# Togo - United States Department of State

- Togo National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the people of the United States, I offer congratulations to the people of Togo as you celebrate the 64th anniversary of your nation’s independence. The partnership between the United States and Togo remains firmly rooted in the advancement of stability and peace throughout the world. We appreciate your commitment and diplomacy in support of the promotion of resilience in the region.The United States stands beside Togo as a close partner on your Independence Day. We look forward to expanding our partnership and deepening our commitment to shared values over the coming year						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State																								Togo
- 2024 Interagency Fact Sheets HomeU.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability &#8230;2024 Interagency Fact Sheets				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										2024 Interagency Fact Sheets																																																																										The following fact sheets were created to provide a snapshot of efforts under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) in each priority country/region.  Each fact sheet details the main objectives and lists a sample of activities that the wider U.S. government is leveraging for SPCPS.Coastal West AfricaHaitiLibyaMozambiquePapua New Guinea						Tags																					Benin																								Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations																								Côte d&#039;Ivoire																								Ghana																								Guinea																								Haiti																								Libya																								Mozambique																								Papua New Guinea																								Togo
- Togo HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Togo				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Togo																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Togo during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by government or on behalf of government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists and enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence and child, early, and forced marriage; enforcement of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.The government took limited steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Violent extremist organizations committed numerous abuses during incursions into the country’s territory. The government made some efforts to investigate these abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were unverified reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, human rights organizations and opposition leaders claimed Kossi Bamoibe died at Lome Civil Prison on June 6 of physical abuse and inadequate healthcare. In 2020 authorities arrested Bamoibe in connection with the Tiger Revolution affair.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no confirmed reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices; however, there were multiple reports government officials employed disproportionate use of force equaling cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. For example, human rights organizations reported systemic physical mistreatment of political detainees.On June 7, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice asked the government to investigate acts of torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment suffered by the 10 detainees arrested in the Tiger Revolution affair and to prosecute the authors of those acts.Impunity remained a problem in the security forces, including police, gendarmes, and the armed forces.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions and detention center conditions remained harsh and potentially life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding was a serious problem. According to the Association for the Prevention of Torture’s May 13 report, detention facilities had severe overcrowding, with most of the country’s prisons operating at more than 180 percent of their capacity.Medical facilities, food, sanitation, ventilation, and lighting were inadequate. According to the inmates’ Legal Club at the Lome Civil Prison, prisoners did not have access to potable water, and disease was widespread.Administration: Although authorities allowed prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of inhuman conditions, they rarely investigated complaints and, when they did, did not release their findings. The government rarely monitored or investigated allegations of inhuman prison and detention center conditions received from other sources.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted accredited organizations to visit prisons every day, including local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The government required access agreements, and such groups as the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international human rights organizations had such agreements. These NGOs were generally independent and acted without government interference. Nevertheless, some NGOs noted instances in which they had received authorization to conduct a visit but were denied access upon arrival, most often when visiting political prisoners alleging mistreatment by prison guards. Security forces monitored visits to the Central Intelligence and Criminal Investigation Service predetention facility, but they did not allow NGO representatives and prisoners to speak in confidence. Authorities generally denied requests by journalists to visit prisons.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government did not always observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law authorized judges, senior police officials, prefects, and mayors to issue arrest warrants. Detainees had the right to be informed of the charges against them, and police generally respected this right. The law provided for a suspect to be brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours of arrest. Although the law stipulated a judge conduct a pretrial investigation to examine the adequacy of evidence and to decide on bail, authorities often held detainees without bail for lengthy periods regardless of a judge’s decision. Attorneys and family members had the right to see a detainee after 48 to 96 hours of detention, but authorities often delayed or denied access. All defendants had the right to an attorney, and the bar association sometimes provided attorneys for indigents charged with criminal offenses. The law gave indigent defendants the right to free legal representation, but the government provided only partial funding for counsel. Abuses of legal protections were supposedly subject to internal disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, but investigations and prosecutions seldom occurred.Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities continued to engage in arbitrary arrest. Djagoundi Rakeya, arrested in July 2022 for circulating audio messages on displaced populations, was released on June 7 after a presidential pardon.Also in July 2022, Amnesty International raised concerns regarding abusive arrests by authorities as part of the fight against violent extremist organizations.Pretrial Detention: A shortage of judges and other qualified personnel, as well as official inaction, often resulted in pretrial detention for periods exceeding the maximum sentence for the alleged crime, in many cases by more than 12 months. Human rights organizations reported the use of prolonged preventive detention.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not consistently respect judicial independence and impartiality. The executive branch exerted control over the judiciary, and judicial corruption was a problem. A widespread public perception existed that lawyers and litigants bribed judges to influence the outcome of cases. The court system remained overburdened and understaffed.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but executive influence on the judiciary limited this right. Defendants faced long delays in trials and denial of access to attorneys.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						The Committee for the Liberation of All Political Prisoners in Togo stated there were more than 100 political detainees. These persons did not receive the same protections given to other prisoners and detainees. Human rights organizations reported it was difficult for political detainees to find legal counsel as the government intimidated attorneys. Human rights and humanitarian organizations had limited access to them, and prisoners and detainees could not see family members as required by law.On April 26, human rights organizations publicized the arbitrary detention since January 2022 of Tchassanti Nouridine Sebabe-Gueffe, Ibrahim Alfa, and Abdou-Razakou Boukari. The organizations considered the detainees to be political prisoners, and emphasized the detentions continued despite an August 2022 Appeal Court’s decision ordering their release.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, but there were exceptions. Under the state of emergency established in the northern Savanes Region in June 2022, security forces could conduct searches without warrants and could search houses at any time and for any reason. They could also arrest anyone they suspected of membership and complicity in extremist organizations and detain them beyond legal custody periods.Freedom House noted the law gave authorities greater authority to conduct surveillance in cases of spreading “fake news” or breaches of public morality.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The regional fight against terrorist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin continued and escalated in the Burkina Faso-Togo-Benin triborder area, with frequent incursions of external violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the north of the country.Killings: VEOs conducted attacks in the Savanes Region, especially in the Kpendjal, Kpendjal-West, Cinkasse, and Tone Prefectures. VEOs killed security forces and civilians seen as informants for the government or community leaders. This practice extended to government representatives, village chiefs, and religious leaders who were subjected to repeated threats. The press and NGOs reported this situation led to the abandonment of farmland and substantial internal displacements and created a humanitarian crisis. On February 10, militants killed 31 village canton leaders and other local authorities after kidnapping them.Abductions: Militant groups and criminals kidnapped dozens of individuals.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: In August, an NGO reported security forces detained and whipped NGO workers and a journalist traveling in their company in the Savanes Region, purportedly because they did not have permission to be in the emergency area.The government continued to enforce its security presence throughout the Savanes Region, with several new checkpoints and procedures to verify the identity of travelers, including checking traveler cell phone logs. Residents reported growing public suspicion and hate speech against the Fulbe community living in the prefecture, fueled further by social media. Human rights groups reported concerns of increased arbitrary arrests of members of the Fulbe community.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Although the constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, the government restricted these rights.Freedom of Expression: The law criminalized “hate speech” and added restrictions on discussion of political or religious concerns or matters of public interest.Violence and Harassment: On March 15, a court sentenced journalists Ferdinand Ayite and Isidore Kouwonu to three year’s imprisonment for criminal insult and publishing false news. After they fled the country, authorities issued an international arrest warrant. They both worked for the newspaper L’Alternative.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The Press Code did not protect online media. The law imposed penalties on journalists deemed to have committed “serious errors,” such as privacy infringement; incitement of racial, ethnic, or religious hatred; apology for war crimes, sedition, or terrorism; and dissemination of defamatory statements. The High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication attempted to regulate online media and required media to be hosted under the government domain name before it issued publishing authorization.Libel/Slander Laws: Libel and slander were criminal offenses. Human rights organizations reported the government used these laws to restrict public discussion and retaliate against journalists.National Security: Authorities cited a national security law to deter criticism of government policies and officials, especially allegations of corruption and mismanagement of COVID-19 funds, and the government’s response to the security crisis in the north of the country.																Internet Freedom						The law criminalized the dissemination of false information online and the production and sharing of data which undermined “order, public security, or breach of human dignity.” Human rights organizations reported the law continued to contribute to an atmosphere of “restricted civic space,” an environment in which citizens self-censored due to the risk of being punished for sharing thoughts and opinions.The government occasionally restricted or disrupted access to the internet or censored online content. Amnesty international Togo and other human rights organizations reported frequent government blocking of access to their online platforms, government cyberattacks to undermine their work, and the government’s use of trolls to manipulate their social media engagement on human rights matters.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, although the government sometimes restricted these rights.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law imposed restrictions on the time, place, frequency, and application process for holding public demonstrations. The law prohibited demonstrations on all major roads; in urban centers; zones of economic activity deemed key; and areas close to government institutions, military sites, and diplomatic buildings. Protests could only take place between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., and protesters had to follow a single route designated by authorities.The government continued to ban civil society or opposition meetings and rallies against government corruption, citing security risks and failure to comply with administrative requirements. Regulations required organizations to seek permission from local prefects and mayors to hold a meeting or any activity in a specific area. In some cases, local authorities required the leaders of organizations to provide detailed personal information, including their income, in addition to a letter requesting authorization.On April 6, the government renewed the Savanes Region state of emergency for an additional year. This state of emergency “prohibits movement and assembly of people on the public highway,” and allowed police and military to question any person “whose behavior may lead to the belief that there is a risk that this person could commit an attack,” according to comments made on national television in 2022 by the minister of territorial administration.						Freedom of Association						The law potentially restricted freedom of association since it granted broad powers to the government to target suspected terrorists.Regulation closely controlled civil society organization and NGO governance, including requiring them to reregister by midyear. An executive order imposed programming restrictions on international NGOs and terminated certain tax privileges. Ministerial orders granted broad power to local administrations regarding the suspension and authorization of NGO activities north of Lome, the coastal capital city.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.In-country Movement: Authorities continued a state of emergency in the northern Savanes Region. The increase in checkpoints negatively impacted market activity and the freedom of movement of civilians.Foreign Travel: The government monitored the foreign travel of opposition leaders, civil society activists, and union leaders. Authorities required them to seek permission to travel outside the country and delayed their requests to renew their national identity cards and passports.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government sometimes cooperated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. In March, the government rejected a UNHCR authorization request to establish an office in the Savanes Region. Starting in April, the government did not permit international organizations and some local NGOs to travel to the Savanes Region to conduct refugee verification exercises and needs assessments prior to starting humanitarian and economic empowerment programs. Consequently, the scale of protection concerns and material needs remained unknown. The government did not allow UNHCR to share registered refugee information with the World Food Program (WFP). Consequently, WFP was not able to target food assistance for Burkinabe refugees.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government established a system for providing protection to refugees. According to local observers, the government conducted time-consuming individual refugee status determinations for the Burkinabe, resulting in inaccurate figures on exact refugee counts and delays in these vulnerable populations receiving necessary support. UNHCR encouraged the government to grant prima facie refugee status to the Burkinabe or expedite the process by granting automatic asylum to certain categories of Burkinabe, such as women and children, as permitted under the law. Since March, UNHCR was not able to update Burkinabe refugee numbers due to access problems in the north.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										The government in 2022 ordered the evacuation of 15 villages in the northeast to serve as a military zone against violent extremists. In an interview on April 27, President Faure Gnassingbe reaffirmed this policy. In the Kpendjal Prefecture, a limited number of farmers were allowed to access their fields during the day, but not to remain overnight. The International Organization for Migration reported as many as 13,274 internally displaced persons in the prefecture, and estimated there were 18,500 conflict-related IDPs nationwide. Their status and treatment were unclear because authorities did not conduct a thorough assessment of needs and they limited access by humanitarian agencies for “security reasons.” Approximately 4,000 citizens self-evacuated in 2022, many registering their displacement after the terrorist attacks of that summer. Also in 2022, Episcopal clergy in Dapaong reported caring for 3,128 persons in the Tone Prefecture alone. The Dapaong-based United Nations Development Program and NGO Plan International representatives confirmed displaced persons were difficult to track because they arrived one or two families at a time and might not register with authorities due to mistrust and suspicion.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, and citizens exercised that ability.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: International observation delegations from ECOWAS and the African Union declared the 2020 presidential elections to be generally free and fair, despite some irregularities. The government excluded some groups from observing the election, including the Episcopal Council for Justice and Peace.In 2018 parliamentary elections, ECOWAS commended “the effective conduct of free and transparent legislative elections,” although expressing regret that 14 opposition parties boycotted those elections.Political Parties and Political Participation: The ruling Union of the Republic (UNIR) dominated politics and maintained firm control over all levels of government. UNIR membership conferred advantages such as better access to government jobs and contracts.The law centralized authority for organizing elections in an independent national election commission but defined its voting board in a way which left it dominated by the UNIR and the government.A reform of the political parties’ law in May 2022 banned dual and naturalized citizens from founding political parties.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Some observers believed gender-based violence, social discrimination, and limited financial resources constrained women, persons with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons from voting, running for office, serving as electoral monitors, or otherwise participating in political life. LGBTQI+ organizations could register as health groups but could not register to advocate for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. Members of southern ethnic groups remained underrepresented in the civil service and the military.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						Although the law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous allegations of government corruption.Corruption: On February 1, the Court of Auditors released a report citing significant irregularities in the management of COVID-19 funds. The report pinpointed the prime minister’s office, the ministers of digital economy, health, communication, grassroots development, education, and commerce, and the National Coordination Committee for the Management of the Response to COVID-19 for the mismanagement of the response to COVID-19. This report particularly identified the minister of digital economy as responsible for the mismanagement of 13,169,951,746 CFA francs ($21.8 million) and criticized the minister’s refusal to cooperate with the auditors.The report was widely discussed on local radio stations and social media with individuals calling for the resignation of the prime minister and other government officials. The government denied allegations of misappropriation, and the human rights minister, the former communications minister, and the minister secretary general declared the debate should be ended, threatening the public and journalists with charges of ‘’slander’’ for future discussion of the matter.On February 9, President of the Supreme Court and Chair of the Council of Judges Professor Abdoulaye Yaya declared “corruption is the second most practiced sport in the country after soccer.”On July 18, Coalition Lidaw, a group of civil society organizations, released a budget analysis of the Ministry of Grassroots Development from 2009 to 2023. This study revealed significant irregularities in funds allocation, expenditures, procedures, award of contracts, and poor monitoring and evaluation of programs.The results of an Afrobarometer survey revealed citizens perceived a rise in government corruption and had a deficit of trust in authorities. They particularly lacked confidence in the government to publish reliable statistics on COVID-19.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating, and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were rarely cooperative and responsive to their views.Retribution Against Human Rights Defenders: Human rights organizations encouraged the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) to take a more active role in protecting human rights defenders.Government Human Rights Bodies: A permanent human rights committee within the National Assembly did not play a significant policy-making role or exercise independent judgment. The CNDH was the government body charged with investigating allegations of human rights abuses, proposing new policies and laws, and protecting human rights activists. The CNDH was nominally independent and somewhat effective in its investigations and deliberations. It continued to arrange meetings of human rights organizations and to visit prisons.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of women and men and addressed spousal rape and other forms of domestic, intimate partner, and sexual violence, but authorities did not generally enforce it effectively. The law provided for five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a substantial fine for rape. Spousal rape was punishable by up to 720 hours of community service and a smaller fine. A prison term of 20 to 30 years applied if the survivor was younger than 14; was gang raped; or the rape resulted in pregnancy, disease, or incapacitation lasting more than six weeks.Domestic violence against women was widespread. According to the NGO GF2D, most women were not aware of the formal judicial mechanisms designed to protect them. The government and women’s human rights organizations made some efforts to combat rape and domestic violence. For example, they had several locations where women survivors could shelter, and the government provided full legal aid to the survivors of sexual violence.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law prohibited FGM/C for girls and women. The most common form of FGM/C was excision, usually performed a few months after birth. According to UNICEF data from 2020, FGM/C was performed on 70 girls in the Savanes Region and one girl in the Maritime Region. Also in 2020, GF2D reported less than 1 percent of girls underwent FGM/C. The government sponsored educational seminars on FGM/C and initiated FGM/C prevention programs. Several domestic NGOs, with international assistance, organized campaigns to educate women on their rights and how to care for survivors of FGM/C. NGOs also worked to create alternative labor opportunities for former FGM/C perpetrators.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Widespread sexual harassment in the workplace, gender-based violence, violence against widows, and bride kidnapping persisted.Discrimination: The law provided for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including under family, religious, and personal status, laws related to labor or employment, property, inheritance, access to credit, and owning or managing businesses or property. Discrimination persisted in nationality laws and the maintenance of polygamy, with the consent of the first wife as one of the options for marriage.In urban areas, women and girls dominated informal market activities and commerce. Harsh economic conditions in rural areas, where most of the population lived, left women with little time for activities other than domestic tasks and agricultural fieldwork. While the formal legal system superseded the traditional system, the government did not enforce the law effectively, and the courts were slow, distant, and expensive to access; rural women were effectively subjected to traditional or customary practices. There were no restrictions on women signing contracts, opening bank accounts, or owning property.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Legal, social, and cultural barriers to sexual and reproductive health included poverty, the lack of education regarding sexual and reproductive health, and the classification of contraceptive services as nonemergency services, leading to delays in providing those services. Emergency contraception was not available as part of the family planning method mix.The government provided access to limited sexual and reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors. Emergency contraception was available as part of the clinical management of rape.According to UNICEF, the maternal mortality rate was 399 per 100,000 live births. In July, Amnesty International Togo reported factors contributing to the high mortality rate included understaffing, dilapidated equipment, and poor quality of care in both urban and rural areas.While there were no legal barriers related to menstruation or access to menstruation hygiene, social and cultural barriers had a negative impact on menstruation hygiene management and on women and girls’ ability to participate equally in society. A 2017 government-funded study surveyed 788 young women and girls from ages 10 to 24 on menstrual hygiene management. The study indicated women and girls were prohibited by their parents (62.5 percent of respondents) and by the culture (20.2 percent of respondents) from performing activities during menstruation such as cooking, seeking water and wood, praying, eating with family, and engaging in sexual intercourse. Lack of private washroom facilities in schools led some women and girls to return home during menstruation out of a desire for privacy. The study reported some girls left school entirely due to menstrual hygiene management problems.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law stated citizens were equal before the law without privilege or deprivation based on race or ethnicity. Northern ethnic groups, especially the Kabye tribe, dominated the civil and military services. The government did not enforce the law effectively.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law criminalized child abuse including sexual abuse, defined as any sexual relationship or touching by an adult of a child younger than 16. Child abuse was a widespread problem. The government worked with local NGOs on public-awareness campaigns to prevent exploitation of children.The government maintained a telephone hotline for persons to report cases of child abuse and connect with resources. The hotline provided information on the rights of the child, legal procedures, and access to social workers who could intervene in emergencies. Additionally, the government worked with UNICEF to train teachers on children’s rights and included human rights education in elementary school curricula.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal ages for marriage were 18 for girls and 20 for boys, although both could marry at younger ages with parental consent. The government did not effectively enforce these minimum age requirements.The government and NGOs engaged in a range of actions to prevent early marriage, particularly through awareness raising among community and religious leaders. Multiple initiatives focused on helping girls stay in school. Messages broadcast through media, particularly local radio, stressed avoiding early marriage and the importance of educating girls.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the commercial sexual exploitation of children, including the sale, offer, or use of children for commercial sex, pedophilia, practices related to child pornography, grooming behavior, and sex trafficking. The law was not effectively enforced. The law defined 16 as the minimum age of consensual sexual conduct. Reported abuses included instances of rape of a child, illicit relationships with children, and the circulation of child pornography via social media networks.																																				Antisemitism										There was no known Jewish community, and there were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law prohibited “acts against nature committed with an individual of one’s sex,” widely understood as a reference to same-sex sexual conduct. The law also prohibited “the promotion of same-sex conduct,” understood to restrict and criminalize sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, as well as advocacy for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons.The law was enforced, although LGBTQI+ persons were rarely punished or jailed under these specific statutes. On those occasions when police arrested someone for engaging in consensual same-sex sexual conduct, the justification was usually an infraction such as a “shameless or unnatural act.” The government often did not bring charges under any statute, or following arrest chose not to prosecute. Apparently neutral laws were disproportionately applied to LGBTQI+ persons, such as immorality or loitering laws. There were no credible efforts to rescind laws applied in a discriminatory fashion to LGBTQI+ persons, such as the “acts against nature” law.Violence and Harassment: Police and other government officials tolerated violence against LGBTQI+ individuals. LGBTQI+ persons were subjected to death threats, physical assault, and intimidation. NGO leaders working with the LGBTQI+ community received threatening messages.Discrimination: Antidiscrimination law did not apply to LGBTQI+ persons. LGBTQI+ persons faced societal discrimination in employment, housing, and access to education and health care.The majority of LGBTQI+ persons did not report discrimination and abuses in view of the stigma and potential criminal consequences.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: No law allowed persons to change gender markers on government-issued identity documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were religious programs for so-called conversion therapy. There were no known surgeries performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons. Authorities and medical associations did not endorse such therapies or surgeries.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Criminal statutes and community self-censorship inhibited most human rights organizations, individuals, and media from addressing LGBTQI+ concerns or engaging in advocacy. LGBTQI+ groups could register with the Ministry of Territorial Affairs as health-related groups, particularly those focused on HIV and AIDS prevention, but not as groups promoting the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. The CNDH stated it advocated for LGBTQI+ community members’ release from police custody when LGBTQI+ individuals believed they were safe enough to request CNDH advocacy.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, employment, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law did not mandate such accessibility.The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, mental, intellectual, and sensory disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce these prohibitions. Societal discrimination against persons with disabilities was a problem.The Ministry of Social Action conducted awareness campaigns to fight discrimination and promote equality; it also distributed food and clothing and provided skills training to persons with disabilities.While children with disabilities attended schools at all levels, with some attending schools specifically for persons with disabilities, negative perceptions of children with disabilities often excluded them from school. School attendance rates of children with disabilities were unavailable, as was information on possible abuses.The law did not restrict the right of persons with disabilities to vote and participate in civic affairs, although lack of accessible buildings and transportation precluded some from doing so.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Persons with HIV and AIDS faced some societal discrimination. There were cases of family abandonment when HIV-positive status was discovered, and the perception persisted that HIV and AIDS were religious punishment for wrongdoing.The law prohibited discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS, and the government sponsored broadcasts aimed at deterring discrimination. The government’s National Council for the Fight against AIDS (CNLS) had a mandate to prevent discrimination against individuals living with HIV and AIDS. The CNLS conducted awareness-raising programs, training, and other activities.Discrimination against migratory workers occurred, as job advertisements generally specified citizenship as a requirement for employment.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution provided for the right of workers, except security force members (including firefighters and police), to form and join unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. Supporting regulations allowed workers to form and join unions of their choosing under restrictive conditions. Those who wished to form a union had to obtain written authorization from a mayor. Children younger than age 18 who were authorized to work could not join unions, except with the authorization of a parent or guardian. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination.While workers had the right to strike, they could be ordered back to work if the government determined it necessary for the security and well-being of the population. Unions were obliged to seek dialogue with the employer before filing a strike notice. The government could legally requisition public workers in the event of a strike, and workers who refused to participate could be subjected to up to six days of forced labor. While no legal provisions protected strikers against employer retaliation, the law required employers to obtain an authorizing judgment from the labor inspectorate before they could fire workers on strike. If employees were fired illegally, including for union activity, they had to be reinstated and compensated for lost salary. The law creating an export-processing zone (EPZ) allowed EPZ workers to form unions but exempted companies within the EPZ from providing workers with many legal protections, including protection against antiunion discrimination regarding hiring and firing.The government generally enforced legal provisions regarding freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, particularly outside the EPZ, but if parties engaged in collective bargaining did not reach agreement, the government could compel arbitration. Penalties were not commensurate with those under other laws involving denial of civil rights and were never applied against violators.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings /.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The National Collective Bargaining Agreement set minimum wages for different labor categories, ranging from unskilled through professional positions. The minimum wage was above the poverty line. Employers often paid less than the official minimum wage, mostly to unskilled workers.The government heavily regulated the labor market. Working hours, except in the agricultural sector, were not to exceed 40 hours per week. There were several categories of work allowing a range of base weekly hours from 42 to 56 hours per week. Working hours for employees in the agricultural sector were not to exceed 2,400 hours per year (46 hours per week). The law required overtime compensation and restricted excessive overtime work. The private sector seldom respected requirements on overtime pay.Alleged violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were most common in the mining sector and the EPZ.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were not appropriate for the main industries in the country. OSH inspectors actively worked to identify unsafe working conditions in addition to responding to workers’ OSH complaints.By law, workers could remove themselves from situations endangering health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. The law also provided protection for legal foreign workers.A 2019 government-commissioned study asserted the highest risk sectors included mining, manufacturing, construction, and public works.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce the law, and formal-sector employers often ignored applicable law. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient for enforcement actions. Labor inspectors had the right to conduct unannounced inspections and impose fines. Penalties were not commensurate with penalties for similar violations, were generally weak, and were sometimes applied. The technical consulting committee in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Dialogue could levy penalties on employers who did not meet wage, hour, and OSH laws.According to a 2019 government-commissioned study, more than 91 percent of the country’s workforce, both urban and rural, participated in the informal economy. Informal employment was found in virtually every sector of the economy including agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and public works. The law did not provide or enforce wage, hour, or OSH protections and inspections for workers in the informal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Togo
- Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Darby FitzSimmonsIn December 2002, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship – the So San – was in the Arabian Sea carrying missiles destined for Yemen. The U.S. alerted the Spanish navy, which had ships in the area and agreed to intercept the ship.The intelligence was right. Upon boarding the So San, Spanish naval personnel discovered 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, and 23 tanks of missile fuel, all hidden under bags of cement.However, after a day of back and forth between the U.S. and Yemeni governments, the ship was released. The U.S. said it lacked clear legal authority to seize the missile parts.Less than a year later, in October 2003, the U.S. and UK once again received intelligence that a ship, the BBC China, was carrying illicit cargo. U.S. government officials contacted German authorities who intercepted the ship. They found and permanently confiscated nuclear centrifuge parts destined for Libya. In 2018, PSI countries held a Mediterranean maritime exercise in the bay of Catania in Sicily. (State Department photo)The difference in outcome between these two events was no accident – it was the result of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003 by eleven like-minded countries, the PSI is a global effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.A Global EffortToday, there are 111 participating countries that endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. These include committing to stopping the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials, and enhancing relevant legal, diplomatic, financial, military, and law enforcement tools.Although the PSI does not have any formal legal authority, the PSI has played a key role in global counterproliferation efforts for more than 20 years. PSI-endorsing countries agree to work together to impede or stop shipments of WMD-related materials to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.Many PSI-endorsing countries also have ship boarding agreements, allowing them to carry out searches and seizures of illicit material on ships originating from each other’s countries.PSI in AfricaPSI endorsing states regularly conduct multilateral meetings, workshops, and exercises to improve their counterproliferation readiness and share best practices. One such event occurred in early February when the United States and Morocco co-hosted the 2024 Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach event. This was the largest ever PSI event on the African continent. More than 160 attendees from 35 countries attended, including 25 African countries.During the three-day event, civilian and military leaders discussed the current state of counterproliferation, shared best practices, and emphasized the importance of continuing to expand upon nonproliferation efforts on the African continent through the PSI and similar mechanisms. Representatives from 35 countries gather in Marrakech for the kick-off of a PSI event in February. (State Department photo)Looking AheadThese PSI efforts are more important than ever. In recent months, several developments have shaken the global nonproliferation regime. These include:Iran withdrawing permission for international verification at several nuclear sites;DPRK continuing to develop its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, andRussia continuing to violate nonproliferation norms by attacking Ukraine with missiles and has doubled down on its dangerous nuclear rhetoric – including withdrawing from the PSI in 2022.However, despite the challenges posed by the current security landscape, the PSI remains strong. Following the meeting, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia became endorsers of the PSI, affirming their commitment to countering the spread of WMDs.The success of the 2024 PSI African Political Meeting and Outreach event is a sign that the international community at large is steadfast in their support of counterproliferation efforts. The United States looks forward to working with the five new endorsing countries to improve our multilateral interdiction efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies.Darby FitzSimmons is an intern in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
- Joint Statement on the Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Marrakesh Co-Chairs’ Summary Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the United States of America on the occasion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach event.Begin text:The Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America co-hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Africa Political Meeting and Outreach Event in Marrakesh, Morocco on January 31 &#8211; February 2, 2024. This meeting was co-chaired by the Director of the United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Redouane Houssaini, and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins.This meeting fulfilled a commitment made by Morocco at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting (HLPM) held in Jeju, Republic of Korea on May 30, 2023.The Marrakesh event featured senior representatives of 35 countries from the international community, including 25 African States and 10 countries from the PSI Operational Experts Group.Opening remarks were addressed by His Excellency Mr. Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, highlighting the pivotal role of the African dimension in international cooperation efforts to face the challenges posed by global security which should be given significant consideration within the framework of the PSI vision and commitment of Morocco to continue its support to the PSI and cooperate with the U.S. to encourage more African states to endorse this initiative.Under Secretary Jenkins also addressed the changing international security environment and new challenges to counterproliferation norms and activities.This event presented an opportunity for the PSI-endorsing states to reiterate their commitment to countering of the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials, and to commit to further working together within the PSI in order to effectively address these issues.A large number of participants from African countries welcomed the meeting and showed interest in the Initiative and committed to report back and assess with all national stakeholders to consider endorsing the PSI.One of the primary objectives of the event was to underscore the significance of South-South cooperation as a focal point, showcasing how nations within this framework can leverage their unique strengths and resources to address common challenges.This meeting represented another opportunity to highlight the close strategic partnership between the United States and Morocco, within the strategic dialogue initiated in 2013, and accentuate the depth of this historic long-standing friendship while exploring ways to broaden its horizons towards a triangular cooperation, involving Africa, in matters of security.The PSI-endorsing states and participating states:Highlighted the benefits of PSI endorsement and provided an understanding of PSI frameworks and Critical Capabilities and Practices.Acknowledged the security challenges inherent in the current context, encompassing both Africa and the global landscape.Provided an overview of proliferation threats and trends, both globally and within Africa through briefings and panel presentations received by the attendees.Acknowledged the importance of the PSI as a voluntary mechanism and flexible framework, compliant with international law and mechanisms, to effectively address this threat.Explored the paramount significance of national capacity building and interdepartmental coordination in addressing complex challenges related to the detection and interception of nuclear and radiological materials.The new endorsers of the PSI:  Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia, announced their formal endorsement of the PSI and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.Recognizing the gravity of the global security landscape, underscored the imperative for collaborative efforts on an international scale.Demonstrated a shared commitment to fostering alliances, information-sharing, and coordinated actions to effectively address the complex challenges posed by the spread of WMDs.Next Steps:States that endorsed the PSI statement of Interdiction Principles at this meeting showed interest in participating in follow-up regional and sub-regional African events for new endorsers at a date and location to be determined.The co-chairs suggested establishing a plan of action (workshops, training, operational cooperation) that will allow the new endorsing countries to reinforce their national capabilities to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. PSI-endorsing states committed to assisting new endorsers with additional training, education, and sharing best practices.Morocco and the United States will continue to work closely with participating states to promote PSI in Africa.
- Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Office of the SpokespersonThe United States and Morocco co-hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach Event from January 31-February 2, 2024, in Marrakesh, Morocco.  The event realizes commitments both countries made at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting in May 2023 in Jeju, Republic of Korea to expand PSI outreach to non-endorsing countries, especially in Africa.At the meeting – the largest PSI event ever held on the African Continent – the United States, Morocco, and 11 other PSI-endorsing countries engaged 22 African countries that had not yet endorsed the PSI to explain the purpose and importance of the Initiative in countering the threats from the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related items in the region.  Over three days, more than 150 civilian and military leaders from 35 governments examined modern WMD proliferation pathways, improved understanding of WMD interdiction obligations, explored legal frameworks and the best practices of partners, and enhanced the growth and connectivity of the counterproliferation community in Africa.At the meeting’s conclusion, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia had announced their endorsement of the PSI, bringing the total number of worldwide endorsers to 111.  Several other states declared their intention to endorse in the near future. The United States and Morocco encourage all states in the African region and beyond to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and participate in future PSI-related events.The now 111 states that have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles have committed to take effective measures to interdict WMD-related transfers consistent with national law and international obligations, adopt streamlined procedures for rapid information exchange, and strengthen relevant national and international laws and frameworks.The PSI was established in 2003 to stop or impede transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
- Online Press Briefing with Ian J. McCary, Deputy Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS BRUSSELS HUBMODERATOR:  Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub. I would like to welcome everyone joining us for today’s virtual press briefing.  Today we’re very honored to be joined by Ian J. McCary, the deputy special envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.Finally, a quick reminder that today’s briefing with the deputy special envoy is on the record. And with that, let’s get started.  Deputy Special Envoy McCary, thanks so much for joining us this evening and I’ll turn it over to you for opening remarks.MR MCCARY:  Thank you very much, John, and thank you to our colleagues in the press corps for your interest. We just wrapped up a meeting today of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, political director-level meeting, which is a meeting that we have once a year.  The meeting was hosted this year by the Italian foreign ministry and we had over 40 delegations present today.Our coalition reflects a counterterrorism context that increasingly demands civilian-led solutions and the development of lines of effort outside of Syria.  Our coalition is regionalizing its efforts to move effectively counter Daesh affiliates active in Africa and in the Central Asia region.Successfully achieving these objectives includes increased coalition engagement with Sub-Saharan African states, and today we had with us representatives of Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, and Senegal, as well as non-member states from Central Asia, including Uzbekistan.  All of these states sent delegations to participate with us in this event today.Italy has played an outstanding leadership role within the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS, including by hosting this meeting today and by serving as the co-chair of the coalition’s Africa Focus Group and also the coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group.  And I think we ended today with a very successful meeting and we have released a co-chair statement that you’ll be interested in reviewing.  And I’d be glad to field any questions that you may have.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Deputy Special Envoy. We’ll go first to a submitted question from Gabriele Steinhauser from The Wall Street Journal in South Africa: “How is the departure of French troops from Niger affecting the war against ISIS and terrorism more broadly in the Sahel?”MR MCCARY:  Well, I do think we regret the developments in Niger over the past few months.  Niger had been a premier counterterrorism partner for the United States and other countries with the Global Coalition.  We had extraordinary cooperation with them, and I think we’re making a lot of progress in defeating ISIS elements, ISIS affiliates, and other violent extremist groups in that region.And we do regret the developments and the coup that led to the removal of President Bazoum, and we’re hoping and working closely with our partners and with ECOWAS and other regional partners and international partners to achieve a political solution there so that we can get back to the sort of counterterrorism cooperation that we enjoyed before.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. We’ll actually go to a live question now.  Pearl Matibe. Pearl, you have the mike.  Pearl, go ahead, if you can unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Yes, thank you so much, John. Good morning, Mr. McCary. It’s good to talk to you again. I’m glad to see that there was a good contingent of African states at your meeting.  Could you speak a little bit about Nigeria’s role?  Any successes or challenges that you see in succeeding in your efforts?MR MCCARY:  Well, Nigeria is – was present in our meeting today, and of course, Nigeria, as the chair of ECOWAS, plays an extremely important role in regional security.  We have very good counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria, and I expect that will continue going forward.  Nigeria has been a member of the global coalition for many years, and obviously, given their geography, the resources that they have, and their – the challenges that they face, we’re going to continue to engage closely with Nigeria.  Clearly that’s a very important element of the solution there.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to the next question – actually another live question – from Diyar Kurda.  Diyar, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Thank you, John. Hi, Ian.  I have two questions, one question about what’s the level of Turkish drone attacks’ impact on your operations and local partner in northeast Syria, and what engagements you have with Türkiye on that.And the second question, if you could speak about your assistance and engagement with KRI Peshmerga forces in this fight against ISIS.  How do you see the return of Peshmerga minister to his office, as he was resigned for a long time ago?  Thank you.MR MCCARY:  Well, I would say Türkiye is a very important member of the Global Coalition, and they were represented at – they sent several senior officials to the meeting today, and Türkiye is extremely active in the Global Coalition.  In fact, they co-chair our – they co-chair our Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group and hosted an important meeting of the working group that took place in Istanbul at the end of October.  We have very close engagement and communication with our Turkish counterparts on all issues, and there are areas – there’s a great deal of overlap and common ground with our Turkish partners, and there are some areas of disagreement as well, but we’re determined to continue to develop our counterterrorism cooperation with the Turkish government.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. We’ll go to submitted questions now.  From Joseph Haboush from Al Arabiya English in the U.S.:  “With almost 80 attacks since October 17th, do you believe the current U.S. approach has deterred malign actors or states, including Iran, which the U.S. has attributed these attacks to, from not negatively impacting Washington’s fight against ISIS?”MR MCCARY:  Yeah. Well, as Joseph mentioned, we’ve been outspoken in our attribution of those attacks and our rejection of the very unconstructive role or malign role that Iran and its proxies have been playing in northeast Syria, as well as in other parts of the Middle East.  But we are also absolutely determined that we will not be deterred in conducting our Defeat ISIS operations in northeast Syria.  We are applying the resources and implementing the tactics necessary both to defend our forces against any such attacks and to continue our campaign against the remnants of ISIS/Daesh in that region.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to another live question now: Soran Khateri. Soran, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Hello, sir. Do you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we hear you. Go ahead.QUESTION:  So, in recent days, local reports suggest that there has been rising activity of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  Do you believe that it’s somehow related to the Gaza war first, and second, the attacks by Iran-aligned proxies against U.S. forces in both of the country – I mean, Syria and Iraq?MR MCCARY:  Yes. Well, let me first say that we have an extraordinary partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces, and we have a lot of confidence in their capability – their capabilities to defend Iraqi sovereignty and defend their people against any threats from remnants of Daesh in Iraq.  And we’re also continuing unabated or undeterred our operations to defeat Daesh elements that may remain in northeast Syria.We do believe that Daesh is seeking opportunities to exploit the violence between the conflict between Israel and Hamas for its own purposes.  But again, we’re determined that we’re going to remain steadfast in our operations to defeat Daesh.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to another live question – Michael Hernandez.  Michael, I believe you have your hand up.  Michael, if you can unmute, otherwise we’ll go to – oh, go ahead.QUESTION:  Can you hear me now?MODERATOR:  Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, great. Thank you, Ambassador, for doing this.  I wanted to follow up on an earlier answer you provided to us, saying that you are determined to continue to develop our counterterrorism cooperation with the Turkish government.  I wanted to see if you could outline any verticals or areas in which you are trying to do just that.  Thank you.MR MCCARY:  Well, like I said, the Turkish Government is one of the co-chairs of the coalition’s Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group, and they hosted a very productive meeting at the end of October in which we took stock of our ongoing efforts to disrupt and intercept terrorist movements, including potential movements of Daesh affiliates into or out of Afghanistan.  And we have a dialogue with Türkiye, conducting – about other theaters in which we’re confronting Daesh, including in Africa.  Türkiye also has a great deal of interest in what’s happening there, in Sub-Saharan Africa.And we’re also – with regard to combatting the threat from the so-called Daesh-Khorasan, we have a – we’re working closely with our Turkish partners to take – make the best use of their very good relationship with Central Asian states and tightening cooperation among coalition partners to help build capacity of Central Asian states as they take measures and we work with them to build their capacity to contain and defeat so-called Daesh-Khorasan.QUESTION:  Thank you, Ambassador.MR MCCARY:  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. Pearl Matibe, you have your hand up again.  Do you have a follow-up question or &#8212;QUESTION:  John, yes, I do. Thank you so much. The information being shared is actually very valuable.  Mr. McCary, you mentioned earlier that the Global Coalition is regionalizing your efforts.  I wonder if you could just kind of break that down a little bit. How will this be operationalized?  What does that look like?  Are you institutionalizing anything?  And I know – maybe if you could make a comment on the Country Reports on Terrorism that were just released last Thursday, I’d appreciate that too if you could tack that on, if you have enough time.  Thank you so much.MR MCCARY:  Well, thank you, Pearl. In terms of the regionalization, what we mean by that is that obviously when the coalition started, all of the focus was on defeating the so-called territorial caliphate which Daesh had created in northeast Syria and Iraq, and all of the attention was on that particular theater.  And the threat has evolved significantly.  The challenges in northeast Syria in particular and also in Iraq persist, but they’re of a very different nature than they were back in 2014 to 2019, roughly, period.And then we have worked over the past few years to increase the coalition’s focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and also Central Asia.  And with regard to Africa, we had a very successful meeting of the coalition’s Africa Focus Group in Niamey, Niger, back in March.  And that was a very productive meeting at which we developed the four-point action plan in which we’re – the four pillars of which being capacity building, counterpropaganda, counterterror finance, and countering malign influences and the disinformation associated with some of the malign actors in Sub-Saharan Africa.But we also decided, as we reflected on the results of the meeting in Niamey, that the challenges in – on the African continent alone are so dispersed geographically that it made sense to break the problem apart and deal with it more piece by piece.  And consequently, we decided to have a meeting in Cotonou, Benin, which we had on the 15th of November, in which we focused exclusively on the nature of the threat and on the needs of our partners, our counterterrorism partners, in the coastal West African states and the Sahel.And I think we’re going to have follow-on meetings, perhaps in other parts of Africa where we also bring coalition attention to other parts of the African continent.  And also, of course, there’s a lot of follow-up to do in West Africa and the Sahel following up on our meeting in Cotonou.  So that’s just an example of what we mean by regionalization.And likewise, we’ve tightened our focus on the threat from so-called Daesh-Khorasan or ISIS-Khorasan.  And as I mentioned, Türkiye hosted a very productive meeting in late October in Istanbul, in which the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group focused on the ongoing challenges of disrupting terrorist movements and dealing with the displaced people who need to be repatriated in northeast Syria, and also talked a great deal about the nature of the threat and steps we can take to counter and undermine and ultimately defeat so-called ISIS-Khorasan.MODERATOR: Thank you, sir, for those remarks.  Unfortunately, we have run out of time.  Thank you to everyone who has joined us.  And special thanks to the Deputy Special Envoy Ian McCary for joining the call as well.  Deputy Special Envoy, can I turn it back to you for any final thoughts, if you have any?MR MCCARY:  Well, now, thank you, John. I appreciate the interest from our colleagues in the press.  And we’d be happy to field more questions or do more tailored interviews as colleagues might be interested in.  I think we’re going to, in 2024, continue to increase our efforts.  And a takeaway from the meeting today is that there – in spite of all of the many other challenges that are crowding the global agenda today, there’s still a very strong international will not to be distracted in our efforts to defeat ISIS and to continue to refine our tactics and deploy whatever tools we need to deploy to ensure that Daesh can’t threaten international security in the future.MODERATOR: Thank you, sir, for those final thoughts. Shortly we will send the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists (inaudible) transcript as it is available.  Thanks again for your participation.  We hope you can join us again for another press briefing in the near future.  This ends today’s briefing.# # #
- A Model and Catalyst for Fighting Violent Extremism in West Africa:  The Expanding U.S.-Togo Partnership Anne A. Witkowsky, Assistant SecretaryBureau of Conflict and Stabilization OperationsThe West African nation of Togo and its coastal neighbors are intensifying their efforts to bolster security, governance, and economic resilience in communities threatened by violent extremism.  The United States is partnering with Togo in this critical endeavor and marshaling support under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflicts and Promote Stability (SPCPS), a whole-of-government initiative with 10-year plans approved by President Biden in March 2023.  This could serve as a model for new forms of partnership and prevention. Togo is a country of strong traditions, culture, and resources.  It boasts one of the world’s largest deposits of fertilizer phosphates, a 35-mile stretch of scenic palm-lined beaches on the Gulf of Guinea coast, and a Land of the Koutammakou cultural heritage site recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).  However, Togo’s mineral deposits, tourism appeal, and cultural pride are increasingly under threat.  Like many of its West Africa neighbors, Togo faces the destabilizing effects of violent extremism at its border with the Sahel, threatening the country’s sustained peace, stability, and prosperity.  A Milestone in the Fight Against Violent Extremism The Government of Togo established the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV), in 2019 with support from a public diplomacy grant from the U.S. embassy in Lomé, Togo.  The committee includes representatives of the Ministries of Decentralization, Health, Justice, Social Affairs, and grassroots development, among others.  In addition, they also created sub-committees at the prefectural and communal levels to collaborate with the national level committees and establish unity of effort.  These subcommittees include representatives from civil society as well as the security forces, religious leaders, and local authorities working together in an integrated fashion to optimize successful outcomes.  These efforts reflect the government’s awareness of the gravity of the violent extremism threat, and its assessment that security forces cannot counter it alone.  Unique in its constitution, CIPLEV is showcasing the strengths of a holistic approach to countering violent extremism.   Government of Togo Leadership + U.S. Support = CIPLEV  Ambassador Fitzsimmons and U.S. officials participate in the grant signing ceremony with Col. Akobi of CIPLEV and grantees Mr. Dacko of Centre Afrika Obota and Dr. Penn of TI-MONDO.In 2022, President Biden announced that the United States would prioritize partnerships with countries of Coastal West Africa, including Togo, to implement the SPCPS.  Earlier this year, President Biden transmitted to Congress the 10-year plan for implementing the SPCPS with the Coastal West African countries of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.  This was followed up by a historic visit by Vice President Harris to Ghana, during which she announced that the United States will marshal more than $100 million in assistance to Coastal West Africa.  The United States supports Togo and its Coastal West African neighbors in this integrated approach to conflict prevention and stabilization.  A whole-of-government effort, combining security, development, and peacebuilding, in concert with Congress to provide additional assistance to the region over the coming years.  Under the SPCPS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department have begun implementing new programs to help strengthen economic development and increase governance and resilience in at-risk communities, including in northern Togo.  The United States is also collaborating with international partners to bolster joint investments in border governance to build unity of effort between local populations and security actors.  The Department of Defense complements these programs with civil-military engagements and robust capacity building and training for partner forces. Under this initiative, the United States has increased support for CIPLEV, including two new grants announced by U.S. Embassy in Lomé.  The first focuses on capacity building to improve community dialogues and develop an early warning system.  The second is focused on developing structured community dialogues in partnership with nearly 2,000 local authorities, municipal actors, and young citizens in nine communes most vulnerable to violent extremism.  In the nine months since deploying the grant, thousands of CIPLEV support agents have been trained across Togo’s Savanes, Kara, and Centrale border regions, and the nascent early warning system is already collecting invaluable Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) threat data.  At the end of last year, a senior defense, diplomacy, and development (“3D”) interagency delegation visited Lomé, Togo, and met with government and civil society leaders to affirm this strengthened partnership.  During a meeting with the Republic of Togo’s President, Faure Gnassingbe, the 3D delegation and U.S. Ambassador to Togo Elizabeth Fitzsimmons affirmed that a whole-of-government approach to addressing insecurity in Togo offers the most effective and sustainable path for success.   CIPLEV President is a 2023 International Visitor Leadership Program Participant.  This summer, Col. Messan Akobi, who serves as the Secretary General of the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection and President of CIPLEV, was selected as a 2023 Department of State International Visitor Leadership Program participant.  His cohort focused on countering violent extremism in Africa and participants came from Togo, Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. While in Washington D.C., the participants: 1) learned more about U.S. programs that counter violent extremism, including those that exemplify the relationship between federal, state, and local entities; 2) explored the underlying conditions that fuel extremism – political grievances, communal conflicts, social structures, and economic disparity – and the emerging trends that creatively address them; 3) examined community-based efforts designed to build strong community resistance to violent extremism and promote tolerance, including community policing and prison rehabilitation programs; and 4) discussed how different sectors of American society work together to resist violent extremism, including government, academia, civil society, religious communities, and the private sector.  All the participants took home with them many lessons learned which will further strengthen their ability to build successful strategies for countering the threat of violent extremism in their respective countries. With buy-in from the top of the Togolese government, and partnerships across the public and private sectors, the U.S.-Togo partnership is paving the way for achieving sustainable security outcomes through CIPLEV.  By reinforcing CIPLEV’s whole-of-government organizational and functional capabilities, the U.S. government is empowering CIPLEV to lead Togo’s national strategy to counter violent extremism, and to serve as a model and catalyst for other countries in the region.  This is just one example of how the United States is partnering with Togo to strengthen resilience in the Coastal West Africa sub region. 
- Togo HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Togo				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Togo																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				With an economically reform-minded government and modern transportation infrastructure, Togo’s steadily improving economic outlook offers opportunities for U.S. firms interested in doing business locally and in the sub-region. Even with a dip in growth due to the pandemic, Togo has sustained steady economic expansion since 2008 through reforms to encourage economic development and a better business environment. It ranked 97th on the Work Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, an improvement of 59 places and the highest ranking in West Africa.Current government policy is guided by the National Development Plan (PND) and an addendum policy roadmap for 2020-2025 that integrates business reforms and infrastructure projects designed to attract investment.Togo launched its five-year PND in 2018, focusing on three axes. The plan’s first goal is to leverage the country’s geographic position by transforming Lome into a regional trading center and transport hub. Togo has already completed hundreds of kilometers of refurbished roadways, expanded and modernized the Port of Lome, and inaugurated in 2016 the new Lome international airport that conforms to international standards. The second goal is to increase agricultural production through agricultural centers (Agropoles) and increase manufacturing. The third goal is improving social development, including electrification of the country. The government seeks private sector investment to fulfill its PND goals and has had notable successes, including a new 2022 connection with the “Equiano” subsea cable owned by Google that will dramatically improve the quality of local broadband.In January 2021, Prime Minister Victoire Tomégah-Dogbe presented a detailed developmental roadmap to extend, supplement and focus the goals of the PND for the remainder of the presidential term, which ends in 2025. The roadmap incorporates 42 specific projects, including universal access to identity documents and electricity; increased access to education, drinking water and sanitation; 20,000 new social housing units; a digital bank; construction of an industrial park around the port of Lome; and the extension of the road network. After a decade of sustained GDP growth of roughly 5% in non-pandemic years, Togo aspires to achieve 7.5% GDP growth by 2025.Togo has also initiated numerous legal and institutional reforms to create a more favorable business environment, including digitalizing public services and revising the labor and investment codes. The Ministry of Investment has been a key advocate for business facilitation and partnering with the private sector since its creation in 2020.Nevertheless, Togo must tackle several challenges to maintain its momentum. Challenges include an opaque legal system, lack of clear land titles, and government interference in various sectors. Corruption remains a common problem in Togo, especially for businesses. Often “donations” or “gratuities” result in expedited registrations, permits, and licenses, thus resulting in an unfair advantage for companies that engage in such practices. Although Togo has government bodies charged with combatting corruption, corruption-related charges are rarely brought or prosecuted. The government has made efforts to professionalize key institutions such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARCOP), the Chamber of Commerce (CCIT), and the National Employment Agency (ANPE) including with new anti-corruption, ethics, and transparency measures.The war in Ukraine has created further difficulties by feeding inflation and food insecurity.The conflict has aggravated an already fragile post-Covid socio-economic situation and has caused disruptions in the supply chain for agricultural products and fertilizers. The main consequences are the rise in the prices of staple food and agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers which saw a price increase of 30% in less than a year.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index2021130 of 180http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewGlobal Innovation Index2022122 of 131https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicatorU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2021N/Ahttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/World Bank GNI per capita2021USD 960http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										Attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) and generating more jobs in priority sectors is the main objective for the Togolese government. Togo has achieved real success, recording inward FDI of $130 million in 2021 (the most recent figures available) after a brief dip in 2020 due to the global pandemic (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2022). The rapidly developing Adetikiopé industrial platform (PIA) has helped attract significant new investments in light industry to take advantage of Togo’s natural resources and skilled labor, with $25 million in new investment in 2022. CimMetal Group (Burkina Faso) in 2021 established a $125 million construction materials plant and Dangote (Nigeria) in 2020 invested in a $60 million cement plant.The Ministry of Investment serves as an interface for potential investors, allowing them to target investment sectors and present priority projects. Government officials work hard to promote Togo internationally by making trips abroad, conducting consultations, and hosting trade roadshows. The state-owned corporation Togo Invest also actively seeks to recruit outside partners for strategic investments tied to national development goals. Two new laws were adopted in December 2021: the Law 2021-034 on Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) aiming to facilitate private investments in new sectors and the Law 2021-033 on Public Procurement intended to enhance transparency and efficiency for investment credits.Togo does not have any laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, and there have been no significant changes since last year. The Investment Code, adopted in June 2019, prescribes equal treatment for Togolese and foreign businesses and investors; free management and circulation of capital for foreign investors; respect of private property; protection of private investment against expropriation; and investment dispute resolution regulation. The code meets West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) standards.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The foreign investor can also create a wholly owned subsidiary. It has no obligation to associate itself with a local investor. This right is contained in the Investment Code (which was adopted in 2019), and there are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Section 3 of the Investment Code states that any company established in the Togolese Republic freely determines its production and marketing policy, in compliance with the laws and regulations in force in the Togolese Republic. Additionally, there are no formal investment approval mechanisms in place for inbound foreign investment nor rules, restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to private investments.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										Togo conducted an investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2017. A link to the report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.There have been no major recent reviews of investment policy by civil society.																																				Business Facilitation										Togo has dramatically improved its business climate in recent years through the implementation of bold reforms. It now takes only seven hours to register a new company online with the “Centre de Formalité des Entreprises” ( https://www.cfetogo.org/eentreprise ), and Togo has continued to work simplify procedures and reduce costs for businesses, including digitizing and automating tax payments.Reforms to public procurement in December 2022 harmonized regulations and provided a more favorable framework to potential foreign investors to participate in government infrastructure projects, improving the business climate.The Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Trade Zone (API-ZF) assists potential and actual foreign investors through the entire investment process. API-ZF maintains two web platforms to publicize key information for investors:investautogo.tg provides information on the business environment, promoting business opportunities and tax incentives, with information on the investment code and the Export Processing Zone (EPZ).apizf.tg presents all documentation on administrative procedures related to investment.																																				Outward Investment										Togo does not promote outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						The United States and Togo signed the U.S. – Togo Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations in 1966, which entered into force a year later in 1967. This treaty provides for protections of U.S. and Togolese investors. Togo has signed many economic, commercial, cooperation, and cultural agreements with its foreign aid donor countries, including France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Japan, and more recently with China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.Togo does not have a bilateral investment or taxation treaty with the United States. Togo joined the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in August 2021 as the 140th member as well as the October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax.																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										In June 2019, the National Assembly adopted a new investment code, which is in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan and embraces the government&#8217;s desire to make the private sector the driver of economic growth.The Investment Code seeks to make Togo an attractive place for international companies, supporting the development of logistics hubs by offering tax incentives. The incentives are proportional to the size of the investments made and the number of jobs created. At a time when Togo is committed to decentralization, the new investment code provides additional advantages to investments that create jobs outside of major urban centers. The code operationalizes the National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) which simplifies formalities. The deadline for adjudicating files is now set at 30 days maximum.As a member of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Togo participates in zone-wide plans to harmonize and rationalize regulations governing economic activity within the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA – Organisation pour L’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires). OHADA includes sixteen African countries, including Togo, and one of the principal goals is a common charter on investment. Togo directly implements WAEMU and OHADA regulations without requiring an internal ratification process by the National Assembly.Togo’s Investment Code also specifies the provision of incentives to encourage investment. Incentives are to be proportional to the size of investment, with tax benefits conditional on job creation. Tax benefits include a lump sum tax reduction per job created and incentives to invest in rural areas, to consolidate social development and strengthen inclusion measures.Although the government does not make draft bills and proposed regulations available for public comment, ministries and regulatory agencies in Togo generally give notice of and distribute the text of proposed regulations to relevant stakeholders. Ministries and regulatory agencies also generally request and receive comments on proposed regulations through targeted outreach to business associations and other stakeholders.Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures  http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities, persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. The site is generally up-to-date and useful.The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARCOP) ensures compliance and transparency with respect to government procurements. Each responsible ministry ensures compliance with its regulations which are developed in conformity with international standards and agreements such as WTO or WAEMU norms. Regulations are not reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. In December 2021, the government adopted the Law 2021-033 on public procurement aimed at improving the legal framework and reducing the delays in procurement procedures through digitalization. In July 2022, a new decree was adopted to allow the former Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) to also regulate Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). The newly renamed ARCOP will regulate PPP contracts entered into by the state or public entities, in addition to public contracts.Togo joined the Development Center of OECD in June 2019, as an opportunity to share experiences and pool resources.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										Togo is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is not known if the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).For the most part, in economic terms, the Togolese legal and administrative framework is aligned with the community texts of UEMOA, ECOWAS or larger groups.On the financial side, Togo depends on sub-regional institutions, notably the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) whose head office is in Dakar. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets (CREPMF), headquartered in Abidjan, regulates financial markets.The Togolese insurance market is subject to the rules of the CIMA zone (Inter African Conference of Insurance Markets).With regard to intellectual property, Togo relies on OAPI (African Intellectual Property Organization).The main laws and directives of these different legal and administrative areas are available, among others, on the website www.droit-afrique.com under the heading Togo.Togo is a member of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).At the African level, the country is also party to the Council of the Agreement, the Benin Electric Community (CEB), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Alliance Zone and the Co-operation Zone for Prosperity (ZACOP), the African Union, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										Togo practices a code-based legal system inherited from the French system. The judiciary is recognized as the third power after the executive and the legislative (the press being the 4th) and thus remains independent of the executive branch. Togo, as a member of the OHADA, has a judicial process that is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable like any other civil actions and are adjudicated in the national court system.A Court of Arbitration and Mediation (CATO) created in 2011 organizes and supervises conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of disputes. The Commercial Courts of Lome and Kara were created by decree in 2019 and settle disputes under the various uniform acts of OHADA.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										The Investment Code allows the resolution of investment disputes involving foreigners through: (a) bilateral agreements between Togo and the investor&#8217;s government; (b) arbitration procedures agreed to between the interested parties; or (c) through the offices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. The OHADA also provides a forum and legal process for resolving legal disputes in 16 African countries.Investment disputes are managed by SEGUCE Togo (Societe d’Exploitation du Guichet Unique pour le Commerce Exterieur), and can be accessed at  www.segucetogo.tg Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures  http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures.																																				Competition and Anti-Trust Laws										The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARCOP) ensures compliance and transparency for competition-related concerns. The government regularly seeks to improve the framework for public procurement (including professionalizing the public procurement sector, moving procurement online, enacting legislative regulations, etc.). The Public Procurement Bill of December 2021 aims to increase transparency and efficiency in the consumption of investment credits. The legal framework for public procurement has been renovated and structured in two parts, in particular a regulation dedicated to public procurement, and another dedicated to public-private partnership (PPP) contracts.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										The government can legally expropriate property through a Presidential decree submitted by the cabinet of ministers and signed by the President.Only two major expropriations of property have taken place in Togo’s history. The first was the February 1974 nationalization of the then French-owned phosphate mines. The second was the November 2014 nationalization of the Hôtel du 2 Février after it had ceased operations for several years. Shortly after the nationalization of the hotel, Togo announced that it was establishing a commission to determine the fair market amount owed as compensation to the hotel’s Libyan owners/investors. The government designed the 2012 Investment Code to protect against government expropriations. Despite the case of the Hôtel du 2 Février, there is little evidence to suggest a trend towards expropriation. There are some claimants from lands expropriated for recent road construction, however, and the procedure to investigate and resolve those claims is slow. Land titles are very unclear with traditional and modern systems overlapping. The government has occasionally earmarked land for development that has raised complaints from local communities.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Togo is not a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Togo is, however, a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention &#8211; also known as the Washington Convention), which it ratified in 1967.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						Togo does not have Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States.Togo does not have a history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors, notwithstanding the two historical examples above. There do not appear to be any investment disputes involving U.S. persons from the past ten years. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						The dispute resolution alternative is the Court of Arbitration of Togo (CATO), which conforms to standards as established by the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF). Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and there are no known State-Owned Enterprise investment disputes that have gone to the domestic court system.The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) worked with the Government of Togo to improve commercial justice through the strengthening of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The aim of the project was to increase the speed and efficiency of settlement of commercial disputes through the procedures used by the CATO.As a result of the project, 30 new arbitrators and 100 magistrates and professionals received training in mediation/arbitration techniques. Further, the new CATO procedure manual is explicit that the time between filing and judgment shall be a maximum of six months as per article 36 of the ruling procedures.In 2019, the CIAM of Lomé (International Center for Arbitration and Mediation) was created for the management and resolution of commercial disputes in the maritime and financial fields. The CIAM contributes to a secure business climate and offers economic operators in these sectors through the swift and efficient resolution of disputes, supplementing the regular judiciary and reducing opportunities for corruption.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										Togo uses the standards set forth under the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). That law states that if bankruptcy occurs, the competent jurisdiction designates an expert that concludes an agreement with creditors and stakeholders (preventive arrangement). The Manager (or managers) can be put under “patrimonial sanctions,” meaning they can be personally liable for the debts of the company. The manager is then forbidden from managing, administering, or controlling an enterprise, and holding political or administrative office for three to ten years. Bankruptcy is criminalized, but generally as a last resort.According to data collected by the World Bank, insolvency proceedings take three years on average and cost approximately 15 percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold off in pieces. The average recovery rate is 27.9 cents on the dollar. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 places Togo at 88 of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator, well above the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										Investment incentives are available to foreign investors that invest more than $100,000. Incentives include exemption from VAT and Customs Duties on new imported plant and materials, reduced income taxes for up to five years, and depending on the number of permanent jobs created for nationals, reduction on salary taxes during an approved period of time.To encourage multinationals to set up in Togo, the special regime for parent companies and subsidiaries contained in the General Tax Code (GTC) provides for an exemption from tax withholdings on dividend distributions (IRCM) between parent companies and subsidiaries. Other incentives are also available in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ).With the creation of the High Council of Togolese Abroad (HCTE), Togo wants to mobilize and attract investment from its diaspora. For this, the government has set up a diaspora office, appointed diaspora points of contact in strategic institutions like the Togolese Revenue Office (L&#8217;Office Togolais des Recettes &#8211; OTR) and the National Employment Agency (ANPE – Agence Nationale Pour l&#8217;Emploi) and inaugurated the Maison de la Diaspora in November 2021 to assist Togolese expatriates in realizing investment projects.For clean energy investments, while some long-term Power Purchase Agreements and taxation incentives exist, these measures tend to favor firms with a government stake, rather than private investment. Imports of electric vehicles have been exempted from taxes since 2020.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										The 2011 law modifying the 1989 law creating the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) provides an advantageous taxation scheme for companies based in the EPZ with a reduced tax bill on their profits for their first 20 years of operation, including a five percent tax on profits for the first five years. The law also exempts companies from customs duties and VAT on imported equipment and inputs, as well as an exemption from VAT on goods and services purchased locally. It also provides EPZ companies the freedom to repatriate capital, including dividends and other income. The law also exempts companies within the EPZ from providing workers with many legal protections, including protection against anti-union discrimination with regard to hiring and firing.The National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) is a government agency designed to help accelerate the growth of investments in line with the government road map and boost national and international investments across all sectors. The new operating model of API-ZF is to attract investment, facilitate the installation of investors in Togo, and offer a post-investment service.Togo has been eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preferences since 2008 and has benefited from the textile benefits since 2017, when it published its national strategy. Togo actively promotes the utilization of AGOA and boosting exports to the United States with products from the agricultural and garment sectors as part of its industrial development strategy, including working with firms on compliance requirements. An industrial sewing training center was inaugurated on October 31, 2022, at the Adetikiopé industrial platform (PIA), with the aim of laying the groundwork for eventual textile exports.Togo hopes to leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA / ZLECAF) to facilitate intra-African trade and eliminate customs duties for 90% of goods from other African countries. The trade accord also aims to reduce or eliminate non-tariff impediments such as corruption and border delays and encourage trade facilitation measures. Togo is actively considering how much to open up its service sector to other African countries with regard to the five priority service sectors identified for liberalization: finance, transport, tourism, communications, and business services.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Firms are required by law to employ Togolese nationals on a priority basis, and after five years foreign workers cannot account for more than 20 percent of the total workforce or of any professional category. In practice, the Togolese government strongly encourages large foreign employers outside of the EPZ to hire as many Togolese nationals as practical. These encouragement schemes do not typically apply to senior management level employees.There are reports that foreigners seeking to legalize their status for long-term work and residence purposes have encountered significant administrative obstacles and delays, although the steps for receiving residence permits are well defined. Issuance of such permits is the responsibility of the National Police.There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest and there is no policy on “forced localization.” Foreign Information Technology providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption and there are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										Property rights and interests are enforced, although nearly 80% of court cases are reported to involve land title disputes. Mortgages and liens exist but land titles are precarious and often subject to litigation. Most land does not have a clear title, especially outside of urban areas. The government is attempting to fix this issue through various commissions that will issue recommendations, but it will take years to resolve.The average time to proceed with property transfer decreased from eight days in 2018 to five days in 2019.All land-related operations are carried out via the government’s “One-Stop Shop” for property transactions (called the Guichet Unique Foncier) at the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR). This “One-Stop Shop” within the OTR simplifies property transfer procedures, reduces administrative costs, and minimizes the risks in the process. The government has reduced the registration fee for property transfer to a 35,000 FCFA ($64) flat fee rather than the previous 4% of market value. The process of issuing a land title now takes only five hours, down from 48 hours in 2018.An independent complaints mechanism exists in the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR). OTR has been set up to deal with land complaints. The office gives itself 48 hours to respond to requests.Since December 10, 2019, all cadastral maps of greater Lomé (2,568 in total) were digitized and are made available in a database. This makes it possible to update the targeted plans and to carry out studies and validation of files at the “Guichet Unique Foncier” (GUF).In Togo, only Togolese citizens, French citizens, foreign governments, and those granted citizenship by the judiciary are allowed to possess real property. Other foreigners must request permission from the Prime Minister, which is usually granted for investors who will develop the land. Land speculation is discouraged by the government. Property legally purchased that remains unoccupied will not be reverted to other owners under the law; however, in practice, unused land that is not protected will likely be occupied or used by others and potentially subject to lengthy court battles to prove ownership.Since 2020, Togo has benefited from a Threshold Program with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), including promoting land reform to increase agricultural productivity. The objectives of this project are to expand access to formalized land by identifying and legitimizing customary land rights, move the legitimized rights into the formal system, improve the formal system so that it effectively protects legitimate land rights, and expand inclusive access to land by ensuring that recognition of women’s rights, already recognized in formal law, are fully incorporated into practice.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										The regional African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and National Institute for Industrial Property and Technology (INPIT) are the two agencies that protect Intellectual Property (IP) in Togo. On November 30, 2020, Togo ratified the Bangui Agreement, which governs intellectual property in the 17 OAPI member states. There are no official figures available on how the country tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. The country may prosecute Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) violations, but there are no known cases.Togo is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report or in the notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en .																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										Togo and the other West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs. Togo relies on the WAEMU Regional Stock Exchange in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to trade equities for Togolese public companies.WAEMU has established a common accounting system, periodic reviews of member countries&#8217; macroeconomic policies based on convergence criteria, a regional stock exchange, and the legal and regulatory framework for a regional banking system. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII and refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms. With sufficient collateral, foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market. The private sector in general has access to a variety of credit instruments when and if collateral is available.																																				Money and Banking System										The penetration of banking services in the country is low and generally only available in major cities.The government and the banking sector have worked to restore Togo’s reputation as a regional banking center, which was weakened by political upheavals from 1991 to 2005, and several regional and sub-regional banks now operate in Togo, including Ecobank, Orabank, Banque Atlantique, Bank of Africa, NSIA Group, International Bank of Africa in Togo (BIA Togo), and Coris Bank. With 4.98 bank branches per 100,000 inhabitants, Togo has one of the highest ratios in WAEMU.In October 2022, Simon Tiemtoré&#8217;s New York City-based investment banking holding Lilium Capital, owner of Vista Bank, acquired the pan-African banking group Oragroup, which has 188 Orabank branches in 12 African countries. The acquisition is in progress.Additionally, Togo is home to the headquarters of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Development Bank (BOAD – the development bank of the West African Economic and Monetary Union), Oragroup, and Ecobank Transnational Inc. (ETI), the largest independent regional banking group in West Africa and Central Africa, with operations in 36 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.The banking sector is generally healthy, and the total assets of Togo’s largest banks are approximately $25-30 billion.Togo&#8217;s monetary policy and banking regulations are managed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). No known correspondent relationships were lost in the past four years. No known correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy.The national financial inclusion strategy aims to reduce regional disparities in access to financial services, and Togo has witnessed the rapid development of mobile money since 2017.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						There are no restrictions on the transfer of funds to other FCFA-zone countries or to France. The transfer of more than FCFA 500,000 (about $1,000) outside the FCFA-zone requires justification documents (e.g., a pro forma invoice) to be presented to bank authorities.The exchange system is free of restrictions for payments and transfers for international transactions. Some American investors in Togo have reported long delays (30 &#8211; 40 days) in transferring funds from U.S. banks to banks located in Togo. This is reportedly because banks in Togo have limited contacts with U.S. banks to facilitate the transfer of funds.Togo uses the CFA franc (FCFA), which is the common currency of the eight West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. The currency is fixed to the Euro at a rate of 656 FCFA to 1 Euro.						Remittance Policies						The 2019 Investment Code provides for the free transfer of revenues derived from investments, including the liquidation of investments, by non-residents.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										Togo does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or other similar entity.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						The government published a list of 16 State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the shareholding of twenty-six (26) other semi-public companies in December 2019. These SOEs generally operate based on commercial consideration but may enjoy non-market-based advantages received from the host government, such as the government delaying private enterprise investment in infrastructure that could disadvantage the market share of the SOE. They do not compete internationally.All SOEs have a Board of Directors and Supervisory Board, although the Togolese government has not specified how it exercises ownership in the form of an ownership policy or governance code. The SOEs also have auditors who certify their accounts. Once certified by these auditors, the accounts of these companies are sent to the Court of Auditors, Togo’s supreme audit institution, which verifies and passes judgment on these financial statements and reports to the National Assembly. The Court publishes the results of its audits annually, including at  http://courdescomptestogo.org .SOEs control or compete in the fuel, cotton, telecommunications, banking, utilities, phosphate, and grain-purchasing markets. The government wants to revitalize the phosphate sector and become a leading global player via the state-owned New Phosphate Company of Togo (SNPT).In June 2020, the New Cotton Company of Togo (NSCT) which produces cotton domestically was sold to the Singaporean Company OLAM Group (51%) with a further 40% going to the Cotton Producers Consortium (FNGPC), while the Government of Togo maintained a 9% stake. Through this privatization, the Government hopes to further develop the textile industry. Before this privatization, NSCT was 60% state-controlled after the bankruptcy and dissolution of the 100% state-owned Togolese Cotton Company (SOTOCO) in 2009.In September 2012, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Togolese Development Bank to Orabank Group, which has some U.S. investors. Likewise, in March 2013, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Togo to the Attijariwafa Bank Group of Morocco.In November 2021, IB Holding, an investment holding controlled by the Burkinabe construction magnate Mahamadou Bonkoungou, bought the public bank Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (BTCI). IB Holding purchased a 90% stake in the bank versus 10% for the Togolese government. While the amount of the deal was not disclosed, it was approved by the Banking Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) on September 20, 2021.Togolese authorities are working in consultation with the IMF on further privatization to include state-owned Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB). UTB holds weak loan portfolios characterized by high exposure (about one-third of total bank credit) to the government, as well as to the cotton and phosphate industries.In the telecommunications sector, the government combined in 2017 the two state-owned entities Togo Telecom and TogoCell into a holding company, TogoCom. In November 2019, Agou Holding consortium, made up of the Madagascan conglomerate Axian (majority) and the capital-investor Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) bought a 51% stake in TogoCom. The Togolese Government maintains a 49% stake. Agou Holding committed to invest $271 million in TogoCom over seven years to improve international connectivity and expand its high-speed fiber-optic and mobile networks.The new entity stills directly competes with a private cell phone company, Moov Africa Togo. Atlantique Telecom, a subsidiary of Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat), owns and controls Moov Togo. The Government of Togo has licensed Togocom and Moov for 4G. Private company CAFÉ Informatique also offers satellite-based internet access and other services, mainly to the business sector. Two new internet service providers &#8211; Teolis and Vivendi Africa Group (GVA-Togo) &#8211; entered the market in 2018, and the government is installing new fiber optic cable throughout the country.Public utilities such as the Post Office, Lomé Port Authority, Togo Water, and the Togolese Electric Energy Company (CEET) hold monopolies in their sectors.The National Agency for Food Security (ANSAT) is a government agency that purchases cereals on the market during the harvest for storage. When cereal prices increase during the dry season, it is ANSAT’s task to release cereals into the markets to maintain affordable cereal prices. When supplies permit, ANSAT also sells cereals on international markets, including Ghana, Niger, and Gabon.The price of petroleum products is tightly controlled by the Togolese government. The CSFPPP (Petroleum Product Price Fluctuation Monitoring Committee) orders and sets the prices of petroleum products, launches calls for tenders, and monitors the execution of tender contracts. Togo imports 30 million liters of refined petroleum products per quarter.Togo does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs (link to guidelines at  www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm 																										Privatization Program										Previous privatization in Togo covered many sectors, such as hotels, banking, and mining. Foreign investors are encouraged to compete in new privatization programs via a public bidding process. The government publishes all notifications in the French language, but unfortunately, a relevant government website is not available.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is not officially addressed in Togo by the government, other than as it relates to corruption and criminal activity. RBC and its variants such as “Fair Trade” are known by independent NGOs and businesses which promote these practices and can do their work freely.Some American-owned companies follow generally accepted RBC principles and participate in outreach programs to local villages where they supply, among other things, school buildings, water, electricity, and flood abatement resources. In accordance with a law passed in March 2011, new construction projects must now address environmental and social impacts.Togo joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2009 and has been officially recognized as EITI-compliant since 2013. Togo’s EITI Secretariat carries out a yearly verification of financial statements relating to the extractive industry. Togo is temporally suspended for missing a December 2022 deadline for publishing its report for 2020.The Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, Administrative Reform, and Social Protection sets workplace health and safety standards and is responsible for enforcement of all labor laws. There have been no high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or resolution of such cases in the recent past.Togolese law provides workers, except security forces (including firefighters and police), the right to form and join unions and bargain collectively. There are supporting regulations that allow workers to form and join unions of their choosing. Workers have the right to strike, although striking healthcare workers may be ordered back to work as necessary for the security and well-being of the population. While no provisions in the law protect strikers against employer retaliation, the law requires employers to get a judgment from the labor inspectorate before they fire workers. If firms fire workers illegally, including for union activity, the companies must reinstate the employees and compensate them for lost salary.The law recognizes the right to collective bargaining; representatives of the government, labor unions, and employers negotiate and endorse a nationwide agreement. This collective bargaining agreement sets nationwide wage standards for all formal sector workers. For sectors where the government is not an employer, the government participates in this process as a labor-management mediator. For sectors with a large government presence, including the state-owned companies, the government acts solely as an employer and does not mediate.The government follows OHADA recommended rules and regulations on corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation.Private security companies are present in Togo, but the country is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA).																										Climate Issues										Togo seeks unconditional greenhouse gas emissions reductions of 21% below its business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2030. It has also made a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by an additional 30% by the same date, contingent upon international support and finance. For methane emissions, Togo’s National Plan for the Reduction of Air Pollution and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants projects a 56 percent reduction in methane emissions by 2040. Togo has not set a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions goal and is ranked 37/51 for Middle East/Africa by Climatescope. A draft decree adopted on March 15, 2023, sets rules for a carbon management mechanism, including the purchase of carbon credits, which are defined as the measurable, verifiable emission reductions from certified climate action projects.Togo’s current National Electrification Strategy aims to provide universal access to electricity by 2030, while increasing the share of renewables to 50% by ambitiously rolling out new power plants and off-grid solutions. In 2021, Togo launched one solar and one thermal power plant and has plans for two additional solar plants and 550,000 solar kits. In 2023, the solar plant will expand its capacity from 50MW to 70 MW, and the project for the electrification of 317 localities by solar mini-grids has received funding for the preparatory phase.Togo government has limited capacity to monitor natural capital. The National Agency of Environment Management (Agence Nationale de Gestion de l’Environnement, ANGE) under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry Resources (MERF) enforces environmental regulations, and there has been significant progress over the past two decades in promoting sustainability. Togo has a Forest Code and has adopted an ambitious strategy for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) as part of the national development plan. While efforts are hampered by the continued usage of firewood and charcoal as the primary energy source for the vast majority of households, the National Electrification Strategy will serve to transform energy usage patterns in the long term. A national reforestation drive was launched in June 2022 with the objective of planting one billion trees by 2030. While still lacking personnel and equipment, agency technical capabilities are adequate for evaluating environment and social risks for major government projects.Togo is also working to increase the legal weight of environmental standards. A revised public procurement law and new public-private partnership (PPP) both mandate consideration of environment and climate change impact, encouraging low carbon infrastructure projects and incorporation of climate adaption and mitigation measures.																																												9. Corruption						    																						The Togolese government has established several important institutions designed in part to reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for bribery and fraud: the Togolese Revenue Authority (OTR), the One-Stop Shop to create new businesses (CFE), and the Single Window for import/export formalities.In 2015, the Togolese government created the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HAPLUCIA), which the government designed to be an independent institution dedicated to fighting corruption. The government appointed members in 2017. HAPLUCIA encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. HAPLUCIA presented on February 7, 2019, its strategic plan for the period 2019-2023; it set up a toll-free number, the &#8220;8277&#8221; to receive complaints and denunciations.In October 2022, Togo adopted a national anti-corruption strategy with three axes: (1) strengthening the legal and institutional framework; (2) mobilization of all national actors; (3) strengthening the integrity, transparency, and quality of public administration.Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, and to political parties and the government does not interfere in the work of anti-corruption NGOs.In 2011, the government effectively implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption. The government announces procurements weekly in a government publication. Once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication. A toll-free number (80 00 88 88) is available to denounce any act of corruption and fraudulent practices in public procurement.Other measurable steps toward controlling corruption include joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and establishing public finance control structures and a National Financial Information Processing Unit.Togo signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003 and ratified it on July 6, 2005.																										Resources to Report Corruption										Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:Kimelabalou AbaPresident of HAPLUCIA, the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related OffensesTel. +228 93 10 84 84 / 96 61 12 12Email: haplucia@haplucia-togo.orgLomé, TogoDirecteur, Anti-CorruptionOffice Togolais des Recettes (OTR)41 Rue des Impôts02 BP 20823Lomé, Togo+228 &#8211; 22 53 14 00 otr@otr.tgContact at a &#8220;watchdog&#8221; organization:Samuel KanindaRegional Coordinator, West AfricaTransparency InternationalAlt-Moabit 9610559 BerlinGermany+49 30 3438 20 773skaninda@transparency.org																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						After a period of political instability and economic stagnation from 1990 to 2007, the government started the country along a gradual path to political reconciliation and democratic reform. Togo has held multiple presidential, legislative, and local elections that were deemed generally free and fair by international observers, though the most recent legislative elections were boycotted by the majority of the opposition. Political reconciliation has moved slowly. A political crisis erupted in 2017 regarding the failure of the government to implement political measures, such as presidential term limits. After international facilitation between the government and opposition parties, in May 2019 the government implemented non-retroactive term limits and a two-round election system. The government held local elections in 2019, the first since 1986. President Faure Gnassingbe was elected for a fourth term on February 22, 2020 in a peaceful election.Political protests still occur on occasion and can often lead to tire burning, stone throwing, and government responses include the use of tear gas and other crowd control techniques. There are no known examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations pertaining to foreign investment due to political violence.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						The labor market is predominately unskilled, and there is a shortage of skilled labor and English-speaking employees. Some migrant farm workers arrive from Ghana and Benin based on familial ties. Widespread underemployment exists, and an estimated 3 million workers participate in the informal economy, which functions as the motor for the economy.In general, government labor policy favors employment of nationals.Regulations require that firms hire workers with time specific contracts that include severance requirements. The labor code, and regulations called the “Convention Collective” differentiate between layoffs and firings, but both require severance payments. Free Trade zones offer different labor law provisions to encourage investment.Public employee unions (teacher, judicial clerks, etc.) use collective bargaining and non-violent protest to raise the profile of their demands. Labor disputes are often resolved on an ad-hoc basis, usually with the intervention of parliamentarians.Togo adopted a new Labor Code on June 18, 2021, replacing the 2006 code. This code, promoted as pro-investment, includes innovations in line with the conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and with the Uniform Act Project relating to OHADA Labor Law, creating a favorable framework for the creation of jobs. The new code also increases social protection measures, requires employers to register employees with the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and introduces severance pay and precarious work premiums. At the same time, it provides greater flexibility in the labor market by allowing for a variety of contract types depending on a company’s activities (e.g. seasonal labor, project-based contracts, telework). Finally, the new code allows the government to favor disadvantaged geographic areas and social groups.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs						    																						The U.S. and Togo have an investment guaranty agreement in place, which requires host government approval prior to the issuance of U.S. government guaranties to any proposed project. The “Guaranty of Private Investments – Agreement Between the United States of America and Togo” was signed on Marcy 20, 1962 and is the basis for requesting pre-approval through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for U.S. government investment support for a proposed project. In 2021, DFC received approval from the government of Togo to provide debt securities and political risk insurance to two enterprises and both are currently pending final approval with DFC. The DFC’s predecessor Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provided political risk insurance and financing for ContourGlobal’s 100-megawatt power plant in Togo. The plant began operation in the fall of 2010 providing base-load electricity for the country. French government agency COFACE provides investment insurance in Togo under programs similar to those offered by DFC. Investment insurance is also available through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)N/AN/A2022$8.31 billionhttps://data.worldbank.org/country/togoForeign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2017$350N/A$0BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/A$0N/A$0BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-dataTotal inbound stock of FDI as % host GDPN/AN/A202110.8%UNCTAD data available athttps://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Coordinated Direct Investment Survey &#8211; Data by Economy &#8211; IMF Data Note: U.S. based ContourGlobal built a 100-megawatt power plant in Togo in 2010. This FDI is not recorded in official U.S. government statistics.																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Political-Economic SectionU.S. Embassy, Lomé4332 Blvd Eyadéma – BP 852, Lomé, Togo+228 2261 5470, ext. 4466togocommercial@state.gov																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											The Bahamas											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											Gabon											The Gambia											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Togo
- Togo HomeReportsOffice of International Religious Freedom2022 Report on International Religious Freedom&#8230;Togo				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Togo																																					Office of International Religious Freedom																																																																																							Download Report																																																																																	 In this section										/																							Executive Summary																																													Executive Summary																															Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																																																																								Executive Summary				The constitution specifies the state is secular and protects the rights of all citizens to exercise their religious beliefs, consistent with the nation’s laws. All religious groups must register as religious associations with the government and apply for authorization to open places of worship with the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) in the Ministry of Territorial Affairs (MTA).In June and August after recurring complaints concerning noise levels, the government announced it had closed 10 neo-charismatic churches (independent churches that emphasize the current availability of gifts of the Holy Spirit). Despite the requests by the closed churches and the religious associations to which they belong for clemency to resume religious services, the churches remained closed at year’s end. During the year, as in previous years, the government refused to accept new applications for new places of worship, per a ministerial order. In a June statement, the Minister of Territorial Affairs urged district officials, prefects, and mayors to take the necessary steps to prohibit, in collaboration with security forces, the establishment of new places of worship. According to the government, many new places of worship were not constructed to an acceptable standard; many also generated complaints of excessive noise.Members of different religious groups attended each other’s ceremonies, and interfaith marriage remained common.U.S. embassy officials discussed religious tolerance and pending legislation affecting religious groups with government officials. U.S. officials also met with religious leaders throughout the year to support their efforts to reduce tensions in communities and support peace and social cohesion, specifically regarding countering violent extremism related to religion. The embassy continued to promote interreligious dialogue through grants to nongovernmental organizations.																														Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.5 million (midyear 2022).  According to the U.S. government, the population is 42.3 percent Christian, 36.9 percent traditional animist, 14 percent Muslim, and less than 1 percent followers of other religions.  Roman Catholics are the largest Christian group, approximately 25 percent of the population, according to the Togolese Conference of Bishops.  Protestants include Lutherans, Methodists, Baptists, Assemblies of God, and neo-charismatic movements.  Other Christian groups include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Nichiren Buddhists, followers of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Baha’is, and Hindus are among other religious groups in the country.  Individuals unaffiliated with a religious group constitute less than one percent of the population.Persons living in the south practice a mixture of different religions, while Muslims live predominately in the central and upper north regions.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										The constitution states the country is a secular state, provides for equality before the law for all citizens regardless of religion, protects all religious beliefs, and prohibits religious discrimination. The constitution also provides for freedom of conscience, religion, and worship; free exercise of religious belief; and the right of religious groups to organize themselves and carry out their activities consistent with the law, the rights of others, and public order.The law requires all religious groups, including indigenous groups, to register as religious associations. Some Christian and Islamic holidays are observed as national holidays. Official recognition as a religious association provides other groups the same rights as those afforded to Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims, including import duty exemptions for humanitarian and development projects. Registration entitles religious groups to receive government benefits such as government-provided teachers for faith-based schools and special assistance in case of natural disasters.Organizations apply for registration with the DRA. A religious group must submit its statutes, statement of doctrine, bylaws, names and addresses of executive board members, leaders’ religious credentials, a site-use agreement, map for religious facilities, and description of its finances. It must also pay a registration fee of 150,000 CFA francs ($244). Criteria for recognition include authenticity of the religious leader’s diploma and the government’s assessment of the ethical behavior of the group, which must not cause a breach of public order. The DRA issues a receipt that serves as temporary recognition for religious groups applying for registration. The investigation and issuance of formal written authorization usually takes several years.By law, religious groups must request permission to conduct large nighttime celebrations, particularly those likely to block city streets or involve loud ceremonies in residential areas.The public school curriculum does not include religion classes. The government assigns its own paid employees as additional teachers and staff to many Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic schools; UNESCO estimates 13 percent of religiously affiliated schools receive such assistance. Other registered religious groups have the right to establish schools if they meet accreditation standards.The constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion. The law forbids private religious radio stations from broadcasting political material.The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.																																				Government Practices										In June, the MTA requested prefects and mayors to no longer authorize new places of worship. The central government transmitted this request to mayors and prefects via a ministerial stop-order and the media. The DRA released a statement in July about several thousand complaints concerning the high level of volume of worship services and religious observances and announced that sanctions would follow efforts to warn religious leaders about the noise. Although there was no law or regulation prescribing a permissible volume, the MTA and mayors recommended acceptable decibel levels through their notes to religious leaders. According to the Director of the DRA, Colonel Bediani Belei, the DRA would seize the audiovisual equipment and shut down places of worship that exceed a threshold of 55 decibels.Similar to previous years, the government did not act on pending registration applications from religious groups and has not accepted new applications since 2013. Most pending registration applications came from Christian evangelical religious movements. The government did not provide a clear explanation for the delay. According to Christian religious organizations, the government returned the application files of some Christian groups without acting on them. They also stated that the government applied the ministerial stop order only to Christians. In years prior, when COVID-19 restrictions were in force until mid-2021, the government cited those restrictions as justification for preventing religious groups from opening new places of worship and limited public gatherings. The cabinet did not act on a bill submitted to it by the MTA in July 2019 that had been pending since 2018 detailing the process for opening places of worship and regulating hours of operation and noise levels allowed during worship.As in 2021, the MTA met with religious leaders to discuss the management of religious services in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the DRA convened a series of meetings with religious contacts throughout August to discuss initiatives to reduce the number of COVID-19 infections. During these meetings and in response to a spike in cases, the government requested religious establishments check for proof of vaccination prior to permitting members entrance to the religious premises.In June and August after recurring complaints concerning noise levels, the government announced it had closed nine neo-charismatic churches: the Church of God in Christ, the Christian Church of the Redeemed of God, the Chapel Church of the Conquerors, the International Church of Mount Armenia, the Church of Power of Redemption, Missionary Church of Christ’s Abundant Grace, Church of Christ’s Awakening, Church of Christ’s International Zoe Life Ministry, and the Almighty Mission Evangelical Ministry. The closed churches and the religious associations to which they belonged asked the government for clemency to resume religious services. The Christian community called for dialogue to solve problems of noise nuisance instead of punishment, arguing that muezzins calling Muslims to prayer and bars make noise freely at similar or greater decibel levels in the hours of sleep and that the government should not uphold a double standard. As of year’s end, the churches remained closed.On February 28 in the Grand-Lome region, the Ministry of Security and a Fulbe Community-based Organization organized a sensitization workshop on social cohesion for the leaders of the primarily Muslim Fulbe (Fulani) communities, religious leaders, and security and defense forces. The participants discussed transhumance (grazing) conflicts between primarily Muslim herders and primarily Christian farmers, religious and ethnic tolerance, and peaceful conflict resolution strategies. In August and September, the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication and the High Commission for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity participated in sensitization campaigns and workshops on the role of journalists in fostering social cohesion, preventing violent extremism, and advancing peace and security.																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															According to religious leaders, community members complained about the noise from religious observances.  The DRA stated they addressed these complaints as they received them but noted limitations to its authority without the passage of the proposed law regulating religious institutions.On September 5, authorities released from prison a voodoo priest named Kossi Edem Wodedzou (also known as Togbui Zewouto), whom the government sentenced in 2021 to two years in prison for burning a copy of the Bible and posting it on social media.  Zewouto said he was protesting a Christian pastor’s practice of burning voodoo fetishes on-camera.Members of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religious groups continued to invite one another to their respective ceremonies.  Marriage between persons of different religious groups remained common.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy and Engagement												    																																															U.S. embassy officials discussed the right of religious freedom as well as freedoms of association and expression in connection to pending legislation regarding religious groups and registration applications, as well as restrictions on public gatherings and the operation of places of worship in meetings with the Ministers of Territorial Affairs, of Security, and of Human Rights.  Embassy officials also met with religious leaders to discuss their efforts to reduce tensions in communities and to support peace and social cohesion, specifically regarding countering violent extremism related to religion.The embassy continued to support the Togolese branch of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, administering a $250,000 U.S. government grant, awarded in 2020, to strengthen resilience against violent extremism, with a strong focus on interreligious dialogue.																																				    							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Religious Demography																																																	Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																							Legal Framework																																																						Government Practices																																																			Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																	Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																							Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom																															Togo