhaps of plastic. According to the brochure, the rifle had a "genuine

Mauser-type action." I could not determine to this day how a "Mauser type"

could ever be "genuine."

As for the rifle itself, I was rather impressed. It was a fine rifle, an

accurate rifle, and as a first endeavor it was at least equal to the Savage,

Parker Hale and Voere which were selling on the market at that time. The name

•Vrystaat" was annoying to be sure. I myself am a born Free Stater, but I

have always referred to this origin with great modesty. It was already clear

those days that Armscor would perhaps later have to look at the action of the

Vrystaat model, because whenever you stepped into a sandy environment with the

Vrystaat, too many of your cartridges landed in the sand as a result of the

fact that the safety catch did not close the bolt. Besides the Vrystaat

there was also an outstandingly accurate RSA target rifle, a deluxe President

model and a terribly ugly Veld [Field] model. One day I told Trevor Musgrave:

If you die one day, the Dear lord will forgive you for many things, but you

will never be forgiven for having made the Veld model." But let me say right

now, that same Veld model was the most accurate hunting rifle that I have ever

yet seen. _ Today they are sought-after collector's pieces and they have become

the favorite rifles of many proud South Africans.

From the start there were a few nasty marketing problems for our commercial

products. Firstly, Armscor had to make its products acceptable to certainly

the most fastidious target markets in the world. South Africans are gun

people. We know the world's top rifles and for years we have been hunting and

target shooting with the world's top ammunition. We know how what the best

2°*. Zp ^

how the best shoot 1"-the world of arms and ammunition. Lower

standards will never be acceptable to South African gun people. Secondly

there was from the start great opposition on the part of business. The

dealers margins of profit were higher on imported products than on our own.

Consequently it was more profitable to talk a man out of a Musgrave or PMP and

into a Winchester or Norma. Thirdly there was perhaps the premise that the

market must accept what we make instead of our having to make what the market

will accept. lastly, there is no getting away from the fact that it is a

nang-up with us South Africans: we do not want to believe that our own people

can make even better products than the Yanks or the English or the Germans.

It s the last-mentioned pothole that Armscor already had to pay attention to

in the early 1970's. Early in the 1970's a small group of us, headed by Cmdt

Piet Marais, went to Houston, Texas. We had decided to go exhibit South

Africa s commercial products at the International NSGA Show. There were

Musgrave Premier rifles, PMP MOA (Minute of Angle) cartridges, Somchem Magna

propellants. _ the teeth of the legendary elephant Dhulamithi, genuine Bushman

bows and poison arrows. There were photos of animal scenes, handmade South

African hunting knives and even magnificent saddles and other leather goods.

We had gone to press a big gag in the big mouth of a boatsful public. Perhaps

SrSF -,

Ye

fP °

ne can say with ^ngue in cheek: it was a good investment.

3f!SY.

South Africans read excellent publicity about their own country's

products in American magazines and publications. Writers like Jack Lott, Tom

Siatos, John T. Amber, Dick Woolf, John Sundra and Dean Grenell, to mention

but a few, referred to our products favorably. The Americans told a

fastidious South African public that their products were much better than what

104
they themselves wanted to believe. But then the political situation changed.

Armscor branches* production capacity had to be rearranged in order to give

attention to more important needs. The results of this were not in the

interests of the commercial side. The name Lyttelton disappeared from the

barrels and actions of our rifles — a name that was becoming synonymous with

accuracy and reliability. IMP was no longer the manufacturer of the

cartridges with which we brought home the meat. Another manufacturer from

overseas furnished the market and IMP and Musgrave only handled the

distribution. Unfortunately, the quality of the overseas product was not

beneficial to the image of our own industry. What further muddled the whole

affair was the fact that our own industry, perhaps necessarily, had to create

the impression on the market that these imported products were produced "in

our own factories."

Seen from the sidelines, there has been a dramatic change to Armscor*s

commercial side, especially over the past year or two: new commercial

propellants from Somchem's factory, which get our bullets to the buck just as

quickly and just as accurately; IMP ammunition with reloadable Boxer primers,

fine shell cases and bullet points, and above all, in calibers for which there

has been a great need for years. Who could ever have thought that one day

South Africa would make its own .375 Holland & Holland, 7x 57, .300 Win Mag,

a large variety of components from which he can choose.

A rifle is lying before me. It's a .416 Rigby. It is going overseas to a

rich American who, after visiting England and being to all the big and wellknown companies, decided that my country and my people can build a better

rifle that the famous ones. It comes from Musgrave's factory. Perhaps this

rifle tells more about the achievement of our own industry than what I can

write in an article. Mr crystal ball says that yet more of these products

will go to those countries from which we imported at one time. We know

Armscor by its products. It's a good image.

Review of Littleton Products

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans Jul/Aug 86 p 12

[Unattributed and untitled article in "Branch Overview" column]

[Text] The name of Lyttelton Engineering Works (Pties.) Ltd may perhaps

deceive the layman, but that company continually has the world buzzing about

arms which have no equal, and it is regarded by the international arms trade

as a unique manufacturer of a broad series of fine products. With products

like the G5 and G6 cannons, which have everywhere been described by

authoritative military publications abroad as one of the best in the world,

LIW [Lyttleton Engineering Works] has made a gigantic input to establishing

the Republic of South Africa as a highly reputed international armament

producer. The high standard of LIW's capacity is again reflected in the fact

that for three successive years it captured the coveted Armscor Chairman's

Prize, and last year one of its workers was again in the team that received

the award. Some of the products which are being manufactured and factoryreconditioned by LIW are:

105
Rifles and Mortars

- 7.62-mm Rl assault rifle

- 5.56-mm R4 and R5 assault rifle

- 5.56-inm IM4 and IM5 semiautomatic rifle

- 7.62-mm MG4 machine gun

- 7.62-mm SS77 machine gun

- 60-mm Mi infantry mortar

- 60-mm M2 rear-loading mortar (spare parts)

- 60-mm M4 patrol mortar series

- 81-mm M3 mortar

Rapid-fire

- 20-mm Gl-2 cannon

- 20-mm GA-1 cannon

- 76-mm rapid-fire cannon barrel assembly

Artillery

- 90-mra Defa armored cannon

- 105-mm Olifant barrel assembly and conversion

- 155-mm GV5 drawn artillery cannon

- 155-mm GV6 self-propelled gun

- combat turrets

Miscellaneous

- SA Navy spare parts requirement

- SA Air Force requirements

LIW's products are designed, produced and maintained according to the most

modern quality concepts and standards. LEW can be considered one of the

pioneers in the Armscor group in this field. This has been endorsed by Mr

P.A.R. Erasmus, Armscor's former general manager for quality, who on occasion

described LEW as the "dean of quality in the Armscor group." However, like

all credible companies, LIW had to learn from its mistakes and the school of

hard knocks. An upgrading in the quality of production, among other things,

was undertaken by Mr Deneys Zeederberg shortly after his apppointment as

general manager of LIW. This resulted in a quality improvement project called

Regberg. The more than 2,000 characteristics of the R4 rifle were among the

first to be put under the magnifying glass during this project. Project teams

were assigned and use was made of the most modern quality engineering

techniques and statistical methods to reach the goal. Jigs and gauges were

redesigned and employees from the production floor themselves got the

opportunity to solve the problems. The project broadened out further into a

streamlining in organizing responsibilities and duties of personnel.

Intensive quality training was given to LIW's employees as well as to

suppliers and subcontractors, and the success achieved by this has been

recognized nationwide by visitors as a giant breakthrough in quality. The

good result is an increase in reliability of the already highly performing RF

rifle, a decrease in price rises of small arms, renewed motivation and zeal

among employees and an improvement in the company's self-image. Armscor

congratuled LIW on the pioneering work which has been done to reach the

highest possible standard of quality — which points out LIW's total capacity

as designer, manufacturer, production supporter and technical adviser to users

of arms.

106
Artillery, >G'S DESCRIBED

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans Jul/Aug 86 p 13

[Unattritouted article: "A Few Products Viewed More Closely"]

[Text] GV5 — The success story of that gun system of 155 mm is already

legion, and it is known as a world leader in its class. The GV5 can be

employed in all three basic artillery functions; namely: fire attack,

cx)unterbambardment and fire support. It can be employed in the operational

sphere as a cannon, howitzer and mortar. The GV5's maximum range is 39.5 km.

The maximum rate of fire is three rounds per minute for 15 minutes, with a

normal rate of fire of one round per minute.

GV6 — is a doughtier little brother of the G5, with the same ballistic

system, which is mounted in an armored turret on a mobile chassis with six

wheels. The weapon, which is regarded as a breakthrough in artillery warfare,

was described at the time of its introduction in 1982 by General Magnus Malan,

minister of defense, as the most sophisticated weapon which has yet come from

the Armscor stable. The big advantage of the GV6 is its strategic, tactical

and inherent mobility which makes the weapon system so unique.

MG-4 — is manufactured according to an applied design of the Browning machine

gun and is a heavy-duty mounted machine gun which is used mainly as secondary

armament in armored and mechanized vehicles. The MG-4 double mounting with a

firepower of 1,300 rounds per minute can be regarded as the enemy's match.

SS-77 — This light, multipurpose machine gun is extremely suitable for use by

foot soldiers, paratroopers and vehicle personnel. It can even be mounted on

armored vehicles and in airplanes. The machine gun can fire between 600 and

900 rounds per minute with a NATO caliber of 7.62 mm.

13084

CSO: 3401/19 - END -

107