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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2771

K E N N E TH M ARS HAL L, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C I T Y OF C H I C A G O

, et al. , Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 1: 12 -cv-02 59 1 — Thomas M. Durki n, Judg e.
A RGU E D J UN E 5, 2014

— D E C I D E D A UGUST 11, 2014

Before W OOD, Chief Judge, and E A S T E R B R OO K a nd K AN N E, Circ uit Judges. K AN N E, Cir cui t Judge. On April 8, 2010, Chi cago poli ce o ff ice r s executin g a search w arr ant on a south si de resi dence di scov ered a shotgun in one of the bedroo ms. Earlier , plainti ff Kenneth Mar shall, who w as presen t in the resi dence, had suggested t hat the bedroo m w as hi s. Mar shall i s a convic ted felon. Accordingly

, the offi cers placed hi m under arr est and2 No. 13-2771

too k hi m into cus tody on the theor y that he constructi v ely possess ed a fi rear m whi le i t w as unlaw ful for hi m to do so. In thi s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 acti on, Mar shall sued the Ci ty of Chi cago and the law enforcement offi cers inv olv ed in hi s arr est for d a ma g e s on the theor y that the arr est w as not supp or ted by probable caus e. The matter proceeded to tr i al, and a jury ret urned a v erdic t in fav or of the defendants. Marshall appeals, challen gin g tw o aspects of the jury selecti on process. First, Mar shall arg ues that the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on by denying hi s motion to excuse a prospectiv e juro r for caus e on the gr ounds that she held a prior beli ef concerning the p o ss e ssi on of fi rear ms by
co nv ict ed felons, whi ch Mar shall beli ev ed made her unfi t to
serv e. Second, Mar shall arg ues that the di stric t court err ed by refusing to agr ee to an ad hoc alter ation of the parti es’ agr eedupon jury selecti on procedures for the expr ess purpose of ensuring th at the petit jury w ould inclu de juro rs of a certain
race. B oth of Mar shall’s arg uments are meritless, and w e affi rm the j udgment of the dis tr i ct court. I Mar shall’s fi rst arg umen t concerns the di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to excuse a prospectiv e juro r for caus e. A fai r tr i a l r e quir es an i mpartial tr i al of fact: a jury capabl e and wi lling to deci de the case solely on the evidenc e before i t. McD on ou gh Power Equipmen t, Inc. v
. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984). Accordingly , the voir dire process ai ms to w eed out juro rs who ho ld per sonal bias es so stro ng that their a bil i ty to act as a neutral arbi t e r is compromi sed. Id

. If a prospectiv e juro r’s responses to voir dire questi oni ng rev eal a bi as soNo. 13-2771 3

stro ngly as to convince the j udge that t he juro r cannot r ender i mpartial jury service, the judge should di smi ss the juro r for
caus e. U n i te d States v
. Brodnicki, 516 F .3d 570, 574 (7th Ci r
. 2008). That sai d, prospectiv e juro r s reg ularly come to voir dire carry ing a host of preconceptions about what the law does and does not require. The source s fo r these beli efs are legion, ranging from personal exper i ence, or the anecdotal exper i ence of fri ends, to popular mus i c and Law a nd O rder rer uns

. 1 Practi cally speaking, a p reconception about the law cannot
w arr ant per se di squali fi cat io n. If i t di d, we w ould be hard pressed to fi nd adequate num bers of quali fi ed juro rs. T o accoun t for that reality whi le also ensuring the p ro tection of each li tigant’s consti tutional rights, w e have endorsed a tw o-step process to assi st di st r ict judges in deter mining whi ch prior beli efs w arr ant for -cause di smi ssal and wh ich do not. First, the court mus t deter mine whether a prospectiv e jur or mani fests a prior b eli ef that i s both material and “ c onte s ta

b l e, ” m e anin g a rat i onal person could questi on i ts
accu racy

. Thompson v

. Altheimer & Gray , 248 F .3d 621, 627 (7th Ci r
. 2001). If a prior beli ef i s not material to the i ssu es the juro r wi ll be a sk e d to deci de, then the exis tence of that beli ef prej udi ces nei ther par ty and t he juro r need not be e xcused. If
a p ri or b e l i e f i s unc ontestable—again, meaning un qu e s ti on ab ly corr ect—then ther e si mply i s no “bi as.”

See, e. g
. , J AY Z, 99 Problems , on T HE B LA CK A LB UM (Roc- A-Fe l l a Recor ds 1 20 03 ), fo r on e rapper-tur ned-mo gul’s wid el y di sseminated take on the Fourth A mendment.4 No. 13-2771
Where a prior beli ef i s both material and contest able, how ev er , the court mus t proceed to the second step in the analysi s and deter mine whether the juro r i s capabl e of
sus pending that beli ef fo r the dur a t io n of the tr i al. Thompson , 248 F .3d at 627. Thi s is usu ally accompli shed b y questi on and
answer

. The judge l o oks for an “unw av ering affi rmation of i mpartiali ty

,” id

. (quoting United S tat es v
. Garcia , 936 F .2d 648, 653 (2d Ci r
. 1991)), wi thout whi ch the juro r should be excused. The requirement is sat i sfi ed by a juro r’s affi rmation, for example, that she can set asid e a ny opin i on she mi ght hold, relinqu i sh her prior beli efs, or lay a sid e her bi ases or her prej udi ci al personal exper i ences. United States v
. Allen , 605 F .3d 461, 464–65 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (internal ci tations o mit ted). Ultim ately

, the deci sio n whether to excuse a juro r for caus e rests fi rmly wi thin the di screti on of the di stric t j udge, and we wi ll rev erse only where w e find an abus e of such. Id

. at 464; see also Aldridge v
. Forest River , Inc. , 635 F .3d 870, 875 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (abu se of di screti on occurs only where “no reasonable person
w ould agre e wi th the t rial c ourt ’s ruling.”). Judge Durkin di d not abu se hi s di screti on, here. That i s so for tw o reasons. First, the prospectiv e juro r’s alleged b i as w as i mmater ia l

. S econd, ev en i f i t w as material, the prospectiv e j ur or repeat edly gav e unequi v ocal assu rances that she co ul d set asi de her personal beli efs and perfor m her duti es fai rly and i mpartially wi thin the confines of thi s cas e. The prospe c tive ju ro r’ s a l l e ge d bi as w as i mmaterial becau se i t had no b earing on the i ssu es to be tr i ed. There i s no need to repr oduce the entirety of the relev ant exchange betw een the court and the prospectiv e juro r in thi s opini on; i t suffi ces to sayNo. 13-2771 5
the prospectiv e juro r w as clearly under the i mpressi on that her son’s parole condi tions prohibi ted any person from possess ing a fi rear m in the house. But that i s o ff- poin t. Thi s case w as not about Mar shall’s parole condi t io ns. Thi s case w as about constructi v e possess i on. The offi cers arr ested Mar shall, a convic ted felon, becaus e they beli ev ed he w as in constructiv e possess i on of a fi rear m found in the resid ence—wh i ch w ould be a felony reg ardless of what w as contained in the documents governing hi s parole. The pro specti v e juro r expr essed no opini on on what does or does not amount to constructi v e possess i on of a fi rear m, no r on when it is or i s not a crim e for
a convic ted felon to possess a gun. Her recollection of her son’s condi tions w as therefor e i mmaterial. That brings us to the second poin t: Ev en i f the prospecti v e juro r had carried in some mi sgui ded preconceptions about the tr uly relev ant i ssu es, she repeat edly offered Judge Durkin her “unw av ering affi rmation” t ha t it w ould not affec t her judgment in the instant case: THE COUR T : Okay

. Okay

. And the fact that there w ere condi tions, nothin g ab out that exper i ence w ould affec t y our abil i ty t o be fai r in thi s cas e? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No

.

* * * THE COUR T : Okay

. And, again

, that exper i ence inv olving y our son, do y ou hav e any thought s y ourself about what condi tions of parole shou l d be? And i f there ’s any e v ide nce presented one w ay or the other
a bout what the condi tions are in thi s case, w oul d t he6 No. 13-2771
fa ct that y our son w as on parole hav e any effect o n what y ou’d do in thi s cas e? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No

.

* * * THE CO URT : W

ell, I guess the questi on i s, if you r ead that—t here may be an i ssu e in thi s cas e about whether being in a house wh e re there ’s a gun may not
necess arily be a violati on of parole unles s when y ou’re in th a t ho us e y ou actually possess the gun or y ou constructi v ely possess i t. None o f that w as an i ssu e for y ou when y ou read these condi tions becau se y ou don’t keep g uns in y our house? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No

.

* * * THE COUR T : Okay

... the final questi on I hav e for y ou i s the one I asked the other juro rs. If y ou w ere sea t e d th e r e at the plainti ff’s table or seated wi th the defendants, could y ou be—knowing y ourself and y our backgro und and y our educati onal backgro und and your w or k exper i ence, could y ou be fai r? W ould you
w ant you r se l f as a juro r i f y ou w ere seated out here as one of the par ties in the case? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: (Nodding head.) THE COURT : The ans w er isy es? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Y es. These responses unequiv ocally confi rm the juro r’s abi li ty to di sregar d her own p rior exper i ence and judge the case on theNo. 13-2771 7
basi s of the evi dence brought before her

. If they are true, they preclude a challen ge for caus e. Allen , 605 F .3d at 464–65 (collecting cases ). Judge Durkin deci ded to ta ke the p ro s p e c tiv e juro r at her w or d , and, as the tr i al judge, he w as in the best posi tion to observ e her credibi li ty and demeanor

. United States
v
. Brodnicki, 516 F .3d 570, 574 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Fin ding no reason to second- guess that deci si on, w e defer to the di screti on of the di stric t court

. II Mar shall’s second arg ument i s unus ual, and requires some co nt ext

. The parties agr eed, prior to tr i al, to tr y the case to a jury of ei ght, whi ch w ould be selected from a v eni re of tw enty

. The or der in whi ch ven ir emen were called for voir dire w as randomly assi gned, wi th no knowledge of race, b y the clerk’s offi ce. As i t happened, of the fi rst fo ur t een v eni remen called,
none of the tw elv e whom w ere not excused fo r ca use w ere black. At that poin t, a petit jury of ei ght (non-b lack) juro rs had been selected. Counsel for Mar shall, who i s black, notic ed that three of the si x remaining v eni remen w ere also black, and
mov ed the courtto e xpand the si ze of the pet i t j ury t o te n “in the hope of get tin g one of the persons of color on the jury .” The defendants obj ected and t he court deni ed Mar shall’s request. Mar shall beli ev es that deni al w as an a bu se of—or , more speci fi cally

, a “fai lure to exer ci se”—di screti on. “The process of empaneling a jury i s fi rmly entrusted to the
so un d di screti on of the tr i al judge and wi ll not be di sturb e d absent an abus e of thi s dis cretion.” United States v

. B e as l e y, 48 F .3d 262, 266 (7th Ci r . 1995) (qu oting United States v
. Rubin , 37 F .3d 49, 54 (2d Ci r
. 1994)). There w as no abus e of di screti on8 No. 13-2771
here. But ev en quoting the standard of rev i ew i s get tin g ahead of ourselv es. Mar shall has suggested no remot ely cogni zable legal harm to supp or t thi s arg ument. It i s establi shed that a li tigant has no right to a petit jury whi ch contains members of hi s race or whi ch fai rly repr esents a cross-s ecti on of t he
commu ni ty

. See Holland v
. Illinois , 493 U.S. 474, 477–78 (19 9 0 ); United States v
. Hatchett, 31 F .3d 1411, 1426 (7th Ci r
. 1994). So how could the di stric t court hav e err ed by fai ling to ensure that Mar shall got one? Mar shall di d, of course, hav e a right to a jury venire composed of a fai r c ro ss- secti on of the c ommuni ty , Hatchett , 31 F .3d at 14 2 6 , bu t he i s not challen gin g the composi tion of the v eni re. He also had a right t o se e t hat no state a ct or intentionally excluded any person from the petit j ur y o n a ccount of their race, Batso n v
. Kentu cky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but, again

, Mar shall i s not clai ming that any state actor acted in such a w ay

. In short, i t i s hard to see the legal basi s for Mar shall’s motion, let alone any reason why the di stric t court’s fai lure to gr ant i t mi ght amount t o an abuse of di screti on. Mar shall atte mpts to si de-step thi s problem by framing the di stric t co ur t’s deni al of hi s motion as a “fai lure to exer ci se” di screti on. Munoz-Pa checo v
. Holder, 673 F .3d 741, 745 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (“Fai lure to exer ci se di screti on is no t exer ci sing di screti on; i t i s making a legal mi stake.”). That is no t what happened. The deni al of a motion i s just as much an exer ci se of di screti on a s t he gr anti ng of a motion; w ere i t other wi se, w e
w ould hav e to rev erse ev ery tim e a tr i al motion w as deni ed. For that matter

, w e w ould hav e been faced wi th a di ffi cult consti tutional questi on i f the di stric t court had gr anted Mar shall’s motion. Mar shall openly asked the court to be “raceNo. 13-2771 9

consc i ous” in jury selecti on—speci fi cally , to expand the si ze of the jury bey ond what the parties or i gin ally agr eed for the expr ess purpose of increasing the chanc es that Mar shall w ould tr y hi s case to at least one bl a ck juro r
. But “the Constituti on prohibi ts all forms of pur p o seful raci al di scri minati on in the selecti on of juro rs.” Batso n , 476 U.S. at 88. At least one co urt has held that the prin ci ple of Batso n ext ends to cov er the facts before us: In sum, w e find that the wrongful inc lusi on of a juro r on a cc o unt of race should be tr eated the same as t he wrongful exclu sion of a prospectiv e juro r on accoun t of
race. Each si tuation vi ol a te s the c on s titu ti on a l c om mand that juro rs be selected pursuant to cri ter ia that do not take race int o a ccount, each depriv es a defendant of a jury that has been “indi fferently chosen” in ter ms of race, and each inv olv es the exer ci se of judi ci al pow er in supp or t of a process in whi ch race becomes di sposi tiv e in terms of who can s erv e on a j ury

. Pellegrin o v
. AMPCO System Parking, 486 Mich. 330, 347–348 (2010) (e mp hasi s or i gin al). W e need not deci de whether w e agr ee w i th the M i chi gan Supre me Court ’s concl usi on, but w e can confi dently say that w e w ould hav e been more tr oubled by the d ist r ict court’s gr ant of Mar shall’s motion t han w e are by i ts deni al. In conclu si on, each o f Mar shall’s arg uments i s meritless

. The di stric t court di d no t a buse i ts di screti on by refusing to
remove the prospectiv e juro r for caus e, no r di d i t do so by denying Mar shall’s motion to adjust the agr eed-upon si ze of the petit jury upw ards for the explic i t purpose of making more10 No. 13-2771

ro om for juro rs of a particu l a r race. The judgment of the di stric t courti s AFFI RMED.