# Yemen - United States Department of State

- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the Middle East Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union. Iran We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, condemn in the strongest terms Iran’s direct and unprecedented attack against Israel of April 13-14, which Israel defeated with the help of its partners. This was a dangerous escalation, as Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones.We also condemn the Iranian boarding and seizure, in breach of international law, of the Portuguese flagged merchant vessel MSC Aries by armed personnel, which occurred while the merchant vessel was sailing near the Strait of Hormuz. We call for the immediate release of the vessel, its crews and cargo.Israel and its people have our full solidarity and support and we reaffirm our commitment towards Israel’s security. Iran’s actions mark an unacceptable step towards the destabilization of the region and a further escalation, which must be avoided. In light of reports of strikes on April 19th, we urge all parties to work to prevent further escalation. The G7 will continue to work to this end.We call on all parties, both in the region and beyond, to offer their positive contribution to this collective effort.We call on Iran to refrain from providing support to Hamas and taking further actions that destabilize the Middle East, including support for Lebanese Hezbollah and other non-state actors.  Iran’s continued provision of arms and related materiel to the Houthis in violation of UNSCR 2216 and to other non-state actors in the region are dangerously increasing tensions. We call on all countries to prevent the supply of components or other items to Iran’s UAV and missile programmes.We demand that Iran and its affiliated groups cease their attacks. We will hold the Iranian government accountable for its malicious and destabilizing actions and we stand ready to adopt further sanctions or take other measures, now and in response to further destabilizing initiatives.We reiterate our determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We urge Iran to cease and reverse nuclear escalations and to stop the continuing uranium enrichment activities reported by IAEA in the framework provided by UNSCR 2231 that have no credible civil justification and pose significant proliferative risks. Tehran must reverse this trend and engage in serious dialogue, returning to full cooperation with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. We support IAEA’s monitoring and verification role regarding Iran’s nuclear-related obligation and commitments and express strong concern about Iran’s current lack of cooperation with the Agency.We are extremely concerned by reports that Iran is considering transferring ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.  We call on Iran not to do so, as it would represent a substantive material escalation in its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Were Iran to proceed with providing ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia, we are prepared to respond in a swift and coordinated manner, including with new and significant measures against Iran.We reiterate our deep concern over Iran’s human rights violations and abuses, especially against women, girls and minority groups, and in light of the first report issued on March 8 by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council, which said that certain violations against “Women, Life, Freedom” protestors amounted to crimes against humanity.We strongly reject Iran’s targeting and arbitrary arrest of dual and foreign citizens and call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions. We condemn Iran’s harassment, intimidation and plots to kill perceived dissidents and opponents of the regime overseas, including journalists and religious figures, as well as the targeting of Jewish individuals and institutions.Conflict in Gaza We condemn in the strongest terms the brutal terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas and other terrorist groups against Israel that began on October 7, 2023. In exerting its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian law. Hamas must release all hostages immediately and unconditionally. We continue to press for the full investigation of the horrific reports of sexual violence committed by Hamas and other terrorist groups and for perpetrators to be held accountable.We deplore all losses of civilian lives and note with great concern the unacceptable number of civilians, including thousands of women, children and persons in vulnerable situations who have been killed in Gaza. We call for urgent action to address the devastating and growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, particularly the plight of civilians throughout the territory. We reiterate our opposition to a full scale military operation in Rafah that would have catastrophic consequences on the civilian population. We reiterate our call for a credible and actionable plan to protect the civilian population there and address their humanitarian needs. We are deeply concerned by the internal displacement within Gaza and the risk of forcible displacement from Gaza. Israel must act in compliance with its obligations under international law and treat individuals humanely and with dignity, and should thoroughly and transparently investigate credible allegations of wrongdoing and ensure accountability for any abuses or violations.We underscore the urgent need for specific, concrete, and measurable steps to significantly increase the flow of aid into Gaza in light of imminent risk of famine for a majority of Gaza’s population.  We urge the rapid implementation of steps announced by the Government of Israel including the commitment to expand flow of aid through existing land crossings, opening new land crossings, and facilitating aid to northern Gaza where humanitarian needs are most acute, including by opening more routes into Gaza.  We welcome efforts to establish a maritime corridor to further increase the flow of much-needed humanitarian assistance into Gaza, in coordination with the United Nations. We reiterate that such corridors must complement and not be a substitute to expanded and sustained assistance flows by land.Securing full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access in all its forms remains an absolute priority. We call on Israel to do more to ensure protection of international and local humanitarian aid workers, journalists, and Palestinian civilians, to improve humanitarian deconfliction, including communications, and to pursue full accountability, as appropriate, for incidents of harm against aid workers and civilians.  We call on all parties to allow the unimpeded delivery of aid, including food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel, shelter, as well as facilitate the restoration of basic services and ensure access for humanitarian workers. All parties must protect civilians, especially those most vulnerable, particularly women, children, and people with disabilities, consistent with international humanitarian law.Since the onset of the crisis, the G7 has been among the largest providers of assistance to the affected population in Gaza. We reiterate our intention to continue doing so and we call on all our partners to strengthen their efforts. We welcome the initiative “Food for Gaza” launched by Italy together with FAO, WFP and IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society), aimed at better meeting the urgent demand for food security and primary health of the population.We recognize the crucial role played by UN agencies and other humanitarian actors in delivering assistance. UNRWA has a vital role in the Gaza humanitarian response. We welcome the swift decision by the UN Secretary General to initiate an immediate investigation on UNRWA to provide full transparency on the serious allegations against its staff and to appoint an independent review group also in view of the implementation of the needed reforms. We agreed it is critical that UNRWA and other UN organizations and agencies’ distribution networks be fully able to deliver aid to those who need it most, fulfilling their mandate effectively.We call for an immediate release of hostages and a sustainable ceasefire that allows for a surge of the urgently needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered safely throughout Gaza. In this context, we strongly support the ongoing mediation efforts undertaken by the United States and regional partners to that aim, respected by all parties, leading to a sustainable cessation of hostilities, in order to facilitate the immediate return of all hostages, a surge of assistance and for the urgent implementation of UNSC resolutions 2712, 2720, and 2728. Hamas’ refusal to release hostages is only prolonging the conflict and the suffering of civilians.We welcome the new Palestinian Authority cabinet and remain ready to support the Palestinian Authority as it undertakes the reforms that are indispensable to enable it to take up its responsibilities in the aftermath of the conflict, in both Gaza and the West Bank.We are also working, including by imposing sanctions and other measures, to deny Hamas the ability to raise funds to carry out further atrocities. Likewise, we will also continue our work to fight against the dissemination of terrorist content online.All parties must refrain from unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution. We are concerned by rising levels of settlers’ violence. Extremist settlers responsible for violent acts against Palestinian communities must be brought to account.A viable solution to the conflict can only be the result of a coordinated regional effort. We remain committed to a lasting and sustainable peace based on a two-State solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel and the Palestinians. We call for upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem. We concur that the final territory of a Palestinian state should be defined through negotiations based on 1967-lines. We note that the recognition of a Palestinian state, at the appropriate time, would be a crucial component of that political process.We are working intensively – along with partners in the region – to prevent the conflict from escalating further. We are particularly concerned by the situation along the Blue Line. We recognize the essential stabilizing role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in mitigating that risk. We urge all involved to exercise restraint and to work toward de-escalation.We oppose all discrimination and violence based on religion or belief and we call for effective protection of all members of religious minority groups. We strongly reject all forms of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred.Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea We condemn the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the navy ships protecting them. We are greatly concerned by the deaths of three innocent mariners aboard the True Confidence and the sinking of the Rubymar, which created a navigational hazard and a serious environmental threat. We call for the immediate release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader and its crew, seized on 19th November 2023. In line with UNSCR 2722, we reiterate our support for countries that exercise the right to defend their vessels from attacks, in accordance with international law. We also call for continued international involvement in close cooperation with the United Nations and coastal states, as well as with regional and sub-regional organizations to prevent further escalation with possible multidimensional consequences.We welcome the continued efforts of the EU maritime operation “Aspides” and of the U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian” along with UK and 10 other countries to protect these crucial shipping lanes.We are concerned by the hindrance to the transit of energy supplies, raw materials and other commodities through the Red Sea. The countries most negatively affected by the Houthis’ attacks include those in the region. Maritime security and navigational rights and freedoms are critical to ensuring free movement of essential commodities to destinations and populations all over the world. This includes delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to more than half the population of Yemen and to Sudan and Ethiopia.Yemen We express great concern for the situation in Yemen, notably for the humanitarian conditions of the Yemeni civilian population. Yemeni parties must allow safe, rapid, and unimpeded access to all those in need, halt requirements that restrict women’s freedom of movement and impede delivery of humanitarian aid, and remove obstacles to the delivery of assistance, notably to the most vulnerable. All parties must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.We reiterate our strong support to the United Nations and to UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg for his efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen.We welcome the understanding reached in December 2023 between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthis that included a commitment on a set of measures to implement a nation-wide ceasefire and to improve living conditions in the country. We urge all involved parties and in particular the Houthis to engage in good faith in preparations for an inclusive political process in consultation with civil society and under UN auspices.We call for accountability for human rights violations, including grave violations of children’s rights, and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.Syria   We remain committed to a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, and we fully support the mandate of the UN Special Envoy, Geir O. Pedersen. We call on the Syrian regime to engage meaningfully with the UN-facilitated political process to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis and national reconciliation. Normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions would only be considered in the framework of a credible inclusive and enduring political process consistent with UNSC resolution 2254. Stability and peace in Syria cannot be achieved without the enduring defeat of Daesh. As members of the Global Coalition against Daesh we are committed to ending Daesh’s presence in Syria.We remain committed to advancing justice for victims and accountability for all actors responsible for violations of international law in Syria, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We reiterate our condemnation of the use that the Syrian régime has made of chemical weapons in Syria. We continue to urge the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention and to eliminate its chemical weapons programme completely and verifiably.We continue to call for the immediate release of all civilians arbitrarily detained and to clarify the fate of those forcibly disappeared. We support the work of organizations such as the Commission of Inquiry and the International Independent and Impartial Mechanism, which document the crimes perpetrated in Syria. We stand ready to support the newly established UN Independent Institution for Missing Persons in Syria.We will continue to support the Syrian people through humanitarian assistance to meet their needs, including early recovery assistance and measures fostering resilience, and demand that the regime facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians, including through UN cross-border humanitarian assistance, for which there is no alternative. We remain grateful to regional countries for continuing to host Syrian refugees, and we call upon the Syrian regime to create the conditions for voluntary, safe, and dignified refugee returns.The upcoming Eighth Brussels Conference on the Future of Syria and the Region is important in maintaining a high level of engagement and mobilisation of the international community in this regard.
- Securing the Red Sea: A Global Response Timothy A. Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for YemenThe Houthis’ reckless and indiscriminate attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are creating even worse food shortages in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Sudan, affecting the most vulnerable people.  This is because the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are a high-traffic global shipping route used to deliver food, fuel, humanitarian assistance, and other essential commodities to destinations all over the world, including Yemen. You may not realize that Houthi attacks against commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea are directly impacting people’s lives. Ships taking longer journeys increase the cost of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as life-saving aid to people who need it most. ⤵️ pic.twitter.com/YIkX1numQa&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) February 2, 2024The Red Sea&#8217;s Strategic Significance The Red Sea holds immense strategic importance, serving as a vital maritime route for global trade. Fifteen percent of international commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic flows through the Red Sea.  Locator map for Yemen. Impacts on Yemen and Beyond The Houthis’ attacks, enabled by Iran, are not limited to U.S. or Israeli ships. Houthi rebels have struck ships and crews with ties to more than 50 different countries, resulting in enormous impacts on international shipping. The situation not only affects Yemen but also reverberates across the globe, affecting food, medicine, and fuel supplies for millions, including those in the Middle East, East Africa, and even the United States.  Shipping companies are changing routes to avoid the Red Sea, requiring boats to travel around the Cape of Good Hope. This often adds about 10 days to journey times and requires more fuel and crew-time, significantly raising shipping costs, which are then passed on to the customers and aid-providing organizations. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea are doubling shipping costs to the United States and having real human impacts—increasing the costs of food, medicine, and fuel. pic.twitter.com/8D7nyEI0cE&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) March 2, 2024Response from the International Community The Houthis’ reckless assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are clear violations of international law. In response, the United States and the international community have taken action to counter these attacks and protect the lives of innocent mariners. In December, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 nations committed to defending international shipping and deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.  Sailors stand ready in the Red Sea! 🚢 Dedicated maintenance and drills ensure peak operational capabilities for Operation Prosperity Guardian. Led by Combined Task Force 153, this international effort promotes maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. pic.twitter.com/Enm8XGN6SZ&mdash; Department of Defense 🇺🇸 (@DeptofDefense) December 28, 2023In January, together with 13 allies and partners, the U.S. issued an unequivocal warning that Houthi rebels would face consequences if their attacks did not cease. Additionally, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the Houthis end attacks on merchant and commercial vessels. Yemen: “The resolution unequivocally demands that the Houthis cease their brazen attacks which violates international law&quot; &#8211; Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UNRead the story➡️:https://t.co/JVIdieimAN pic.twitter.com/6vk99ku0cX&mdash; UN News (@UN_News_Centre) January 11, 2024Disrupting Houthi Activities To disrupt the flow of funds to the Houthis for their terrorist activities and to limit their access to financial networks, the United States has designated them as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.  This is a significant step to prevent financial support from reaching the Houthis and to ensure they are held accountable for their actions. If the Houthis stop their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will review this designation. The United States has also sanctioned entities that are enabling Iran’s financial assistance to the Houthis’ destabilizing activities. Today, we announced the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. pic.twitter.com/NFYOaUrm8G&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) January 17, 2024&nbsp;Condemning Houthi Actions These aggressive actions not only endanger innocent lives but also disrupt the free flow of global commerce — including in nations that are already experiencing challenges — exacerbating already dire humanitarian crises across the region.  The United States remains committed to combating Iranian support to the Houthis and calls for international unity against their destabilizing activities. 
- Yemen HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Yemen				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Yemen during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government or on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by the parties in Yemen; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement or threats of enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions of religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on and harassment of international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child, early, and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation; crimes involving violence targeting migrants; crimes, violence, or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex persons; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.This report covers abuses by the government (sometimes referred to as the Republic of Yemen Government) and other actors who exerted control over areas of the country (including the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council), otherwise referred to as “the parties in Yemen.” The Iran-backed Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, controlled the former capital of Sana’a, including remnants of former state institutions and entities located there, as well as much of northern Yemen, where approximately 80 percent of the citizens lived.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Nongovernmental actors, including the Houthis, tribal militias, and terrorist groups (including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and a local branch of ISIS), committed significant abuses with impunity. The Houthis confiscated state resources, collected “taxes” on the business sector, and diverted humanitarian assistance. The Houthis misused remnants of former anti-corruption authorities to stifle dissent and repress political opponents. Houthi control in the north severely reduced the government’s capacity to conduct investigations into abuse or corruption.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports of government, progovernment, rebel, terrorist, and foreign forces committing arbitrary or unlawful killings.Established in 2012 by Presidential Decree No. 140, the National Commission for the Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights (the National Commission) was the lead body within the government tasked with opening formal inquiries into allegations of “human rights violations by all parties to the conflict.” In their reporting period from the beginning in August 2022 and ending July 31, the National Commission investigated 76 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings across the country. The National Commission found 15 cases were committed by government-backed military and security forces, and 35 cases of reported killings committed by the Houthis.The local human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Mwatana reported that forces backed by the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Southern Transitional Council (STC) were responsible for eight incidents they documented during the year and that the Houthis were responsible for five incidents.The National Commission reported that on February 18, Omar Abdul Basit Ha’il al-Qadsi, a member of the 170th Air Defense Brigade that reported to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), shot and killed Anwar Abdul Fattah Hassan al-Soufi in al-Noor City in the Ta’iz Governorate. The military’s prosecution issued an arrest warrant for al-Qadsi but did not compel him to appear before the judiciary for further investigation.On April 21, media reported progovernment personnel from the Shabwah Defense Forces shot and killed Abdullah bin Abdullah Abd Rabbuh al-Bani as he departed the airport prayer area in Biyhan District, Shabwah Governorate. Armed individuals blocked al-Bani’s car, preventing his departure, and opened fire, killing al-Bani and injuring six others. The attorney general commissioned a team to investigate the case, and several suspects were referred to the judiciary for trial.On March 30, local and international press reported Houthi forces had detained, tortured, and killed activist Hamdi Abdul Razaq, known on the internet as “al-Mukhol.” Houthi forces allegedly detained him for his critical statements on social media regarding Houthi leadership and their relationship with Iran.The National Commission reported that on March 16, Qais Saleem Musfir al-Munbah was stopped for an identity check at a Houthi-controlled checkpoint. When al-Munbah explained he did not have an identity card with him, Houthi-affiliated security forces refused him passage and insisted that he return with identification documents. When he attempted to bypass the checkpoint, the Houthi guards shot and killed him.																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government, progovernment, Houthi, terrorist, and foreign forces. Mwatana reported 102 enforced disappearances during the year, attributing 41 to security forces loyal to the ROYG, nine to what Mwatana referred to as the Joint Forces (an umbrella term referring to UAE-backed anti-Houthi armed groups), and two to the progovernment international coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Mwatana attributed 49 of disappearances to the Houthis and was unable to attribute one disappearance to any party to the conflict. Mwatana noted the full count was likely much higher by all actors.There was no update by year’s end on the whereabouts of 11 current and former local employees of the U.S. embassy, detained by the Houthis since October 2021. None of the employees had been “charged” with a crime as of year’s end.Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that UAE-backed forces, in particular the STC, arbitrarily arrested and forcibly disappeared individuals at two informal detention facilities.In a July report, the Abductees’ Mothers Association recorded 56 cases of civilians disappeared in 2022, of which it said 41 were taken by Houthi forces, eight by STC security forces, three by security agencies affiliated with the ROYG, and four by the Joint Forces. There were no reports that the government made significant efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish these acts.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited torture and other such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials and progovernment, foreign, Houthi, and terrorist forces committed such abuses, including against journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs), and migrants. Although the law lacked a comprehensive definition of torture, there were provisions allowing prison terms of up to 10 years for those convicted of torture. Mwatana reported it documented 57 cases of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment during the year, attributing 21 to forces loyal to the ROYG, 21 to the Joint Forces, five to the Saudi-led coalition, and nine to the Houthis. In a February report, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (POE) assessed that the parties in Yemen engaged in torture and other forms of mistreatment. Journalists, HRDs, and migrants were among the victims of these abuses.Mwatana’s October 11 submission for the country’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) listed 70 incidents of torture carried out by what the group referred to as governmental forces and 117 by STC forces between 2019 and July 2023.Mwatana also reported widespread torture by government forces in the Political Security Prison in the city of Seiyun in the Wadi Hadhramawt District. One prisoner reported under the pseudonym of Sami Haider that he had endured torture and degrading treatment, including suspension by iron shackles, beatings and whippings with wires, and dousing with cold water for hours.The POE’s February report included interviews from 12 former detainees who reported being abducted by the Houthis, detained for several months or years in different locations, and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, including severe beatings using batons and wires, electric shocks, suspending by the arms for hours, and repeated spraying with ice-cold water. In July, al-Arabiya reported the Houthis moved detained former model and actress Entisar al-Hammadi to solitary confinement, after allegedly beating her with an electrical cable.Impunity was a significant problem among government security forces, including a lack of effective mechanisms to investigate and prosecute abuse. Civilian control of security agencies was weak. There was no information that the government, STC, or Houthis took any accountability measures for these abuses.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in prisons and detention centers operated by the government, STC, Houthis, and rural tribes under areas of their respective control were harsh and life-threatening. Monitoring organizations reported overcrowding, limited ventilation, extremely high temperatures and humidity, and lack of access to natural light, bathroom facilities, health care, water, and sufficient meals.Abusive Physical Conditions: The Global Organized Crime Index characterized conditions in prisons operated by the parties in Yemen as difficult, citing security and health concerns as the most serious.The Abductees’ Mothers Association reported cases of partial paralysis, loss of hearing and sight, and death as the result of inadequate health care in detention centers. Many detainees also raised complaints before the court regarding the lack of health care in government-controlled detention centers. Some detainees contracted diseases during their arrests, resulting in the deterioration of their health. Court decisions to refer detainees to doctors and specialists were often ignored by security agencies overseeing the detention facilities.The National Commission conducted field visits to prisons in the governorates of Ta’iz, Hudaydah, Aden, Dhalea, and Marib. The National Commission reported numerous instances of insufficient food provisions and inadequate healthcare, which prison administrators blamed on overcrowding caused by a backlog in the courts.The Abductees’ Mothers Association also reported on poor conditions in the Houthi-run “Security and Intelligence Prison” in Sana’a. Detainees reportedly lacked access to health care. The Organization for Rights and Liberties (SAM), an NGO based in Geneva, found that at times when detainees were taken to the hospital, the detainees’ families were forced to cover their medical expenses, although the Abductees’ Mothers Association noted at times prisoners were denied medicine provided by families. The group also reported that prisoners lacked blankets at several detention facilities under Houthi control.In December, the magazine UNIPATH cited the Yemeni Organization for Detainees and Abductees to report that the Houthis operated 639 “prisons,” of which 230 were public and 298 were secret facilities, as well as 111 specially created “prisons” located under Houthi-controlled buildings.On April 16, the Houthis and the government plus the Saudi-led coalition released a total of 887 detainees in a prisoner exchange. Media reported alleged mistreatment and torture by detainees held by both sides, including physical abuse as well as inadequate food and medicine.Administration: Limited information was available on prison administration. There was no information on whether authorities conducted investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment. There was no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees.Authorities across the country kept women who had completed their sentences in prisons and detention facilities if there was no male guardian to accompany them on release, or released them only to women’s shelters if their families refused to receive them.Independent Monitoring: The government, STC, and Houthis denied independent human rights observers and humanitarian organizations access to detention facilities. Monitoring organizations generally obtained information regarding the condition of prisons and detention facilities from released detainees and their family members. They also reported receiving threats related to their work, particularly from the Houthis.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The parties in Yemen did not observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law stated authorities could not arrest individuals unless they were apprehended while committing a criminal act or served with a warrant. The law required authorities to arraign a detainee within 24 hours or release them. A judge or prosecuting attorney had to inform the accused of the basis for the arrest when deciding whether detention was required. The law stipulated authorities could not hold a detainee longer than seven days without a court order. The law prohibited incommunicado detention, provided detainees the right to inform their families of their arrest, and allowed detainees to decline to answer questions without an attorney present. It also required the government to provide attorneys for indigent detainees, prohibited arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, and contained provisions for bail. UN bodies, NGOs, and media reporting concluded the parties in Yemen frequently violated these laws and international human rights norms.Detainees often did not know which investigating agency had arrested them, and the agencies frequently complicated matters by unofficially transferring custody of individuals between agencies.Houthi-controlled entities and “courts” were accused of granting bail only if they received a bribe. Tribal mediators commonly settled cases in rural areas without reference to the formal court system. Tribes in rural areas operated unauthorized “private” detention centers based on traditional tribal justice. Tribal leaders occasionally placed “problem” tribesmen in private jails, which sometimes were simply rooms in a sheikh’s house, to punish them for noncriminal actions. Tribal authorities often detained persons for personal reasons without any formal trial or judicial sentencing.Arbitrary Arrest: The POE reported the government judicial system was weak and that the parties to the conflict and security forces largely disregarded even the few court rulings on cases of arbitrary arrest or detention.Local NGOs reported arrests by unidentified authorities and frequent incommunicado detentions for long periods of time. From August 1, 2022, to July 31, the National Commission investigated 689 cases of “detention and disappearances,” including 152 cases allegedly perpetrated by the government and affiliated security entities and 516 cases allegedly perpetrated by the Houthis.Mwatana reported that by the year’s end it had documented 216 arbitrary detentions and 42 incidents to internationally recognized government forces, 38 incidents to the STC, five incidents to the Joint Forces and 131 incidents to the Houthis.Mwatana reported that on October 23 government forces conducted an extensive campaign targeting civilians for arrests and detentions in Hadramawt Governorate. According to their reporting, the Houthis also launched a widespread campaign of detention of dissidents during the September 26 Revolution celebrations.The Houthis did not provide any information regarding the situation of three UN staff members in their custody, two since November 2021 and one since August. A staff member of NGO Save the Children, Hisham al-Hakimi, died in Houthi custody in September. The Houthis had not provided information regarding the circumstances of his death as of year’s end.The law prohibited arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, but local NGOs reported governmental and Houthi security agents regularly detained some persons suspected of crimes from their homes at night without warrants.Pretrial Detention: Limited information was available on pretrial detention practices, but persons arrested were frequently denied their constitutional right to be charged within 24 hours. Prolonged detentions without charge or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing within a reasonable time were believed to be common practices by the parties in Yemen, despite their prohibition by law.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but there were no indications that any form of independent judiciary existed. The government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality.A July report from Abductees Mothers Association documented the failure of the Special Criminal Court in government-controlled Aden to provide a fair public trial to 14 defendants accused of forming an armed gang in 2018. The report noted that the defendants’ confessions were extracted under torture, that all charges were baseless and fabricated, and that the defendants were denied judicial proceedings within a reasonable timeframe. In 2022, the defendants were acquitted but released only after they undertook an extended hunger strike.SAM Organization for Rights and Freedoms, Yemeni Coalition, U.S. Center for Justice, and other local and international human rights organizations released a statement in February calling on Houthi-affiliated “authorities” to end “political trials” against detainees and dissidents. It also urged the government to respect international standards and release detained activists. The groups found the Houthi-controlled “Specialized Criminal Court” in Sana’a did not follow procedures meeting minimum fair trial standards. SAM also found that government and STC courts issued inordinately harsh sentences to at least 32 public figures, including journalists and activists, five of whom were sentenced to death in Marib, although charges were not publicly specified.On April 16, as part of the nearly 900-person prisoner exchange with the government and the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis released journalists Abdul Khaleq Amran, Tawfik al-Mansouri, Hareth Homaid, and Akram al-Walidi, whom they had detained for eight years on charges of spying for Saudi Arabia.																Trial Procedures						The law provided the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce that right. Criminal defendants were commonly denied the following rights: a presumption of innocence; prompt informing of the charges; a fair, timely, and public trial; presence at their own trial; communication with an attorney of their choice; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; free assistance of an interpreter if necessary; opportunity to confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses and present one’s own witnesses and evidence; not be compelled to testify or confess guilt; and an appeal.Trials were generally supposed to be public, but courts could and did conduct closed sessions “for reasons of public security or morals.” Judges played an active role in questioning witnesses and the accused while adjudicating criminal cases. The law required the government to furnish attorneys for indigent defendants in serious criminal cases, but the government often did not provide counsel in such cases. There was no information regarding whether defendants had adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense or to free assistance of an interpreter. The law allowed defendants to confront or question witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf.The government limited access to due process. For example, a court of limited jurisdiction considered security cases and a specialized criminal court, the State Security Court, operated under different procedures in closed sessions and did not provide defendants the same rights provided in the regular courts. Defense lawyers in security cases reportedly did not have full access to their clients’ charges or court files.In addition to established courts, there was a tribal justice system for noncriminal matters. Tribal judges, usually prominent sheikhs, adjudicated noncriminal cases under tribal law, which usually involved public accusation without the formal filing of charges. Tribal mediation often emphasized social cohesion over punishment, sometimes at the expense of the accused’s fair trial guarantees. The public often respected the outcomes of tribal processes more than the formal court system, which many viewed as corrupt and lacking independence.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were numerous reports of political prisoners and detainees held by the parties in Yemen.Amnesty International reported that during a hearing in March, Ahmad Maher, a journalist detained by STC forces, told a judge at the STC’s “Specialized Criminal Court” that he had been subjected to torture and that his confession was extracted under duress. Maher was arrested by STC forces in August 2022, and Amnesty reported he was repeatedly subjected to torture and other mistreatment and was denied access to adequate health care, including for injuries sustained as a result of torture. The group reported that as of December, he had conducted several hunger strikes protesting his detention in Bi’r Ahmad prison in Aden.In March, local and pan-Arab media reported the Houthi-controlled “Specialized Criminal Court” had “sentenced” three YouTubers, who had posted videos critical of the Houthis’ handling of the economy and accusing them of corruption, to “prison terms” ranging from six months to three years and fined them 10 million Yemeni riyals each ($40,000). Houthi-controlled media released confession videos, which some believed to be coerced, of the detainees, but the defendants recanted the confessions before they were “sentenced.”The Houthis continued the “prosecution” of more than 20 Baha’is on charges of apostasy and espionage dating from 2018. On May 25, Houthi forces broke into a private residence in Sana’a where Baha’is were meeting and detained and subsequently disappeared 17 persons. Human rights groups widely reported the incident as the targeting of Baha’is solely on the basis of their religious belief. The Houthis did not file “charges” against any of the 17 Baha’is they detained, seven of whom were released, and 10 of whom remained in detention at the end of the year, according to Baha’is of the United States.(For more detail on the Houthis persecution of the Bahai’s, see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Country Report for Yemen.)																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Freedom House reported the conflict affected government enforcement of property rights, making it difficult for individuals to own property or seek restitution for seized property. The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate in Aden reported security forces affiliated with the STC seized its offices in February.According to the February POE report, the Houthis continued judicial procedures to seize assets and properties from Baha’is, even though many of the defendants had been expelled from the country.The February POE report noted disputes over land and property were a long-standing problem. The POE investigated one case where a Houthi supervisor in the Zubaid, Beit al-Faqih, and al-Jarrahi Districts forced residents in those areas to cede their lands. When they refused, Houthi forces overran the village with military vehicles, bulldozers, and tractors, beat women with rifle butts, and “arrested” approximately 76 citizens, many of whom were released only after signing documents handing over their lands.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with an individual’s privacy, family, home, or correspondence, but the government generally failed to effectively enforce this law. The law required the attorney general personally to authorize telephone call monitoring and reading of personal mail and email, but there was no indication authorities followed the law.According to human rights NGOs, Houthi agents searched homes and private offices, monitored telephone calls, read personal mail and email, and otherwise intruded into personal matters without even the pretense of “warrants” or authorization from Houthi “courts.”																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Although the UN-mediated truce between the ROYG and the Houthis formally expired in October 2022, its terms largely remained in place during the year. As a result of the UN-mediated truce in 2022, cross-border aerial attacks between Saudi and Houthi forces were limited compared with earlier years. The UN Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) reported the year saw the lowest annual civilian casualty count on CIMP’s records since it started reporting in the country in 2018, with 1,675 civilian casualties reported, including 284 children.Killings: Despite the truce, Mwatana reported the parties in Yemen used shelling, ammunition, land mines, and other explosive devices that resulted in the killings and injuries of hundreds of individuals and destroyed civilian infrastructure.An August 21 HRW report found that Saudi security forces on the border with Yemen killed at least 650 Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who tried to cross the border between March 2022 and June 2023. CIMP reported more than one-third of all civilian casualties in the country during the year were the result of violence in Saada’s western border with Saudi Arabia, with 586 civilian border casualties, constituting a 58 percent increase compared with the 372 reported in 2022. CIMP reported that 343 of these casualties were the result of shelling and another 240 were killed or injured by border outpost and patrol shootings. CIMP reported that 81 percent of the 432 civilian casualties caused by shelling took place in Saada, typically in the form of machine gun fire from border outposts and patrols on the Saudi border.(See the Country Report for Human Rights Practices for Saudi Arabia for additional information.)Mwatana reported 32 incidents of ground shelling during the year, resulting in 77 casualties, including 46 children and eight women. It attributed seven incidents to the internationally recognized government forces, one incident to the Joint Forces, one to the STC, 18 incidents to the Houthis, and eight incidents to Saudi border guard units.Mwatana documented 165 incidents involving land mines and explosive devices, which led to the injury and loss of life for 306 civilians, among them 200 children and 25 women. It reported government forces were linked to four landmine incidents and 15 incidents with other explosive weapons, the STC was responsible for one landmine incident and six other explosive device incidents, and the Houthis for 77 landmine incidents and 51 other explosive device incidents.On August 15, government investigator Adnan al-Muhya was killed while leading the investigation into the July 21 killing of World Food Program staff member Moayad Hameidi. Both killings occurred in areas of the Ta’iz Governorate controlled by the government but pan-Arab media reported al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was likely responsible for the incidents.Abductions: On November 19, Houthi forces seized the Bahamas-flagged, Japanese-operated cargo ship MV Galaxy Leader as it was transiting the Red Sea and forced it to anchor near Hudaydah Port. The Houthis detained the ship’s multinational crew including Bulgarian, Mexican, Romanian, Ukrainian, and Filipino citizens. The Houthis continued to detain the ship and its crew at year’s end, despite calls by the UN Security Council and other international actors for their release.Tribal militias and terrorist groups, including AQAP and a local branch of ISIS, committed significant abuses, including abductions. Pan-Arab media linked AQAP to the August 28 abduction of two Doctors without Borders staff members in the Ma’rib Governorate.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: The POE assessed that torture and mistreatment were endemic and committed by the parties in Yemen. The POE documented that Security Belt Forces in government-controlled Aden abducted Ahmed Maher, a freelance journalist and former editor of the Marsad Aden news website, and his brother and held them at Bi’r Ahmad prison, where they subjected them to treatment potentially amounting to torture and coerced them to confess to terrorism-related offenses.The POE documented interviews with 12 victims the Houthis detained, tortured, maimed, and, in some cases, sexually violated in Houthi detention facilities. The POE detailed one instance of a young woman subjected to torture and sexual violence during her more than 17 months in various Houthi detention centers.Child Soldiers: The parties in Yemen were implicated in child soldier recruitment and use. The Secretary of State determined Yemen had governmental forces and Houthi armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.A Mwatana report in March documented the recruitment and use of a total of 3,402 child soldiers recruited between 2015 and March. Government forces recruited 552 children, Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces recruited 284 children, and Houthi forces recruited at least 2,566 children.According to an Arab News report on May 1, government officials and activists alleged the Houthis used “summer camps” to radicalize and indoctrinate children and recruit them as soldiers. According to reports, the Houthis threatened to treat those who refused to attend as foreign collaborators, detaining several activists for failure to attend such events. SAM reported that in one camp children as young as seven were taught to clean weapons and dodge missiles.The lack of a consistent system for birth registration compounded difficulties in proving age, which at times contributed to the recruitment of children into the military.Other Conflict-related Abuse: The parties in Yemen routinely imposed severe restrictions on the movement of persons, goods, and humanitarian assistance. HRW reported the government impeded aid through “the imposition of complex bureaucratic requirements on aid agencies that have impacted millions of civilians’ ability to access it.” They also documented many cases of aid interference and obstruction by Houthi forces, including violence against aid staff and their property and attempts to control aid monitoring and recipient lists to divert aid for political patronage purposes.In a report released on January 30, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted 727 incidents across the country where access to humanitarian aid and services was affected from October to December 2022. OCHA also confirmed in an August 16 press release that aid workers experienced interference, with UN national women staff facing extensive movement restrictions.Mwatana’s submission for the country UPR documented 29 incidents where government forces obstructed humanitarian aid access, including hindering the passage of trucks transporting food assistance, between 2019 and July. It also documented 30 incidents where forces described as UAE-backed obstructed humanitarian aid access.Mwatana documented 165 incidents of attacks on schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure carried out by all parties to the conflict. In their submission to the country’s UPR, Mwatana reported there were many cases in which schools were used as prisons, military bases, and detention centers. Between 2019 and July 2023, Mwatana attributed at least 91 incidents to forces it described as UAE-backed and 19 incidents to government forces in which these groups used schools for military bases or detention centers.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution restricted freedom of expression, specifying members of the press were permitted to exercise that right only within the limits of the law. The law also called for journalists to uphold national unity and prohibited criticism of the head of state. Government-aligned actors did not respect even these restricted rights, and the Houthis significantly restricted freedom of expression in areas under their control through violence and intimidation.Freedom of Expression: All parties to the conflict severely restricted freedom of expression. Women HRDs, journalists, and activists faced specific repression based on gender. HRDs faced harassment, threats, and smear campaigns from the government, Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi forces.NGO Reporters Without Borders wrote that journalists faced abuses by the parties to the conflict and ran the risk of being abducted, mistreated, tortured, or killed.The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate reported 82 violations against journalists, workers, and media outlets during the year, with slightly more than half attributed to the government. They reported five journalists detained at year’s end. The STC held Ahmed Maher and Naseh Shaker, Houthi forces held Waheed al-Sufi and Nabil al-Sadawi, and AQAP held Muhammed Qaid al-Maqri.On March 6, Reporters Without Borders reported that STC personnel expelled the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate from its Aden headquarters on February 28 and threatened the organization’s president with death if he did not leave. The STC denied using force to take over the building, claiming the government owned the building and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate was an illegitimate entity that had exceeded its legal mandate and violated labor laws.Freedom House reported freedom of expression and private discussion were severely limited because of intimidation by armed groups and unchecked surveillance by the Houthis. In multiple instances, Houthi-controlled entities went to the homes of activists and political leaders opposed to the Houthis and threatened detention to intimidate perceived opponents and silence dissent.Violence and Harassment: Progovernment militias, Houthis, and tribal militias were responsible for a range of abuses against media outlets.Freedom House assessed in its annual Freedom in the World Report that journalists endured violent attacks and enforced disappearances committed by all sides in the conflict.On June 13, the International Federation of Journalists reported prosecutors in government-controlled Marib issued arrest warrants against five journalists investigating alleged corruption in the judiciary of Marib: Ali al-Faqih, editor in chief of the website al-Masdar Online; Ahmed Yahya Ayed and Muhammad Musad al-Salihi, editors in chief of the news outlet Marib Press; and the bureau chiefs of two television channels, Yemen Shabab and al-Mahreya.On May 28, STC-affiliated officials on the island of Socotra arrested two French journalists, Quentin Mueller and Sylvain Mercadier, demanding the journalists disclose the names of their sources and their meeting places and confiscating their passports, laptops, cameras, and books. The officials reportedly questioned Mueller about previous reporting on UAE interference in Yemen in a 2021 al-Jazeera documentary.On June 5, Houthi security services in Amran City jailed journalist Fahd al-Arhabi for publishing information on a Houthi politician who appropriated land belonging to workers of a state-owned cement factory.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: All parties to the conflict routinely retaliated against media outlets and workers expressing critical views and censored media outlets in areas under their control. All parties to the conflict restricted access for international reporters, as well as rights documentation bodies. Reporters Without Borders noted objective reporting on the war was rare because the parties to the conflict controlled the media outlets and threatened independent journalists with arbitrary detention and abusive treatment.On June 18, government authorities in Marib arrested and imprisoned writer Manea Suleiman for opinions he shared on social media. He remained in detention at year’s end, and authorities prevented his family from communicating with him.Freedom House assessed in their March report that the government historically controlled much of the terrestrial television and radio. Houthis reportedly regularly blocked certain news websites, online messaging and social media platforms, and satellite broadcasts.Libel/Slander Laws: The law criminalized criticism of the “person of the head of state,” the publication of “false information” that might spread “dissent and division among the people,” materials that might lead to “the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni revolution,” and “false stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their relations.”On January 14, Houthi “courts” charged Mustafa al-Mumari and Ahmed Hajar with spreading false information, defamation, and inciting violence after posting a 10-minute YouTube video titled, “The Sanaa government loots the wealth of Yemen and Yemenis.” The video named specific Houthi officials, accused them of corruption, and criticized tax policies in Houthi-controlled territory.Nongovernmental Impact: Nongovernmental actors inhibited freedom of expression, including for members of the press.																Internet Freedom						All parties to the conflict censored online content. Internet access was significantly limited and disrupted by the conflict. Censorship affected internet freedom, and there were notable cases of Houthi intrusion into cyberspace.Monitoring and information platform the Observatory for Media Freedoms in Yemen reported in its biannual report that on January 9, the Public Funds Prosecution in the government-controlled Hadramawt Governorate held its second hearing in the trial of journalist Ali Salem al-Awbathani. Al-Awbathani was charged with defaming a scientific institution in a posting on his personal Facebook page. The complaint was brought against him by the Presidency of Hadramawt University. The case was later adjourned.Various sources confirmed the Houthi-controlled “Public Telecommunications Corporation” and internet service providers systematically blocked user access to websites and internet domains that the Houthis deemed dangerous to their political agenda.On February 14, Scholars at Risk reported Dhamar University had dismissed six students from the mechatronics department for their participation in protests regarding Houthi interference in the university as well as the need for improved laboratory facilities.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but all parties to the conflict failed to respect these rights. The government and all parties to the conflict restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						In September, Amnesty International reported all parties to the conflict curtailed peaceful assembly of HRDs, journalists, political opponents, and perceived critics. It also reported Houthi agents carried out a “wave of arrests rounding up scores of largely peaceful demonstrators” carrying Yemeni Republic flags who gathered to commemorate the anniversary of the country’s September revolution.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for freedom of association, but it also regulated the activities of associations and foundations and the establishment and activities of NGOs. Government authorities required annual NGO registration. The law required the government to provide a reason for denying registration, such as deeming an NGO’s activities “detrimental” to the state, but the government complied with this provision inconsistently. The law prohibited NGO involvement in political or religious activities and required government observation of NGO internal elections.Civil society organizations reported the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation used conflicting directives governing engagement between international and national organizations to increase oversight and control over humanitarian funding. NGOs reported these requirements made it difficult to implement their programs.In July, a Mwatana field study described wide-ranging restrictions and repressive policies imposed on civil society by all the parties to the conflict.There were NGO reports that the Houthis harassed and detained activists and shut down numerous NGOs, often citing treason or conspiracy with foreign powers. Houthi-controlled entities created the “Executive Office for Monitoring Operations of International Organizations,” reportedly to monitor NGO activity. As a result, several NGOs originally based in Sana’a moved to Aden, other cities in government-controlled areas, or abroad.Restrictions on movement by women significantly constrained humanitarian and NGO activities, and in some cases the Houthis deliberately targeted women working for NGOs and humanitarian organizations.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at   https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, the government and all parties to the conflict often did not respect those rights.In-country Movement: Progovernment forces, the Houthis, and tribal forces maintained checkpoints on major roads. In many regions, armed tribesmen frequently restricted freedom of movement, operated their own checkpoints, sometimes with military or other security officials, and often subjected travelers to physical harassment, extortion, theft, or short-term kidnappings for ransom. Damage to roads, bridges, and other infrastructure from the conflict hindered the movement of goods and persons throughout the country, including hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid and commercial shipments.In July, the conflict analysis NGO ACAPS confirmed movement restrictions in areas controlled by each party to the conflict continued impacting the safety and security of humanitarians and movement of commodities.Houthi forces had kept the main roads in and out of the city of Ta’iz closed since 2015, severely restricting freedom of movement for civilians and impeding the flow of essential goods, medicine, and humanitarian access to residents. The Houthis agreed under the terms of the truce to negotiate with the government on restoring access to Ta’iz roads, but there was no progress while the truce remained in effect, and the roads remained closed as of year’s end.Women did not enjoy full freedom of movement, although restrictions varied by location. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported harassment at checkpoints of women and girls not accompanied by a male escort, as well as inability to afford transport, hampered women’s ability to reach health, nutrition, and other services.Houthi “authorities” required women to show mahram (guardianship) permission and have their guardian (father, brother, husband, or son) present to obtain or renew personal identity cards, despite the law not requiring such conditions.The Houthis increased the enforcement of mahram requirements, even though the law did not impose such requirements. The Houthis largely enforced mahram through verbal directives and governorate-level localized circulars. Tribal authorities in areas bordering Houthi-controlled territory also imposed mahram requirements. The unclear Houthi directives concerning mahram requirements resulted in some Sana’a-based car rental agencies refusing to rent vehicles to women or to sell seats to women for travel in shared vehicles.Foreign Travel: Limited commercial flights operated with few interruptions out of Sana’a International Airport under Houthi control, allowing residents to travel to Jordan and onward. International flights also operated from the government-controlled airports of Aden, Seyun, and Ar-Ryan.Houthi “authorities” imposed mahram requirements on women seeking to travel internationally or obtain or renew passports and prevented HRDs from traveling.On September 30, Houthi agents prevented Mwatana chairperson Radya al-Mutawakel, vice chairperson Abdul-Rashid al-Faqih, and three other Mwatana staff from traveling through Sana’a International Airport. The five HRDs were released without charges after interrogation, but the Houthi agents banned them from travel indefinitely.Exile: There were no known reports that the government forcibly exiled political opponents but there were reports that the Houthis forcibly exiled political opponents, HRDs, religious minorities, and others.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: According to Integral Human Development, access to asylum procedures was restricted. The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had not established a system for providing protection to refugees. No domestic law addressed the granting of refugee status or asylum, and there was no system for providing protection to asylum seekers. UNHCR was able to conduct some refugee status determinations in the country, although this did not guarantee individuals protection under the law. According to UNHCR, the government granted prima facie status to Somali nationals. The Houthis attempted to take over the refugee status determination process in areas under their control, leaving many refugees with lapsed documentation. According to UNHCR, asylum seekers were not registered in Houthi-controlled, northern areas of the country.The government lacked the capacity to provide physical protection to refugees, many of whom were held in detention centers operated by the Houthis in the north and by the government in the south. Smuggling groups often helped de facto authorities run these detention centers. According to UNHCR, approximately 65 percent of asylum seekers resided in southern governorates.According to the October UNHCR Strategy and Action Plan, there were more than 71,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the country, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: An August 21 HRW report alleged that the Houthis had a significant role in trafficking, extorting, imprisoning, and abusing of migrants in camps in the north. The report found that Houthi forces coordinated and facilitated access to the border for smugglers in Saada Governorate and sometimes collected migrants injured during their crossing into Saudi Arabia from hospitals in Saada and forcibly return them to smugglers in the camps. Interviewees alleged Houthi forces often extorted bribes from the migrants or transferred them to what migrants described as detention centers, where migrants suffered abuse until they paid an exit fee.Employment: Refugees faced insufficient livelihood opportunities given the pervasive economic challenges. There were also legal barriers to formal employment for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants.Access to Basic Services: Refugees generally lacked access to basic services due to the conflict. Many health facilities remained closed due to damage caused by the conflict, some were destroyed, and all facilities faced shortages in supplies, including medications and fuel to run generators. According to UNHCR, the Kharaz refugee camp in Lahj Governorate was the only refugee camp in the country and hosted more than 9,600 refugees and asylum seekers.Durable Solutions: The government did not assist in returning or resettling refugees. Instead, the International Organization for Migration reported that during the year it assisted approximately 6,000 migrants and refugees, mostly Ethiopians, to voluntarily return to their home country.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										According to a May report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, approximately 276,000 displacements were recorded across the country in 2022.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																				g. Stateless Persons										There was minimal reporting available on stateless persons.The country contributed to statelessness through discrimination against women in nationality laws.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: There had been no national elections since the conflict began in 2014. The parliament last convened in April 2022 to grant legitimacy to the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which took control after former President Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi stepped down and included political and security leaders from various parties and armed groups.Political Parties and Political Participation: The law required political parties to be national organizations that did not restrict their membership to residents of a particular region or to members of a particular tribe, religious sect, class, or profession. The former ruling General People’s Congress party split into several regional factions as well as a separate faction under Houthi control in Sana’a. The sitting cabinet and the PLC included members affiliated with established political parties, as well as other political elements, including the STC. PLC Vice President Tareq Saleh and his National Resistance forces also had a political wing.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Gendered social norms, security considerations, and disproportionate caretaking responsibilities posed barriers to women participating on equal basis with men in political life. Persons who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) did not participate openly in the political process.Women held limited ministerial-level positions in the government. One woman was appointed to Executive Committee of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission under the PLC, several women served in the larger, 50-member Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, and one woman was named to the government’s official delegation for UN-led peace talks. Women remained active in civil society, including participating in protests and demonstrations in the south, developing a feminist road map for peace, negotiating the release of detainees and political prisoners, and working through civil society organizations to hold authorities accountable.In its Freedom in the World Report for the year, Freedom House wrote that the minority group with East African origins known as the muhamasheen (marginalized) accounted for as much as 10 percent of the population but suffered discrimination in politics and society. The INSAF Center for Rights and Development reported on other estimates of the muhamasheen population accounting for as much as 12.7 percent of the population. The Sana’a Center reported that the muhamasheen lacked political power in local communities to lobby for inclusion in development projects and humanitarian beneficiary lists.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						While the law provided for criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: Corruption was pervasive throughout the country, and observers reported petty corruption in nearly every government office. Applicants for government jobs were often expected to purchase their positions via bribery. Observers believed tax inspectors routinely undervalued property assessments and pocketed the difference. Many government officials and civil service employees, including teachers and health-sector workers, went unpaid due to lack of government resources, while public-sector payrolls were padded with “ghost workers” receiving salaries for jobs they did not perform. Corruption also regularly affected government procurement.Local and international organizations, including Transparency International, agreed corruption was a serious problem in every branch and level of government and among nonstate actors, especially in the security sector. International observers claimed government officials routinely benefited from insider arrangements, embezzlement, and bribes.The ATWAD Anti-Corruption Organization, an NGO, assessed that the government’s Supreme National Authority for Combatting Corruption (SNACC) suffered from a lack of sufficiently qualified staff and investigators, as well as a lack of independence. The government lacked adequate reporting mechanisms for corruption and written protections for whistleblowers. SNACC struggled to cover its operating expenses and employee salaries during the year.On August 25, parliament issued a report alleging violations and corruption in the electricity, energy, telecommunications, and financial sectors. The report stemmed from a parliamentary investigation into the sale of the telecommunications company Aden Net to a UAE company. It also accused the electricity ministry of misappropriating funds, purchasing low-quality fuel, and unlawfully waiving tariffs on fuel derivative imports.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights groups generally operated with restrictions from all parties to the conflict to monitor or investigate human rights conditions and cases and publish their findings. Government officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to the views of these groups.International NGOs and international organizations faced permission restrictions in accessing Houthi-controlled areas and frequently were not able to operate at full capacity in Sana’a. Local employees of international NGOs and organizations faced potential detention and kidnapping by nongovernmental groups. Employees of local NGOs faced similar restrictions.The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago discontinued on-the-ground data collection efforts in a human trafficking patterns study, following incidents involving its staff. In February, a visibly terrified resident of Abyan returned to the center’s offices a day after being interviewed and asked staff to delete their interview notes without explanation.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: There were numerous reports of threats or violence against HRDs.On December 5, a Houthi-controlled court in Sana’a convicted and sentenced to death Fatima Saleh al-Arwali, the former head of the Yemen office of the Arab League’s Union of Women Leaders, on charges of collaborating with the enemy. She had no legal representation at the trial, and by year’s end, her family had only been able to contact her twice in detention since she was arrested in August 2022.On July 10, the UN special envoy to Yemen stated the Houthis severely restricted freedom of movement for the United Nations and other international organizations due to mahram requirements and road blockades in Ta’iz and other governorates.Government Human Rights Bodies: The government’s National Commission had the mandate to investigate all alleged human rights abuses in the country but was generally ineffective in carrying out its mandate. The commission was nominally independent of the government but did not have enforcement power. The commission investigated and reported on human rights conditions during the year and participated in training with the United Nations.In September, the National Commission released its 11th periodic report, documenting 2,997 incidents of human rights violations countrywide from August 2022 to July 31. The commission addressed violations committed by the government and government-backed security forces, the Houthis, the Saudi-led coalition, and other parties to the conflict.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of men and women, but it did not criminalize spousal rape. The punishment for rape was imprisonment for up to 25 years. The government did not enforce the law effectively, however. By law, authorities could prosecute rape survivors on charges of fornication if they did not charge a perpetrator with rape. Without the perpetrator’s confession, the rape survivor had to provide four male witnesses to the crime. There were no reliable rape prosecution statistics, and the number of rape cases was unknown. Human rights NGOs said sexual assault and gender-based violence were widespread among migrant communities and generally underreported.In February, the POE reported Houthi use of detention, torture, degrading treatment, and sexual violence on civilians in their custody was widespread. The POE reported former women detainees were particularly vulnerable in Houthi-controlled areas because of the assumption they had suffered sexual violence while in detention, resulting in social ostracism and decreased personal and professional opportunities. Former women detainees of Houthi “prisons” reported to the POE that although they had regained their liberty, they continued to suffer from trauma, receive threats from Houthi operatives, face social rejection, and lack psychosocial support, employment, and other livelihood opportunities.A woman who escaped Houthi custody in August 2022 was interviewed by the panel in February and described her detention for more than 17 months by the Houthis under charges of working against the Islamic religion and serving the interests of foreign powers. She resisted rape by a Houthi official while in secret detention and was repeatedly physically assaulted by detention center guards. She also stated the Houthis often threatened to publish compromising images of detained women as a means of coercion.The OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview confirmed that migrant women and girls faced disproportionate risk of sexual violence. The August HRW report on the Saudi-Yemen border reported the case of a woman who was allegedly raped and impregnated by a smuggler. The report alleged three of the 10 women and girls interviewed were raped by smugglers or other migrants.Muhamasheen women were particularly vulnerable to rape and other abuse because negative societal attitudes toward muhamasheen resulted in general impunity for attackers.The law stated authorities should execute a man convicted of killing a woman, but it allowed leniency for persons guilty of “honor” killings or the violent assault or killing of a woman for perceived “immodest” or “defiant” behavior. The law did not address other types of gender-based abuse, such as forced isolation, imprisonment, or early and forced marriage.The law provided women with protection against domestic violence, except spousal rape, under the general rubric of protecting persons against violence, but authorities did not enforce this provision effectively. Survivors rarely reported domestic abuse to police, and criminal proceedings in cases of domestic abuse were rare.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law did not prohibit FGM/C, but a ministerial directive banned the practice in government institutions and medical facilities, according to HRW. According to a United Nations Population Fund report published in October, the most recent data from 2013 indicated 19 percent of women ages 15 to 49 had undergone FGM/C, with prevalence rates as high as 80 percent and 85 percent in al-Mahrah and Hadramawt Governorates, respectively. FGM/C was less common among girls ages 15 to 19 than among women ages 45 to 49.Discrimination: Women faced deeply entrenched discrimination in both law and practice in all aspects of their lives. Mechanisms to enforce equal protection were weak, and the government did not implement them effectively.Women could not marry without permission of their male guardians; did not have equal rights in inheritance, divorce, or child custody; and had little legal protection. They experienced discrimination in areas such as employment, credit, pay, owning or managing businesses, education, and housing.Hospitals often required a male guardian’s consent before admitting a woman, creating significant problems for households with no remaining adult men. Women also faced unequal treatment in courts, where a woman’s testimony equaled half that of a man’s testimony. A husband could divorce a wife without justifying the action in court, but a woman had to provide justification.Any citizen wishing to marry a foreigner had to obtain the permission of the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Bureau, and, in some instances, the Political Security Organization under regulations that authorities enforced arbitrarily. A woman wishing to marry a foreigner had to present proof of her parents’ approval. A foreign woman who wished to marry a male citizen had to prove to the ministry that she was “of good conduct and behavior.” Women experienced economic discrimination, and the Houthis “prohibited” women from participating in certain professions and increasingly limited women’s freedom of movement through mahram requirements.According to international organizations, mahram requirements prevented women and girls, particularly female heads of household, from receiving humanitarian aid, as female staff could not travel to field locations, and it was generally considered inappropriate for male staff to deliver support or assistance to unaccompanied women.The law prohibited women from working the same hours as men or in jobs deemed hazardous, arduous, or morally inappropriate.HRW reported in February that the Houthis discouraged women from obtaining work outside of the home through laws barring them from public places and certain workplaces.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The continuing conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis made it difficult to find reporting on the government’s approach to reproductive rights. The conflict led to a breakdown of the health-care system, and women and girls, including survivors of sexual violence, did not have access to essential reproductive health services.In February, UNFPA reported that less than half of the hospitals remained functional and, of those, only 20 percent of health facilities offered maternal and child health services, due to lack of supplies, staff shortages, damage due to conflict, inadequate equipment and supplies, and inability to meet operational costs. As a result, 5.5 million women and girls of childbearing age and 1.5 million pregnant and breastfeeding women had limited or no access to reproductive health services.The Houthis prevented health centers and pharmacies in areas under their control from providing any method of family planning to women without a prescription and the presence and consent of their husbands. The Houthis justified this policy and a ban on health workers using illustrated family planning guides as being consistent with “faith identity.”																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Although racial discrimination was illegal, some groups, such as the muhamasheen community and citizens born to foreign parents, faced social and institutional discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and social status. The muhamasheen, who traditionally provided low-prestige services such as street sweeping, generally lived in poverty and endured persistent societal discrimination, including discrimination in employment. Muhamasheen women were particularly vulnerable to rape and other abuse.Media reports referencing muhamasheen activists noted that while social castes and slavery were abolished in the 1960s, tribal justice systems reinforced historical patterns of discrimination. Walk Free, an NGO focused on ending modern slavery, estimated in its 2018 report (most recent data available) there were 85,000 victims of modern slavery in the country, or 3.1 percent of the population, but that due to the impossibility of conducting surveys under conflict, the data likely underestimated the problem. This broad category included forced labor and debt bondage, human trafficking, and forced and early marriage.During the year the Houthis reportedly targeted muhamasheen communities to recruit fighters. INSAF Center for the Rights and Development reported muhamasheen women were also more vulnerable to sexual violence and harassment by Houthi and other combatants, especially at checkpoints.According to UNICEF, muhamasheen struggled to register their newborns, with only 9 percent holding birth certificates, the absence of which limited access to other government documents, as well as jobs and services.																																				Children										Birth Registration: There was no universal birth registration. Many parents, especially in rural areas, never registered their children or registered them several years after birth. The requirement that children have birth certificates to register for school was not universally enforced. The lack of birth registration reportedly led courts to sentence juveniles as adults, including for crimes eligible for the death sentence.Education: Public schooling was free to children through the secondary school level, but HRW reported that many children, especially girls, did not have easy access to education.Approximately 170,000 teachers in Houthi-controlled provinces had not received regular pay since 2016.Child Abuse: The law did not define or prohibit child abuse, and there was no reliable data on its extent. Authorities considered violence against children a private family matter.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: Early and forced marriage was a significant, widespread problem, exacerbated by the conflict. The United Nations reported forced marriage and child marriage for financial reasons due to economic insecurity was a systemic problem. There was no minimum age for marriage, and girls reportedly married as young as age eight.According to UNICEF, girls forced into early marriage often remained trapped in a cycle of poverty and unfulfilled potential, and married boys and girls were more vulnerable to being coerced into child labor or recruited into fighting.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law criminalized the commercial sexual exploitation of children. The law prohibited pornography, including child pornography, although there was no information available on whether the legal prohibitions were comprehensive. The law did not define statutory rape and did not impose a minimum age for consensual sex.																																				Antisemitism										Media outlets reported that only one Jewish citizen, Levi Salem Musa Marhabi, might remain in the country, and he remained in Houthi-controlled detention.The Houthi movement regularly used antisemitic slogans. Anti-Israel rhetoric often blurred into antisemitic propaganda. The Houthis propagated such materials and slogans throughout the year, including adding anti-Jewish slogans and rhetoric into the elementary education curriculum and books. In March, the Yemen Policy Center reported children in Houthi summer camps were instructed to shout the Houthi slogan, which contained the phrase “death to Israel, curse the Jews.”Members of the Jewish community were not eligible to serve in the military or national government. Government and nongovernment authorities forbade them from carrying the ceremonial national dagger.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct. The penal code stated that “unmarried men shall be punished with 100 lashes of the whip or a maximum of one year of imprisonment, married men with death by stoning”. For women, the penalty for premeditated commission of same-sex consensual behavior was up to three years’ imprisonment; when the offense was committed under duress, the perpetrator was punishable with up to seven years’ detention.There were no known executions of LGBTQI+ persons during the year.Violence and Harassment: The government did not consider violence or discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons “relevant” for official reporting. No nongovernment reporting was available.Discrimination: Due to the criminalization of and possible severe punishment for consensual same-sex sexual conduct, few LGBTQI+ persons were open regarding their sexual orientation or gender identity. Individuals known or suspected of being LGBTQI+ faced discrimination.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Information regarding involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices specifically targeting LGBTQI+ individuals was unavailable.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Information regarding restrictions of freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly for LGBTQI+ persons was not available. LGBTQI+ expression was viewed as taboo and largely hidden due to widespread stigma.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The constitution and the law affirmed the rights of persons with disabilities. The law granted persons with disabilities the same rights as persons without disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce it. The law mandated the establishment of special educational institutions to provide basic education to persons with disabilities. The law, however, was not implemented. The law also affirmed the right of persons with disabilities to public education.The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor was responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but the ministry did not carry out these duties due to the conflict and humanitarian crisis. The Yemen Fund for the Care and Rehabilitation of People with Disabilities reported in 2018, the most current information available, that only 750 students with disabilities were studying at the university level, and that the closure of 300 special education centers had deprived 190,000 students with disabilities of education. Persons with disabilities faced limited access to the workplace and discrimination in hiring. The law reserved 5 percent of government jobs for persons with disabilities, but this was rarely enforced.In March, Amnesty International reported those with disabilities experienced unique hardship during conflict in the region because they lacked sufficient warning in advance of impending attacks. Families were separated while fleeing, and those with disabilities were left behind.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										While there were no reports of social violence against persons with HIV or AIDS, the topic was a socially sensitive taboo and infrequently discussed. Discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS was a criminal offense. Information was not available regarding incidents of discrimination.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of citizens employed in the private sector to join unions and bargain collectively. These protections did not apply to public servants, day laborers, domestic servants, foreign workers, and other groups who together made up most of the workforce. The civil service code covered public servants. The law prohibited antiunion retaliation, including prohibiting dismissal for union activities. While unions could negotiate wage settlements for their members and could conduct strikes or other actions to achieve their demands, workers had the right to strike only if prior attempts at negotiation and arbitration failed. Unions had to give advance notice to the employer and the government and receive prior written approval from the executive office of the General Federation of Yemen Workers’ Trade Unions before striking. Strikes could not be carried out for “political purposes.” The proposal to strike had to be put to at least 60 percent of all workers concerned, of whom 25 percent had to vote in favor of the strike. Foreign workers could join unions but could not hold office.The government was unable to enforce labor laws due to the conflict. The government did not enforce laws on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in areas under its control. Parties to the conflict often accused unions and associations of being linked to a political group or opposition. Additionally, Houthi-controlled former ministries purportedly responsible for the implementation of labor laws in areas under Houthi control did not implement the law in those areas.Houthi militia members kidnapped Abu Zaid al-Kumaim, a leader of the Yemeni Teachers Club union, from his home in Sana’a on October 9 after he called for payment of public employee salaries. The union issued a statement expressing disappointment that he was “arrested” for asking the Houthis to pay educators who had gone without salaries for the last eight years. In November, SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties reported al-Kumaim’s condition significantly deteriorated and that Houthi authorities transferred him temporarily to al-Kuwait hospital after he fell into a coma. According to NGO reports, at year’s end he was still detained despite Houthi promises to release him.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ 																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a minimum wage for all sectors. The minimum wage for private-sector employees had to at least equal the public-sector minimum wage. The law mandated that wage payments depended on the terms of the employment contract. Employees could be paid on a monthly, fortnightly, weekly, or hourly basis.The minimum civil service wage was more than the estimated poverty income level, but many civil servants were not paid consistently, and most salaries were too low to provide for a large family. Workdays were limited to eight hours. Work weeks were limited to 48 hours distributed over six working days followed by one day of paid rest. The maximum working hours during the month of Ramadan could not exceed six hours per day or 36 hours per week. The law required an employee’s workday to have at least one hour of rest so that any continuous period of work did not exceed five hours. Friday was the day of rest but could be substituted for another day of the week if required for work.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) laws and standards were not appropriate for the main industries in the country.Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts and not the worker. The law provided workers the right to remove themselves from a hazardous workplace.The law obligated employers to provide health care to workers for preemployment medical examinations and for periodic medical exams while employed. The conflict made it difficult to verify whether these laws were implemented consistently.There was no credible information available regarding work-related accidents or fatalities during the year.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not, or was unable to, enforce penalties for wage, hour, or OSH violations. No information was available regarding penalties imposed for wage and hour violations or if any were applied. Many workshops and stores operated 10- to 12-hour shifts without penalty. In practice, the agencies responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws did not operate or were significantly impaired, due to the conflict. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance. Inspectors had no authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated in March 2021 that informal employment represented 78 percent of total employment. In July, the government reported the informal sector had developed at an “accelerated pace” in recent years due to the impact of conflict and lack of effective economic policies. OSH law did not apply to the informal sector, including domestic servants, casual workers, or agricultural workers. The government did not enforce other labor laws applicable to this sector. Working conditions were poor in the informal sector, and wage and overtime violations were common. Foreign migrant workers, youth, and women workers typically faced the most exploitative working conditions.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Yemen
- Digital Press Briefing with Timothy Lenderking, Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy A. Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for YemenDubai HubMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Dubai Regional Media Hub.  I would like to welcome our participants joining us from the Middle East and around the world for this on-the-record briefing with U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking.  During this call, Special Envoy Lenderking will discuss issues related to maritime security and efforts to de-escalate tensions in the Red Sea.   After opening remarks, Special Envoy Lenderking will take questions from participating journalists.  We are pleased to offer simultaneous interpretation for this briefing in Arabic.  We request that everyone keep this in mind and speak slowly. I’ll now turn it over to Special Envoy Lenderking for some opening remarks.  Sir, the floor is yours. MR LENDERKING:  Good afternoon.  Thank you, Hala, and thank you all for joining us today.  Ramadan kareem for those of you celebrating.  I’m pleased to be joining you all from Muscat, where I’ve had excellent meetings today, including with Oman’s foreign minister, His Excellency Sayyid Badr.  During my meetings here, I expressed my appreciation for the important role Oman has played in advancing peace in Yemen and for the importance of this bilateral relationship to the United States. Yesterday I traveled to Saudi Arabia for additional engagements with partners helping lead the effort to promote regional stability.  In all of these discussions, the bottom line is this:  The Houthis must immediately halt their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden because they are undermining progress on the Yemen peace process and complicating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemenis and others in need, including the Palestinian people.  We discussed steps to secure Houthi de-escalation and renew focus on securing a durable peace for the Yemeni people.  I also had a chance to congratulate the new Yemen foreign minister before he traveled to Aden.   Houthi attacks must stop so we can return our focus to the Yemen peace effort and direct our full attention towards supporting the Palestinians and their legitimate aspirations for a two-state solution, which Houthi behavior, frankly, is complicating and undermining.  Houthi actions endanger the lives of civilian seafarers, disrupt the flow of food and other essential commodities to people worldwide, undermine navigational rights and freedoms, and irreparably harm the marine environment and sensitive ecosystems that Yemeni fishermen depend on. The Houthi attacks are raising prices for consumers and jeopardizing the regional development goals of countries in the region that depend on shipping and international trade, including Oman.  These attacks are also not helping Yemen, which remains in dire need of humanitarian and economic support.   The Houthis claim that their actions are a response to the conflict in Gaza, but their attacks only hurt ordinary people in the region.  You can care about and support the Palestinians and still oppose the Houthi attacks.  These negative impacts are due exclusively to Houthi recklessness and Iran’s efforts to sow instability across the region.  These attacks serve nothing more than a narrow Houthi agenda.  Iran continues to enable these attacks through arms funding and intelligence support to the Houthis, reminding the world that they are the leading sponsor of terrorism.   Let’s be clear.  The Houthis’ attacks against civilians and commercial ships are acts of terrorism.  This is further exemplified by their seizure last November and continued unlawful detention of the MV Galaxy Leader and its 25-member crew.  The United States has been very clear that we seek de-escalation in the Red Sea and that the Houthis’ attacks cannot continue.  When their attacks stop, so too will coalition actions in the Red Sea and Yemen. Our commitment to the peace process in Yemen remains unshakable.  The Houthis could have avoided global condemnation, including recently by the UN Security Council, by ceasing their illegal attacks.  They can still de-escalate and return to the path of peace.  But they have left the international community with no choice.  While there remains broad international support for an inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni peace process to find a lasting solution to the country’s conflict, successful negotiations are extremely difficult as long as the Houthis continue their aggressive actions.  Absent a political settlement, we fear Yemen’s humanitarian and economic crises will only get worse.  But we cannot let the Yemeni people continue to suffer.  The United States is the world’s leading donor of humanitarian assistance for Yemen.  The United States has provided almost $6 billion in assistance since the conflict began.   Let me stop there.  I’m happy to take your questions.  Thank you.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Special Envoy.  And we’ll start the Q&amp;A with a pre-submitted question, and we had two Omani journalists that asked similar questions, so I will take questions from both of them.  It was from Mohammad Afar from the Muscat Daily and Shaded Al Musalmy from Oman Observer, and their questions are:  “What are the main challenges that are facing peacemaking and hindering negotiations given all the efforts by Oman and the United States, and considering Oman’s history of negotiating with the Houthis on various issues?”  MR LENDERKING:  Thank you so much, Mohammad and Shaded.  I really appreciate that question.  This is exactly what has brought me to Muscat today and to Saudi Arabia yesterday.  These two countries in particular have such an important role to play.  They both border on Yemen, as you know, and have very, very strong interests in a solution in Yemen.  I couldn’t think of two better partners, quite honestly, to work with, and that’s why I am here so often – more than 50 trips to this region since I was appointed envoy three years ago. And I think what we have to do is seize the moment that was presented to us before October 7th.  There is a roadmap for peace that the parties have agreed to.  It may be imperfect.  It may have challenges.  But the fact that the key conflict parties have agreed to it – it’s been endorsed by the Omanis and by the UN of course – gives us an opportunity to take advantage of these principles to push the peace process forward.  And that’s why I’m so committed to seeing that this happens, that not every crisis in the region is going to be able to be resolved before Yemen’s peace effort can go forward.  And that’s why we need to seize this moment now, building on the progress that has been made, the ongoing truce, the possibility of releasing more prisoners, the possibility of getting Yemen’s economy back on track.  These are such important aspects that I think we need to push toward.  It’s going to be a team effort.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Special Envoy.  Now we will go to the live queue to Elizabeth Hagedorn from Al-Monitor.  Elizabeth, please go ahead and ask your question.  You can unmute yourself.  Go ahead.  QUESTION:  Hi, thanks.  Tim, do you see any evidence that the SDGT designation or the U.S.-led military strikes have deterred the Houthis or changed their behavior?  And then if I could just add, have you – how would you characterize the Saudi-Houthi peace process at this stage?  Are the talks indefinitely postponed?  MR LENDERKING:  Thanks so much, Elizabeth.  I know how closely you have been following these issues and thank you for your interest.  I do think, from our point of view, that the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization in February has put additional pressure on their ability to fundraise, and it is – it was our intent to put this additional pressure on the Houthis as a way of signaling our desire to move their behavior away from the focus on the Red Sea back toward the peace process.  And I do think, from what I’m seeing, that there is this pressure that is being felt.   But my hope as the envoy for Yemen is that we can find diplomatic offramps to find ways to de-escalate and allow us to pull back eventually the designation and of course to end the military strikes on Houthis’ military capability.  We favor a diplomatic solution.  We know that there is no military solution, and in that commitment we are joined by all members of the P5 – Russia, China, France, the UK – united in this goal, and I think that’s very helpful for listeners to know that there’s a strong consensus in the international community and among key players to support the peace effort going forward. MODERATOR:  And back to a pre-submitted question from Saudi’s Almughtarib TV, from Yaser Almuaalemi, and the question is:  “Is your visit to Saudi Arabia intended to signal a de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Yemen?”  MR LENDERKING:  Hello, Yaser.  Thank you very much.  In no way are we de-escalating our involvement.  What we want to see is a de-escalation of the tensions that we’re seeing not only in Yemen and the Red Sea, but throughout the region.  And of course, my focus is particularly on the ways that we could move beyond the current crisis in the Red Sea and get back to the Yemen peace effort.  As I say, there’s a fundamental foundation, a very, very important foundation in the roadmap that was agreed to in December after a year or more of painstaking work.   And I think tying back to Elizabeth’s question earlier, the fact that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have been able to make progress, Saudi Arabia mediating between the Houthis and the Yemen Government, multiple visits to Sana’a and to Riyadh by both sides, building confidence and driving agreement on a roadmap, gives us some hope that we can use this moment to get beyond current tensions and refocus on what the Yemeni people need, which is an end to this nine-year civil war.   MODERATOR:  We’ll go back to the live queue, to Jeff Seldin from Voice of America.  Jeff, feel free to unmute yourself and ask your question.  QUESTION:  Thank you very much for doing this.  I’m wondering, in your talks the last couple of days, how much concern there’s been, how much talk there’s been about the Israeli airstrike on the embassy complex in Damascus, Iran’s embassy complex, and whether – and what that means for the region in terms of perhaps dragging it into a wider or escalated war, and specifically what it might mean for the Houthis given their relationship with Iran and whether they may escalate their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.   MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you for that.  That was a significant development, and of course it has – that issue has come up in my stops on this trip.  This attack took place while I was on the road.  I was not briefed on it.  I believe that the White House has made very clear that the United States was not briefed on it.  This was not our strike.  And I think you can continue to look toward Washington for further commentary on that. What I’ve sought to do is keep the Yemen focus first and foremost – that whatever is happening in the region, we need to keep a laser focus on the needs of the Yemeni people.  They’ve suffered through nine years of war, of deprivation, of destroyed infrastructure, of displacement, and I think harnessing the regional efforts in a positive direction toward peace is exactly where this administration wants to go.  We have to be able – to be able to push efforts on peace in Yemen just as we’re working on multiple other crises in the region.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  Now to Farida Ahmed from the pre-submitted questions, and she is from South24 Center for News in Yemen, and her question is:  “The American response to the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has yet to achieve its objectives.  What are the next steps for the United States in light of the Houthi escalation, and will this escalation affect the expected negotiations process and your efforts as a special envoy to Yemen alongside Hans Grundberg?”  MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you so much again for reaffirming the importance of the peace effort.  I do think that the efforts, the pressure that the United States and a coalition of other countries – Operation Prosperity Guardian, the coalition that is conducting military strikes on Houthi military capability to destroy that capability that the Houthis use to attack ships – it has no broader purpose than that very specific goal – plus the designation of the Houthis does put additional pressure on that – on the Houthis and may help discourage them from continuing down this path. But nevertheless, I do think that ultimately diplomatic solutions will have to be found, and again, that’s why the importance of consulting with regional partners who have such a strong stake in a peaceful outcome to this conflict – Oman, Saudi Arabia, and others.  I will travel elsewhere in the region later this month.  That’s why this is so important, I think, and why I refer to this being a team effort, because I think the other countries in the region have such a strong stake in a peaceful outcome.  We all want Yemen to be a source of stability for the region.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  And we’ll take one more question from the pre-submitted questions, from the Oman News Agency from Khalid Al Busaidi, and the question is:  “Since the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea is linked with the genocide in Gaza, why is the U.S. administration continuing to supply Israel with weapons instead of forcing Israel to end the brutal war on Gaza after the shocking numbers of casualties and famine?” MR LENDERKING:  Khalid, thank you so much for that question.  I know that’s very much on people’s minds, and I would refer you to Secretary Blinken’s long statement on the issue of weapons sales to Israel.  I think it’s quite comprehensive, but one of the points that he makes is that we do have a longstanding commitment to Israel’s security and to helping ensure its ability to defend itself.  That, of course, does not mean rampant attacks on civilians, which the United States has called out and is seeking to end through very, very forceful engagement with the parties in that conflict.   Again, I think let us do our utmost together to ensure that regional conflicts do not impinge, threaten, or undermine the effort that we’re trying to do to build on these foundations that we have laid over the last couple of years in Yemen.  And let me just remind everybody, despite the attacks on the Red Sea, there is a truce in fact being observed in Yemen.  The fighting that we had seen that was so raging up to two years ago ended with the truce, and I think it’s very important for people to appreciate that internally in Yemen, fighting has not returned.  That de-escalation has allowed more humanitarian supplies to reach Yemen, for Yemenis to travel abroad on their own airlines for the first time from Sana’a since 2016, for prisoners to be released, and for some efforts to begin to be made toward rebuilding Yemen’s economy.   We need to pull all of these lines of effort together in a united fashion, joined with efforts from the region, focused and determined, to get us to ending this war in a durable way and promoting Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue which ensures that Yemen’s – that the Yemeni people can take charge of their own future. MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  And now we’re back to the live queue to Tawfiq Ali from Independent Arabia.  Tawfiq, please feel free to unmute yourself and ask your question.  You’re still on mute, Tawfiq.  Go ahead and unmute, and feel free to ask your question.  Okay, I don’t think we’re able to hear Tawfiq.  Tawfiq, feel free to write your question and we’ll try to ask it on your behalf. QUESTION:  Oh, hello.  Hello, hello.  I will speak Arabic, okay?   MODERATOR:  Actually, we can only take questions in English, but feel free to write – (in Arabic).  But the questions will be asked only in English. QUESTION:  (In Arabic.) MODERATOR:  I’m sorry?  Okay, thank you.  All right, I will go back to the pre-submitted questions and ask a question &#8212; QUESTION:  I will be back shortly, okay?   MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you – thank you, Tawfiq. All right, so back to the pre-submitted questions.  Huthaifa Al Amiri from ymn-now.com:  “Is there any breakthrough in the Yemen peace process given that the Houthis continue their terrorist activities in the Red Sea?” MR LENDERKING:  I think most importantly we’re looking for and working toward the durable ceasefire in the Yemeni-Yemeni talks that we so much want to achieve, and I think that the UN Security Council and the countries in the region want to achieve.  It’s very difficult to take advantage of the momentum that we have made in Yemen over the last few years given these attacks on the Red Sea.  Unfortunately, these attacks against international shipping have undermined the credibility of the Houthis as a good-faith actor in Yemen.   Let us see whether they can find a way to release the crew of the Galaxy Leader – 25 sailors who were detained in November of last year who are still being held.  There is no justification for it.  They have no connection to Israel; their ship had no connection to Israel.  This is a step that the Houthis could take to show good faith to the international community that they do have an intent to de-escalate, they do have a commitment to do – to de-escalate.  Steps like these could generate a lot of goodwill, will be noticed and welcomed by the parties, and can be used to contribute to the peace process going forward. MODERATOR:  All right.  And now Monalisa Freiha from Annahar asks:  “Does Washington have an assessment of the impact of the U.S. campaign against Yemen’s Houthis?  Are there any other options on the table to deter attacks by the group?” MR LENDERKING:  So as I’ve said, I think that the pressure campaign is something that is having its intended effect in the sense that those targets that the military is striking, whether they be underground facilities or coastal radars, they are being destroyed.  They are hampering the ability of the Houthis to continue to launch attacks on Red Sea shipping.  And by the way, these attacks are hurting ships of many, many different countries – I think more than 70 attacks over the last several months.  They’ve sunk a ship; they’ve killed three mariners.  I mean, this is not acceptable behavior for any party to exert on international waterways and threatening freedom of navigation.   So I do think that we need to – we collectively need to continue this pressure, but at the same time continue to talk to our allies and partners in the region about ways to de-escalate, and looking to defuse this tense situation as soon as we can. MODERATOR:  Now Abdulhadi Habtor from Asharq Al Awsat newspaper asks:  “How do you respond to the recent Houthi actions regarding the issuance of a new currency denomination of a hundred rials?  And is there any change in the U.S. position regarding the peace process?” which I believe you’ve answered.  Over to you, sir. MR LENDERKING:  Thank you for that question, referring to the introduction of a new coin in some parts of Yemen.  What this shows us is that there is economic pressure that the Houthis are facing.  I’ve talked about the economic pressure that the Houthis are placing on international shipping, which is harming regional economies, but it’s also harming Yemen.  And in that sense I would point to a 15 percent reduction in ships being able to dock at Hudaydah Port, which is a lifeblood for the Yemeni people.  These actions on Red Sea shipping have obstructed humanitarian supplies from reaching the Yemeni people.  And that’s why we say that these attacks are misplaced and why they’re reckless and indiscriminate.   And so I think what this introduction of a new coin shows is economic pressure that is being felt by the Houthis.  There is a liquidity crisis in Yemen.  What this all points to is the importance of returning Yemen to a period of stability where its economic resources can be used to promote stability and benefit for all Yemenis, where salaries can be paid according to the terms of the roadmap, where Yemen’s fisheries are not endangered by attacks on oil tankers and other ships that could threaten these vital ecosystems.  And that’s, again, why we need to make this push toward the Yemen peace effort, which will help the humanitarian situation and also help Yemen – Yemenis rebuild their economy. MODERATOR:  Now Lama Alhamawi from Arab News asks:  “You met with officials in Riyadh this week to discuss the recent Houthi attacks on vessels on the Red Sea.  Who did you meet with, and what were the results of those meetings?” MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you.  I continue to meet with a broad range of officials in Riyadh.  I did meet – I did mention the Yemen foreign minister, who was on his way to Aden, and that was a pleasure to meet him for the first time in this new capacity.  And of course, we welcome the presence of the legitimate Yemeni Government in Yemen, where it can connect with the Yemeni people, I think do projects that are of benefit to the Yemeni people, and demonstrate its accountability to the Yemeni people.  I also do meet with a broad array of Saudi officials and other Yemenis who may be found in Riyadh at the times that I am there.  I think all these consultations are extremely important in narrowing the differences that may exist between the conflict parties and ensuring that the international community is fully behind a genuine and sustained peace effort in Yemen, that these efforts are coordinated and focused and determined. MODERATOR:  Now Amina Zaki from Dostor asks:  “Is there cooperation with Arab countries and Egypt to confront the challenges in the Red Sea?” MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you so much.  Of course, we talk about Yemen as a regional issue, and indeed it is; while Yemen is connected by border with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and those two countries have a special stake, the Egyptians have had longstanding interest in Yemen.  And we see that Yemen’s stability is a benefit to all countries in the Middle East.  And so that’s why I think the regional effort is so important to what we are doing.  We welcomed Algeria on the Security Council, for example, recently, and we’ve had very productive conversations with all the members of the Security Council about the need to push Yemen peace efforts forward.  The Egyptian economy is taking a terrible hit as a result of attacks on the Red Sea, with revenues from the Suez Canal decreasing by 50 percent.  And this is why we say that the – that the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping have such a negative impact, and why that impact is spread out and being felt by ordinary people, ordinary consumers, and obstructing the movement of fuel, food, medicine to people who need it around this entire region. MODERATOR:  All right, we just have time for just a couple more quick questions, if you have time, sir.  From Jamila Alabri from Atheer in Oman, and she asks:  “If the attacks on ships continue in the future, will America continue its attacks?  And are there clear statistics on the losses resulting from the rerouting of shipping routes and ports?” MR LENDERKING:  There are some terrific websites and a lot of open-source reporting on the impact of the attacks on Red Sea shipping.  We look at those quite extensively ourselves.  Every single country almost in the region is impacted in one way or the other, in a negative way – a loss of revenues, blockage of essential commodities, driving up of insurance costs, of fuel costs.  The diversion of ships from going through the Red Sea and going around Africa instead adds millions of dollars in fees that is going to be passed on to consumers and to ordinary people in each of these countries, and it’s a shame to see this kind of impact continue when it’s not necessary to resolving the conflict in Gaza. So again, I think that’s why we point to the urgency of ending these attacks on Red Sea shipping, returning the focus to the Yemeni peace process. MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ve unfortunately run out of time, so I’m sorry for those who have not been able to get their questions answered.  But we’ll turn the floor back to Special Envoy Lenderking for any closing remarks, sir. MR LENDERKING:  Hala and colleagues, thank you so much for organizing this call today, and thank you to the many callers who called in from periodicals and publications and organizations from around the region.  I value very much this conversation, I look forward to further opportunities, and once again, the United States, very committed to the peace effort in Yemen.  We must stay focused and committed, we must consult our partners, and think of the needs of the Yemeni people first and foremost.  Ramadan kareem to all of you.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  That concludes today’s call.  I would like to thank the special envoy for joining us, and thank all of our colleagues from the media for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, please do contact the Dubai Regional Media Hub at DubaiMediaHub@state.gov.  Thank you for joining us for this important briefing today, and have a lovely rest of your day. 
- U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman																																		Media Note																														April 1, 2024																																							U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking is traveling to Saudi Arabia and Oman this week to meet with partners to discuss the need for an immediate cessation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which are undermining progress on the Yemen peace process and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen and other countries in need.The United States remains firmly committed to supporting a durable peace in Yemen and alleviating the complex humanitarian and economic crises harming the Yemeni people. The United States supports a return to UN-led peace efforts once the Houthis halt their indiscriminate attacks.Special Envoy Lenderking will meet with regional counterparts to discuss the steps to de-escalate the current situation and renew focus on securing a durable peace for the Yemeni people.						Tags																					Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																																Humanitarian Aid																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Oman																																Peace																																							Red Sea																																																					Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance																															Saudi Arabia																																Seas																																							United Nations																															Yemen
- Department Press Briefing – March 6, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 6, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 6, 2024																																																					March 6, 2024																																																								1:14 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: All right, everyone. I don’t have anything for the top, so &#8212;QUESTION: Really?MR MILLER: &#8212; Matt, you want to &#8212;QUESTION: You don’t have anything at the top?MR MILLER: You have – I have – calling on you counts as something. So &#8212;QUESTION: There’s a lot going on. Well, yeah, not much. All right. I &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s your assessment, not mine. I don’t share that assessment.QUESTION: I got several – I have several brief ones, in alphabetical order, but – and my colleagues should feel free to interrupt if they have anything on these. My alphabetical order are Haiti, Houthis, and Gaza.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Starting with Haiti, what is the situation with Prime Minister Henry. There – the report that you guys wanted – you guys want him out, is that correct? I understand that your ambassador to the UN spoke to this earlier, but wondering what you have to say about it.MR MILLER: So let me start by just saying generally the United States has long worked with CARICOM and Haitian leaders on the path to restoring democratic order in Haiti through free and fair elections, inclusive governance, and power sharing, which will give them the opportunity to democratically elect a prime minister. And as the situation on the ground grows increasingly dire, we and CARICOM have continued to call on stakeholders, including the prime minister, to make concessions in the interest of the Haitian people.So we are not calling on him or pushing for him to resign, but we are urging him to expedite the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure that will move with urgency to help the country prepare for a multinational security support mission to address the security situation and pave the way for free and fair elections.QUESTION: Okay. So what’s your understanding of where he is now and his efforts to get back to the country?MR MILLER: So I will let him speak to his travel plans and his location.QUESTION: All right. Well, look, the U.S. has a long and very difficult history with Haiti and going back long before you or I were born, decades, and decades, and decades. But also in my time at the State Department, I was there when you guys organized the, quote/unquote, “evacuation” of the prime minister. So how far are you guys prepared to go in pushing or telling Prime Minister Henry that he needs to either start the transition or get out of the way so that the transition can start?MR MILLER: So we are going to continue to work with CARICOM, because I think it’s important to make clear that it’s not the United States acting alone in this – with this regard. It’s the United States in consultation with partners in the region are having these conversations. And what we are saying to the prime minister is that he needs to expedite the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance, including the appointment of a transition council. So that’s what we’ll continue to discuss with him.QUESTION: All right. If anyone else has anything on Haiti &#8212;QUESTION: Can I ask a couple things on &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know you’re not confirming his whereabouts, but is he welcome in the United States? I mean, can Prime Minister Henry stay in the United States and U.S. territory?MR MILLER: I’m just – I am just not going to speak to his travel plans at all. I think it’s appropriate for him to make those announcements.QUESTION: Sure. And also, I mean, the – can you flesh it out a little bit more? To a new governance structure – is that something – is there something concrete that’s in mind? I mean, there’s obviously ideas from CARICOM and elsewhere, but is there some sort of a concrete plan or this more just generally speaking that something needs to change?MR MILLER: I don&#8217;t want to speak to it in detail from here, because it’s something we’re in conversation with partners in the region about at this time. But we have always been clear that there needs to be a transition to free and fair elections in Haiti, and we have been clear that we need to see the deployment of a multinational security support mission to address the dire security situation on the ground. So we are continuing to work through both of those things. We are making progress on deploying the MSS; we want to see that happen as soon as possible. And we’re also in – as I said, in conversation with partners in the region about how to transition back to the path to democracy.QUESTION: And just one more. The new governance structure – is that – and the elections, I mean this – the call for elections – is that – do those go in tandem? Is there an idea that you need to have elections to have this new governance structure? Is there any idea that there needs to be something that changes right now even before &#8212;MR MILLER: I just don’t want to get into details. But of course we are looking to get to – on – back on the path to elections in the country, as well as to security.QUESTION: Go ahead.QUESTION: There’s no more on Haiti? I just want to go to the Houthis.MR MILLER: The Houthis?QUESTION: And you’ve seen that there’s been – CENTCOM has put out a statement about fatalities. These are apparently the first fatalities. Do you have anything to say about this incident?MR MILLER: So I think that it was, sadly, inevitable. The Houthis have continued to launch these reckless attacks with no regard for the well-being of innocent civilians who are transiting through the Red Sea. And now they have, unfortunately and tragically, killed innocent civilians. And so the United States will continue to hold the Houthis accountable for their attacks, which have not just disrupted international commerce, not just disrupted the freedom of navigation in international waters, and not just endangered seafarers, but now, tragically, killed a number of them. So we will continue to hold them accountable, and we call on governments around the world to do the same.Anything else?QUESTION: No. I’ll let other people go on Gaza.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Do you want to step in or &#8212;QUESTION: Just a little bit.QUESTION: Go ahead.MR MILLER: It’s just so &#8212;QUESTION: Just one more thing on the Houthis.MR MILLER: I’m sort of – it’s so weird.QUESTION: So cooperative.MR MILLER: Like, the two of you guys, like, collaborating or maybe conspiring. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Well, why not? Great. When you say we’ll continue to hold the Houthis accountable for their attacks, should we expect, like, a new wave of U.S. retaliatory attacks from here in a way that we’ve saw – we’ve seen three weeks ago, or what is that that you’re referring to?MR MILLER: I am just – I am not going to preview actions that we will take from this podium, as is always the case.QUESTION: Okay. I’ll go to Gaza in that case.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, sure. Go ahead.QUESTION: Just briefly one more.MR MILLER: Comity.QUESTION: We’re being very polite. I mean, just the flipside of what Humeyra asked – I mean, does this show a failure, for lack of another term, of deterrence? I mean, there have been these strikes from the U.S. and the UK and others on Houthi targets. Does this show it’s not working and that there needs to be a new strategy?MR MILLER: Look, we have always made clear that this is going to be a long-term process, both to deter the Houthi attacks and to degrade their capabilities to carry them out, and that’s a process that is continuing. At the same time, we continue to talk to partners in the region about how they ought to make clear to the Houthis that these attacks are irresponsible, that they endanger international commerce, and that they hurt the economies of countries in the region as well as countries around the world. So it’s something that we will continue to push, not just on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the coalition that we have assembled to oppose the Houthis’ actions, and again, to collaborate with other countries in the world who share those interests.QUESTION: Go ahead.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Okay. On Gaza ceasefire, Matt, yesterday you said that U.S. believes that the obstacles at the moment are not insurmountable. How would you describe the talks today, given that there’s still no breakthrough, and it’s day three and it’s at a very critical week?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to give a day-by-day assessment of the talks, but the over &#8212;QUESTION: Gazans live day by day.MR MILLER: But the overall assessment that I offered yesterday has not – we still – we continue to believe that the obstacles are not insurmountable and that a deal can be reached and a deal is in the interest of Israel, it’s in the interest of the Palestinian people, and it’s in the interest of the broader region. So we’re going to continue to push for one, but I’m not going to offer an assessment of where things stand today.QUESTION: So you wouldn’t describe the talks as they’re at an impasse?MR MILLER: They are ongoing. No.QUESTION: Right. And what is the U.S. understanding that the biggest sticking point is at the moment?MR MILLER: Nice try, but you know I’m not going to answer that one. (Laughter.)QUESTION: And would you say that it is right now up to Hamas or Israel or both of them – which one – to basically accept the deal? Or is – it’s not like that; it is something that they have to &#8212;MR MILLER: So it is a negotiation. It’s an ongoing process. But the point that you have heard me make and that you have heard the Secretary and other leaders of the administration make over the past few days is that Israel put a serious proposal on the table, and it’s for Hamas to accept it; it’s also for Hamas to engage in good faith and show that they actually want to get a deal, and we’re going to continue to engage on good faith on our behalf and continue to try to get a deal over the finish line.QUESTION: Have you seen in recent days that Hamas is not engaging in good faith &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and they actually don’t want a deal?MR MILLER: So I think that I – it’s hard to ever offer an assessment that a terrorist organization that attacks innocent civilians is acting &#8212;QUESTION: Sure, but they’re &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; is acting wholly in good faith, but it is a negotiation, and I don’t want to comment on the underlying negotiation.Go ahead, Tom, and then I’ll come to you next, Said.QUESTION: The World Health Organization said yesterday that its officials had visited Shifa Hospital, where there were treatment – there was the treatment of 50 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition. In Kamal Adwan Hospital, 10 children had reportedly died from hunger and dehydration in recent days, and that it was overwhelmed by patients. They say the current rate of 15 percent of wasting among children under the age of two in northern Gaza suggests a serious and rapid decline. Such a decline in a population’s nutritional status in three months is unprecedented globally. I mean, you know about this situation, so what is being done to alleviate this?MR MILLER: So first of all, let me say that those reports, which we saw and reviewed, are obviously heartbreaking, and it confirms what you heard the Secretary say yesterday – that not only is the situation on the ground right now in Gaza unacceptable, but it’s unsustainable. It cannot continue this way. And so you have seen the United States take action to air drop food supplies in. You have seen us take action to fund the delivery of humanitarian assistance. You have seen us announce that we are exploring a maritime option to deliver humanitarian assistance through new routes. But it still is incumbent upon the Government of Israel to do more as well.Now, we did see an increase in the number of trucks that went into Israel yesterday – around 250, 260 trucks made it in through Rafah and Kerem Shalom. That’s an improvement over where we have been. We have seen some improvement in the distribution, but we need to see dramatically more go in. We need to see it go in not just through Rafah and Kerem Shalom, but we need to see it go in through a crossing in the north. And we have made very clear to the Government of Israel that’s what we expect and that we expect to see improvement, and as the President said, there can be no excuses.QUESTION: And he said that on Friday. The Vice President’s repeated it. We heard from the Secretary of State yesterday a similar message, insisting that Israel facilitate some more aid, and yet yesterday 14 World Food Programme trucks were blocked by the Israelis going to the north of Gaza. So they’re not listening.MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to that specific report of trucks being blocked. Sometimes trucks are blocked for legitimate reasons; sometimes they’re blocked for less than legitimate reasons. We want to see trucks move all around, and there needs to be a security situation that allows them to move, and that’s one of the difficult things that we have tried to work through.So what I’ll say is the messages that you ticked through that you heard the President, and the Vice President, and the Secretary deliver publicly, I can assure you that we are delivering those messages every bit as clearly privately with Israel as well, and we expect to see action.Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Just to follow up on Tom’s referencing of the hospitals. I mean, of Gaza’s 33 hospitals before that were fully operational before October 7th, there are now three that are semi-functional and so on. That’s creating a really horrific situation. And we talk about the food and the starvation and so on, but is there any way – I don’t have any ideas, but – is there any way to actually make these hospitals more functional and able to care for more people, especially children?MR MILLER: So the best way to achieve that goal, which is very much a goal that we have, would be to reach a deal for an immediate ceasefire that would last for at least six weeks and would allow for a cessation in hostilities, would allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, would allow for people inside Gaza to move around, both doctors and patients and those who just need to seek medical care. That would be the best route to reach that objective, and it’s one that we are continuing to pursue.QUESTION: So six weeks would probably be a nice respite for the people and for everybody involved, but it also presumes that the fighting will continue thereafter for whatever reason after the end of the six weeks, especially in light of what you alluded to yesterday, that you support Israel in its pursuit of the defeat of Hamas and so on. And what we see 150 days after this war began, we see that the fighting is still going, Hamas is not defeated; by the best analysis, it has been degraded somewhat, maybe 30 percent, 20 percent, whatever it is. So conceivably this war can go on for another year.MR MILLER: So we have always said that we want to see this conflict end as soon as possible. We want to get a temporary ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation and get the hostages home, but it is our goal to end the conflict completely, and to end it as soon as possible, and, as you have heard me say before, Hamas bears a lot of responsibility for the conflict continuing to be waged. Hamas could come forward and surrender, they could come forward and swear off violence, they could put their arms down. And one of the things that we would very much try to pursue in the event of a humanitarian ceasefire would be the demilitarization of Gaza and the demilitarization of Hamas. And we are – it’s something that we will consult with – that we have been consulting and will continue to consult with partners in the region about. Because for all that – for all that Israel has done in this conflict, and the – and all it has done to bring Hamas terrorists to justice, Hamas does bear a lot of responsibility for the conflict ongoing. So if we are able to get a ceasefire, it is very much something that we will pursue.QUESTION: I understand, but you’re saying that you want Hamas to surrender – that is, I mean, is there really serious thinking that this is actually going to happen? I mean, considering that the Palestinians have been waging some sort of an armed struggle against Israel for the past 75 years. I mean, they take – they go from Beirut to (inaudible) to Jordan to places like this, but it goes on in the West Bank and so on. Is there really expectation that the Palestinians will give up the notion of getting their rights or – getting their rights; in the absence of the world doing anything about granting them their rights, that they have to do it on their own?MR MILLER: So we do not want the Palestinians to give up their rights. In fact, you have seen the Secretary and the President pushing very hard for a two-state solution that would create an independent Palestinian state, and would answer the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.But to this question about Hamas, when you’ve seen 30,000 Palestinians killed, why wouldn’t they lay down their arms and stop that bloodshed? Why wouldn’t they lay down their arms and stop the war? If they truly care about the thousands and thousands of civilians who have been killed in a war that Hamas started – so remember who started this war – if that was in their real interest, the well-being of the Palestinian people, I’m hard-pressed to answer why they wouldn’t lay down their arms and pursue a demilitarization option when you have the United States and other countries in the region saying we are prepared to step forward and work on a legitimate political path forward for the Palestinian people – not one that’s brought about by terrorism, not one that’s brought about by violence, but a legitimate political path that leads to an independent Palestinian state.QUESTION: And lastly – I’m sorry, but just to push this point a bit further – the Palestinians basically said okay, we lay down our arms; they’ve done it time and time again. They recognize Israel. They sign treaties and so on with them &#8212;MR MILLER: Hamas has not done it.QUESTION: Hamas said they will abide by the – I mean, let’s not – it’s a very complex issue.MR MILLER: Hamas won’t even sign up to the principles of the PLO, so.QUESTION: But I’m saying that – what we’re saying is there has been a Palestinian effort that has failed. I mean, people look – whether it’s Hamas or somebody else – they look at 30 years of efforts to arrive at the resolution that the United States has signed to and in fact sponsored in 1993. No? And it has gone nowhere. We see the settlements expand. We see the occupation become more violent against the Palestinians. People are more imprisoned and so on.MR MILLER: So if people continue to look at the past and only the past that has happened for decades and decades without being willing to sign on to a positive vision of the future, we will never have a peaceful way out of this conflict – not just the current conflict in Gaza, but an actual resolution to the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestinians.QUESTION: Well – but the problem with that, Matt, is that you have called for in every single conflict around the world there to be accountability for things that have happened in the past, and now you’re saying, oh, well, just forget about it.MR MILLER: No. That’s not – my point is there has to be at some point a political reconciliation. And so I think Said’s point was why would Hamas agree to lay down arms when we have seen grievance after gradience go on for decades. And the point that we have made – and you’ve heard this – the Secretary speak to this a number of times &#8212;QUESTION: Fair enough, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Ultimately there are two paths. There is – you can continue down this path where we talk about what happened decades and decades ago and try to address that with – through violent activities, or we can have a peaceful resolution to this. And of course you &#8212;QUESTION: But &#8212;MR MILLER: Of course, there’s a process for addressing legitimate grievances through that process. But what I am saying, and the point that we have made, is continuing to carry out violence as the solution to decades-old grievances &#8212;QUESTION: Legitimate gradiences.MR MILLER: &#8212; is a path – is a path to continued conflict and a never-ending cycle that does not advance the interests of the Palestinian people.QUESTION: But you’re talking about addressing legitimate grievances from the past, right?MR MILLER: Yes. And my point is through violence will just lead you in this never-ending cycle that we – that the region has been in for decades.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I follow up on Said’s point?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, because you said that why wouldn’t Hamas look at the numbers of dead – 30,000 – and effectively surrender, but that almost suggests or implies that the numbers killed creates a political or military pressure on Hamas to do so. But you’ve always said that any civilian death is unacceptable.MR MILLER: That’s – that is not – that’s not my implication. That’s not my implication at all. Any civilian death is unacceptable.QUESTION: But you connected those two issues &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that if Hamas surrender – Hamas looking at the number of dead, why would they not surrender?MR MILLER: This – any – hold on. It is not – it is – it is not the implication. I don’t think that’s a fair reading of what I’m saying. My – every civilian death is unacceptable. The point is that Hamas surrendering would end the conflict, and would end the civilian causalities that have unfortunately happened since October 7th.Go ahead. I’m sorry, Jenny. Go.QUESTION: So I just want to clarify: The Israeli Government has told you that if Sinwar was to purely surrender, that would be sufficient to end the war?MR MILLER: I – so I’m not going to get into our – the conversations that we’ve had, but obviously if Hamas surrendered and laid down its arms that would be an end to the conflict.QUESTION: Including Sinwar?MR MILLER: That – he is the leader of Hamas in Gaza.QUESTION: So it’s sufficient for them.MR MILLER: So I am not – I am not going to speak on behalf of the Israeli Government, but obviously when you have one side of a conflict stop fighting and lay down its arms, that brings about an end to the conflict.QUESTION: Okay. And I want to push you on some of the many things the U.S. Government has called on Israel to investigate. Do you have any updates on the convoy shooting into the air, into the crowd, that &#8212;MR MILLER: That investigation is ongoing, is our understanding. They have announced preliminary results. I know they’ve announced those publicly, and they’ve briefed them to us privately as well. But the fuller investigation is still ongoing.QUESTION: And then on the investigations into the two American teenagers who were killed in the West Bank? What is the &#8212;MR MILLER: Those investigations are also going – ongoing. But we should be clear, only one of those is an Israeli-conducted investigation. The other is being conducted by Palestinian law enforcement authorities because of where that killing took place in the West Bank.QUESTION: And the CHIRG process, have there been any conclusions there?MR MILLER: It’s ongoing. Yeah.QUESTION: Please follow up &#8212;QUESTION: I – just &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, Humeyra.QUESTION: Just on the investigations &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just two others specifically. The one – the implosion of the university in Gaza?MR MILLER: I don’t – I don’t have any new information to report from the Israeli Government.QUESTION: And what about the incident that happened a couple months ago in which the – Israeli agents went into the hospital, went room by room and &#8212;MR MILLER: I’ll have – I’ll have to check to see if we have any updates on it.QUESTION: &#8212; basically killed people?MR MILLER: I’ll have to check and get back to you and see if we have any updates.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, sorry. Humeyra and then &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; just one further – on this – on these investigations, when was the first time that State Department or the administration has launched one of these investigations in an incident like this?MR MILLER: Do you mean &#8212;QUESTION: Do you remember?MR MILLER: Are you speaking with respect to the CHIRG process which is not something I would describe as an investigation?QUESTION: Not necessarily CHIRG, but like all of these investigations: the university, the hospital, West Bank.MR MILLER: So a little bit of conflation. Those are investigations that are being conducted either by Israeli authorities, or in one of these cases, by the Palestinian law enforcement authorities.QUESTION: Right. So I’m just trying to get a sense of what U.S.’s expectation of how long those investigations will last, and what is your mechanism to really follow up on the result of the investigation. And &#8212;MR MILLER: So it depends on the circumstances. There are things that the Israeli Government has looked into at our request where they have come back and reported to us either that – I’ve talked about this some before. Like, we’ve gone and asked them about specific strikes, and they have come back to us and said we were targeting this specific strike where there were reports of civilian casualties because there was a legitimate military target. And sometimes they’re able to tell us who – the name of that legitimate military target who is there. At other times, they have come back to us and told us that this strike that you asked us to look into, we were targeting one facility, and we mistakenly hit another facility. So we have gotten answers on a number of things that we have raised questions for.With respect to other investigations, it’s different depending on the circumstance – for example, the killing of two American citizens in the West Bank, one of which is being conducted by the Israeli police, one of which is being conducted by Palestinian law enforcement. I can’t possibly give you a timetable on how long a police investigation takes, just as we can’t – local law enforcement in the United States can’t usually give you a timetable on how long an investigation is going to take because it depends on how they turn up leads and how they’re followed through and if they get breakthroughs.What we do is ask for those investigations to be carried out as quickly as possible. We ask to be briefed on the results when it’s appropriate for us to be briefed on those results, and we ask that when there’s appropriate there be accountability.QUESTION: Right. Can you then commit that U.S. will somehow follow up with the results of all of those investigations and ensure accountability? And can you think of one example that the situation has moved to that level since the beginning &#8212;MR MILLER: There have been absolutely cases that we have raised with the Israeli Government about incidents targeting civilians in Gaza where they have come back to us and said that they made a mistake, and there have been times where they have talked about accountability for IDF forces. And I know at times they’ve talked publicly about accountability for members of the IDF who have done things that are inappropriate.QUESTION: And let me just ask a question that we’ve asked before: Is there any process of atrocity determination or anything similar to that from this building looking into Israel – its military conduct?MR MILLER: Again, we continue to collect information, monitor information. We collect information about specific incidents and examine that through the CHIRG process that we set up last year, but I don’t have any updates on that.QUESTION: One last thing, sorry. On the ceasefire talks, you don’t agree that there at an impasse or you just don’t want to use that word, but what is the U.S. alternative if – because, I mean, the President talked about March the 4th a week ago. Ramadan, the start of Ramadan is fast approaching. If the talks are really at an impasse and they go south, does the U.S. have like an alternative plan and specifically regarding the aid situation? Because you’re relying so much on the establishment of this truce to get in more aid.MR MILLER: So – yeah. So I disagree a little bit – or disagree with that quite a bit. So first of all, I don’t want to talk – speculate about a hypothetical. We are pushing for – I mean – and I mean not with respect to aid, but overall I don’t want to speculate about a hypothetical. We are pushing for a successful conclusion to these talks. We believe that’s possible and we’re going to continue to push for it.Now, that said, we are not waiting for the outcome of these talks to push for an improvement in the humanitarian assistance – the humanitarian situation on the ground, and that’s why you’ve seen us take our own action already by launching air drops, which will continue. It’s why you see us exploring a maritime option that we are very much engaged in. And it’s why you see us pushing the Israeli Government at the seniormost levels. We are not waiting for the outcome of a hostage deal, and I think you heard this – the Secretary say this yesterday, that notwithstanding what happens with a hostage deal, the improvement in the humanitarian situation is something that needs to happen immediately.QUESTION: Sorry, can you just – when you say that sometimes they’ve gotten back to you and said we were going for one target and hit the wrong one and we made a mistake, can you give one or two or three or – examples?MR MILLER: I do not have them off the top of my head. This has been something that we’ve been in conversation with them back to the earliest days of this war.QUESTION: Are you aware of any situation where they’ve come back to you and said we screwed this up?MR MILLER: Of course. Yeah, of course.QUESTION: And people have been held accountable?MR MILLER: We have seen examples where they have come back to us and said people made a mistake &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Can you give me one or two?MR MILLER: I don’t – I – no &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Not a mistake, like this was bad, this was something &#8212;MR MILLER: We have seen examples where they have come to us and said they are holding members of the IDF accountable.QUESTION: Can you give an example of one?MR MILLER: I don’t have them off the top of my head, but you can also look, Matt. They have announced some of these publicly as well, and so it’s publicly available, but they have disciplined IDF members.QUESTION: Yeah, but – okay, but I’m not talking – I’m talking about when they get back to you, because you guys are their prime supplier of weaponry and money. And so when you guys ask or demand an explanation for something, it should be – you should get an answer, right?MR MILLER: We do get an answer now. It’s not always perfect, but we do get answers, and sometimes we want more information about those answers.QUESTION: But if you can’t give – if you can’t give a single example of either &#8212;MR MILLER: So I can’t – so Matt, this is something that’s been going on for five months, but I can say – remember, as I – so I’m not going &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I understand that, but I’m not &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. I’m not going to remember &#8212;QUESTION: But I’m not looking for an exhaustive list.MR MILLER: Hold on. I’m not going to remember every example.QUESTION: I’m just asking – I’m asking for one example of either.MR MILLER: And I’m telling you I can’t give you every example off the top of my head, but as I said, you can look publicly and find examples of this.QUESTION: All right. All right.MR MILLER: So you don’t have to take my word for it. They have announced publicly where they have disciplined IDF members for acting – for inappropriate actions that they have taken inside Gaza.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: Camilla, finally. Sorry. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Staying on this question, sorry.MR MILLER: Don’t blame me, blame them.QUESTION: You said to Jenny that the investigation’s still ongoing with the convoy. Last week it was notable that you topped the briefing with the incident of the convoy. I asked you yesterday about the apparent sticking point of a list – Israel wanting a list of names, Hamas saying they can’t get a list of names. Was the incident – the convoy incident last week, was that a significant reason for derailing the talks this time around?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to – I am not going to speak at all to the status of the talks and how they’re going, but the talks have – are ongoing, so to the extent that they have been derailed or anything, I wouldn’t describe them as been – as having been derailed. They are ongoing and we continue to think a deal is possible.QUESTION: And with the questions you’ve been getting about what happens if a deal is not reached soon and not enough aid gets in – if there are more incidents like what happened last week with the convoy being stormed, if that happens again and again, is there a concern that, again, this deal is getting further and further away from being achievable?MR MILLER: So again, I don’t want to speak to hypotheticals, but the desperation of the Palestinian people continues, and people still are desperate for food and water and medicine. They’re desperate to feed their families. So the situation that we saw last week is something that we are concerned could be repeated, which is why we are continuing to push to get as much aid in as possible through as many channels as possible so, one, people have the food to feed their families; and two, as I said yesterday – I think it was yesterday – that when they see a convoy coming through, they don’t believe it’s the last chance they’re going to have to feed their families for a week or two weeks or a month.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple of separate topics. Russian missile strike appeared to target President Zelenskyy today in Odesa and while he was meeting with Greek prime minister. This – let me get a reaction first. Also, did anyone reach out to Ukrainians or Greek side to discuss this?MR MILLER: We are in constant contact with both of those countries. I don’t have any specific conversations to read out. I think the strike is yet another reminder of how Russia continues to strike Ukraine every single day, and it’s a reminder of Ukraine’s need for air defense interceptors, and it’s a reminder that the United States Congress needs to take action, as we have called on them to do, to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.QUESTION: Thank you. And while this was happening in Odesa, back in Sochi we saw the IAEA chief met with President Putin today. The pictures of him shaking hand with indicted war criminal is all over the place. Do you approve that meeting? Did he reach out to the U.S. side prior to the meeting? Is there any message that he’s conveying on behalf of &#8212;MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that meeting at all.QUESTION: And may I move to Azerbaijan, please?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: There’s a police raid against independent news outlet called Toplum TV. Let me get your reaction. And this, as you know, is part of the ongoing media crackdown in the country.MR MILLER: So we are deeply troubled by the reports that Azerbaijani police raided the office of independent media outlet Toplum TV and by the reported arrests of multiple independent journalists and civil society activists in Azerbaijan today. We must express our strong objections to continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists, civil society voices, and opposition figures. We call on Azerbaijan to end the harassment of those exercising their fundamental freedoms and urge the release of all individuals being unjustly held in politically motivated cases. No one should face incarceration or other retribution for exercising freedom of expression.QUESTION: Thank you for that. Let me press you a little bit on that, because strong objections have been expressed during previous raid against Abzas TV as well. That did not stop them; they arrested reporters. Why do you think they should draw a different conclusion this time?MR MILLER: I think they should draw a different – so I will not speak to drawing different conclusions. What I will say is that they should stop these actions that crack down on free expression because it – doing so would be in the interest of their own people. So we will continue to make that clear. And I can assure you that when we have private diplomatic conversations with Azerbaijani officials, as the Secretary had occasion to do just last month, we make those same points privately.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Willy, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. The two Americans detained in Gaza now a month ago and the woman in the West Bank – any further consular visits with them? The Israelis are saying it was on suspicious – suspicion of collaborating with Hamas. The family completely refutes that. Do you guys have any sense of where the truth is?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to an ongoing legal process. But with respect to the two who are detained in Gaza, we have had consular access to those two American citizens, and with respect to the American citizen that was arrested in the West Bank, we had consular access to her and she has now been released on bail.Jenny, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, tomorrow Chairman McCaul has threatened to mark up a bill to keep – or put Blinken in contempt of Congress. Has there been any update on trying to appease his demands?MR MILLER: So we have been in close, repeated consultation with the committee about this matter. As I’ve said before, we have done everything that we can to try and address their legitimate oversight needs. We have made 15 department officials or former department officials available for lengthy interviews about – throughout this process. We have turned over somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 pages of documents. So we have a – the need to protect legitimate Executive Branch equities. We recognize that Congress has a need to conduct legitimate oversight authorities, and so we’re in conversation with them. We are trying to resolve this amicably, as we have been successful in doing at previous points in the past year. And so we’ll continue to do that today and tomorrow.QUESTION: Are you confident this will be resolved before tomorrow?MR MILLER: All I will say is that we are hopeful it can be resolved, we’re doing everything we can to try to resolve it, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And then on Afghanistan, are there any updates on the number of SIVs you guys have been able to get out now more than two years &#8212;MR MILLER: So as you know, we invested a good deal of resources to ramp up our ability to grant SIV visas. In fact, in the last fiscal year, we were able to issue more than 39,000 SIVs. It was the record number of visas for principal applicants and their eligible family members. We’ve now given out a hundred – 117,000 SIVs since the passage of the Afghan Allies Protection Act in 2009, and more than 30 percent of that number came in just the past 28 months.But we are at this point where because we made these investments in our ability to more quickly process these visas, that we have been issuing them at this record number – somewhere around now over 1,000 a month – and we are nearing the annual cap. So we’re going to hit the cap; we have somewhere around 8,000 left that we can process this fiscal year. We are clearly going to hit this cap, and we need statutory approval to raise the cap. We have urged Congress to raise the cap and allow us to meet our obligation to those Afghans who put their lives on the line for the United States, make sure that they are not forgotten. Congress has not acted yet, so we are urging them to do so, because we are going to hit that cap and we want to make sure that we can continue to grant as many of these visas as is appropriate and is possible.Shaun.QUESTION: Could I just revisit a question I asked yesterday about Maldives, whether you have a reply to – basically I asked – the Maldives after kicking out Indian forces – if there’s any concern about a defense deal with China.MR MILLER: So we are tracking reports that the Government of Maldives has reached a military assistance agreement with the PRC. Maldives is a valued partner of the United States. Our countries share almost 60 years of partnership and a commitment to an Indo-Pacific region that is connected, secure, resilient, and prosperous, and we remain committed to strengthening our partnership with the Maldives across many spheres, including economic development, education, security cooperation, and climate change response.QUESTION: And specifically on the Chinese defense deal, that’s all you’re going to say?MR MILLER: So I would defer to the Government of Maldives for details or on the specific agreement. We see them as a valued partner and look forward to continuing to work with them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Two questions on Middle East. First, on humanitarian aid, yesterday you said that Israeli ministers are preventing aid deliveries, and this raises questions about the legality of U.S. military assistance to Israel. So I’m going to ask again: Is the U.S. still in the position of not considering cutting off military assistance to Israel?MR MILLER: So while – what I meant in my comments yesterday: We have seen actions by specific ministers of the Israeli Government to try and block aid, but ultimately we’ve seen the Government of Israel take decisions to allow aid to go in. And so when we saw protesters blocking Kerem Shalom and preventing aid to go in, we saw the ministry of defense step in and declare that a military security area and send in military police to ensure that aid could reach. So while we’ve seen actions taken by members of the government that don’t support the provision of aid, ultimately the decisions of the government have been to allow aid in.Now, that doesn’t – that doesn’t mean that it’s enough aid. There’s not enough aid, and Israel needs to do more, and so that’s why we continue to press them to do that.QUESTION: So you don’t think Israel is deliberately preventing humanitarian aid entering to Gaza?MR MILLER: So they have – they have made clear – they have said that they want to allow aid in, and they have allowed aid in. Now, that aid is not enough, and there needs to be more. There needs to be &#8212;QUESTION: And is &#8212;MR MILLER: There need to be additional crossings open, and there needs to be additional improvement and distribution. So that’s – those are the conversations we’ll continue to have with them.QUESTION: And is there any further steps that the U.S. is planning to take in order to force Israeli Government to allow more aid in?MR MILLER: So we are going to continue to have the – very frank and candid conversations with them about this matter.QUESTION: Just a quick one.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have anything to say on Israeli Government approving plans for more than 3,400 new settlements in the occupied West Bank, since you view these last settlements illegal?MR MILLER: Only that settlements continue to be a barrier to peace. These settlements continue to be inconsistent with international law. And so the point that we will make to the Government of Israel is that these settlements don’t just harm the Palestinian people, but that they ultimately weaken Israel’s security and weaken the prospects for a lasting agreement that would provide real peace and real security for the Israeli people.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Indian Prime Minister Modi greeted Shehbaz Sharif for his election as the new prime minister of Pakistan. How do you see this gesture of Indian prime minister as there are too many tensions between the two countries on several issues?MR MILLER: So we of course welcome the prime minister’s statement. The United States values its relationship with both India and Pakistan, and we want to see them have a productive and peaceful relationship.QUESTION: So would the U.S. welcome future talks between India and Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir?MR MILLER: Of course we would welcome productive and peaceful talks between India and Pakistan, but the pace, scope, and character of any dialogue is a matter for India and Pakistan to determine.QUESTION: Sir, one last question. Sir, any updates from India on assassination attempt on Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun? You told us a month ago that State Department is waiting for the internal investigations of Indian Government on this. Any updates?MR MILLER: My understanding is that investigation is ongoing.Go ahead.QUESTION: First question on Iran. Based on today’s report by Iranian judiciary, Iran seizes a U.S. cargo and oil tanker, which valued more than $50 million, over sanction. What’s your reaction on that?MR MILLER: So the Iranian Government should immediately release the Advantage Sweet, the old tanker to which you refer. Iran has unlawfully seized a number of commercial vehicles sailing in the Middle East in recent years. Iran’s continued harassment of vessels and interference with navigational rights and freedoms in the region’s vital waterways is a threat to maritime security, regional stability, and the global economy.QUESTION: Another question on Afghanistan. The new academic year in Afghanistan begin in two weeks, and for third years millions of women and girls are banned from school. And this meanwhile U.S. and UN are trying to engage with Taliban, regardless of their policy against human rights and educational rights. Is there any hope for Afghan girls to – back to school? Do you – can you estimate a time for that?MR MILLER: So I cannot, unfortunately. We’re of course aware that this sad anniversary is coming up, and we have made it clear that girls should never have been blocked from going to school in the first place. Advancing respect for the rights of Afghan women and girls is critical to our efforts in Afghanistan. At every opportunity we urge the Taliban to allow girls to return to school, respect the rights of all Afghans, and reverse their discriminatory decrees on women and girls.Go ahead, and then we’ll – oh, and then Guita, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just two questions, please. One question is, I want to give you an opportunity – you had again called Maryam Nawaz a milestone, and in 48 hours half a million people in Pakistan have said that Matt should take this milestone statement back because her father was corrupt – came out his name in Panama Papers; she has been accused of corruptions, and you are calling her milestone. So, I mean, I do not get half a million &#8212;MR MILLER: I do not have any update on my comments &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Second question.QUESTION: &#8212; from a couple of days ago.QUESTION: Is today Mr. Javed Hashmi, who has been in politics for 56 years – and again, he was the president of the ruling party which Benazir – I mean Maryam Nawaz that you called milestone – he used to be president. Today he said that the situation in Pakistan has reached a point where the whole nation is in catastrophic situation. I mean, for the last one year, I personally have been – raised issues with you regarding human rights, women – mothers are dragged from the houses. Journalists are put in jail on likely ridiculous charges. It’s been one year. Why doesn’t the Secretary just pick up the phone and call the Pakistani establishment and the people to just settle on some things? Nobody is accepting this corrupt government.MR MILLER: So we – let me go ahead and answer. So we have made clear publicly – you’ve heard me say from this podium many times, and we have made clear from – we have made clear in our private conversations that we want to see Pakistan respect the human rights of all of its citizens.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, in answer to the question about Iran intending to unload the crude oil in the tanker that belonged to Chevron, an American company, you said that Iran should release the tanker and it has seized unlawfully. Hasn’t the United States itself seized tankers or marine vessels that are – have been carrying Iranian goods and commodities in the past?MR MILLER: So our sanctions have always had carveout for humanitarian purchases: food, medicine, medical devices, agricultural products. That has been our sanctions policy, not just in this administration but back across multiple administrations, and we have never prevented medicine from reaching the Iranian people.QUESTION: Can I just ask &#8212;QUESTION: But &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, let Guita – you &#8212;QUESTION: Go ahead. Different subject. It is very brief.MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah. Go – Guita, you finish.QUESTION: Well, all right. That was about U.S. sanctions, which Iran claims that it’s going to truse the proceeds from the sale of that oil for certain patients there which it claims the U.S. sanctions have prevented from getting the necessary medicine from overseas. But what about the U.S. seizing ships carrying Iranian commodities?MR MILLER: So with respect to – so with respect to commodities that are exempt from our sanctions policy that has never been our target. Now, with respect to the seizures that we have done, we have done those consistent with the rule of law.So Matt, go ahead and then &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, I just wanted to ask you if – I know you expressed your concern on multiple occasions about the situation between China and the Philippines. But I just wanted to see if there was anything you had to add since the statement of &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I don’t have anything.QUESTION: &#8212; 6:51 p.m. last night?MR MILLER: No, I do not.QUESTION: Oh, okay.MR MILLER: I do not.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Humeyra, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: Sorry, I have two small things. On China, they released their defense budget, and it looks like their – the growth of their defense budget outstrips their economic growth. I’m just wondering if U.S. has, like, any concerns or any comment about that particular &#8212;MR MILLER: So we have for a long time expressed concerns about their rapid and opaque modernization efforts as well as their efforts to acquire dual-use technologies and know-how under their Military-Civil Fusion strategy.QUESTION: All right. And the report also seems to highlight that they officially adopted tougher language against Taiwan, dropping the mention of peaceful reunification. Is that also a particular reason of concern for you guys?MR MILLER: So we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. We don’t support Taiwan independence. We support cross-strait dialogue and expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the strait.QUESTION: Final thing on South Sudan. U.S. prosecutors have charged a prominent South Sudanese economist conspiring to export Stinger missile systems. Do you have any particular comment on that?MR MILLER: So I would refer to DOJ on specific questions about that matter. But just to be clear, the United States does not support violent or undemocratic changes in government in Africa or elsewhere; and all violations of U.S. export regulations will be punished to the full extent of the law.With that, wrap for the day.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Thank you.QUESTION: Wait a second. The United States does not support violence or undemocratic changes to government in Africa or elsewhere?MR MILLER: We do not.QUESTION: Come on.MR MILLER: We’ll wrap up – wrap for the day.(The briefing was concluded at 2:00 p.m.)# # #Gaza ↑						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Haiti																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Maldives																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								South Sudan																								Taiwan																								Ukraine																								Yemen
- Department Press Briefing – February 27, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; February 27, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; February 27, 2024																																																					February 27, 2024																																																								1:18 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Hello, good afternoon. Start with some opening comments. The United States condemns Russia’s unjust sentencing today of Oleg Orlov, the renowned Russian human rights leader and co-chair of the 2022 Nobel Prize-winning organization Memorial. Russian authorities – dissatisfied with the outcome of an earlier ruling that imposed a simple fine – sought a re-do. The outcome? Mr. Orlov was sentenced today to two and a half years in prison simply for peacefully and courageously speaking out against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Ambassador Tracy joins diplomats from 17 other countries to bear witness to this latest miscarriage of justice in Putin’s Russia, which Orlov aptly described as Kafkaesque.Today’s verdict falls on the 9th anniversary of the assassination of Russian pro-democracy politician Boris Nemtsov. Like Aleksey Navalny, Nemtsov was a clarion voice for reform and accountability who Putin targeted for his activism. A former deputy prime minister of Russia, Nemtsov devoted his life to improving the lives of his fellow citizens until he was gunned down in the shadow of the Kremlin.Nemtsov’s civic commitment continues to be an inspiration for other pro-democracy politicians and human rights defenders in Russia and beyond. Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Nemtsov protégé and courageous leader in his own right, now languishes in a Russian prison for advocating a freer future for Russia.The United States strongly condemns the Kremlin’s escalating domestic repression. Together with our allies and partners, the United States will continue to insist Russian authorities immediately release the more than 680 political prisoners they continue to hold, and we reiterate today our support for Russia’s courageous citizens who continue to work toward a better future for the Russian people.And with that, Matt.QUESTION: Right. Sorry, yeah. Sorry, I was on the phone.MR MILLER: Sorry for being &#8212;QUESTION: I apologize.MR MILLER: Sorry for being on time today.QUESTION: Exactly.MR MILLER: Guess I caught everyone off guard.QUESTION: Well, exactly. It’s such a shock. So because I was late and I missed your opening, I’ll defer.MR MILLER: Shaun.QUESTION: Could I ask you maybe switch to the Middle East first?MR MILLER: Yes, of course.QUESTION: The President’s comments talking about Sunday as the goal for a ceasefire, what can you tell us about that? Is that a goal? Is that something that is actually maybe not a deadline but something that you think is possible?MR MILLER: So our goal is to achieve a deal to reach a humanitarian pause and the release of hostages as soon as possible. Certainly, we’d welcome getting one by this weekend. What I can say about the overall progress is that we made significant progress towards an agreement last week when we had officials from the United States Government engaging in the region. We continue to pursue further progress this week. American officials across the government continue to be engaged on this question.We are trying to push this deal over the finish line. We do think it’s possible. But as you’ve heard me say before, ultimately some of this comes down to Hamas and whether Hamas is willing to agree to a deal that would provide significant benefits to the Palestinian people that they claim to represent.QUESTION: Sure. I mean, you said it’s possible by the end of the weekend, and you mentioned the U.S. diplomacy. I mean, are there – what needs to happen for that to take place? Are there actual talks that are going on actually with the U.S. side?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to negotiate in public, but there are talks that continue. American officials continue to engage on this and discuss it with our counterparts in the Government of Israel as well as the Governments of Qatar and Egypt. And we continue to push to try to get this deal over the finish line. We think it’s possible. We think we can reach a deal. But ultimately, we would need Hamas to say yes. We would need Hamas to agree to a deal that would allow for the release of hostages which never should have been taken in the first place, that would allow for a temporary ceasefire and allow increased humanitarian assistance to come in.As I said, that is a deal that is not just in the interest of the hostages obviously, it’s not just in the interests of the Government of Israel or the Israeli people. It is a deal that is in the interest of the Palestinian people, so we will continue to push for it because we think it’s in the interest of all parties concerned.QUESTION: And could I just – just as a part of that, the President talked about a ceasefire, not necessarily a temporary ceasefire. I know you’ve – the Secretary himself has said that there needs to be a durable – I forget the exact phrasing, but durable solution. But is what’s – is the goal for this weekend or the goal for as soon as possible an actual ceasefire, like a long-lasting ceasefire rather than a temporary?MR MILLER: So again, I’m not going to negotiate in public and talk about what the contours of a deal might look like, but we certainly are trying to reach a temporary ceasefire as part of this agreement that would allow us to get hostages out and would allow us to get humanitarian assistance. And we would like to see a temporary ceasefire go on long enough to allow all the hostages to get out. Again, without talking about what the contours of any agreement might look like, we want to see a ceasefire go on for as long as it can to get all the hostages out.That said – and you’ve heard the Secretary speak to this and heard the President speak to this – our ultimate goal is to end this war as soon as possible and end it in a way that ensures Israel’s security and in a way that puts us on a path towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and that’s the diplomatic route that we continue to pursue.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that, Matt?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: Do you foresee the ceasefire being in one continuous phase or in multiple phases, and would you expect female IDF soldiers to be released (inaudible)?MR MILLER: Again, I just don’t want to talk about what the contours of an agreement might look like as we continue very sensitive negotiations.QUESTION: And can you give us any more details on what’s underpinning the President’s optimism given that partners in the region have kind of thrown cold water on the notion that this could be accomplished in the coming days?MR MILLER: What’s underpinning the President’s optimism is looking at the broad outlines of a deal that we have put in place through negotiations last week and negotiations that are continuing through this week, and the fact that he believes and we believe one was in – one is within reach. That said, to be clear, we don’t have one yet. Hamas will need to agree to one. But we do think it’s possible and we’re going to continue to push for it, and we want to see it happen as soon as possible.QUESTION: And then one more unrelated to the hostages.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have any updates on the CHIRG assessments that you mentioned are underway?MR MILLER: Only that it’s ongoing. As part of our regular work and normal processes, we’re accessing facts and examining them as they develop, but I don’t have any update on the outcomes of that review.Yeah, Simon.QUESTION: Yeah, I wanted to just, I guess, try this from another approach. But the President said that the Israelis have agreed to a ceasefire during Ramadan. It’s sort of been said all along from the Hamas side that what they want is a longer-lasting, a permanent ceasefire, right. So I mean, has there been any movement that’s closed the gap between the two sides on that specific aspect?MR MILLER: I appreciate you trying from another angle. I still don’t think I can answer that without getting into the underlying contours of a deal and the underlying issues that we are trying to negotiate.That said, if we got a temporary ceasefire as soon as this weekend or as soon as early next week, just looking at logically how that would proceed, that would extend over the course of Ramadan. So obviously we’re trying to reach it as soon as possible. If we were able to reach over Ramadan – or before Ramadan, that would extend through Ramadan and would provide an outcome that I think would help alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people and, as I said, get hostages out. So we will continue to pursue it and try to get it as soon as possible.QUESTION: Just to sort of understand where this optimism, I guess, is coming from, we’re talking about – we’re talking about a temporary ceasefire, but you think that that will lead to a – or the Secretary has said and you just said, I think, this is the best way to get to an end of the conflict. But just so we kind of understand, Israel’s position is still – they still are seeking to take out the leadership of Hamas. There are these battalions in Rafah that they want to get to. So is there a prospect for a longer-term ceasefire? Even if you get a temporary ceasefire, the Israelis are still going to have those broader war aims.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Are you going to be able to support – are the Israelis ever going to be able to agree to that before they’ve sort of achieved those aims?MR MILLER: So that’s a great question. Let’s start by saying no one here can predict the future, and we ought to be – all ought to be humble in trying to predict how the future will unfold, especially in such a volatile situation. We want to get a ceasefire, as I’ve said, as soon as possible. We want to see it last long enough to get all of the hostages out.Once you get a temporary ceasefire, there are a number of variables that could be in play. Yes, we agree with the Government of Israel that the persistence of Hamas battalions in Rafah or wherever else they might be, or Hamas fighters wherever else they might be in Gaza, does represent a legitimate security threat to the state of Israel that they have a right to address. And so that may be addressing through a military campaign. But as we’ve heard us say before, Hamas could make all this easier by laying down their arms and forswearing further threats against the Government of Israel.So I know whenever I say that, people say, oh, Hamas will never do that. But again, there’s no reason why they shouldn’t if they want to see this war end, if they want to see the suffering of Palestinians – one way to alleviate that suffering would be for those Hamas battalions to swear off the fight against Israel. So all of that said, it’s very hard to predict what might happen weeks from now. What we are focused on now is trying to get this temporary ceasefire that would alleviate the very severe conditions on the ground right now as well as get these hostages out.QUESTION: Sure. Finally, I wonder if you had any concern with some comments that the Israeli Defense Minister Gallant made saying if there is a possible ceasefire, then Israel would increase attacks on Hizballah in the north. Do you have concern that there would be escalation in that sort of separate front in the north?MR MILLER: So we do not want to see either side escalate the conflict in the north, and in fact, we are going to continue to pursue a diplomatic resolution of that conflict. And while we saw the defense minister’s comments, we have also taken note that repeatedly the defense minister and other officials of the Government of Israel, including the prime minister, have said publicly that they would prefer this situation to be resolved diplomatically.They do face a real security threat in that there are tens of thousands of Israelis who do not feel safe returning to their homes in northern Israel. That’s a legitimate issue that needs to be addressed. We want to achieve a diplomatic path. The Government of Israel has said publicly and they have assured us privately that they want to achieve a diplomatic path, and so that’s what we’re going to continue to pursue, and ultimately that would make military action unnecessary.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Just following up on Shaun, Jen, and Simon on – there’s a great deal of pushback. I mean, when the President spoke yesterday, there was an element of certainty that we will have a ceasefire by next Monday.MR MILLER: I think you’re over describing his comments a little bit.QUESTION: Well, I’m not – I’m not &#8212;MR MILLER: He said that’s what we’re trying to – what we’re trying to get to.QUESTION: I mean, okay. I mean, let’s see what he – he said that &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah. Exactly. He used the word &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I mean, okay, the impression – let’s put it this way. The impression &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t speak to people’s impressions, Said. Sorry.QUESTION: Okay, fine. It’s okay. That’s all right. I mean, you know exactly what I – where I’m coming from on this issue. What I’m saying is that does that mean that all the I’s have been dotted and the T’s have been crossed, or at least they have been fined-tuned right now and we are probably getting closer? Would you say we are closer today than we were yesterday?MR MILLER: We’re closer today than we were yesterday. But no, the I’s haven’t been crossed and the T’s haven’t been dotted. As I said, we don’t have a deal. And we are trying to get one and we’re trying to push this over the finish line. There are a number of officials from the United States Government doing that hard work even as we speak, and we want to get there. But ultimately Hamas has to agree to a deal, and we hope that they will.QUESTION: Yeah, but time and again, you put the blame squarely on Hamas, and that’s your prerogative. That’s fine. But before October 7th, there was – there was a siege on Gaza for 16 years. I mean, the suffering has been going on for a very, very long time. Would there be, as a part of this deal – whenever it comes to pass – would there be a commitment to lift the siege by the Egyptians, by the Israelis, with the influence of the United States of America?MR MILLER: So again, I don’t want to speak to what this deal would look like, if and when we get one. But if you go back to the principles that the Secretary outlined in Tokyo that we want to see govern Gaza going forward, one of the principles that he outlined was no ongoing siege of Gaza.QUESTION: But, I mean, let me ask you about the food situation in Gaza. We saw that the Jordanian monarch himself went on a plane and was – also, they say, was – basically they were dumping the foodstuffs and so on from an airplane. Why couldn’t the United States do that? I mean, you guys have all these C-130s anyway that Jordan is using, Israel is using, everybody’s using. Why not do it &#8212;MR MILLER: Every partner &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and show the Palestinians a great gesture?MR MILLER: Sure. Every partner plays a different role and has different capabilities that they bring to bear. We are the leading donor of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. The United States just announced a significant new aid package of over $50 million in humanitarian assistance today that will go into Gaza. That said, there are other partners that bring other capabilities to bear, and we welcome the Government of Jordan air-dropping supplies in and will continue to work with them on that. But we have our own ways of getting humanitarian assistance into Gaza.QUESTION: And lastly, would the United States be prepared to deal with a sort of super-urgent situation if the ceasefire ever takes place, because you have disease, you have – probably have issues of shelter, and so on, schools and all these things, to sort of – like I said, beyond aiding UNRWA on your own, so to speak?MR MILLER: I don’t – what was the last?QUESTION: The question is would the United States have any kind of its own initiative, so to speak, after – if the ceasefire takes place, if the hostilities cease? Will – is there – do you talk in this building, do you discuss in this building ways and means to aid the Palestinians afterwards with possibly tents, with foodstuff &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: – medicine, emergency things?MR MILLER: Absolutely. So it would be a part of our ongoing – excuse me – humanitarian assistance that we’ve been providing to the Palestinian people. But as we saw in the last pause, the nature of a pause is it’s safer for humanitarian assistance to move around inside Gaza and so relief can get into the hands of the people that need it most. And because you alleviate some of that backlog that happens once you get humanitarian assistance through Rafah or through Kerem Shalom into Gaza, you then can get more of it in. So we would very much anticipate that during a pause or a temporary ceasefire you would see increased humanitarian assistance come in, and of course the United States would play its role and its part, as we have from the outset, to try to get that humanitarian assistance in and make sure it’s sustained.QUESTION: Matt, is there anything you can point to to back up the assertion that you just made in response to one of Said’s questions, that we’re closer today than we were yesterday?MR MILLER: Just that we continue negotiations, and I can’t, unfortunately – I can’t – but I &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you’re – okay, fine. But continuing negotiations – so they haven’t broken down. Is that why they’re closer to them &#8212;MR MILLER: We – I am – so I can’t really answer that &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; today than yesterday?MR MILLER: &#8212; without getting into the underlying substance of the negotiations. But the talks continue, and we think we continue to make progress on them.QUESTION: Okay. But I’m – well, yeah, you said that &#8212;MR MILLER: You said – I said we think we continue to make progress. That’s the basis.QUESTION: Well, no, no, I &#8212;MR MILLER: That is the basis of my statement.QUESTION: You said we are closer today than we were yesterday, and so &#8212;MR MILLER: Continuing to make progress is closer.QUESTION: &#8212; I’m just wondering – just wondering what you can point to to back that up.MR MILLER: I am not going to point to anything related to these underlying talks because I can’t do it without &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. So just so it’s like &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. Let me just finish, Matt. I can’t do it without getting into the issues that we’re discussing and the sticking points that remain. But we continue to make progress, and that’s the basis of my statement.QUESTION: And it sounds like that old one-hit-wonder Spiral Staircase song: “I love you more today than yesterday, but not as much as tomorrow.” But you can’t – but you can’t show &#8212;MR MILLER: Well, we would hope – we – we – you can &#8212;QUESTION: There isn’t anything you can give to us now or present to us or tell us that would actually back up the idea that I – that a ceasefire/hostage deal &#8212;MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; is closer today than it was yesterday.MR MILLER: I can never show you definitive progress in talks that, by their very nature, are secret until we have an agreement. What I can tell you is that we made progress last week, we continue to make progress, and we hope to get a deal as soon as possible.Go ahead.QUESTION: Shifting back to Europe before – if I may. Starting from your opening statement on Russia and human rights, the Navalny family has found itself in a very peculiar situation. They can’t recover the body, and her mom was threatened by the officials, and her lawyer got arrested today. Do you have any comment on &#8212;MR MILLER: So we remain in touch with the Navalny family. As you know, the Secretary met with Yulia Navalny on the margins of the Munich Security Conference last week. We, as we’ve said, hold Russia accountable for Navalny’s death. You saw us impose sanctions on officials connected to the death of Navalny last week. And we will continue to maintain – to be in touch with the Navalny family. I had not seen the reports of the arrest, so I’m not going to comment in detail until I have a chance to look at them. But I will say we have of course seen continued crackdown on dissent by the Russian Government; that was the focus of my opening comments, and it’s why we continue to call on the Russian Government to release all of the more than 600 political prisoners it is holding.QUESTION: Thank you. And moving to Ukraine, any comment on the French leader’s latest comments about potentially Western soldiers, troops, fighting in Ukraine? Concerns around it, debates around it – where are you standing?MR MILLER: So President Biden has made clear, going back more than two years to before even Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that he will not send U.S. soldiers to fight in Ukraine.QUESTION: And what is your observation about the current state of – state in the battlefield? Ukraine appears to be in retreat. What’s next? How dangerous is the current situation?MR MILLER: The situation is extremely serious right now. We have seen Ukrainian frontline troops who don’t have the ammo they need to repel Russian aggression. They’re still fighting bravely. They’re still fighting courageously. They still have armor and weapons and ammunition they can use, but they’re having to ration it now because the United States Congress has failed to act. And so we expect that for the remainder of the year Ukrainian forces will continue to fight bravely and they will make advances, as they have done most significantly in the Black Sea as of late. But it will be much tougher for them if they don’t have access to the ammunition that (inaudible) need, which is why you see the President continue to push for Congress to act.We believe, as we have said multiple times, if the House would just hold an up-or-down vote on aid to Ukraine, it would pass. And so we again call on Congress to do its duty to hold this vote and get the assistance to the Ukrainian army, that desperately needs it.QUESTION: Thank you. And final one from me on Armenia-Azerbaijan. The ministers – foreign ministers – are meeting tomorrow in Berlin. I know the Secretary wanted to have them here in Washington since December. Is it the end of the Washington process? And also, what is your expectation from tomorrow’s meeting?MR MILLER: I don’t have any announcements to make, but we continue to encourage both sides to try to reach a durable, lasting agreement.QUESTION: Could I actually &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; just ask a question that the – Alex’s question on Macron?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know, of course, the President has it clear – made clear that the U.S. isn’t going to send soldiers to Ukraine. The overall debate, though, do you think it’s useful to have Macron’s sort of musing that it shouldn’t be ruled out? Is this something that should be in the cards a little bit, should be discussed, not necessarily U.S. troops but some Western NATO forces?MR MILLER: So certainly every country is free to speak to its own interests. But in addition to the President making clear that the U.S. will not send any troops to fight in Ukraine, the NATO secretary general has ruled out any NATO troops to fight in Ukraine. I think fundamentally we think that the path to victory for Ukraine right now is in the United States House of Representatives. That’s what Ukraine needs most. They need the national security supplemental that the President has proposed to get Ukraine the weapons and ammunition it needs to defend themselves and continue to fight courageously for their freedom and independence.QUESTION: And just finally, have there been any discussions with the French, before or after, about these remarks made by Macron?MR MILLER: I don’t have – I’m not aware of any conversations or don’t have any to read out.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Go ahead, Michel.QUESTION: Yeah. Do you have any comments on the attacks that the Houthis made yesterday on cables, submarine communication cables, in the Red Sea?MR MILLER: Only that it’s the latest in the – a long string of reckless attacks by the Houthis on entities and interests that have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza. Just as when we saw the Houthis attack ships that were bringing food to the people of Yemen, these attacks are on entities that do nothing to help Palestinians who are suffering, are in no way connected to the conflict in Gaza, and they should stop immediately. And we will continue to hold them accountable for the attacks.QUESTION: And how will you counter these attacks, and what alternative does the international community have?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to the – any specific actions we might take. I never want to preview them in advance. But we will continue to work to degrade and deter the Houthis’ capability to take such reckless actions.QUESTION: Is there any alternative for these cables?MR MILLER: You’re going to have to talk to a telecommunications expert, someone other than – and that is very much not me. Sorry.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just briefly.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just reading back when he said – just wanted to see if there’s a nuance to it, saying that the President’s been clear – back on Macron’s comments – ruling out sending soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Is that – could there be a training role? Could there &#8212;MR MILLER: There is no nuance that I mean – that I mean to communicate there. We are not sending boots on the ground to Ukraine. The President has been very clear about that from the beginning.QUESTION: Sorry, isn’t there already a training role?MR MILLER: I don’t believe it’s in Ukraine. I believe it’s in – I’ll defer to &#8212;QUESTION: But there is various National Guard forces who were in Ukraine and are in Poland and elsewhere training.MR MILLER: I believe that’s correct. I’ll defer to my colleagues at the Pentagon. But I believe the training – if I remember correctly, the training mission was before the invasion, and since it’s happened, outside of Ukraine.QUESTION: On Afghanistan, I know the Secretary spoke to the oppression of women there today. He didn’t mention anything about the three public executions that have been held there in the past five days. So what, if any, comment do you have on that?And separately, Chairman McCaul is again threatening to hold the Secretary in contempt of Congress, demanding notes from Dan Smith on the withdrawal be turned over by March 6th. Does State intend to comply with that?MR MILLER: So as it pertains to public executions, we condemn the public executions. It’s another sign of the brutality that the Afghan Government shows to its own people.And with respect to the letter from Chairman McCaul – so been a while since I’ve spoken to this, but I’ve spoken to it before. We have repeatedly and explicitly underscored the important role that we believe Congress plays in foreign policy – excuse me – and its vital oversight responsibility. We have engaged with the committee extensively to respond to requests on the after-action review. We remain committed to accommodating the committee’s legitimate need for information regarding the withdrawal.In terms of that cooperation and what it’s looked like, for more than six months we have, every week, provided hundreds of pieces of – hundreds of documents and information from the AAR files. We sent our most recent transmission to the committee just this past Friday. We have provided them numerous briefings, tens of thousands of pages of documents, public testimony from the department’s senior leaders, and witnesses for day-long transcribed interviews – all demonstrating, in our view, our commitment to accommodating the commitment’s – the committee’s request to the greatest extent possible, while still respecting the Executive Branch’s legitimate confidentiality interests. So that’s our overall record in cooperating with the committee’s oversight responsibility.As it relates to the chairman’s latest letter, I think it is worth pointing out that it doesn’t have some of the facts right. The department has never told the committee that the White House or any other agency is holding the interview notes used to compile the AAR. Those are department records. What we have actually asked for is the chance for Chairman McCaul to speak to the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Rich Verma to discuss our concerns in order to try to reach some understanding, and those requests have gone unanswered.So we will continue to work in a good faith and timely manner with the committee to answer their oversight requests, but we would ask that they also engage with us in good faith.QUESTION: Matt, follow-up on Afghanistan?MR MILLER: Go ahead. I told Nike I’d come &#8212;QUESTION: Matt, follow-up on &#8212;MR MILLER: I – please don’t interrupt. I told Nike I’d come next.QUESTION: But Matt, this is &#8212;QUESTION: If I may &#8212;MR MILLER: Please do not interrupt your colleagues. Go ahead.QUESTION: If I may, I would like to go back to Gaza. Earlier this month, the Sinai Foundation said that they obtained information that current constructions in eastern Sinai is to create a highly securely gated, isolated area near the Gaza borders to prepare for the reception of Palestinian refugees. I took note that the Egyptian Government has come out – has denied it. What is the State Department’s assessment, especially at a time when Israel is planning for a military operation around Rafah that would affect about 1.5 million Palestinians?MR MILLER: So I will let the Government of Egypt speak to what it is they’re constructing. I know they’ve said that that is construction, I believe, for staging of humanitarian assistance. I will also note that we have made clear for months that we are opposed to the forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. The Egyptian Government has made quite clear that it is opposed to the forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and we have seen, just in the past few days, that the Government of Israel has come out publicly and said it has no intention to forcibly displace Palestinians from Gaza.So as it pertains to any potential military operation in Rafah, what we want to see is a credible and executable humanitarian assistance plan to account for the more than 1 million Palestinians who are sheltered there, some of who them – who have been displaced more than once. We have not been briefed on such a plan yet by the Government of Israel. It’s our understanding that they have developed one and presented it – we’ve seen the public comments that they’ve presented it to the prime minister, so we will look to that plan.But I do think it’s worth emphasizing, again, that our focus continues to be on achieving an agreement that would give us a temporary ceasefire and alleviate some of that humanitarian suffering, that might allow people to leave crowded areas in Rafah and go elsewhere inside Gaza.QUESTION: When you said &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible) Gaza.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. If you weren’t done &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah. When you said that we have not been briefed by Bibi’s plan, are you talking about the State Department or are you talking about the whole Biden administration?MR MILLER: I’m speaking on behalf of the State Department. I’m not aware of any briefings. It may be that we’ve received cursory briefings, but I know we have not engaged with them in any kind of substantive way on this plan that was reported, was presented to the prime minister just in the past couple days.Go ahead.QUESTION: Oh, great. Thank you, Matt. I wanted to ask &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible) follow-up. I (inaudible) get it.MR MILLER: Hold on. I’m just going to say, I was getting ready to call on you, but &#8212;QUESTION: I’ve been coming to this house for eight years. I know very (inaudible) &#8212;MR MILLER: I was getting ready to call on you, but I’m going to observe my long &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible) get the follow-up from (inaudible).MR MILLER: First of all, it’s the second time you’ve interrupted your colleague. I’m going to observe my longstanding rule that the best way to get called on is to not interrupt your colleagues when they’re asking questions. And I’ll call on the gentleman sitting next to you.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. I wanted to ask about Aaron Bushnell, the 25-year-old, active-duty airman who self-immolated in front of the Israeli Embassy on Sunday, especially since it didn’t come up during yesterday’s briefing. I know you released a statement extending your condolences to his family, but I wanted to ask if you have any comments beyond that. Specifically, I wanted to ask: Will U.S. policy in any way be changed or affected by what happened on Sunday?MR MILLER: So again, I just want to reiterate here our deepest condolences to his family. It’s obviously a horrific situation, and our most heartfelt sympathies go out to them.With respect to this act or any kind of protest, obviously we are aware of the depth of feelings that people have over this issue, and we are constantly taking those points of view into account and using them to think about how we approach the issue and whether there is – there are things that we can do differently. That is the case whether it’s with respect to protesters; it is the case with respect to people that the Secretary meets with and hears from directly on all sides of this issue.So yes, we will always look at the points of view that people have and – but ultimately, we have to make our own decisions based on what we think is in the national security interests of the United States, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: So will U.S. policy be affected? Yes or no.MR MILLER: I – that’s – I don’t want to – again, just – I don’t think I should comment with regard to this specific case, other than extending my sympathies to his family.As I’ve said, generally, we are always looking at the strongly held views by people across the spectrum, and I guarantee you we do hear from people across the spectrum who want us to do one thing differently, whether it comes from stopping support for Israel to supporting Israel more, and we hear loudly from people about this issue. We have to make the best decisions we can about national security interests, and right now we believe the best thing that we can do is to continue to pursue a temporary ceasefire that would get the hostages out and alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead, in the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.MR MILLER: No, no, no. Behind you. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. God bless you.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: There have been now at least six documented instances depicting members of the IDF displaying or rifling through women’s underwear, and of course that’s just on camera. Soldiers have, as we’ve seen, stripped and tortured Palestinians. There have been a reported history of soldiers abusing children that they’ve detained even before October 7th. And, of course, investigations need to be pursued, but still, given all that we’ve seen from Israeli forces just up to this point, what’s the U.S. Government doing in response now, given the UN experts’ alarm at credible allegations of human rights violations and sexual violence committed against Palestinians?MR MILLER: We made clear to the Government of Israel that we expect them to behave consistent with the laws of war and consistent with their own rules of engagement, and we have seen the Israeli military come out and say it is conducting its own investigations into reports of soldiers who have failed to comply with either of those two sets of rules. And that’s appropriate, and that’s what you expect a professional military to do, and we expect those investigations to proceed and, if appropriate, hold the responsible parties accountable.QUESTION: Then a few more. And then, like, related to that investigation and related, as well, to the Biden administration’s memo a couple weeks ago regarding this kind of thing of ensuring that American military aid isn’t contributing to these kinds of violations, what sort of conversations are being had right now to make sure that these accountability measures, if they need to be taken, are taken on time, expeditiously? I know, for instance, like the assurances for the memo, those need to be done within 45 days. So what’s the conversations like around this?MR MILLER: It is the exact kind of conversation I just detailed in response to your last question, which is we have very frank and candid conversations with the Government of Israel about this. But again, the Government of Israel has itself come out and said publicly – you’ve seen the head of the IDF say that they are conducting investigations. You’ve seen – I think it’s the chief attorney or the chief lawyer – I’m going to get the exact title wrong – come out with a report in the last week or so of alleged violations and say that there are members of the IDF who did not behave in accordance with Israeli rules of engagement and that there are investigations ongoing.We think those are appropriate. That’s what we expect our military to do when American servicemen or servicewomen don’t behave consistent with the laws of war, consistent with rules of engagement. It’s what we expect the Israeli military to do. It’s what we would expect of any professional military operating anywhere in the world.QUESTION: And then on Aaron Bushnell, per my colleague’s question just now, specifically I was wondering if there’s any concern with regards to him saying – as he said, “I’m an active-duty member of the United States Air Force, and I will no longer be complicit in genocide.” I’m curious if there’s been any conversations about that kind of claim being made by a member of the armed service before. Of course, he committed such a &#8212;MR MILLER: I think I should defer to the Pentagon for an answer to that question.QUESTION: And any updates on Hind Rajab’s – the investigation into the killing of Hind Rajab’s family and the paramedics sent to save her?MR MILLER: I don’t have an update. My understanding is that the investigation is ongoing. It’s not concluded yet.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Sir, authorities in Pakistan detaining journalists who are talking about the reports of rigging in elections. We also heard that Pakistani authorities also ask the bureau chief of New York Times to leave Pakistan as soon as possible because she was also reporting on the same subject. Do you have any comments on the free speech?MR MILLER: So we want to see freedom of expression and the right to a free press observed in Pakistan, as is true anywhere around the world.QUESTION: Sir, United States spends millions of every year winning hearts and minds and promoting democracy overseas, including significant investments in Pakistan. But in last few months, the image of U.S. has suffered due to some misleading and irresponsible statements by some political leadership. What’s your message to the Pakistani people, like &#8212;MR MILLER: Is there anything – is there anything in specific you’re asking me to respond to other than general statements? What specifically do you mean?QUESTION: President Trump has said – he’s still saying that U.S. was involved in Pakistani politics because of America – I mean, I’m not on the far end. People are chanting slogans in the streets against U.S.MR MILLER: All I can do is continue to stand up here and tell the truth, which is those allegations are incorrect, they are false. What we want is for the people of Pakistan to be able to decide the future of Pakistan, including their own government.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. After so many weeks, I don’t know how to even ask question.MR MILLER: Just get to the question.QUESTION: So a couple of weeks ago, I had asked you about my assessment of the Taliban getting stronger. And my colleague just mentioned them, about there’s public hanging. You did not agree with my assessment, but the State Department in their letter to the SIGAR stated that the Taliban resurgence is going on. Can you now at least officially accept that under President Biden the Taliban have becoming more stronger at least?MR MILLER: I am not familiar with that letter, so I want to review it before I comment in detail.QUESTION: Okay. One more, sir. Just one more, sir.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: For 20 years, the U.S. was in Afghanistan. It lost more than 2,000 of its soldiers there, okay? So some questions are a bit more serious. Can you officially agree with me on one point here, that all these 20 years China was the one basically that was supporting the Taliban with those weapons, especially those Chinese AK-47s, which they copied from the Russians? And China is the only country right now that has one of the diplomats from Taliban in their country.MR MILLER: So I am unfortunately unable to offer you an assessment of how the Taliban was arming itself over the course of that 20 years of war. It’s not something that I was working on in the U.S. Government at the time.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Back to the war in Gaza. You’re pursuing the negotiations in Paris, in Doha. Is the government holding off the draft resolution in New York to see if you get to a deal? And what do you intend to do with that?MR MILLER: No, the two issues are not related. We continue to discuss a potential resolution with partners on the UN Security Council, continue to talk through the – both the content of such a resolution and the timing of when one might come up for a vote. I don’t have any updates other than those conversations continue.QUESTION: Would reaching a deal put – cancel that, presenting the resolution?MR MILLER: That asks me to, I think, respond to a hypothetical, and I’m going to decline to do.QUESTION: Well, I have another hypothetical, but just listen to it.MR MILLER: Shoot.QUESTION: Should you get a deal, did you – does the administration want it presented to the Security Council?MR MILLER: Again, I’m going to decline to comment on that until if and when we reach such an agreement.QUESTION: Yes, you would?MR MILLER: No, I said I’m going to decline on commenting on what we might do until if and when we reach such an agreement.Go ahead, Jen.QUESTION: Matt, has the U.S. gotten any information or additional answers from the Israeli Government on the deaths of the two 17-year-old Americans who were shot in (inaudible)?MR MILLER: Only that those matters are both under investigation, and we think that’s appropriate. And when those investigations conclude, if accountability is the appropriate outcome, you will – you can be sure that we will be calling for accountability and we will expect accountability.QUESTION: Have you given them any sort of timeline in which they need to get back to you with answers?MR MILLER: So again, like – with respect to the two investigations, one is being conducted by I believe it’s the Israeli national police; the other is being conducted by the Palestinian police because of where that specific killing took place. And so it’s not just a question of pressing the Israeli Government. It’s – one of the investigations is being conducted by the Palestinian Authority’s police force. That said, we want them to proceed – we want them to be finished as soon as possible. I think you know it’s sometimes hard to put a timeframe on investigations, especially criminal investigations, so I’m not able to do that. We want to see it happen as soon as possible.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Given the fact that the Palestinian Authority has removed maps of Israel from new Palestinian textbooks, is there any evidence that the Palestinian Authority will accept and/or recognize a two-state solution, yes or no? And I have a follow-up.MR MILLER: So the evidence I’d present to you is that in all of our conversations with President Abbas he has represented that he is ready to move towards a two-state solution. He is ready to look at any proposal that we can put forward, and we are working with our Arab partners in the region to come up with just such a plan.QUESTION: Okay. The Palestinian Authority at UNRWA have reinserted a text which praises a woman terrorist, Mughrabi, who attacked a civilian bus, murdering 38 Israelis, including 13 children. Will you demand that the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA remove that text, yes or no?MR MILLER: I am not familiar with the specific text to which you’re referring, so I’m not going to comment on it.QUESTION: Sorry, just to take the &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah, go &#8212;QUESTION: Can I please &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Go.MR MILLER: Go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Matt, do you mind? Please.QUESTION: No, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much. So I’m very – I’m genuinely confused. Is the administration calling for a permanent ceasefire, or are they calling for a temporary ceasefire?MR MILLER: We are calling for a temporary ceasefire as part of the negotiations.QUESTION: Okay. And President Biden is going to the southern border on Thursday. Do you expect him to bring up the migration matters in Latin America?MR MILLER: I think that’s a question you should direct to the White House briefing, which I believe starts in two minutes.QUESTION: You’ve called for the unconditional release of hostages. Why then support a deal where there would be hostages released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners who have committed terrorism against Israel? MR MILLER: We ultimately want to see these prisoners get out, and in any &#8212;QUESTION: Talking about the Palestinian prisoners?MR MILLER: No, we want to see the hostages get out.QUESTION: I was just (inaudible).MR MILLER: And in any such negotiation, you have to make difficult choices. Ultimately, these are choices that the Government of Israel is going to have to make, and we’re going to work with them to try to reach the best deal possible. We want to see all the hostages released. But this is – as often is the case around the world, when you’re trying to get hostages released or where you’re trying to get wrongfully detained individuals released, you have to make difficult choices to bring them home.QUESTION: And finally, funding for the State Department expires at midnight on March 9th. Does the department have a contingency plan in the event of a shutdown?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to contingency plans other than to say that we think Congress should do its job and pass a funding bill.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Matt, go ahead.QUESTION: So sorry, just two really brief things. One, you were just asked if there was any evidence that the Palestinian Authority supports a two-state solution or any evidence that they do. Is there any evidence that the current Israeli Government supports a two-state solution?MR MILLER: So we continue to engage with the Government of Israel about &#8212;QUESTION: Sorry. No, no, no just answer the –MR MILLER: No, no.QUESTION: This is what I said. Do – does the current Israeli Government support a two-state solution?MR MILLER: I think you can – I think you can look at the prime minister’s very well-covered public comments &#8212;QUESTION: Yes.MR MILLER: &#8212; on this matter.QUESTION: And the answer would be yes or no?MR MILLER: That said – that said &#8212;QUESTION: Do they or do they not?MR MILLER: That said – I will let you interpret them how you want. That said, we continue to believe that a two-state solution is in the interest &#8212;QUESTION: So no doesn’t always mean no.MR MILLER: &#8212; of Israel, and we’ll continue to push for it.QUESTION: All right. And then secondly on these questions about Bushnell – I’m a little bit confused as to why this is coming up at the State Department briefing other than that it is a policy matter – but this guy was not an employee of the State Department. As it does relate to the State Department because this happened outside the Israeli embassy, was there any contact between the Israelis and you guys about what actually happened?MR MILLER: There was contact at the security level on Sunday, I believe, when this happened. I know there was contact when DSS was looking at the matter, and I believe the Secret Service was as well. So there was contact at that level about a potential security situation. But I’m not aware of any beyond that.QUESTION: Just on the – when the incident actually happened?MR MILLER: When the incident occurred.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: There may have been other conversations that I’m not aware of, but &#8212;QUESTION: And – okay, but since then, since Sunday, there hasn’t been any discussion, at least involving you guys?MR MILLER: About? In what regards?QUESTION: About what &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m not trying to be cute.QUESTION: About what happened.MR MILLER: It’s just that we talk to them all the time about things, so &#8212;QUESTION: Well, there – I mean – no, look, I mean, if you’re – from an Israeli perspective, you could have imagined that this might be – like they might look at this as a security incident in which they might get in touch with you guys about it. But as far as you know, there hasn’t been anything?MR MILLER: We – so I will say we talked to them Sunday, when the event first happened, about any potential security threat. I’m sure we are having ongoing dialogue with them about that. That would be the normal course of practice. I’m not aware of any specific conversations in that regards.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR MILLER: And with that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:02 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Egypt																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Ukraine																								Yemen
- Supporting Efforts to Promote Transitional Justice and Accountability and Advance Women’s Leadership in Yemen Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborUnited States Department of StateBureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO):DRL Supporting Efforts to Promote Transitional Justice and Accountability and Advance Women’s Leadership in YemenThis is the announcement of funding opportunity number SFOP0010260Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number: 19.345Type of Solicitation: Open CompetitionApplication Deadline:  11:59 PM EST on 19, April, 2024Funding Floor: $750,000Funding Ceiling: $1,250,000Anticipated Number of Awards: 1-2Type of Award: Grant or Cooperative AgreementPeriod of Performance: 24-36 monthsAnticipated Time to Award, Pending Availability of Funds: 6-9 monthsA. Project DescriptionThe U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) announces an open competition for organizations to submit applications for projects under two program categories: 1) promoting transitional justice and accountability; and 2) advancing women’s leadership and engagement in community level peacebuilding processes. Organizations may submit proposals that address one or both of these categories.Competitive proposals will include clear program strategies that explain the program’s logic, outline the program’s specific activities and objectives, and highlight their link to one of DRL’s two categories outlined below.  Applicants are encouraged to design programs to address a clearly articulated category; however, if your proposal addresses multiple categories, please designate a primary category that best reflects the project’s stated objectives and ensure a clear nexus between the two categories addressed.  Addressing more than one category will NOT make a proposal more competitive.  With the above in mind, DRL invites organizations to submit proposals for programs in the following areas:Transitional Justice and Accountability One of DRL’s goals in Yemen is to hold perpetrators of human rights violations (HRVs) and abuses accountable for their actions. The bureau seeks to achieve this goal by supporting civil society to implement transitional justice measures where possible. Successful program design(s) should focus on approaches that strengthen civil society’s capacity to accurately document HRVs, promote the inclusion of civil society and survivors in transitional justice processes, and provide access to comprehensive support services, such as legal and/or psychosocial assistance, for survivors of HRVs.Potential program approaches may also include:Strengthening the ability of Yemeni civil society organizations to document, verify, and preserve information related to human rights abuses and violations from all sides of the conflict. Program designs should aim to expand documentation collection to include under-documented violations and abuses, such as conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), violations against digital rights and marginalized communities, and/or abuses against migrants. This may include efforts to document violations against women, youth, the “Muhamasheen” community, migrants, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, and/or persons with disabilities.Creating or facilitating access to coordination mechanisms among entities contributing to documentation efforts to prevent overlap and share verified information, as appropriate.Supporting informal, community designed and implemented, and trauma-informed transitional justice initiatives and civil society-led advocacy.Engaging with key stakeholders and decision-makers at the local, national, and international levels to implement reforms to improve accountability mechanisms.Increasing awareness, understanding, and support for the promotion of transitional justice measures from key stakeholders, such as government authorities and the public in Yemen.Creating or improving existing Yemeni-led referral networks for survivors and victims’ families to access legal, psychosocial, and other support services.Advocating on behalf of complainants under universal jurisdiction statutes.Women’s LeadershipAnother DRL goal in Yemen is to support the meaningful inclusion of women in public life, including international and community level peace processes. DRL seeks proposals that will increase the number of women who serve as advocates of human rights and accountability efforts, assume leadership roles in decision-making fora and stabilization efforts, and/or work as negotiators in locally-led resource management efforts. In the absence of centralized control in local energy, infrastructure, transit, housing, and criminal justice disputes, women have often intervened to generate positive change through mediation, de-escalation, and grassroots advocacy efforts. Additionally, women have served as staunch advocates of peace and stabilization initiatives at the local level. Successful program design(s) should build on these efforts, and may include:Supporting women’s roles in conflict prevention initiatives, including women-led negotiations and local, grassroots advocacy campaigns against HRVs. This could include advocacy efforts against the recruitment of child soldiers, arbitrary detention, and torture; prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and abuse, including CRSV and other forms of gender-based violence; and locally mediated efforts surrounding prisoner exchanges and detainee releases.Advancing women environmental defenders’ advocacy on local and national priorities related to protecting the environment and increasing equitable access to natural resource management.Fostering grassroots initiatives to increase the meaningful participation of women in community level peacebuilding processes.Enabling women’s groups to mainstream gender equality issues into peace and stabilization initiatives to improve the conditions of women’s rights in post-conflict and conflict environments.Addressing barriers to women’s participation in public life, including engaging men and boys as allies where possible.Working with local Yemeni partners, including civil society organizations, should be a central aspect of any proposed program. Activities should incorporate efforts to support participants’ resilience and safety, enabling them to carry out their work in a trauma-informed and survivor-centered manner at all levels. The proposed program should include consultative discussions with relevant stakeholders to ensure a participatory and needs-based approach and should demonstrate familiarity and experience working within the country context. The proposed program should also address how it will ensure coordination with existing transitional justice and accountability and women’s leadership efforts in Yemen. Applicants should clearly describe how they will engage Yemeni experts, and legal and aid institutions, in addition to organizations representing underserved or target populations. DRL strongly encourages applicants to submit letters of commitment if partners are identified in the proposal.All programs should aim to have impact that leads to reforms and have the potential for sustainability beyond DRL resources.  DRL’s preference is to avoid duplicating past efforts by supporting new and creative approaches.  This does not exclude from consideration projects that improve upon or expand existing successful projects in a new and complementary way.DRL is committed to advancing equity and support for underserved and underrepresented communities. In accordance with the Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Underserved Communities, programs should implement strategies for integration and inclusion of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries that can bring perspectives based on their religion, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, national origin, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, pregnancy, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  Programs should be demand-driven and locally led to the extent possible. Proposal approaches should specifically center on supporting underserved and marginalized communities in Yemen.DRL requires all programs to be non-discriminatory and expects implementers to include strategies for nondiscrimination of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries based on race, color, religion, sex, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, pregnancy, national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.DRL is conscious of the ever-changing security situation in the broader NEA region including Yemen. With this in mind, applicants are required to submit a detailed contingency plan and risk assessment in order to demonstrate situational awareness and preparedness.Where appropriate, competitive proposals may include:Opportunities for beneficiaries to apply their new knowledge and skills in practical efforts.Solicitation of feedback and suggestions from beneficiaries when developing activities to strengthen the sustainability of programs and participant ownership of project outcomes.Input from participants on sustainability plans and systematic review of the plans throughout the life of the project, with adjustments made as necessary;Joint identification and definition of key concepts with relevant stakeholders and stakeholder input into project activities;Systematic follow up with beneficiaries at specific intervals after the completion of activities to track how beneficiaries are retaining new knowledge as well as applying their new skills.Activities that are not typically allowed include, but are not limited to:The provision of humanitarian assistance;English language instruction;Development of high-tech computer or communications software and/or hardware;Purely academic exchanges or fellowships;External exchanges or fellowships lasting longer than six months;Off-shore activities that are not clearly linked to in-country initiatives and impact or are not necessary per security concerns;Theoretical explorations of human rights or democracy issues, including projects aimed primarily at research and evaluation that do not incorporate training or capacity-building for local civil society;Micro-loans or similar small business development initiatives;Initiatives directed towards a diaspora community rather than current residents of targeted countries.This notice is subject to availability of funding.B. Federal Award InformationPrimary organizations can submit 1 application in response to the NOFO.The U.S. government may: (a) reject any or all applications, (b) accept other than the lowest cost application, (c) accept more than one application, and (d) waive irregularities in applications received.The U.S. government may make award(s) on the basis of initial applications received, without discussions or negotiations. Therefore, each initial application should contain the applicant&#8217;s best terms from a cost and technical standpoint. The U.S. government reserves the right (though it is under no obligation to do so), however, to enter into discussions with one or more applicants in order to obtain clarifications, additional detail, or to suggest refinements in the project description, budget, or other aspects of an application.DRL anticipates awarding either a grant or cooperative agreement depending on the needs and risk factors of the program. The final determination on award mechanism will be made by the Grants Officer. The distinction between grants and cooperative agreements revolves around the existence of “substantial involvement.” Cooperative agreements require greater Federal government participation in the project. If a cooperative agreement is awarded, DRL will undertake reasonable and programmatically necessary substantial involvement. Examples of substantial involvement can include, but are not limited to:Active participation or collaboration with the recipient in the implementation of the award;Review and approval of one stage of work before another can begin;Review and approval of substantive provisions of proposed sub-awards or contracts beyond existing Federal policy;Approval of the recipient’s budget or plan of work prior to the award.The authority for this funding opportunity is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).To maximize the impact and sustainability of the award(s) that result from this NOFO, DRL retains the right to execute non-competitive continuation amendment(s). The total duration of any award, including potential non-competitive continuation amendments, shall not exceed 54 months, or four and a half years. Any non-competitive continuation is contingent on performance and pending availability of funds. A non-competitive continuation is not guaranteed, and the Department of State reserves the right to exercise or not to exercise this option.C. Eligibility InformationFor application information, please see the proposal submission instructions (PSI), updated December 2022 on our website.C.1 Eligible ApplicantsDRL welcomes applications from U.S.-based and foreign-based non-profit organizations/nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and public international organizations; private, public, or state institutions of higher education; and for-profit organizations or businesses. DRL’s preference is to work with non-profit entities; however, there may be some occasions when a for-profit entity is best suited.Applications submitted by for-profit entities may be subject to additional review following the panel selection process. Additionally, the Department of State prohibits profit to for-profit or commercial organizations under its assistance awards. Profit is defined as any amount in excess of allowable direct and indirect costs. The allowability of costs incurred by commercial organizations is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at 48 CFR 30, Cost Accounting Standards Administration, and 48 CFR 31 Contract Cost Principles and Procedures.Please see 2 CFR 200.307 for regulations regarding program income.C.2 Cost Sharing or MatchingProviding cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not an eligibility factor or requirement for this NOFO and providing cost share will not result in a more favorable competitive ranking.C.3 OtherApplicants should have existing, or the capacity to develop, active partnerships with thematic or in-country partners, entities, and relevant stakeholders, including private sector partners and NGOs, and have demonstrable experience in administering successful and preferably similar projects. DRL encourages applications from foreign-based NGOs headquartered in the geographic regions/countries relevant to this NOFO. Applicants may form consortia in order to bring together organizations with varied expertise to propose a comprehensive program in one proposal. However, one organization should be designated in the proposal as the lead applicant, with the other members designated as sub-award partners. DRL reserves the right to request additional background information on applicants that do not have previous experience administering federal grant awards, and these applicants may be subject to limited funding on a pilot basis.DRL is committed to an anti-discrimination policy in all of its programs and activities. DRL welcomes applications irrespective of race, ethnicity, color, creed, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or other status. DRL seeks applications that demonstrate that the recipient does not discriminate against any beneficiaries in implementation of a potential award, such as, but not limited to, by withholding, adversely impacting, or denying equitable access to the benefits provided through this award on the basis of any factor not expressly stated in the award.  This includes, for example, race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  The recipient should insert this provision, including this paragraph, in all sub-grants and contracts under a potential award.Any applicant listed on the Excluded Parties List System in the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) (www.sam.gov) and/or has a current debt to the U.S. government is not eligible to apply for an assistance award in accordance with the OMB guidelines at 2 CFR 180 that implement Executive Orders 12549 (3 CFR,1986 Comp., p. 189) and 12689 (3 CFR,1989 Comp., p. 235), “Debarment and Suspension.” Additionally, no entity or person listed on the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov can participate in any activities under an award. All applicants are strongly encouraged to review the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov to ensure that no ineligible entity or person is included in their application.D. Application and Submission InformationD.1 Address to Request Application PackageApplicants can find application forms, kits, or other materials needed to apply on www.grants.gov and SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com) under the announcement title “DRL Supporting Efforts to Promote Transitional Justice and Accountability and Advance Women’s Leadership in Yemen,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010260.” Please contact the DRL point of contact listed in Section G if requesting reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities or for security reasons. Please note that reasonable accommodations do not include deadline extensions.D.2 Content and Form of Application SubmissionFor all application documents, please ensure:All documents are in English and all costs are in U.S. Dollars. If an original document within the application is in another language, an English translation must be provided (please note the Department of State, as indicated in 2 CFR 200.111, requires that English is the official language of all award documents). If any document is provided in both English and a foreign language, the English language version is the controlling version;All pages are numbered, including budgets and attachments;All documents are formatted to 8 1⁄2 x 11 paper; and,All documents are single-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, with 1-inch margins. Captions and footnotes may be 10-point Times New Roman font. Font sizes in charts and tables, including the budget, can be reformatted to fit within one page width.D.2.1 Application RequirementsComplete applications must include the following:Completed and signed SF-424, SF-424A, and SF-424B forms. Please see SF-424 instructions in Section 2B of the PSI.Organizations that engage in lobbying the U.S. government, including Congress, or pay for another entity to lobby on their behalf, are also required to complete the SF-LLL “Disclosure of Lobbying Activities” form (only if applicable). Please see SF-LLL guidance in Section 2B of the PSI.Cover Page (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that includes a table with the organization name, project title, target country/countries, project synopsis, and name and contact information for the application’s main point of contact. Please see Cover Page Section 2C of the PSI for a template and more details.Executive Summary (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that outlines project goals, objectives, activities, etc.The Executive Summary should include a brief section that explicitly states: (1) the problem statement addressed by the project, (2) research-based evidence justifying the unique project approach, and (3) quantifiable project outcomes and impacts.Table of Contents (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) listing all documents and attachments with page numbers.Proposal Narrative (not to exceed ten (10) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please note the ten-page limit does not include the Cover Page, Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Attachments, Detailed Budget, Budget Narrative, Audit, or NICRA. Applicants are encouraged to combine multiple documents into a single Word Document or PDF (i.e. Cover Page, Table of Contents, Executive Summary, and Proposal Narrative in one file). Please see Proposal Narrative Guidelines in Section 2F of the PSI for more details.The Proposal Narrative should demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to ensuring the participation of all people as a strategy for implementation. Please integrate inclusion strategies in all sections of the Proposal Narrative to enhance programmatic impact.Budget (preferably as an Excel workbook) that includes three (3) columns containing the request to DRL, any cost sharing contribution, and the total budget. A summary budget should also be included using the OMB-approved budget categories (see SF-424A as a sample) in a separate tab. Costs must be in U.S. Dollars. Detailed line-item budgets for sub-grantees should be included as additional tabs within the Excel workbook (if available at the time of submission). Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.The programming approach should be dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Please include costs associated with this commitment in the Budget and Budget Narrative.Budget Narrative (preferably as a Word Document) that includes substantive explanations and justifications for each line item in the detailed budget spreadsheet, as well as the source and a description of all cost-share offered. Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.The organization’s most recent audit, if applicable. This should be a single audit, program-specific audit, or other audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). Please see Audit Section 2H of the PSI for more information.Logic Model (preferably as a Word Document). Please see Logic Model Section 2I of the PSI for more information.Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative (not to exceed four (4) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please see Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative Section 2J of the PSI for more information.As stated within the DRL Guide to Program Monitoring and Evaluation (p. 6): DRL strongly encourages applicants to consider whether their monitoring and evaluation systems are utilizing human rights-based approaches, applying a gender and equity lens, and/or include the participation of sub-grantees and project participants. Within the Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative, applicants should demonstrate their commitment to inclusive strategies and consider whether evaluation design, data collection, analysis, reporting and learning are conducted in an ethical and responsible way with all project participants (e.g. direct beneficiaries, sub-grantees). Applicants should still make adequate provisions to protect the privacy of human subjects when collecting data from individuals. For instance, when collecting data from project participants, consider whether your organization will have the necessary informed consent forms, confidentiality agreements, and data security protocols. Applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.Risk Analysis (preferably as a Word Document). Please see Risk Analysis Section 2K of the PSI for more information on this requirement, including Do No Harm principles and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) policies/plans.Key Personnel (not to exceed two (2) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please include short bios that highlight relevant professional experience. Given the limited space, CVs are not recommended for submission.Timeline (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document or Excel Sheet). The timeline of the overall proposal should include activities, evaluation efforts, and program closeout.Gender and Inclusion Analysis (not to exceed three (3) pages, preferably as a Word Document) that provides a concise analysis of relevant gender norms, equity and equality for underserved communities and marginalized populations, power relations, and conflict dynamics in target countries. Potential domains of analysis include institutional practices and barriers, cultural norms, gender roles, access to and control over assets and resources, and patterns of power and decision-making. Applicants should briefly explain how they have integrated findings from their analysis into project design and/or other proposal documents, including a plan for regularly reviewing and updating the gender and inclusion analysis with local partners/beneficiaries, and making any necessary adjustments to project implementation. A set of guiding questions can be found in Section 2L of the PSI.Security Plan addressing any issues involving in-person events and recruitment for said events, and safety for any online programs or communications, including independent IT security audits (to include a vulnerability assessment) of any proposed web application or platform. Organization’s Security Plan should demonstrate consideration of the risks identified in the submitted risk assessment. Costs may also be identified within the budget and budget narrative. Applicants are also encouraged to include contingency plans for in-person or online activities.Contingency Plan for proposed activities should the originally planned activities not be able to be implemented. The Contingency Plan should be submitted as an additional annex. Applicants should demonstrate consideration of the risks identified in the submitted risk assessment and include specific alternative activities or locations as part of the Contingency Plan. Any proposed “plan” must comply with 2CFR200.433 – Contingency provisions. Plans must not include unallocable or unallowable expenses and must not result in a larger Total Award Value than the identified as the “competition ceiling.” DRL requires prior approval by the Grants Officer of the “plan” before any activities can take place, or costs can be incurred against the “plan.”Lessons Learned (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) from past programs (insert country or theme) that demonstrate how the implementer has safely operated and responded to programmatic challenges, learning from both successes and failures, in the operating environment.  To be incorporated into the ten (10) pages allowed for “Proposal Narrative.”Psychosocial Assistance (to be incorporated into the ten (10) pages allowed for “Proposal Narrative,” and into “Budget” and “Budget Narrative”). A section in the proposal, budget, and budget narrative to reflect appropriate resources and support for the psychosocial health of staff (i.e., activities can range from access to educational materials and training opportunities to counseling services to other contextually relevant support).References: For reference to international guidance, please see the following: Core Humanitarian Standard Commitment 8.9 (https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/CHS-Guidance-Notes-and-Indicators.pdf); and IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings Action Sheet 4.4 (http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/guidelines_iasc_mental_health_psychosocial_june_2007.pdf).Applications that do not include the elements listed above will be deemed technically ineligible. D.2.2 Additional Application DocumentsStrong applications will also contain the following:Individual Letters of Support and/or Memorandum of Understanding. Letters of support and MOUs must be specific to the project implementation (e.g. from proposed partners or sub-award recipients) and will not count towards the page limit.Please refer to the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI), updated December 2022, on DRL’s website for detailed guidance on the documents above: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/. For an application checklist and sample templates please see the Resources page on DRL’s website: https://www.state.gov/resources-for-programs-and-grants/. The sample templates provided on the DRL website are suggested, but not mandatory.DRL reserves the right to request additional documents not included in this NOFO. Additionally, to ensure that all applications receive a balanced evaluation, the DRL review panel will review from the first page of each section up to the page limit and no further.Note: If ultimately provided with a notification of non-binding intent to make a federal award, applicants typically have two to three weeks to provide additional information and documents requested in the notification of intent. The deadlines may vary in each notification of intent and applicants must adhere to the stated deadline in the notification of intent.D.2.3 Additional Information Requested For Those Receiving Notification of IntentSuccessful applicants must submit, after notification of intent to make a federal award, but prior to issuance of a federal award:Written responses and revised application documents addressing conditions and recommendations from the DRL review panel;A copy of the applicant’s latest NICRA as a PDF file, if the applicant has a NICRA and includes NICRA charges in the budget;A completed copy of the Department’s Financial Management Survey, if receiving DRL funding for the first time;Submission of required documents to register in the Payment Management System managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, if receiving DRL funding for the first time (unless an exemption is provided);Other requested information or documents included in the notification of intent to make a federal award or subsequent communications prior to issuance of a federal award;Applicants who submit their applications through Grants.gov will be required to create a SAMS Domestic account in order to accept the final award. Accounts must be logged into to every 60 days in order to maintain an active account.D.3 Unique Entity Identifier and System for Award Management (SAM)All prime organizations, whether based in the United States or in another country, must have a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and an active registration with the SAM.gov before submitting an application. DRL may not review applications from or make awards to applicants that have not completed all applicable UEI and SAM.gov requirements. A UEI is one of the data elements mandated by Public Law 109-282, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA), for all Federal awards.Note: As of April 2022, a DUNS number is no longer required for federal assistance applications.The 2 CFR 200 requires that sub-grantees obtain a UEI number. Please note the UEI for sub-grantees is not required at the time of application but will be required before the award is processed and/or directed to a sub-grantee.Note: The process of obtaining or renewing a SAM.gov registration may take anywhere from 4-8 weeks. Please begin your registration as early as possible.Organizations based in the United States or that pay employees within the United States will need an Employer Identification Number (EIN) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov. Please note that as of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language: “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense. I do not wish to obtain a CAGE code. I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that do not pay employees within the United States do not need an EIN from the IRS, but do need a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov. Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language: “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense. I do not wish to obtain an NCAGE code. I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO NOT plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions: Step 1: Proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process. SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions:Step 1: Apply for an NCAGE code by following the instructions on the NSPA NATO website linked below:NCAGE Homepage:https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/AC135Public/sc/CageList.aspxNCAGE Code Request Tool (NCRT):https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/Codification/CageTool/homeFor NCAGE help from within the United States, call +1 (888) 227-2423.For NCAGE help from outside the United States, call +1 (269) 961-7766.Or, email NCAGE@dlis.dla.mil for any problems in applying for an NCAGE code.Step 2: After receiving an NCAGE code, proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process. SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.All prime organizations must also continue to maintain active SAM.gov registration with current information at all times during which they have an active Federal award or application under consideration by a federal award agency. SAM.gov requires all entities to renew their registration once a year in order to maintain an active registration status in SAM.gov. It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure it has an active registration in SAM.gov and to maintain that active registration. If an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements at the time of application, the applicant may be deemed technically ineligible to receive an award and use that determination as a basis for making an award to another applicant.Please refer to 2 CFR 25.200 for additional information.Note: SAM.gov is not the same as SAMS Domestic. It is free of charge to register in both systems, but the registration processes are different.Information is included on the SAM.gov website to help international registrations, including “Quick Start Guide for International Registrations” and “Helpful Hints.” Navigate to www.SAM.gov, click “HELP” in the top navigation bar, then click “Explore” and “New to SAM.gov?” for general information. Please note, guidance on SAM.gov and the guidance on GSA’s website about requirement for registering in SAM.gov is subject to change and is currently being updated. Applicants should review the website for the most up-to-date guidance.The attached “AQM Guidance for NCAGE-SAM.gov for Grant Applicants as of Dec. 2022” is a compilation of resources gathered by the Department’s Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM). Any content shown from SAM.gov is not owned by the Department of State. This guidance and instruction are to the best of our knowledge based at the time of posting this solicitation. Where guidance in these attachments differs from the SAM.gov website, SAM.gov prevails and the applicant is encouraged to seek and document responses provided by the SAM.gov help desk.D.3.1 ExemptionsAn exemption from these requirements may be permitted on a case-by-case basis if:An applicant’s identity must be protected due to potential endangerment of their mission, their organization’s status, their employees, or individuals being served by the applicant.For an applicant, if the federal awarding agency makes a determination that there are exigent circumstances that prohibit the applicant from receiving a UEI and completing SAM.gov registration prior to receiving a federal award. In these instances, federal awarding agencies must require the recipient to obtain a UEI and complete SAM.gov registration within 30 days of the federal award date.Organizations requesting exemption from UEI or SAM.gov requirements must email the point of contact listed in the NOFO at least two weeks prior to the deadline in the NOFO providing a justification of their request. Approval for a SAM.gov exemption must come from the warranted Grants Officer before the application can be deemed eligible for review.Note: As of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. As of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. DoD awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.D.4 Submission Dates and TimesApplications are due no later than 11:59 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST), on 19, April, 2024 on https://www.grants.gov/ or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com) under the announcement title “DRL Supporting Efforts to Promote Transitional Justice and Accountability and Advance Women’s Leadership in Yemen,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010260.” Grants.gov and SAMS Domestic automatically log the date and time an application submission is made, and the Department of State will use this information to determine whether an application has been submitted on time. Late applications are neither reviewed nor considered. Known system errors caused by Grants.gov or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.service-now.com) that are outside of the applicant’s control will be reviewed on a case by case basis. Applicants should not expect a notification upon DRL receiving their application.D.5 Funding RestrictionsPrior to issuing a federal award with a total amount of federal share greater than $250,000, the Department of State is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is found in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (41 USC §2313). An applicant, at its option, may review information in the designated integrity and performance systems accessible through SAM.gov and comment on any information about itself that a federal awarding agency previously entered and is currently in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov. The Department of State will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in 2 CFR 200.206.DRL will not consider applications that reflect any type of support for any member, affiliate, or representative of a designated terrorist organization. Please refer the link for Foreign Terrorist Organizations: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/Project activities whose direct beneficiaries are foreign militaries or paramilitary groups or individuals will not be considered for DRL funding given purpose limitations on funding.In accordance with Department of State policy for terrorism, applicants are advised that successful passing of vetting to evaluate the risk that funds may benefit terrorists or their supporters is a condition of award. If chosen for an award, applicants will be asked to submit information required by DS Form 4184, Risk Analysis Information (attached to this solicitation) about their company and its principal personnel. Vetting information is also required for all sub-award performance on assistance awards identified by the Department of State as presenting a risk of terrorist financing. Vetting information may also be requested for project beneficiaries and participants. Failure to submit information when requested, or failure to pass vetting, may be grounds for rejecting your proposal prior to award.The Leahy Law prohibits Department foreign assistance funds from supporting foreign security force units if the Secretary of State has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Per 22 USC §2378d(a) (2017), “No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter  or the Arms Export Control Act  to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Restrictions may apply to any proposed assistance to police or other law enforcement. Among these, pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), no assistance provided through this funding opportunity may be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country when there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. In accordance with the requirements of section 620M of the FAA, also known as the Leahy law, project beneficiaries or participants from a foreign government’s security forces may need to be vetted by the Department before the provision of any assistance. If a proposed grant or cooperative agreement will provide assistance to foreign security forces or personnel, compliance with the Leahy Law is required.U.S. foreign assistance for Burma or Burmese beneficiaries is subject to restrictions. This includes restrictions, pursuant to section 7043(a)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. G, P.L. 116-94)(SFOAA), on funds appropriated under title III of the act for assistance for Burma. Section 7043(a)(3) provides that such funds “may not be made available to any organization or entity controlled by the armed forces of Burma, or to any individual or organization that advocates violence against ethnic or religious groups or individuals in Burma, as determined by the Secretary of State.” In addition, funds cannot be made available to any individual or organization that has committed serious human rights abuse.Organizations should be cognizant of these restrictions when developing project proposals as these restrictions will require appropriate due diligence of program beneficiaries and collaboration with DRL to ensure compliance with these restrictions. Program beneficiaries subject to due diligence vetting will include any individuals or entities that are beneficiaries of foreign assistance funding or support. Due diligence vetting will include a review of open-source materials.Federal awards generally will not allow reimbursement of pre-award costs; however, the Grants Officer may approve pre-award costs on a case-by-case basis. Generally, construction costs are not allowed under DRL awards. For additional information, please see the DRL Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for Applications: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.D.6 Application SubmissionAll application submissions must be made electronically via www.grants.gov or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com). Both systems require registration by the applying organization. Please note that the Grants.gov registration process can take ten (10) business days or longer, even if all registration steps are completed in a timely manner.It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure that it has an active registration in SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov. Applicants are required to document that the application has been received by SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov in its entirety. DRL bears no responsibility for disqualification that result from applicants not being registered before the due date, for system errors in either SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov, or other errors in the application process. Additionally, applicants must save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Faxed, couriered, or emailed documents will not be accepted. Reasonable accommodations may, in appropriate circumstances, be provided to applicants with disabilities or for security reasons. Applicants must follow all formatting instructions in the applicable NOFO and these instructions.DRL encourages organizations to submit applications during normal business hours (Monday – Friday, 9:00 AM-5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST)). If an applicant experiences technical difficulties and has contacted the appropriate help desk but is not receiving timely assistance (e.g. if you have not received a response within 48 hours of contacting the help desk), you may contact the DRL point of contact listed in the NOFO in Section G. The point of contact may assist in contacting the appropriate help desk.The Grants Officer will determine technical eligibility of all applications.SAMS Domestic Applications:Applicants using SAMS Domestic for the first time should complete their “New Organization Registration.” To register with SAMS Domestic, click “Login to https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com” and follow the “create an account” link.Organizations must remember to save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.SAMS Domestic Help Desk: For assistance with SAMS Domestic accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com . Customer support is available 24/7.Grants.gov Applications:Applicants who do not submit applications via SAMS Domestic may submit via www.grants.gov.Please be advised that completing all the necessary registration steps for obtaining a username and password from Grants.gov can take ten (10) business days or longer.Please refer to the Grants.gov website for definitions of various &#8220;application statuses&#8221; and the difference between a submission receipt and a submission validation. Applicants will receive a validation e-mail from Grants.gov upon the successful submission of an application. Validation of an electronic submission via Grants.gov can take up to two business days. Additionally, organizations must remember to save a screenshot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Grants.gov Helpdesk: For assistance with Grants.gov, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov. The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays.See https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/ for a list of federal holidays.E. Application Review InformationE.1 Proposal Review CriteriaThe DRL review panel will evaluate each application individually against the following criteria, listed below in order of importance, and not against competing applications. Please use the below criteria as a reference, but do not structure your application according to the sub-sections.Quality of Project IdeaApplications should be responsive to the program framework and policy objectives identified in the NOFO, appropriate in the country/regional context, and should exhibit originality, substance, precision, and relevance to DRL’s mission of promoting human rights and democracy. Projects should have the potential to have an immediate impact leading to long-term, sustainable reforms. DRL prefers new approaches that do not duplicate efforts by other entities. This does not exclude from consideration projects that improve upon or expand existing successful projects in a new and complementary way. In countries where similar activities are already taking place, an explanation should be provided as to how new activities will not duplicate or merely add to existing activities and how these efforts will be coordinated. Proposals that promote creative approaches to recognized ongoing challenges are highly encouraged. DRL prioritizes project proposals with inclusive approaches for advancing these rights.Project Planning/Ability to Achieve ObjectivesA strong application will include a clear articulation of how the proposed project activities contribute to the overall project objectives, and each activity will be clearly developed and detailed. A comprehensive monthly work plan should demonstrate substantive undertakings and the logistical capacity of the organization. Objectives should be ambitious yet measurable, results-focused and achievable in a reasonable timeframe. A complete application must include a Logic Model to demonstrate how the project activities will have an impact on its proposed objectives. The Logic Model should match the objectives, outcomes, key activities, and outputs described in the narrative. Applications should address how the project will engage relevant stakeholders and should identify local partners as appropriate.If local partners have been identified, DRL strongly encourages applicants to submit letters of support from proposed in-country partners. Additionally, applicants should describe the division of labor among the direct applicant and any local partners. If applicable, applications should identify target geographic areas for activities, target participant groups or selection criteria for participants, and the specific roles of sub-awardees, among other pertinent details.DRL recognizes that all programs have some level of risk due to internal/external variables that have the potential to adversely affect a program. Risk management should address how the project design incorporates the identification, assessment, and management of key risk factors. DRL will review the Risk Analysis based on the organization’s ability to identify risks that could have an impact on the overall program as well as how the organization will manage these risks.Institution’s Record and CapacityDRL will consider the past performance of prior recipients and the demonstrated potential of new applicants. Applications should demonstrate an institutional record of successful democracy and human rights programs, including responsible fiscal management and full compliance with all reporting requirements for past grants. Proposed personnel and institutional resources should be adequate and appropriate to achieve the project&#8217;s objectives. Projects should have potential for continued funding beyond DRL resources.Addressing Barriers to Equal ParticipationDRL strives to ensure its projects advance the rights and uphold the dignity of all persons. As the U.S. government’s lead bureau dedicated to promoting democratic governance, DRL requests a programming approach dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Discrimination, violence, inequity, and inequality targeting any members of society undermines collective security and threatens democracy. DRL prioritizes inclusive and integrated program models that assess and address the barriers to access for individuals and groups based on their race, ethnicity, religion, income, geography, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability. The proposal should also demonstrate how the project will further engagement in underserved communities and with individuals from underserved communities. Applicants should describe how programming will impact all of its beneficiaries, including support for underserved and underrepresented communities.  This approach should be an integral part of both the concept and explicit design, and implementation of all proposed project activities, objectives, and monitoring. Strong proposals will provide specific analysis, measures, and corresponding targets as appropriate.  Stakeholders shall identify the difference between opportunities and barriers to access, and design projects accordingly to not perpetuate these inequalities, but rather enhance programmatic impact by including all people in society. The goal of this approach is to bring communities and those in power together in support of more stable and secure societies.Cost Effectiveness DRL strongly encourages applicants to clearly demonstrate project cost-effectiveness in their application, including examples of leveraging institutional and other resources. However, cost-sharing or other examples of leveraging other resources are not required. Inclusion of cost-sharing in the budget does not result in additional points awarded during the review process. Budgets should have low and/or reasonable overhead and administration costs, and applicants should provide clear explanations and justifications for these costs in relation to the work involved. All budget items should be clearly explained and justified to demonstrate necessity, appropriateness, and connection to the project objectives.Please note: If cost share is included in the budget, the recipient must maintain written records to support all allowable costs that are claimed as its contribution to cost share, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal government. Such records are subject to audit. In the event the recipient does not meet the minimum amount of cost-sharing as stipulated in the recipient’s budget, DRL’s contribution may be reduced in proportion to the recipient’s contribution.Multiplier Effect/SustainabilityApplications should clearly delineate how elements of the project will have a multiplier effect and be sustainable beyond the life of the grant. A good multiplier effect will have an impact beyond the direct beneficiaries of the grant (e.g. participants trained under a grant go on to train other people; workshop participants use skills from a workshop to enhance a national level election that affects the entire populace). A strong sustainability plan may include demonstrating continuing impact beyond the life of a project or garnering other donor support after DRL funding ceases. Project Monitoring and EvaluationComplete applications will include a detailed M&amp;E Narrative, which detail how the project’s progress will be monitored and evaluated. Incorporating well-designed monitoring and evaluation processes into a project is an efficient method for documenting the change (intended and unintended) that a project seeks. Applications should demonstrate the capacity to provide objectives with measurable outputs and outcomes.The quality of the M&amp;E sections will be judged on the narrative explaining how both monitoring and evaluation will be carried out and who will be responsible for those related activities. The M&amp;E Narrative should explain how evaluation(s), internal or external, will be incorporated into the project implementation plan or how the project will be systematically assessed in the absence of one. Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the narrative.Note: Applicants are no longer required to submit a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in their proposals. However, applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.The output and outcome-based performance indicators should not only be separated by project objectives but also should match the objectives, outcomes, and outputs detailed in the Logic Model and Proposal Narrative. Performance indicators should be clearly defined (i.e., explained how the indicators will be measured and reported) either within the table or with a separate Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS). For each performance indicator, the table should also include baselines and quarterly and cumulative targets, data collection tools, data sources, types of data disaggregation, and frequency of monitoring and evaluation. There should also be metrics to capture how project activities target those who face discrimination due to their religion, gender, disabilities, ethnicity or sexual orientation and gender identity, where applicable. Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the plan.E.2 Review and Selection ProcessDRL strives to ensure that each application receives a balanced evaluation by a DRL review panel. AQM will determine technical eligibility for all applications. All technically eligible applications for a given NOFO are reviewed against the same seven criteria, which include quality of project idea, project planning/ability to achieve objectives, institutional record and capacity, inclusive programming, cost effectiveness, multiplier effect/sustainability, and project monitoring and evaluation.Additionally, the DRL review panel will evaluate how the application addresses the NOFO request, U.S. foreign policy goals, and the priority needs of DRL overall. DRL may also take into consideration the balance of the current portfolio of active projects, including geographic or thematic diversity, if needed.In most cases, the DRL review panel includes representatives from DRL, the appropriate Department of State regional bureau (to include feedback from U.S. embassies), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (to include feedback from USAID missions). In some cases, additional panelists may participate, including from other Department of State bureaus or offices; U.S. government departments, agencies, or boards; representatives from partner governments; or representatives from entities that are in a public-private partnership with DRL. At the end of the panel’s discussion about an application, the review panel votes on whether to recommend the application for approval by the DRL Assistant Secretary. If more applications are recommended for approval than DRL can ultimately fund, the review panel will rank the recommended applications in priority order for consideration by the DRL Assistant Secretary. The Grants Officer Representative (GOR) for the eventual award does not vote on the panel. All panelists must sign non-disclosure agreements and conflicts of interest agreements.DRL review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed project, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award. To ensure effective use of DRL funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and project activities.F. Federal Award Administration InformationF.1 Federal Award NoticesDRL will provide a separate notification to applicants on the result of their applications. Successful applicants will receive a letter electronically via email requesting that the applicant respond to review panel conditions and recommendations. This notification is not an authorization to begin activities and does not constitute formal approval or a funding commitment.Final approval is contingent on the applicant successfully responding to the review panel’s conditions and recommendations; being registered in required systems, including the U.S. government’s Payment Management System (PMS), unless an exemption is provided; and completing and providing any additional documentation requested by DRL or AQM. Final approval is also contingent on Congressional Notification requirements being met and final review and approval by the Department’s warranted Grants Officer.The notice of Federal award signed by the Department’s warranted Grants Officers is the sole authorizing document. If awarded, the notice of Federal award will be provided to the applicant’s designated Authorizing Official via SAMS Domestic to be electronically counter-signed in the system.F.2 Administrative and National Policy and Legal RequirementsDRL requires all recipients of foreign assistance funding to comply with all applicable Department and Federal laws and regulations, including but not limited to the following:The Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards set forth in 2 CFR Chapter 200 (Sub-Chapters A through F) shall apply to all non-Federal entities, except for assistance awards to Individuals and Foreign Public Entities.  Sub-Chapters A through E shall apply to all foreign organizations, and Sub-Chapters A through D shall apply to all U.S. and foreign for-profit entities. The applicant/recipient of the award and any sub-recipient under the award must comply with all applicable terms and conditions, in addition to the assurance and certifications made part of the Notice of Award.  The Department’s Standard Terms and Conditions can be viewed at https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-the-procurement-executive/.Additionally, DRL supports implementation of the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality; the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Act of 2017, which highlights the U.S. commitment to the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and the Department of State WPS Implementation Plan. For additional information, please refer to the following link: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1141.Due to the determination made under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) for funds obligated during FY 2023, assistance that benefits the governments of the following countries may be subject to a restriction under the TVPA.  The Department of State determines on a case-by-case basis what constitutes assistance to a government; the general principles listed below apply.Assistance to the government includes:All branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial) at all levels (national, regional, local);Public schools, universities, hospitals, and state-owned enterprises, as well as government employees;Cash, training, equipment, services, or other assistance provided directly to the government, assistance provided to an NGO or other implementer for the benefit of the government, and assistance to government employees.Additional requirements may be included depending on the content of the program.F.3 ReportingApplicants should be aware of the post-award reporting requirements for federal assistance awards as reflected in 2 CFR 200 Appendix XII &#8211; Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters.https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&amp;SID=027fb85899500d580fc71df69d11573a&amp;mc=true&amp;n=pt2.1.200&amp;r=PART&amp;ty=HTML &#8211; ap2.1.200_1521.i DRL awards require that all reports (financial and progress) are uploaded to the federal award file in SAMS Domestic on a quarterly basis. The Federal Financial Report (FFR or SF-425) is the required form for financial reports and must be submitted in PMS, and a copy of the report submitted in PMS then uploaded to the award file in SAMS Domestic. Progress reports uploaded to the award file in SAMS Domestic must include a narrative as described below as well as Program Indicators (or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer), including standard (F) framework indicators and DRL framework indicators. F and DRL framework indicators will be reviewed and negotiated during the final stages of issuing an award on a project-by-project basis.Narrative progress reports should reflect the focus on measuring the project’s progress on the overarching objectives and should be compiled according to the objectives, outcomes, and outputs as outlined in the award’s Scope of Work (SOW) and in the Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Narrative. An assessment of the overall project’s achievements should be included in each progress report. Where relevant, progress reports should include the following sections:Relevant contextual information (limited);Explanation and evaluation of significant activities of the reporting period and how the activities reflect progress toward achieving objectives, including meeting benchmarks/targets as set in the approved M&amp;E Plan. In addition, attach the M&amp;E Plan, comparing the target and actual numbers for the indicators;Any qualitative impact or success stories from the project, when possible;Copy of baseline, mid-term, and/or final evaluation report(s) conducted by an external evaluator; if applicable;Relevant supporting documentation or products related to the project activities (such as articles, meeting lists and agendas, participant surveys, photos, manuals, etc.) as separate attachments;Description of how the recipient is pursuing sustainability, including looking for sources of follow-on funding;Any problems/challenges in implementing the project and a corrective action plan with an updated timeline of activities;Reasons why established goals were not met;Data for the required F and/or DRL framework indicator(s) for the quarter as well as aggregate data by fiscal year;Program Indicators or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer;Proposed activities for the next quarter; and,Additional pertinent information, including analysis and explanation of cost overruns or high unit costs, if applicable.Foreign Assistance Data Review: As required by Congress, the Department of State must make progress in its efforts to improve tracking and reporting of foreign assistance data through the Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR). The FADR requires tracking of foreign assistance activity data from budgeting, planning, and allocation through obligation and disbursement. Successful applicants will be required to report and draw down federal funding based on the appropriate FADR Data Elements, indicated within their award documentation. In cases of more than one FADR Data Element, typically program or sector and/or regions or country, the successful applicant will be required to maintain separate accounting records.A final narrative and financial report must also be submitted within 120 days after the expiration of the award.Please note: Delays in reporting may result in delays of payment approvals and failure to provide required reports may jeopardize the recipient&#8217;s’ ability to receive future U.S. government funds. DRL reserves the right to request any additional programmatic and/or financial project information during the award period.G. Contact InformationFor technical submission questions related to this NOFO, please contact DRL-NEAProgramInfo@state.gov. For assistance with SAMS Domestic accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://afsitsm.service-now.com/ilms/home. Customer support is available 24/7.Please note that establishing an account in SAMS Domestic may require the use of smartphone for multi-factor authentication (MFA). If an applicant does not have accessibility to a smartphone during the time of creating an account, please contact the helpdesk and request instructions on MFA for Windows PC.For assistance with Grants.gov accounts and technical issues related to using the system, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov. The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays. For a list of federal holidays visit:https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/Except for technical submission questions, during the NOFO period U.S. Department of State staff in Washington and overseas shall not discuss this competition with applicants until the entire proposal review process has been completed and rejection and approval letters have been transmitted.H. Other InformationApplicants should be aware that DRL understands that some information contained in applications may be considered sensitive or proprietary and will make appropriate efforts to protect such information. However, applicants are advised that DRL cannot guarantee that such information will not be disclosed, including pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or other similar statutes.The information in this NOFO and “Proposal Submission Instructions for Applications” is binding and may not be modified by any DRL representative. Explanatory information provided by DRL that contradicts this language will not be binding. Issuance of the NOFO and negotiation of applications does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the U.S. government. DRL reserves the right to reduce, revise, or increase proposal budgets.This NOFO will appear on www.grants.gov, SAMS Domestic, and DRL’s website https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.Background Information on DRL and General DRL FundingDRL has the mission of promoting democracy and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms globally. DRL supports projects designed through an evidence-based framework that empower local civil society partners to promote and defend democracy globally, including efforts to counter authoritarianism, promote human rights, and meaningfully address diversity, equity, and inclusion as a core element of good governance. DRL typically focuses its work in countries facing human rights violations and abuses, where democracy and human rights defenders are under pressure, and where governance infrastructure is undemocratic, in transition, or at risk of backsliding. Additional background information on DRL and its efforts can be found on https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/.
- Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Darby FitzSimmonsIn December 2002, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship – the So San – was in the Arabian Sea carrying missiles destined for Yemen. The U.S. alerted the Spanish navy, which had ships in the area and agreed to intercept the ship.The intelligence was right. Upon boarding the So San, Spanish naval personnel discovered 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, and 23 tanks of missile fuel, all hidden under bags of cement.However, after a day of back and forth between the U.S. and Yemeni governments, the ship was released. The U.S. said it lacked clear legal authority to seize the missile parts.Less than a year later, in October 2003, the U.S. and UK once again received intelligence that a ship, the BBC China, was carrying illicit cargo. U.S. government officials contacted German authorities who intercepted the ship. They found and permanently confiscated nuclear centrifuge parts destined for Libya. In 2018, PSI countries held a Mediterranean maritime exercise in the bay of Catania in Sicily. (State Department photo)The difference in outcome between these two events was no accident – it was the result of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003 by eleven like-minded countries, the PSI is a global effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.A Global EffortToday, there are 111 participating countries that endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. These include committing to stopping the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials, and enhancing relevant legal, diplomatic, financial, military, and law enforcement tools.Although the PSI does not have any formal legal authority, the PSI has played a key role in global counterproliferation efforts for more than 20 years. PSI-endorsing countries agree to work together to impede or stop shipments of WMD-related materials to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.Many PSI-endorsing countries also have ship boarding agreements, allowing them to carry out searches and seizures of illicit material on ships originating from each other’s countries.PSI in AfricaPSI endorsing states regularly conduct multilateral meetings, workshops, and exercises to improve their counterproliferation readiness and share best practices. One such event occurred in early February when the United States and Morocco co-hosted the 2024 Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach event. This was the largest ever PSI event on the African continent. More than 160 attendees from 35 countries attended, including 25 African countries.During the three-day event, civilian and military leaders discussed the current state of counterproliferation, shared best practices, and emphasized the importance of continuing to expand upon nonproliferation efforts on the African continent through the PSI and similar mechanisms. Representatives from 35 countries gather in Marrakech for the kick-off of a PSI event in February. (State Department photo)Looking AheadThese PSI efforts are more important than ever. In recent months, several developments have shaken the global nonproliferation regime. These include:Iran withdrawing permission for international verification at several nuclear sites;DPRK continuing to develop its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, andRussia continuing to violate nonproliferation norms by attacking Ukraine with missiles and has doubled down on its dangerous nuclear rhetoric – including withdrawing from the PSI in 2022.However, despite the challenges posed by the current security landscape, the PSI remains strong. Following the meeting, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia became endorsers of the PSI, affirming their commitment to countering the spread of WMDs.The success of the 2024 PSI African Political Meeting and Outreach event is a sign that the international community at large is steadfast in their support of counterproliferation efforts. The United States looks forward to working with the five new endorsing countries to improve our multilateral interdiction efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies.Darby FitzSimmons is an intern in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
- Department Press Briefing – February 20, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – February 20, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – February 20, 2024																																																					February 20, 2024																																																								1:41 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. Sorry to be – sorry, thank you. Sorry to be late. Let me &#8212;QUESTION: Are you really?MR MILLER: I am sorry to be late. You think I don’t want to get on with my day as much as you do. (Laughter.) Let me &#8212;QUESTION: I accept your apology.MR MILLER: No, thank you. Let me start with some opening comments. As we mark two years this week since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the brutality of Putin’s regime is increasingly evident both at home and abroad. The weakness and rot at the heart of the system that Putin has built was confirmed not only by Aleksey Navalny’s death last week, but also by the fact that the Russian – that Russia detained close to 400 people over the weekend just for mourning his passing.The Kremlin has poisoned Navalny, imprisoned him unjustly, kept him in harsh conditions, and denied him medical care. It is the Russian Government that is responsible for Navalny’s death while in detention. And now, in any other society – in a free, democratic society – we would see openness and transparency as his family seeks more information about their beloved son, husband, and father. But of course, in Russia, openness and transparency remain in short supply.We saw further evidence of Putin – the Putin’s regime’s brutality and disregard for human life in Avdiivka this weekend, where Ukrainian citizens bravely tried to hold off Putin’s illegal invasion while facing rationed ammunition due to dwindling supplies. Unfortunately, Russia made its first notable gains in months. It is now clear – more clear than ever what the stakes are in Ukraine. Without more support from Congress, Ukraine will not be able to replenish its air defenses and ammunition supplies to help protect itself from Russia’s aggression.As the White House announced this morning, at President Biden’s direction, we will be announcing a major sanctions package on Friday to hold Russia accountable for Navalny’s death in prison, and for its actions over the course of the vicious and brutal war they have waged in Ukraine for the past two years. We also renew our call for Congress to pass the national security supplemental funding bill, both to enable Ukraine and its people to defend against the ongoing invasion, and also to advance U.S. national security interests. It is critical that Congress act without further delay.With that, Matt.QUESTION: Thanks. Before we get into the – what you just talked about, I just want to get what you have to say about the detention of a U.S.-Russian dual national.MR MILLER: So with respect to this most recent detention, we are aware of the case. We are seeking consular assistance that has not yet been granted. I’d limit what more we can say because – with respect – because of privacy laws, as I’ve discussed many times from this podium.And I will just say generally, as I think you are aware, Russia – when it comes to dual citizens of the United States and Russia or dual citizenship of any other country and Russia, Russia does not recognize dual citizenship; considers them to be Russian citizens first and foremost, and so oftentimes we have a difficult time getting consular assistance. But we will pursue it in all matters where a U.S. citizen is detained.QUESTION: Okay. And then on the sanctions, why wait until Friday?MR MILLER: It takes time to put these sanctions packages together. There’s &#8212;QUESTION: Well, it’s been two years. I mean &#8212;MR MILLER: It has been two years.QUESTION: Well, it wasn’t a secret that the anniversary was coming up, so &#8212;MR MILLER: And if you have watched, you have seen us roll out a significant number of sanctions packages over that two years. So it’s not like we have delayed anything.QUESTION: Yes. No, no, no, I know. But &#8212;MR MILLER: But we are always looking to impose new sanctions as facts justify when we see sanctions evasion or activity moving to new areas, and to tighten our existing sanctions. And we’ll have more to say on Friday.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Or do you want to go to there? Could I ask – I’ll just ask you if you have any reaction on Evan Gershkovich’s, the latest pretrial detention, that he’s being kept in for another 30 months – excuse me – 30 days?MR MILLER: So with respect to Evan Gershkovich, Ambassador Tracy attended Evan’s hearing and spoke to the press soon after. You may have seen her comments. We’re disappointed but not surprised by the outcome of the hearing. As you’ve heard me say many times from this podium, the charges against him are baseless and Russia should immediately release Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, and the United States will continue to work towards securing both of their freedom.QUESTION: And just one other on Russia, Radio Free Europe. I don’t know if you saw the announcement on that saying it’s undesirable as an organization. Do you have any reaction on the Russian statement?MR MILLER: I don’t have any specific reaction other than to say that you have seen Vladimir Putin oppose the free dissemination of information, the free press inside Russia, and unfortunately that seems to be – seems not surprisingly but unfortunately not moved off that position.QUESTION: And may I follow up on that, Matt?MR MILLER: Let me go to Humeyra first.QUESTION: Matt, can you say at all if the administration is going to use this EO that you guys issued in December that threated basically penalties for financial institutions that help circumvent Russia’s sanctions?MR MILLER: You mean with respect to our announcements that are coming on Friday? I certainly don’t want to preview those.QUESTION: Yes, yes.MR MILLER: And I just – I’d just say in general &#8212;QUESTION: The announcements that are coming on Friday that you guys &#8212;MR MILLER: On Friday that you would like me &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; have made public on Monday.MR MILLER: That you would like – it’s Tuesday, actually.QUESTION: Oh, Tuesday. Long weekend.MR MILLER: But we made public that we’ll be taking that action. I don’t want to preview what they will be, but as we have said, they will be a major sanctions package.QUESTION: Right. Can I – can I just ask a little bit on Ukraine coming off the heels of Munich Security Conference, where a lot of European leaders and sort of various officials have tweeted their rather negative outlook about the supplemental and Congress and all that? And the Congress is on holiday until mid-March. What exactly is the administration planning how to convince the Speaker, whether you have a Plan B if the supplemental prospects look pretty bleak?MR MILLER: So we will continue to engage with Congress to make clear that it is in the national security interest of the United States to pass this supplemental funding request. You heard the Secretary speak about this last week. One of the points he made is that when it comes to our security assistance to Ukraine, 90 percent of that money is actually spent here in the United States. It benefits American manufacturing. It benefits American technological development.So we will continue to make that case, but I think it’s also the American people that make that case. If you look at the recent polls that came out, the American people overwhelmingly continue to support standing with Ukraine. And there were a number of members of Congress who were in Munich over the weekend and at the end of the last week attending the Munich Security Conference, and they heard directly from Ukrainian officials and from European officials how it is in the national security interest of Europe and also in our transatlantic national security interest. So we’ll continue to make the case, but I would say it’s not just the United States that will continue to make the case.And I will say, as you have heard the Secretary say, there is no other magic plan that we can unveil to support Ukraine. Ukraine will continue to defend itself even in the absence of a supplemental funding request passing Congress. That is without a doubt. You have seem them fight with bravery, you’ve seen them fight with skill, and we fully expect that they will continue to do so and they will continue to make gains against Russia as they have done in the Black Sea. But the situation will be very difficult. When you don’t have the ammunition you need on the front lines, you’re going to be vulnerable. And that’s what we saw over the weekend with the loss of Advika (ph) and – or Avdiivka. And so I think it’s the fact on the ground that will continue to make the case to members of Congress why they need to act, and we hope they will.QUESTION: Would you say that you’re – you still have some sort of confidence that it will pass?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make an assessment on what Congress will do. What we will say and continue to represent is why it is in the national interest of the United States for it to pass this bill. Members of Congress will have to make their own assessments, and it continues to be our belief that if you brought this funding up for an up-or-down vote it will pass the House, and that’s what needs to happen.QUESTION: Okay, I have some Gaza questions but I’ll let people ask questions.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, a single on Russia. Russian Supreme Court of Tatarstan today rejected Alsu Kurmasheva, RFE/RL reporter’s, request for house arrest. Can we do a quick reaction? And I want to follow up on that.MR MILLER: So we will continue to engage with the Russian Government. This is another one – another matter where they consider a – this to be a dual – well, not a dual citizen. It’s another matter of a dual citizen they – where they rejected that request. We’ll continue to engage with the Russian Government on this question, but I don’t want to speak to a specific court matter.QUESTION: I mean, yesterday marked four months of the arrest of – day before yesterday. Are you telling us that you are out of option here in terms of defending a U.S. citizen even on &#8212;MR MILLER: The safety and security of United States’ citizens overseas is always our first priority, and we always look to protect the safety and security of every United States citizen whether they be in Russia or whether they be in any other country.QUESTION: Is her designation – or designating her arrest as wrongful? Is it still on the table? Are you still considering it?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to make any kind of judgment about a wrongful detention determination. That is something that we always look at when it comes to American citizens who are detained overseas. It is a process. Sometimes it takes time. Sometimes new facts develop that we take under consideration. But I don’t want to put – I don’t want to speak to that any further from here.QUESTION: And going back to Shaun’s question, you &#8212;QUESTION: On this, Alex, RFE/RL too?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Russia has labeled Radio Free Europe today as an undesirable organization after designating it as a foreign agent. Do you have any &#8212;MR MILLER: I just – I commented on that a moment ago just to say we have seen Russia continue to crack down on a free press, continue to track down – crack down on transparency. It is quite clear that they do not want their people to have information about what the Russian regime does abroad, what the Russian regime does to its own people.QUESTION: And one more. Russia placed U.S. Senator &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t think Alex completely yielded the floor.QUESTION: Since you’re talking about Russia.MR MILLER: But go ahead, Michel. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Yeah. Russia placed U.S. Senator Lindsay Graham on Russia’s terrorist and extremist list. Any reaction to that?MR MILLER: So I – we’ve seen obviously the Russian Government designate a broad range of United States officials with various sanctions. I doubt there are any significant ramifications from that, partly because I doubt very much that Senator Graham – who I shouldn’t speak to, he can speak for himself – planned to travel to Russia anytime in the near future.QUESTION: RFE/RL again.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Is it fair for us to report back that you just said you will not take any action just for RFE/RL designation?MR MILLER: Alex, you can report back what I just said, not your implication of what I didn’t said – say. And what I said was that the safety and security of American citizens abroad is always our first priority. That is true with respect to this case. It is true with respect to every American overseas. And when it comes to the wrongful detention determination, that is a process that takes time here at the department where we assess the facts, some of which change over time, circumstances change over time, and make a determination that is consistent with the law.QUESTION: Please come back to me on the region?MR MILLER: Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Two questions on South Korea, Cuba, and North Korea. South Korea and Cuba established diplomatic relations last week. Cuba has been a brother country with North Korea for a long time. What is the U.S.’s view?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on a relationship between South Korea and Cuba. Obviously, we have always said that countries are free to pick their own – free to decide their own diplomatic engagements and their own diplomatic alignments.QUESTION: Okay, on North Korea. North Korea Kim Yo Jong announced that North Korea is open to talks with Japan if Japan does not interfere with North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and abduction issues. My question is: If Japan tolerates these and talked with North Korea, what impact do you think it will have on the U.S. and South Korea – North Korea – alliance?MR MILLER: I think that’s a pretty big “if.” I think I will wait to see how the Government of Japan responds to that question before I weigh in any further.Go ahead.QUESTION: You don’t have any &#8212;MR MILLER: I am aware of the North Korean offer.QUESTION: &#8212; any opinions or &#8212;MR MILLER: I have not see the Government of Japan respond, but it will be – continue to be our policy to achieve – that – for full denuclearization of the North Korean – or of the Korean Peninsula. That, of course, has not changed and will not change.QUESTION: Any intention – any intention of North Korea, why they suggest, talked with &#8212;MR MILLER: That is a good – that is a question for North Korea, not for me.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Sir?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. I have a question about a statement by the UN experts from the UN Human Rights Office yesterday, expressing alarm over allegations of human rights violations to which Palestinian women and girls in the West Bank, in Gaza is subjected to. They said – the UN experts said that Palestinian women and girls in detention have been subjected to multiple forms of sexual assault by male Israeli army officers. At least two of them were reportedly threatened with rape and sexual violence. Have you seen those allegations &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and do you have any reaction?MR MILLER: &#8212; I have seen the allegations. I cannot independently confirm the reports. I will say that we have been clear that civilians and detained individuals must be treated humanely and in accordance with international humanitarian law. We strongly urge Israel to thoroughly and transparently investigate credible allegations and ensure any accountability for abuses and violations, and that will continue to be our position.QUESTION: Have you heard back from your previous call for investigation into the killing of Hind Rajab?MR MILLER: The &#8212;QUESTION: Hind Rajab, killing of.MR MILLER: We have heard that those investigations are underway. We have – it’s our understanding that the investigations have not yet been concluded.QUESTION: Sorry, can I just – on the &#8212;QUESTION: Sir?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: When you said you had no independent confirmation of what the UN experts found &#8212;MR MILLER: I mean, the underlying &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, I get it. But did you ever get – did you ever have confirmation of what Hamas allegedly did to Israelis who were – women and girls who were &#8212;MR MILLER: There are Israeli medical experts who have testified to that, and that is something we consider credible, yes.QUESTION: So you have – you consider those instances to be confirmed, but not what the UN was talking about yesterday?MR MILLER: We have seen this report and we have called for an investigation to confirm whether the allegations are true or not.QUESTION: I get it. And who – and if you’re willing to take a word of an Israeli – and I’m not saying you shouldn’t – but if you’re willing to take the word of Israeli medical experts on what happened to the people who were abducted on October 7th, whose word are you willing to take – if not the UN, who &#8212;MR MILLER: A full, independent, credible investigation &#8212;QUESTION: Would it have to be – would it have to be an Israeli medical expert?MR MILLER: We are calling for that – and, no, of course it would not have to be an Israeli medical expert. A credible medical expert, a credible &#8212;QUESTION: Or a Palestinian &#8212;MR MILLER: A credible – I don&#8217;t want to prescribe who it would be – a credible medical expert that can testify to it would be something we would look at, of course. It would not have to be &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you would look at, but you’d take – you’ve taken &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m not going to – because that’s one where we have seen the outcome of the investigation and are able to opine on it. I’m not going to opine on a matter that hasn’t been conducted.QUESTION: Well, yeah, but you didn’t do your own independent investigation into what I think is pretty much well accepted by everybody that there were instances of rape and sexual assault on October 7th, so &#8212;MR MILLER: And the circumstances very much matter, and in this – in this &#8212;QUESTION: I completely understand that, but I’m just &#8212;MR MILLER: It is a well – it is a well – hold on. It is a well-accepted fact. With respect to this &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, no, no. It might be a well-accepted fact &#8212;MR MILLER: No, this – hold on. No, let me – just let me finish. It – just &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; but you’re saying that – but you’re saying that you have what you consider to be independent confirmation that those &#8212;MR MILLER: Let &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; attacks, those assaults, happened. And in this case &#8212; sMR MILLER: Independent confirmation – it is a well-accepted fact because the investigations produced credible evidence that not just the United States accepted but countries &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: No, no, let me finish – countries around the world accepted. With respect to these new allegations, we want to see an investigation, and we will, of course, look at the investigation, make our judgements when that investigation is concluded.QUESTION: Okay. So it’s just too early for you?MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Could I stay in the Middle East?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Matthew, sir?QUESTION: Just – well, a couple things, but of course the Secretary’s on his way to Brasilia. I’m sure you saw the comments by Lula, by President Lula, in Ethiopia this past weekend. Israel’s quite upset with him likening what’s happening there to the Holocaust. Do you have any comment on – both on – both do you have any comment on what Lula said, and do you think the Secretary will raise this with him tomorrow?MR MILLER: So obviously we disagree with those comments. We have been quite clear that we do not believe that genocide has occurred in Gaza. We want to see the conflict ended as soon as practical. We want to see humanitarian assistance increased in a sustained manner to innocent civilians in Gaza. But we do not agree with those comments.QUESTION: And does – do you expect the Secretary to raise this? Will this affect relations &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m going to follow my general rule and never preview what the Secretary plans to raise before he has a chance to do so directly with officials, but we engage with Brazil on a number of issues, and I don’t expect that to change.QUESTION: And just – can we stay on the Middle East? Obviously there was the veto this morning at the Security Council. I know Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield spoke about this at length, but in terms of U.S. engagement with the region, how do you think this affects – I mean, do you think that – a number of Arab states in particular have been calling for a ceasefire. How does this take U.S. diplomacy &#8212;MR MILLER: So look, when it comes to an immediate ceasefire, this has been a place where we’ve had a disagreement with a number of countries in the region for some time now. I don’t think that’s anything that’s new. But that has not stopped us from being able to engage constructively about how to bring this conflict to an end – and not just an end, but a durable end, in a way that ensures that the violence that we saw on October 7th and the death and destruction that has plagued this region for so long is not continued, and that we can finally find a durable peace agreement.And so despite our differences of opinion about the – this UN resolution, we continue to engage with Arab countries about finding a way forward and working on some of the issues that we know we will have to deal with when it comes to establishing long-term peace and security in the region.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me make sure Shaun’s done before I go &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, go ahead.MR MILLER: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Just on Gaza, the mention of temporary ceasefire, the word “ceasefire” in the UN resolution, is this change in wording comes after President Biden used this last week?MR MILLER: “Temporary,” obviously, does. The President made that point last week, and now you’ve seen the draft resolution that we’re working on. But this has been a matter that we have been pursuing for some time, trying to get a temporary ceasefire in exchange for a release of hostages, and something we think is critical to try to achieve and we’ll continue to focus on.QUESTION: Right. Do you think – the administration has obviously been under pressure domestically on this and internationally as well. Do you think that the change in President’s wording but the fact that now it’s in draft resolution has anything to do with those pressures that it’s facing domestically?MR MILLER: No, I think it has to do with how we are responding to the situation on the ground and the situation in the region. We are trying to achieve a temporary ceasefire – or you can call it a pause; you can call whichever name you prefer – to secure the release of hostages. We worked on achieving a humanitarian pause back last year, were successful in doing it. It didn’t go as long as we wanted it to. We got some hostages out; we didn’t get all of them out. We are back now trying to get a longer pause, a longer temporary ceasefire, and secure the release not just to some of the hostages but all of the hostages.And I would say we have made quite clear that we want to see not just a temporary ceasefire, but ultimately an enduring end to the hostilities, and one that ensures that Palestinian civilians are protected, that we get humanitarian assistance to them, and that ultimately the attacks of October 7th cannot be repeated.And that’s one of the reasons why you’ve seen us oppose the resolutions at the UN, not just today but in the past, because we think just an unconditional ceasefire only benefits Hamas, that it would – that Hamas is not going to abide by a full temporary ceasefire. They’re going to continue to hold hostages; they’re going to continue to launch attacks against Israel. They may not do it for a week or so, but they have not forsworn their aims to destroy the State of Israel. And so we’ve oppose that policy, and we think it’s not one that’s effective.We think a negotiated agreement that would get a temporary pause, a temporary ceasefire, is ultimately not just the way to release the hostages and alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people but to give us a pathway to a more enduring end to hostilities.QUESTION: Right. And you’d like to achieve that pause before Ramadan starts?MR MILLER: We would like to have achieved that pause yesterday.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: We would like to achieve it today or tomorrow.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: We want to achieve it as soon as possible.QUESTION: Sure. But how concerned are you that the fighting will continue into Ramadan? Are you doing anything specific about that?MR MILLER: I don’t want to get ahead of the situation, because we are right now in conversations and in negotiations to try to achieve a humanitarian pause. We are still over two weeks away from Ramadan. We would like to get that humanitarian pause before Ramadan begins. We’d like to get it before the end of the week, as I said. We’d like to get it as soon as possible. So that’s what we’re going to continue to try to do.At the same time, we have made clear that Israel should not launch a full military campaign in Rafah unless it has a humanitarian plan that is both credible and realistic, and one that they can execute.QUESTION: Have you seen any indications of that humanitarian plan? And what is the United States prepared to do if they go ahead anyway?MR MILLER: One has not been presented to us yet. I’ve seen reports that one is being developed and will be presented to the Government of Israel this week. I will let them speak, of course, to that. But one has not been presented to the United States, so I, of course, can’t speak to it, and I wouldn’t want to deal with any kind of hypothetical situation down the road.QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Go – Shannon, go ahead.QUESTION: While in Munich, the Secretary raised Russia’s pursuit of an anti-satellite capability in meetings with his Chinese and Indian counterparts. Can you say this is the first time the Secretary has raised such meetings with other countries and whether he hopes to achieve anything by raising the topic with China and India specifically?MR MILLER: So I will say that on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference he did raise Russia’s pursuit of an anti-satellite technology with our allies and partners, but not just our allies and partners – with other countries as well – because as the Secretary made clear, he thinks it’s an issue that should be of concern, not just to the United States but to other countries in the world. And I won’t speak to the details of those diplomatic engagements, but I would just say generally that when you have an issue like this that we think should be of broad concern, not just to the United States but other countries, we, of course, would fully expect that they would use their diplomatic engagements to, as we have done, urge that the pursuit of such a technology be abandoned.QUESTION: Can you say those other countries – did they express concern about the capability as well?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to speak to private diplomatic engagements.QUESTION: Matthew, sir?MR MILLER: Okay. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Sir, a senior Pakistani official admits to helping rig the vote. He claimed that he changed the election results with a margin of 70,000 votes in favor of Nawaz Sharif, and that those seats were actually won by Imran Khan’s party candidates. What are your views? You already talk about the allegations of rigging and fraud. What are your views on this?MR MILLER: So I saw that report. Any claims of interference or fraud should be fully and transparently investigated – excuse me – in accordance with Pakistan’s own laws and procedures. And that, of course, includes this claim as well.QUESTION: Sir, a number of Pakistani politicians and media analysts in Pakistan have termed these elections most controversial, and asking political leadership to respect Imran Khan’s party’s mandate as the largest group. Would you also like to see the political leadership in Pakistan to respect the PTI’s candidate – mandate?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to get – I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to cut you off.QUESTION: Sorry.MR MILLER: What was the last piece?QUESTION: I’m – are you also, like, asking the political leadership in Pakistan to respect the PTI’s mandate?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to get into an internal Pakistani matter, which I very much believe that the formation of a new government is. But – so that’s a matter that I will leave to Pakistan. But as I said, when it comes to the – any claims of interference or allegations of irregularities, we want to see those fully investigated.QUESTION: Can I just follow up?QUESTION: Different topic?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: There was &#8212;QUESTION: Can I – do you mind if I just follow up very briefly on something?QUESTION: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just on &#8212;MR MILLER: You guys are so nice to each other. Like, all the – (laughter) – you’re just tolerating all these interruptions today.QUESTION: Always cordial.MR MILLER: Huh?QUESTION: Always trying to be. Can I just follow up on Pakistan, though? In relation to the &#8212;MR MILLER: He’s going to be mad if I don’t come back to him now. (Laughter.)QUESTION: I’ll get two.MR MILLER: There you go.QUESTION: X, formerly known as Twitter, has been disrupted in Pakistan in recent days. There have been a number of calls from the Hill in particular for the State Department to raise this. Has it been raised? Do you have a stance on this?MR MILLER: I don’t have any updates on whether it’s something that’s been raised, but we always want to see full internet freedom around the world, and that includes the availability of platforms that people use to communicate with each other.QUESTION: And specifically in Pakistan, is it of concern in light of these allegations about the election?MR MILLER: So I’ll just say as a general matter that we want that to – we want internet platforms to – I don’t know why I keep saying “internat” today, I don’t know where that came from – internet platforms to be available to people in Pakistan and around the world. And I don’t have anything further than that.Nick, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. There have been some reports over the weekend that the State Inspector General opened an investigation into Rob Malley and is being put on leave. Do you have anything you can add to that?MR MILLER: So I won’t speak on behalf of the inspector general. As you know, they operate independently and they should be the ones to decide whether to confirm any investigation or not confirm an investigation. I will say that when it comes to inspector general investigations, we always comply with those fully and will continue to do so.QUESTION: And then separately, there’s been some criticism of a cable that the Secretary sent a few weeks ago on gender identity to staff, urging staff to use gender-neutral language whenever possible, and avoid terms like “manpower” and “ladies and gentlemen.” Why do you think a memo like that was needed?MR MILLER: So I will say first of all, when it comes to these types of cables, they all come out with the Secretary’s signature on it – that tends to be standard department practice, has been for years. It doesn’t mean that it’s necessarily a memo from the Secretary himself. I would say if you look at that memo, as I have done, it’s a standard government practice to try to encourage just – people just to be respectful of others and use the terms that – with which others are comfortable, and talk to people the way that they would like to be addressed, and nothing more than that.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Actually, let me go back. Alex, I need – it’s too late to come back to you.QUESTION: Please come back to me, yeah.MR MILLER: You’re right in front, so sometimes I come back, but there are people in the back that need to &#8212;QUESTION: So you’re saying that it is not an order?MR MILLER: It is a – I would like to look at the memo again before – but my understanding is it was a best-practices piece.QUESTION: Okay. Well, you remember there was a little bit of a kerfuffle some time ago – maybe before you were here – when the email system &#8212;MR MILLER: When people’s pronouns were changed for them &#8212;QUESTION: Yes.MR MILLER: &#8212; by mistake. I do remember that.QUESTION: Exactly.MR MILLER: No, yeah. No, this was just encouraging people to be respectful and treat people with – treat people with respect, and address them with the terms that they feel comfortable with.QUESTION: Okay. Well, I mean, does the Secretary or anyone else in the building have an issue with the phrase “ladies and gentlemen?”MR MILLER: I do not have &#8212;QUESTION: Not you personally.MR MILLER: I do – hold on – I do not have any problem with the term “ladies and gentlemen,” and I feel fully confident saying the Secretary does not either.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Bangladesh regime people involvement in corruption is an open secret, according to a Bloomberg detailed report yesterday. Saifuzzaman Chowdhury, one of the cabinet ministers, is alleged to have built an empire in the UK and U.S. valued at 200 million pounds sterling, equivalent to 1 percent of the country’s foreign reserve. This is just one case among many. How is the U.S. addressing this matter to hold the government accountable and combat corruption globally?MR MILLER: We are aware of these reports and encourage the Government of Bangladesh to ensure that all elected officials comply with the country’s laws and financial regulations.QUESTION: Matt, can I follow up (inaudible)?MR MILLER: Go, go, go, go, go. No, no. Note that the best way to not get called on is to shout out a question while I’m calling on other people. Go ahead. I will come across to this side of the room in a minute.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. In light of world pressure on Israel to accept a Palestinian state dividing their land with Hamas and Palestinian Authority terrorist organizations, and for Israel not to enter Rafah in Gaza to destroy Hamas there, what is the State Department’s response to Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli cabinet, as well as the entire Jewish population, who are defending their right to live free from terrorism? And a follow-up.MR MILLER: We, of course, agree with Israel’s right to live free from terrorism. If you’ve looked at the repeated comments that Secretary Blinken has made – not just here in the United States, but in Israel itself on his five trips to the region – he has made clear that he supports Israel’s right to ensure that October 7th can never happen again. And more importantly, he is trying to achieve a resolution of this conflict that will ensure Israel has long-term peace and long-term security, including security, of course, from terrorism.QUESTION: Are you going to be wanting to prevent Israel from entering Rafah to take out Hamas there?MR MILLER: What we have said is we do not support an – a full-scale military campaign in Rafah that does not account for the more than 1 million Palestinians who are currently there – people who have nothing to do with Hamas, innocent civilians; men, women, children, the elderly, who in many cases have fled to Rafah from their homes; in some cases, have fled more than once – have fled two or three times to escape the war, the conflict that is raging in Gaza.So we fully support Israel’s right to take a military campaign to Hamas and ensure that the attacks of October 7th cannot be repeated, as I said, but we also want to see civilians properly accounted for, and right now we don’t believe that there is a way to conduct a military campaign in Rafah without moving some of those civilians and properly accounting for their humanitarian needs.QUESTION: What are the reasons of the State Department for not demanding Hamas immediately release all remaining hostages unconditionally?MR MILLER: I think you’ve missed dozens and dozens of statements from the State Department going back to October 7th – well, it’s actually October 8th by the time that we were aware that hostages should be released, and was the first time the Secretary called for the immediate release of hostages. And he has continued to make that clear; as have I, as has the President. We have demanded time and time again that hostages be released immediately and unconditionally.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. I just wanted to circle back to the verbiage used in the draft – UN draft today. I mean, how important is it that you used the word ceasefire as opposed to an extended pause, which is what you’d been using prior?MR MILLER: I will let other people make those sorts of assessments. From a policy perspective, we want to achieve a temporary stop in fighting. You can call that a ceasefire. You can call that a pause. Ultimately, we want to see the fighting stop so hostages can get out, hostages can be released, and humanitarian assistance can get in.But I should make clear the only kind of temporary ceasefire that is going to achieve a release of hostages is one that’s negotiated. Just calling for a temporary ceasefire is not going to – that Hamas has not agreed to is not going to do anything to get the hostages out, which is why we continue to pursue diplomacy with Israel and with the governments of Egypt and Qatar to try to achieve a temporary ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages. We think that is by far the most productive way forward. It is what achieved a release of more than a hundred hostages last year and what we think should be the productive path for moving forward now.QUESTION: A question about Afghanistan.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: As you know, the Taliban refused to attend a UN-sponsored conference in Doha that’s concluded yesterday. They didn’t send any delegation, and also they rejected the appointment of a special envoy by UN in Afghanistan. Does the United States still hope to engage with Taliban by considering all of that?MR MILLER: Let me just tell – speak to what we were trying to engage – or what we were trying to achieve by attending this conference. And it’s not surprising that the Taliban, of course, has different objectives. We were trying to achieve a number of things: One, to make clear that Afghanistan should not be a hotbed for terrorist activities that impact other countries; two, a vision for Afghanistan with inclusive institutions in which its diverse groups all feel represented in a state that is truly inclusive; and number three, a concern about the respect of human rights, and in particular the rights of women and girls.So that’s what we’re going to continue to pursue. I shouldn’t – I can’t say I’m incredibly surprised that the Taliban declined the invitation to participate in a meeting with a broad representation from the international community. But I will say, as you’ve heard us say before, that the Taliban are not the only Afghans who have a stake in the future of Afghanistan. We will continue to support giving all Afghans, including, of course, women and girls, a voice in shaping their country’s future.QUESTION: And the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian envoy into the peace meeting, they refused to meet with the Afghan civil society because they were not greeted by the Taliban regime. Do you support this idea, and what’s your take on that?MR MILLER: So I won’t – I won’t speak to the actions of another country, but I will make clear we always find engagement with civil society to be productive. We try to take actions through our diplomacy to empower civil society, and we would certainly encourage every country in the world to pursue that path.Let me &#8212;QUESTION: Follow-up?MR MILLER: Let me go back to – I promised you I’d come to you a minute ago. Go ahead.QUESTION: Me?MR MILLER: Yeah. Well, now I call on you &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; you don’t want a question, after like jumping in for other people – during other people’s questions? (Laughter.)QUESTION: No, I do. Thank you. Thank you, Matt. I’ll be very respectful. I – before I ask you a question, I have to let you know that Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu was speaking at the Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., last week. He said that the situation in Burma was not getting better, and what worried him was that the refugee crisis and security problem it was creating for Bangladesh and potentially for India could get deeper in coming days. Quote, “It is something we have to watch out for and enable our partners in the region – in this case Bangladesh and India – to cope with those stresses without it boiling over the instability in their countries as well,” over – I mean cross-border instability. What is your opinion on that? Thank you.MR MILLER: I think it was a well-crafted, well-delivered speech, and I don’t have anything to add to it. (Laughter.)Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Wow, going out on a limb there. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Thank you, Matt.Go ahead.QUESTION: Who?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah, thanks. I have two questions. The Houthis have escalated their attacks on ships in the Red Sea during the weekend. One of the attacks targeted or damaged a ship and forced its crew to abandon it. How do you view this escalation and what or how the U.S. will react?MR MILLER: So obviously we continue to condemn the reported reckless and indiscriminate attacks on civilian cargo ships by the Houthis, not just those that were reported to have occurred over the weekend but all those that have been occurring for the past number of weeks. But I just want to mention something specific about one of these attacks this weekend – the attack on the Sea Champion. That ship was bringing corn and other food supplies to the Yemeni people in Aden. These were supplies for the Yemeni people, have nothing to do with Israel, have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza. That of course is what the Houthis have claimed their attacks on civilian ships are trying to impact.This was a reckless attack on a ship delivering humanitarian assistance to the Yemeni people, and I think it was another sign that the Houthis continue to demonstrate disregard not just for international shipping, not just for supplies that are going to benefit civilians all around the world – in many cases far from the region, but ultimately for their own people. It was a dangerous attack, and the fact that they’re launching these just kind of wanton, indiscriminate attacks – even when they hurt their own people and hurt the provision of supplies to their own people – shows just how reckless their actions have been.QUESTION: And on Lebanon, how do you view the escalation of military operations between Israel and Hizballah? Will the U.S. participate in two conferences that will be held in France and Rome to help increase the Lebanese army capabilities to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1701?MR MILLER: So we continue to be concerned about the risk of escalation and continue to be concerned about the risk of the conflict widening, and we continue to work to achieve a diplomatic path forward that resolves the legitimate concerns of the Government of Israel and the legitimate concerns of Israeli people who don’t want to move back to the north because they feel that their houses continue to be threatened, their communities continue to be threatened by attacks from Hizballah. So we’re continuing to pursue that diplomatic resolution.As it pertains to these two conferences – or I think maybe in one of the cases, potential conferences – I don’t have anything to add about possible U.S. participation.Let me go back here.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. I have two questions, one about the irregularities in Pakistan election. From the last Monday briefing you have mentioned that United States raised privately and publicly the irregularities matter with Pakistani officials, but ministry of foreign affairs in Islamabad just in last briefing said they are not aware of any bilateral messaging that has taken place post-elections. Meanwhile, what we observed are U.S. ambassador in Pakistan, just after two days after election, held a meeting with former foreign minister of Pakistan. So do United States directed speaking in Pakistan to have engagements with the officials or the politicians?Secondly, I want to ask regarding the efforts for United States for the Israel-Saudi normalization.MR MILLER: Let me – let me – before we get in – let me ask – let me answer the question you asked, which is I’m not going to talk to private diplomatic engagements, but we have made clear that we want to see any claims of – any – any irregularities or claimed irregularities fully investigated.Go ahead with the second one.QUESTION: So the October 7th is considered as big damage for diplomatic efforts by U.S. in Saudi-Israeli normalization process, so MBS – the crown prince – reminded two-state solution and he also looking for a timeline from U.S. So Netanyahu’s not, like, bothering this two-state solution, this condition, so what is the time frame after the post-Gaza war, what really the damage repair by the U.S. to repair this, as number of Arab nations have reservations on this. So &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to any timetable, but I will say – as, again, you have heard the Secretary say – we continue to work on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, which we believe doesn’t just benefit the Palestinian people but would benefit the Israeli people and would benefit the entire region. That is something we have heard from a number of Arab partners in the region, including, of course, the Government of Saudi Arabia. And one of the things that the Secretary discussed directly with the crown prince and heard directly from the crown prince was that the – Saudi Arabia was not prepared to pursue normalization or was not prepared to agree to normalization, I should say, without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.Go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just raise the extradition hearing of Julian Assange, which has taken place at the high court in London today, and his lawyers have repeated an allegation saying that there is evidence of – that a plan was discussed to either kill or kidnap Assange while he was in the Ecuadoran embassy in London. Mark Summers KC, Assange’s lawyer, is saying senior CIA officials requested plans; the president himself – that’s President Trump – requested on being provided with options on how to do it and sketches were drawn up. Is there any comment?MR MILLER: No, I – I’m not going to comment on an ongoing extradition matter.QUESTION: Can I just ask a follow-up to that, please?QUESTION: Well &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead, Matt. Go ahead.QUESTION: Well – and I mean, I want to go back to what you were talking about a bit earlier, and that is just – the question is whether the administration regards Julian Assange as a journalist.MR MILLER: So with respect to that question, I think I should decline to comment in detail because, as I said, it is an ongoing extradition matter and it’s an ongoing legal matter. This is a case which is under indictment. But I will just say generally that I have never heard a journalist say that, as a legitimate journalistic practice, to help a source hack into a government computer to steal information. It’s not a legitimate journalistic activity to hack into anything to steal government information, so I think I will leave it at that.QUESTION: Well, okay. Well, that suggests, then, that you don’t. I’m – and I want to specifically avoid getting into what the Justice Department has to say about this case. I want to talk about what the State Department believes about his status, Assange’s status, because you guys are self-proclaimed champions of independent, free press. You are all the time saying journalism is not a crime and this kind of thing. So if you believe that what Julian Assange has been doing or was – or did is journalism, I don’t see how you can – I don’t see how that squares with &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: And if you don’t, are you saying, from your comment just now, that you don’t regard him as a journalist, because he accepted or allowed or helped someone hack into computers? Is that – is &#8212;MR MILLER: So again, I’m at a limit to what I can say about an ongoing legal matter that is under indictment. I remember from my days as the Department of Justice spokesperson that it was &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, exactly, which I think has probably colored your personal – your personal reaction to it.MR MILLER: Let me just – let me – no, let me just finish this answer, that it’s not appropriate for government officials to speak at length about matters that remain under indictment. We support an independent, free press in the United States; we support an independent, free press around the world. We feel that an independent, free press not just benefits the people of the United States, it benefits those of us in government by making us work harder, by making us be ready to explain what we’re doing, by making us think through the decisions that we are making and making sure that they fully represent the best interests of the American people. And we think that same process holds true everywhere in the world, and that’s why you see dictators and autocrats and others crack down on independent, free press.At the same time, helping someone hack into – which is a crime; hacking is a crime, right – helping someone hack into a government network or a private network, for that regard, is not something I think any journalist considers to be a legitimate journalism activity.QUESTION: Okay. Do you not think then that what was published as a result of hacks into the government database, especially as it relates to State Department cables, which are – many, many thousands of them, and that were then published by an independent, free press – you don’t see a problem here with the &#8212;MR MILLER: I think &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; prosecution or attempted prosecution, the indictment, and your stated view that you think that this kind of activity should be protected?MR MILLER: Again, if you look at the conduct that is alleged in the indictment, when it comes to helping someone hack into a government network, that is a very different type of activity.QUESTION: So – but publishing it is not &#8212;MR MILLER: I am not going to get into the ongoing details of what is a – probably gone too far already in discussing this case – the ongoing detail – the details of what is very much a live, ongoing litigation matter.QUESTION: Well, do you not think the publication of these documents, when they came out, back – the original ones, the ones that Chelsea Manning provided to WikiLeaks, and when they were published by The New York Times and El País and all the – and others, do you not think that that helped informed public discussion? Do you not think that those – that that was useful?MR MILLER: So I – let me say this, because I’m not going to speak to that specific case, for the reasons I just articulated. But I will say that two things can often be true when it comes to the publication of classified government documents. It is true that at times the publication of a classified government document, well, will inform the public, and sometimes it will uncover wrongdoing. It’s also true that sometimes the publication of classified government documents serves no underlying purpose and can jeopardize sources and methods that the government uses to keep the American public safe. So it is a very difficult situation. It is a – I think one of the trickiest questions the government faces in navigating this area. But I can tell you that we try to do it as responsibly as we can.All right. Over here. And then &#8212;QUESTION: Good to see you, Matt.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: And thank you so much for taking. I have two questions, if you will allow. First, I’d like to talk about the anniversary of the war in Ukraine that is coming up. And as you rightly know at the very start of the war African countries – there was sort of an outright split, right, some ambivalence in the support to Ukraine. So I’m seeking your assessment on U.S. efforts – I’m not saying that you – we’ve had this conversation and narrative about is or is the U.S. not trying to ask African countries to pick a side. That’s not what my question is. My question is to ask, while we recognize that garnering international support for Ukraine sovereignty and territorial integrity is important, what over the two years has been your efforts, the U.S., in garnering international support in terms of African countries?And then my second question is on Guinea.MR MILLER: Let me take that one first. So I will say that we have engaged in countries all over the world – not just in Africa, but of course across the world – to urge them to support Ukraine and support its efforts to defend itself from Russian aggression. We think when you see any country’s sovereign borders violated, see its – control of its territory violated, that it threatens all countries around the world. Because it is ultimately the UN Charter that upholds the territorial integrity and sovereignty of every country in the world.And I will just say we – not just because of our efforts, although they have helped, but because I think we’ve seen countries in the world outraged by Russia’s activities – we have seen a number of UN resolutions, including ones that were joined by dozens of African countries, in support of holding those – of upholding those principles of the UN Charter, of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and ultimately finding a comprehensive, just, and durable peace that recognizes those principles.QUESTION: Sure. And then on Guinea, if I may – and this will be my last question to you, Matt – since yesterday, as you may already know, there is no leadership in Guinea. I think there is currently maybe some low-level leadership. They dissolved the government. And so while I appreciate that you will not comment on the internal affairs of another country, I am asking you to see if you can comment on your own efforts and how you might be engaging any stakeholders in Guinea or in that part of the world, for that matter, or any regional organization besides ECOWAS, which may seem more weakened. Are there any other countries that you may be engaging – Angola, South Africa, Kenya – in your efforts in this regard?MR MILLER: Sure. So we are closely monitoring developments in Guinea. We encourage the transition authorities to work with ECOWAS. It’s something we’ve discussed with a number of ECOWAS states and – to continue positive momentum by holding a constitutional referendum and elections in order to complete democratic governance. We remain concerned about media restrictions placed on the Guinean people and calls on the – and call on the transition authorities to ensure that freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression are fully respected, including from members of the press. And we are engaging with a number of countries in the region around those goals.QUESTION: Can I just do one more on Africa?MR MILLER: Yeah. Yeah, one more and then – Humeyra, did you have one?QUESTION: Sorry.MR MILLER: We’ll do that.QUESTION: But just one more on Africa. Rwanda-DRC – you issued a statement on Saturday, I believe it was, on the – so the DRC is alleging Rwandan involvement in the drone attack in – on the airport. Besides the statement, has there been any response from Rwanda? Are you confident that there’s some progress in there? How do you see things going &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any update on the situation since we released that statement over the weekend.QUESTION: But is it – do you find the DRC allegations credible for Rwandan involvement in this?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything to add beyond what we said over the weekend.Humeyra, and then we’ll finish up.QUESTION: Matt, there were some incidents off the coast of Taiwan in the past couple of days. China’s coast guard boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat, and on Tuesday Taiwan drove away a Chinese coast guard boat that entered its waters. Are you guys worried about like any escalating tensions? Have you seen that?MR MILLER: Yeah, we are closely monitoring Beijing’s actions. We continue to urge restraint and no unilateral change to the status quo, which has preserved peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region for decades. We urge the PRC to engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan to reduce the risk of miscalculation. And we share with other countries, not just in the region but around the world, an abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader Indo-Pacific region, which impact global security and prosperity.And with that, we’ll wrap for today.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:32 p.m.)# # #access ↑access ↑						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Bangladesh																								Brazil																								China																								Cuba																								Guinea																								Israel																								Lebanon																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								South Korea																								Ukraine																								Yemen