1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0046n.06 F iled: Janu ary 18, 2007 No. 05-4388 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. KEV IN G RA NT , Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Be for e : M AR TIN , N OR RI S, a nd G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Def endant- Appellant Kevin Grant (“ Gra nt”) pled g uilty

to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) , 1956(h) and 21 U.S.C. § 848. Following entry of his ple a and a hear ing, the district c ourt sentenc ed Gra nt to twenty -five y ear s in pr ison, the minim um sentenc e that the district cour t could, by

statute, impos e. C l ai m i n g that the g overnme nt lacked a sufficie nt fac tual basis for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) a s require d under F ed. R. Crim. Proc. 11(b)( 3), Gra

nt seeks to have his plea and se ntence on that char g e vac ated. Gr ant also see ks vacatur of his sentenc e for the remaining convictions, claiming that the district court improper ly calc ulated the applica

ble sentenc ing r ang e under the United States Sentenc ing G uidel i n es . Finally , Gra nt claims that his counsel wa s ineffe ctive in advising him about his g uilty plea to the § 924(c) violation2

and duringthe sentenc ing he aring . For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgme nt and sentenc e of the district cour

t. I. On April 15, 2005, Gra

n t p l ed gu i l t y to three separ ate offe nses: (1) conspirac y to launder
mon e y in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 56 (h ); (2 ) o pe ratio n of a c on tin uin g c ri min a l e nte rp ri se in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 8 48; and (3) posse ssion of a fire arm in fur thera nce of a drugtraff

icking offe nse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Following entry

of his plea, the Probation Depa rtment compiled a Presentence I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”). The PSRassig ned Gr ant a total off ense le vel of 37 a

nd place d hi m i n Criminal History Categ ory V. As a result, the Guidelines called for 324 to 405 months i mprisonment. Under t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a tu t e s , t h e m i n i m u m s e n t e n c e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtc o u l d h a v e i mp o s e d

i s t w e n t yfive y ear s: twenty

y ear s for the c ontinuing cr iminal enterprise count an d fi ve y ear s, to be serve d
consec utively , for the f

irea rm violation. See 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (A )( i) , ( c )( 1) (D )( ii) ; 21 U. S.C. § 848(a) . The money

launder ing statute has no statutory minimum

. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). On Octobe r 6, 2005, the dist rict court, following a hearing , sentenc ed Gr ant to twenty -five y ear s in prison. II. A. Gra nt first challeng es the dist rict court’s acc eptanc e of his plea of g uilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He argues that the district cour t violated Fe d. R. Crim. Proc. 11(b)(3) by acc epting his g uil ty ple a wi th a n in su ff ic ie nt f a c tua l bas is. We re vie w a dist ri c t court ’s c omp lia

nc e wi th R

ule 11 for abuse of discretion. Un ite d S tat es v . B e nn e tt , 2 9 1 F
. 3 d

8 8 8 , 8 9 4 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 )

. S p e c i f i c a l l y,3

with respec t to the “f

ac t ual basis” r equire ment, “the e x act method of producinga fa ctual basis on the re c or d is su

bje c t to a fl e xible sta

nd ard of re vie w, [but ] the ne e d to have so me fa c tua l ba sis [is] a rule subject to no exceptions.” United States v. Turner , 272 F.3d 380, 384 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The district court must satisfy itself that there is a fa ctual basis to support
eac h element of

the cr ime to wh ich the def endant se eks to enter

a g uilty plea. United States v. Tunning , 69 F.3d 107, 112 ( 6th Cir. 1995). During his Rule 11 hearing , Gra nt pled g u i l t y

to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A)

. Specifica lly , the indictment char g ed Gr ant with the possession of a firea rm in f urthera nce of a drug tr a ff ic kin g c rime. Th e re le va nt p or tio n o f § 92 4( c )( 1) (A ) d e fi ne s tw o s e pa rate of fe ns e s: the fi rs t criminalizes c arr

y ing or using a firea

rm during and in r elation to a drug traff icking o ff

en s e (the “use/c arr y ” off ense) , and the second cr iminaliz es possession of a f irea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime ( the “possession” of fense ). United States v. Combs , 369 F.3d 925, 932 ( 6th Cir. 2 004). Eac h crime r equire s differ ent proof. Id. Wi th r e s p e c t to th e p o s s e s s ion crime, the g overnme nt must show that the “firea rm was possesse d to advanc e or pr omote the commission of the under ly ing [drugtraff icking ] offense.” Id. at9 3 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Mac key , 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001)). There must be “a s pecif ic nexus between the [poss ession of] the gun a nd the cr ime char g ed.” Mack ey , 265 F.3d at 462. Thus, the g overnme nt must have been able to prove thr e e e sse nti a l e le me nts to e sta bli sh Gr ant’ s g uil t un de r § 92 4( c )( 1) (A ): (1 ) po sse ssi on of a fi re arm ; (2) c ommissi on of a dr

ug traff icking offe nse; and (3) a spec ific nexus between that possession and the re levant drugtraff

icking offe nse. There can be littl e doubt as to the suff iciency of the fac tual basis for the § 924(c) plea. The g overnme nt was pre pare d to prese nt evidenc e that on Aug ust 27, 2004, g overnme nt ag ents executedGra nt also relies on the Supre me Court’s dec ision in United States v. Bailey , 516 U.S. 137 1 (1995), f or the proposition that something mor e than possession of a firea rm must be shown in order to support a conviction under § 9 2 4(c) (1)( A). While this is a cor rec t rea ding of Bailey , Bailey a dd re sse s o nly

the us e /c arr

y of fe ns e . Co ng re ss a dd e d th e po sse ssi on of fe ns e to § 92 4( c)(1 )(A ) i n response to Bailey

. T h e n ex u s require ment identified by this court in Mack

ey and Combs is the showing require d in addition to possession for the possession offense

. 4 a se arch w arran t on Gr ant’ s r e sid e nc e and fo un d a 9 mm pis tol and

a mmunit ion

in a be dr oo m in which 168.8 g rams of he roin wer e also found. Mor eover , thr o u gh electronic surve illance, the g overnme nt was able to rec ord a c onversation in which Gra nt r efe rre d to his possession of a fire arm
a s a me ans of pr ov idi nghim se lf

pr ote c tio n w hil e he wa s e ng a g e d in the dr ugtr a ff ic kin g bu sin e ss. The fa ctual re cord be fore the district court c lear ly showed that the g overnme nt was in a position t o prove that Grant possesse d a fire arm wi t h t h e go al of fur thering his drug traff

icking business. His statement that the g un was intende d to provide protec tion as he e n gage d i n drug transac tions c lear ly satisfies the nexus re quirement established by this circuit for a § 924(c) (1)( A) possession conviction. No furthe r showing need ha ve bee n made. Ac cording ly , the district court did not abuse its d i s cr et i o n in finding that there w as a suf ficient fa ctual basis to support Gra nt’s g uilty plea. Gr ant a rgue s th e re c or d is ins uf

fi c ie nt to pr ov ide the ne c e ssa ry fa c tua l ba sis . T he c ru x of h is argument is that mere possession of a fire arm is insufficie nt to support a conviction under § 92 4( c )( 1) (A ) a

nd that the g ov e rnme nt mus t be ab le to sho w that th e fi re arm wa s u se d d

ur ingand in
re la tio n to a dru g tr a ff

ic kin g of fe ns e . Ho we ve r, thi s a dd iti on a l sh ow ingis r e qu ir e d o nly to e sta bli sh

a violation of

the “use /car

ry ” off ense. Gra

nt pled g uilty

to the possession crime, and his relianc e 1 on authority

that addre sses the use/ca rry offe nse is misplaced. B.5

Gr ant n e xt ch a lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Gu ide lin e s c a lc ulatio ns . We ne e d no t a dd re ss t his issue beca

use any alleg ed er ro rs in the Guidelines we re ha rmless as Gr ant re ceive d the minimum sentenc e author ized by

statute. Cf. United States v. Goliday , 145 F. App’x 502, 507 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting there was no ne ed to re mand for a Bo ok e r err or whe re the defe ndant re ceive d the minimum statut or y se nte nc e ); United States v. Johnson , 129 F. App’ x 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005) (same ). C. Finally , Gra n t argue s that his § 924(c)( 1)(A) conviction and e ntire sentenc e should be set

a s i d e b e c a

u s e h e r e c e i v e d

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y i n e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t an c e o f c o u n s e l a s d e f i n e d b y Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Such claims are g ener ally inappropriate for r esolution on direct

a pp e a l be c a

us e the ne c e ssa

ry fa c tua l re c or d wi ll of

te n be ina de qu a te . In a dd iti on , a pp e llate c ourt s
are g ener ally

not as well-e quipped as trial c ourts to co n d u ct t h e n ece ssary fac tfinding. See, e .g., United St ates v. Neuhausser , 241 F.3d 460, 474 (6th Cir. 2001). We see no r eason to de viate fr om thi s g e ne ra l r

ule he re and

the re fo re de c lin e to r e vie w G ra nt’ s Strickland claims at this time. III
. For t he fo regoi ng reas on s, we aff ir m t he j ud gment andsen ten ce ren dere d b y th e di st ri ct c ou

rt
.