# Equatorial Guinea - United States Department of State

- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Equatorial Guinea																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Equatorial Guinea during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by or on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including censorship and enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.The government did not take steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.Throughout the year, there were anecdotal accounts of deaths in prison due to injuries inflicted by prison staff; no remedial action was taken.On January 17, local and international media reported Julio Obama Mefuman of the Movement for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea Third Republic (MLGE3R), an Equatoguinean political organization based in Spain, died in prison in Equatorial Guinea. In 2017, authorities convicted Obama Mefuman of attempting to overthrow the government, and he received a 60-year sentence. MLGE3R claimed security officials at Oveng Asem Prison tortured Obama Mefuman during his detention and he died as a result, but acknowledged he also had severe chronic illness exacerbated by his abuse in prison. Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Diaspora Simeon Oyono Angue stated during a national press conference that Obama Mefuman “died in Mongomo hospital following [an] illness.”In August and September, activists reported at least five youth arrested during the May 2022 street crime Operacion Limpieza (Operation Clean-Up) died in custody with marks of physical abuse evident on their bodies. When authorities asked families to identify the remains of their children, the families were allegedly often shown incorrect remains before the remains of their own children were presented to them.No office investigated the legality of security force killings.																																				b. Disappearance										In October, members of the political movement Citizens for Innovation (CI) reported authorities forcibly disappeared CI members during the previous 12 months. CI members were unable to contact their relatives or establish their relatives’ whereabouts or well-being, and estimated they were unable to account for between 20 and 50 CI members.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports government officials employed them. Police tortured activists, members of opposition parties, and former government officials accused of corruption, according to political opposition leaders and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Lawyers and other observers who visited prisons and jails reported serious abuses, including beatings, sleep deprivation, use of car batteries to shock and inflict pain, and withholding of food, liquids, and medical treatment.Police reportedly beat and threatened detainees to extract information or to force confessions. Local civil society organizations claimed security forces tortured detainees in every prison in the country, including Black Beach Prison in Malabo, the capital city, and in several Ministry of Interior locations, with increasing prisoner transfers between Malabo and prisons on the mainland to avoid domestic and international scrutiny.According to activist and lawyer Anacleto Micha, in May, authorities placed him in solitary confinement without electricity, food, or water for 13 days during his lengthy pretrial detention in the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations jail. After Micha’s conviction at trial, authorities moved him to Black Beach Prison in Malabo, where a national gendarme officer, nicknamed the “Iron Fist Sergeant” for his brutal beatings, stripped and beat Micha.Opposition groups reported credible allegations of torture by security forces against Spanish citizens.In January, the Spanish judicial system filed charges against three Equatoguinean officials, Nicholas Obama Nchama, Carmelo Ovono Obiang (also known as “Didi”), and Isaac Nguema Endo, for luring two Spanish citizens into South Sudan in 2018, where they were extraordinarily rendered to Malabo to face charges for allegedly participating in the 2017 coup plot against Obiang. According to the Spanish indictment, authorities allegedly tortured the two Spanish citizens in prison in Malabo.Police raped and sexually abused transgender women and girls in detention facilities, as well as lesbian or queer-presenting youth to “prove” the youth were women.Impunity was a significant problem within the security forces.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions.Abusive Physical Conditions: Prison cells were overcrowded, dirty, and lacked mattresses. Up to 30 detainees commonly shared one toilet that lacked toilet paper and a functioning door. Inmates rarely had access to exercise. Diseases such as COVID-19, malaria, typhoid, tuberculosis, hepatitis C, and HIV and AIDS were serious problems. Prison authorities sporadically provided a limited number of prisoners and detainees with basic meals, but food was generally insufficient and of poor quality. Jails did not provide food to detainees, but authorities generally allowed families and friends to deliver meals twice daily, although police did not always pass on the food to the detainees. Ventilation and lighting were not always adequate, and rodent infestations were common.Authorities kept prisoners confined in cells for long periods of time without access to movement or exercise, including keeping multiple prisoners in cells designed for solitary confinement. In some cases, prisoners were reportedly left in solitary confinement for extended periods.NGO leaders previously described conditions in mainland prisons as worse than conditions in Black Beach Prison, but civil rights activists using first-hand accounts of conditions in prisons concluded conditions were far worse in Black Beach, while treatment of prisoners was equally problematic in all prisons.Administration: Authorities did not regularly investigate credible allegations of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring: The government did not allow independent monitoring of prisons or detention centers.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government rarely observed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required arrest warrants unless a crime was in progress or in cases affecting national security. Members of the security forces frequently arrested persons in violation of the warrant requirement, and there were credible reports that in cases where no crime had been committed individuals were detained at the order of a senior executive branch official. A detainee had the right to a judicial determination of the legality of detention within 72 hours of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays, but this determination often took longer, sometimes several months. NGOs indicated most detainees were not charged and judges typically failed to issue a writ of habeas corpus within the 72-hour limit.Courts rarely approved bail. The bar association supplied public defenders to those who could not afford private counsel but only at the time they were charged. Authorities occasionally denied access to lawyers, particularly in the case of political detainees. The law prohibited incommunicado detention, but local police chiefs did not always respect this prohibition and individuals detained in connection with civil society groups or political opposition movements were frequently held incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reported cases of arbitrary arrests. The government arbitrarily arrested immigrants, opposition members, activists, and others. Many detainees complained bribes had to be paid to obtain release.Police detained foreign nationals and took them into custody even when they provided proper documentation. Police raided immigrant communities. Reliable sources reported police abused, extorted, or detained legal and irregular immigrants during raids. Diplomatic representatives in the country noted the government made foreign nationals vulnerable to abuse through harassment, abuse, extortion, detention, and not renewing residence and work permits in a timely manner.On February 9, authorities arrested two South African employees of an oil and gas servicing company, and despite insufficient evidence, charged them with drug trafficking offenses. Many commentators considered the arrests a retaliation by the vice president against South Africa. In early February, South African courts seized a yacht and two residences in Cape Town to pay a judgement against the vice president for arbitrarily detaining a South African businessperson in 2013.On August 16, authorities arrested writer, journalist, and activist Trifonia Melibea Obono on unspecified charges and detained her for several days after she published an article critical of the vice president and reportedly joined a civil society coalition led by a high-profile Equatoguinean former government official in Spain. Activists and commentators also attributed her detention to her work exposing alleged torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. Authorities later released her without charge.On June 6, President Obiang released 109 youth arrested during the May 2022 Operacion Limpieza for breaking curfew. Authorities held these youth in jails, prisons, and detention facilities for more than a year with no charges filed.Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem and was often politically motivated. Inefficient judicial procedures, corruption, lack of monitoring, and inadequate staffing contributed to the problem. While reliable statistics were lacking, pretrial detention reportedly equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime for a number of detainees.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law did not provide for an independent judiciary, and the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The president was designated the “first magistrate of the nation” and chair of the Judicial Council responsible for appointing judges and magistrates.Members of the government often influenced judges in sensitive cases. Judges and magistrates sometimes decided cases on political grounds, and many were members of the ruling party; others sought bribes. Impunity for politically motivated abuses was a problem, and human rights activists and opposition members had little legal recourse to protest such abuses. Authorities did not always respect court orders. There were reports of individuals kept in custody after completion of their sentences. Local lawyers asserted these cases represented interference from the highest level of the executive branch in judicial matters, and few if any judges would contradict an order from the executive branch.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair public trail, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right. Courts generally did not respect the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed promptly and in detail of charges, the right to free interpretation, or the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Unless defendants could afford private counsel, they were rarely able to consult promptly with attorneys. Courts seldom respected the right to confront and question witnesses and to present one’s own witnesses and evidence. Authorities did not respect the right not to be compelled to testify, or confess guilt, or the right to appeal.The military justice system provided defendants with fewer procedural safeguards than the criminal court system. The code of military justice stated a military tribunal should judge any civilian or member of the military who disobeyed a military authority or who was accused of committing a crime considered a “crime against the state.” A defendant in the military justice system could be tried in absentia, and the defense did not have the right to cross-examine an accuser. Such proceedings were not public, and defendants had no right of appeal to a higher court. The government prosecuted members of political movements and opposition groups in military courts.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were numerous reports of political prisoners or detainees, but no data was available on their number or length of detention; the government denied it held any political prisoners. Political prisoners were often held at Black Beach Prison, Oveng Asem Prison, or housing units converted into Ministry of Interior and Ministry of National Security detention facilities. These prisoners remained without charge or trial and without access to attorneys or human rights or humanitarian organizations for months at a time. They were also held in the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations jail – known in the country as Guantanamo – where sensitive political detainees were often kept for the first several days of their detention. There was little to no information regarding conditions at Guantanamo. Authorities also restricted religious observances for political prisoners.Charges of terrorism, threatening the president or vice president, contributing to social instability, and inciting unrest were often used as pretexts to detain members of civil society or opposition groups.Some activists and political opposition members arrested in September 2022 remained in prison, while authorities released others.In June, authorities sentenced the CI leader Gabriel Nze Obiang to 29 years in prison for his participation in an alleged terrorist plot in 2022, one widely believed to be fabricated to implicate him and CI in the run-up to the November 2022 elections. Other party members received sentences of between nine and 29 years’ for their alleged actions during the September 2022 police assault on CI’s headquarters. Activists and human rights observers characterized these convictions as politically motivated and designed to permanently sideline CI from domestic politics.																										f. Transnational Repression										Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: Local activists reported the government surveilled activists abroad to disrupt their travel and dissuade them from criticizing the government.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government routinely seized valuable land for governmental development or the personal benefit of government officials, with a systemic failure to provide proportionate and timely restitution or compensation for governmental takings of private property. In some cases, the government demolished private residences and businesses to clear land for government or personal projects.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, but the government often did not respect these prohibitions. Search warrants were required unless a crime was in progress or for reasons of national security, but security force members reportedly entered homes without required warrants and arrested alleged criminals, foreign nationals, and others. They also confiscated property and demanded bribes with impunity.Authorities reportedly monitored opposition members, NGOs, journalists, and foreign diplomats, including through internet and telephone surveillance. Members of civil society and opposition parties reported both covert and overt surveillance by security services. Many individuals assumed the government monitored their social media activity and their telephone calls. There were extensive reports of informer systems, including within families, neighborhood communities, and political opposition groups, and at demonstrations. The ruling party rewarded individuals with promotion within the party if they reported derogatory information to the Ministry of National Security. A local NGO reported authorities detained family members of LGBTQI+ individuals until the LGBTQI+ persons presented themselves to authorities to answer allegations of alleged offenses.In July, police raided the headquarters of an LGBTQI+ advocacy organization, home to some of its members, allegedly searching for drugs. Organization members reported police presented no warrant; unidentified officials claimed a warrant was unnecessary because the organization was unregistered.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Although the constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, the government retained and used extensive legal powers to restrict media activities.Freedom of Expression: Individuals generally chose not to criticize the president, his family, other high-ranking officials, and security forces due to the risk of reprisal. The government attempted to impede criticism by continuing to monitor the activities of opposition members and others. In some cases, authorities reprimanded individuals, removed them from their jobs, or both. Most individuals on social media assumed the government was monitoring their activity, and activists reported electronic surveillance of their personal email accounts. Many individuals avoided discussing certain sensitive topics on the telephone due to concerns of monitoring.Violence and Harassment: During the year no incidents were reported of security forces detaining journalists or intimidating or harassing them beyond monitoring their activities.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The law gave the government considerable authority to restrict media content through official prepublication censorship, and established criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for violation of its provisions. Activists and commentators reported media self-censorship.Media remained weak and under government influence or control. A limited number of independent media outlets were active and expressed a variety of views, but not without restriction. The country had one marginally independent newspaper that published sporadically, and an online news portal published articles including criticism of the government.The only publishing facility available to newspapers was located at the Ministry of Information, Press, and Radio, where officials censored printed materials.Print media outlets were extremely limited. Persons close to the president, including his son, the vice president, owned the few private media outlets; the vice president owned the only private broadcast media. Starting a newspaper was a complicated process governed by an ambiguous law and impeded by government bureaucracy; creating a digital presence was less onerous. Accreditation was cumbersome for both local and foreign journalists.The government owned the only national radio and television broadcast system. Journalists who worked for these entities could not report freely.The government denied or left pending requests by political parties to establish private radio stations.As all nonofficial foreigners needed visas to visit the country, the time-consuming nature of the process effectively dissuaded some foreign journalists from visiting. In other cases, the government prevented reporters from obtaining visas.Libel/Slander Laws: The government used criminal libel and slander laws to restrict public discussion.Actions to Expand Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media: Unlike in previous years, media products on some sensitive political topics, such as the military takeover in neighboring Gabon, remained posted and available for public consumption and interaction.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet and censored online content. Independent media outlet AhoraEG was accessible only through a virtual private network.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution and law provided for the right of peaceful assembly, but regulatory provisions effectively undermined this right, and the government routinely restricted freedom of assembly, including for political parties. For example, the government routinely rejected applications for permits to assemble. Permits were regularly issued only for gatherings in support of the ruling party. Civil society and political opposition members met infrequently, claiming any gathering of activists or individuals perceived to be engaged in political activities would be seen as suspicious, and authorities would harass or detain participants.If the government approved events or activities, it then used other tactics to delay or disrupt them. In July, for example, the government approved an event organized by the civil society platform Somos Mas (We Are More) to take place at a cultural center. When organizers arrived the day of the event, they found the cultural center closed for “repairs.”						Freedom of Association						The constitution and law provided for freedom of association, but the government severely restricted this right. All political parties, civil society organizations, and other associations had to register with the government, but the registration process was costly, burdensome, opaque, and slow.Politically motivated crackdowns on civil society organizations remained a problem, including the temporary detention of civil society activists without charge. The government was slow to authorize NGOs, especially those working in areas it considered sensitive, including human rights, those with members associated with opposition parties, or international NGOs from countries with whom the government had strained political relationships. The government restricted international organizations from working with unregistered organizations. Unregistered organizations reported vulnerability to harassment and intimidation from government officials or police because they were unregistered.Several prominent organizations remained unregistered despite years of requesting government approval. Other organizations reported they were able to register when they invited ministry participation and attendance, although they had to pay salaries or per diem to the attending officials. By law, the government had to approve organizations or activities within two months, but this was rarely followed.The law prohibited the formation of political parties along ethnic lines. Some parties were unable to register for years. Only one labor organization was believed to be registered.The law limited the amount of funding civil society organizations could receive from any source to approximately 53,000 CFA francs ($88) per year, but the restriction was not widely enforced.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government often restricted these rights. Multiple members of the opposition reported authorities delayed the renewal of their identity documents, effectively limiting their ability to travel within the country and abroad.In-country Movement: Police at roadblocks routinely checked travelers, and some engaged in petty extortion. The government also conducted frequent roundups of foreign nationals at roadblocks, claiming the need to counter irregular immigration, delinquent activities, and coup attempts. The government continued tight restrictions on interdistrict movement, nominally to prevent crime and detect illegal migration but used for extortion attempts and to threaten immigrants. Authorities sometimes exiled political opponents to their home villages.Foreign Travel: The passport application process was difficult and convoluted, with limited transparency, and authorities closed the passport issuing agency sporadically. Some observers believed authorities made the process deliberately difficult and closed the passport issuance agency to reduce emigration. Sometimes the government denied personal travel by individuals, including government officials, seeking urgent medical care. The government declined to issue a passport to activist and musician Adjonguening since 2018, and for CI leader Gabriel Nze Obiang since 2017. On September 19, a court banned Joaquin Elo Ayeto, a former political opposition member and founder of Somos Mas, from leaving the country.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government did not generally cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. There were no organizations that provided protection and assistance. UNHCR did not maintain an office in the country.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had not established a system for providing protection to refugees. The United Nations reported several cases of Cameroonians attempting to claim refugee status in the country but being unable to do so because of the lack of a refugee or asylum framework.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but the government severely limited this right.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to not be fair and free of abuses or irregularities.The November 2022 presidential and legislative elections were combined, contrary to the constitution, which required these elections be held separately. Voters were required to vote for the same party for presidential and legislative elections; there was no option to split their vote.In the months leading up to the presidential election, authorities closely monitored and tightly controlled public gatherings. Political parties required government authorization to hold rallies; the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) received preferential treatment.International observers noted significant irregularities and lack of transparency in the electoral process, particularly in rural mainland areas. Many voting booths were not secret; in some, poll workers could watch the voter cast their vote. In almost all polling places, heavily armed security forces sat within a few yards of registration tables. At some locations, voters cast votes on behalf of family members. In some precincts, poll workers instructed voters to only pick up PDGE ballots, handed voters ballot envelopes already containing PDGE ballots, altered the envelopes so they could see who voters had voted for, or wrote voters’ identification numbers on the ballot envelopes, which could allow election officials to later connect the ballot to the voter. There was one report from an opposition party that two of its supporters were refused their right to vote because of their political affiliation.Political Parties and Political Participation: The PDGE ruled through a complex network of family, clan, and ethnic relationships. Public-sector employees were pressured to join the PDGE and agree to garnishment of their salaries to fund PDGE activities. Party affiliation remained a key factor in obtaining government employment. The ruling party’s near monopoly on power, funding, and access to national media hampered opposition parties. The government subjected opposition members to arbitrary arrest and harassment before elections.Opposition members reported discrimination in hiring, job retention, and obtaining scholarships and business licenses.Registered opposition parties faced restrictions on freedom of speech, association, and assembly. For example, supporters who attended opposition political party campaign rallies were singled out for police interrogation and harassment. Some political parties that existed before the law establishing procedures to register political parties remained banned for allegedly “supporting terrorism.” The government required prior permission for public events, such as meetings in other venues or marches, and frequently denied the permit requests.Despite laws authorities stated were designed to facilitate the registration of political parties, the government prevented the registration of opposition parties. The government deregistered CI in 2018, and it remained suspended as a political party. Members of CI continued to face discrimination and harassment, including in the aftermath of the September 2022 police raid on their headquarters.The government generally restricted leadership positions in government to select PDGE members or members of a coalition of loyal parties that campaigned and voted with the PDGE.Participation of Women and Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Patriarchal cultural influences, including deferring social, financial, and political decision-making to the heads of families and clans who were always men, limited women’s political participation, especially in rural areas. Individuals reported instances of heads of families – all men – deciding how the family should vote and then casting votes for each individual family member for the party of his choosing.The government did not overtly limit minority participation in politics, but members of the Fang ethnic group occupied most of the top ranks. Estimated to constitute 80 percent of the population, the Fang group exercised dominant political and economic power. The law prohibited parties that were not national, eliminating opportunities for minority or regionally focused parties, although minorities were represented in most major parties, including the PDGE.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: Officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The president and members of his inner circle continued to amass personal fortunes from the revenues associated with monopolies on all domestic commercial ventures, as well as timber and oil exports. Corruption at all levels of government was a severe problem. Numerous foreign investigations continued into high-level official corruption.Government efforts to combat corruption reportedly returned nearly $1 million in seized assets to the treasury during the year. The vice president, however, directed many of the investigations, and according to many activists, conducted them for his individual political gain.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A small number of unregistered organizations operated with significant government restriction and were largely unable to monitor human rights conditions. When NGOs published allegations of government abuses of human rights, authorities harassed or intimidated them. The government was generally suspicious of human rights activities, claiming human rights concerns were largely prompted by antigovernment exile groups and hostile foreign NGOs who aimed to overthrow the government. Government officials were generally not cooperative or responsive to the views of human rights groups, although they cooperated in some areas. The government did not allow international NGOs access to the country to monitor human rights conditions.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: Government officials used media outlets to try to discredit civil society actors, categorizing them as supporters of the opposition and critics of the government. The few local activists who sought to address human rights risked intimidation, harassment, unlawful detention, and other reprisals. Many examples of arbitrary arrests and detentions, lack of fair trials, and political prisoners involved human rights defenders.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government rarely cooperated with UN offices to conduct monitoring activities and investigations. The government did not cooperate with other international human rights organizations.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Commission on Human Rights, which was part of the House of Representatives’ Committee for Complaints and Petitions, received citizen petitions. The commission was not fully operational, independent, or effective. An ombudsperson and a coordinator for the government’s efforts to combat trafficking in persons were also not fully operational or effective.Government officials responsible for addressing human rights problems functioned more to defend the government from accusations than to investigate human rights complaints or compile statistics.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape was illegal and punishable by 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines. The law did not address spousal rape or the gender of rape survivors. The government did not enforce the law effectively, in part due to reluctance of survivors and their families to report rape. Even when survivors reported rape, police and judicial officials were reluctant to act, particularly if alleged perpetrators were politically connected or members of the military or police. LGBTQI+ women and transgender men were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in the military, and these same groups reported abuse by their families or religious leaders, including rape as a form of so-called conversion therapy. Transgender persons reported harassment, rape, and sexual abuse in police custody.Domestic violence was illegal but commonly practiced. The penalty for assault ranged from one to 20 years’ imprisonment. Survivors were reluctant to report cases, and the government did not enforce the law effectively, with police and the judiciary reluctant to prosecute cases. Authorities generally treated domestic violence as a private matter to be resolved in the home, did not protect the anonymity of survivors, and often disclosed survivors’ whereabouts to their alleged abusers even when survivors sought refuge at government shelters. Prevalence of abuses was difficult to establish, as no statistics were available on prosecutions, convictions, or punishment.The government-controlled media sporadically broadcast public service announcements regarding domestic violence and trafficking in persons.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: In rural areas there were instances of levirate marriage, the practice by which a woman was required to marry her deceased husband’s brother, often against her will. Under such practice, women were not allowed to inherit their late husbands’ possessions. In some cases, large bride prices paid to a wife’s family made it difficult for women to leave their marriages. Despite the law’s requirement for an equitable division of assets, in the case of divorce traditional practices within the majority Fang ethnic group required reimbursement of the bride price and additional goods accrued during the marriage.Discrimination: While the constitution provided for equality between men and women, the law discriminated against women in matters of nationality (for example, it was easier for a man to pass citizenship to a foreign spouse than it was for a woman), real and personal property, and inheritance. The prevalence of negative stereotypes and adverse cultural norms and customs contributed to discrimination against women.Custom confined women in rural areas largely to traditional roles. Women in urban areas experienced less overt discrimination but did not enjoy pay or access to employment and credit on an equal basis with men. The country continued to have large gender gaps in education, equal pay, and employment opportunities. Deep-rooted stereotypes and ethnic traditions impeded women’s employment opportunities, and pregnant women faced additional barriers. Because of difficulties in the formal sector, women mostly worked in the informal sector, where they did not have access to benefits or social security. The lack of enforcement left women vulnerable to discrimination, but they rarely complained due to the risk of reprisals. There were no protections against sexual harassment in the workplace.LGBTQI+ women and women with disabilities faced significantly higher barriers to securing employment and addressing discrimination or harassment.The government did not effectively enforce constitutional provisions of equality.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Legal, social, and cultural barriers and government policies impeded access to sexual and reproductive health services, including for LGBTQI+ individuals.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors, including interviews and medical examinations at hospitals and clinics, although service providers had no specific training on handling sexual violence. Emergency contraception was not available as part of family planning method mix or the clinical management of rape cases. There was access to emergency health care but with limited access to postabortion care.According to the World Health Organization, in 2017, the most recent year for reliable statistics, the maternal mortality rate was 301 per 100,000 live births. Major factors affecting maternal mortality included poverty, poor medical training, and limited access to health care, especially in rural areas. Prenatal and obstetric care was free in government clinics but limited primarily to the cities of Malabo and Bata. The birth rate was 176 per 1,000 girls and women ages 15 to 19. Factors likely contributing to the high birth rate included cultural tolerance for childbirth out of wedlock, low access to sexual education and contraception in rural populations, and economic constraints increasing the risk of child, early, and forced marriages, unions, and other relationships for girls with older men.The Ministry of Education required teenage girls to take pregnancy tests, and those who tested positive were expelled from school.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law did not protect members of racial or ethnic minorities or groups from violence and discrimination.The predominant ethnic group, the Fang, dominated politics and the economy. Discrimination continued against a distinct ethnic group, the inhabitants of remote Annóbon island.																																				Children										Education: LGBTQI+ youth reported discrimination or exclusion from school by teachers and school administrators. Chores and work at home limited girls’ access to secondary education, especially in rural areas. Attention to school attendance generally focused more on citizen children than on their foreign resident peers.Child Abuse: Abuse of children was illegal, but the government did not enforce the law effectively. Corporal punishment was a common method of discipline, including in schools.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage was 14. Forced marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Gender Equality operated programs to deter child marriage but did not address forced marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Commercial sexual exploitation of children, including child sex trafficking, was illegal, but authorities generally did not identify nor prosecute offenders. The law addressed the sale, offering, or use of children, but not the grooming of children for commercial exploitation. It addressed child pornography. Antitrafficking provisions included sexual exploitation and pornography as examples of cases of trafficking-related crimes. The government sometimes enforced laws governing child pornography. The minimum age of sexual consent was 18.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community was small, likely fewer than 100 persons. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between civilian adults, but consensual same-sex sexual conduct was criminalized in the armed forces, as was LGBTQI+ identity. There were multiple reports of the military enforcing these prohibitions, and several women were convicted and serving sentences in military jails on conduct or gender identity charges. Laws on public delinquency, social disruption, or deviance were disproportionately and frequently applied against LGBQTI+ persons. There were no efforts to rescind discriminatory laws targeting LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment: Security forces reportedly subjected LGBTQI+ individuals to violence, including rape and other sexual violence, within the military and in jails and prisons. LGBTQI+ women and transgender men were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in the military. There were numerous reports of violence against lesbian women. LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations reported significant domestic violence. Because LGBTQI+ persons were often isolated from familial and social support, they were frequently homeless or hungry, leaving them vulnerable to acts of violence. Authorities did not investigate these abuses. There were no reliable statistics on the number of cases.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, except in the workplace. The workplace provision was not enforced. The law did not explicitly recognize LGBTQI+ couples or their families or grant them rights equal to the rights of other persons. The government made no effort to protect LGBTQI+ persons or to combat discrimination or stigma against them. There was significant discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in the workplace, leaving many financially vulnerable and exposed to trafficking or coerced into commercial sex work. Transgender women continued to face significant discrimination in employment, in treatment by security forces, and in detention.Stigmatization of and discrimination against the LGBTQI+ community was widespread, and nonstate support and recognition was extremely limited. Bisexual women’s sexuality, especially if they had children, was not acknowledged, including by the LGBTQI+ community, and they were subject to significant levels of exclusion. There was little to no societal recognition of transgender individuals, and there was significant cultural ignorance regarding the gender identity, expression, and experience of transgender individuals.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were reports of LGBTQI+ individuals being subjected to so-called conversion therapies through religious rituals and detentions. Reports included “corrective rape,” forced pregnancy, and forced child-rearing to try to “change” the sexual identity of lesbian and bisexual women and the gender identity of transgender men. Reports emerged of religious leaders who raped congregants in an attempt to change the survivors’ sexual orientation, or gender expression or identity. Religious organizations played important roles in coercive practices that caused families to seek “treatment” for LGBTQI+ family members.There was no information available concerning medically unnecessary surgery on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons. The government and medical associations made no effort to address or limit so-called conversion therapies or other abuses.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws or other restrictions on individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, but media and individuals often self-censored. There were no laws but there were restrictions on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private, form associations, or convene events. The government declined to register LGBTQI+ organizations, despite attempts by LGBTQI+ organizations to conform with the registration law.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, employment, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. There was no law requiring such access, except for new buildings. Authorities did not effectively enforce existing access requirements. The government did not provide information on disability concerns in accessible formats.Authorities did not investigate incidents of violence or other abuses against persons with disabilities.The law did not prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities. While the law required companies employing more than 50 employees hire a certain percentage of persons with disabilities, few if any did so, and the government did not enforce the law. Children with disabilities attended primary, secondary, and higher education, although generally no accommodations were made for their disabilities. A small number of private schools for children with disabilities operated with a combination of public and private funding.Persons with disabilities could vote and otherwise participate in civic affairs, but lack of physical access to buildings posed a barrier to full participation.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Foreigners were often victimized, including documented and irregular immigrants from Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and other African countries, who represented a significant portion of the labor force. The government required immigrants to have relevant documents, partly to address concerns regarding trafficking in persons, although police and gendarmes used documentation status to extort bribes from foreigners at routine traffic stops. The registration process was laborious and excessive, often resulting in foreigners failing to maintain legal status despite timely applications for appropriate documentation. In April, the government stopped processing residency permit applications, leaving immigrants and expatriate workers vulnerable to extortion, human trafficking, and harassment.In public speeches, President Obiang frequently referred to foreigners as security and terrorist threats and warned of a renewal of colonialism by foreign interests.There was stigma regarding persons with HIV and AIDS, and many individuals kept their illness hidden. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare estimated fewer than half of persons with HIV and AIDS sought treatment, and some persons likely avoided no-cost treatments because of associated social stigma.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided workers the right to establish unions, affiliate with unions of their choice, collectively bargain, and strike. The law also allowed unions to conduct activities without interference, but the government did not enforce this right. The law required a union to have at least 50 members from a workplace to register, however, effectively blocking most union formation. The government generally did not allow unions to organize. In view of the general absence of union recognition, there were no reports of government enforcement of laws respecting their establishment or operation.Authorities refused to recognize unions such as the Workers Union of Equatorial Guinea, Independent Service Union, Teachers’ Trade Union Association, and the Rural Workers Organization. Most often those seeking to organize were co-opted into existing political party structures by means of pressure and incentives.No law required the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity, although such dismissal could fall under wrongful termination. The government never authorized a strike.Penalties for violations of the freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike were commensurate with those for analogous crimes such as civil rights violations but were never enforced.Labor NGOs faced restrictions and were unable to operate.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all the worst forms of child labor. The law prohibited employment of children younger than age 18 in all sectors. With the authorization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and their parents or guardians, however, children between ages 16 and 18 could perform light work that did not interfere with their schooling. The minimum age for apprenticeships was 16.Children were permitted to work only during the day, and their workday was limited to six hours, for which they were paid the equivalent of an eight-hour daytime work rate.The government did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties were not commensurate with those for other analogous crimes, such as kidnapping, and penalties were never enforced.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law required a minimum wage for all sectors. The minimum wage was above the official estimate for the poverty income level.The standard work week was eight hours a day and 48 hours a week for daytime work, six hours a day and 36 hours a week for night work, and seven hours a day and 42 hours a week for mixed day and night work. Offshore work in the oil and gas sector was 44 hours a week.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were not appropriate for the main industries in the country; they did not provide for protection of workers from occupational hazards. The government did not proactively identify unsafe conditions.The law permitted workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Labor and Social Security oversaw wage, hour, and OSH laws but did not effectively enforce those laws. Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar violations such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators. The ministry conducted some workplace inspections, but the small number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance, although inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. When inspectors found violations, the government required some employers to correct the problem, pay fines, or pay reparations to the employees, but most employers were able to renegotiate the findings or pay bribes to eliminate the penalty.The informal sector employed most workers and was estimated at 32 percent of GDP in 2017. Labor laws did not apply in the informal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Equatorial Guinea
- Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Darby FitzSimmonsIn December 2002, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship – the So San – was in the Arabian Sea carrying missiles destined for Yemen. The U.S. alerted the Spanish navy, which had ships in the area and agreed to intercept the ship.The intelligence was right. Upon boarding the So San, Spanish naval personnel discovered 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, and 23 tanks of missile fuel, all hidden under bags of cement.However, after a day of back and forth between the U.S. and Yemeni governments, the ship was released. The U.S. said it lacked clear legal authority to seize the missile parts.Less than a year later, in October 2003, the U.S. and UK once again received intelligence that a ship, the BBC China, was carrying illicit cargo. U.S. government officials contacted German authorities who intercepted the ship. They found and permanently confiscated nuclear centrifuge parts destined for Libya. In 2018, PSI countries held a Mediterranean maritime exercise in the bay of Catania in Sicily. (State Department photo)The difference in outcome between these two events was no accident – it was the result of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003 by eleven like-minded countries, the PSI is a global effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.A Global EffortToday, there are 111 participating countries that endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. These include committing to stopping the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials, and enhancing relevant legal, diplomatic, financial, military, and law enforcement tools.Although the PSI does not have any formal legal authority, the PSI has played a key role in global counterproliferation efforts for more than 20 years. PSI-endorsing countries agree to work together to impede or stop shipments of WMD-related materials to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.Many PSI-endorsing countries also have ship boarding agreements, allowing them to carry out searches and seizures of illicit material on ships originating from each other’s countries.PSI in AfricaPSI endorsing states regularly conduct multilateral meetings, workshops, and exercises to improve their counterproliferation readiness and share best practices. One such event occurred in early February when the United States and Morocco co-hosted the 2024 Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach event. This was the largest ever PSI event on the African continent. More than 160 attendees from 35 countries attended, including 25 African countries.During the three-day event, civilian and military leaders discussed the current state of counterproliferation, shared best practices, and emphasized the importance of continuing to expand upon nonproliferation efforts on the African continent through the PSI and similar mechanisms. Representatives from 35 countries gather in Marrakech for the kick-off of a PSI event in February. (State Department photo)Looking AheadThese PSI efforts are more important than ever. In recent months, several developments have shaken the global nonproliferation regime. These include:Iran withdrawing permission for international verification at several nuclear sites;DPRK continuing to develop its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, andRussia continuing to violate nonproliferation norms by attacking Ukraine with missiles and has doubled down on its dangerous nuclear rhetoric – including withdrawing from the PSI in 2022.However, despite the challenges posed by the current security landscape, the PSI remains strong. Following the meeting, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia became endorsers of the PSI, affirming their commitment to countering the spread of WMDs.The success of the 2024 PSI African Political Meeting and Outreach event is a sign that the international community at large is steadfast in their support of counterproliferation efforts. The United States looks forward to working with the five new endorsing countries to improve our multilateral interdiction efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies.Darby FitzSimmons is an intern in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
- Joint Statement on the Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Marrakesh Co-Chairs’ Summary Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the United States of America on the occasion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach event.Begin text:The Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America co-hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Africa Political Meeting and Outreach Event in Marrakesh, Morocco on January 31 &#8211; February 2, 2024. This meeting was co-chaired by the Director of the United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Redouane Houssaini, and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins.This meeting fulfilled a commitment made by Morocco at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting (HLPM) held in Jeju, Republic of Korea on May 30, 2023.The Marrakesh event featured senior representatives of 35 countries from the international community, including 25 African States and 10 countries from the PSI Operational Experts Group.Opening remarks were addressed by His Excellency Mr. Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, highlighting the pivotal role of the African dimension in international cooperation efforts to face the challenges posed by global security which should be given significant consideration within the framework of the PSI vision and commitment of Morocco to continue its support to the PSI and cooperate with the U.S. to encourage more African states to endorse this initiative.Under Secretary Jenkins also addressed the changing international security environment and new challenges to counterproliferation norms and activities.This event presented an opportunity for the PSI-endorsing states to reiterate their commitment to countering of the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials, and to commit to further working together within the PSI in order to effectively address these issues.A large number of participants from African countries welcomed the meeting and showed interest in the Initiative and committed to report back and assess with all national stakeholders to consider endorsing the PSI.One of the primary objectives of the event was to underscore the significance of South-South cooperation as a focal point, showcasing how nations within this framework can leverage their unique strengths and resources to address common challenges.This meeting represented another opportunity to highlight the close strategic partnership between the United States and Morocco, within the strategic dialogue initiated in 2013, and accentuate the depth of this historic long-standing friendship while exploring ways to broaden its horizons towards a triangular cooperation, involving Africa, in matters of security.The PSI-endorsing states and participating states:Highlighted the benefits of PSI endorsement and provided an understanding of PSI frameworks and Critical Capabilities and Practices.Acknowledged the security challenges inherent in the current context, encompassing both Africa and the global landscape.Provided an overview of proliferation threats and trends, both globally and within Africa through briefings and panel presentations received by the attendees.Acknowledged the importance of the PSI as a voluntary mechanism and flexible framework, compliant with international law and mechanisms, to effectively address this threat.Explored the paramount significance of national capacity building and interdepartmental coordination in addressing complex challenges related to the detection and interception of nuclear and radiological materials.The new endorsers of the PSI:  Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia, announced their formal endorsement of the PSI and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.Recognizing the gravity of the global security landscape, underscored the imperative for collaborative efforts on an international scale.Demonstrated a shared commitment to fostering alliances, information-sharing, and coordinated actions to effectively address the complex challenges posed by the spread of WMDs.Next Steps:States that endorsed the PSI statement of Interdiction Principles at this meeting showed interest in participating in follow-up regional and sub-regional African events for new endorsers at a date and location to be determined.The co-chairs suggested establishing a plan of action (workshops, training, operational cooperation) that will allow the new endorsing countries to reinforce their national capabilities to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. PSI-endorsing states committed to assisting new endorsers with additional training, education, and sharing best practices.Morocco and the United States will continue to work closely with participating states to promote PSI in Africa.
- Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Office of the SpokespersonThe United States and Morocco co-hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach Event from January 31-February 2, 2024, in Marrakesh, Morocco.  The event realizes commitments both countries made at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting in May 2023 in Jeju, Republic of Korea to expand PSI outreach to non-endorsing countries, especially in Africa.At the meeting – the largest PSI event ever held on the African Continent – the United States, Morocco, and 11 other PSI-endorsing countries engaged 22 African countries that had not yet endorsed the PSI to explain the purpose and importance of the Initiative in countering the threats from the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related items in the region.  Over three days, more than 150 civilian and military leaders from 35 governments examined modern WMD proliferation pathways, improved understanding of WMD interdiction obligations, explored legal frameworks and the best practices of partners, and enhanced the growth and connectivity of the counterproliferation community in Africa.At the meeting’s conclusion, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia had announced their endorsement of the PSI, bringing the total number of worldwide endorsers to 111.  Several other states declared their intention to endorse in the near future. The United States and Morocco encourage all states in the African region and beyond to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and participate in future PSI-related events.The now 111 states that have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles have committed to take effective measures to interdict WMD-related transfers consistent with national law and international obligations, adopt streamlined procedures for rapid information exchange, and strengthen relevant national and international laws and frameworks.The PSI was established in 2003 to stop or impede transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
- Equatorial Guinea National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I extend our congratulations to Equatorial Guinea in honor of the 55th anniversary of your independence on October 12.The United States values our relationship with Equatorial Guinea, and we remain committed in our partnership to combat trafficking in persons, develop the initiative on Atlantic Cooperation, and promote maritime security and economic growth. In the coming year, we look forward to Equatorial Guinea advancing its efforts to improve democratic governance and respect for human rights and to grow our economic and security partnership.As you celebrate another year of independence, we send our wishes for a peaceful and prosperous year for Equatoguineans.
- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Equatorial Guinea																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources																																																																											Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				The investment climate in Equatorial Guinea reflects a lack of clear rules and regulations to establish and run a business, a lack of investment in critical infrastructure like power generation, and a lack of follow-through on high-level commitments to economic diversification or increased transparency. Additionally, ministers and ruling family members own important businesses and win many contracts. There have been instances in the past decades of government officials abusing their power or access to power to imprison or mistreat individuals with whom they have a business dispute. Though the government has communicated its intentions to foster private sector participation in its plan for economic diversification, no concrete steps were taken last year toward creating a sound enabling environment for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While a requirement to partner with a local organization was removed five years ago, uncertainty still drives foreign investors to look for a local partner or guide to work through overwhelming bureaucracy in the public administration and unclear, informal requirements for registration and operation. Plans to establish an Investment Promotion Agency were not implemented during this period, even though it was listed as priority for the new Minister of Planning and Economic Diversification. In addition, major investments decisions are still being discussed at the presidential level with direct intervention from the vice president.During the covered period no significant steps were taken by the government to implement its plans to improve the business environment, despite adopting the National Strategy for Economic Diversification and several meetings of the Technical Committee for the Improvement of the Business Environment occurring throughout 2022. The government had identified agriculture, fishery, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and transportation sectors as keys to overcome dependency on oil revenues. Throughout last year, the public administration had accelerated the process for online visa applications to boost influx of tourists and businesspeople, but the status remains unclear.Historically, Equatorial Guinea’s economy has benefitted from FDI in the oil and gas sector, which is responsible for a significant portion of government revenues. Government revenues were then spent on large or mega infrastructure projects built by international construction firms. The government used these infrastructure projects to ostensibly facilitate foreign investment by providing quality roads and buildings, but lack of maintenance and underinvestment in other critical areas – including power generation – presents obstacles to investment in the government’s priority sectors. Additionally, since 2015, with the contraction of oil production and fluctuation in global oil prices, the government had to reduce public expenditure on infrastructure. While seeking to attract large-scale investments, Equatoguinean authorities had been promoting mining and gas exploration contracts with the hope to reduce unemployment.The banking sector has been weighed down by high percentages of nonperforming loans (NPLs),undercapitalization, and low liquidity at some banks, driven by government arrears with construction firms. Furthermore, the new Central Bank FOREX regulation on place has restricted remittance policy.Equatorial Guinea imports most of its consumer products, and consequently was hit by the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, which caused food shortages that worsened already steady rising inflation nationwide. In response, the vice president signed food provision contracts with the Serbian government to furnish local supermarkets.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasure Year Index/Rank Website AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 171 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator  U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $2.8 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet World Bank GNI per capita 2021 $12,026  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD  																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										Foreign investment is concentrated in the hydrocarbon and construction sectors. Total amounts of foreign investment, therefore, have declined due to fluctuating oil and gas prices, declining oil production, and non-payment of construction contracts. U.S. companies dominate Equatorial Guinea&#8217;s oil and gas sector, European companies are present in fuel distribution, while Chinese, Middle Eastern, and European companies dominate investment in the country&#8217;s construction sector.Article 27 of the country’s fundamental law states “the State protects, guarantees, and controls the investment of foreign capital that contributes to the development of the country.” In Article 12 of Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime, the government again commits to fair and equitable treatment for all investors. Law No. 7/1992 also creates an Investment Promotion Center (IPC) to advise the government on investment policies, promote investments, and support both domestic and international investors with information and in the resolution of conflicts. These laws also create a National Investment Commission (NIC). In the same vein, Equatorial Guinea also guarantees currency convertibility and repatriation of profits and protects against expropriation. However, it is not a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and has not signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (i.e. the New York Convention), which weakens investor confidence in the country. Historically, the president has had de facto final approval on large contracts with foreign investors; however, since 2020, the vice president has largely taken over this role. Foreign-owned companies pay higher registration fees than local companies and are often subject to taxes that more informal local businesses avoid.Following his appointment in February 2023, the new Minister of Planning and Economic Diversification had announced his plans to expedite the implementation of the Investment Promotion Agency to facilitate foreign investment. This Agency will be the result of a collaboration with existing joint venture fund Holding 2020, created by the government to promote investments in strategic sectors.In general, the government focuses its efforts on recruiting investments in large capital projects over small ventures, as large-scale projects are more likely to create new employment opportunities for Equatorial Guinea’s largely unskilled workforce and provide greater fiscal benefits for the government under its underdeveloped and poorly implemented taxation system. The government is increasingly seeking South-South FDI from new partners in countries like Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Turkey, and Venezuela. The government sometimes focuses on recruiting new partners in lieu of maintaining existing partnerships, neglecting improvements to its operating environment, and damaging its prospects for longer term returns from investments.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										Law No 72/ 2018 reviewed Decree No 127/2004 to facilitate investments within the country. The new law eliminated the local partner obligation for investors outside the oil sector, however the mandate is still in force for enterprises in the oil sector, requesting 35% local ownership.Foreign investors are still subject to specific provisions related to land acquisition and must comply with local content rules that vary by sector. The acquisition of land titles by foreign individuals or legal entities requires presidential authorization, in accordance with Decree 140/2013. In addition, local content rules dictate that foreign workers may not represent more than 10 percent of all workers (30 percent in the extractive and agricultural sectors). A percentage of domestic content in goods and technologies from companies with foreign investors must also be included. Local content rules are inconsistently applied, creating disincentives to foreign investment.The oil and gas sector is regulated by specific legislation. Some particularities that govern it are that: the entry into force of contracts depends on the ratification by the president, and non-Equatoguinean contractors must establish a local branch. Prior to being authorized by the local government, a foreign investor can be required to provide an investment guarantee as proof of its financial capacity to conduct the solicitated investment, as evidenced by opening an account in a local bank and transferring significant amount of money into it. Also in the oil sector, production sharing agreements require oil companies to transfer ownership of their facilities, material, and equipment to the host country upon conclusion of the contracts.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										Prior to approving an Extended Fund Facility in 2019, the IMF conducted several rounds of staff-monitored assessments of the government’s structural, fiscal, and monetary reforms. The results of these assessments, which include investment policy recommendations, can be found on the IMF’s website:  https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GNQ .Civil society organizations in Equatorial Guinea remain weak, hampered by difficulties in registering for legalization through the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations, and thus are unable to provide oversight of investment policy-related concerns.																																				Business Facilitation										In January 2019, the Ministry of Commerce launched its Single Business Window (abbreviated VUE for its Spanish name Ventanilla Unica Empresarial) at its headquarters in Malabo. The VUE reduced the time required to register a business from an average of 33 days to five. In July 2021, the ministry opened a second VUE office in the mainland city of Bata. Registration still must take place in person, however, as there is no online registration page nor a working VUE website. Individuals choosing to register their businesses without utilizing the VUE must complete the following steps through a variety of government agencies:ProcessAgency Time RequiredUndergo criminal background checkMinistry of Justice1 dayLegalize business’s articles of incorporationMinistry of Justice, Office of the Notary Public3-14 daysAdd name to business registryMinistry of Justice2-3 daysOpen bank account and obtain bank solvency certificateCommercial Bank1 dayObtain tax clearance certificate (certificate of good standing)Ministry of Finance2 daysAdd name to business registryMinistry of Commerce15 daysComplete small and medium enterprise (SME) registration, if applicableMinistry of Commerce15 daysRegister for the Employee Guarantee FundMinistry of LaborObtain tax ID numberMinistry of Finance3 daysRegister for social securityNational Institute of Social Security1 day																																				Outward Investment										Although Equatoguinean citizens may legally invest outside the country, the government does not actively promote foreign investment and there are minimal mechanisms to do so since foreign currency availability is restricted and there is only one local bank with international operations. There are no known restrictions on foreign investment, but some individuals and companies have faced delays when transferring money overseas or converting local currency into foreign exchange, which has been exacerbated by new CEMAC rules on foreign currency reserves enacted in 2019. The National Bank of Equatorial Guinea (BANGE) – majority-owned by the government – launched two subsidiary offices in neighboring Cameroon.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						Equatorial Guinea has signed several bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, a list of which can be found at  https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/64/equatorial-guinea?type=bits . It is also a signatory to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and has ratified all additional protocols. It is not a member of the OECD’s Inclusive Framework Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, nor does it have a bilateral taxation or investment treaty with the United States.																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										Regulations governing the investment environment in Equatorial Guinea are implemented at the national level and can be introduced and enacted in one of three ways:As a law, which begins as a draft bill presented by the relevant government ministry to the Council of Ministers before being submitted to Parliament for review and a vote.Through a decree (at times referred to as a “decree-law”) issued directly by the president.Through a ministerial order issued by the relevant ministry, in this case often the Ministry of Commerce and Business Promotion; the Ministry of Labor, Employment Promotion, and Social Security; or the Ministry of Finance and BudgetThe government does not make draft versions of bills and regulations available for public comment at any stage of the approval process. Civil society groups complain that they are not consulted in the drafting of relevant laws and regulations.The regulatory regime suffers from both a lack of public information and shortcomings in implementation and enforcement. Online versions of laws and regulations are difficult to find and sometimes completely unavailable. To comply with the IMF’s 2019 required reforms, the Ministry of Finance created both a website ( https://minhacienda-gob.com/biblioteca-juridica/ ) and physical office to facilitate public access to commercial regulations, but in practice limited documentation is available. In 2020, the government launched the official webpage of the state bulletin ( https://boe.gob.gq/# ) to improve public access to laws and regulations. No substantial information on EG regulation has been uploaded to webpage so far. Despite these efforts at digitalization, most of the information on regulations is still only accessible in hard copies for a fee through the Office of the National State Bulletin.As a member country of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), Equatorial Guinea’s accounting standards are governed by the organization’s uniform act on accounting law and financial information (AUDCIF). However, due to a lack of local expertise on OHADA’s accounting standards, the government uses the Spanish model for its general accounting system. In 2020, a World Bank-sponsored program to strengthen the investment climate in the OHADA region established an office in Equatorial Guinea to train local accountants on OHADA accounting law. Of the 10 accountants registered through the office, currently only two are Equatoguineans. Officially, only these accredited accountants can audit and certify companies’ financial statements, while in practice non-accredited accounts still prepare the declaration of statistical and fiscal information for SMEs.Equatorial Guinea did not make major improvements from last report’s Fiscal Transparency performance, and despite activating its Court of Accounts as Supreme Auditing Institution, significant operative measures were not introduced, and thus Equatorial Guinea does not meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency as established by the U.S. Department of State. While the government’s published budget provides a substantially complete picture of its planned expenditures and revenue streams, including natural resource revenues, in 2022 it failed again to disclose its total debt obligations and produce audited financial statements for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However a list of SOEs for privatization was published and, for the first time, assets declaration statements of public officials were made public. Additional information is included in the Department of State’s annual Fiscal Transparency Report:  https://www.state.gov/fiscal-transparency-report/.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										As a CEMAC member, Equatorial Guinea’s investment-related regulations are based on CEMAC policies. Implementation of some policies at the national level remains pending, such as the commitment to free movement of people and goods between member countries. Equatorial Guinea is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but has been an observer since 2002. In 2013, the government applied for full WTO membership. A Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime was submitted in 2023 as part of the country’s application to accede the WTO.																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										The Fundamental Law of Equatorial Guinea, officially promulgated on February 16, 2012 followed a constitutional reform approved by referendum on November 13, 2011 set much of the law in Equatorial Guinea. The penal code and judicial system is still largely based on the Spanish colonial model.The President of the Republic is the Head of State and exercises the Executive Power as Head of Government. According to the Constitution, he is also the Chief Magistrate. He is in charge of determining the policy of the nation, arbitrating and moderating the functioning of the institutions of the state, promulgating and sanctioning laws, directing the armed forces, presiding over the Council of Ministers and other powers recognized in the Fundamental Law. The current president is Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was re-elected in November 2022, and has served as president for 44 years after deposing the previous leader in a coup in 1979. He is the longest serving Head of State in the world. There are multiple instances of high-level government officials or well-connected relatives of the ruling family interfering in the judicial system.Weaknesses in the justice system contribute to legal insecurity in Equatorial Guinea. There is no institutionalized mechanism for the selection, appointment, tenure or promotion of judges and judicial personnel that guarantees the independence of judicial decisions. Judges are appointed directly by the executive and can be removed at any time. In practice, there are no minimum requirements to be a judge. In Equatorial Guinea, judges do not receive sufficient training, resulting in inconsistent judicial decisions. While the justice system has evolved since 2009 towards greater specialization with the creation of courts for labour and family matters, commercial cases are processed the same as civil cases in the courts of first instance. Among the CEMAC economies, only Equatorial Guinea and Gabon lack specialized commercial courts. In addition, the country lacks an arbitration and mediation center, which could be created in the context of existing OHADA legislation to promote alternative dispute resolution. The current judicial process is not considered procedurally competent, fair, or reliable.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										The primary legal instrument governing foreign investment in Equatorial Guinea is Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime in Equatorial Guinea, which was last updated by in 1994 by No. 2/1994. Due to the difficulty in passing new laws, subsequent changes have mostly been implemented through more than two dozen presidential decrees, which are summarized in a document published on the Ministry of Finance’s website:  https://minhacienda-gob.com/materia-de-inversion-3/ . The government published Decree 45/2020 in April 2020 reducing the minimum amount of capital needed to register a limited-liability company from one million XAF (approximately $1,650) to 100,000 XAF (approximately $165). Specific regulations governing investments in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors are summarized on the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbon’s website at  https://mmie.gob.gq/ , although the English version of the page has not been updated since 2017.In February, the new Ministry of Planning and Economic diversification announced that one of his priorities was to create an investment promotion agency to serve as a center to provides information relevant to investing in Equatorial Guinea. In addition, the Ministry of Finance has now hosted a virtual legal library on its website, which includes laws and regulations of about most aspects of the EG economy, including trade and investment. (https://minhacienda-gob.com/biblioteca-juridica/)																																				Competition and Antitrust Laws										Due to Equatorial Guinea’s membership in OHADA, OHADA competition laws should be applied to such cases. Information on all OHADA uniform acts and case law can be found at  https://www.ohada.org/en/ .The CEMAC Community competition regime is governed by two sets of rules: the regulation on anticompetitive business practices and the regulation on state practices affecting trade between member States. The entities responsible for community competition law are the Community Competition Surveillance Authority, the Community Court of Justice and the national competition control structures. CEMAC legislation does not preclude the adoption of national competition laws. CEMAC competition law provides for good coordination between these two levels of competition law, which complement each other and whose respective fields of application are clearly delimited. The application of CEMAC competition law is the responsibility of a CEMAC competition authority, a CEMAC court and the national competition authorities. The Directorate for Competitiveness and Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Trade and Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises has been designated the national competition authority for Equatorial Guinea. However, in practice national competition authorities in CEMAC are not operational, with the exception of Cameroon. The regional agency has not yet been established, but the CEMAC Commission has already reviewed and approved two company merger requests.In some sectors, specific laws refer to competition principles. For example, Law No. 7/2005, General Telecommunications Law, provides that, in the telecommunications sector, tariffs are freely set by the officially established operators, within the framework of the principles of transparency, objectivity and equal treatment.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										Law No. 7/1992 states that the government will not expropriate foreign investments except when acting in the public interest with fair, just, and proper compensation. The government does not generally nationalize or expropriate foreign investments, although there are alleged cases of local private companies cooperating with the government to expropriate property from foreign investors after falsely accusing them of breach of contract. This practice has become less common since 2018, when the government eliminated the requirement for foreign investors to identify a local business partner. The government has an extensive record, however, of expropriating locally owned property, frequently offering little or no compensation.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Equatorial Guinea is not a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention, also known as the Washington Convention), although Law No. 7/1992 states that international arbitration may be based on the ICSID rules. The government has stated that its action plan for improving the national business climate includes joining ICSID. The country is not a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						Equatorial Guinea is member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Over the past 10 years, there have been a few investment disputes involving a U.S. or other foreign investor and the government, a limited number of which were brought before international arbitration tribunals. While Equatorial Guinea is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention, one case was brought before a tribunal in 2012, but was dismissed. In 2014, a French court ordered the government to pay 150 million euro to a French-based telecommunications company for violating a clause in their contract. The government made payments pursuant to this judgement between October 2016 and October 2018.As of 2021, two U.S.-owned companies were awaiting payment from the government for services rendered since 2019. Separately, a European agriculture company claims the government has neglected to fulfill its part of a contract by failing to provide its promised co-investment funding after the investor had transferred capital into a local bank.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						Law No. 7/1992 states that disputes that cannot be resolved through direct negotiation by the involved parties shall be referred to Equatoguinean courts. Either party can also submit the dispute for international arbitration. In their initial application to invest in the country, foreigners must declare their desired international arbitration venue, though arbitration must take place in a neutral location with Spanish as the official language. Under OHADA’s Uniform Arbitration Law, parties can also bring disputes before the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). The CCJA is based in Abidjan but can hear cases within the borders of any one of its member countries. There are no recent relevant cases in Equatorial Guinea demonstrating whether local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral judgments and awards. Equatorial Guinea does not have and arbitration and mediation center.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										OHADA’s uniform code and case law on bankruptcy applies in Equatorial Guinea. However, despite being an OHADA member country and therefore having recourse to insolvency and debt recovery proceedings, the country has no legal practice or expertise in judicial reorganization, judicial liquidation, or debt enforcement. Creditors are therefore likely to face difficulty in recovering their money through a formal legal process in insolvency cases.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										To stimulate investment and job creation, Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime establishes the following incentives, which have been in place since 1992:A reduction in the company’s tax base equivalent to 50 percent of the salary of an employee in a newly created position.A reduction in the company’s personal income tax equivalent to 200 percent of the cost of training offered to local employees.A credit worth 15 percent the value of non-traditional exports, which can be used in the payment of any fiscal obligations.Additional incentives offered to investors operating in the country’s rural areas, as described in the government’s tax law.In addition, since the start of the pandemic the government has attempted to incentivize local business creation by reducing the minimum capital investment threshold for registering an LLC. The government does not currently offer any incentives for clean energy investments or for businesses owned by underrepresented investors, such as women.In accordance with CEMAC provisions, newly established companies in the agricultural, industrial, mining or forestry sectors are eligible for an exemption from taxes on profits during their first three years of operation. Although the rate of depreciation of investments is set at the Community level, companies may make degressive and accelerated depreciation if they have invested in these specific sectors. In the first years of operation, they are allowed to carry forward negative results to subsequent years. Tax reductions are also provided for in the event of reinvestment of profits.Companies with subsidiaries may deduct from their taxable profit from shares or participations in such subsidiaries, subject to the following conditions: both companies must have their headquarters in CEMAC countries and the parent company must hold at least 50 percent of the capital of the subsidiary and retain such participation for at least two consecutive years.In 2014, the government established Holding Equatorial Guinea (HOLDING G.E.) to manage a $1.6 million investment fund created to finance its joint ventures with private companies in sectors identified as key to its economic diversification strategy. Previously, the government allocated up to 20 percent of the country’s general budget to this fund every three years, but now it provides funding on a case-by-case basis when HOLDING G.E. identifies co-investment opportunities. Information on investment opportunities in strategic sectors is available on HOLDING G.E.’s website ( https://www.holdingequatorialguinea.com/ ), as is the agency’s “Equatorial Guinea Investment Guide,” which has not been updated since 2018.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										The CEMAC Customs Code recognizes the right of member States to establish export processing zones (EPZs) exempted from the customs regime. Goods admitted to commercial free zones may undergo the necessary operations to ensure their preservation, improve their presentation or commercial quality, or be packaged for transport. The processing operations applicable to goods in export processing zones depend, however, on national legislation.Three entities have tax-free status: the Luba Free Port, the Port of Bata, and the K5 Free Port Oil Centre. Goods that are properly cleared through a fellow CEMAC member country are not taxed when entering Equatorial Guinea. In addition to tariff and VAT exemptions for imported goods (normally equipment and supplies for oil companies), the ports offer tax advantages for companies setting up their tax-free zones, including exemptions from: corporate income tax; VAT; personal income tax; sales tax; and dividend tax. These exemptions are not automatic, however, and require separate applications to the the government in order to qualify.In January 2021, Presidential Decree 2/2021 introduced new regulations on cross-border trade with neighboring Cameroon and Gabon, including establishing an import-export office.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Under Equatorial Guinea’s Local Content Law, a significant percentage of the goods and technology used by foreign hydrocarbon companies must be produced or assembled locally or within the CEMAC region. The Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons has fined, suspended, and expelled companies perceived to be noncompliant with local content laws, although such cases are more often related to the failure to hire local nationals rather than the failure to use equipment and technology produced in the region.The government requires internet service providers, whether local or foreign, to turn over source code or to allow surveillance. According to Article 15 of the Telecommunication Law 7, dated November 7, 2015, the Regulating Organ of Telecommunications (ORTEL) oversees official communication lines and networks. The government has no requirements regarding locating data storage within the country.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										Despite existing laws protecting the rights of property owners, the government selectively enforces those rights and uses the judicial system to seize land “in the public interest” with little to no due process. Mortgages are offered under a &#8220;Social Housing Program&#8221; in which payments are made to the government via the commercial bank CCEI Bank. Mortgage terms vary and can be more than 20 years, and interest rates are high, ranging from 12 to 18 percent. Non-payment for six months results in foreclosure on the property.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										While Equatorial Guinea still faces challenges in registering and protecting intellectual property, it was not included in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2020 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy nor in its 2021 Special 301 Report.Equatorial Guinea is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a contracting party to the Berne, Paris, and Nairobi Conventions, as well as Patent Cooperation Treaties (PCT). At the regional level, Equatorial Guinea is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), which serves as the national intellectual property service and whose national structures are responsible for the promotion and defence of industrial property rights in accordance with the minimum standards of protection set out in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). OAPI ensures a common system of administrative procedures for the registration of rights in this area.On September 2022, the draft bill on intellectual property, drafted by the Minister of Culture, Tourism and Artisanal Promotion, with assistance of EU Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation (AfrIP), the OAPI, and the EG’s Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CICTE) was presented to the government. The draft bill is pending parliamentary approval. During the same period, the government inaugurated the Intellectual Property Documentation Center, which aims to provide scientific and technical information on intellectual property, technological innovation, and creativity for artisans, researchers, creators, businessmen and women, teachers, students, and other actors in the scientific and technological field.The scope of the Bangui agreement covers patents for inventions, utility models, trademarks or service marks, industrial designs, trade names, geographical indications, copyright and related rights and protection against unfair competition.The competent institution at the national level for the formulation of intellectual property policy is the Council for Scientific and Technological Research (CICTE), an autonomous body under the Office of the Head of Government, established on 7 August 1987 by Decree-Law No. 7/1987. Its mandate is to register scientific patents, trademarks and authors, process application files, grant titles and other services related to intellectual property. Within CICTE, the Directorate General of Intellectual Property is in charge of issuing patents. The protection of the intellectual property rights recognized by law is understood to be applicable to industry and trade in all forms, including agricultural, forestry, livestock and biological industries, as well as protection against unfair competition and counterfeiting of trademarks of all kinds (products and services).For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										The government is encouraging portfolio investment thorough the National Bank of Equatorial Guinea’s (BANGE) brokerage agency BANGE Sociedad de Valores (BANGE SV), which initiated an awareness-raising campaign to inform on the investment opportunities available through this institution for any investor. BANGE SV is listed in the subregional stock market (BVMAC) and is currently working on listing the national electric company SEGESA and national telecom company GETESA on the BVMAC as well. Currently, the country does not have its own stock market, but it does participate in the subregional stock market. BANGE SV had to meet all requirements demanded by the BVMAC in order to participate as broker dealer and is supervised by the Central African Banking Commission (COBAC) to complain with mandatory regulations.CEMAC’s Bank of Central African States (BEAC) regulates interest rates in member countries by setting the discount rate. The COBAC is the supervising body of the central bank with the mandate to verify that banks operate withing the regulatory framework established by the Central Bank. However, the COBAC’s human capacity in the country is limited and thus banks in Equatorial Guinea fail to comply with most of Central Bank’s directives. For instance, some banks still charge fees for banking services such as for issuing account holder certificates or banks statements that should be free.Private sector actors can access credit instruments like loans and bank overdrafts after meeting certain requirements, however, the volume of financing available for small and medium-sized enterprises is very low, and microcredits are relatively rare, unlike in in other sub-Saharan countries. Foreigners must provide proof of residency to establish a bank account.																																				Money and Banking System										Per the Central Bank’s estimations, the country has the highest rate of financial inclusion within the CEMAC region, with 35 percent of EG population having access to financial services. However, the banking sector is underdeveloped with only five commercial banks operating nationwide. While banks have branches throughout the country, they are concentrated in urban centers. BANGE has the most branches (31), while CCEI/CCIW Bank de Guinea Equatorial, which has been wholly owned by the government since 2021, is the largest bank in the country in terms of total assets under management. BGFI Bank Guinea Equatorial operates as a subsidiary of BGFI Holding Corporation (Gabon). Pan-African EcoBank (Togo) and Societe Générale (France) also operate in Equatorial Guinea. Foreigners must provide proof of residency to establish a bank account.Per the IMF last article IV consultation, regarding the banking sector, the aggregate short-term liquidity ratio remains above the prudential minimum, although deposits continue to decrease. EG banking sector has one of the lowest credit-deposit ratios in the subregion, a particularity that had served as buffer to withstand external shocks, added to its lower banking penetration. However, the banking sector has been weighed down by many nonperforming loans (NPLs), undercapitalization, and low liquidity at some banks. High NPL rates and low coverage ratio are mainly driven by government arrears with construction firms (for which provisioning is not compulsory). Many of the NPLs are concentrated in CCEI, in which the government acquired a majority stake in 2020. Following COBAC’s alignment of capital definition with Basel II framework at end of 2019, the banking sector is deeply undercapitalized. The aggregate short-term liquidity ratio remains above the prudential minimum, although deposits continua to decrease.CEMAC members do not have their own central banks, but instead host national BEAC branches. Three BEAC branches are located in Equatorial Guinea in: Ebibeyin, a small city on the borders with Cameroon and Gabon; Bata, the most populous city in Equatorial Guinea, located on the Atlantic Coast; and Malabo, the capital, located on Bioko Island 75 km from mainland Equatorial Guinea. BEAC’s Central Africa Banking Commission (COBAC) regulates the region’s banking systems and provides authorization for commercial banks to operate in each member country. The Ministry of Finance provides information on establishing a financial institution within the CEMAC region on its website at  https://minhacienda-gob.com/condiciones-para-la-solicitud-de-una-acreditacion-de-actividades-financieras-en-la-cemac/ .																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						As a CEMAC member, Equatorial Guinea uses the Central African franc (XAF), which is backed by the French treasury and pegged to the euro at a fixed rate of 655.957 XAF/EUR. The XAF/USD exchange rate thus fluctuates with the value of the euro. Foreign currency is not widely available in the XAF zone but can be physically obtained in Equatorial Guinea in small quantities. There have been reports of arbitrary restrictions on access to or transfers in and out of foreign currency accounts held by Equatoguinean citizens.In December 2018, CEMAC approved Regulation No. 02/18/CEMAC/UMAC/CM, instituting new foreign currency exchange rules for all businesses and individuals residing within the subregion. A few of the more notable rules under the new regulations include:Companies and individuals residing in CEMAC countries must receive authorization from BEAC to hold offshore and onshore foreign currency accounts, thus forcing most companies to maintain their bank accounts in XAF rather than a foreign currency. If BEAC does not act on the request within 30 days, it is considered to be approved.Export proceeds over 5 million XAF (approximately $8,250) must be repatriated to a commercial bank within the CEMAC region within 150 days.Companies must declare the importation of services to the BEAC, and export proceeds over 5 million XAF (approximately $8,250) must be held in a CEMAC bank.These regulations have caused an increase in delays for transfers or exchanges of local currency into foreign denominations. In September 2020, BEAC instituted an online &#8220;e-transfer&#8221; application to ensure credit establishments comply with the new regulations. The online application automates the entire process of transfer requests and monitors the progress of each request in real time. The new regulations went into force in March 2019, but following pushback from the extractive industry, CEMAC granted an extension until December 31, 2020 for compliance by hydrocarbon and mining companies. CEMAC granted an additional extension until December 31, 2021 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the months leading up to the deadline, the extractive industry negotiated with CEMAC to adapt the regulations to meet their unique foreign currency needs. Following these negotiations, CEMAC released updated instructions for mining and hydrocarbon companies in December 2021 and February 2022, under which:Certain transactions can be conducted using an onshore or offshore foreign currency account, including the payment of external transactions or the repayment of loans;Only 35 percent of proceeds must be repatriated, rather than 100 percent; andContractors can be paid in foreign currency so long as the transactions are handled through onshore foreign currency accounts.While not formally included, CEMAC verbally agreed to a 10-month grace period ending October 31, 2022 to provide addition time for extractive industry countries to fully comply with the updated regulations. In general, oil and gas companies operating in Equatorial Guinea have been able to adapt their financial processes to meet the new requirements, although they have been unable to find a local bank that can handle their account balance and transaction needs, forcing them to open accounts in Cameroon to comply with repatriation requirements, and adding additional administrative and compliance burdens. In addition, CEMAC has not yet defined how funds from abandonment and decommissioning of assets will be handled, a point of concern for foreign hydrocarbon companies.						Remittance Policies						Remittances and money transfers in general are regulated by CEMAC’s Exchange Regulation no02/18/CEMAC/UMAC/CM. Additionally, Ministerial Order 3221 released by the government in June 2017 regulates rapid money transfers via money transfer agencies. Transfers of remittances are limited to the equivalent of 1 million XAF (approximately $1,663) per sender per month and to 400 million XAF (approximately $666,331) per financial institution per month. Western Union wire transfers are no longer available in the country, and informal money transfer operations have become more commonplace.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										The government established the Fund for Future Generations as its sovereign wealth fund in 2002. The fund receives 0.5% of all oil revenues and is governed and managed by BEAC. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates that the fund has approximately $165.5 million under management, although there is no publicly available information on its allocations or the regulations directing its maintenance and management.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						The government controls at least eight state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy, housing, fishing, aerospace and defense, and information and communication sectors. These include Sonagas (natural gas), GEPetrol (oil), SEGESA (electricity), GECOMSA and GETESA (telecommunications), SONAPESCA (fishing), ENPIGE (low-income housing), and Ceiba Intercontinental (national airline). The government’s annual budget includes allocations to and earnings from SOEs, but other details – such as total assets and number of employees – are not made available. SOEs also lack publicly available audited financial statements. In 2017, the government contracted Deloitte and Ernst &amp; Young to conduct a detailed report on its SOEs, which provided a comprehensive list of these entities. The report and other information regarding SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Finance’s website at  https://minhacienda-gob.com/empresas-publicas-y-entidades-autonomas/ .Following the recommendations of the IMF’s 2018 staff-monitored program, the government began efforts to improve governance of its SOEs. It established a committee for the restructuring of public entities and appointed new governing boards for each one. The IMF also required the government to contract an internationally reputable firm to audit the accounts of the state-owned oil (GEPetrol) and gas (Sonagas) companies, which the government hired at the start of 2019. As of April 2023 however, the audits had not been completed.																										Privatization Program										To comply with the IMF’s recommendations, the government also committed to the privatization several of its SOEs. In April 2022, it announced that it would be privatizing GETESA, SEGESA, GITGE, and Ceiba Intercontinental, as well as its mail delivery service (GECOTEL) and vehicle inspection service (ITV). The government also stated that it will undertake privatization of undefined assets in the hospitality, health, and education sectors, as well as at the airports and ports. The government did not provide any details on the timeline or process for the privatization process, but it instructed the Ministry of Finance to establish the relevant procedures, including a transparent public bidding process that is open to international investors. The government is in active negotiations with BANGE SV to restructure SEOs SEGESA and GETESA in order for those entities to be listed in the subregional stock market.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						The government does not have a clearly defined vision on responsible business conduct (RBC) for companies operating in the country. Rather, it encourages such practices through individual decrees and enforcement of laws and policies. The Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, for example, mandates that international oil companies invest a percentage of their proceeds in local corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects. Under the local content rules added to the Hydrocarbon Law in 2014, a significant portion of these funds are used to support the National Technological Institute of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which trains local nationals to work in the extractive sector. Some funds are invested in environmental projects through local and U.S.-based NGOs, while others support social projects like a human trafficking awareness campaign. All CSR projects must be approved by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, and the Ministry receives branding and credit for all CSR initiatives even if it does not contribute any funding. The Ministry oversees the entire CSR process through its Department of Local Content, including selecting the project, local implementing partner(s), and location(s).There are significant human rights concerns in Equatorial Guinea, including arbitrary detentions and restrictions on free speech and assembly, which occasionally affect the investment sector as foreign workers or investors are subject to arbitrary detention and mistreatment when business deals sour or local partners look to seize more profit. There are no alleged instances of child labor in supply chains, major land tenure issues, forced evictions of indigenous peoples, or arrests of environmental defenders. There are some cases of alleged forced labor of third country nationals working for foreign companies and foreign state-owned enterprises, which are covered in more detail in the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report linked below.As a result of Equatorial Guinea’s underdeveloped and under-resourced judicial system, laws designed to protect human rights, workers, the environment, and consumers are rarely effectively enforced. The absence of labor unions and weak civil society organizations result in little third-party oversight of or advocacy for improved government actions related to RBC. A high-profile case in early 2022 resulted in the arrest of six individuals accused of putting consumers at risk by falsifying the expiration dates on products at a prominent supermarket, but local commentors pointed out that practice is widespread and it appeared these individuals were being targeted for political or personal reasons. In 2021, national police arrested multiple individuals for falsifying official signatures and documents to engage in illegal logging, a sector in which the vice president has extensive involvement.Equatorial Guinea applied to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2010, but its application was delisted after the government missed the validation deadline. To comply with IMF recommendations, it reapplied in 2019, but it once again had to withdraw its application in 2020 for failure to meet all requirements. The government has been unable to identify a civil society organization to serve as part of an effective multi-stakeholder oversight mechanism, a key component of admission into the EITI. In late 2021, the Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons stated that the government would be resubmitting its application in early 2022, but as of April, no progress toward reapplying had been made public.Equatorial Guinea is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor does it participate directly in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA).																										Additional Resources										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/equatorial-guinea)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/equatorial-guinea/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOFAC Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ )																																				Climate Issues										Equatorial Guinea’s national climate change policy is established in the following documents:National Food Security Program (NFSP), adopted in 2012;National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), prepared in 2013;Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) plan, adopted in October 2015;National action plan to mitigate CO2 emissions in international aviation, adopted in 2016;Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation National Strategy (NS-REDD+), adopted in 2018;2018-2025 National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP), adopted in 2018; andREDD+ national investment plan (NIP-REDD+), adopted in 2020.Through its existing NDC, the government sets a target of a 20 percent reduction of CO2 emissions by 2030 and a 50 percent reduction 2050 compared to 2010 levels. The NDC plan includes a variety of initiatives designed to help meet this goal and improve Equatorial Guinea’s overall climate adaptation, including: installation of early alert systems for climate risks and natural disasters; periodic resiliency reviews of critical infrastructure; increased use of renewable energy with a focus on hydropower; greater public transportation options; and greater use of new technology, including more fuel-efficient machinery, vehicles, and airplanes. In late 2021, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forests, and Environment (MAGBMA) stated that the government would be releasing its updated NDCs in April 2022, which would include more aggressive targets. Both Ministry officials and third-party observers admit that the government does not currently have the capacity or resources to meet its existing targets, and little tangible progress has been made.Equatorial Guinea’s Hydrocarbon Law No. 8/2006 requires all hydrocarbon operations to be undertaken in a manner that protects and preserves the environment and allows the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons to suspend the operations of any company that damages the country’s natural resources. Law No. 7/2003 on the Environment further requires all companies to present environment protection plans, including environmental impact studies and rehabilitation plans, to the Ministry. There are no known regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, or other desirable ecological benefits, and it is unknown if the government’s public procurement policies include environmental considerations.																																												9. Corruption						    																						Governance is weak and the risk of corruption is perceived as widespread in Equatorial Guinea. The country continues to maintain a low ranking in corruption and governance indexes. Although some anti-corruption measures were introduced in 2012, the legislative and regulatory framework is not fully in line with international standards. Since 2012, corruption has been considered a constitutional offence under article 15.2 of the Constitution. The UNCAC has recently been ratified and an anti-corruption law has been approved by the Parliament. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was ratified in October 2019 and will be transposed into domestic laws. While the criminal code provides severe criminal penalties for official corruption, the relevant agencies (e.g., anti-corruption prosecutor) did not implement the law effectively and officials engage in corrupt practices with impunity.There is no proper code of conduct for public officials. However, Law No. 2/2014 of July 28 on Civil Servants of the State stipulates duties, incompatibilities, accumulations and prohibitions for civil servants, to which must be added the provisions of the aforementioned Law on Ethics and Dignity. On the other hand, there are specific Codes of Conduct for the different autonomous bodies and public business entities. The Commission on Ethics – established to develop and put in place measures and systems to facilitate reporting by public officials of acts of corruption when such acts come to their attention in the performance of their functions – is not operational yet. Declarations of assets were published with minimal information, but did not include activities outside the country, including employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may results with respect to public officials’ functions.Through harassment and intimidation, the government prevents civil society organizations from advocating on any issues that it considers to be political, and it does not offer protection for entities investigating corruption. NGOs of all kinds, but especially those engaging on issues of human rights and good governance, have difficulty obtaining legal registration through the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations.Although there are some rules in place for judicial and other forms of international cooperation, these are not in line with international standards. The CEMAC regulation on international cooperation and the criminal procedure code (Articles 183, among others) include some provisions related to mutual legal assistance, extradition, and the exchange of information. Those rules are not fully in line with international standards since they do not include clear deadlines for dealing with requests, do not provide prosecutors with explicit powers to process these requests, require dual incrimination of money laundering offense, and do not provide provisions for the confiscation and recovery of assets. In relation to extradition, they do not require the prosecution of nationals in case an extradition request is declined.																										Resources to Report Corruption										Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:The government has not provided contact information for the newly created office of the anti-corruption prosecutor. The National Committee on the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (CNPCC) created under Law No. 1/2020 is designed, among other things, to receive reports of suspected corruption cases, but it has yet to be fully established.Contact at a &#8220;watchdog&#8221; organization:The European Union-funded project APROFORT reports on issues of corruption and transparency in the country. Its legal clinic is primarily designed to provide services to human rights activities, civil society organizations, women and girls in vulnerable situations, and LGTBQI+ communities, but it also takes on whistleblower cases. The clinic can be contacted at:Legal Aid ServiceAPROFORTCalle del Botuku Luba, s/nMalabo, Bioko Norte, Equatorial Guinea(+240) 333 099 118 secretariado@transparencia.pt 																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Politically motivated arbitrary detentions do occur. Equatorial Guinea does not have a recent history of political violence or civil disturbance, due in part to significant government controls on political opposition and civil society. Over 50 percent of the population has official membership in the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE), which has maintained control of the legislative, executive, and, by extension, judicial branches since its founding in 1987. In November 2022 the country held its presidential, legislative, and municipal elections, where President Obiang was reelected for a sixth consecutive and last term. International election observers, civil society groups, and opposition parties made credible allegations of significant election-related irregularities, including documented instances of fraud, intimidation, and coercion. These allegations include restrictions on the ability of representatives of political parties to access polling stations, repeat voting, pre-filling of Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) ballots, non-secret voting booths, and heavily armed soldiers within 20 meters of voting booths. Observers concerned by irregular counting practices that favor the party in power, including the counting of unopened ballots in favor of the PDGE and the counting of ballots without all political parties represented.Weeks before election day, opposition leader of political party Citizen for Innovation (CI) was detained alongside his closest collaborators, after the political party headquarters had been surrounded by military troops for weeks. The government accused the leader of conspiring to commit terrorist attacks in the capital Malabo and economic hub Bata. Human rights campaigner Anacleto Micha Nlang, co-founder of the banned rights group “Guinea is also ours” was arrested on September 25 after returning from the offices of the CI party.In response to an increase in crime by youth gangs, especially a group known as the “8 Machetes,” Equatorial Guinea’s Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue launched a national plan to combat these gangs at the beginning of May, which was labelled by the authorities as “Operation Cleanup.” The government instituted a curfew for young people and detained thousands of youth. In a single week in May, for example, more than 400 young people were arrested, while three months later, thousands of young men were reportedly arrested across the country. Some youth remain in detention.In November 2022 Equatorial Guinea authorities launched a nationwide campaign to expel illegal migrants ahead of November 20 general elections. This campaign started after the local government had granted undocumented foreign nationals until August to regularize their status in the country. Security forces launched a vast operation of immigration control, detention, and expulsion of undocumented foreigners in illegal situation.The threat level in the Gulf of Guinea region remains high, as highlighted by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2634 on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, which was unanimously adopted in May 2022. Spearheaded by Ghana and Norway, the resolution expressed the UNSC’s deep concern about the “grave and persistent threat” posed by piracy and transnational organized crime in the Gulf of Guinea. The resolution correctly stressed that unless tackled head-on, piracy will continue to impede international security and navigation, and the sustainable development of states in the region.The first report, pursuant paragraph 16 of resolution 2634, covering period from January 2021 to August 2022 highlighted a change in the patterns of pirate groups in the region, shifting their focus toward kidnapping for ransom piracy. According to a study under the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme, kidnapping for ransom piracy peaked in 2020, with approximately 140 individuals reportedly abducted at sea. The pirate groups operated indiscriminately, targeting vessels of all types, including fishing vessels, and increased their activities further afield. Several cases at the time were reported beyond 200 nautical miles from shore.Against this backdrop, in the reporting period, there were positive developments as the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including kidnapping for ransom, decreased from 123 in 2020 to 45 in 2021. According to data from the Interregional Coordination Centre for the Implementation of the Regional Strategy for Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa, in the first three months of 2021, the number of incidents of maritime crime remained consistent with previous years, with 20 incidents of piracy reported. However, since April 2021, the number of incidents of maritime crime, including piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, has dropped. For instance, in the second and last quarters of 2021, only nine and eight cases of maritime crime were recorded by the Interregional Coordination Centre, respectively. This trend has continued in 2022, with the Interregional Coordination Centre reporting a total of 16 incidents of maritime crime between January and June. The trend has been corroborated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System, which contained data on 13 incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf ofGuinea between January and June 2022. The report is available at  https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/situation-piracy-and-armed-robbery-sea-gulf-guinea-and-its-underlying-causes-report-secretary-general-s2022818 																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						In December 2021, the Parliament passed General Labor Law No. 4/2021, updating the regulations governing Equatorial Guinea’s labor law. This new law was designed to strengthen workers’ rights and create streamlined procedures for arbitrating labor disputes. It also raised the retirement age from 60 to 65. While the government has not published the law’s text online, in March 2022 it organized a public session to provide information on the new regulations to private companies.Labor disputes may be heard by the legislature or in the courts, and decisions often favor the employee. This can be especially true for foreign firms. Labor disputes involving companies are frequently resolved through legislative hearings, after which the company may be obligated to pay a substantial compensation to the local employee. Employers are required to make significant severance payments to separated employees, even when employment demands fluctuate due to market conditions. Currently, the government does not provide any unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs to assist laid-off workers.Due to its small labor pool and underdeveloped education system, Equatorial Guinea has a consistent shortage of both skilled and unskilled local labor. Foreign laborers make up an important segment of all sectors of the economy, and dominate in highly skilled professions, including engineers, pilots, and doctors. Despite local skilled labor shortages, the National Content Law of Equatorial Guinea requires that 70 percent of foreign oil company’s staff consist of local nationals. Furthermore, before hiring an expatriate worker, these companies must demonstrate to the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons that they have been unable to find a suitable local employee during a period of 30 days.While official statistics are scarce, anecdotal evidence suggests that youth unemployment is widespread and that women remain under-represented in the formal economy. A study conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 2017 estimated that the informal sector is responsible for 32 percent of Equatorial Guinea’s GDP. This informal sector, which includes the provision of both goods and services, grew quickly following the start of an economic recession in 2015, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.Aside from a union of small farmers and the taxi association, the government has not recognized any labor unions, so collective bargaining is not common. The government allows small collectives and associations to register but does not permit them to engage in labor advocacy. There have not been any strikes during the last year that posed an investment risk, as the government typically restricts strikes or protests. There is no evidence of the government waiving labor laws to attractive foreign investments. Equatorial Guinea joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1981 and has ratified the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, and the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs						    																						In June 1998, the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea signed an investment incentive agreement through the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the precursor to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC does not have any active projects in Equatorial Guinea, but there is potential for DFC programs to support investments in infrastructure (including water and power), telecommunications, agriculture, petrochemicals, and other industries.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics						    																						&nbsp;Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2022$12,1392021$12,270www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investmenthttps://inege.gq*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/A2021$2,793BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/AN/A$N/ABEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDPN/AN/A2021122.7%UNCTAD data available athttps://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report   Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIEquatorial Guinea is not listed in the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey database.																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Ruffing, Claire(Government Affairs and Economic Chief)(Malabo II highway)(+240) 333 09 57 41ruffingce@state.gov																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											The Bahamas											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Philippines											Peru											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources																																																						Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Equatorial Guinea
- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Fiscal Transparency Report&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Fiscal Transparency Report: Equatorial Guinea																																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Government-by-Government Assessments:Equatorial Guinea																																												Government-by-Government Assessments:Equatorial Guinea				During the review period, the government published its enacted budget within a reasonable period. The government did not, however, publish an executive budget proposal and an end-of-year report within a reasonable period. Budget documents were prepared according to internationally accepted principles. Budget documents, except the proposed budget and end-of-year report, were available online. Only limited information on debt obligations, including major state-owned enterprise debt, was publicly available. Budget documents provided a substantially complete picture of the government’s planned expenditures and revenue. Budget executions deviated significantly from budget projections and the government did not produce and publicly issue revised budget estimates or pass a supplementary budget. The government also maintained significant off-budget accounts not subject to public oversight. Military and intelligence budgets were not subject to parliamentary or civilian public oversight. While the government established a supreme audit institution, it was not yet operational and did not audit the executed budget or make its reports publicly available. Major state-owned enterprises lacked publicly available audited financial statements. The government specified in law or regulation the criteria and procedures for awarding natural resource extraction contracts and licenses. The government’s attempts to renegotiate awarded contracts created concern about its commitment to follow such laws. Basic information on natural resource extraction awards was publicly available. The sovereign wealth fund did not have a sound legal framework or disclose its source of funding and general approach to withdrawals.Equatorial Guinea’s fiscal transparency would be improved by:Publishing an executive budget proposal and an end-of-year report in a reasonable period;Making budget documents and information on debt obligations widely and easily accessible to the public, including major state-owned enterprise debt;Subjecting off-budget accounts to public oversight;Producing and publicly issuing revised budget estimates or passing a supplementary budget when budget executions deviate significantly from projections;Eliminating off-budget accounts or subjecting them to adequate oversight and audit;Subjecting military and intelligence budgets to parliamentary or civilian public oversight;Ensuring the supreme audit institution meets international standards of independence and publishes audit reports of the government’s executed budget that contain substantive findings;Publishing audited financial statements for major state-owned enterprises;Following natural resource extraction laws and regulations in practice; andEstablishing a sound legal framework for the sovereign wealth fund and disclosing its source of funding and general approach to withdrawals.																												    							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- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Equatorial Guinea																																					Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons																																																																																																				 In this section										/																							EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Tier 3)																																													EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Tier 3)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Tier 3)				The Government of Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity, and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Equatorial Guinea was downgraded to Tier 3.  Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including training law enforcement officials on trafficking.  However, the government did not prosecute any traffickers and has never convicted a trafficker under its 2004 anti-trafficking law.  The government did not identify any trafficking victims for the second consecutive year and did not make any efforts to proactively identify victims among vulnerable populations.  The government’s anti-trafficking law did not criminalize all forms of trafficking.  Allegations that senior government officials were complicit in trafficking crimes continued to hinder the government’s overall efforts to combat human trafficking.  Authorities did not screen vulnerable populations for trafficking.  																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Prioritize the proactive identification of victims of trafficking – separate from fraudulent adoptions or other forms of abuse – including by screening vulnerable communities such as child laborers in markets; women in commercial sex; domestic and construction workers; undocumented immigrants; and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) national workers; and Cuban overseas workers, including medical professionals.  Significantly increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and convict traffickers, including complicit officials.  Increase funding for victim services and coordinate with civil society as well as NGOs to provide shelter for all identified trafficking victims.  Amend the penal code to remove the requirement of a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking cases.  Implement the 2022-2024 anti-trafficking NAP to enhance governmental coordination on anti-trafficking efforts and allocate dedicated resources to its implementation.  Continue to expand training for law enforcement and judicial officials to increase their capacity to investigate, prosecute, and – following a fair and transparent trial – convict traffickers.  Continue to train social workers, law enforcement, labor inspectors, and immigration officials on trafficking indicators.  Continue to include local officials in the nation-wide anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns to educate more individuals on trafficking indicators.  Re-establish the government’s web-based reporting platform and hotline for the public to report potential trafficking cases.  Screen all individuals in immigration detention or custody for indicators of human trafficking. Provide legal pathways for undocumented migrants to obtain a residency permit. Allow registration of anti-trafficking NGOs and enable their full and independent operation.  Regularly cooperate and communicate with law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and community advisors on victim identification and referral procedures among vulnerable populations to ensure better coordination with the anti-trafficking Interagency Coordinating Committee (TICC), NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government made inadequate anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.  The 2004 Law on the Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons, as amended, criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of at least 50 million Central African francs (CFA) ($81,460) for offenses involving adult victims; an additional five years would be added to the principle penalty for those involving child victims.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.  Inconsistent with the international law definition, Equatorial Guinea’s legal framework required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, and therefore, it did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking.  Additionally, the law defined trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation.The government did not make comprehensive law enforcement statistics easily accessible and had limited information management and data collection capabilities.  The government reportedly initiated investigations of 40 cases involving an unknown number of suspects; all 40 cases involved suspects identified in previous reporting periods.  This compared with the government investigating three suspects in an unknown number of cases in the previous reporting period.  The government has not prosecuted any suspected traffickers since 2019 and has never convicted a trafficker under its 2004 trafficking law.  The government did not report cooperating with foreign government counterparts on any law enforcement activities.The government has not initiated prosecutions of any traffickers since 2019; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement and investigative efforts.  Multiple credible sources alleged senior officials were involved in human trafficking crimes, particularly by exploiting women and girls in domestic servitude in their own households or in sex trafficking.Lower-level officials reportedly took bribes from foreign nationals who overstayed their visas, and judges were also accused of taking bribes and accepting other goods in exchange for favorable rulings.  Sources alleged members of the Equatoguinean military used fake family ties to falsify identity documents to facilitate a sex trafficking ring in Menorca, Spain involving women and girls.The government organized training in Bata on human trafficking, investigative techniques, and victim identification for border agents and military personnel stationed in Equatorial Guinea’s continental region.  Despite continued training and awareness raising efforts by the government, many government officials lacked understanding of human trafficking, hindering the government’s ability to identify victims and address the crime.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government made negligible efforts to protect victims.  The government did not report identifying any trafficking victims for the second consecutive year.  One NGO identified 250 potential trafficking victims and reintegrated nine Equatoguinean trafficking victims to their local communities.  The government previously reported it had finalized two new SOPs for victim protection and care – one for government agencies and the other for consular officers to use abroad; however, the SOPs remained pending final approval by the end of the reporting period.  The government did not report providing services or referrals to any trafficking victims.  Officials could designate government housing as temporary shelters for victims of trafficking and domestic violence, although authorities did not report providing such services to any trafficking victims.  The government did not report funding allocated for anti-trafficking efforts to provide services and raise awareness compared with 75 million CFA ($122,190) in the previous reporting period.  The government did not have victim-witness assistance procedures to support victim participation in the criminal justice process.  The government had no formal policies to provide foreign trafficking victims legal alternatives to their removal to countries where they might face retribution or hardship.  Due to a lack of widely used formal victim identification procedures, authorities may have deported or arrested some unidentified trafficking victims.&nbsp;																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained limited efforts to prevent trafficking.  The TICC, which included representatives from the Office of the Third Vice Prime Minister in charge of Human Rights, multiple ministries, and two NGOs, convened six times during the reporting period.  The government maintained its 2022-2024 NAP, which built on key anti-trafficking priority recommendations highlighted in the previous reporting period.  Authorities included activities in the updated NAP to combat emerging trends in online sexual exploitation.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Diaspora did not provide any updates on the draft roadmap document to address anti-trafficking gaps highlighted in previous reporting periods.  The Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations, in collaboration with a local NGO and international organizations, continued to host seminars for local authorities and community leaders on the identification of human trafficking and child labor in urban districts in Malabo and Bata, reportedly training 46 local leaders and health workers, a significant decrease compared with training 810 local leaders in the previous reporting period.  As previously reported, the government partnered with the same NGO to hold additional seminars to raise awareness of human rights issues, including trafficking, for 20 health care workers.  Observers reported a public service announcement on human trafficking created by the Ministry of National Security in 2020 continued to air on national TV stations.  The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security’s web-based reporting platform and hotline were no longer operational for individuals to anonymously report potential trafficking cases; no other hotline was available for trafficking-related calls.The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security continued to implement regulations requiring all companies to sign formal labor contracts with their employees; however, observers reported limited enforcement by the government.  Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security officials conducted inspections; however, the government did not report identifying any trafficking victims during these inspections.  The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.  The government did not provide anti-trafficking training for diplomats; new training materials for diplomats drafted in the prior reporting period remained pending.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Equatorial Guinea, and traffickers exploit victims from Equatorial Guinea abroad.  Despite continued education and awareness raising efforts by the government, many civil society members and government officials still lack an understanding of human trafficking, hindering the country’s ability to identify victims and address the crime.  Observers reported traffickers are adjusting their tactics to increasingly use online platforms to recruit and exploit victims.  Observers reported Equatoguineans exploit the majority of trafficking victims in domestic servitude and sex trafficking in the cities of Malabo, Bata, Mongomo, and Ebebiyin, where relative wealth and security attracts Central and West African migrant workers.Equatoguinean traffickers exploit local and foreign women in sex trafficking in these cities, with the Malabo neighborhoods of Banapa, Paraiso, and the city center as primary areas of concern.  NGOs reported women and girls, especially LGBTQI+ persons, were particularly vulnerable to trafficking.  Additionally, in some instances, the practice of “bride price,” where a man gives a certain amount of money to marry, is misused and may increase vulnerabilities to trafficking.  Foreign national men were susceptible to deceptive employment offers and forced labor in construction, agriculture, domestic work (informal security guards), and other jobs with limited formal training.Observers noted the sustained economic downturn due to decreasing oil prices and oil production – exacerbated by the global economic contraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic – resulted in Equatoguineans in urban centers replacing some foreign domestic workers with children from rural areas in Equatorial Guinea, whom they exploited in forced labor.  Some business owners involved in the hospitality and restaurant sectors exploit hotel and bar workers in forced labor and sex trafficking within the country’s urban centers.  Observers report LGBTQI+ youth are often left homeless and stigmatized by their families and society, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking.  Traffickers fraudulently recruit Equatoguinean and foreign national children to attend school or learn a trade and instead exploit them in domestic servitude.  Young men and girls participating in employment mentorship programs are vulnerable to trafficking due a lack of formal contracts.  Equatoguinean and foreign business owners reportedly exploit children from nearby countries – primarily Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Cameroon – in forced labor as domestic workers, market laborers, and street vendors.  Observers reported Equatoguinean traffickers – some of whom may be associated with the country’s elites – may exploit women from Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Ethiopia, and the PRC in sex trafficking at nightclubs, bars, and brothels in the country.  Traffickers may exploit Equatoguineans in sex trafficking in Spain.  Sources alleged members of the Equatoguinean military falsified identity documents to facilitate a sex trafficking ring in Menorca, Spain involving women and girls.Some business owners recruit women from Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, other African countries, and Latin America for work in Equatorial Guinea and exploit them in forced labor in markets and hair salons or in sex trafficking.  Sources reported the lack of birth certificates and legal documents to establish proof of individuals’ age, particularly children and women, make them vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking.  Authorities reported some Equatoguineans hire domestic workers from Paraguay and other South American countries to exploit them in domestic servitude.  PRC national-owned firms recruit PRC nationals to migrate to Equatorial Guinea for work; some of these businesses then confiscate workers’ passports, which increases their vulnerability to forced labor or sex trafficking.Observers noted the government contracted highly-skilled professionals such as Cuban doctors and teachers to work in its public schools and hospitals.  Some Cuban doctors arrived independently and established their own clinics.  A small number of PRC nationals may have been forced to work on government-funded projects.  Companies in the construction sector, among others, also sometimes held the passports of foreign workers, increasing their vulnerability to forced labor.  Observers reported some corrupt and complicit government workers – including senior officials – participated in trafficking-related crimes.  Authorities asserted some foreign diplomats accredited to Malabo may be directly involved in child trafficking and smuggling.  Sources also reported government officials are keen on using foreigners as scapegoats for human trafficking crimes committed in Equatorial Guinea.																																				    							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- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsOffice of International Religious Freedom2022 Report on International Religious Freedom&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Equatorial Guinea																																					Office of International Religious Freedom																																																																																							Download Report																																																																																	 In this section										/																							Executive Summary																																													Executive Summary																															Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy																																																																																																								Executive Summary				The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation. The law states there is no national religion, but by decree and practice, the government gives preference to the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea, which are the largest religious groups and the only ones not required to register their organization or activities with the Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs, and Penitentiary Institutions (MJRAPI).In July, authorities arrested and detained Ruben Maye Nsue, a former ambassador and Minister of Justice, reportedly in reaction to a sermon he preached as an ordained Pentecostal apostle condemning the “tyranny” of the government. Following Maye’s arrest and detention, authorities interrogated other Pentecostal church officials, who subsequently condemned Maye’s actions in statements that they said were intended to preserve their ability to preach and access their congregations. The government disbanded religious groups for noncompliance with new requirements to provide a theological certificate to obtain authorization to operate. Evangelical Christians continued to report that residency permits were prohibitively expensive, leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing their permits.There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom during the year.The U.S. Ambassador met with government officials, including the MJRAPI Minister, to discuss the importance of religious freedom and respect for human rights. U.S. embassy staff members met with the Catholic Archbishop of Malabo, the presidents of the evangelical Christian and Pentecostal communities, and members of the Muslim and Baha’i communities to discuss their experiences as minority religious groups and religious tolerance in the country. The embassy also hosted Muslim religious leaders and members of the diplomatic corps for the mission’s first-ever iftar during Ramadan.																														Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.7 million (midyear 2022). The most recent local census, conducted in 2015, estimates the total population at 1.2 million. According to the most recent government estimate from 2015, 88 percent of the population are Roman Catholic and 5 percent Protestant. Many Christians reportedly practice some aspects of traditional Indigenous religions as well. According to the 2015 census, 2 percent of the population are Muslim, mainly Sunni; most of the Muslim population consists of expatriates from West Africa. The remaining 5 percent of the population adhere to animism, the Baha’i Faith, Judaism, or other beliefs.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation. The law states there is no national religion and individuals are free to change religions. By law, Christians converting to Islam are permitted to add Muslim names to their Christian names on their official documents.Neither the Catholic Church nor the Protestant Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea, the two largest religious groups in the country, are required to register with the MJRAPI. The only religious group to receive state funding for operating educational institutions is the Catholic Church.Some longstanding religious groups, such as Methodists, Muslims, and Baha’is, hold permanent government authorizations and are not required to renew their registrations with the MJRAPI. Newer groups and denominations may be required to renew their registration annually. Groups that have successfully registered in the past may re-register every two years. To register, religious groups at the congregational level must submit a written application to the MJRAPI director general of religious affairs. Groups seeking to register must supply detailed information about the leadership (e.g., curriculum vitae) and membership of the group, construction plans for religious buildings, property ownership documents, accreditations, and a mission statement from the religious organization’s headquarters, and must pay a fee of 500,000 Central African francs (CFA francs) ($820). The director general of religious affairs adjudicates these applications and may order an inspection by the MJRAPI before processing. The government may fine or shut down unregistered groups.The law requires a permit for door-to-door proselytizing.An MJRAPI decree specifies that any religious activities taking place outside the hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. or outside of registered places of worship require preauthorization from the ministry. The decree prohibits religious acts or preaching within private residences if those acts involve persons who do not live there. Foreign religious representatives or authorities must obtain advance permission from the MJRAPI to lead or speak at religious activities, but such permission is not required simply to attend services. The MJRAPI permission is usually granted for the duration of the foreign religious representative’s visit to the country. The decree exempts the Catholic Church.The government recognizes official documents issued by authorized religious groups, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates.The constitution states individuals are free to study religion in schools and may not be forced to study a faith other than their own. Catholic religious classes are part of the public school curriculum, but such study may be replaced by non-Catholic religious study or by a recess with a note from a leader of another religious group.There are several Catholic schools. Protestant groups, including the Reformed Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Methodists, Baptists, and other Christians, operate primary and secondary schools. These schools must be registered with the government and fulfill standard curriculum requirements.Most foreigners, including foreign evangelical Christian missionaries, are required to obtain residency permits to remain in the country. Catholic missionaries are exempt from the residency permit requirement.By law, the National Day of Prayer, usually celebrated on the first Sunday in April, is an annual event.The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.																																				Government Practices										On August 7, authorities arrested and detained Ruben Maye Nsue, a former ambassador and former Minister of Justice, reportedly in reaction to a sermon he preached as an ordained Pentecostal apostle condemning the “tyranny” of the government. Maye stated he suffered mistreatment during his detention. On August 9, the MJRAPI issued a decree barring Maye from holding church services and “disqualifying” him from serving as a minister of worship, pastor, or in any similar position because of his inflammatory statements against government officials and perceived calls for violence and disorder. Authorities also interrogated other Pentecostal church officials, especially those associated with Maye’s ordination and his church, the Prophetic Ministry of the Shadow of Christ. The other Pentecostal officials eventually issued statements condemning Maye’s statements, an action that they said was intended to preserve their ability to preach and access their congregations.During the year, the MJRAPI continued to enforce the requirements to renew registration that originally took force in late 2021. All leaders of churches must present a certificate of theology or religious studies from an internationally recognized institution of higher education, and the National University of Equatorial Guinea (UNGE) must issue an equivalent certificate.Many religious groups in the country criticized the 2021 regulations and some evangelical Christian churches reportedly lodged a formal complaint with MJRAPI during the year. None of the religious leaders reported having presented the required certificate, since UNGE is not yet able to issue them. As a result of this regulation, families of foreign missionaries have had to leave the country, while others are confined to their houses without any option to renew their temporary residency or permanency permit because their churches are unable to register.In February and March, the government ordered the closure of several religious groups for noncompliance with the new regulations to renew registration, including churches in Akonibe, Luba, Nsork, Bata, and Malabo. The leaders of the churches in Malabo protested to MJRAPI and eventually secured permission to reopen these churches for the rest of the year; at year’s end they were awaiting re-registration. The new regulations disproportionately adversely affected evangelical Christian churches: the Catholic Church is exempt from the requirements, Muslim communities are already established, and other religious communities are too small to be registering new entities.The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God-Stop Suffering, run by Brazilian missionaries and disbanded in 2020 by presidential decree for violating COVID-19 protocols, successfully reopened during the year and was operating at year’s end.During the year, the government maintained the price of registration of religious groups at 350,000 CFA francs ($570), and religious groups could apply to reregister every two years instead of annually.While the government continued routinely to grant permission for religious groups to hold activities outside of places of worship, with the exception of private homes, it usually denied permits to hold activities outside of the prescribed hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., according to religious leaders. Authorities permitted all religious groups to hold services provided they finished before 9 p.m. and did not disturb the peace. The government punished evangelical Christian groups for holding activities outside the prescribed period and permanently closed some churches and church branches.Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians continued to report that residency permits (which are separate from group registration permits) were prohibitively expensive, at 400,000 CFA francs ($650) for a two-year period, leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing their permits. Local police reportedly enforced the requirement with threats of deportation and requested a small bribe as an alternative.There were deportations throughout the year, but no reports of specific targeting of missionaries. The residency permit fee for foreign missionaries was the same as for other foreigners.The regulation requiring applicants to prove their missionary status and submit a theological certificate precluded most missionaries from qualifying for a residency permit. Catholic missionaries did not require residency permits to remain in the country.Catholic masses remained a normal part of all major ceremonial functions and were held, for example, on Independence Day (October 12) and the President’s Birthday holiday (June 5). Catholic leaders were the only religious leaders to regularly meet publicly with the highest-level government officials. Catholic and Reformed Church leaders were often seated in preferred locations at official functions. On August 15, the Metropolitan Cathedral of Malabo (also known as Santa Isabel Cathedral) reopened its doors with a massive, government-funded ceremony in the presence of the President and his wife, members of government, diplomats, businessmen, and representatives from other religious groups, including evangelical Christians, Muslims and Baha’is. Special Envoy and Secretary of State of the Vatican, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, celebrated the Mass.Some non-Catholics who worked for the government continued to report that their supervisors strongly encouraged participation in religious activities related to their government positions, including attending Catholic masses. Government officials stated that it was expected that they attend major events such as the President’s Birthday Mass at nearby Catholic churches.The government again did not allow the Muslim community to celebrate Eid al-Adha in Malabo Stadium due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.For the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic began, the Catholic Church held and hosted a National Day of Prayer lunch in person. By law, the lunch rotates to a different Christian denomination to host each year.																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy												    																																															The U.S. Ambassador met with government officials, including the MJRAPI Minister, to discuss the importance of religious freedom, efforts to promote religious tolerance, and respect for human rights. The embassy also hosted Muslim religious leaders and members of the diplomatic corps for the embassy’s first iftar during Ramadan.Embassy officials spoke with the Catholic Archbishop of Malabo to discuss the dynamics between the church and secular authorities as well as the ongoing Batete church project. Embassy officials met with evangelical Christian pastors and Protestant leaders to discuss the impact the registration requirements had on their churches and communities. They also discussed religious freedom and the ability to freely practice religion with Muslim religious and community leaders. Finally, embassy officials discussed the needs facing minority religious communities with representatives from the Baha’i faith.Renovation of the Batete Catholic Church began during the year, but the continued deterioration of the church building since the project was originally developed in 2019 significantly complicated work. The embassy and the World Monuments Fund, the project implementer, continued to explore ways to move the renovation forward. The national government has also committed funding.																																				    							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Religious Demography																																																	Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																							Legal Framework																																																						Government Practices																																																			Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																	Section IV. U.S. Government Policy																																																							Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Equatorial Guinea																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom
- Equatorial Guinea HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Equatorial Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Equatorial Guinea																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																								Transnational Repression																																																								Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies																																																								Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																																																																		f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																								Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																																												Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government																																																																																		Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																																																																																		Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Equatorial Guinea is nominally a multiparty constitutional republic. Since a military coup in 1979, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has dominated all branches of government in collaboration with his clan and political party, the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea, which he founded in 1991. In November, President Obiang claimed to receive 94.9 percent of the vote in the presidential election. His ruling party won all Senate and lower chamber seats. Many observers considered the elections to lack credibility, with significant irregularities such as instances of voter intimidation, nonsecret ballots, nontransparent voting processes, and systemic favoritism for the ruling party.The vice president (Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, eldest son of President Obiang) has overall control of the security forces. Police generally are responsible for maintaining law and order in the cities, while gendarmes are responsible for security outside cities and for special events. Police report to the Ministry of National Security, while gendarmes report to the Ministry of National Defense. Military personnel, who report to the Ministry of National Defense, fulfill police functions in border areas, sensitive sites, and high-traffic areas. Both ministries report to the vice president directly. Additional police elements are in the Ministries of Interior (border and traffic police), Finance (customs enforcement), and Justice (investigating and prosecuting police). Presidential security officials also exercise police functions at or near presidential facilities. Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over the security forces. There were reports that members of the security forces committed numerous abuses.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by or on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including censorship and enforcement of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and outlawing of independent trade unions or significant restrictions on worker’s freedom of association.The government took some steps to prosecute or punish officials who engaged in corruption, but impunity was a serious problem. The government did not take steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, or punish officials who committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.Throughout the year, there were anecdotal accounts of deaths in prison due to injuries inflicted by prison staff; no remedial action was taken.In August, several individuals died after arrest and detention during police action Operacion Limpieza (Operation Clean-Up), allegedly from maltreatment or neglect in police custody.Also in August, a prisoner from the 2017 coup attempt against President Obiang died while in custody. Activist groups claim his death was because of government mistreatment. Members of the political opposition claimed a second prisoner in the same prison died from maltreatment during the same period.In September, political movement Citizens for Innovation (CI) claimed police killed nine of their members during a raid on CI’s headquarters.No specific office investigates the legality of security force killings.																																				b. Disappearance										In September, authorities arrested numerous activists and civil society members without appropriately registering them in pretrial detention, during and after the government attack on the CI headquarters.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibit such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.  Police tortured activists and members of opposition parties, according to political opposition leaders and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  Lawyers and other observers who visited prisons and jails reported serious abuses, including beatings and torture.Police reportedly beat and threatened detainees to extract information or to force confessions.  Local civil society organizations claimed security forces tortured detainees in every prison in the country, including Black Beach prison in Malabo and in several Ministry of Interior locations, with increasing prisoner transfers between Malabo and prisons on the mainland to avoid domestic and international scrutiny.In July, officials claiming to be from the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations arrested and detained a representative of a local NGO.  The representative appeared at a subsequent meeting with foreign diplomats with open facial wounds and body bruises, injuries he claimed he received from those Ministry of Interior officials.In September, authorities detained popular rapper and activist Leoncio Pisco Eko, known as “Adjoguening.”  Later that month, a WhatsApp audio recording circulated of him allegedly being tortured.  The government denied the voice of the victim on the recording was Adjoguening.  In October, authorities released Adjoguening, and he posted a video claiming he had experienced torture, including being stripped naked and beaten.During the September police raid on CI headquarters, leader Gabriel Nze Obiang was arrested, stripped, and made to walk through a crowd in his underwear.In the aftermath of the September government assault on CI’s headquarters, members of CI accused the government of transferring CI members to Oveng Asem prison on the mainland to avoid the intense international attention the incident had attracted.  In a WhatsApp audio circulated by opposition groups and human rights organizations containing information consistent with other reports, a woman accused the government of mistreating the prisoners, including denying food, water, and medical treatment.  In October, when authorities released some CI members, they appeared in a video accusing police of mistreatment.  Allegations included confiscated belongings and forced disavowals of political affiliation with CI.  Released members alleged individuals who remained in custody had been denied medical treatment for their wounds sustained during the September raid.Impunity was a significant problem within the security forces, due to corruption, poor training, and the ability of senior government officials to order extrajudicial acts.  An inspector general’s office within the Ministry of National Security investigates abuses within the ministry.  Early in the year, gendarmes and police received training from the United Nations and a local NGO on human rights.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						According to local observers, conditions in the country’s three prisons and 12 police station jails were generally harsh and occasionally life threatening due to severe physical and emotional abuse, overcrowding, disease, inadequate food, poorly trained staff, limited oversight, and lack of medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Prison cells were overcrowded, dirty, and lacked mattresses.  Up to 30 detainees commonly shared one toilet that lacked toilet paper and a functioning door.  Inmates rarely had access to exercise.  In some cases, prisoners were reportedly left in solitary confinement for extended periods.  Diseases such as COVID-19, malaria, typhoid, tuberculosis, hepatitis C, and HIV and AIDS were serious problems.  In September, there were reports of a tuberculosis outbreak in one of the prisons in the continental region.  In December, authorities reported a cholera outbreak in Black Beach prison.  Prison authorities sporadically provided a limited number of prisoners and detainees with basic meals, but food was generally insufficient and of poor quality.  Jails did not provide food to detainees, but authorities generally allowed families and friends to deliver meals twice daily, although police did not always pass on the food to the detainees.  Ventilation and lighting were not always adequate, and rodent infestations were common.  An NGO leader reported conditions and prisoner treatment in prisons on the mainland was much worse than in Black Beach prison in Malabo.The Ministries of Justice and National Security operated civilian prisons on military installations, with military personnel handling security outside the prisons and civilians providing security and other services within them.Statistics on prisoner deaths were unavailable.  In August, a local NGO reported deaths of Operacion Limpieza detainees, including multiple children, because of mistreatment and abusive physical conditions in jails.  A September WhatsApp audio accused the government of causing frequent prison deaths from hunger and illness at the Oveng Asem prison on the mainland.Administration:  Authorities did not regularly investigate credible allegations of mistreatment.  Visitors had to pay guards small bribes to see detainees.  Since 2020, authorities restricted visitation rights for family members and for legal counsel due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  According to advocacy organizations, health concerns or outbreaks were used as pretexts to deny access to certain prisoners.  Civil society organizations that received permission from the Ministry of Justice, Penitentiary Institutions, and Religion to visit prisoners were often refused entry by Ministry of National Security officials staffing the prisons.Independent Monitoring:  There was no independent monitoring of prisons or detention centers.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court.  The government rarely observed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law requires arrest warrants unless a crime is in progress or in cases that affect national security.  Members of the security forces frequently arrested persons in violation of the warrant requirement, and there were credible reports that in cases where no crime had been committed individuals were detained at the order of a senior executive branch official.  A detainee has the right to a judicial determination of the legality of detention within 72 hours of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays, but this determination often took longer, sometimes several months.  NGOs indicated most detainees were not charged and judges typically failed to issue a writ of habeas corpus within the 72-hour limit.Courts rarely approved bail.  The bar association supplied public defenders to those who could not afford private counsel but only at the time they were charged.  Authorities occasionally denied access to lawyers, particularly in the case of political detainees.  The law prohibits incommunicado detention, but local police chiefs did not always respect this prohibition and individuals detained in connection with civil society groups or political opposition movements were frequently held incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest:  There were numerous reported cases of arbitrary arrests.  The government arbitrarily arrested immigrants, opposition members, activists, and others.  Many detainees complained bribes had to be paid to obtain release.Police detained foreign nationals and took them into custody even when they provided proper documentation.  Police raided immigrant communities.  Reliable sources reported police abused, extorted, or detained legal and irregular immigrants during raids.  Diplomatic representatives in the country noted the government made foreign nationals vulnerable to abuse through harassment, abuse, extortion, detention, and not renewing residence and work permits in a timely manner.In May, the government began Operacion Limpieza allegedly in response to increased street violence from a gang armed with machetes called 8Machete.  Police arrested more than 450 youths.  According to civil society groups, many of the youths were unaffiliated with the gang and had committed no crime.  As of November, some of the individuals detained in the initial roundup were still being held in pretrial detention.  Authorities did not charge those released with any crime.  When questioned, a high-level Ministry of Justice official stated it was possible police had “taken things too far.”Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem and was often politically motivated.  Inefficient judicial procedures, corruption, lack of monitoring, and inadequate staffing contributed to the problem.  Occasionally, pretrial detention equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the crime.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law does not provide for an independent judiciary, and the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality.  The president is designated the “first magistrate of the nation” and chair of the Judicial Council responsible for appointing judges and magistrates.Members of the government often influenced judges in sensitive cases.  Judges and magistrates sometimes decided cases on political grounds, and many were members of the ruling party; others sought bribes.  Impunity for politically motivated abuses was a problem, and human rights activists and opposition members had little legal recourse to protest such abuses.  Authorities did not always respect court orders, and many persons turned to the legislature, the Constitutional Court, or the president in his executive role for enforcement of civil judgments on matters such as employment, land, and personal injury disputes, circumventing appropriate legal processes altogether.  Credible reports alleged judges decided in favor of plaintiffs in cases against international companies in return for a percentage of damages awarded.  There were reports of individuals kept in custody after completion of their sentences, and local lawyers asserted these cases represented interference from the highest level of the executive branch in judicial matters, and few if any judges would contradict an order from the executive branch.																Trial Procedures						The law provides for the right to a fair public trail, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.  Courts generally did not respect the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed promptly and in detail of charges, the right to free interpretation, or the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense.  Unless defendants could afford private counsel, they were rarely able to consult promptly with attorneys.  Courts seldom respected the right to confront and question witnesses and to present one’s own witnesses and evidence.  Authorities did not respect the right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt or the right to appeal.The military justice system provided defendants with fewer procedural safeguards than the criminal court system.  The code of military justice states that a military tribunal should judge any civilian or member of the military who disobeys a military authority or who is accused of committing a crime that is considered a “crime against the state.”  A defendant in the military justice system may be tried in absentia, and the defense does not have the right to cross-examine an accuser.  Such proceedings were not public, and defendants have no right of appeal to a higher court.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were numerous reports of political prisoners or detainees, but no data was available on their number or length of detention and the government denied it held any political prisoners.  Political prisoners were often held at Oveng Asem, where they remained without charge or trial and without access to attorneys or human rights or humanitarian organizations for months at a time, and in the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations – known in the country as Guantanamo – where sensitive political detainees were often kept for the first several days of their detention.  There was little to no information regarding conditions at Guantanamo.  Authorities also restricted religious observances for political prisoners.Charges of terrorism, threatening the president or vice president, contributing to social instability, and inciting unrest were often used as pretexts to detain members of civil society or opposition groups.In September, authorities detained without cause at least five members of the civil society platform Somos + (We are More), as were four activists who primarily operated on WhatsApp.  Authorities arrested four members of unregistered opposition political parties after they provided testimony at the office of the fiscal general, the government’s chief prosecutor.In the aftermath of the September raid on CI headquarters, there were reports political detainees were transferred to the mainland instead of remaining in Black Beach Prison because there were fewer opposition or human rights observers available on the mainland.						Transnational Repression						Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion:  A local activist reported the government surveilled activists abroad to disrupt their travel and dissuade them from criticizing the government.						Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies						Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights abuses through domestic courts or other administrative mechanisms, such as filing petitions with the House of Representatives’ Commission on Human Rights.The government sometimes failed to comply with court decisions pertaining to human rights, including political rights.  Individuals and organizations may appeal adverse court decisions to the ombudsperson or the legislature.						Property Seizure and Restitution						The government routinely seized valuable land for governmental development or the personal benefit of government officials, with a systemic failure to provide proportionate and timely restitution or compensation for governmental takings of private property.																										f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but the government often did not respect these prohibitions. Search warrants are required unless a crime is in progress or for reasons of national security, but security force members reportedly entered homes without required warrants and arrested alleged criminals, foreign nationals, and others. They also confiscated property and demanded bribes with impunity. Military and police personnel committed many break-ins.Authorities reportedly monitored opposition members, NGOs, journalists, and foreign diplomats, including through internet and telephone surveillance. Members of civil society and opposition parties reported both covert and overt surveillance by security services. There were extensive reports of informer systems, including within families, neighborhood communities, and political opposition groups, and at demonstrations. The ruling party rewarded individuals with promotion within the party if they reported derogatory information to the Ministry of National Security. There were also reports from a local NGO authorities detained family members of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals as proxies until the LGBTQI+ persons presented themselves to authorities.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, the government retained and used extensive legal powers to restrict media activities.Freedom of Expression:  Individuals generally chose not to criticize the president, his family, other high-ranking officials, and security forces due to the risk of reprisal.  The government attempted to impede criticism by continuing to monitor the activities of opposition members, journalists, and others.  In some cases, authorities reprimanded individuals, removed them from their jobs, or both.  Most individuals on social media assumed the government was monitoring their activity, and activists reported electronic surveillance of their personal email accounts.  Individuals also assumed their telephone calls were monitored by government officials.  Many individuals avoided discussing certain sensitive topics on the telephone due to concerns of monitoring.Violence and Harassment:  Unlike in previous years, no incidents were reported of security forces detaining, intimidating, and harassing journalists during the year.  The government took no steps to preserve the safety and independence of media.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The law gives the government considerable authority to restrict media content through official prepublication censorship, and establishes criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for violation of its provisions.  The government occasionally exercised that authority.Media remained weak and under government influence or control.  A limited number of independent media outlets were active and expressed a variety of views, but not without restriction.  The country had one marginally independent newspaper that published sporadically, and an online news portal published articles including criticism of the government.The only publishing facility available to newspapers was located at the Ministry of Information, Press, and Radio, where officials censored printed materials.Print media outlets were extremely limited.  Persons close to the president, including his son, the vice president, owned the few private media outlets that existed; the vice president owned the only private broadcast media.  Starting a newspaper was a complicated process governed by an ambiguous law and impeded by government bureaucracy; creating a digital presence was less onerous.  Accreditation was cumbersome for both local and foreign journalists.The government owned the only national radio and television broadcast system.  Journalists who worked for these entities could not report freely.The government denied or left pending requests by political parties to establish private radio stations.As most foreigners needed visas to visit the country, the time-consuming nature of the process effectively dissuaded some foreign journalists from visiting.  In other cases, the government may have prevented reporters from obtaining visas.Libel/Slander Laws:  The government used criminal libel and slander laws to restrict public discussion.Actions to Expand Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Media:  In a change from previous years, officials did not routinely take down comments on social media critical of government personnel, actions, or policies.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet and censored online content.  Independent media outlet AhoraEG was accessible only through a virtual private network.  For three days in September, the government telecommunications provider cut off a diplomatic mission’s access to the internet.During the September siege of CI’s headquarters in the Perez neighborhood, the government cut off all cell phone and internet reception, significantly restricting the ability of journalists, NGOs, and embassies to obtain and verify information.						Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events						The government restricted academic freedom and cultural events.Some cultural events required coordination with the Ministry of Information, Press, and Radio, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, or both.  This was more common outside of the largest cities.  Occasionally authorization from local authorities was also required.  The resulting bureaucratic delay was a disincentive for prospective organizers, who often could not ascertain the criteria used for judging proposed events or their chances for approval.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution and law provide for the right of peaceful assembly, but regulatory provisions effectively undermined this right, and the government routinely restricted freedom of assembly, including for political parties (see section 3, Political Parties and Political Participation).  For example, the government routinely rejected applications for permits to assemble.  Permits were regularly issued only for gatherings in support of the ruling party.  Civil society and political opposition members met infrequently, claiming any gathering of activists or individuals perceived to be engaged in political activities would be seen as suspicious, and authorities would harass or detain participants.The political opposition party Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS) requested permits to demonstrate on June 30.  Authorities initially granted the permit and then withdrew permission and deployed security forces to dissuade any potential participation.  Days after revoking the CPDS permit, authorities approved a progovernment pro-unity demonstration held in reaction to a declaration of independence in Annobón, an island close to Sao Tome and Principe.						Freedom of Association						The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government severely restricted this right.  All political parties, civil society organizations, and other associations must register with the government, but the registration process was costly, burdensome, opaque, and slow.Politically motivated crackdowns on civil society organizations remained a problem, including the temporary detention of civil society activists without charge.  The government was slow to authorize NGOs, especially those working in areas considered sensitive by the government, including human rights, or those with members associated with opposition parties.  During a months-long civil society capacity building training organized by an international NGO, on several occasions the government restricted or cancelled activities it had previously approved and required the international NGO to submit a list of participants to the Ministry of Interior.  The ministry later demanded the international organization refuse training to unregistered organizations.The LGBTQI+ collective Somos Parte del Mundo (We are Part of the World) was still not registered after submitting its request in 2016.  Somos + submitted a registration request in 2018 and was also still not registered, apparently due to an opposition party member being one of its leaders.  Several other civil society organizations, such as the Asociación de Emprendedores Ecuatoguineanos (Association of Entrepreneurs of Equatorial Guinea) were unable to register.  Other organizations reported they were able to register activities with the requisite ministry when they invited ministry participation and attendance.  The legally established period for government approval of organizations and activities is two months.The law prohibits the formation of political parties along ethnic lines.  Some parties have been unable to register for years (see section 3, Political Parties and Political Representation).  Only one labor organization was believed to be registered (see section 7.a.).The law limits the amount of funding civil society organizations may receive from any source to approximately 53,000 CFA francs ($86) per year, but the restriction was not widely enforced.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government often restricted these rights. Multiple members of the opposition reported authorities delayed the renewal of their identity documents, effectively limiting their ability to travel within the country and abroad.In-country Movement: Police at roadblocks routinely checked travelers, and some engaged in petty extortion. The government also conducted frequent roundups of foreign nationals at roadblocks, claiming the need to counter irregular immigration, delinquent activities, and coup attempts. The government continued tight restrictions on interdistrict movement, nominally to prevent crime and detect illegal migration but used for extortion attempts and to threaten immigrants. Additionally, the government imposed a 10:00 p.m. curfew on anyone younger than age 23 in reaction to reported gang violence in certain neighborhoods in Malabo and Bata.The law prohibits forced internal exile, but since 2016 authorities restricted CI leader Gabriel Nze Obiang’s movements to the capital.Foreign Travel: Officials at the airport continued to sporadically and inconsistently require a negative COVID-19 test certificate issued by the Ministry of Health to leave the country despite a governmental decree abolishing the practice. Authorities required some dual nationals to renounce their non-Equatoguinean citizenship as a requirement for departure. The passport application process was difficult and convoluted, with limited transparency. Some observers believed authorities made the process deliberately difficult to reduce emigration. The government has declined to issue a passport to activist and musician Adjonguening since 2018.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government did not generally cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. There were no organizations that provided protection and assistance. UNHCR did not maintain an office in the country.Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, but the government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																																															The constitution and law provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but the government severely limited this right.																																				Elections and Political Participation										Recent elections: In November presidential and legislative elections, the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) claimed 94.9 percent of the vote. The PDGE took all 75 Senate seats and all 100 seats in the House of Representatives. Contrary to the constitution, which requires that presidential elections be held separately from legislative elections, elections were combined. Voters were required to vote for the same party for presidential and legislative elections; there was no option to split their vote.In the months leading up to the presidential election, authorities closely monitored and tightly controlled public gatherings. Political parties required government authorization to hold rallies; the PDGE received preferential treatment.International observers noted significant irregularities and lack of transparency in the electoral process, particularly in rural mainland areas. Many voting booths were not secret; in some, poll workers could watch the voter cast their vote. In almost all polling places, heavily armed security forces sat within a few yards of registration tables. At some locations, voters cast votes on behalf of family members. In some precincts, poll workers instructed voters to only pick up PDGE ballots, handed voters ballot envelopes that already contained PDGE ballots, altered the envelopes so they could see who voters had voted for, or wrote voters’ identification numbers on the ballot envelopes, which could allow election officials to later connect the ballot to the voter. There was one report from an opposition party that two of its supporters were refused their right to vote because of their political affiliation.Despite reports that opposition party CPDS won the necessary number of votes in urban districts to earn a seat in either a municipal council or the lower chamber, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) declared the PDGE won all seats.The NEC was not independent of the PDGE or government influence. By law the NEC consists of six judges appointed by the head of the Supreme Court, six government representatives and a secretary appointed by the president, and one representative from each registered political party. The president appointed the minister of interior, a PDGE leader, to head the NEC. Election laws regarding the NEC were not enforced.Political Parties and Political Participation: The PDGE ruled through a complex network of family, clan, and ethnic relationships. Public-sector employees were pressured to join the PDGE and agree to garnishment of their salaries to fund PDGE activities. Party affiliation remained a key factor in obtaining government employment. The ruling party’s near monopoly on power, funding, and access to national media hampered the CPDS.Political parties could receive both private and public funding but were not required to disclose the amount of private funding. In advance of the November elections, the two opposition presidential candidates received 350 million CFA francs ($569,000) to fund their campaigns. The director of the ruling party campaign accused both candidates of misusing the funds. The government subjected opposition members to arbitrary arrest and harassment before elections.Opposition members reported discrimination in hiring, job retention, and obtaining scholarships and business licenses.Registered opposition parties faced restrictions on freedom of speech, association, and assembly. For example, supporters who attended opposition political party campaign rallies were singled out for police interrogation and harassment. Some political parties that existed before the law establishing procedures to register political parties remained banned for allegedly “supporting terrorism.” The government abolished permit requirements for political party meetings within party buildings but required prior permission for public events, such as meetings in other venues or marches, and frequently denied the permit requests.Despite laws authorities stated were designed to facilitate the registration of political parties, the government prevented the registration of opposition parties. The government deregistered CI in 2018, and it remained suspended as a political party. Members of CI continued to face discrimination and harassment, including in the aftermath of the September police raid on their headquarters. CI members claimed they could not return to their homes without jeopardizing the safety of their friends and family. CI members, including the family of leader Gabriel Nze Obiang, claimed jailed family members were subjected to increased harassment and mistreatment.The president exercised strong powers as head of state, commander of the armed forces, head of the judiciary, and founder and head of the ruling party, and the government generally restricted leadership positions in government to select PDGE members or members of a coalition of loyal parties that campaigned and voted with the PDGE.Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit participation of women and members of minority groups in the political process, and they did participate. Patriarchal cultural influences, including deferring social, financial, and political decision-making to the heads of families and clans who were always men, however, limited women’s political participation, especially in rural areas.The government did not overtly limit minority participation in politics, but members of the Fang ethnic group occupied most of the top ranks. Estimated to constitute 80 percent of the population, the Fang group exercised dominant political and economic power. The law prohibits parties that are not national, eliminating opportunities for minority or regionally focused parties, although minorities were represented in most major parties, including the PDGE.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government												    																																															While the law provides severe criminal penalties for official corruption, the government did not effectively implement the law.  There are no specific laws concerning conflict of interest or nepotism.  There were numerous reports of government corruption.According to Freedom House, the budget process was “opaque.”  The government continued to improve fiscal transparency, including auditing state-owned enterprises and public debt using international accounting firms and publishing data on public-sector debt in the budget.Corruption:  Officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.  The president and members of his inner circle continued to amass personal fortunes from the revenues associated with monopolies on all domestic commercial ventures, as well as timber and oil exports.  Corruption at all levels of government was a severe problem.  Numerous foreign investigations continued into high-level official corruption.On July 8, President of the Supreme Court David Nguema Obiang Eyang presented his resignation to President Obiang, according to the vice president’s Twitter account.  It was later reported Obiang Eyang admitted receiving bribes of 100 million CFA francs ($163,000) or more from the supermarket chain Santy.																																					Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																																															The law restricts NGO activity.  The country’s few domestic NGOs mainly focused on topics such as health, women’s empowerment, and elder care.  The Center for Studies and Initiatives for the Development of Equatorial Guinea (CEIDGE) was one of the few NGOs that made public statements regarding government corruption and human rights abuses.  After authorities revoked its charter in 2019, CEIDGE remained unable to conduct operations.The government was generally suspicious of human rights activities, claiming human rights concerns were largely prompted by antigovernment exile groups and hostile foreign NGOs.  Government officials rarely were cooperative and responsive to the views of human rights groups, although they cooperated in some areas, such as on combatting trafficking in persons and gender-based violence.Somos + conducted democracy events and advocated for the rights of citizens.  Lack of accreditation hampered its effectiveness.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Government officials used media outlets to try to discredit civil society actors, categorizing them as supporters of the opposition and critics of the government.  The few local activists who sought to address human rights risked intimidation, harassment, unlawful detention, and other reprisals.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The government generally cooperated with UN bodies focused on human rights matters, including the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, but that representative did not conduct monitoring activities or investigations due to government reluctance to authorize them or participate.  The government did not cooperate with other international human rights organizations.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The Commission on Human Rights, which is part of the House of Representatives’ Committee for Complaints and Petitions, received citizen petitions.  The commission was not fully operational, independent, or effective.  An ombudsperson and a coordinator for the government’s efforts to combat trafficking in persons were also not fully operational or effective.Government officials responsible for addressing human rights problems functioned more to defend the government from accusations than to investigate human rights complaints or compile statistics.																																					Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is illegal and punishable by 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines. The law does not address spousal rape or the gender of rape survivors. The government did not enforce the law effectively, in part due to reluctance of survivors and their families to report rape. Even when survivors reported rape, police and judicial officials were reluctant to act, particularly if alleged perpetrators were politically connected or members of the military or police. LGBTQI+ women and transgender men were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in the military, and these same groups reported abuse by their families including rape as a form of so-called conversion therapy. Transgender women reported harassment, rape, and sexual abuse in police custody.Domestic violence is illegal. The penalty for assault ranges from one to 20 years’ imprisonment. Survivors were reluctant to report cases, and the government did not enforce the law effectively, with police and the judiciary reluctant to prosecute cases. Authorities generally treated domestic violence as a private matter to be resolved in the home, did not protect the anonymity of survivors, and often disclosed survivors’ whereabouts to their alleged abusers. No statistics were available on prosecutions, convictions, or punishments.The government-controlled media regularly broadcast public service announcements regarding domestic violence and trafficking in persons.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence: In rural areas there were instances of levirate marriage, the practice by which a woman is required to marry her deceased husband’s brother, often against her will. Under such practice, women were not allowed to inherit their late husbands’ possessions. In some cases, large bride prices paid to a wife’s family made it difficult for women to leave their marriages because, despite the law’s requirement for an equitable division of assets, traditional practices within the majority Fang ethnic group required reimbursement of the bride price and additional goods accrued during the marriage to a husband’s family in the case of divorce.Sexual Harassment: Although the law prohibits sexual harassment, with penalties of fines and imprisonment, it continued to be a problem. The government made no effort to address the problem; no statistics were available.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Legal, social, and cultural barriers and government policies impeded access to sexual and reproductive health services including for LGBTQI+ individuals.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors, including interviews and medical examinations at hospitals and clinics, although service providers had no specific training on handling sexual violence. Emergency contraception was not available as part of family planning method mix or the clinical management of rape cases. There was limited access to postabortion care. LGBTQI+ persons reported so-called corrective rape, involuntary pregnancy, and forced child-rearing.According to the World Health Organization, the maternal mortality rate was 301 per 100,000 live births in 2017. Major factors affecting maternal mortality included poverty, poor medical training, and limited access to health care, especially in rural areas. Prenatal and obstetric care was free in government clinics but limited primarily to the cities of Malabo and Bata. The birth rate was 176 per 1,000 girls and women ages 15 to 19. Factors likely contributing to the high birth rate included cultural tolerance for childbirth out of wedlock, low access to sexual education and contraception in rural populations, and economic constraints increasing the risk of child, early, and forced marriages, unions, and other relationships for girls with older men.The Ministry of Education required teenage girls to take pregnancy tests, and those who tested positive were expelled from school.Discrimination: While the constitution provides for equality between men and women, the law discriminates against women in matters of nationality (for example, it is easier for a man to pass citizenship to a foreign spouse than it is for a woman), real and personal property, and inheritance. The prevalence of negative stereotypes and adverse cultural norms and customs was believed to contribute to discrimination against women.Custom confined women in rural areas largely to traditional roles. Women in urban areas experienced less overt discrimination but did not enjoy pay or access to employment and credit on an equal basis with men (see section 7.d., Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation).LGBTQI+ women and women with disabilities faced significantly higher barriers to securing employment and addressing discrimination or harassment.While the government did not effectively enforce constitutional provisions of equality, it provided courses, seminars, conferences, and media programs to sensitize the population and government agencies to the needs and rights of women. The government also provided limited technical assistance and financial support to rural women.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law does not protect members of racial or ethnic minorities or groups from violence and discrimination.The predominant ethnic group, the Fang, dominated politics and the economy. Inhabitants of Annobón, home to a distinct ethnic group, were systematically discriminated against and denied access to services including internet services.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from a citizen parent, whether born in the country or abroad, but not automatically from birth on the country’s territory. If both parents are foreigners, a person born in the country can claim nationality at age 18, but the process was extremely burdensome and rarely resulted in approved citizenship. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare required parents to register all births and adjudicated them on a nondiscriminatory basis. Failure to register a child could result in denial of public services.Education: Education is tuition free and compulsory until age 16, although students were required to pay for registration, textbooks, and other materials. Most children attended school through the primary grades (sixth grade) (see section 6, Women, Reproductive Rights, and section 7.c.). Boys and girls generally completed secondary or vocational schooling. LGBTQI+ girls reported discrimination or exclusion by teachers. Chores and work at home also limited girls’ access to secondary education, especially in rural areas. Attention to school attendance generally focused more on citizen children than on their foreign resident peers.Child Abuse: Abuse of children is illegal, but the government did not enforce the law effectively. Corporal punishment was a culturally accepted method of discipline, including in schools.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage is 14. Forced marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Gender Equality operated programs to deter child marriage but did not address forced marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Commercial sexual exploitation of children is illegal, but authorities generally did not identify nor prosecute offenders. The law addresses the sale, offering, or use of children, but not the grooming of children for commercial exploitation. It addresses child pornography. Antitrafficking provisions include sexual exploitation and pornography as examples of cases of trafficking-related crimes. The government sometimes enforced laws governing child pornography. The minimum age of sexual consent is 18.Children were exploited in commercial sex, particularly in the two largest cities, Malabo and Bata. Transgender children and youth were particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation according to a study performed by a local NGO, and both security forces and high-level officials were complicit.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community was small, likely fewer than 100 persons. There were no known reports of antisemitic acts.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: There are no laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between civilian adults, but consensual same-sex sexual conduct is criminalized in the armed forces, as is LGBTQI+ identity. There were multiple reports of the military enforcing these prohibitions, and there were several women convicted and in military jails on conduct or identity charges.Violence against LGBTQI+ Persons: Security forces reportedly subjected LGBTQI+ individuals to violence, including rape and other sexual violence, within the military and in jails and prisons. LGBTQI+ women and transgender men were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in the military. There were numerous reports of violence against lesbian women. Authorities did not investigate these abuses. There were no reliable statistics on the number of cases (see section 1.f.).Discrimination: The law does not formally recognize or protect the existence of LGBTQI+ persons or groups; no laws prohibit discrimination. The government’s position was that LGBTQI+ sexual orientations and gender identities were inconsistent with cultural beliefs; the government made no effort to protect LGBTQI+ persons or combat LGBTQI+ stigma and discrimination. Transgender women continued to face significant discrimination in employment and treatment by security forces and in detention. There was no state support available for LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, or their families.Societal stigmatization of and discrimination against the LGBTQI+ community was widespread, and nonstate support and recognition was extremely limited, although activists reported acceptance of the LGBTQI+ community might generally be on the rise. Bisexual women’s sexuality, especially if they had children, was not acknowledged, nor were the women included as members of the LGBTQI+ community, and they were subject to significant levels of exclusion. There was little to no societal recognition of transgender individuals, and there was significant cultural ignorance regarding the gender identity, expression, and experience of transgender individuals, including within the LGBTQI+ community.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: There was no process for legal gender recognition.Involuntary of Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices Specifically Targeting LGBTQI+ Individuals: There were reports of LGBTQI+ individuals being subjected to so-called conversion therapies through religious rituals and detentions. There were also reports of “corrective rape,” involuntary pregnancy, and forced child-rearing to “change” the sexual identity of lesbian and bisexual women and the gender identity of transgender men.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: The government declined to register LGBTQI+ organizations, despite attempts by LGBTQI+ organizations to conform with the registration law.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities cannot access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. New buildings must reportedly be accessible to persons with disabilities, but inaccessible public buildings and schools remained obstacles, including some newly constructed government buildings. Access to other state services such as health services, information, communications, transportation, and the judicial system are not explicitly provided by law. Authorities did not effectively enforce existing access requirements. The government did not provide information on disability concerns in accessible formats.Authorities did not investigate incidents of violence or other abuses against persons with disabilities.The law does not prohibit discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities. While the law requires companies employing more than 50 employees hire a certain percentage of persons with disabilities, few if any did so. Children with disabilities attended primary, secondary, and higher education, although generally no accommodations were made for their disabilities. A small number of private schools for children with disabilities operated with a combination of public and private funding.Persons with disabilities may vote and otherwise participate in civic affairs, but lack of physical access to buildings posed a barrier to full participation.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Foreigners were often victimized, including documented and irregular immigrants from Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and other African countries, who represented a significant portion of the labor force. The government required immigrants to have relevant documents, partly to address concerns regarding trafficking in persons, although police and gendarmes used documentation status to extort bribes from foreigners at routine traffic stops. The registration process was laborious and excessive, often resulting in foreigners failing to maintain legal status despite timely applications for appropriate documentation.In public speeches, President Obiang frequently referred to foreigners as a security and terrorist threat and warned of a renewal of colonialism by foreign interests.There was stigma regarding persons with HIV and AIDS, and many individuals kept their illness hidden. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare estimated fewer than half of persons with HIV and AIDS sought treatment, and some persons likely avoided the no-cost treatment because of associated social stigma.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provides workers the right to establish unions, affiliate with unions of their choice, and collectively bargain. The law also allows unions to conduct activities without interference. The law requires a union to have at least 50 members from a workplace to register, however, effectively blocking most union formation. The government did not generally allow unions to organize. In view of the general absence of union recognition, there were no reports of government enforcement of laws respecting their establishment or operation.Authorities refused to recognize unions such as the Workers Union of Equatorial Guinea, Independent Service Union, Teachers’ Trade Union Association, and the Rural Workers Organization. Most often those seeking to organize were co-opted into existing political party structures by means of pressure and incentives.The law broadly acknowledges the right to engage in strikes, but no implementing legislation defines legitimate grounds for striking. No law requires the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity, although such dismissal may fall under wrongful termination. The government has never authorized a strike.The government did not protect the right of unions to conduct their activities without interference. Penalties were not applied but were commensurate with those for other laws involving denial of civil rights, such as discrimination.Labor NGOs faced restrictions and were unable to operate.Dismissed workers could appeal to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through their regional delegate, but there was little trust in the fairness of the system. Citizens and foreigners with valid work permits have the right to appeal Ministry of Labor and Social Security decisions to a special standing committee of the House of Representatives established to hear citizen complaints regarding decisions by any government agency. The committee was not active.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security made no significant findings of forced or coerced labor despite high-level government officials acknowledging forced labor was a problem in the country. The government did not effectively enforce the law or take sufficient action to end trafficking, and forced labor occurred.Men and women from Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, and other neighboring countries, as well as from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, were recruited for work, and there were reports some were subsequently subjected to forced labor. Often, they were not compensated as agreed, and their employers held or confiscated their passports. One of the largest grocery chains reportedly held its expatriate workers’ passports and enforced curfews and other restrictions.Employees in the public and private sector were often paid months late. Some workers, especially those from overseas, quit their jobs because of nonpayment, having effectively worked for months without compensation.Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibits all the worst forms of child labor. The law prohibits employment of children younger than age 18 in all sectors. With the authorization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and their parents or guardians, however, children between ages 16 and 18 may perform light work that does not interfere with their schooling. The minimum age for apprenticeships is 16.Children are permitted to work only during the day, and their workday is limited to six hours, for which they are paid the equivalent of an eight-hour daytime work rate. The government did not publish a list of hazardous types of work prohibited for children.The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing child labor laws, but labor inspectors focused mainly on the construction industry and not on child labor. The laws were not effectively enforced, penalties were not commensurate with those for other analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping, and penalties were never enforced. The government did not have data on the worst forms of child labor.Children were reportedly transported from nearby countries, primarily Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and Togo, and forced to work as domestic servants, market laborers, street vendors, launderers, and beggars, as well as reports of local children brought from rural areas to work as domestic servants in Malabo and Bata. The law prohibits children from working as street vendors to reduce child labor.Some children worked in family businesses, mostly in the informal economy, and were seen selling used clothes, fruit, and vegetables, especially on weekends. Other children worked as servers or cooks in family restaurants and bars.																																				d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation										Laws and regulations prohibit discrimination based on race, skin color, sex, political opinion, national origin, social status, or union affiliation. Laws do not prohibit discrimination based on age, religion, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity, language, HIV and AIDS status, or refugee or stateless status. The government did not effectively enforce these laws and regulations. Penalties were not commensurate to laws related to civil rights. Penalties were rarely enforced. Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to political affiliation, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, and HIV and AIDS status. Wage discrimination against foreign migrant workers occurred.The government does not have an agency responsible for the protection of persons unable to work due to permanent or temporary illness or other health conditions. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security did not effectively enforce the legal mandate to employ a specific percentage of persons with disabilities in companies with 50 employees or more, nor did the government take steps to accommodate them in the workplace.The country continued to have large gender gaps in education, equal pay, and employment opportunities. Deep-rooted stereotypes and ethnic traditions impeded women’s employment opportunities, and pregnant women, women with disabilities, and LGBTQI+ women faced additional barriers. Because of difficulties in the formal sector, women mostly worked in the informal sector, where they did not have access to benefits or social security. The lack of enforcement left women vulnerable to discrimination, but they rarely complained due to the risk of reprisals. There were no protections against sexual harassment in the workplace.The informal sector provided some women with sufficient economic resources to finance major purchases, pay for education abroad for family members, or obtain financial security, achievements not possible in the formal economy. The government did not maintain accurate or updated statistics on unemployment generally, nor by segment of society.The Ministry of Social Affairs and Gender Equality continued a program to promote self-employment among rural women. The president’s wife, on an ad hoc basis, donated funds to promote women-owned businesses.																																				e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law requires employers to pay citizens at the same rate as foreigners and to pay domestic workers not less than 60 percent of the national minimum wage.The standard work week is eight hours a day and 48 hours a week for daytime work, six hours a day and 36 hours a week for night work, and seven hours a day and 42 hours a week for mixed day and night work. Offshore workdays in the oil and gas sector are a minimum of 12 hours, of which eight hours are considered regular work and four hours are counted as overtime. Overtime is not mandatory, except as provided by law or special agreement, and is prohibited for pregnant workers. The law allows overtime for night work. Premium pay is required for overtime and holidays.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards do not provide for protection of workers from occupational hazards. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for setting OSH standards but did not have OSH experts to actively identify unsafe conditions. The ministry did not publish the results of its OSH inspections.The law permits workers to remove themselves from situations that endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.Legal protections exist for employees injured or killed on the job and for those who are exposed to dangerous chemicals, but these protections were generally extended only to those in the formal sector. Protections in the hydrocarbons sector exceeded minimum international safety standards.Foreigners, including migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Americas, were sometimes subjected to poor working conditions. An existing ministry website and a telephone hotline established during the year enabled workers to report workplace irregularities and violations, including safety concerns and forced labor. No cases had been reported to the hotline as of October.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. The government did not effectively enforce wage, overtime, or OSH laws. Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar violations, such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators. The ministry conducted some workplace inspections to verify adherence to labor laws. The small number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce the law effectively. Inspectors have the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. When inspectors found violations, the government required some employers to correct the problem, pay fines, or pay reparations to the employees, but most employers were able to renegotiate the findings or pay bribes to eliminate the penalty.Informal Sector: The government did not monitor the informal sector, which employed most workers, including large numbers of women and African immigrants. The country’s informal sector was estimated to have reached 32 percent of GDP in 2017 in response to growing demand for goods and services. The informal sector was mainly made up of small businesses that provided consumables and services, such as frozen food, produce, fish and fish products, hair salons, convenience stores, auto repair shops, restaurants, and bars. Employees and businesses in the informal sector were vulnerable to extortion and abuse from officials, including demands for bribes, demolition of structures, and harassment from police and gendarmes. Workers in the informal sector and part-time workers are not covered by wage, hour, and OSH laws or other labor laws or inspections. No official entity provided social protections for informal economy workers.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																												Transnational Repression																																												Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies																																												Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																																				f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																												Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																				Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government																																																	Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																																																	Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Equatorial Guinea