E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATION

B OARD

SAFE T Y

N 

 National Transportation Safety Board

 Washington, D.C. 20594

 Highway Accident Brief

This brief discusses two rear-end, chain-reaction collisions that occurred at the same 

location near North Hudson, New York. The first accident took place on February 22, 2004, and 

will be referred to as North Hudson I. The second accident, which will be referred to as 

North Hudson II, occurred on September 19, 2004. 

North Hudson I Accident Facts 

Accident No.: HWY-04-FH-015 

Accident Type: Rear-end, chain-reaction collision 

Location: Interstate Highway 87, near North Hudson, New York 

Date and Time: February 22, 2004, about 2:40 p.m. 

Vehicle 1: 1998 Prevost/Volvo 58-passenger motorcoach 

 Owner 1: AutoBus Bell Horizon, Incorporated 

 Injuries 1: 8 serious, 39 minor; 1 not injured 

Vehicle 2: 1997 Kenworth truck-tractor with 2003 Manac semitrailer 

 Owner 2: Serge Lemay, Incorporated 

 Injuries 2: None 

Vehicle 3: 2003 Chevrolet Tahoe sport utility vehicle 

 Owner 3: Private owner 

 Injuries 3: 4 minor 

Vehicle 4: 1992 Chevrolet Corsica 4-door sedan 

 Owner 4: Private owner 

 Injuries 4: 2 minor; 1 not injured 

North Hudson I Accident Description 

On February 22, 2004, about 2:40 p.m., personnel from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), were conducting an immigration checkpoint on 

Interstate 87 (I-87) near North Hudson, New York, about 74 miles south of the Canadian border. 

Checkpoint operations required vehicles in both southbound traffic lanes to stop for an 

inspection and a brief driver interview. As a result, traffic became congested on I-87 southbound 

and had backed up approximately 900 feet north of the checkpoint. Two passenger vehicles 

followed by a Kenworth combination unit were stopped at the end of the queue in the right lane. 

Meanwhile, a 1998 Prevost motorcoach carrying 47 passengers was approaching the area 

of congested traffic at a recorded speed of 64 mph1

 in the posted 65-mph zone. The motorcoach 

had departed earlier that day on a planned 2-day trip from St. Leonard díAston,2

 Quebec, to 

 1

 Obtained from a postaccident examination of the data recorded by the motorcoachís Detroit Diesel DDEC 

IV electronic engine recorder. 

2

 St. Leonard díAston is a municipality in southern Quebec located about halfway between Quebec City 

and Montreal, Quebec. 

1 NTSB/HAB-05/03 
2 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

 

Miami, Florida. The operator, a Canadian national with 15 years of driving experience, 

held a valid commercial driverís license (CDL)3 and began driving that morning at 8:15 a.m. 

The roadway was dry and clear, and, despite an overcast sky, visibility was good. The bus driver 

stated that when he first saw the rear of the Kenworth tractor-semitrailer, he thought that he was 

slowly catching up to it. He said he then momentarily looked in his rear view mirrors and, upon 

looking ahead, saw that he was rapidly advancing on the trailer. He said that he did not see any 

brake lights on the back of the trailer. Once he realized the trailer was not moving, the bus driver 

made a hard brake application to avoid colliding with the stopped combination unit. After 

skidding for 123 feet, the driver said he could not slow his vehicle in time to avoid the collision 

and swerved to the left as the motorcoach struck the rear of the Kenworth tractor-semitrailer. 

From the impact area, the Kenworth tractor-semitrailer was pushed forward about 120 

feet, striking the rear of a 2003 Chevrolet sport utility vehicle and pushing it into the rear of a 

1992 Chevrolet passenger car. 

Eight motorcoach passengers sustained serious injuries. The driver and 38 passengers 

sustained minor injuries while one passenger was not injured. The driver of the combination 

vehicle was not injured. Of the seven occupants in the two passenger vehicles, six sustained 

minor injuries and one was not injured. 

North Hudson II Accident Facts 

Accident No.: HWY-04-MH-038 

Accident Type: Rear-end, chain-reaction collision 

Location: Interstate Highway 87 at reference marker 1188, near North Hudson, 

New York 

Date and Time: September 19, 2004, about 2:26 p.m. 

Vehicle 1: 2004 Peterbilt truck-tractor with 1978 Strick container chassis trailer 

 Owner 1: Transport L.F.L., Inc., Vallee-Jonction, Quebec, Canada 

 Injuries 1: 1 serious 

Vehicle 2: 1990 Honda Accord 4-door sedan 

 Owner 2: Private owner 

 Injuries 2: 3 fatal 

Vehicle 3: 1999 GMC Sierra pickup truck 

 Owner 3: Private owner 

 Injuries 3: 1 serious 

Vehicle 4: 1994 GMC pickup truck with 1983 Nomad camper trailer 

 Owner 4: Private owner 

 Injuries 4: 1 fatal; 1 serious 

Vehicle 5: 1994 Peterbilt truck-tractor semitrailer 

 Owner 5: B & B Global Logistics, Inc., Greenfield Park, Quebec, Canada 

 Injuries 5: None 

3

 Canadian CDL requirements are similar to U.S. CDL requirements except that Canadian applicants must 

physically inspect a vehicle during the road test (U.S. applicants need only answer questions regarding the 

inspection process). Further, unlike U.S. applicants, Canadian applicants must drive with a learnerís permit for at 

least 3 months before the final CDL is issued, which entails restrictions such as only driving when accompanied by 

a 2-year licensed CDL driver and completing training that includes 300 hours of driving a tractor-semitrailer on a 

public roadway. 
3 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

 

North Hudson II Accident Description 

On September 19, 2004, about 2:26 p.m., personnel from the USBP were again 

conducting an immigration checkpoint on I-87 near North Hudson, New York, about 74 miles 

south of the Canadian border. Checkpoint operations required vehicles in both southbound traffic 

lanes to stop for an inspection and a brief driver interview. As a result, traffic became congested 

on I-87 southbound and had backed up approximately 807 feet north of the checkpoint. A 1994 

Peterbilt combination unit and three passenger vehicles were stopped at the end of the queue in 

the right lane. 

A 2004 Peterbilt truck-tractor, in combination with a 40-foot container chassis 

semitrailer, loaded with aluminum wire and operated by a 48-year-old truck driver, was 

approaching the checkpoint at a recorded speed of 59 mph4 in the posted 65-mph zone. The 

truck driver, a Canadian national, had departed Boucherville, Quebec, about 11:30 a.m. and had 

driven about 135 miles of an approximate 560-mile trip to York, Pennsylvania. He had driven 

this trip twice weekly since November 2003, using this same route on I-87 through northern 

New York. Reaching the queue of stopped vehicles at the checkpoint, the combination unit failed 

to stop and collided with a 1990 Honda passenger car. The Honda was pushed underneath a 1999 

GMC pickup truck. The pickup truck was pushed off to the right, traveling about 100 feet, where 

it came to rest facing northbound off the west side of the interstate. The Honda continued 

forward and to the right, coming to rest approximately 94 feet from the impact area. The 2004 

Peterbilt truck-tractor continued forward and collided with a 1994 GMC pickup truck that was 

towing a 29-foot Nomad camper trailer. The 1994 GMC pickup truck was pushed forward 

approximately 100 feet and came to rest at the right side of the 2004 Peterbilt truck-tractor. The 

2004 Peterbilt combination unit that initiated the accident sequence traveled approximately 173 

feet from the initial impact with the traffic queue to where it stopped in the roadway against the 

back of a 1994 Peterbilt combination unit. A postaccident fire burned the 1990 Honda, the 1994 

GMC pickup truck and camper trailer, and the accident vehicle. 

The occupants of the Honda were fatally injured; the driver of the 1994 GMC pickup 

truck was fatally injured. A passenger in the 1994 GMC pickup truck, the driver of the 1999 

GMC pickup truck, and the driver of the 2004 Peterbilt truck-tractor all sustained serious 

injuries. The driver of the 1994 Peterbilt combination unit was not injured. 

USBP Checkpoint Operations 

In addition to the fixed inspection stations located along the international boundaries of 

the United States, the USBP employs other checkpoints5 within the zone of security to prevent 

the entry of illegal persons and drugs. (The zone of security, as defined by the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, extends inward for 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United 

States.) These checkpoints are in use in California, New York, Texas, and Vermont, with an 

additional checkpoint planned for Washington State. The USBP first began conducting 24-hour 

4

 The Engine Control Module (ECM) of the 2004 Peterbilt truck-tractorís Caterpillar engine had recording 

capabilities for quick-stop events (those exceeding 9 mph/second). The ECM data showed that the vehicle was 

traveling 59 mph for several seconds before its rapid deceleration (impact) and that the brake had not been applied 

for 15 seconds before impact. 

5

 The USBP refers to these checkpoints as ìtactical deployment mobile stations.î 
4 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

checkpoint operations along I-87 in the North Hudson area in 1988. Initially, they were 

planned as short-term operations, lasting for 4 to 5 consecutive days and typically occurring less 

than six times during any given year. On December 29, 2003, in response to an elevated threat of 

terrorist activities, the USBP instituted a continuous operation in the North Hudson area 

designed to provide 24-hour coverage year-round. 

The North Hudson checkpoint was situated within the southbound lanes of I-87 at the 

entrance to the High Peaks rest area. From this location, Border Patrol agents stopped all 

interstate traffic while conducting preliminary inspections and interviews with motorists. 

According to the USBP, agents required about 10 seconds, on average, to conduct each vehicle 

inspection. For more thorough examinations, vehicles were directed out of the traffic flow and 

into the rest area. 

Checkpoint Traffic Control Devices 

Besides the USBP checkpoint, the New York State Police (NYSP) also used the High 

Peaks rest area for commercial vehicle inspection and enforcement activities. The various uses of 

this facility resulted in a mixture of signs and flashing beacons being posted along the 

southbound interstate approaching the rest area. These signs included: 1) service signs notifying 

motorists of the rest area; 2) regulatory signs for vehicle speed, lane usage, and prohibited 

turning movements; and 3) warning signs regarding vehicle inspections and the requirement for 

vehicles to stop. (See figure 1.) Of the 12 signs posted in the 4 miles preceding the accident 

location, none gave specific notice of the USBP checkpoint. 

Approximately 0.9 mile before the checkpoint, a sign displayed the message ìVehicle 

Inspection Ahead When Flashing.î This sign was used in combination with a flashing beacon, 

which was not flashing at the time of the North Hudson I accident but was at the time of the 

North Hudson II accident. Following this sign, 0.6 mile before the checkpoint, were a pair of 

ìStop Aheadî warning signs; slightly less than 0.1 mile later, approximately 0.5 mile from the 

checkpoint, motorists encountered a sign with the message ìTrucks Must Stop When Flashing.î 

Unlike the first sign, the flashing beacon for this sign was working when the North Hudson I 

accident occurred. With the exception of the ìAll Trucks When Flashingî sign and another pair 

of ìStop Aheadî signs, all signs incorporating flashing beacons were located on the approach to 

the checkpoint before the collision site; the remaining signage was used to regulate vehicle lane 

position. 

After the February accident, the USBP and the New York State Department of 

Transportation (NYSDOT) added signage along the approach to the checkpoint as follows: 

• Changeable message sign that alternated between ìReduce Speedî and ìStop Aheadî 

(in median 4,780 feet before the checkpoint). 

• ìTraffic Stopped Aheadî sign (on right side of road and median 3,770 feet before the 

checkpoint).

• ìReduce Speedî sign (on right side of road and median 2,330 feet before the 

checkpoint).

• ìBe Prepared to Stopî sign (on right side of road and median 913 feet before the 

checkpoint).
5 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

Figure 1. Signage at approach to USBP checkpoint on February 22, 2004. 
6 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

The additional signage increased the number of signs to at least 25, none of which gave 

specific notice of the USBP checkpoint. (See figure 2.) 

Figure 2. Signage at approach to USBP checkpoint on September 19, 2004. 
7 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

Following the September accident, the USBP and the NYSDOT again added signage, 

bringing the total number of signs on the approach to the checkpoint to 29. The additional 

signage included the following: 

• Changeable message sign that alternates between ìBe Prepared to Stopî and 

ìStopped Traffic Aheadî (in median 2.6 miles prior to checkpoint). 

• ìSpeed Zone Aheadî sign (on right side of road and median 2.2 miles prior to 

checkpoint). 

• ìSpeed Limit 45î sign (on right side of road and median 2.0 miles, 1.8 miles, and 1.2 

miles prior to checkpoint). 

• Changeable message sign that alternates between ìSpeed Limit 45 MPHî and ìYour 

Speed ___ MPHî (in median 1.1 miles prior to checkpoint). 

• ìSpeed Limit 30î sign (on right side of road and median 3,300 feet and 2,138 feet 

prior to checkpoint). 

• Symbol sign for stop ahead (on right side of road and median 3,036 feet prior to 

checkpoint). 

In November 2004, the NYSDOT installed five sets of rumble strips about 1 mile before 

the checkpoint. The rumble strips and additional signage created a speed zone in which drivers 

must reduce their speed on approach to the USBP checkpoint but established no clear warning of 

the checkpointóthe reason vehicles would be stopped on the roadway ahead. (See figure 3.) 
8 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

Figure 3. Signage at approach to USBP checkpoint after September 22, 2004.
9 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

Guidance for Advance Warning Traffic Control Devices 

The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) is the primary source of 

guidance used by transportation officials in establishing traffic control devices. Section 1A.02 of 

the MUTCD states that effective traffic control devices must fulfill a need; command attention; 

convey a clear, simple meaning; command respect from road users; and give adequate time for a 

proper response. The MUTCD addresses temporary traffic control (TTC) for use in work zones 

and in response to highway incidents but does not contain information specific to checkpoint 

operations on interstates. In August 1998, USBP personnel created initial TTC plans designating 

the type and placement of traffic control devices to be used before and at the checkpoint. The 

NYSDOT subsequently made several changes to the proposed plans, as shown in the table that 

follows, intended primarily to ensure that the wording used on the warning signs complied with 

New York State Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices guidelines. Additionally, the 

NYSDOT eliminated the proposed use of nonconforming flashing lights6 contained in the 

original proposal. 

Initial TTC plan developed by 

the USBP 

NYSDOT changes Approximate distance from 

checkpoint

Top lights (emergency ìpoliceî 

flashersóstrobe) 

Removed 3,000 feet 

Stop Ahead [No change] 2,450 feet 

Use Both Lanes Use Two Lanes 1,850 feet 

Slow Stay in Your Lane Stay in Lane 1,250 feet 

Slow No Passing Do Not Pass 750 feet 

Stop Ahead [No change] 400 feet 

Stop Signs and Red Light Stop Location of Border Patrol 

checkpoint 

Once the USBP plan was approved in September 1998, the TTC plan for the checkpoint 

was applied to three existing NYSDOT signs installed for NYSP commercial vehicle 

inspections. As a result, the NYSDOT reworded the existing ìTruck Inspection Ahead When 

Flashingî sign to read ìVehicle Inspection Ahead When Flashing.î The other signs specific to 

the NYSP commercial vehicle inspections, ìTrucks Must Stop When Flashingî and ìAll Trucks 

When Flashing,î were left unchanged. 

Although ìStop Ahead,î ìReduce Speed,î and speed limit signs were added to the TTC 

after the February and September 2004 accidents, motorists approaching the checkpoint had no 

clear advance warning that all vehicles, not just trucks, would be required to stop. 

Prior Incidents at the North Hudson Checkpoint 

Police accident reports from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles showed 

that four minor, noninjury accidents had occurred at the North Hudson checkpoint in the 

2 months from the time the USBP shifted to 24-hour/7-day-a-week coverage on December 29, 

2003, until the February 22, 2004, accident. On January 6, 2004, a rear-end accident occurred 

before the entrance of the coned checkpoint area. On January 17, 2004, a vehicle entered the 

checkpoint at a high rate of speed; the driver applied the brakes, causing the vehicle to skid and 

 6

 These included post-mounted yellow, red, and blue police-style strobe lights to be erected about 3,000 

feet north of the checkpoint and a red light at checkpoint stop signs. 
10 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

knock down 10 cones and a USBP emergency light. On January 19, 2004, a rear-end accident 

occurred when a vehicle collided with another vehicle already stopped at the checkpoint. On 

February 6, 2004, a vehicle lost control and veered off the right shoulder, striking a snowbank 

and going over the top of the guiderail cables. The report from the January 6 accident stated that 

all traffic controls were in effect and functioning prior to the checkpoint location; the subsequent 

reports did not mention the condition of the traffic controls. 

North Hudson II Peterbilt Truck Driver Information 

On March 9, 2005, the Peterbilt truck driver from the North Hudson II accident 

underwent a polysomnography (sleep study) at the Laboratoire MÈdical Biron in St. Lambert, 

Quebec, Canada. The study, which consisted of a questionnaire and 7.5 hours of data recording, 

showed that the driver had mild obstructive sleep apnea and alveolar hypoventilation syndrome 

of the obese, also known as obesity-hypoventilation syndrome. Obesity-hypoventilation 

syndrome, often associated with mild or moderate sleep apnea, is seen in obese individuals who 

do not respond to increased blood carbon dioxide levels with increased respiration sufficient to 

maintain normal low blood carbon dioxide and high blood oxygen levels.7

 This condition can 

cause hypoxia (oxygen deprivation), which may considerably degrade cognitive functioning. The 

results of the study were also consistent with sleep deprivation. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of these 

accidents was the failure of the United States Border Patrol and the New York State Department 

of Transportation to provide adequate warning of the checkpointís presence in the southbound 

lanes of the interstate and to convey a clear, simple message that all vehicular traffic would be 

required to stop for the checkpoint. Contributing to the North Hudson I accident was the failure 

of the motorcoach driver to identify the excessive closure rate between his vehicle and the 

slowed or stopped traffic at the end of the queue. Contributing to the North Hudson II accident 

was the truck driverís failure to react to the line of stopped vehicles at the checkpoint, most 

likely caused by degraded cognitive functioning as a result of his obesity-hypoventilation 

syndrome and sleep deprivation. 

Previously Issued Recommendations 

As a result of the North Hudson I and II accidents, the National Transportation Safety 

Board issued the following recommendations on October 21, 2004, to the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA): 

H-04-32

Assist the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in immediately developing 

comprehensive traffic control guidelines specifically tailored to U.S. Border 

Patrol checkpoints located on high-speed arterial roadways. (Urgent) 

 7

 E.A. Philipson, ìDisorders of Ventilation,î Harrisonís Principles of Internal Medicine, 16th edition, ed. 

Dennis L. Kasper and others (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), chapter 246. 
11 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

H-04-33

Incorporate, in cooperation with the American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials, the guidelines referred to in Safety Recommendation 

H-04-32 into the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. 

Safety Recommendations H-04-32 and -33 were classified ìOpenóAcceptable 

Responseî on March 18, 2005. 

As a result of the North Hudson I and II accidents, the National Transportation Safety 

Board issued the following recommendation on October 21, 2004, to the U.S. Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection: 

H-04-34

Assist the Federal Highway Administration and the American Association of 

State Highway and Transportation Officials in immediately developing 

comprehensive traffic control guidelines specifically tailored to U.S. Border 

Patrol checkpoints located on high-speed arterial roadways and use those 

guidelines, once developed, as a basis for implementing traffic control at 

checkpoints nationwide. (Urgent)

Safety Recommendation H-04-34 was classified ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî on 

April 27, 2005. 

As a result of the North Hudson I and II accidents, the National Transportation Safety 

Board issued the following recommendations on October 21, 2004, to the American Association 

of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO): 

H-04-35

Immediately develop, with the assistance of the Federal Highway Administration 

and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, comprehensive traffic 

control guidelines specifically tailored to U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints located 

on high-speed arterial roadways. (Urgent)

H-04-36

Assist the Federal Highway Administration in incorporating the guidelines 

referred to in Safety Recommendation H-04-35 into the Manual on Uniform 

Traffic Control Devices. 

Safety Recommendations H-04-35 and -36 remain classified ìOpenóAwait Response.î 

Post-Recommendation Actions 

Since October 2004, the USBP has been coordinating with the FHWA and AASHTO to 

develop traffic control guidelines for USBP checkpoints. Specifically, the USBP, the NYSDOT, 

the NYSP, and the FHWA further refined the traffic controls on I-87 approaching the North 
12 NTSB/HAB-05/03 

Hudson checkpoint; many issues detailed in the Safety Boardís recommendations concerning 

the site have been addressed. Resulting improvements include the following: 

• Installation of rumble strips, speed limit signs, and electronic signs that notify 

motorists of their current speed. 

• Extension of checkpoint signage from 1 mile to 2.6 miles north of the I-87 

checkpoint. 

• Removal of signage considered excessive by the Safety Board from the current traffic 

control plan. 

• Increase in NYSP enforcement presence at the I-87 checkpoint to improve driver 

attention and reduce speeding. 

• Issuance of a directive by USBP headquarters to all USBP sectors that operate traffic 

checkpoints to coordinate with their respective State Departments of Transportation 

(DOTs) to ensure that all checkpoints are using the required traffic safety control 

devices in compliance with guidelines recommended by their State DOTs. 

AASHTO, the USBP, and the FHWA have also actively participated in a special task 

force to develop recommendations for traffic controls for Border Patrol checkpoints. As a result, 

in July 2005, the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices issued three typical 

application drawings and corresponding guidance for traffic controls at USBP traffic 

checkpoints. The Board is currently evaluating this guidance for its responsiveness to Safety 

Recommendations H-04-32 through -36. 

By 2007, the FHWA plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the 

MUTCD with new standards, guidance, and/or options for USBP high-speed arterial traffic 

checkpoints; the revised MUTCD is expected to be published in 2008. Additionally, a Traffic 

Safety Group has been established to address specific issues of joint concern, enhance national 

security efforts, and ensure the safety of the traveling public. 

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

MARK V. ROSENKER DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN 

Acting Chairman Member 

ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS 

Member 

Adopted: October 17, 2005