Rocky Mountain HIDTA

ANNUAL REPORT

YEAR 2005 
 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA

2005 ANNUAL REPORT

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Trafficking and use of illicit drugs affect practically every aspect of our society. Under the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the HIDTA program was designed to reduce 

the availability of illicit drugs by disrupting or dismantling major drug trafficking organizations. 

The HIDTA program was also designed to enhance cooperation, coordination, information 

sharing and training among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to target the drug 

problem from not only a state and local level but also a national level. The question is how 

efficiently and effectively are public dollars being spent on these two primary objectives of the 

program. This report will hopefully provide sufficient information for the reader to come to an 

objective conclusion as to the performance of Rocky Mountain HIDTA. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA completed its eighth full year of operation with an allotment of $9.2 

million involving thirty-seven initiatives in four different states. The initiatives include 10 

federal and 136 state/local agencies with a commitment of 90 federal and 1,400 state/local 

personnel. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board, made up of federal, state and local 

law enforcement leaders, played an active role in setting goals and direction for the program. 

Some of the more noteworthy accomplishments under the Executive Board’s direction, guidance 

and encouragement, etc. with a willing participation and execution by the individual agencies 

and drug task forces include: 

Enforcement Activities:

• Mesa County Sheriff Deputy Mike Miller was awarded Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s 

Outstanding Interdiction Officer of the Year Award. 

• Southern Colorado Drug Task Force was awarded Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s 

Outstanding Drug Task Force of the Year Award. 

• Salt Lake City Police Officer Tyler Boelter was awarded the Outstanding Drug 

Enforcement Officer of the Year Award. 

• The Wyoming Southeast Enforcement Team moved into the new DEA building in 

Cheyenne. 

• TRIDENT merged with the DEA office in Glenwood Springs. 

• DEA assigned two agents to the Southwest Drug Task Force. 

• The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Investigation and Interdiction initiatives increased 

outputs in almost every category from 2005 and include the following: 

o 6,161 felony drug arrests. 

o Removed drugs from the marketplace with a wholesale value of $143.5 

million in a return on investment (ROI) of $17 for every dollar of Rocky 

Mountain HIDTA funds invested. This includes: 

 36 pounds of heroin 

 1,333 pounds of cocaine 

 14 pounds of crack cocaine 

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 11,370 pounds of marijuana 

 22,357 pounds of marijuana plants 

 252 pounds of methamphetamine 

 357 pounds of methamphetamine “ice” 

 13 pounds and 4,604 dosage units of hallucinogens 

 5 pounds and 18,401 dosage units of club drugs 

 3 pounds and 17,321 dosage units of illegal pharmaceuticals 

o Seized $10 million in assets gained through illegal drug trafficking for a ROI 

of $1.00 for every dollar of Rocky Mountain HIDTA funds invested. 

o Seized 807 weapons. 

o Dismantled 140 clandestine drug labs that were capable of producing one 

million dollars worth of methamphetamine with only “one cook”. 

o Seized clan lab chemicals and glassware on 31 occasions and cleaned up 34 

clan lab dumpsites. 

o Identified 57 children affected by clan lab operations. 

o Targeted 41 international drug trafficking organizations while disrupting 16 

and dismantling 3. 

o Targeted 92 multi-state drug trafficking organizations while disrupting 20 and 

dismantling 5. 

o Targeted 116 local drug trafficking organizations while disrupting 37 and 

dismantling 10. 

o Investigated drug trafficking organizations in which 9 were designated CPOT, 

12 RPOT and 31 had OCDETF designation. 

o Drug task forces used wire intercepts on 58 occasions. 

o Drug task forces used PEN registers on 128 occasions. 

o 309 cases or investigations involving Rocky Mountain HIDTA enforcement 

or interdiction were referred, coordinated with or information shared with 

areas outside the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region. 

o Rocky Mountain HIDTA task forces assisted drug enforcement agencies 

outside the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region on 33 occasions. 

o 356 drug loads were intercepted with 32 resulting in controlled deliveries of 

the intercepted loads. 

Intelligence:

• The Colorado Bureau of Investigations connected its name pointer index system to the 

RissIntel application, which is the final phase of the Tri-Connectivity project. 

• The implementation of the web-based event deconfliction application was completed 

allowing designated officers from both HIDTA and non- HIDTA Colorado agencies to 

enter their own events 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 

• An ISC Analyst instructed a PenLink course for analysts in Utah. This is the first time in 

five years Rocky Mountain HIDTA did not require a PenLink employee to instruct the 

course. 

• 4,634 event deconflictions submitted. 

• 12,652 subject deconflictions submitted. 

• 361 investigations of DTOs had some analytical support. 

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Training:

• Conducted forty-four training courses of which forty-one were investigative/interdiction, 

one analytical and one management. 

• Trained 1,516 students from 129 different agencies which totaled 46,732 student hours. 

• Rocky Mountain HIDTA continued through partnership with the Colorado Regional 

Community Policing Institute (CRCPI) to present clan lab awareness training to 890 

citizens. 

• The Rocky Mountain HIDTA/CRCPI partnership also was responsible for training 848 

police, EMT and other at-risk government employees with a clan lab first responder 

course. 

• Successful implementation of on-line admissions and approval of training applications. 

(Comprising of 60% of enrollment) 

• Training Officer Patrick Novak was awarded the Outstanding Support Personnel of the 

Year Award. 

• Mandated entry into the HIDTA on-line Training Tracker (HOTT) system. 

• POST approval for HIDTA courses in Montana. 

• Development of new Law Enforcement Officer Survival Spanish II 40 hour course. 

• Created standardized lesson plans for core classes. 

• Outsourced nine classes through MCTFT and MCTC saving approximately $10,000. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

 

The Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), designates regions with critical 

drug trafficking problems adversely impacting the nation as High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Areas (HIDTAs). The major federal, state and local law enforcement leaders in the designated 

areas form an Executive Board to assure compliance with the overall goal of the HIDTA 

program. The Executive Board hires a director and additional staff who helps establish multiagency collocated/commingled drug task forces, an intelligence center, a training unit, and fiscal 

component. The initial step in developing the regional HIDTAs is to complete a drug threat 

assessment of the region and then develop a strategy to combat the threat. The fiscal component 

of HIDTA is used to implement the strategy and the results are reported in the annual report. 

This annual report reflects the activities of calendar year 2005. There are twenty-eight individual 

HIDTAs spread throughout the nation who work together in a partnership to address this nation’s 

drug problem. All HIDTAs must address the National HIDTA Program Mission Statement 

which is: 

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National HIDTA 

Program Mission Statement 

The mission of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program is to 

disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States by assisting federal, state, 

and local law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA program to 

dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, with particular emphasis on 

drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United 

States. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA was designated in October 1996 and became operational July 1997. 

During the reporting period of this annual report (January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2005) 

ONDCP allocated $9,189,625 for HIDTA operations which includes enforcement, interdiction, 

intelligence, training and management/administration. The majority of these funds go to state 

and local fiduciaries supporting federal, state and local task forces with only about 3% going 

directly to federal agencies. Breakdown of the funding is approximately 79% that goes directly 

to support enforcement and interdiction efforts with 11% funding for the intelligence support 

centers, 5% for training and 5% for administration. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA consists of four states with the following geographic area of 

responsibility: 

• Colorado – the counties of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, Eagle, El Paso, 

Garfield, Grand, Jefferson, LaPlata, Larimer, Mesa, Moffat, Pueblo, Routt, and Weld. 

• Montana – the counties of Cascade, Flathead, Lewis and Clark, Missoula, and 

Yellowstone. 

• Utah – the counties of Davis, Salt Lake, Summit, Utah, Washington and Weber. 

• Wyoming – the counties of Albany, Campbell, Laramie, Natrona, Sweetwater, and Uinta. 

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Flathead

Missoula Lewis&Clark

Cascade

Yellowstone

Campbell

Natrona

Uinta

Sweetwater

Albany Laramie

Summit

Weber

Davis

Salt Lake

Utah

Washington

Moffat Weld Routt Larimer

Grand Boulder

Garfield Eagle

Mesa

LaPlata

Adams Arapahoe Jefferson

Douglas

El Paso

Pueblo

Denver

HIDTACounties

N

2005RockyMountainHIDTA

DesignatedCounties

Rocky Mountain HIDTA consists of 146 federal, state and local agencies and approximately 

1,500 personnel working together to achieve the vision established by the director and executive 

board. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA vision statement is: 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

Vision Statement 

To stop any increase and actively reduce drug use and trafficking. 

The Rocky Mountain HIDTA also has established a mission statement so that Rocky Mountain 

initiatives have no doubt what the program is trying to achieve. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

mission statement is as follows: 

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Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

Mission Statement 

The mission of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA is to support the national drug 

control strategy of reducing drug use. Specifically, the Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA’s ultimate mission is to facilitate cooperation and coordination among 

federal, state and local drug enforcement efforts to enhance combating the drug 

trafficking problem locally, regionally and nationally. This mission is 

accomplished through intelligence-driven joint multi-agency collocated drug task 

forces sharing information and working cooperatively with other drug 

enforcement initiatives including interdiction. The aim is to: 

• Reduce drug availability by eliminating or disrupting drug trafficking 

organizations. 

• Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations in 

their efforts within HIDTA. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA uses five subsystems to accomplish the vision and mission consisting 

of Administration, Intelligence, Training, Investigation and Interdiction. Administration, 

Intelligence and Training are singular initiatives whereas in Investigation, there are thirty 

initiatives, and in Interdiction, there are four. For more details on the strategy, please see the 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2005 Strategy Report. 

III. NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS 

Nationally, HIDTAs have adopted two specific goals to be achieved in addressing the drug 

threat. These two national goals apply to all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout the 

nation. In developing a strategy to address the drug threat, the HIDTA program must target their 

efforts around two goals. The two national HIDTA goals are: 

National HIDTA Goals 

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug 

trafficking and/or money laundering organizations; and 

Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. 

IV. SUMMARY OF THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR BUDGET YEAR 2005 

As indicated earlier in this report, the first step is to identify the threat before developing a 

strategy to address the threat. Each HIDTA is required to prepare a threat assessment annually 

for those areas designated HIDTA. This section consists of a brief summary of the threat in the 

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Rocky Mountain HIDTA region. For in-depth detailed information, please refer to the 2005 

Threat Assessment. 

• Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are using the Rocky Mountain HIDTA to 

further their illicit drug activities through well-established trafficking networks that reach 

from sources of supply in Mexico to Colorado Springs, Denver, and Salt Lake City. They 

transport illicit drugs from these distribution centers to drug markets in Midwestern and 

eastern states. 

• Mexican DTOs increasingly distribute low-cost, high-purity methamphetamine (primarily 

ice) throughout the Rocky Mountain HIDTA in response to the decreased availability of 

locally-produced methamphetamine. Manpower and resources previously allocated to 

investigations of local methamphetamine production are now being shifted to 

investigations of major Mexican DTOs. 

• The increased availability and abuse of ice methamphetamine has resulted in a surge in 

drug-related crimes including identity theft, retail theft, burglary, forgery, and currency 

counterfeiting throughout the Rocky Mountain HIDTA. Arrests related to these crimes 

have overburdened court systems, treatment facilities, and prisons and jails. 

• Mexican DTOs are now distributing crack cocaine at the retail level in some urban areas 

of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA, forcing local African American street gangs to move 

their crack distribution operations to suburban areas, and resulting in increased violence 

and drug-related crime in these suburbs. 

• Asian DTOs are transporting high potency BC Bud marijuana and MDMA across the 

Montana-Canada border to markets in the Rocky Mountain HIDTA and throughout the 

United States. 

• Mexican DTOs increasingly exploit the vast expanses of public and tribal lands in, and 

adjacent to, the Rocky Mountain HIDTA to distribute and produce illicit drugs, believing 

that in doing so they will evade law enforcement detection. 

 

V. HIDTA STRATEGY SUMMARY 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA developed a strategy to address the drug problem based on the threat, 

personnel resources, fiscal resources and past performance. In some cases, existing task forces 

modified their focus to meet the threat and in other cases, task forces were developed to meet a 

threat that appears to go basically unchallenged. Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s primary strategy is 

to foster sharing of information and resources through collocated interagency federal, state and 

local task forces willing and able to target the most posing threats. These task forces are 

developed, trained, equipped and guided by the Rocky Mountain HIDTA program. They are 

routinely monitored and evaluated both fiscally and operationally to assure that they stay on 

track in trying to accomplish the national and regional mission. Rocky Mountain HIDTA uses 

zero-based budgeting thus maintaining flexibility to make changes to address the threat as 

necessary. Programs have been discontinued and others created in furtherance of the strategy. 

The emphasis on intelligence, information-sharing, deconfliction and analytical support serves as 

the core or hub to the strategy as it branches out to the various regions of the four states. 

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Training also plays an important role in assuring that officers have the knowledge and skill to 

address the threat as it currently exists and changes. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA consists of 146 different federal, state and local agencies and offers 

approximately 1,500 personnel, the majority of which are officers. These agencies’ officers and 

personnel are involved full-time in thirty-seven different initiatives. There are thirty 

investigative initiatives of which: 

• 23 investigate all levels of drug trafficking but focus on DTOs 

• 3 target exclusively major DTOs 

• 1 targets primarily drug fugitives 

• 1 targets primarily drug trafficking gangs 

• 2 target money laundering organizations 

There are four interdiction initiatives with three working primarily interstate interdiction and one 

working various aspects of interdiction in the Denver metro area. There is one intelligence 

initiative with satellites, one training initiative and one management/administration initiative. 

Seventy-nine percent of HIDTA funds support the investigative and interdiction initiatives or are 

applied to operations with 11% applied to intelligence, 5% training and 5% administration. 

The Fugitive Location and Apprehension Group (FLAG) initiative in Colorado targets and 

apprehends fugitives throughout the Denver metro area who are wanted for major violent crimes 

and/or drug trafficking offenses. In 2005, FLAG made 572 arrests, confiscated 32 weapons, 3.3 

pounds of cocaine, 5.4 pounds of methamphetamine, 500 dosage units of club drugs, investigated 

8 cases and referred or assisted 7 cases outside the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region and referred 

or assisted on 4 cases within the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region. 

VI. HIDTA PERFORMANCE MEASURES 

In 2005, the National HIDTA Program modified its performance measurements to more 

accurately and clearly reflect the performance of each individual HIDTA as it related to the 

national goals. The National HIDTA Program has always had measurements and performance 

evaluators although the new ones should provide a better barometer for the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the HIDTA program. These measurements will allow scrutiny as to how the 

HIDTA strategy actually impacts the drug threat on a local, regional and national level. This 

section of the annual report will be a series of tables and charts to present these specific outputs 

and efficiency measures reflecting National HIDTA Goal 1 (disrupt/dismantle drug trafficking 

organizations) and Goal 2 (increase effectiveness and efficiency of drug law enforcement.) 

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR GOAL 1

TABLE 1 

Table 1 reflects the number of drug trafficking organizations that were identified and targeted by 

the various HIDTA initiatives within the Rocky Mountain region. The table also reflects the 

number of those targeted that were disrupted or dismantled. Rocky Mountain HIDTA uses the 

national definition of a drug trafficking organization which, simply put, is an organization

consisting of five or more persons operating in a clearly-defined hierarchy whose principal 

activity is to generate income through a series of illegal drug production, manufacturing, 

importation or distribution activities. Rocky Mountain HIDTA adds that these DTOs must be 

involved in distributing or manufacturing kilo quantities of drugs on a monthly basis. A task 

force targets a DTO when they officially open a case and begin investigating the organization 

with the intent of disrupting and/or dismantling. In order for an initiative to be credited with 

disrupting a DTO, they must have impeded their normal and effective operation for at least sixty 

days causing major changes which at least temporarily seriously disrupts their ability to operate. 

For an initiative to be credited with dismantling a drug trafficking organization, they must 

basically destroy the organization’s leadership, financial base and supply network to the extent 

that the organization is incapable of operating or reconstituting itself. 

It should be noted that to target a drug trafficking organization, it is a long-term proposition and 

very resource-intense. Seldom is a DTO disrupted or dismantled in less than six months and 

depending on its size and scope can take multiple years. Generally, DTO investigations involve 

coordinating with other jurisdictions, require case analytical support and depending upon the 

circumstances, may involve various sophisticated investigative techniques including wire 

intercepts. 

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TABLE 2 

Table 2 categorizes the drug trafficking organizations by what is considered their scope or 

geographic tentacles. The scope with the greatest geographic impact is considered an 

international drug trafficking organization. It regularly conducts illegal drug trafficking or 

money laundering activities in more than one country or is based in one country and conducts or 

coordinates illegal activities in another. The second category is multi-state, which is an 

organization that regularly carries out illegal drug trafficking or money laundering activities in 

more than one state. The third category is local, and it is an organization whose illegal drug 

trafficking or money laundering activities are generally but not always limited to the same 

metropolitan area or in the case of non-metropolitan areas, is limited to an easily-defined region 

or small number of geographic proximity counties. Within Rocky Mountain HIDTA, there were 

forty-one international cases targeted and nineteen disrupted and dismantled. This is consistent 

with the threat that indicates the Rocky Mountain region has become much more of a distribution 

and transshipment point than was believed many years ago. The large number of multi-state 

DTOs also indicates how the drug activity in the Rocky Mountain region impacts the rest of the 

nation. 

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TABLE 3 

Table 3 monitors the activities related to money laundering organizations. A money laundering 

organization is one where a hierarchy of individuals engages in processing illegal drug profits 

through a continual series of illegal activities so as to make those illegal profits appear to be 

legitimate income. Within the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region, these organizations have to be 

involved in an average of $10,000 on a monthly basis. This is a category where traditionally 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA has not been successful. Although Rocky Mountain HIDTA initiatives 

have been successful in seizing assets, more in-depth investigation to discover hidden assets and 

to actually disrupt or dismantle money laundering organizations has been limited. This focus has 

changed over the last year and should improve annually. In 2005, the HIDTA Financial Task 

Force and Utah Financial Investigations Team focused its efforts to almost exclusively targeting 

money laundering organizations and has a number of major cases. These cases have not come to 

fruition yet because they are long-term and complicated. Again, this is an area that should see 

vast improvement within the next couple years. 

 TABLE 4 

In Table 4 the National HIDTA Program further defines drug trafficking organizations by their 

operational scope. Two of these operational scopes include what is called priority targets. The 

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first one is Consolidated Priority Organizational Targets (CPOTs). A CPOT is a drug trafficking 

organization known to be linked to or affiliated with a major international drug trafficking 

organization and/or money laundering enterprise that is included on the Department of Justice’s 

CPOT list. This CPOT list contains the control and command element of a major international 

drug trafficking organization and/or money laundering enterprise that significantly impacts the 

U.S. drug supply. The second is Regional Priority Organizational Target (RPOT). An RPOT is 

a drug trafficking organization known to be linked to or affiliated with a major regional/national 

drug trafficking organization and/or money laundering enterprise that is designated as an RPOT 

by the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program Regional 

Coordinating Committee. The last column listed in the table is OCDETF cases. This is an 

investigation that has been accepted and designated by the OCDETF program which may also be 

considered a CPOT or RPOT. The aspect of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region as it relates to 

operational scope again is indicative of this region and its relationship to international, national 

and regional drug problems. These are good indications as to why this region has been declared 

a HIDTA region and its impact in relationship to the national drug enforcement strategy. This 

focus of Rocky Mountain HIDTA on the larger more international CPOTs and OCDETF 

designation has increased over the years directly related to the HIDTA program and its emphasis 

on these priorities. This includes not only the emphasis but the training and encouragement to 

expand cases beyond just a local or even multi-state region. 

Core Table 5: Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Year

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Table 5 reports drug seizures. Seizing drugs and removing their availability from the 

marketplace is an important aspect of the overall drug strategy. This not only lessens the 

availability, which affects drug use, but increases the cost of doing business. Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA has in the past and continues to have significant impact on the drug trade through its 

drug seizures. This is true not only regionally, but a portion of the seizures were destined for 

other locations in the United States. In the interest of conservative reporting and true depiction 

of economic impact, the HIDTA program has chosen to use the wholesale value of the respective 

drugs as opposed to the retail value. Table 5 lists the amount of the various drugs seized and the 

wholesale value of those drugs based on the National Drug Intelligence Center’s illicit drug 

prices for the United States. This report reflects the prices for the various drugs in the Rocky 

Mountain HIDTA four-state region. Ecstasy was combined with all other club drugs, and in the 

last line, “other” refers to pharmaceuticals and anabolic steroids seized. 

Core Table 6: Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year

Table 6 shows measurement of the program related to the return on investment. In this case, one 

measurement would be the return on the dollar value of drugs seized in relation to each dollar 

spent in the HIDTA program for the various investigative, interdiction and intelligence 

initiatives. This chart only considers the HIDTA investment for the Rocky Mountain region and 

acknowledges that other federal, state and local agencies also invest much to make the program 

successful. However, within Rocky Mountain HIDTA, much of what has been accomplished 

would not have been if it weren’t for the HIDTA program. 

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Core Table 7: Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year

 

Table 7 relates to illegally-gained assets removed. The vast majority of drug traffickers attempt 

to secure assets for fiscal reasons. The HIDTA program, whenever possible, seeks out and 

attempts to forfeit those illegally-gained assets. This directly attacks their primary motive and 

increases the cost of doing business and oftentimes negates the ability to do business because of 

the upfront costs. Rocky Mountain HIDTA does fairly well in this category although this is an 

area that improvement could be made. The HIDTA Financial Task Force in Denver has 

refocused its efforts more toward money laundering and Utah created the Utah Financial 

Investigations Team which also targets money laundering organizations. There are a number of 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA-initiated cases whose tentacles spread throughout the United States in 

which assets were seized but reported by the seizing jurisdiction and not Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA. 

Core Table 8: Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets 

Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year

Table 8 relates to return on investment for both drugs and assets. Removing drugs reduces 

availability and increases the cost of doing business as does the forfeiture of illegally-gained 

assets by these drug trafficking organizations. Not only is this a significant aspect of drug 

enforcement but an important measurement as well. In Table 8, Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

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combined the wholesale value of the drugs seized plus the value of the assets seized and 

compared them to the budget or investment. The purpose of this table is to show the combined 

return on investment for the taxpayers. Regarding Rocky Mountain HIDTA in 2005, which 

invested $9 million dollars to achieve the two goals as set forth by the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, the return on investment was $24.00 every $1 of HIDTA funds spent. Overall, 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA permanently removed $190 million in illicit drugs and $10 million in 

drug profits from the marketplace. There was a substantial increase of drugs/assets removed 

from the market in 2005 compared with 2004. This table alone would compare more than 

favorably to even the best run organizations in the private or public sector and would 

demonstrate efficient and effective drug law enforcement. 

Core Table 9: Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes by Year

Table 9 is related to HIDTA prosecution outputs and outcomes. Rocky Mountain HIDTA does 

not have separate prosecution initiatives per se although has funded some attorneys to help 

prosecute the more complex sophisticated HIDTA investigations against drug trafficking 

organizations. During 2005, these prosecutors handled 228 separate prosecutions or 

investigations. Many of the prosecutors are collocated with the task forces and besides 

prosecuting investigations, they provide on-site advice, legal counsel, legal assistance in 

operational matters, assistance on search warrants, developing probable cause, training, etc. 

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Core Table 10: Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories 

Dismantled by Size for Year 2005, at Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

Table 10 explains the manufacture of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine abuse, production 

and trafficking presents unique problems not associated with most drugs. The fact that there are 

so many clandestine labs manufacturing meth not only affects availability but has other adverse 

impacts such as explosion, drug endangered children, toxic waste dumps, etc. Methamphetamine 

is an extremely dangerous drug that is closely associated with violence of the users. The 

manufacture of methamphetamine is dangerous and affects innocent people by the toxic nature 

of the labs in unsuspecting apartments and motels. There were 57 children found in the 140 labs 

seized. Its adverse impact is only beginning to be discovered. The National Jewish study out of 

Denver, largely coordinated by Rocky Mountain HIDTA, has confirmed these widespread 

negative aspects of clandestine labs. In Table 10, the labs are categorized by how much they 

would normally manufacture at one particular setting. Clandestine labs that manufacture ounces 

are generally referred to as “mom and pop” operations; however, they can be just as dangerous 

as the “super labs” that manufacture multi pounds of methamphetamine at a time. The majority 

of the labs in the Rocky Mountain region are the lesser producing labs. Table 10 considers the 

number of clandestine labs dismantled by their production rate and then uses the ounce cost of 

methamphetamine to put a value on the labs that were dismantled. For instance, if a lab is 

making two ounces or less and the cost of methamphetamine in the area is $800 per ounce, then 

the value of that lab dismantled would be considered $1,600. This does not take into 

consideration that this lab may be producing two ounces or less on a monthly basis, but HIDTA 

tends to be conservative when giving its estimates so as not to be accused of distorting the 

problem or the value of the HIDTA program. It should be noted that since HIDTA was initiated 

in the Rocky Mountain region, clan lab seizures have been reduced dramatically in each state due 

to the efforts of drug law enforcement, precursor and chemical laws, and education of the public 

and industry. This again demonstrates the success of a coordinated cooperative effort from a 

federal, state and local standpoint. In 2003 there were 499 labs seized, in 2004 365 labs seized 

and in 2005, 140 labs seized. This reflects a highly successful decrease in the amount of labs 

16 
 

producing methamphetamine, which includes chemical/glassware equipment and dumpsites. 

Table 10 effectively demonstrates very conservatively the dollar value of production of raw 

material that was stopped prior to hitting the streets. But again, this is assuming that a lab would 

only produce that amount of methamphetamine once a year, which would be highly unlikely as 

the majority of labs have multiple productions. 

TABLE 11 - Clandestine Labs

Table 11 demonstrates other aspects of manufacturing methamphetamine. Unlike many drugs 

used by Americans, methamphetamine has its unique issues, particularly since much is 

manufactured in this country. Associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine is the 

securing of sufficient precursors and essential chemicals to make the drug as well as dumping the 

toxic waste to avoid detection. There are three categories that HIDTA captures related to 

clandestine lab activity. 

First is the number of laboratory dumpsites. Discovery of a dumpsite does not necessarily mean 

that an operational lab was seized, but it does mean that a lab was in operation and that the 

organization dumped toxic chemicals. This oftentimes has an adverse affect on our environment. 

These dumpsites can be extremely dangerous and have a very detrimental affect to the 

environment. They are also indicative of clan lab activity even though a lab was not seized. 

Second is the number of chemical/glassware seizures. By definition, a clan lab can only be 

counted as having been seized if there is sufficient chemicals and glassware at a specific location 

that could actually result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Oftentimes officers come 

across partial, disassembled or parts of labs that cannot be counted as clandestine lab seizures. In 

these cases, HIDTA categorizes these seizures as chemical/glassware which falls short of an 

actual operating lab but are indicative of clandestine manufacturing activities. 

17 
 

The last category is the amount of children affected that were found in the clandestine 

laboratories. There are continuous studies being done by the National Jewish Medical Center in 

Denver, Colorado to determine the contamination effects of meth labs and the overall affect they 

have on children exposed to meth lab chemicals. 

All three of these measures are important to recognize and are not only indicative of the problem 

but demonstrate continued success of the program in taking a holistic approach to the 

manufacture of methamphetamine. 

PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR GOAL 2

TABLE 12 - Training 

Table 12 illustrates overall training. Prior to the inception of HIDTA in the Rocky Mountain 

region, there was a major void in training. Understanding this need, the Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA Executive Board initially set out and continues to make training a major priority for this 

particular HIDTA. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Training Program consists of a training 

manager and two assistant training officers. This program develops its own training courses to 

meet the regional needs and has continually been cited for its successful endeavors. In fact, in 

2004 Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s Training Program was recognized as a Best Practice and 

continues to be one of the premier training programs throughout HIDTA. Most of the training 

provided to the officers and criminal justice personnel are in courses developed and taught within 

the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region. This includes a basic two-week school, gang school, 

Spanish training and clandestine lab training. Rocky Mountain HIDTA training courses have 

been approved by the Peace Officers Standard and Training (POST) for all four states and have 

18 
 

looked at the considerable leadership and coordination role it plays for training in general and 

even for non-HIDTA regions. Table 12 lists the number of students actually trained and the 

training hours provided along with the cost of this training that can be broken down into training 

costs per hour. Rocky Mountain HIDTA trained 1,516 personnel from 129 different agencies 

and had a total of 46,732 student hours. Rocky Mountain HIDTA breaks down training into cost 

per student, which is $587 for interdiction training, $160 for investigative training and $90 for 

intelligence training. 

Core Table 13: Percentage of HIDTA Initiatives Using Event and Case Deconfliction 

Services, by Year

Table 13 deals with deconflicting systems. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board 

mandates event and case deconfliction use by all HIDTA initiatives. This is not optional, and the 

use and amount of use is monitored on a regular basis. All initiatives use these deconfliction 

services, and there is 100% compliance. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board 

considers this not only critical to sharing information, making sure there is no duplicate effort on 

the same drug trafficking organization but also an officer safety issue. Prior to Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA becoming operational in 1997, there were no regular deconfliction services in the region. 

Montana’s deconfliction system became operational at the end of 2005. Rocky Mountain 

HIDTA established a users group to work with Montana DCI in making sure not only their 

system works well but is consistent tying into a national system. 

Case or subject deconfliction consists of submitting the suspects and associates of drug 

trafficking organizations and/or others with a criminal predicate (compliance with 28CFR) into a 

statewide system that all agencies and task forces use. Should two agencies have the same case 

or subject, the system will put them together so they can discuss and join their efforts. In the 

case of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, they are also tied to the nationwide system through 

riss.net. Montana, as stated earlier, has just started a deconfliction system and is probably a year 

away from tying into the national system. 

Event deconfliction is utilized in metropolitan areas where large numbers of drug units, task 

forces and other tactical operations occur on a regular basis. In this case, police departments, 

task forces and drug units are required to submit the tactical operation into a system giving the 

19 
 

date, the approximate time and location. If something else is going on at the same location or 

near the vicinity of that location, the two operating units are notified and they discuss the 

situation to avoid any kind of conflict. This is particularly important in officer safety of covert, 

undercover operations when plain-clothes officers are utilized. 

Core Table 14: Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted by 

Year

Table 14 is self-explanatory and includes not only the number of deconflictions anticipated but 

the actual event and case/subject deconflictions submitted by Rocky Mountain HIDTA initiatives 

in 2005. 

Core Table 15: Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical Support, by Year 

Table 15 shows analytical support. One of the cornerstones of the HIDTA program is the 

Intelligence initiative which includes an Investigative Support Center (ISC). The ISC is set up to 

support major investigations through a number of activities including telephone toll analysis, 

graphs, charts, timelines, Grand Jury preparation, interviews, etc. Ideally, when a task force 

targets a drug trafficking organization, they will then request case support from an analyst who is 

assigned at the beginning of the investigation and works with the investigator through the 

conclusion of the investigation. When Rocky Mountain HIDTA was started in 1997, with the 

20 
 

exception of DEA, there were no investigative or intelligence analysts nor did the drug units or 

task forces understand the value of the service in enhancing their investigations to a successful 

conclusion. Since that time, there has been an increased acceptance and demand for analysts for 

analytical services. This is reflected in the number of investigations currently worked by both 

the ISC in Denver and the satellite ISC in Salt Lake City. Unfortunately the vast geographic area 

makes it very difficult to assign an analyst to task forces that are three or four hours away and 

work with them on a regular basis. In 2004, case analytical support in Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

included not only assigning an analyst, but the analyst must perform at least three separate and 

distinct activities for that task force in the investigation. This is a more conservative approach to 

claiming credit for a case resulting in lower numbers. In 2005, RMHIDTA used ONDCP’s 

definition of any analytical support which resulted in the large increase from 68 to 361 cases. 

Core Table 16: Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred to Other 

HIDTAs and Other Agencies, by Year 

Table 16 refers to impact outside the RMHIDTA region. Too often, pre-HIDTA, when a drug 

task force or unit developed leads or information concerning related drug activity in other areas 

of the nation, this data was not forwarded. With the emphasis on perceiving the drug problem 

from not only a local and regional level but a national level, this has changed immensely. Leads 

and information concerning investigations affecting other areas routinely are passed on and 

referred to the appropriate agencies. In the case of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA Highway 

Interdiction, whenever the origin of the load and/or the destination load is made known, this 

information is passed on to the appropriate law enforcement entity in those regions. The HIDTA 

has no control over what happens to that information but is aware on a number of occasions the 

information has resulted in some significant cases, seizures and arrests. There is insurmountable 

information passed back and forth between the HIDTAs and case referrals to track it all, but the 

fact is, more information sharing, cooperation and coordination is occurring nationwide. It is 

one of the cornerstones of the HIDTA program. The numbers in Table 16 reflect those 

investigations or cases that had an impact on regions outside the Rocky Mountain HIDTA area. 

It includes information on cases referred as well as coordinated investigations with entities 

outside the Rocky Mountain HIDTA region where they work a particular aspect of a major DTO. 

Table 16 includes DTO cases and interdiction cases. 

21 
 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 Calendar year 2005 marked the second year that Rocky Mountain HIDTA has reported 

initiative operational targets and subsequent outcomes using the new Performance Management 

Process (PMP) in its completeness. These performance measurements should give the reader an 

accurate and reliable basis on which to judge the performance of Rocky Mountain HIDTA. Each 

HIDTA has its own uniqueness, and the four states that make up this HIDTA are no different. 

The Rocky Mountain region is not Los Angeles, New York or Miami or the southwest border. 

This HIDTA is made up of a combination of major metropolitan areas, smaller population 

centers and even more rural jurisdictions. However, the graphs and tables clearly point to how 

the drug trafficking problem in this country is inter-related and that all regions must address this 

as a national problem. 

The vast majority of the 690 interdiction seizures and arrests involved other regions of this 

country. In fact, in 199 cases there was a tie-in to another region of the country outside the 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA area. The information on the interdiction stops, seizures and follow-up 

investigations are forwarded to those in the jurisdictions. In a number of cases, they resulted or 

contributed to some major drug trafficking investigations ongoing in other areas. Examining the 

drug trafficking organizations targeted by HIDTA task forces, the nexus to the rest of the nation 

is obvious. Fifty-four percent had international or multi-state involvement and 46% primarily 

local. 

The charts and statistics clearly point out the national level of the drug problem and the necessity 

for HIDTA programs throughout the country. The numbers do not include the daily interaction 

among the HIDTAs, the sharing of best practices and facilitating a unity in the national drug 

problem. These tables and charts cannot account for the lack of duplicity or the more effective 

and efficient drug law enforcement that has developed because of the HIDTA program. There 

are multi-agency collocated, commingled task forces that would not exist except for the HIDTA 

program. Tactical deconfliction and event deconfliction were non existent to the area before 

HIDTA. There was a major void in drug enforcement training in the four-state region prior to 

HIDTA. In fact, drug unit commanders in the various states did not have regular meetings, but 

they do now because of HIDTA. It is doubtful the Drug Endangered Children program would be 

such a national focus if it weren’t for the HIDTA program. The use of civilian analysts to assist 

on major investigations was a new concept in the Rocky Mountain region prior to HIDTA. 

These are just a few things that HIDTA has done and continues to do for the region of its 

responsibility. Others include the first regional investigative support centers, helping to establish 

the Colorado Drug Investigators Association (CDIA), assisting in getting needed precursor, 

chemical and drug-endangered children laws passed, creation of the Colorado Coalition for Drug 

Endangered Children which subsequently became a national coalition, thousands and thousands 

of officers and other key criminal justice personnel being trained. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA completed its eighth full year of operation in 2005. As indicated 

above, there have been significant activities and accomplishments during the year. However, the 

program is still developing. The future includes continued growth, constant pursuit of stated 

goals and objectives, fine-tuning and putting additional systems in place for further effective and 

22 
 

efficient operation and assessments. Other developments will include strengthening the existing 

initiatives and making necessary changes to meet the ever-moving threat. All of the above are 

based on a detailed threat assessment, a flexible strategy and the ability to modify initiatives to 

address the threat. 

HIDTA has already had significant impact but cannot take full credit for all drug enforcement 

activities from HIDTA-funded programs in the four-state area. Federal, and particularly state 

and local agencies, contributes much in resources, knowledge, skill etc. Some of the task forces 

supported by HIDTA were pre-existing. They were and continue to be supported by the Edward 

Byrne Memorial Fund as well as state and local resources. HIDTA’s greatest success has been 

to bring federal, state and local law enforcement resources together working as partners to attack 

the drug problem. This cooperation and coordination includes law enforcement agency heads 

and drug unit commanders joining together to plan, strategize and attempt to be more efficient 

and effective. This is a critical and important outcome. 

Another major milestone of the HIDTA program is been the Investigative Support Center which 

has increased the exchange of information and sharing in investigations. This, augmented by 

event and subject deconfliction, continues to enhance the information flow among not only local 

agencies but state and federal agencies in the Rocky Mountain region and the nation. 

The HIDTA Training Program has been able to allow officers to safely disassemble clandestine 

labs as well as handle tactical operations. The training in gangs, basic drug investigations, 

Spanish language training and clandestine labs as well as interdiction has been critical to the 

success of the program. The Highway Patrol Criminal Interdiction Program established by 

HIDTA is a model. Through professional law enforcement officers and good training, there have 

been no complaints about their interdiction activities. 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA will continue to progress and develop into being even more effective 

and efficient. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board, director and staff as well as all 

participants in HIDTA are proud of the program and their accomplishments. The basic question: 

‘Has Rocky Mountain HIDTA been effective in targeting and dismantling/disrupting drug 

trafficking organizations thus reducing the availability of drugs in this region and the nation?’ 

The other question: ‘Has Rocky Mountain HIDTA played a significant role in making drug law 

enforcement more effective and efficient in the Rocky Mountain region?’ The answer to both 

questions is ‘yes’, and the program has been successful and will continue to be so in the future. 

The primary reason for the success of the program is that it is managed by the top federal, state 

and local leaders in the region with the flexibility to adapt it to regional needs as it pursues 

national goals. This is an equal partnership with equal commitment and desire for success. 

23 
 

VIII. APPENDICES 

A Table of Organization for Rocky Mountain HIDTA 

B.. Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board 

C. Participating Agencies 

D. Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2005 Annual Report Investigative and Interdiction 

Initiatives Summary 

IX. LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS 

Table 1 – Percentage of DTOs/MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled, 2005...............................9 

Table 2 –Percentage of DTOs/MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2005..............10 

Table 3 – Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by 

Scope, 2005........................................................................................................11 

Table 4 – Operational Scope of all DTO and MLO Cases Initiated, 2005........................11 

Table 5 – Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2005....................................................12 

Table 6 – Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law 

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005............................................................................13 

Table 7 – Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law 

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005............................................................................14 

Table 8 – Total Return on Investment (ROI) For Drugs and Assets Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2005..........................................14 

Table 9 – Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes, 2005.........................................................15 

Table 10 – Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs Dismantled by Size, 2005 .....16 

Table 11 – Clandestine Laboratory Activities, 2005 .........................................................17 

Table 12 – Rocky Mountain HIDTA Training Efficiency by Type of Training, 2005 .....18 

Table 13 – Percentage of HIDTA Initiatives Using Event and Case Deconfliction 

Services, 2005..................................................................................................19 

Table 14 – Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted, 2005......................20 

Table 15 – Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical Support, 2005 ...................20 

Table 16 – Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred to Other HIDTAs and 

Other Agencies, 2005.......................................................................................21 

24 
 

X. ENDNOTES 

 The information for this report came from: 

• Rocky Mountain HIDTA annual reports required of all initiatives 

• National Drug Intelligence Center Narcotics Digest Weekly, “Illicit Drug Prices,” 

December, 2005 

• EPIC Clan Lab Report 

• HIDTA Drug Trafficking Organization and Money Laundering Organization Report 

• 2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Strategy 

• 2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Budget Initiatives 

• Performance Management Process (PMP) database 

25 
 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board 

Federal Agencies (10) State Agencies (4) Local Agencies (9)

Jeff Sweetin, SAC 

DEA (Colorado & Wyoming) 

Joe Morales, Exec. Director 

Colorado DPS 

Dan Oates, Chief 

Aurora Police Department, CO 

Richard Powers, SAC 

FBI (Colorado & Wyoming) 

Mike Batista, Administrator 

Montana DCI 

Rich St. John, Deputy Chief 

Billings Police Department, MT 

Tim Fuhrman, SAC 

FBI (Utah) 

Robert Flowers, 

Commissioner 

Utah DPS 

Luis Velez, Chief 

Colorado Springs Police Department, CO 

Jeff Copp, SAIC 

Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

(Colorado & Wyoming) 

Kurt Dobbs, Director 

Wyoming DCI 

Bob Fecht, Chief 

Cheyenne Police Department, WY 

Terry Stuart, SAC 

Internal Revenue Service/CID 

(Colorado & Wyoming) 

Gerald Whitman, Chief 

Denver Police Department, CO 

William Leone, U.S. Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office 

(Colorado) 

Dave Weaver, Sheriff 

Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, CO 

Kathleen Roberts, Inspector in 

Charge 

U.S. Postal Service 

(Colorado, Utah & Wyoming) 

Stan Hilkey, Sheriff 

Mesa County Sheriff’s Office, CO 

Bill Mercer, U.S. Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office 

(Montana) 

Rick Dinse, Chief 

Salt Lake City Police Department, UT 

Paul Warner, U.S. Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office (Utah) 

Buzz Nielsen, Chief 

West Valley Police Department, UT 

Matt Mead, U.S. Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office 

(Wyoming) 

26 
 

2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Participating Agencies 

• Adams County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• American Fork (Utah) Police Department 

• Arapahoe County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Arvada (Colorado) Police Department 

• Aurora (Colorado) Police Department 

• Billings (Montana) Police Department 

• Boulder County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Boulder (Colorado) Police Department 

• Bountiful (Utah) Police Department 

• Brighton (Colorado) Police Department 

• Broomfield (Colorado) Police Department 

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

• Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

• Campbell County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• Carbondale (Colorado) Police Department 

• Casper (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Cascade County (Montana) Sheriff’s Office 

• Cheyenne (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Clearfield (Utah) Police Department 

• Colorado Bureau of Investigations 

• Colorado Department of Corrections 

• Colorado Judicial District Attorney’s Offices – 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 17th, 19th, 20th 

• Colorado National Guard 

• Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department 

• Colorado State Patrol 

• Colorado State University Police Department 

• Commerce City (Colorado) Police Department 

• Craig (Colorado) Police Department 

• Davis County (Utah) Sheriff’s Office

• Denver (Colorado) District Attorney’s Office 

• Denver (Colorado) Police Department 

• Douglas County (Colorado) Government 

• Drug Enforcement Administration 

• El Paso County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Englewood (Colorado) Police Department 

• Erie (Colorado) Police Department 

• Evanston (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation 

• Federal Heights (Colorado) Police Department 

• Flathead County (Montana) Sheriff’s Office 

• Fort Collins (Colorado) Police Services 

27 
 

2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Participating Agencies continued... 

• Fountain (Colorado) Police Department 

• Garfield County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Gillette (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Glenwood Springs (Colorado) Police Department 

• Golden (Colorado) Police Department 

• Grand County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Grand Junction (Colorado) Police Department 

• Great Falls (Montana) Police Department 

• Green River (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Greenwood Village (Colorado) Police Department 

• Hurricane (Utah) Police Department 

• Ignacio (Colorado) Police Department 

• Internal Revenue Service 

• Jefferson County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Kalispell (Montana) Police Department 

• Kaysville (Utah) Police Department 

• Lafayette (Colorado) Police Department 

• Lakewood (Colorado) Police Department 

• LaPlata County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Laramie County (Wyoming) District Attorney’s Office 

• Laramie County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• Laramie (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Larimer County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Laurel (Montana) Police Department 

• Layton (Utah) Police Department 

• Lehi (Utah) Police Department 

• Lewis and Clark County (Montana) Attorney’s Office 

• Littleton (Colorado) Police Department 

• Louisville (Colorado) Police Department 

• Loveland (Colorado) Police Department 

• Mesa County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Midvale (Utah) Police Department 

• Missoula (Montana) Police Department 

• Missoula County (Montana) Sheriff’s Office 

• Moffat County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Montana Department of Corrections 

• Montana Division of Criminal Investigation 

• Murray City (Utah) Police Department 

• Natrona County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• Northglenn (Colorado) Police Department 

• Orem (Utah) Police Department 

28 
 

2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Participating Agencies continued... 

• Payson (Utah) Police Department 

• Pleasant Grove (Utah) Police Department 

• Provo (Utah) Police Department 

• Pueblo (Colorado) Police Department 

• Rangely (Colorado) Police Department 

• Rifle (Colorado) Police Department 

• Rio Blanco County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Routt County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• St. George (Utah) Police Department 

• Salt Lake City (Utah) Police Department 

• Salt Lake County (Utah) District Attorney’s Office 

• Salt Lake County (Utah) Sheriff’s Office 

• Salt Lake (Utah) District Attorney 

• Sandy (Utah) Police Department 

• Sheridan (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Sheridan County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• South Jordan (Utah) Police Department 

• Spanish Fork (Utah) Police Department 

• Springville (Utah) Police Department 

• Steamboat Springs (Colorado) Police Department 

• Sweetwater County (Wyoming) District Attorney’s Office 

• Sweetwater County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• Teller County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office 

• Teton County (Montana) Sheriff’s Office 

• Thornton (Colorado) Police Department 

• Torrington (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Uinta County (Wyoming) Sheriff’s Office 

• United States Attorney’s Offices – Colorado, Montana, Utah and Wyoming 

• United States Marshal’s Service 

• University of Colorado Police Department 

• Utah County (Utah) Sheriff’s Office

• Utah Department of Public Safety 

• Utah National Guard 

• Washington County (Utah) District Attorney’s Office 

• Washington County (Utah) Sheriff’s Office 

• West Jordan (Utah) Police Department 

• West Valley City (Utah) Police Department 

• Westminster (Colorado) Police Department 

• Wheat Ridge (Colorado) Police Department 

• Wheatland (Wyoming) Police Department 

• Whitefish (Montana) Police Department 

• Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 

29 
 

30 

2005 Rocky Mountain HIDTA Participating Agencies continued... 

• Wyoming 7th Judicial District Attorney’s Office 

• Wyoming Highway Patrol 

• Yellowstone County (Montana) Sheriff’s Office 
Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2005 Annual Report 

INVESTIGATIVE INITIATIVES 

ts

Arres 

Seizures in Pounds Unless Noted 

Heroin 

Cocaine 

Crack 

Marijuana 

Marijuana 

plants 

Meth 

ICE 

Club Drugs 

Dosage Units 

Hallucgns 

Dosage Units 

Pharm/lbs 

Dosage Units 

COLORADO Boulder DTF 64 0.02 3.60 0.01 19.4 1,162 1.2 0.00 0.20 1,081 2.00 261 0 398 

Colo Sprngs Metro TF 519 0.04 82.8 1.6 137.6 1,169 4.2 34.9 0 22 0 4,000 0 851 Financial TF 17 0 0 0.00 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8 0 

Front Range TF 63 6.6 69.6 0.04 1,595 0 2.3 14.9 0 1,000 0 0 0 0 Fugitive TF 572 0 3.3 0 0 0 5.4 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 

GRAMNET 65 0 0.6 0.03 2.40 101 1.3 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 58 

Larimer County DTF 175 0.7 12.7 0 82.40 1,894 10.8 0 0 0 1.3 0 0 496 

Metro Gang TF 91 0 9.6 3.9 105.6 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 

North Metro TF 312 2.3 59.9 3.4 141.3 718 26 0 0 25 0 45 0 4,075 

South Metro TF 96 0.2 4.6 1.1 444 235 6.9 0 0 1,061 0 31 0 505 

Southern Colo TF 71 0.18 120.4 0 376.4 530 18.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 567 

Southwest Colo TF 56 0 0.2 0 62.30 176 0 10.5 0 10 0.1 0 0 325 

TRIDENT 66 0.08 1.2 0.01 4.50 4 0 0.4 0 0 0 246 0 82 

Weld County DTF 147 0 4.4 0 4.8 389 0 8.5 0 3,297 0 0 0 0 

West Metro DTF 298 0.3 27.1 1.1 129.8 1,260 22.2 0 0 6,093 0.6 0 0.00 445 

Western CO DTF 97 0 26.7 0 235.9 12,247 0.00 58.4 0 108 0.9 0 0.3 0 

Subtotal: 2,709 10.42 426.70 11.19 3,184.10 19,885 99.30 127.60 0.20 13,197 4.95 4,583 3.10 7,852 

MONTANA 

Central MT DTF 94 0.00 0.06 0.00 13.00 7 0.09 3.90 0.00 0 0.00 9 0.00 125 Eastern MT DTF 364 0.00 0.60 1.50 146.50 74 3.10 0.00 0.00 24 2.00 0 0.00 0 Missoula County DTF 282 0.40 3.80 0.00 536.80 1,140 5.50 0.00 0.00 0 0.03 0 0.00 1,271 Missouri River DTF 139 0.01 0.20 0.00 11.80 0 4.30 0.00 0.00 41 0.00 0 0.00 364 Northwest MT DTF 268 0.00 0.05 0.00 510.80 167 0.00 2.70 0.00 0 0.30 0 0.00 378 Subtotal: 1,147 0.41 4.71 1.50 1,218.90 1,388 12.99 6.60 0.00 65 2.33 9 0.00 2,138 
Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2005 Annual Report 

NVESTIGATIVE INITIATIVES 

ts

Arres 

Seizures in Pounds Unless Noted 

Heroin 

Cocaine 

Crack 

Marijuana 

Marijuana Plants 

Meth 

ICE 

Club Drugs 

Dosage Units 

Hallcngns 

Dosage Units 

Pharm/lbs 

Dosage Units 

UTAH Davis Metro TF 94 0.07 13.10 0.00 7.60 6 13.20 0.00 0.00 0 0.02 0 0.00 1,710 

Salt Lake Metro TF 149 9.80 24.40 0.00 90.50 0 44.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 UT County Major Crimes TF 543 7.20 9.30 0.00 168.50 31 14.00 0.00 0.00 71 0.00 0 0.00 744 

UFIT 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.70 74 0.30 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.08 0 

Washington County TF 215 0.02 20.70 0.00 22.90 523 8.90 0.00 0.00 5 0.00 12 0.00 525 

Weber/Morgan TF 317 0.00 11.50 0.20 15.50 142 25.80 0.00 0.00 0 0.20 0 0.00 249 

Subtotal: 1,336 17.09 79.00 0.20 322.70 776 106.20 0.00 0.00 76 0.22 12 0.08 3,228 

WYOMING 

Wyoming CEET 171 0.00 0.50 0.00 16.90 14 6.50 0.00 0.30 0 0.90 0 2.80 0 

Wyoming NEET 108 0.00 1.10 0.00 3.20 0 5.20 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 Wyoming SEET 137 0.00 0.20 0.20 71.50 260 0.50 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.03 0 

Wyoming SWET 136 0.00 40.20 0.00 1.10 16 6.90 0.00 0.03 0 0.00 0 0.30 0 Subtotal: 552 0.00 42.00 0.20 92.70 290 19.10 0.00 0.33 0 0.90 0 3.13 0 

 TOTAL: 5,744 27.92 552.41 13.09 4,818.40 22,339 237.59 134.20 0.53 13,338 8.40 4,604 3.18 13,218 

INTERDICTION INITIATIVES 

CO Crim Interdiction 152 0.4 76.3 0.07 1,903 18 2.4 9.6 0.00 915 0.04 0 0.00 2,289 Denver Interdict. TF 37 0.07 94.20 0.60 181.00 0 0.00 0.00 4.00 0 0.01 0 0.00 460 UT Crim Interdiction 143 0.60 403.40 0.00 2,218.90 0 0.00 166.00 0.00 148 1.70 0 0.00 656 WY Crim Interdiction 85 7.00 206.70 0.00 2,250.00 0 12.50 46.90 0.00 4,000 3.20 0 0.00 698 Total: 417 8.07 780.60 0.67 6,552.50 18 14.90 222.50 4.00 5,063 4.95 0 0.00 4,103 GRAND TOTAL: 6,161 35.99 1,333.01 13.76 11,370.90 22,357 252.49 356.70 4.53 18,401 13.35 4,604 3.18 17,321 
DTO's/MLO's/Gangs Drug Loads

Initiative

Targeted

Disrupted 

Dismantled

Intercept

Deliver

Invest

Outside

RMHIDTA

Refer/assist 

inside 

RMHIDTA

Assist 

outside 

RMHIDTA

Wire

COLORADO

Boulder TF 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Colorado Springs TF 5 2 0 0 1 4 0 0 

Financial TF 10 1 1 1 3 4 2 0 

Front Range TF 30 9 0 0 7 15 2 4/1

Fugitive TF n/a n/a n/a n/a 8 4 7 n/a 

GRAMNET 7 1 3 2 5 0 0 0 

Larimer County DTF 6 6 0 1 0 3 0 0 

Metro Gang TF 8 1 0 0 4 3 3 1/3 

North Metro TF 10 5 0 5 0 7 2 1/1 

South Metro TF 18 2 0 0 1 7 0 0 Southern Colo TF 10 5 0 2 8 6 0 10/2

Southwest Colo TF 8 3 0 0 3 1 2 2/2 

TRIDENT 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Weld County DTF 4 1 0 0 2 3 0 2/2 

West Metro TF 9 2 42 0 0 1 0 0 

Western CO DTF 7 1 29 2 21 5 1 0 

Subtotal: 146 41 72 13 63 62 19 20/4

MONTANA

Central Montana DTF 7 2 0 0 6 3 0 0 

Eastern Montana DTF 7 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 

Missoula County DTF 4 3 0 0 2 6 0 0 

Missouri River DTF 8 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 Northwest Mont DTF 6 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 

Subtotal: 32 13 0 0 18 11 0 0 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS 

INVESTIGATIVE INITIATIVES 
INVESTIGATIVE INITIATIVES 

DTO's/MLO's/Gangs Drug Loads

Initiative

Targeted

Disrupted 

Dismantled

Intercept

Deliver

Invest

Outside

RMHIDTA

Refer/assist 

inside 

RMHIDTA

Assist 

outside 

RMHIDTA

Wire

UTAH

Davis Metro TF 9 2 0 1 2 10 1 0 

Salt Lake Metro TF 15 5 7 2 6 5 2 5/1

Utah County TF 13 7 0 0 2 2 2 0 

UFIT 5 2 0 0 6 6 2 0 

Washington County TF 9 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 

Weber/Morgan TF 7 3 3 6 0 0 3 1/2 Subtotal: 58 21 10 9 16 26 10 6/1

WYOMING

Wyoming CEET 4 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 

Wyoming NEET 9 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 

Wyoming SEET 6 3 0 0 7 2 1 0 

Wyoming SWET 10 4 0 0 3 2 0 0 

Subtotal: 29 13 1 0 15 6 2 0 

TOTAL: 265 88 83 22 112 105 31 26/5
INTERDICTION INITIATIVES 

DTO's/MLO's/Gangs Drug Loads

Initiative

Targeted

Disrupted 

Dismantled

Intercept

Deliver

Invest

Outside

RMHIDTA

Refer/assist 

inside 

RMHIDTA

Assist 

outside 

RMHIDTA

Wire

CO Crim Interdict n/a n/a 74 2 53 26 0 n/a Denver Interdict. TF n/a n/a 27 5 0 9 2 n/a UT Crim Interdic n/a n/a 87 3 94 75 0 n/a WY Crim Interdict n/a n/a 85 0 50 71 n/a n/a TOTAL: n/a n/a 273 10 197 181 2 n/a 

GRAND 

TOTAL: 265 88 356 32 309 286 33 26/5