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SYRIA: WEIGHING THE OBAMA

ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 4, 2013

Serial No. 113–113

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State ... 4

The Honorable Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................................................................................... 16

General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: Prepared statement ............................................. 10

The Honorable Chuck Hagel: Prepared statement ............................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement and questions .................................... 87

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 89

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Material submitted for the record .......................................................... 91

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, to the Honorable John F. Kerry ..................... 92

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, to the Honorable 

John F. Kerry ....................................................................................................... 93

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State of South Carolina, to: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry ............................................................................. 94

The Honorable Chuck Hagel ............................................................................... 95

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Alan Grayson, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, to the Honorable John 

F. Kerry ................................................................................................................. 96

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Alan Grayson and 

responses from: 

The Honorable Chuck Hagel ............................................................................... 102

General Martin E. Dempsey ............................................................................... 112

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Mo Brooks, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama, to the Honorable John F. 

Kerry ..................................................................................................................... 119

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable George Holding, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina, to: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry ............................................................................. 121

General Martin E. Dempsey ............................................................................... 122

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SYRIA: WEIGHING THE OBAMA 

ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:15 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. I am going to 

ask all of the members if you could take your seats at this time. 

Welcome, Secretary Kerry. 

Today we meet to weigh the Obama administration’s proposed 

military response to the Syrian regime’s odious use of chemical 

weapons. I want to thank Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey for appearing before us today. And I want to express my appreciation to committee members, Democrats and Republicans, for attending this 

hearing on short notice. 

The President’s decision this past weekend to seek an authorization of military force from Congress was not anticipated, but it was 

welcomed. This committee has no greater responsibility than overseeing the deployment and use of the United States Armed Forces. 

Since the administration of President John Adams, Congress has 

acted several times to authorize the use of military force by the 

President. One thing different here is that the administration’s proposal supports a U.S. military response against a country in civil 

war. Needless to say, this complicates the consideration. 

I think we are all troubled by the unfortunate lack of international support. Although the proposed action aims to uphold an 

international norm, there is no United Nations resolution of support, nor NATO backing. 

As we will hear today, the President views striking the Syrian 

regime as a way to strengthen deterrence against the future use 

of chemical weapons by Assad and by others. That is an important 

consideration. There are too many bad actors out there. Countries 

like Iran are watching. And, yes, a credible threat is key to putting 

the brakes on Iran’s nuclear program. 

There are concerns. The President promises a military operation 

in Syria of limited scope and duration. But the Assad regime would 

have a say in what happens next. That would be particularly true 

as President Obama isn’t aiming to change the situation on the 

ground. What are the chances of escalation? Are different scenarios 

2

accounted for? If our credibility is on the line now, as is argued, 

what about if Assad retaliates? Americans are skeptical of getting 

near a conflict that, as one witness has noted, is fueled by historic, 

ethnic, religious, and tribal issues. 

The administration’s Syria policy doesn’t build confidence. For 

over 2 years U.S. policy has been adrift. Initially, the Obama administration saw Assad as a reformer. Once the revolt started, it 

backed U.N. diplomacy. And then it bet on a Moscow policy and the 

thought that Russia would play a constructive role. Predictably, 

that has not worked. 

Over a year ago, President Obama drew, in his words, a red line. 

Yet only last week did the administration begin to consult with 

Congress on what that means. Today, the House begins formal consideration of the President’s request to use military force in Syria. 

It is a cliche ́ but true: There are no easy answers. Syria and much 

of the Middle East are a mess. So we look forward to a thorough 

and deliberate discussion today, one reflecting the gravity of the 

issue. 

And I will now turn to Ranking Member Engel, who has been 

ringing the alarm bell on Syria for a long, long time. Ranking 

Member Engel from New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing today. 

Secretary Kerry, welcome. 

I look forward to this hearing, which addresses the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, the serious threat to the national 

security interests of the United States and our allies. 

Many of you know that I have been following the Middle East 

for many years, but in particular I have spent an enormous amount 

of time on Syria. The Syria Accountability Act of 2003, which I authored, is the landmark statement of American policy toward Syria, 

and imposed sanctions on Damascus in large part due to its chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In March of 

this year, I introduced a bipartisan bill that would authorize the 

President to arm fully vetted members of the moderate Syrian opposition. So when I talk about Syria, I am speaking from years of 

experience, hours of hearings, and scores of meetings with U.S. and 

foreign officials. 

Mr. Chairman, we have all seen the images of the lifeless bodies 

of Syrian men, women, and children, at least 400 children, neatly 

lined up in rows, wrapped in white sheets. Their bodies appeared 

to have no outward physical injuries. Entire families killed in their 

homes in the blink of an eye. Our intelligence agencies have assessed with high confidence that these innocent civilians were 

killed by sarin gas, a deadly nerve agent classified as a weapon of 

mass destruction by the U.N. Security Council and outlawed by the 

Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. They have also concluded 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Assad regime is responsible for 

the use of these horrific weapons. 

I strongly agree with President Obama that the United States 

must respond to this flagrant violation of international law with a 

limited military strike to deter the further use of chemical weapons 

and degrade the Assad regime’s ability to use them again. 

3

But the issue we confront today is much bigger than the use of 

chemical weapons in Syria. We are talking about the credibility of 

America as a global power. We are talking about sending a clear 

message to the dictators in Tehran and Pyongyang that there will 

be serious consequences for flouting the will of the international 

community and that the U.S. backs its words with action. 

Iran in particular is watching very carefully to see if the United 

States is willing to stand up for its vital interests in the region and 

the interests of our allies. They are a central player in the Syrian 

civil war, providing weapons, money, advice, and manpower to the 

Assad regime, and supporting the intervention of their terrorist 

proxy Hezbollah. And according to the IAEA, they are moving full 

speed ahead with efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. 

I believe that Congress must authorize the Commander in Chief 

to use limited military force against the Assad regime, and I hope 

my colleagues will join me in supporting such an authorization. 

But we should not give the President a blank check. The authorization measure we take up must clarify that any strike should be of 

a limited nature and that there should absolutely be no American 

boots on the ground in Syria. 

While it is critically important for the U.S. to hold the Assad regime accountable for the use of chemical weapons, we must also 

focus on developing a larger strategy to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis, support our regional partners, and ultimately 

find a path forward that brings a lasting peace for the Syrian people. 

As I mentioned earlier, in March I introduced the bipartisan 

Free Syria Act, legislation that would increase humanitarian aid 

and authorize the President to provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to Syria’s moderate opposition. I continue to believe that the 

moderate opposition is key to Syria’s future and that we must redouble our efforts to support them as soon as possible. 

I know many Members on both sides of the aisle are struggling 

with this issue of using force in Syria. We are all trying to do the 

right thing for our constituents, for our country, and for our national security. Questions of war and peace are always difficult, 

and I am proud that we are treating them with the utmost seriousness in this committee. But in the days before we take any vote, 

I encourage my colleagues to ask themselves these questions: If we 

do not pass the authorization measure, what message will Assad 

get? What message will Iran receive? Hezbollah? Our allies? We 

have to live up to our commitments. 

So Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this important hearing, and I look forward to Secretary Kerry and to the 

testimony of our other distinguished witnesses. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This afternoon we are pleased to be joined by our Secretary of 

State, John Kerry. And shortly we will be joined by the Secretary 

of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Prior to his appointment, John Kerry served as United States 

Senator from Massachusetts for 28 years and chaired the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee for the last 4 years. And without objection, the witnesses’ statements, Senator Kerry and those of Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, will be made part of the 

4

record. Members here will have 5 days to submit statements and 

questions and extraneous material for the record. 

And I would like to note, members, that we have a nearly full 

committee here with us today. And therefore, we need to work 

within the time constraints that we have. We are going to ask all 

members to be mindful of that timer as you ask questions. So we 

will begin now with Secretary Kerry’s testimony. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY, 

SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Ranking 

Member Engel, as the chairman said, an early congressional leader 

on Syria. And to all the members of the committee let me just say 

first of all that I have enormous respect for the fact that everybody 

has returned unexpectedly and hurriedly to come back here to be 

part of this debate. And on behalf of the administration and the 

American people, I thank you for doing so. 

I think it is—I don’t think, I know it is no exaggeration to say 

that the world is not just watching to see what we decide here, but 

the world is really watching to see how we decide it, frankly, 

whether or not we can still make or achieve a single voice speaking 

for the United States of America, the Congress, and the President 

of the United States. And they want to know whether or not America is going to rise to this moment, whether or not we will express 

our position with the unity that this moment demands. 

The question of whether or not to authorize force, the chairman 

referenced my 28 years here, I had a number of occasions to make 

those votes and a number of occasions to make judgments about 

Presidents who acted without coming to Congress. And I found that 

we were and are always stronger when we can act together. 

First and foremost, I think it is important to explain to the 

American people why we are here. And I don’t think it can bear 

enough recognition, as people grapple with this at the end of summer, post-Labor Day, kids going back to school, and a lot of other 

concerns on their mind. We are here because against the multiple 

warnings from the President of the United States, warnings from 

Congress, from many of you, warnings from friends and allies, and 

even warnings from Russia and Iran that chemical weapons are 

out of bounds, against all of that the Assad regime, and only, undeniably, the Assad regime, unleashed an outrageous chemical attack 

against its own citizens. So we are here because a dictator and his 

family’s enterprise, which is what it is, were willing to infect the 

air of Damascus with a poison that killed innocent mothers and fathers and children, their lives all snuffed out by gas during the 

early morning hours of August 21st. 

Now, some people in a few places, amazingly, against all the evidence, have questioned whether or not this assault on conscience 

actually took place. And I repeat again here today, unequivocally, 

only the most willful desire to avoid reality, only the most devious 

political purpose could assert that this did not occur as described 

or that the regime did not do it. It did happen, and the Bashar alAssad regime did it. 

5

Now, I remember Iraq. And Secretary Hagel, who will soon be 

here, and General Dempsey, obviously, also remember it very well. 

Secretary Hagel and I both voted in the United States Senate. And 

so both of us are especially sensitive to never again asking any 

Member of Congress to vote on faulty intelligence. And that is why 

our Intelligence Community took time, that is why the President 

took time to make certain of the facts, and make certain of this 

case, and to declassify unprecedented amounts of information in 

order to scrub and rescrub the evidence and present the facts to 

the American people, and especially to the Congress, and through 

you, to the American people. We have declassified unprecedented 

amounts of information, some of it, I might add, not because initially that might have been the instinct in the sense of protecting 

sources and methods, but some leaked. And after its leaking, we 

thought it was important to verify whether it was true or not. 

So by now you have heard a great deal from me and others in 

the administration about the comprehensive evidence that we have 

collected in the days following the attack on August 21st. So I am 

not going to go through all of it again right now. I am happy to 

discuss it further if any of you have any questions. But I can tell 

you beyond a reasonable doubt—and I used to prosecute cases; I 

ran one of the largest district attorney’s offices in America—and I 

can tell you beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence proves that 

the Assad regime prepared this attack and that they attacked exclusively opposition-controlled or contested territory. 

Now, at some point in the appropriate setting you will learn additional evidence, which came to us even today, which further documents the acknowledgment of various friends of the Assad regime 

that they know that this happened. Our evidence proves that they 

used sarin gas that morning, and it proves that they used some of 

the world’s most heinous weapons to kill more than 1,400 innocent 

people, including at least 426 children. 

Now, I am sure that many of you have seen the images yourselves of men and women, the elderly, and children sprawled on a 

hospital floor, no wounds, no blood, and chaos and desperation 

around them, none of which could possibly have been contrived. All 

of that was real. We have the evidence. We know what happened. 

And there is no question that this would meet the standard by 

which we send people to jail for the rest of their lives. 

So we are here because of what happened. But we are also here 

not just because of what happened 2 weeks ago, we are here because of what happened nearly a century ago, when in the darkest 

moments of World War I, when they were over, after the horror of 

gas warfare, when the majority of the world came together to declare in no uncertain terms that chemical weapons crossed the line 

of conscience and that they must be banned. And over the years 

that followed, more than 180 countries, I think it is 184 to be precise, including Iran, Iraq, and Russia, all agreed and joined the 

Chemical Weapons Convention. Even countries with whom we 

agree on very little else agreed on this. 

Now, some have tried to suggest that the debate that we are having today is about this President’s red line, that this is about President Obama’s red line. Let me make it as clear as I can to all of 

you: That is just not true. This is about the world’s red line, it is 

6

about humanity’s red line, a line that anyone with a conscience 

should draw, and a line that was drawn nearly 100 years ago, in 

1925, when the Chemical Weapons Convention was agreed on. 

This debate, I might add to you, is also about Congress’ red line. 

You agreed to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Not all of you 

were here to vote for it, but the Congress agreed to that. The Congress passed the Syria Accountability Act, which Congressman 

Engel has referred to and authored. And that act says clearly, and 

I quote, ‘‘Syria’s chemical weapons threaten the security of the 

Middle East and the national security interests of the United 

States.’’ I think repeatedly Members of Congress have spoken out 

about the grave consequences if Assad in particular were to use 

chemical weapons. And both Speaker Boehner and Leader Pelosi 

have stated in recent days that the actions of the Assad regime are 

unacceptable and that the United States has a responsibility to respond. 

So as we debate, the world is watching and the world is wondering not whether Assad’s regime actually did this—I think that 

fact is now beyond question—the world is wondering whether the 

United States of America is going to consent through silence to 

stand aside while this kind of brutality is allowed to happen without consequence. 

In the nearly 100 years since this global commitment against 

chemical weapons was made, only two tyrants have dared to cross 

the world’s brightest line. Bashar al-Assad has now become the 

third. And history, I think everyone here knows, holds nothing but 

infamy for those criminals. And history also reserves very little 

sympathy for their enablers. And that is the gravity of this moment. That is really what is at stake in the decision that the Congress faces. 

Syria, bottom line, is important to America and our security for 

many reasons. First, you can’t overlook the danger that these 

weapons, as you said in the Syria Accountability Act, pose to the 

Middle East, to our allies, to our friends. You can’t overlook the 

threat that they face even to the United States ultimately if they 

fall into the wrong hands or if they are used with impunity. Since 

President Obama’s policy is that Assad must go, it is not insignificant that to deprive or degrade Assad’s chemical weapons deprives 

him of a lethal weapon in this ongoing civil war. In addition, we 

have important strategic national security interests, not just in 

preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, but to avoid the 

creation of a safe haven or a base of operations for extremists, alNusra, others, to use these chemical weapons either against us or 

against our friends. Forcing Assad to change his calculation about 

his ability to act with impunity can contribute to his realization 

that he cannot gas or shoot his way out of his predicament. 

Syria is also important because, quite simply, and I can’t say this 

strongly enough to all of you, many of you are parents, you know 

how lessons are learned by children. Many of you at school may 

have confronted at one point or a time a bully on the block or in 

the building. I think, quite simply, common sense and human experience and reality tell us that the risk of not acting is greater than 

the risk of acting. If we don’t take a stand here today, I guarantee 

you we are more likely to face far greater risks to our security and 

7

a far greater likelihood of conflict that demands our action in the 

future. 

Why? Because we, as confidently as we know what happened in 

Damascus on August 21, we know that Assad will read our silence, 

our unwillingness to act as a signal that he can use his weapons 

with impunity. After all has been said and done, if we don’t now, 

knowing that he has already done this at least 11 times that our 

Intelligence Community can prove, and here in this grotesque larger event, larger than anything that has happened before, if we back 

down, if the world backs down, we have sent an unmistakable message of permissiveness. 

Iran, I guarantee you, is hoping we look the other way. And surely they will interpret America’s unwillingness to act against weapons of mass destruction as an unwillingness to act against weapons 

of mass destruction. And we will fight for the credibility to make 

a deterrent against a nuclear weapon as meaningful as it should 

be without that fight. 

North Korea is hoping for ambivalence from the Congress. They 

are all listening for our silence. So the authorization that President 

Obama seeks is distinctly and clearly in our national interest, in 

our national security interest. We need to send to Syria and to the 

world, to dictators and terrorists, to allies and civilians alike, the 

unmistakable message that when we say never again we actually 

don’t mean sometimes, we don’t mean somewhere, we mean never 

again. 

So this is a vote for accountability, the norms and the laws of the 

civilized world. That is what this vote is for. And if we don’t answer Assad today, we will erode the standard that has protected 

our troops for a century. Our troops. Our troops in war have been 

protected by the existence of this prohibition, through World War 

II, through Korea, through Vietnam, through both Iraq wars. The 

fact is we have not seen chemical weapons in the battlefield but for 

the two occasions I mentioned previously. Our troops are protected. 

This is a standard that we need to enforce to stand up for America’s interests. 

And I will say to you unequivocally that our allies and our partners are counting on us. The people of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, 

each look next door and they see chemical weapons being used. 

They are one stiff breeze away from the potential of those weapons 

harming them. They anxiously await our assurance that our word 

is true. And they await the assurance that if the children lined up 

in those unbloodied burial shrouds in Damascus were their own 

children, as they might be if this got out of hand, they want to 

know that we would keep the world’s promise. 

As Justice Jackson said in the opening argument at Nuremberg, 

‘‘The ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable 

in a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to the law.’’ If the world’s worst despots see that they can 

flout with impunity prohibitions against the world’s worst weapons, 

then those prohibitions are rendered just pieces of paper. That is 

what we mean by accountability. And that is, I say to all of you 

respectfully, that is why we cannot be silent. 

Let me be very, very clear. When I walked into this room a person of conscience stood up behind me, as is the ability of people in 

8

our country, and that person said, please don’t take us to war, 

don’t take us to another war. I think the three of us sitting here 

understand that plea as well as any people in this country. Let me 

be clear, we are not asking America to go to war. And I say that 

sitting next to two individuals who well know what war is, and 

there are others here today who know what war is. They know the 

difference between going to war and what the President is requesting now. We all agree there will be no American boots on the 

ground. The President has made crystal clear we have no intention 

of assuming responsibility for Assad’s civil war. That is not in the 

cards. That is not what is here. 

The President is asking only for the power to make certain that 

the United States of America means what we say. He is asking for 

authorization, targeted and limited, to deter and degrade Bashar 

al-Assad’s capacity to use chemical weapons. 

Now, I will make it clear, for those who feel that more ought to 

be done or that, you know, in keeping with the policy that Assad 

must go, clearly the degradation of his capacity to use those weapons has an impact on the lethality of the weapons available to him. 

And it will have an impact on the battlefield. Just today, before 

coming in here, I read an email to me about a general, the Minister 

of Defense, former Minister or Assistant Minister, I forget which, 

who has just defected and is now in Turkey. And there are other 

defections that we are hearing about the potential of because of the 

potential that we might take action. So there will be downstream 

impacts, though that is not the principal purpose of what the President is asking you for. 

Now, some will undoubtedly and understandably ask about the 

unintended consequences of action. Will this drag you in inadvertently? And they fear that a retaliation could lead to a larger conflict. Let me say again, unequivocally, bluntly, if Assad is arrogant 

enough and foolish enough to retaliate to the consequences of his 

own criminal activity, the United States and our allies have ample 

ways to make him regret that decision without going to war. Even 

Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, say publicly that the use of 

chemical weapons is unacceptable. And guess what? Even Iran and 

Syria itself acknowledge that these weapons were used. They just 

pretend that the other guys, who don’t even have the capacity to 

do it, somehow did it. 

So some will question the extent of our responsibility to act here. 

To them I say, when someone kills hundreds of children with a 

weapon the world has banned, we all are responsible. That is true 

because of treaties like the Geneva Convention and the Chemical 

Weapons Convention. But it is also true because we share a common humanity and a common sense of decency. 

This is not the time for armchair isolationism. This is not the 

time to be spectators to slaughter. This is not the time to give permission to a dictator, who has already used these weapons, the unfettered ability to continue to use them because we stepped back. 

Neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence or inaction. 

So we have spoken up, the President of the United States has 

made his decision. The President has decided we need to do this. 

But in keeping with our Constitution, and the full measure of the 

9

hopes and articulated aspirations of our Founding Fathers, the 

President is coming to the Congress of the United States, a decision that the American people agree with, and asking the Congress 

to stand with him and with this administration to stand up for our 

security, to protect our values, to lead the world with conviction 

that is clear. That is why we are here. And we look forward to having a rigorous discussion with you in furtherance of that mission. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. We have been joined by Secretary Hagel, who 

before being appointed Secretary of Defense served in the United 

States Senate from 1996 until 2009. He is the recipient of two Purple Hearts for his service in Vietnam. And we have been joined by 

General Dempsey. From platoon leader to Commandant Commander, he has served in the United States Army for over 40 

years, and now serves as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We will 

go to our Secretary of Defense, Mr. Hagel, first. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you. And General Dempsey and I also 

apologize for being late. The other side of the Capitol held us up, 

but we are much better for it. So thank you for your understanding. 

In the coming days, as we all know, Congress will debate how 

to respond to the most recent chemical weapons attack in Syria, a 

large-scale sarin gas assault perpetrated by the Syrian Government 

against its own people. I welcome this debate, and I strongly support President Obama’s decision to seek congressional authorization for the use of force in Syria. 

As each of us knows, committing the country to using military 

force is the most difficult and important decision America’s leaders 

can make. All of those who are privileged to serve our Nation and 

have the responsibility in many ways to serve our country, but the 

primary responsibility is to ask the tough questions before any 

military commitment is made. The American people must be assured that their leaders are acting according to U.S. national interests, with well-defined military objectives, and with an understanding of the risks and consequences involved. The President, 

along with his entire national security team, asked those tough 

questions before we concluded that the United States should take 

military action against Syrian regime targets. 

I want to address very briefly, Mr. Chairman, before we get to 

your questions, how we reached this decision by clarifying the U.S. 

interests at stake, our military objectives, and the risks of not acting at this critical juncture. As President Obama said, the use of 

chemical weapons in Syria is not only an assault on humanity, it 

is a serious threat to America’s national security interests and 

those of our closest allies. The Syrian regime’s use of chemical 

weapons poses grave risks to our friends and partners along Syria’s 

borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. If 

Assad is prepared to use chemical weapons against his own people, 

we have to be concerned that terrorist groups like Hezbollah, which 

has forces fighting in Syria supporting the Assad regime, could acquire them and use them. 

This risk of chemical weapons proliferation poses a direct threat 

to our friends and partners, and to U.S. personnel in the region. 

We cannot afford for Hezbollah or any terrorist group determined 

to strike the United States to have incentives to acquire or use 

these chemical weapons. The Syrian regime’s actions risk eroding 

the nearly century-old international norm against the use of chemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
17

ical weapons, a norm that has helped protect United States forces 

and our homeland. 

Weakening this norm could embolden other regimes to acquire or 

use chemical weapons. For example, North Korea maintains a massive stockpile of chemical weapons that threaten our treaty ally, 

the Republic of South Korea, and the 28,000 U.S. troops stationed 

on the border. I have just returned from Asia, where I had a very 

serious and long conversation with South Korea’s Defense Minister 

about the threat that North Korea’s stockpile of chemical weapons 

presents to them. Our allies throughout the world must be assured 

that the United States will fulfill its security commitments. Given 

these threats to our national security, the United States must demonstrate through our actions that the use of chemical weapons is 

unacceptable. 

The President has made clear that our military objectives in 

Syria would be to hold the Assad regime accountable, degrade its 

ability to carry out these kinds of attacks, and deter the regime 

from further use of chemical weapons. The Department of Defense 

has developed military options to achieve these objectives, and we 

have positioned U.S. assets throughout the region to successfully 

execute the mission. We believe we can achieve them with a military action that would be limited in duration and scope. General 

Dempsey and I have assured the President that U.S. forces will be 

ready to act whenever the President gives the order. 

We are also working with our allies and our partners in this effort. Key partners, including France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the 

United Arab Emirates, and other friends in the region have assured us of their strong support for U.S. action. 

In defining our military objectives, we have made clear that we 

are not seeking to resolve the underlying conflict in Syria through 

direct military force. Instead, we are contemplating actions that 

are tailored to respond to the use of chemical weapons. A political 

solution created by the Syrian people is the only way to ultimately 

end the violence in Syria, and Secretary Kerry is leading international efforts to help the parties in Syria move toward a negotiated transition. 

We are also committed to doing more to assist the Syrian opposition. But Assad must be held accountable for using these weapons 

in defiance of the international community. Having defined America’s interests and our military objectives, we also must examine 

the risks and the consequences. 

As we all know, there are always risks in taking action. But 

there are also risks with inaction. The Assad regime, under increasing pressure by the Syrian opposition, could feel empowered 

to carry out even more devastating chemical weapons attacks. 

Chemical weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent civilians, and inflict the worst kind of indiscriminate suffering, as we have recently seen. A refusal to act would undermine 

the credibility of America’s other security commitments, including 

the President’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

The word of the United States must mean something. It is vital 

currency in foreign relations and international and allied commitments. Every witness here today at this table, Secretary Kerry, 

18

General Dempsey, and myself, as Secretary Kerry has noted, have 

served in uniform, fought in war, and seen its ugly realities up 

close. We understand that a country faces few decisions as grave 

as using military force. We are not unaware of the costs and the 

ravages of war. But we also understand that America must protect 

its people and its national interests. That is our highest responsibility. 

All of us who have the privilege and responsibility of serving this 

great Nation owe the American people, and especially those wearing the uniform of our country, a vigorous debate on how America 

should respond to the horrific chemical weapons attack in Syria. I 

know everyone on this committee agrees and takes their responsibility of office just as seriously as the President and everyone at 

this table. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel follows:]

19


82640b-1.eps
20


82640b-2.eps
21

Chairman ROYCE. And we also appreciate General Dempsey 

being with us today to answer any members’ questions. 

And if I could go, Secretary Kerry, to you for a question. Something I referenced in my opening statement, other countries are 

watching. And as I understand it, the administration and you, as 

a matter of fact, have been in contact with the governments, in discussions with South Korea, with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia, with 

Israel, and I have read several others in the press. I was going to 

ask you the communications that you are having. What are they 

communicating to you about this incident when you talk to these 

governments? 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to share that 

with you. Let me just say at the outset, I mentioned an email I got 

coming in. The same news outlet, Reuters, has now said that the 

Syrian Government is saying that the defection hasn’t taken place. 

So who knows whether it has or it hasn’t. 

What I do know is this: The intelligence is very clear, and in 

other settings I urge you to go and look at it, that there are currently defections taking place. I think there are something like 60 

to 100 in the last day or so, officers and enlisted personnel. And 

there are serious questions taking place among the so-called elite 

of Syria about whether or not Bashar al-Assad has kind of run the 

table here too far, and that there are serious questions about the 

future. I just put that on the table for you to think about. 

Chairman ROYCE. We understand. But the views of South Korea, 

the views of the Governments of Turkey——

Secretary KERRY. We have reached out to over 100 countries. We 

continue to reach out to these countries. Fifty-three countries or organizations have acknowledged that chemical weapons were used, 

and 37 of them have said so publicly. That will grow as the evidence that we released yesterday becomes more prevalent. I will be 

meeting with the foreign ministers of Europe, the 28 foreign ministers in Vilnius on Saturday. This will clearly be a topic of discussion. And many of them have had reservations, waiting for the evidence. So I see many more countries joining. 

Thirty-one countries or organizations have stated publicly or privately that the Assad regime is responsible for this attack and that 

was before our evidence package was put together. And 34 countries or organizations have indicated that if the allegations prove 

to be true they would support some form of action against Syria. 

Now, to be more specific and bear down on the President’s proposal and this particular action, currently in the region there are 

a number of countries, friends of ours, that have offered to be part 

of this operation, and those countries can speak for themselves. But 

there are more countries who have offered to be part of this operation than our military currently believes we need to have part of 

it in order to effect the operation. Obviously, there is an interest 

in having an international, multinational effort, and I think the 

President is committed to doing so. But there are friends of ours, 

including France, as you know, which is sticking with its position, 

and others in the region who are prepared to be part of this operation with us. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let me ask a question of our Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey. One of the first reactions that I 

22

have gotten from members here was on the open-ended nature of 

that authorization. And as you know, on the Senate side there is 

now discussion. We all know there is no support for boots on the 

ground on the House side. But it doesn’t reference it in the authorization. Now they are. They are taking that off the table. They are 

looking at a short timeframe. They are talking about a comprehensive Syrian strategy. And resolutions here on the House side likewise are coming at this from a different direction than the original 

authorization. I would like your views. Can you express your perception or your response to the initiatives that you now see or the 

resolutions that you now see on the Senate side and here on the 

House side on rewriting the original authorization? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. Thanks, Chairman. I have made it a 

point of importance not to discuss my personal views about the resolution. That is for you to determine. I will tell you that militarily, 

the broader the resolution the more options I can provide. But that 

said, I will also assure you that the President has given me quite 

clear guidance that this will be a limited and focused operation, not 

an open-ended operation. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I think that—and I will maybe go to Secretary Hagel there for a few comments on this, if you could sum 

up—but again, it is very clear on the House side there is no support for boots on the ground and the desire to rewrite the authorization. Your response? 

Secretary HAGEL. I saw one draft this morning, Mr. Chairman, 

from the Senate side. I have not seen anything since, over the last 

few hours. I know all of our agencies represented at this table, as 

well as the National Security Council, are working with the appropriate committee people. And I have confidence that we will be able 

to come up with a mutually agreed upon resolution to be able to 

accomplish the objective. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel, perhaps you could answer 

this. I know Secretary Kerry referred to it in his opening remarks. 

I believe, like you, Mr. Secretary, that American credibility on the 

international stage hangs in the balance. And while it is crucial to 

make sure that Assad never uses chemical weapons again, I believe 

there is something even greater at stake, and that is the message 

we send to Iran as they continue to pursue a dangerous nuclear 

weapons capability. Iran is watching how we respond to the Syrian 

regime’s crossing of the President’s red line and of the world’s red 

line, and the Supreme Leader is also aware that President Obama 

is keeping all options on the table, including utilizing military force 

to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons. So I would like 

to ask you, what will Iran’s reaction be if we don’t act now? Will 

they see our threat to stop their nuclear weapons program as hollow and will our effort to stop the Iranian bomb be put in jeopardy? 

And do you think their calculus on their nuclear program will 

change based on what we do now? 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, there is an enormous amount of 

question in the region, not just by Iranians, but by Emiratis, 

Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris and others as to whether or not the 

United States of America means what it says. And they ask me all 

23

the time, are you guys serious about Iran? I am sure when they 

come and visit with you, they look to you for reassurances with respect to America’s position on Iran. 

There is no question in my mind that the President of the United 

States does not bluff, and he is committed that Iran will not have 

a nuclear weapon. But if we fail to enforce a standard that has 

been in existence for almost 100 years regarding weapons of mass 

destruction we are putting that into question in the minds of a lot 

of observers and creating problems for ourselves, where we may get 

closer to a test that cannot be constrained or managed as a consequence of the misinterpretation of our word today. So I believe 

it is critical. 

Just two other things I would say. Without any question in my 

mind, if we fail to pass this, those who are working with us today 

with the Syrian opposition, and I know Congressman Engel, you 

know this, we have been working hard to keep them from funding 

bad elements, whether it is al-Nusra or others, which they have 

funded out of frustration because they think they are the best 

fighters and the only people who are going to get the job done of 

getting rid of Assad. And so if we back off and we fail to enforce 

our word here, I promise you that the discipline we have put in 

place with respect to the moderate opposition versus bad guys will 

dissipate immediately and people will resort to anybody they can 

find to help them accomplish their goal, and we would have created 

more extremism and a greater problem down the road. So the word 

will be misinterpreted in many ways, not just Iran, Congressman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, perhaps Secretary Hagel could answer this, Secretary Kerry just mentioned the opposition. And I put in a bill several months ago which would allow us to aid the well-vetted Syrian 

opposition. I don’t think that the potential of military force we are 

considering can be looked upon in a vacuum. I think that this operation must be utilized as one piece of a larger comprehensive Syria 

strategy. So let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, as we downgrade Syria’s ability to use chemical weapons, will we in turn be degrading 

Assad’s ability to attack and suppress the opposition, and will we 

degrade Assad’s air force so that he cannot continue to use the sky 

to murder his own people? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, I would respond this way. You 

are correct as you assess this one option that we are debating today 

in that it works in parallel with a number of other tracks that are 

ongoing. I think most all of us believe, the President believes, everyone at this table believes there is no military solution in Syria. 

It is going to require a political resolution. In that regard, the actions that we would take would be in parallel to the opposition, 

strengthening of the opposition. It would be in parallel to what Secretary Kerry noted, the continuing defections from Assad’s military 

and from his regime. It would be in parallel with the international 

community continuing to strengthen their voices and join with us 

in this condemnation. All the other consequences that would come 

from this would be part of it. So that is the way I would answer 

your question. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to the chairman emeritus of 

this committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

24

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. 

We have been aware of Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile for 

years, yet we failed to hold him accountable. The United Nations 

has been completely useless at effecting any change in Syria, 

thanks in no small part to Russia and China’s persistent 

stonewalling at the Security Council. And Congress has certainly 

had our fair share of missed opportunities. Last Congress, the 

House passed the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act overwhelmingly, with a vote of 418 

and only 2 against. Yet, Mr. Secretary, the Senate failed to take 

any action on it. 

Had the United States been taking a more proactive role in Syria 

by instituting strict sanctions against Assad’s regime it may have 

changed his calculations on the use of chemical weapons. In order 

to justify action now against his regime and risk further escalating 

the conflict the President must clearly identify what our national 

security interests are. What are our objectives in limited and targeted air strikes? What does degradation look like? And what will 

we do if the initial action does not yield the intended result? 

One Senate version of the resolution has a limitation on ground 

troops for combat operations. This sounds like it leaves open the 

possibility of boots on the ground for something other than combat 

operations, like special operations. Is this intentional? Will you confirm that under no circumstances will we place boots on the ground 

in Syria? 

We all know we are in a tough fiscal environment. Even a limited engagement, if it ends up being only limited, could potentially 

cost taxpayers billions. With members of the Arab League so eager 

for U.S. participation, have they offered to offset any of the costs 

associated with this action? 

Iran and North Korea are carefully watching our next move. If 

we say that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, yet we 

fail to act, this will embolden Iran’s pursuit of nuclear breakout capabilities. A refusal to act in Syria, after the President has set such 

a clear red line, will be seen as a green light by the Iranian regime, 

who will see that we don’t have the will to back up our words. 

So, gentlemen, what about boots on the ground? The Arab 

League, are they going to pony up? Our objectives? And lastly, 

there is some rumor circulating today that perhaps the House will 

not have a vote on authorization, the Senate will and perhaps not 

on the House side. If you could comment on that. 

Secretary KERRY. Madam Chairwoman, I don’t know anything 

about this rumor, so I am not going to comment on it because it 

is a rumor. And it is the first I have heard of it. 

With respect to Arab countries offering to bear costs and to assist, the answer is profoundly yes, they have. That offer is on the 

table. 

With respect to boots on the ground, profoundly no. There will 

be no boots on the ground. The President has said that again and 

again. And there is nothing in this authorization that should contemplate it. And we reiterate no boots on the ground. 

In terms of what you do if it doesn’t work, I think I will let General Dempsey speak to the question of targeting, which he can’t go 

25

into in detail. But we have absolute confidence that what our military undertakes to do, if it is ordered to do so, will degrade the capacity of Assad to use these weapons and serve as a very strong 

deterrence. And if it doesn’t, then there are subsequent possibilities 

as to how you could reinforce that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And the details on 

the offer and the proposal on the table, what are the figures that 

we are talking about? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we don’t know what action we are engaged in right now. But they have been quite significant. I mean 

very significant. In fact, some of them have said that if the United 

States is prepared to go do the whole thing the way we have done 

it previously in other places, they will carry that cost. That is how 

dedicated they are to this. Obviously, that is not in the cards and 

nobody is talking about it, but they are talking in serious ways 

about getting this job done. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And in terms of other countries being in the 

fight with us with these limited strikes, what other—the time is 

over? Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. The time is up. And we better go to Mr. Meeks 

of New York in order to get through the full panel. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ROYCE. Oh, Mr. Sherman is next. Mr. Sherman of 

California then. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The President drew a red line. Presidents often 

draw red lines in order to deter action. Usually they deter that action, to our benefit and at no cost. When the President drew that 

red line, I am not aware of anyone in this room who criticized it 

or disassociated themselves from that red line. Now Assad has 

crossed that red line, it is America’s red line. If we do not act, 

Assad will use chemical weapons many times in the future. They 

may be decisively successful for him, and dictators for decades to 

come will learn from Assad’s lesson that chemical weapons on civilians used on a mass scale can be effective and that the 1925 protocol against their use is a dead letter. 

In picking targets, gentlemen, you are going to be torn between 

the germane and the effective. Germane would be directly related 

to chemical weapons. But the fact is we want Assad to control, 

store, and keep control of his chemical weapons. And so you will 

be seeking out targets somehow related to the creation, storage, 

control, or delivery of chemical weapons. And I think that instead 

you should focus on punishing and deterring Assad by hitting valuable assets that will demonstrate to him that it was a military mistake to hit Ghouta with chemical weapons. Even air or naval assets 

unrelated to the delivery of chemical weapons will make that lesson clear to him. 

We have all learned a searing lesson from over 4,000 casualties 

in Iraq, but we should be aware that there are 150 occasions—and, 

Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to put into the 

record a CRS listing and analysis of 150 occasions in the last 40 

years when America has deployed its forces into dangerous or hostile situations. And in most of those, we had a limited purpose, limited deployment, and the cost was so limited that we have forgotten 

26

the incident involved. And I hope very much that what you are 

planning is something much more along those lines than Iraq. 

The resolution that was sent to us on August 31 is obviously 

flawed. I sent Secretary Kerry amendments the next day, on September 1st. Our colleagues, Mr. Van Hollen and Mr. Connolly, have 

proposed a substitute, as has Senator Menendez. I would like to explore with you what elements a good resolution would have, knowing that this resolution adds to the authority you already have 

under the War Powers Resolution of 1973. 

Is it acceptable for this resolution to confirm what you have already said, and that is that the resolution itself does not add in 

any way to the powers of the President to put boots on the ground 

in Syria? Is that an acceptable position? Secretary Kerry? 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Would a time limit of 60 days, indicating that you 

might have other authorities to act beyond those 60 days, you 

might come back to Congress, but what we are authorizing now is 

limited to 60 days, would that be acceptable? 

Secretary KERRY. We would prefer that you have some kind of 

trigger in there with respect to if he were to come back and use 

chemical weapons again, that there would be a capacity to respond 

to that. If you just have a fixed——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, you could always come back to Congress or 

you could have a provision every time he uses chemical weapons 

you get another 60 days. 

Secretary KERRY. That would be acceptable. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The second, the first, or——

Secretary KERRY. The second. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And, finally, would you accept a provision that 

said that you may want to pursue regime change with other authorities that you have, including arming the rebels under other 

authority that you have, but that this resolution is limited to actions designed to punish and deter the use of chemical weapons 

and not to change the outcome of the civil war? 

Secretary KERRY. The preference of the President is to have this 

a narrow authorization so that nobody gets confused here and people aren’t asked to vote for two different things. One thing the 

President wants is the capacity to enforce the international norm 

with respect to chemical weapons and to make our word with respect to that meaningful to the region. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I know your staff will be working with Congress to draft a resolution, and the more carefully tailored it is, the 

more narrow it is, the more likely you are to actually succeeded in 

the House. 

I hope very much, Mr. Chairman, that we are marking up a resolution in this committee and considering in regular order. 

And, finally, for the record, if you could explain——

Chairman ROYCE. Well, yeah, afterwards we can introduce the 

questions for the record, but we need to go now to Mr. Smith, 

chairman of the Africa Subcommittee. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

A New York Times editorial yesterday, Mr. Secretary, or Secretaries, said that it was ‘‘alarming’’ that President Obama did not 

27

‘‘long ago put into place with our allies and partners a plan for 

international action.’’

Their word, ‘‘alarming,’’ that we have failed over the course of 

the last several years to do what ought to have been done. That 

is a New York Times editorial—hardly a conservative newspaper. 

I have three specifics questions, and I would ask that you, to the 

best of your ability, answer all three. 

Yesterday, Secretary Kerry, you testified that the Obama administration wanted to make him—that is Assad, I presume—regret 

the decision to use chemical weapons as he has done on August 

21st and, as we all know, on previous occasions as well. First question: Do we have clear proof that Assad himself ordered it? 

Second question: In an interview with Chris Wallace on Sunday, 

you said that, ‘‘Actually, Chris, at the very instant the planes were 

in the air on Kosovo, there was a vote in the House of Representatives, and the vote did not carry.’’ That is true. The House of Representatives voted against force against Slobodan Milosevic. Your 

word, ‘‘very instant,’’ however, is certainly an elastic term. The vote 

was a full month later. Clinton and NATO’s bombing of Serbia 

began on March 24th, and the House voted against it on April 

28th. 

During that time, there were significant assurances that the entire operation would be of short duration, very limited. And I know 

many people had thought, including in Brussels at NATO headquarters, that it would last just a few days. It lasted 78 days. Four 

hundred and eighty-eight to five hundred and twenty-seven civilian 

deaths when the bombing occurred in Serbia. And, significantly, 

Milosevic’s retaliation was the invasion of Kosovo, and that invasion killed about 10,000 people and put most Kosovar Albanians to 

flight. And I, like perhaps you and others, visited them as refugees. 

How do you define ‘‘limited’’ and ‘‘short duration’’? And what 

might Assad do in retaliation? And what contingency plans do we 

have when he attacks in other areas that we may not have anticipated? 

And, finally, I plan on introducing a resolution when we reconvene to authorize the President to establish a specialized court, the 

Syrian war crimes tribunal, to help hold accountable all those on 

either side, including Assad, who have slaughtered and raped in 

Syria. I am wondering how you might think about that, as well, 

whether or not the administration would support such a court. 

We have learned lessons from the special court in Sierra Leon. 

We have learned lessons from the Rwandan court and certainly 

learned lessons from the court in Yugoslavia. It has to be immediate. And I think it could be a rallying point. You yourself said, 

Mr. Secretary, you would send them to jail. Well, let’s send them 

to jail. But killing people and not targeting Assad himself may be 

accountability, but I think there are other alternatives. 

I yield. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, I actually didn’t have time 

yesterday, because of our testimony, to read the New York Times 

editorial, so I would like to read it. But there is a plan in place. 

The London 11, so-called, have been working over some period of 

time, working internationally. 

28

Last year, Secretary Clinton joined in in convening, with the 

Russians and others, a meeting in Geneva that resulted in the Geneva Communique ́, which set up a process for transition in Syria. 

And that is what we are currently pursuing now together with our 

allies and friends in this endeavor, and that includes France, Great 

Britain, Italy, Germany, the Emirates, Saudis, and others. 

So there is an international effort. It may not be—it is not working as well as we would like; it hasn’t had its impact yet fully. But, 

in addition to that, we have seen the President take steps in response to the initial attacks of chemical weapons to increase lethal 

aid to the opposition. That is now known, so——

Mr. SMITH. I am almost out of time, with all due respect. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. Well, let me——

Mr. SMITH. Limited, short duration, a special tribunal on war 

crimes for Syria? 

Secretary KERRY. I understand there been conversations already 

with Syrians and other countries about a special court. Perhaps we 

can have more luck with that. I would certainly welcome an effort 

to hold people accountable for those kinds of abuses, but, as you 

know, the international courts have not fared well with both parties in the Congress. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the interest of time, I also would like to submit my statement 

for——

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

First let me state that I agree with the President’s decision to 

come to Congress for the authorization for the use of U.S. military 

force to address the use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces. I 

think it was the appropriate decision both constitutionally and 

morally. 

And in making my determination on the use of force, I try to look 

at it through both a short- and long-term interest in the security 

of America as my paramount focus. To that end, I believe that the 

use of chemical weapons by the Assad region is indeed a flagrant 

violation of international norms against the use of such weapons, 

and this and other repugnant acts by Syrian forces are indeed 

against U.S. interests. 

But it is not only against U.S. interests; it is also against the 

international interests. So if we act in a unilateral way, I have 

huge concerns; that if there is a violation, we should act, especially 

militarily, in a multilateral way. 

We have regional countries—and I have been listening to the testimony here, but I don’t know where NATO is. At least I have 

heard NATO, who basically said they have condemned it, but I 

don’t hear them saying that they will step up with us militarily. 

I have not heard the Arab union, the Arab League, step up with 

us. 

I have heard people condemn—in fact, Mr. Secretary, you said 

the world is watching what we are doing, but I have yet to hear 

some concrete things of what the world is doing. I am fearful that 

they will isolate the United States, where we are only doing someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
29

thing unilateral while the world just sits back and watch, when 

there is an international violation that took place. 

And you stated, Mr. Secretary, that it matters today that we are 

working as an international community to rid the world of its worst 

weapons. And I couldn’t agree with you more. But I don’t see or 

hear, unless there is another setting that I need to be in, where 

the world is stepping up and agreeing to act with us militarily, not 

just condemning the acts, but acting on that condemnation of the 

acts with us in a military fashion. 

And you stated during the hearing yesterday, Mr. Secretary, you 

indicated that while Russia has obstructed efforts to react to 

Assad’s regime’s use of chemical weapons, there are other ways 

that Russia may yet prove helpful. Would you please elaborate on 

what, if any, role Russia has or can play in bringing about a political solution in Syria? And how is Russia being engaged, given the 

Obama administration’s correct assertion that there is no military 

solution to the crisis in Syria? 

And quickly, General Dempsey, you know, I have serious concerns, as I have stated, about any action that is not broadly supported internationally. And one of my concerns is the possibility of 

unintended consequences, including the prospects of prolonged 

military engagement. 

And in mid-August, you sent Representative Engel a letter. You 

expressed that there are certainly actions that the U.S. could take, 

short of tipping the balance of Syrian conflict, that could impose a 

cost on them for abhorrent behavior. You also indicated that at 

least some of those options would, and I quote, ‘‘escalate and potentially further commit the United States to the conflict. It would not 

be militarily decisive, but it would commit us decisively to the conflict.’’

Can you elaborate on what you meant when you stated that we 

could be decisively committed to the conflict? And if the U.S. commits a limited military strike in Syria, how do you minimize the 

possibility of prolonged commitment? And if the international supports remain as limited as it seems now, are there risks of a longer 

engagement which are more pronounced? 

Secretary KERRY. Go ahead, General. 

General DEMPSEY. You are going to have to take yours for the 

record, I predict. 

Congressman, in the time remaining, I think it is the focus and 

the purpose of the military action that will give us the best chance 

of limiting it in time and in commitment. 

In other words, my letter to Representative Engel talked about 

answering the question what would it take to tip the scales in favor 

of the opposition. If we were to take military action ourselves to 

support the opposition, that is a very long—that is a long prospect. 

What we are talking about here is not that. The purpose is to 

deter and degrade for the specific purpose of chemical weapons. 

And I think it is the purpose that allows us to say with some confidence that our intent is to limit it. 

Now, that is not to say that I discount the risk of escalation, 

which I can never discount, but I can tell you we have mitigated 

it to as low as possible. 

30

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Mr. Chabot, chairman of the 

Asia Subcommittee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. 

I know you would like me to tell you about the number of people 

that came up to me in the airport this morning and urged me to 

stand with President Obama on the Syrian issue, or that my 

phones have been ringing off the hook with callers supporting the 

administration’s position, but I think we all know that wouldn’t be 

accurate. 

Nevertheless, I am trying to approach your potential resolution 

with an open mind and will certainly consider any argument that 

the administration might make in favor of the use of force against 

the Assad regime. 

That being said, I do, however, have some serious concerns and 

I think many of my colleagues on this committee probably share a 

number of them. Whether we ultimately support a resolution on 

the use of force or not will depend on how these concerns are addressed in the coming days by the administration, and this, of 

course, today is part of that process. I have a number of questions, 

so I will forgo a long statement and get right into them. 

Secretary Kerry, President Obama did not come to Congress 

seeking a resolution on the use of force in Libya. What is the difference between Libya and Syria when it comes to seeking congressional authorization? 

Secretary KERRY. The difference is that, in the case of Libya, you 

had already passed a U.N. Security Council resolution and an Arab 

League resolution and a Gulf States Cooperation resolution, and 

you had a man who we knew was prone to follow through on his 

word promising that he was going to kill like dogs all of the people 

in Benghazi. And so there was an emergency and an urgency to responding, in which the United States provided air support while 

the French and the British carried out the mission. 

So I think, under those circumstances, the President felt the urgency, the emergency of protecting life, and a capacity that had already been granted through the international community. This is 

different——

Mr. CHABOT. Let me ask you this. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Which is why he is coming to Congress. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Let me ask you this. Had the British Parliament not rejected 

Prime Minister Cameron on the Syria issue, would President 

Obama have bothered to come to Congress? 

Secretary KERRY. Oh, I believe he absolutely would have. I think 

the President was thinking about this. There were discussions, to 

some degree, about whether or not it should happen. He hadn’t 

made up his mind. He certainly didn’t announce it to us. But my 

personal belief is, yes——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. I think the President believed it 

was important. And there were people making that argument, particularly on his legal team. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

31

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that you didn’t have time to read 

the New York Times editorial today, so I assume you probably 

haven’t had time to read Tom Friedman’s column in today’s New 

York Times. 

Secretary KERRY. Actually, I am familiar with his column today. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Well, let me refer to that piece. I don’t 

always agree with Mr. Friedman; in fact, I seldom do. But I tend 

to agree with his assessment of the Syrian situation today in which 

he says, ‘‘Rather than firing some missiles into Syria, a more effective measure would be arming and assisting the more moderate 

rebel groups in Syria.’’

My only concern is, as Mr. Smith and some others have already 

referred to today, it may be too late for that, as failing to arm these 

groups months or even years ago has allowed al-Qaeda-connected 

rebel groups to become more influential and powerful. 

Would you comment, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely. I am delighted to. And I think that 

what Tom Friedman said—and I often do agree with him; I don’t 

happen to on this particular occasion because he said you should 

arm and shame. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I don’t think Assad is going to be shamed 

into any particular activity, nor the Russians or others. And there 

is arming taking place, but if you simply arm and say that your 

policy is to shame and you back off, deteriorating his capacity to 

deliver chemical weapons, and say, okay, that doesn’t matter to us, 

you have opened Pandora’s box for the use of chemical weapons. 

And all those people you arm will wind up being the victims of a 

chemical weapons attack. 

So, with all due respect to Tom Friedman, who is most often correct, I think on this occasion it is absolutely vital that we send the 

message and deteriorate his capacity——

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. And hold him accountable. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me stop you if I can. I only have a short period 

of time. 

Secretary KERRY. And we have given him impunity with respect 

to any future use. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Last Friday, all indications were that the President had made 

the decision to take military action. Then things obviously changed 

and he decided to consult with Congress. What made the President 

change his mind? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you would have to ask the President. I 

don’t know completely. I think he——

Mr. CHABOT. I assume you have discussed this with him. 

Secretary KERRY. We did discuss it, and what the President said 

was he felt very, very strongly that it was important for us to be 

in our strongest posture, that the United States needed to speak 

with one voice. He knew that you, in the consultations—I mean, 

you all asked for consultations. We began a process of consultation. 

We heard from you. And many of you said, we think it is really important to come to Congress. 

32

I know Mike Rogers, in particular, in one conversation, talked 

about, you know, the need to not have the display of your—you 

know, you have a group of people you are opposed to, and you are 

sort of fighting the Congress and fighting with your allies and 

fighting with the U.N., try to unify it to the greatest degree you 

can. I think that was great common sense from Chairman Rogers. 

And the President decided, accordingly, to try to put America in 

the strongest position possible. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman ROYCE. We need to go to Mr. Sires from New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here this afternoon. 

Mr. Secretary, one of the things that I read today which disturbed me a great deal is that, by the end of the year, we are going 

to have about 3 million refugees from the Syria conflict. And I am 

concerned about the impact that striking Syria will have on increasing the number of refugees. And I am concerned about how 

it is going to destabilize our friends in the region. Jordan is already 

overburdened. Turkey is already experiencing a burden. 

Are we anticipating, are we making policies to alleviate what is 

coming, this avalanche of refugees? Because by the end of the year, 

they expect 3 million refugees, and that could be a bigger destabilizing factor in that region. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, this brings you squarely into a 

confrontation with this question that is fundamental to the choice 

you are going to make. There are risks of acting, but believe me, 

it is our judgment collectively and the President’s that the greater 

risks are not acting. 

You have 1.6 million to 2 million refugees today without our acting, and every prediction is that is going to get worse. I guarantee 

you that if we don’t act and Assad is able to rain gas down on his 

people, you watch the numbers of refugees. 

The greater capacity to prevent the numbers of refugees in this 

catastrophe that is building in the region is, frankly, to degrade his 

chemical capacity, help the opposition, and get to a point where you 

have a state of Syria that is still intact enough to actually have a 

negotiation for the Geneva I implementation of a transition government. That is the strategy, that is the goal. 

And we have no chance of getting there if we back off and give 

him a message of impunity. We will have said to him, nobody 

cares, gas your people, you do what you need to stay in office, and 

we are backing off. That would be—I honestly find—I mean, that 

would be one of those moments in history that will live in infamy. 

And there are some of those moments: Munich; a ship off the coast 

of Florida that was sent back filled with Jews who then lost their 

lives to gas because we didn’t receive them. 

There are moments where you have to make a decision, and I 

think this is one of those moments. 

Mr. SIRES. Are we making any new policies? I know that we are 

already contributing more money than anybody else to assist the 

refugees. Are we——

Secretary KERRY. The world needs to step up on this refugee 

issue. The United States proudly is providing more than anybody 

else, but this is unsustainable. 

33

There are other discussions taking place now as to how we might 

respond to this ongoing crisis in nonmilitary terms. But I think 

that there are options available to us, but I don’t want to get ahead 

of ourselves. 

Mr. SIRES. General, this military action that we are taking, I assume that we are coordinating with our friends in the region? 

General DEMPSEY. We are, Congressman. 

Mr. SIRES. And do you anticipate them going along with us if it 

increases the need for them to participate? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, we are reaching out to them. Some will 

support us directly and some indirectly with basing and overflight. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your and Ileana RosLehtinen’s longtime leadership to avoid the crisis that we face 

today. 

And, General Dempsey, Secretary Hagel, Secretary Kerry, thank 

you for being here today. 

We are here to learn more about a very serious issue, a United 

States strike on Syria. As a member of this subcommittee, as chairman of the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee, as a 31-year veteran myself of the South Carolina National Guard and Army Reserve, but most particularly as the grateful father of four sons currently serving in the United States military, I am very concerned about what we are hearing today. I have 

many questions concerning the President’s proposed strike and the 

risk to our military, American families, and our allies, particularly 

neighboring Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. 

Secretary Hagel, some have characterized the plans for the strike 

as leaked to the press as ‘‘a pinprick’’ that will not prevent President Assad from resuming his use of chemical weapons. How severely do you intend to degrade his capabilities? What will you do 

if he resumes chemical weapons? Where did these chemical weapons come from?

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. Thank you for your 

service and for your sons’ service. 

I can assure you, on the first point you made, I can speak for 

General Dempsey and all of our military leaders that there is no 

higher purpose that we all have, nor more significant responsibility, than the protection of our men and women who serve in uniform. They are our highest priority. 

As to your other questions, the President has said, he stated it 

again yesterday in a meeting in the Cabinet Room with the leaders 

of Congress—and I think Congressman Engel was there, as was 

Chairman Royce—this would not be a pinprick. Those were his 

words. This would be a significant strike that would, in fact, degrade his capability. 

I think the three of us have noted, you have all noted and are 

much aware, that any action carries with it risk, any action with 

it carries with it consequence, but also does inaction, as Secretary 

Kerry has noted. 

34

I can assure you, as Secretary of Defense, that the Department 

of Defense, our leaders, have spent days and days going over every 

option, every contingency, everything you talked about, and more—

security of our forces, security of our Embassies, consulates, working with the State Department, everything that we needed to factor 

in if we took action. The President insisted on that. He wanted to 

see those plans—collateral damage, innocent people being hurt. 

We think that the options that we have given him, first, would 

be effective, would, in fact, carry out the intent of what we 

have——

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Secretary, I don’t mean to be rude, but time is 

flying. Where did the chemical weapons come from? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, there is no secret that the Assad regime 

has had chemical weapons, significant stockpiles of chemical weapons. 

Mr. WILSON. From a particular country? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the Russians supply them; others are 

supplying them with those chemical weapons. They make some 

themselves. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Secretary Kerry, on April 25th, the White 

House legislative director, Miguel Rodriguez, wrote, ‘‘Our intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of confidence 

that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons.’’

With the President’s red line, why was there no call for military 

response in April? Was it delayed to divert attention today from 

the Benghazi/IRS/NSA scandals, the failure of Obamacare enforcement, the tragedy of the White House-drafted sequestration, or the 

upcoming debt-limit vote? Again, why was there no call for military 

response 4 months ago when the President’s red line was crossed? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the reason is very simple. The President 

made a decision to change his policy, but he didn’t believe that the 

evidence was so overwhelming. It was significant, it was clear it 

had happened but on a scale that he felt merited the increase of 

assistance and the announcements that he made with respect to 

the type of aid that he would provide the opposition. So he did respond. 

This is so egregious and now builds on the conclusions of our 

intel community as to the numbers of times, but such a clear case, 

so compelling and urgent with respect to the flagrancy of the 

abuse, that the President thinks that as a matter of conscience and 

as a matter of policy the best route to proceed is through the military action now. 

Mr. WILSON. But in April it was very clear, chemical weapons——

Secretary KERRY. Yeah, but the President——

Mr. WILSON. Syria was identified, Mr. Secretary. Action should 

have been taken then. 

Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. But the President didn’t believe it was a compelling enough case to win the support of the American people as 

well as the world. This is. 

The President did respond. He upgraded what we were doing 

very significantly. He came to Congress. As a matter of fact, many 

35

of you know we had to struggle to get the Congress to agree to let 

him do the things that he wanted to do to upgrade that effort. 

Mr. WILSON. But chemical——

Chairman ROYCE. Excuse me. Your time has expired. We need to 

go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and 

Mr. Engel for holding this very important meeting. 

And I thank our Secretaries of State and Defense and General 

Dempsey for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, late last night, we delivered to all Members of 

Congress and I physically delivered a copy today of an alternative 

resolution, very narrowly drawn, that actually codifies what the 

President has said he wishes to accomplish and codifies no boots 

on the ground to try to make sure that we stay focused on the issue 

and a response to that issue and possibly provide the White House 

with a path to authorization here in the Congress. I commend it 

to both Secretaries and urge you to look at it. And, Mr. Chairman, 

I hope we will be able to mark it up. 

When I looked at this issue, I used a filter with five aspects to 

it. And I commend it to my colleagues if they find it helpful. The 

first was, is the evidence strongly compelling and convincing, if not 

incontrovertible? Secondly, if so, what action is thereby warranted? 

Thirdly, what is the efficacy of the proposed action and what are 

the risks? Fourth, what is the efficacy and what are the risks of 

doing nothing? 

And, finally, if the latter outweighs the former, how can Congress provide an authorization that narrowly is drawn to ensure no 

other involvement but that does two things: It enforces international law with respect to the ban on chemical weapons, and it 

deters future use of such weapons? 

All of this is a matter of judgment. Everything I have heard from 

my colleagues on both sides of the aisle this week has been sincere 

and heartfelt. And I pray that we proceed on a nonpartisan basis 

to try to tackle this issue with respecting everybody’s ultimate 

judgment, because it is a difficult issue and does not lend itself to 

facile answers. 

I have come to the conclusion myself that the evidence is convincing and compelling. I also believe that the overhang of Iraq has 

many of us chained. Iraq was based on faulty and shoddy intelligence that was also misused to justify an a priori commitment to 

invade another country. 

That is not the case here. We are not dealing with a President 

who is hungering to invade another country or put boots on the 

ground. In fact, quite obviously, his reluctance to do that is why 

we are here. We are also not dealing with prospective surmise 

about whether such weapons exist and whether or not he might 

use them. There is no doubt the weapons exist, the stockpiles are 

there, and there is no doubt he used them. So the question for us 

is, what do we do about it? 

Mr. Secretary, let me ask one question. If we do nothing—and, 

Secretary Hagel, I invite you to answer, as well, keeping in mind 

we have a limited amount of time—if we do nothing, what is the 

likelihood, in your judgment, that Bashar al-Assad will use chemical weapons as a routine weapon to turn the tide of the civil war? 

36

Secretary HAGEL. I think the likelihood is very high that he 

would use them again. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I agree completely. I might even put it 

at 100 percent. And, well, you should go check the intel on it; I 

think you will be convinced. But I would say probably 100 percent. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, Mr. Secretary, if you are right that it is 100 

percent, we will see these weapons now used routinely in the civil 

war to turn the tide if we do nothing. What is the probability that 

such weapons will also then get into the hands of Hezbollah and 

other elements supporting the Assad regime and, thus, perhaps 

proliferate the region against friend and foe alike? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I can’t give you that probability. I just 

don’t know what it is. 

I do know this: That there are three principal supporters of 

Assad, and the rest of the world is in horror of what is happening. 

The three principal supporters are Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. 

And if Iran and Hezbollah are allowed to both see him stay in 

power as well as do so with the use of chemical weapons, that is 

extraordinarily dangerous for Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and our interests. 

Chairman ROYCE. We need to go to the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Mr. Michael McCaul from Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the chairman. 

I thank the Secretaries for being here. And, General Dempsey, 

thank you for being here, as well. 

Next week, we commemorate the 12th anniversary of 9/11. It was 

al-Qaeda that hit the World Trade Center. It was al-Qaeda that hit 

the Pentagon down the street from here. Al-Qaeda is the enemy, 

and before 9/11 al-Qaeda was the enemy. As chairman of Homeland Security Committee, I want to make sure that never happens 

again. And I know you share that, as well. 

I think what gives the Congress great pause and the American 

public great pause is there is no good outcome here. They don’t see 

a good side versus a bad side. They see Assad as a bad actor who 

has used chemical weapons. There is no question about that. But 

then who is the other side? Who are the rebel forces? Who are 

they? I ask that in my briefings all the time. 

And every time I get briefed on this, it gets worse and worse, because the majority now of these rebels forces—and I say majority 

now—are radical Islamists pouring in from all over the world to 

come to Syria for the fight. And my concern is any strike against 

this regime, as bad as it is, will empower these radical Islamists, 

these extremists. 

And we have seen this movie before. We have seen Afghanistan. 

We have seen what happened in Egypt. We saw what happened in 

Libya. We saw what the Arab Spring has brought us, and it is not 

good. They filled the vacuum; they have filled a vacuum. 

So my greatest concern when we look at Syria is who is going 

to fill the vacuum when the Assad regime falls, which we know 

that it will. Who is going to fill that vacuum? Are the rebel forces, 

the extremists, going to take over not only the government but 

these weapons? Because they are the ones most likely to use these 

weapons against Americans in the United States. And while, you 

37

know, those images of children in Damascus are horrific, I do not 

want to see those images in the United States. And that is my 

grave concern. And this is a very dangerous step that we are taking, and I believe that we have to be very careful in how we proceed. 

And so, with that and with all due respect, I think this is wellintentioned, but I have these concerns. And I want to hear from 

both Secretaries and the General as to whether you share these 

concerns and what you are going to doing to stop that outcome. Because that is the absolute worst scenario, worst outcome that could 

happen. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, I was just trying to make sure—

I apologize for interrupting. I think it would be helpful to you, as 

you were asking the question, because I am very concerned about 

the foundation of your question, the premise of it. 

A woman by the name of Elizabeth Bagley, B-a-g-l-e-y, just wrote 

an article. She works with the Institute of War. She is fluent in 

Arabic and has spent an enormous amount of time studying the opposition, studying Syria. She just published this the other day, a 

very interesting article which I commend to you. 

The fact is that sitting behind me, incidentally, is Ambassador 

Robert Ford. He is our Ambassador to Syria. He has spent an enormous amount of time with the opposition, working with them and 

helping us to understand this dynamic. 

I just don’t agree that a majority are al-Qaeda and the bad guys. 

That is not true. There are about 70,000 to 100,000 oppositionists. 

About somewhere maybe 15 to 25 percent might be in one group 

or another who are what we would deem to be bad guys. There are 

many different groups—al-Nusra, al-Shamra. There are different 

entities. And sometimes they are fighting each other, even now. 

The general belief, there is a real moderate opposition that exists. General Idris is running the military arm of that. And our allies in this effort, our friends, from the Saudis, to the Emiratis to 

the Qataris and others, are now in a disciplined way funneling assistance through General Idris. And the moderate opposition is getting stronger as a result of that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I have 40 seconds, but I—there are moderates 

there, but the briefings I have received, unless I have gotten different ones or inaccurate briefings, is that 50 percent and rising. 

These fighters coming globally are not coming in as moderates; 

they are coming in as jihadists. And that is my concern. And——

Secretary KERRY. There are jihadists——

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. I want to hear from the Secretary, 

also, and the General, as well. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I agree with Secretary Kerry’s analysis. 

But let me just remind us all, and you know this very well, Congressman, especially with your responsibilities as chairman of the 

Homeland Security Committee. This is an imperfect situation. 

There are no good options here. This is complicated. There is no 

clarity. Every point you made, the complications of the various terrorist groups which we have noted, are there. They are in play. 

This is a specifically difficult part of us trying to sort out who we 

would support, how we would support them. So I don’t question 

that. 

38

But I do think that Secretary Kerry’s points are correct, that we 

are seeing some movement on the inside in the right direction. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, thanks for calling this 

very important hearing. 

And, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, 

thanks for being here. 

I believe we stand at a pivotal moment where Congress is either 

going to uphold its duty to protect our national security or we are 

going to retreat from our moral and strategic obligations. I believe 

our vote on what will have to be ultimately a very narrowly drawn 

resolution will determine whether Congress stands up for human 

rights or puts us on a dangerous path to isolation, whether Congress will increase American influence in the Middle East or allow 

our power to dramatically shrink. 

I stand behind the President’s request for limited and targeted 

strikes without U.S. troops on the ground against a regime that is 

guilty of heinous chemical weapons attacks on its own people. 

And I know that this is a difficult decision. I know that some of 

my colleagues wish that we had done a lot more before now. And 

I know that my colleagues, other colleagues, wish to do nothing 

now. And I acknowledge the difficulty of being unable to predict 

Assad’s next move. Secretary Hagel, you spoke to that. 

This is a hard choice, and I don’t think any of us relish making 

it. No use of force can ever be taken lightly. But inaction here, I 

believe, will dramatically harm our national security by 

emboldening the vile Syrian regime, its terrorist proxies, and its 

Iranian patron. 

I think it is essential that the United States send an unequivocal 

message to Assad and to other brutal regimes around the world, especially Iran, that when the United States Congress, when the 

President, and when every civilized nation on Earth says that you 

cannot gas innocent children to death and you can’t use chemical 

weapons and weapons of mass destruction, that we mean it. I believe America’s credibility is on the line in Syria. 

We all saw the gut-wrenching images of children, of women, of 

families lying dead, cruelly and coldly murdered by Assad. This 

strike, if it is to occur, is about preventing such atrocities now and 

in the future, preventing the continued use of chemical weapons in 

Syria, and preventing those weapons from being used by terrorist 

groups like Hezbollah that threaten our allies and our citizens. 

But American credibility is also on the line in Iran. Much like 

the red line set in Syria, the President has and this committee has, 

in strongly bipartisan fashion, set a clear red line that we will not 

allow Iran to obtain nuclear-weapons capability. If Congress votes 

down a limited authorization, then to Iran’s leaders our red line 

against their development of nuclear weapons is meaningless. The 

sanctions that we passed unanimously out of this committee and 

400 Members supported on the House floor will be rendered largely 

worthless because they are not backed up by a credible threat of 

force. 

Secretary Kerry, I believe if we want to do everything in our 

power to solve the Iranian nuclear issue without military action, 

39

then we must support this authorization. By authorizing use of 

force against Syria, America will make abundantly clear to the 

world, including Iran, that using chemical weapons or defying 

international law in pursuit of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated by this Nation. 

So make no mistake, this resolution is about Syria and holding 

Assad accountable, but it is also about Iran and whether this Congress will make it more likely or less likely that that nation obtain 

nuclear weapons. 

I haven’t come to this decision lightly. I don’t want to be in this 

position. None of us do. But we didn’t put ourselves in this position. The President didn’t put ourselves in this position. Bashar alAssad put us in this position when he chose to gas his own people. 

Now, Secretary Kerry, a lot of people have come up to me and 

said that they are disgusted by what they see, but the question 

they ask is, why does America always need to be the world’s policeman? So I ask you, why should the U.S. lead this effort? And will 

we learn which are the 34 nations and organizations who have said 

they will support our action and how they are prepared to support 

it? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the United States of America is not being 

the world’s policeman. The United States of America is joining with 

other countries in upholding an international standard that 184 

nations have joined into. 

Obviously, we have a greater capacity. We are blessed with an 

extraordinarily capable military that through the years the American people have invested in in order to protect our security interests. Our security interests are directly involved in what is happening in the Middle East. Our security interests are directly 

threatened with respect to Assad’s use of these chemical weapons. 

So we are building a support with other countries, among them 

the Arab League that announced its condemnation of this, specific 

countries that have talked in terms of acting, Saudi Arabia, the 

Emirates, the Qataris, the Turks, and the French. Obviously, the 

British Government sought to, felt it should. They had a different 

vote, but that doesn’t—in fact, that, I think, raises the stakes in 

terms of our holding ourselves accountable to a multilateral effort, 

to a multilateral standard, in which the United States is the most 

technologically advanced partner. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Ted Poe, the chairman of 

the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have heard a lot today about credibility of the United States. 

It seems to me that we have a credibility problem because our foreign policy in the Middle East is inconsistent. Our enemies really 

don’t know what our foreign policy is, our friends don’t know what 

it is, and I am not so sure Americans know what our foreign policy 

is in the Middle East. And we have seen it play out with different 

reasons, going into different countries, removing people from leadership and putting somebody else in, or being approving of it, tacitly approving of it. 

I, like my friend Mr. McCaul from Austin, are concerned about 

the players on both sides. There is no pure side in this civil war. 

You have Hezbollah, a bunch of bad guys, on one side, and you 

40

have the other terrorist groups on the other side, including alNusra and al-Sharam. I do believe that these are powerful groups 

on both sides. History will find out who ends up winning this civil 

war. And then you factor in the religious connotation in this civil 

war, and you really do have a real problem. We do have a real 

problem on our hands. 

My concern is now, specifically, we want to do something to punish Mr. Bad Guy Assad. No question about it, he is a bad guy. He 

is wasting good air breathing. But we are just going to shoot a 

shell over the bow. We are not going to take him out, because we 

don’t want to destabilize the civil war going on between two different sides, if I understand what that policy is. 

So let’s do that. Let’s assume we do that. I am going to ask General Dempsey this question first. Assume we do that, whatever it 

is, to destabilize the weapons of mass destruction, get rid of them. 

I assume that is what we are trying to do, eliminate the weapons 

of mass destruction, even though, as Secretary Hagel said, they are 

getting those things from Russia, which are they going to give 

them more weapons? I don’t know. 

Assume we do that. Assad fights back. He doesn’t just take it; 

he retaliates against us or lets Iran retaliate against Israel, all because we have come into this civil war. So they shoot back. Then 

what do we do? Once Americans are engaged now in an escalated 

specific strike, not by our choosing but by their choosing, do we escalate or do we not fight back? 

And I know, General Dempsey, you have a tough situation on 

your hands. What do we do if they literally shoot back at Americans, or our friends the Israelis? 

General DEMPSEY. First, just to clarify, this isn’t about eliminating chemical weapons. That is not possible, given the number 

and the distribution of them. It is about convincing the Assad regime that it is unacceptable for them to use them, and that is the 

limit of this military operation. 

We are postured for the possibility of retaliation, and I can assure you that our regional partners are, as well. 

Mr. POE. Let me just ask that question with a little more clarification from you, if you can, General. I know you are in the military and you are to the point, and that is great. We are glad you 

are in charge. 

Can you see that escalating, though, with U.S. military involvement in the region? Have you made a contingency plan for that 

happening, whatever their reaction is, the Syrians’ reaction to us 

specifically? Have you made contingency plans for us being in an 

escalated military operation in the region? 

General DEMPSEY. In the spirit of your compliment on my conciseness, yes.

Mr. POE. And do you see escalation as a possibility, U.S. military 

escalation in the region as a possibility? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I can never drive the risk to escalation 

to zero, but I think that the limited purpose, the partnerships we 

have in the region, the contributions that we will seek from others 

I think begins to limit that risk. 

Mr. POE. One last question, since I am nearly out of time here. 

41

General Dempsey, you mentioned earlier that you are concerned 

about removing Assad from power. Will you elaborate on that? And 

if so, what is your elaboration? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I still—again, separate from this conversation, which is about the limited purpose of deterring and degrading—I still am cautious about whether we should use U.S. 

military force in support of the opposition for the purpose of tipping 

the balance. I think there are other ways we can contribute to that 

through the development of a moderate opposition. But I remain 

cautious about taking the opposition’s role here in the civil war. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brian Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

That Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons I think is clear, 

compelling, and irrefutable. However, I think that facts, experience, 

and history are all needed here, as well. The situation in Syria is 

that of a national civil war, an ethnic and sectarian conflict that 

America cannot solve and should not try to. This is not a fight for 

freedom and democracy; there is no democracy movement in Syria. 

There is no unifying vision or social contract, not a constitution or 

even a preamble of what Syria wants to become. 

This is nothing more than a fight for control between two sectarian factions: An Alawite faction, or a militia, with airpower, supported by the Assad regime; and a mix of Islamic militias, estimated to be about 1,000, with no airpower. This is a conflict between a brutal and murderous dictator and an opposition whose 

best fighters are represented by al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic extremists bent on creating an Islamist state in Syria. There are no 

good options, military options, for the United States in Syria. 

The lesson in Syria, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that civil wars 

have to be fought internally and that political reconciliation cannot 

come from without. It has to come from within, and that can’t be 

imposed by outside influences. We know that from our own history. 

While the Syrian civil war has caused 100,000 deaths in a country 

of 23 million, the American civil war caused 675,000 deaths from 

a young nation of 34 million people. 

After spending $2 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan, representing 

$40,000 in debt for every American family, and the loss of 6,668 

American lives, and the physical and mental destruction of tens of 

thousands of more young Americans, Iraq is as violent today as any 

time in its history and Afghanistan is as poor and as corrupt as 

it has always been. 

The American people are sick and tired of war. It is time to nation-build in America and invest in the growth of the American 

economy. 

Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons on his own people, and 

that is morally reprehensible for certain. He should be condemned 

universally by the international community, and stiff sanctions 

should be imposed. He should be indicted as a war criminal in the 

international tribunal for his murderous deeds. 

Unfortunately, the use of chemical weapons in this part of the 

world is not new. Saddam Hussein used them in the Iraq-Iran War 

between 1983 and 1988 and again against his own civilian population in northern Iraq in 1991. And, unfortunately, the stockpiling 

42

and use of mustard gas and sarin, thousands of tons of chemical 

weapons, is all too common in the Middle East today, dating back 

decades. 

The international support for the United States-led military 

strike in Syria, however surgical and limited in scope and time, 

consists of 2 countries, Turkey and France, out of 194 countries. 

The rest of the international community but for China and Russia 

says, ‘‘We support you, America, in your military strike so long as 

we don’t have to do anything.’’ The Arab League’s response to this 

crisis is pathetically weak and, given their strategic interest, a 

joke. 

So here we are, left with trying to topple the last minority regime in the Middle East and, for the third time in a decade, entering a national civil war in that part of the world essentially alone 

again. 

Secretary Kerry, you spoke of the history of the world’s response 

to the use of chemical weapons. Given that history, one would 

think that more countries would join the U.S. in participating—not 

supporting—in participating in a military strike against Syria. 

What gives? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, let me just begin, I will try 

to be very, very quick here. First of all, I regret to say it, I don’t 

want to make this debate about what is happening in terms of regime change and the larger issues. But I just want to clarify. A 

fruit vendor who was tired of corruption and of being slapped 

around started the Arab Spring in Tunisia, and they threw out a 

dictator that had been there for a long period of time, the President. In Tahrir Square it was a bunch of young people with their 

modern technology, Googling each other and Facebooking, so forth, 

who organized a revolution. It wasn’t the Muslim Brotherhood. Had 

nothing do with religion. It had to do with a generational revolution of people looking for their freedom, their opportunity, and 

their aspirations to be met. 

Same thing happened in Syria. And in Syria, that opposition was 

met with violence by Assad. And so that is what has happened 

here. Now, the moderate opposition is in fact committed to democracy. It is committed to protection of all minority rights, to an 

inclusivity. They want an election in the future of Syria. So I don’t 

want to have a debate about that because this is not about regime 

change. This is about the enforcement of the standard with respect 

to chemical weapons. That is what this is about. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Matt Salmon. 

Secretary KERRY. The President is asking for limited authority to 

enforce that standard, not to deal with all those other issues. 

Chairman ROYCE. Matt Salmon of Arizona, chairman of the 

Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Secretary Kerry, let me first congratulate the President on bringing this matter to the Congress, as I believe he is constitutionally 

required to do. I, for one, am very happy that he has chosen to do 

this. He said just this morning that he didn’t draw a red line, the 

world did, with the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Yet where is the rest of the world in the response? Why 

are we looking at a near go-it-alone military mission? You said in 

43

your testimony that there are 34 countries who are with us. What 

degree are they with us and who are they specifically? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t have the full list of them here, but I 

have listed a bunch of them. The Arab League countries have condemned this. A number of them have asked to be part of a military 

operation. The Turks, a NATO country, have condemned it, pinned 

it on Assad, asked to be part of an operation. The French have volunteered to be part of an operation. There are others who have volunteered. But, frankly, and I will let General, you know, Dempsey 

speak to this, we got more volunteers than we can use for this kind 

of an operation. 

Now, in the next days those names, as they choose to, as this evidence comes out, will be made more public. But as I said to you, 

we have 53 countries have already condemned the use publicly, 37 

have said so publicly. And there are I think it is a total of 34 countries or organizations have indicated that they are prepared to take 

action. Now, that is growing. There are more countries reviewing 

the evidence that we have shown. And as I said, over this time the 

President has purposefully taken to come to Congress he has asked 

me and the State Department to reach out to more countries and 

to build the kind of international support that this merits, and we 

will do so. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would really appreciate it if we could 

get a list of the countries and what assets they are willing to commit. 

Secretary KERRY. Delighted. We have it all broken down. 

Mr. SALMON. Not now. We can get that later. I do have a question for General Dempsey. 

General Dempsey, what are our goals in a military strike? The 

President said that the military attack would be limited in duration and scope and degrade the Assad regime’s capacity to carry 

out future attacks on its own people. Do you believe that the use 

of surgical strikes will achieve the President’s stated goal? And can 

you guarantee the American people that the Assad regime will be 

unable to launch any further chemical warfare attacks both at 

home or against their neighbors after the U.S. mission is complete? 

And in addition, do you believe that the region will be more stable 

after a U.S. attack or less stable? 

General DEMPSEY. The mission given to me was to prepare options to attack to deter and degrade, and that would mean targets 

directly linked to the control of chemical weapons, but without exposing those chemical weapons to a loss of security. Secondly, the 

means of delivery. And third, those things that the regime uses, for 

example air defense, long-range missiles and rockets, in order to 

protect those chemical weapons or in some cases deliver them. So 

that target package is still being refined as I sit here with you. 

As far as whether it will be effective, given the limited objectives 

I have received, the answer is yes, I believe we can make the military strike effective. In terms of what it will do to the region, that 

clearly will depend on the reaction of the Assad regime. But as I 

mentioned earlier, our partners and the United States military is 

postured to deter his retaliation. 

Mr. SALMON. Finally, General Dempsey, as we have been discussing this over the last few weeks we have given pretty clear—

44

we telegraphed our message to Assad and his regime that we are 

planning to make an attack. Do you not assume that they might 

circle those wagons with civilians and that the possibility of civilian 

casualties could be very great? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, the targeting requirements actually, as 

given to me by the President, require us to achieve a collateral 

damage estimate of low. And though they are in fact moving resources around, and in some cases placing prisoners and others in 

places that they believe we might target, at this point our intelligence is keeping up with that movement. 

Chairman ROYCE. Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you, chairman and ranking member, for holding this hearing today, and also for our witnesses for 

coming. I have three questions. I would like to get out all three 

questions, and then ask whoever chooses to respond. 

The first one, as I recall in Libya, the Arab League asked us to 

intervene. And if I am wrong, you know, correct me. But I wanted 

to know what was different this time. I know they have condemned 

the attacks, but why haven’t they asked us to intervene? 

And then second, what type of retaliation, if any, do you expect 

from Syria, from Iran, Hezbollah, or other affiliated parties if we 

move ahead with this strike? And what are we doing to prepare for 

any possible retaliation? 

And then finally, as I understand, Putin made some comments 

today that he might be open to the idea of responding if it could 

be proven where the chemical weapons came from. And I was wondering if you thought that this provided an opportunity, one, how 

you might interpret his comments, but also is there still an opportunity for the international community to come together through 

multilateral bodies like the U.N. or NATO? 

Those are my questions to whichever one of you chooses to answer them. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I learned in the military long ago never 

to volunteer, but I have just been tasked. I will answer the one 

that actually most applies to my particular expertise, and that is 

what kind of risk of retaliation. You know, there is both conventional risks. That would be if he chose to use some of his longrange rockets to attack his neighbors or some of our facilities. 

There is also asymmetric. You know, he could encourage some of 

the surrogates and proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah to attack 

an Embassy. There are actions he could probably seek to achieve 

in cyber. And we are alert to all of the possibilities, and our mitigating strategy is in the way we have positioned ourselves in the 

region. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

I asked about the Arab League, and then the other one was 

about Putin. 

Secretary KERRY. And the Arab League question? 

Ms. BASS. The Arab League question was, as I recall during 

Libya, I believe that the Arab League asked us to intervene. And 

I wanted to know what the difference was with Syria. So they have 

condemned the attack, but they have not asked us to intervene, 

and why? 

45

Secretary KERRY. The reason is that a couple of their members, 

a number of their members, three or four of them, are not in favor 

of it, so they didn’t—they did a consensus statement. But individual countries are prepared to and are in favor of it, and I have 

named a number of them. But Lebanon, for obvious reasons, has 

some problems. Algeria, Iraq have some issues. Iraq for obvious 

reasons. So you can understand why people might be a little restrained. 

Let me just share, because this has been a recurring theme here 

today, Australia, Foreign Minister Carr said that Australia supports the U.S. position on Syria and its right to take actions to enforce vital international norms. And he noted that Australia believes the United States has this right independent of any endorsement by the U.N. Security Council. Albania. The Albanian Ministry 

said, we are ready to politically support the U.S. and NATO in any 

action needed to be undertaken to put an end to the massacre of 

Syrian population and to support the Syrian opposition in building 

a free and democratic Syria. Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Ms. BASS. Before I run out of time, could you respond about 

Putin, you know, how you interpret what his comments were 

today? 

Secretary KERRY. I would interpret his comments today as hopeful that perhaps at the G–20 he and the President will have a good 

conversation and there may be a road forward where Russia would 

consider not blocking action. But I would just quickly say to everybody here, Canada, Stephen Harper has said we should take action. Denmark, France, Poland, Turkey, all have suggested the 

United States should take action, they would be prepared to take 

action with us, and so forth. This is a building response, and I 

think other countries understand the moment. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go now to Mr. Tom Marino of 

Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, if you could tell me or tell us, who are the bad 

guys? Or maybe put it this way, who are our allies? Who are the 

good guys over there in Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. You are referring to the opposition, I assume? 

Mr. MARINO. But who are they? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we have covered some of this ground. But 

again, you are looking at various groups that are part of the opposition. As Secretary Kerry noted, under General Idris there are 

groups who in fact have one motive and one objective, and that is 

a free and inclusive Syria. 

Mr. MARINO. Do you implicitly trust these people? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is not my business to trust anybody. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, certainly it has to be the business because 

you are making decisions to go into war and put American lives at 

risk. So it is a simple concept. You either trust or do not trust. And 

if you do not trust, we don’t call these people our allies or support 

them. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, every nation, every individual, 

every group responds in their own self-interests. We are not unaware of all the different groups’ self-interest. 

46

Mr. MARINO. I think we are——

Secretary HAGEL. Our allies and friends——

Mr. MARINO. Excuse me, sir. With all due respect, I think we are 

aware, if we look back what happened in Libya, if we look what 

happened in the Middle East in the past, if we look at the Muslim 

Brotherhood, if we look at al-Qaeda, we have to take this into consideration. But obviously we do not know yet who the good guys 

are. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman——

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, let me respond to that. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Would you do it quickly, please? 

Secretary HAGEL. The focus is not on good guys and bad guys, 

the focus is on a narrowly drafted resolution asking authorization 

from the Congress regarding chemical weapons. 

Mr. MARINO. I wouldn’t think good guys would be using the gas. 

I wouldn’t think the good guys would be using the gas. 

And, Secretary Kerry, if I may ask you, for argument’s sake, as 

one prosecutor to another, I believe you are beyond a reasonable 

doubt assertion. I truly believe that. But this will not stop the 

butchering and the killing that takes place over there. So what is 

the purpose? What is the end game here? Where is the imminent 

danger to the United States? 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, you are absolutely correct that 

it will not stop the butchery. I wish it would. But what it will do 

is what it is intended to do. It is intended to assert the principle, 

which has been in place since 1925, that no one should use chemical weapons under any circumstances. 

Mr. MARINO. Sir, I understand that. I understand that. 

Secretary KERRY. All right. That is what this——

Mr. MARINO. But what is the reality of this? What is the reality 

of this? 

Secretary KERRY. I am trying to tell you. 

Mr. MARINO. We have seen this used in the past. You made the 

comment in 2002, when Bush wanted to go into Iraq, which I didn’t 

agree with, and the President also made the statements when he, 

I think, was in the senate in the State, but at least was advancing 

his career, that we should not do this even though Saddam Hussein gassed his own people, the Kurds. Now what is the difference 

now, today, that you and the President are so intent on going into 

Syria because Assad has done this? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the gassing was not the pretext for that 

operation. But ultimately Saddam Hussein was held accountable 

for not just that crime, but all of his other crimes. And he hung. 

So the bottom line is he was held accountable. 

Mr. MARINO. In hindsight, I can see in hindsight you stating 

that. But you weren’t supporting that in 2002 like you are supporting it now. And I don’t see the difference. My issue really gets 

to this. Who is going to pay for this? And what is it going to cost 

the United States taxpayers? 

Secretary KERRY. Let me let Secretary Hagel address the cost 

issue for the military. 

Mr. MARINO. Please. Please. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, we have looked at the different 

costs depending on the different options, depending on the decision 

47

the President makes. We have given some ranges of this. It would 

be in the tens of millions of dollars, that kind of range. 

Mr. MARINO. That answered my question. And I see my time is 

running out here. But believe this: Regardless of the minimization 

of intervention, an American military personnel will die. This I 

cannot accept. Soldiers coming home deformed and limbless and 

even in a body bag is not acceptable to me, and therefore I cannot 

and will not vote for this intervention in Syria. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, this specifically notes that no boots 

would be on the ground, this resolution that is being drafted, I 

might remind the Congressman. 

Mr. MARINO. I have heard that before. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go down to Mr. William Keating of 

Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all three of you gentlemen for your service to our 

country. And I want to thank all of you for sharing the information 

that you have thus far with Congress and the American public, as 

well as the world. And I think clearly that anyone looking at this 

evenly, that it has been a success in making clear the case there 

were chemical weapons used and the Assad government indeed 

used them. And I want to congratulate you and the President on 

those efforts. 

So General Dempsey doesn’t run out of time and has a few seconds to answer, we were going down a road that I just wanted to 

pursue, if I could. General, you raised concerns in the past about 

engaging militarily in the Syrian conflict. And obviously, you are 

here today to support a limited military action. But, you know, you 

did say, started to say in your remarks, there are military outcomes in supporting the opposition. But you qualified it saying that 

is not what we are doing here. But I am concerned that regardless 

of our stated intent in this area, others won’t share that same view 

that it is not our intent. 

So if you could, I am giving you plenty of time I hope, can you 

just expand upon what your concerns were, and maybe are, that 

you had in the past that you stated so we have a better understanding of what they are? And I am giving you enough time, too, 

to see what your views might be on how we can mitigate that or 

navigate around those concerns in the situation we are right now. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. I want to separate support for the opposition from acting in a limited, focused way to deter and degrade 

the Assad regime from using chemical weapons. Because the 

former, the support for the opposition, does come with some risk 

of the slippery slope of not entirely understanding when that support ends and how much it has to grow over time, which is why 

I am mostly supportive of helping the opposition by their development, by their training and equipping, not by becoming their military arm. Okay. 

Now, separate that from what we are here for today. In my view, 

militarily, the fact that the Assad regime has increased its use of 

chemicals over time to the point where initially it was a weapon 

intended to terrorize a small portion of a particular neighborhood, 

to send a message to the opposition, to where now in the most recent case it was used to literally attempt to clear a neighborhood, 

48

they have reached the point now where Assad is using chemical 

weapons as just another military tool in his arsenal. That runs 

great risk for Syria, it runs risk in the region, it runs risk in the 

globe. 

And I am able to, with some integrity, with a lot of integrity I 

hope, be able to come here before you today and make that distinction, that we should do something in our national interest based 

on the use of chemical weapons without committing to supporting 

the opposition to overthrow the regime. 

Mr. KEATING. Was part of that slippery slope, General, was that 

part partly a concern about how other countries or how other factions could be taking our actions? Because even in a limited sense, 

we are helping the opposition because we are attacking the Assad 

government. So I mean in that respect was that any concern that 

you had prior to that and how do you mitigate that now? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, we have always considered not only 

what effect our actions would have on our partners in the region, 

the Turks, the Jordanians, the Israelis, and even the Iraqis for that 

matter, with what in fact it would have potentially on our potential 

adversaries. And so, yeah, of course that has always been a concern, a concern and a consideration. But when something reaches 

the level where I think it has direct impact on our national security, then the overriding consideration is not what others think but 

what we think. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, General. Very quickly, I am ranking 

member on Europe, and Eurasia, and Emerging Threats there. 

NATO, there was a precedent set in 1999 where NATO did move 

without U.N. Security Council approval. Do you think there is hope 

for them moving not just individually as countries? Have you exhausted everything in terms of trying to get NATO support as an 

organization? I will ask either Secretary that question. 

Secretary KERRY. I apologize, I was just reading a note from 

them. Could you repeat that? 

Mr. KEATING. It was about NATO, the 1999 precedent, where 

they moved forward without that Security Council approval. Is 

there any hope in doing that organizationally going forward? 

Secretary KERRY. I doubt it, but I can’t tell you until I have the 

meeting that we are slated to have this weekend. I will get a better 

sense of that. 

I would say to Congressman Marino with respect to the body 

bags and the specter that he drew, we had I think it was about a 

28-day campaign, maybe 30-day campaign in Kosovo, Bosnia. There 

were over 30,000 sorties of our aircraft and so forth, none of which 

is contemplated here, none of which. And there were zero casualties. Zero. 

Chairman ROYCE. We should go to Jeff Duncan of South Carolina 

at this time. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I can’t discuss the possibility of U.S. involvement in 

Syria’s civil war without also talking about Benghazi. The administration has a serious credibility issue with the American people due 

to the unanswered questions surrounding the terrorist attack in 

Benghazi almost a year ago. When you factor in the IRS targeting 

of conservative groups, the AP and James Rosen issues, Fast and 

49

Furious, and NSA spying programs, the bottom line is that there 

is the need for accountability and trust building from the administration. To paraphrase Friedrich Nietzsche, he said I am not upset 

over you not telling me the truth, I am upset because from now on 

I can’t believe you. The administration has a credibility issue. 

In my opinion, Secretaries Kerry and Hagel, Benghazi is germane to the discussions in Syria because, as you stated, Mr. Secretary, the world was and is watching for our response. But after 

almost a year of not bringing anyone to justice in Benghazi, they 

are watching our response. Mr. Kerry, your predecessor asked, 

what difference does it make now? Well, this is the difference, Mr. 

Secretary. These issues call into question the accountability of this 

administration, its commitment to the personnel on the ground, 

and the judgment that it uses when making these determinations. 

The American people deserve answers before we move forward 

talking about military involvement in Syria. Section IV of your testimony today said this is about accountability. Sure it is. The 

American people deserve answers about Benghazi before we move 

forward with military involvement in Syria’s civil war. 

This is a picture. You might not be able to see it from there, you 

might be able to see it on the screen, but this is the picture of Tyrone Woods given to me by his father, Charles Woods, a Navy 

SEAL. The Woods family deserves answers. He was killed in 

Benghazi. America deserves answers before we send another man 

or woman the caliber of Ty Woods into harm’s way, especially in 

another country’s civil war, especially when there is no clear indication that there is an imminent threat to the United States. 

I don’t question that chemical weapons were used in Syria. I 

have looked at the classified briefings. I do ask that, if so, where 

are the other signatory countries of the Chemical Weapons Convention as the U.S. beats the drums of war against this regime in 

Syria? 

I have spoken to hundreds of constituents. This represents about 

300 emails that my office has gotten. And not a one, not a one 

member in my district in South Carolina or the emails of people 

that have contacted my office say go to Syria and fight this regime. 

To a letter they say, no, do not go into Syria, don’t get involved in 

their civil war. I spoke to eighth graders, about 150 eighth graders 

yesterday. They get it. They get it that we shouldn’t be drug into 

someone else’s civil war where there are no good guys. There are 

no good guys to get behind here. And I can only envision an escalation of this current conflict. 

The same administration that was seemingly so quick to involve 

the U.S. in Syria now was reluctant to use the same resources at 

its disposal to attempt to rescue the four brave Americans that 

fought for their lives in Benghazi. 

Mr. Kerry, you have never been one that has advocated for anything other than caution when involving U.S. forces in past conflicts. The same is true for the President and the Vice President. 

Is the power of the executive branch so intoxicating that you would 

abandon past caution in favor for pulling the trigger on a military 

response so quickly? 

The reason that I say Benghazi is germane to our discussions on 

Syria is this. Secretary Kerry, have there been any efforts on the 

50

part of the United States, directly or indirectly, to provide weapons 

to the Syrian rebels? And that would also include facilitating the 

transfer of weapons from Libyan rebels to the Syrian rebels. 

Secretary KERRY. Have there been efforts to? 

Mr. DUNCAN. To put weapons in the hands of Syrian rebels and 

also transfer weapons from Libya to Syria. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me begin, Congressman, by challenging your proposition that I have never done anything except 

advocate caution, because I volunteered to fight for my country. 

And that wasn’t a cautious thing to do when I did it. Secondly, 

when I was in the Senate——

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, my time——

Secretary KERRY. I am going to finish, Congressman. I am going 

to finish. When I was in the United States Senate I supported military action in any number of occasions, including Grenada, Panama, I can run a list of them. And I am not going to sit here and 

be told by you that I don’t have a sense of what the judgment is 

with respect to this. We are talking about people being killed by 

gas and you want to go talk about Benghazi and Fast and Furious. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely I want to talk about Benghazi because 

four Americans lost their lives. I have sympathy for the people in 

Syria, and I do think there should be a worldwide response. But 

we should act cautiously. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, we are acting cautiously. We are 

acting so cautiously that the President of the United States was accused of not acting because he wanted to have sufficient evidence 

and he wanted to build the case properly. 

Mr. MARINO. It has been 15 days. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to——

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, Congressman. Let me finish. 

Mr. Chairman, point of privilege here. This is important. I think 

this is important. I think it is important whether or not we are 

going into Syria in a way that the Congressman describes, which 

I think most people in America don’t want us to do. We don’t want 

to do that. That is why the President has said no boots on the 

ground. This is not about getting into Syria’s civil war. This is 

about enforcing the principle that people shouldn’t be allowed to 

gas their citizens with impunity. And if we don’t vote to do this 

Assad will interpret from you that he is free to go and do this any 

day he wants to. That is what this is about, not getting involved 

in Syria’s civil war. 

So let’s draw the proper distinction here, Congressman. We don’t 

deserve to drag this into yet another Benghazi discussion when the 

real issue here is whether or not the Congress is going to stand up 

for international norms with respect to dictators that have only 

been broken twice until Assad—Hitler and Saddam Hussein. And 

if we give license to somebody to continue that, shame on us. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Mr. David Cicilline of Rhode 

Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

ranking member for convening this hearing. And I want to begin 

by thanking our three witnesses not only for being here today, but 

for your extraordinary service to our country. 

51

I want to acknowledge and thank the President for his consultation. I have had the opportunity to participate in a classified briefing on Sunday, review some documents, a briefing on the telephone 

on Monday with Secretaries Kerry, Hagel, Jim Clapper, and others, 

Ambassador Rice. I really thank the President for this ongoing consultation and sharing of information. 

This is, I think, a very difficult question. And there are, as Secretary Hagel said, no good answers. The use of chemical weapons 

was horrific. I think there is ample evidence that the Assad regime 

is responsible for that and should be held accountable. And my 

question really is, as I talk to constituents in my district who react 

the same way, this war weariness and a recognition of all of the 

enormous risks associated with military intervention, both in propping up the wrong opposition and loss of life and being deeply engaged in a civil war and the spiraling of that, they all wonder is 

there a set of actions we could take which would evidence strong 

condemnation, isolate Assad, and also vindicate our deep commitment to a set of international institutions and organizations? So 

things like making China and Russia act in the Security Council 

on a public stage to veto a resolution. Attempt to seek an indictment of Assad for war crimes. Isolate Syria in ways through sanctions and other kinds of international actions where we might build 

a broad coalition, strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons, 

isolate Syria, and help build the sort of international voice, and do 

it in a way, frankly, that would be more consistent with our values, 

with the idea of working together with other nations and using 

international organizations. 

So I would like to know was there a discussion about a set of 

such options that might be effective without the risks that are associated with military action? Were they considered and rejected? 

Or is it something we could put together that would be a strong, 

forceful statement and set of actions that would hurt Assad, deter 

the likely use of chemical weapons again, but without any of the 

dangers? 

And then second question quickly is, Mr. Secretary, Secretary 

Kerry, you mentioned that America and her allies have ample ways 

to make Assad regret that decision without going to war. I think 

we would love to hear more about what those things are because 

I think one of our concerns or many concerns is what happens after 

a military attack. 

But I am really interested in that first question from all of you 

as to whether or not we might think hard about other ways to do 

this that will invite the kind of condemnation that is appropriate. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, a very good question. Let me 

just say to you that we wish, believe me, we wish that the international institution that is there for this kind of response was able 

to respond, and that is the U.N. and the U.N. Security Council. As 

recently as a few weeks ago, when this event took place, our representatives at the U.N. attempted, along with other allies, to put 

a resolution in front of the Security Council that would have simply 

condemned the event, not assigning any blame at all, just condemned the use of action, and the Russians said no. They blocked 

it. So that is what has set us into this path of believing that we 

52

have to act in a way that has an effect at deterring Assad from the 

use of these weapons. 

Now, even if the U.N. did pass something, even if you had some 

sanction, if it isn’t meaningful in a way that is going to deter the 

action, and no one has yet contrived of some, you know, piece of 

paper or terminology that is going to change this man’s calculation 

with respect to what he is fighting for. So I think the judgment has 

been made that the only way to have an impact, the only way you 

are going to hold him accountable now is to make it clear to him 

that this will in fact detract from his ability to abuse his people 

and to use force to stay in power. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I know Secretary Hagel has——

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I think what the Secretary said is exactly 

right. I would add two things. There are a number of tracks that 

we are on right now to accomplish what you are talking about. Secretary Kerry’s diplomatic track, which has been ongoing and intense. Our reaching out to our allies all over the world. I was in 

Asia last week with 15 defense ministers from all over Asia-Pacific, 

discussing this, meeting with leaders of countries in those areas. 

Our NATO allies. All three of us have been talking to our counterparts from countries all over the world. What the White House is 

doing. What the President is doing. So working through institutions. We are still involved with the United Nations. So those 

tracks are being run in addition to what we are talking about here. 

One exact point on the purpose of this hearing. General Dempsey 

said this morning at the Senate Armed Services Committee, when 

asked about the violation of the chemical weapons norm, a 100-

year-old norm, well, is it that important? Is it that big a deal? One 

of the points that General Dempsey made, which is exactly right, 

and we start here, this is a threat to our interests, to our forces, 

to our country, allowing a tyrant to continue to get away with the 

use of chemical weapons, that is a real threat against us. 

Chairman ROYCE. Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you. I know you have had a couple of very 

long weeks. I am about to support this, but I do want to say at the 

very beginning my disapproval of the President’s policies in the 

Middle East. And I believe that part of the reason we are having 

difficulty rallying an international coalition is because they don’t 

see the United States having led on this until recently. 

But that said, as a veteran of the military, as a current-serving 

military pilot in the Air National Guard, I also am war weary, as 

many Americans are war weary. But I want to remind Americans 

what one of my favorite Presidents, Ronald Reagan, said, if we 

want to avoid war. He said war begins when governments believe 

that the price of aggression is cheap. And I think that is a situation 

we find ourselves in, in Syria now. In fact, in listening to some of 

my colleagues, it has been amazing to me that we are seeming to 

paralyze ourselves into inaction, running through every potential 

scenario that could occur in this. And it makes me wonder, God 

help us if we become a country that can’t do the right thing because we paralyze ourselves to inaction. 

What I have got here is a picture that I think everybody needs 

to see. This is a picture of Syrian children, many of which, the SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
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retary said earlier, about 400-some died in at least just this one 

chemical gas attack. And if we don’t do anything about this, you 

can ensure that maybe even the kids in this picture, or definitely 

other kids, will die from the same attack. 

I want to very quickly read to you the effects of sarin gas, and 

I want you to look at these children and understand that children 

have gone through this. The mild effects of sarin exposure is runny 

nose, watery, burning eyes, small pupils, eye pain, blurred vision, 

drooling and excessive sweating, cough, chest tightness, rapid 

breathing, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, increased 

urination, confusion, drowsiness, weakness, headache, slow or fast 

heart rate, low or high blood pressure. Exposure to large doses of 

sarin, like we saw in Syria, loss of consciousness, convulsions, paralysis, respiratory failure, which is a polite way of saying you suffocate to death while you are aware that you are suffocating to 

death. 

What we are talking about is a discussion of what the international community and the United States of America in the goodness of our heart has determined is the right thing in an area that 

we can affect. Can we ban all artillery shells? We can’t. Can we 

ban all war? We can’t. But if we can stand up and say that chemical weapons have no place in this world and we can do something 

about it, God help us if we don’t. 

And I would remind folks, and I will ask you all to comment on 

this eventually, from 1991 to 2002 or 2003, we maintained two nofly zones over Iraq under bipartisan administrations because of our 

disdain for chemical weapons. And most people would have agreed 

that what we did over northern and southern Iraq was the right 

thing to do because Saddam Hussein gassed his own residents. 

This is not the first time America has put down a red line on 

chemical weapons. I have heard people say that this is the President’s red line, it is not the red line of the United States of America, and you just have to look at history and know that it is. And 

I am also reminded of what President Clinton said when he was 

asked what his one regret was for his time in presidency. He said, 

my one regret was inaction in Rwanda. And I wonder, in 20, 10, 

50 years what are we going to say if we did nothing about the gassing of thousands of people in Syria. 

Now, I just have a couple of questions. I have heard some people 

say, and it has really bothered me, they say that if we go in and 

we strike Assad and make him pay for the use of chemical weapons, more than any benefit he gains, that we are acting as ‘‘alQaeda’s Air Force.’’ And I believe that is a cheap line by some people to garner headlines and not a serious discussion of what is 

going on in Syria. So, Mr. Secretary Kerry, if you will start, what 

is your thought on the comment of the cheap line of al-Qaeda’s Air 

Force in dealing with the opposition and in punishing an evil man 

for using evil weapons? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, your comments have been 

very eloquent and I think very, very important to this discussion. 

And I am confident I join the General and Secretary Hagel in 

thanking you for your service, willing to serve both in the Guard 

as well as a pilot but also here. 

54

The intent of the President could not be more clear. And the impact if we effect, if Congress will pass this and we can carry out 

this action, the impact will be not to help al-Qaeda. In fact, it won’t 

help al-Qaeda. It will further expose al-Qaeda. But it will hold a 

dictator accountable to this critical standard. You just reiterated it, 

and I said it in my opening testimony, this is not just about folks 

in Syria, my friends. American troops benefit from this standard 

being upheld. And through all of our wars since 1925 we have managed to see it upheld against when we have been involved. 

And the fact is that the absence of our willingness to uphold this 

standard will do several things that are directly against our interests. Number one, completely undermine America’s validity, America’s credibility, America’s word in the region and elsewhere. It will 

embolden North Korea and embolden Iran with respect to activities 

that will directly threaten the United States and our allies. It will 

importantly increase the number of terrorists that we are already 

concerned about because it will force people who want to take on 

Assad to go to the least common denominator of efficiency and expediency, and that will be to arm the worst people who will try to 

get the job done. 

And so I would just urge everybody to listen carefully to Congressman Kinzinger, but to really evaluate this just on a fundamental basis of common sense and human behavior. In the absence 

of doing this, there will be a grant of impunity to Bashar al-Assad 

for the use of these weapons. 

Chairman ROYCE. Alan Grayson from Florida. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, do Syria and Hezbollah have the means to 

launch a counterattack against U.S. vessels in the Mediterranean, 

the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and Israel? 

General DEMPSEY. Our maritime assets are positioned such that 

there are no capabilities that can threaten them. Embassies of 

course are a fixed resource and are always subject to terrorist attack. That remains true today as it has for the last 10 years. And 

we have taken steps to mitigate that risk. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And Israel? 

General DEMPSEY. Israel, you may be aware, is actually anticipating some action, gone to a state of high alert, called reserves up, 

taken a lot of measures. And by the way, we partner with Israel 

very closely on the defense of Israel. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Would you say that a counterattack is more likely 

than not? 

General DEMPSEY. No, I don’t think I can say that. But, you 

know, without signaling the Syrian regime in some way, I wouldn’t 

say that. I wouldn’t come to that conclusion. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Secretary Kerry, have members of the Syrian opposition called for such an attack? And if so, whom? 

Secretary KERRY. Not specifically that I know of. They support 

it apparently, but they have not advocated to me. I have had conversations with the president of the opposition and there was no 

pleading or urging to do this. 

Mr. GRAYSON. In fact, haven’t members of the Syrian opposition 

said they don’t want an attack? Isn’t that true? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I have not heard that. 

55

Mr. GRAYSON. You haven’t seen the public reports to that effect? 

Secretary KERRY. No. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right. Secretary Kerry, there are 189 signers 

of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria does not happen to be 

one of them. How many of those signatories have pledged to participate in the military intervention in Syria? And what exactly has 

each one pledged to do? 

Secretary KERRY. There are at least 10 countries that have 

pledged to participate. We have actually not sought more for participation. We have sought people for support. And there are many 

more, obviously, that support. But I think I should let the General 

speak to the question. You know, I said earlier there really is a 

limit, for this kind of an operation, as to how many you want to 

participate. You want support. But just physically, the management of it, the technical capacity and other issues are critical. 

And, General, perhaps you want to say something. 

General DEMPSEY. Actually, Congressman, I apologize, I was 

writing down your first question. What was the question about 

partners? 

Mr. GRAYSON. Of the 189 signatories to the Chemical Weapons 

Convention how many of them have pledged to participate in a 

military attack on Syria and what have they pledged to do? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I don’t have the final answer to that 

question. Commander USCENTCOM is actually militarily conducting most of the outreach. And we have, you know, we have 

agreement to assist in many different ways, some of which 

wouldn’t be appropriate to speak about in an unclassified setting. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Secretary Hagel, will the military action in Syria, 

if it does take place, require a supplemental appropriation? And if 

you think not, then will you commit to that now? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, it depends on the option that the President would select. I have said that we will work with the Congress 

on whatever the cost of that is. Thank you. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Secretary Hagel, there has been a report in the 

media that the administration has mischaracterized post-attack 

Syrian military communications and that these communications actually expressed surprise about the attack. This is a very serious 

charge. Can you please release the original transcripts so that the 

American people can make their own judgment about that important issue? 

Secretary HAGEL. What transcripts are you referring to? 

Mr. GRAYSON. The transcripts that are reported that took place 

after the attack in which the government has suggested that they 

confirmed the existence of an attack, but actually it has been reported that Syrian commanders expressed surprise about the attack having taken place, not confirmed it. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is probably classified, Congressman. 

I would have to go back and review exactly what you are referring 

to. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Well, you will agree that it is important that the 

administration not mislead the public in any way about these reports, won’t you? 

56

Secretary HAGEL. Well, of course. But I am not aware of the administration misleading the American public on this issue or any 

other issue. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Will you agree that the only way to put that matter to rest is to release the original reports in some redacted form? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I am not going to agree to anything until 

I see it, until I understand better what it is. But most likely it is 

classified. 

Mr. GRAYSON. I understand that. I am asking will you declassify 

it for this purpose? 

Secretary HAGEL. I just gave you my answer. I have no idea 

what exactly you are talking about. I would have to go back and 

look at it. I would have to confer with others, our Intelligence Community. That is all I can tell you now. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Tom Cotton of Arkansas. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kerry, Mr. Hagel, General Dempsey, thank you for your time 

and service, most importantly, in uniform, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Hagel as 

young men, General Dempsey as a young man and now as a more 

seasoned man as well. 

I have grown weary for several months, not weary of war, because I know, as each of you know, that war is sometimes the price 

that a free society must pay to defend our freedom and to protect 

our interests abroad. I have grown weary of the President’s war 

weariness. I have called for months for action in Syria. I feel that 

action should have been taken years ago. I am deeply worried that 

our core national security interests are at stake in Syria. 

Mr. Kerry, you said that the President does not bluff. I fear that 

both our enemies and our allies do not believe that statement. For 

some time now we have let Iran violate numerous United Nations 

resolutions. In Syria, we have not acted previously on uses of chemical weapons. And I do believe the world is watching. And the day 

the United States does not act is not just a day that Bashar alAssad knows it is open season for chemical weapons, but also the 

day Kim Jong Un knows that, and most ominously, the day that 

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, spins his centrifuges 

into overdrive, which starts the clock ticking to the less than 2-year 

moment when those nuclear warheads on intercontinental missiles 

could hit our constituents here in the United States. 

I agree with what my colleague Adam Kinzinger has said, that 

we have a vital interest in maintaining the international taboo 

against chemical weapons. All of you, like me, have been in training, I suspect, where you have been exposed to gas, and you know 

that no one benefits from that taboo more than do American troops. 

And I am also deeply worried that our inaction is destabilizing the 

Middle East, in particular our allies in Israel and Jordan, as well 

as Turkey, and emboldening Iran, one of our most implacable enemies, as they send thousands of troops to fight in Syria, along 

with Hezbollah, its terrorist proxy from Lebanon. 

So that is why, miracle of miracles, I am in support of the President’s call for action in Syria. I am urging my colleagues, on both 

sides of the aisle, to support this action as well. However, the 

President’s stated policy was not just a red line against chemical 

weapons, which, as Mr. Sherman said, occurred without any objecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
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tion from Members of Congress, and occurred before he was reelected by the American people, it was also a stated policy of regime change. 

So I would like to ask you, what is the President planning that 

could lead not just to punishment for this use of chemical weapons, 

but also an ultimate victory in Syria, which is a change in the nature of the regime so they will not use chemical weapons again and 

so that a pro-Western, moderate, native Syrian Government can 

take its place? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, thank you for a very clear 

and compelling statement, and thank you for the support for the 

President’s initiative for the interests of the country. 

With respect to the longer term, you are absolutely correct. But 

I want to separate here because it is very important in terms of 

what the President is asking the Congress for. Yes, the President’s 

policy is that Assad must go and there should be a regime change. 

And the President is committed to additional efforts in support of 

the opposition, together with friends and allies in the region, in a 

coordinated way in order to achieve that, with the understanding 

that the ultimate transition will come and can come through a negotiated settlement, a political resolution, not a military. He 

doesn’t believe—we don’t believe—there is a military solution. 

But this action, because nobody should be confused, Americans 

should not be confused, and I said earlier, you know, this is not an 

effort to take over Syria’s civil war, it is an effort to uphold this 

standard. And the action the President is asking the Congress to 

approve is not—is a singular military action to uphold that standard with respect to chemical weapons. 

On a separate track is the political track, which the President is 

seeking support for through appropriate channels here in Congress, 

which is in effect now, to help the opposition in order to ultimately 

see Assad leave. But we don’t want to confuse the two and the context. Is there a downstream collateral benefit to what will happen 

in terms of the enforcement of the chemical weapons effort? The 

answer is yes, it will degrade his military capacity. It will for sure 

have downstream impact. But that is not the primary calculation 

of what brings us here, and nobody should confuse the two in this 

effort. What I would like to do, Congressman, is really in classified 

session we should have the discussion about the other things the 

President would like to see us do to support the opposition. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretaries, for being here, and General. First of 

all, I would like to say before I ask an embarrassing question, I 

have the greatest respect for all of you. I think Secretary of State 

Kerry, I think I first heard of you from Dan Berrigan back in 1985 

when I was in the Jesuits, I was at Jesuit House, and he had great 

respect for you because of your activities after Vietnam. And I 

know, Secretary Hagel, that you were so reluctant on going to war 

that you almost weren’t approved by the Senate. In fact, I think 

you were the only Secretary ever to be filibustered. So I know you 

are not anxiously running to war. And the President of course ran 

58

on not getting us into war. And I am certainly someone who is very 

reluctant to get into any kind of war like this. 

On Saturday, however, I had the opportunity to speak to a small 

group of veterans in my district in San Diego before I flew here for 

the classified briefing on Sunday, and they asked a question, and 

I told them I would ask. I first told them I wouldn’t, but then they 

convinced me it was a good question. And that is that one of them 

has a son in the military today, and he believes that last time we 

went running off to war that the facts that we were given were lies 

or misleading. And what he wanted is just one thing. And I told 

him that all I had read, and certainly now all that I have read does 

lead me to believe that chemical weapons were used, and that children were gassed, and because of that we do have to act. But he 

wanted you to promise that the facts that you have given us are 

true to the best of your ability, that you are not lying, that you are 

not holding anything back, that what we have seen and what I 

have read—and I have read everything that they have given to us, 

I have been back twice now to make sure that I have read everything—I want to make sure that you promise us that you are telling the truth. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, I am proud and perfectly willing 

to tell you that everything that I have said is the truth, and based 

on the information as it has been presented to me, and as I have, 

based on my own experience in war, which I resolved to do if I ever 

was in a position to make any choices in the future, fully vetted, 

and I am comfortable with it. And I wouldn’t possibly make this 

recommendation if I weren’t comfortable with it. 

I believe we have vetted this, we have double-checked it, we have 

asked the intel people to rescrub. We have even had a separate 

team created that had independent from the original to totally vet, 

check all the analysis, find out if it could have been an opposition 

or anything else. And in every case I would say for myself, and everybody that we have sat around the table with, there is a comfort 

level with this that is rare in this kind of situation. I wouldn’t have 

said you could prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt if I didn’t 

believe it. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Secretary Hagel? Again, I apologize for the insulting question, 

but I think it has to be asked. 

Secretary HAGEL. No, I think it is a very important question. We 

ought to ask more questions like that. 

I don’t know how I would improve on my former Senate colleague’s question and answer back to you. I feel exactly the same 

way. I know that the three of us wouldn’t be sitting here today saying the things we are saying if we didn’t absolutely believe it. We 

have all three been through too much and our experiences guide 

us. Thank you. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I still have a lot of time left, but 

that was my only question. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go now to Mr. George Holding of South Carolina. 

Mr. HOLDING. North Carolina, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. North Carolina, of course. 

59

Mr. HOLDING. That is all right, it is all right. We still like South 

Carolina. 

General Dempsey, thank you very much for your service. I appreciate the fact that we have a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

that also has a master’s degree in literature, Irish literature at 

that. The objectives of this military action that have been stated 

is, you know, to hold accountable, degrade ability, and deter future 

action, and, you know, the associated targeting with those objectives. Would this military action, militarily speaking from your perspective, constitute war? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as you know, Congressman, the decision 

on whether something rises to the level of war is actually one that 

is made collaboratively between the Commander in Chief and the 

Congress of the United States. I think militarily it is hard—it 

would be hard for me to say that this is other than an act of war. 

But the problem with that characterization is that war has this 

image of being a campaign over an extended, protracted period of 

time until someone plants a flag or someone surrenders. And I 

want to make it clear that is not what we are talking about here. 

We are talking about something very limited to address the specific 

issue of the use of chemical weapons. 

Mr. HOLDING. If we take these actions, you know, trying to 

achieve the objectives that you stated and the Syrians punch back, 

you know, that escalation, you know, I am sure we can degrade 

their ability to punch back, I am sure that you have planned for 

the contingencies of them punching back, but, you know, there is 

always the chance that they can punch back and it can hurt. I 

think about the British in the Falklands, and they had tremendous, overpowering strength, and all of a sudden they found that, 

you know, there were some weaknesses there, there was a hole in 

defenses, and they lost a capital ship. And that could happen to us. 

If the Syrians punch back and are successful, would that be closer 

to a definition of war? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I am not sure that their reaction to our 

action and our reaction to that—you know, I mean this gets into 

a cycle. And again, it is not the chairman of the Joint Chiefs that 

defines or declares war. But if you are asking me are we prepared 

for a retaliation, we are as well prepared as we possibly could be. 

Mr. HOLDING. So certainly we are prepared for any retaliation. 

And if there was retaliation, we would have to answer that immediately. 

General DEMPSEY. You know, Congressman, I wouldn’t make 

that conclusion. I mean, you know, I think there is no automaticity 

to anything in conflict, at least from my perspective. I think, you 

know, I think that we would certainly have the ability to control 

our response on our terms. So I wouldn’t conclude that this resolution starts a process that you or the President lose control of. 

Mr. HOLDING. Militarily speaking, is Russia still a superpower? 

General DEMPSEY. I think the answer to that question is when 

you look at the instruments of power—look at ourselves. So it is 

a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic power that defines us as a ‘‘superpower.’’ I think that Russia still possesses elements that would qualify them to join the club of superpowers. 

They still have an incredible strategic arsenal. But conventionally 

60

I wouldn’t put them in that class. And so I think there are parts 

of their apparatus that rise to that level. 

Mr. HOLDING. Obviously, I mean we all know that Syria and 

Russia are close allies, and Syria is Russia’s last ally in the Middle 

East. Syria has the only Russian military base outside of Russia. 

If Russia decided to strike at us in that theater what are the top 

three options that they would have to strike us in retaliation for 

us striking their closest ally? 

General DEMPSEY. You know, Congressman, I am going to suggest that it wouldn’t be helpful in this setting to have a discussion 

about that kind of hypothetical. But I do have some views about 

it that I could share in a classified environment. 

Mr. HOLDING. But we can certainly say that Russia would have 

options to strike us in that theater in retaliation for us striking 

their ally. 

General DEMPSEY. Russia has capabilities that range from the 

asymmetric, including cyber, all the way up through strategic nuclear weapons. And again, it wouldn’t be helpful in this setting to 

speculate about that. 

Mr. HOLDING. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. And I want to thank you all again, 

first, of course, for the service to our country, but also for the time 

you have spent with us today, as well as Ambassador Ford, for the 

time you spent with us earlier in the year. This is without a doubt 

the biggest decision, one of the biggest decisions we can possibly 

make, and one I think we all take very seriously. It is why I came 

Sunday for the classified briefing. I have read the classified report. 

I have listened in on the teleconference we had on Monday, and I 

am grateful to have the time with you here. 

I also recognize the angst of my constituents of the country, as 

there is a worry and a legitimate concern. But, Secretary Kerry, I 

don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you said, if we do nothing, the likelihood of Assad using chemical weapons again is, I will 

say, approaching 100 percent. Is that fair? 

Secretary KERRY. Fair. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And, with that, I want to turn—I am sorry—to 

General Dempsey, because you said, in escalation, you can’t get the 

risk of escalation down to zero. But I wonder if there is a risk of 

escalation if we do nothing. 

General DEMPSEY. There is absolutely a risk of escalation in the 

use of chemical weapons if we do nothing. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And if that approaches 100 percent, if we do 

stand down now, is there a likelihood that we are back at this 

same question again a month or 6 months from now at a higher 

level with a greater risk? 

Secretary KERRY. I believe so. 

Secretary HAGEL. I think so. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So, I guess, as I evaluate the decision we have 

to make, you know, the first thing I wanted to see was the evidence. And I think, without a doubt, as you have said, beyond any 

reasonable doubt, the Assad regime has planned, perpetrated, and 

even tried to cover up this massive use of chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction. 

61

One of my questions was a question of national interest. And, 

General Dempsey, you have said, without a doubt, for our soldiers 

who are here at home and our interests around the world, this is 

a threat to our national interests. Is that fair, as we go through the 

decision process? 

General DEMPSEY. It is, because of the essentially establishing, 

kind of, it is an overused phrase, but a new norm. And I haven’t 

lived in a world where, militarily, chemical weapons were routinely 

used, and I don’t want to live in that world. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. From an international standpoint, I guess I 

come to, if we have the interest, in our national interest, the authority—clearly, I reviewed the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

The United Nations is the authority here. But, Secretary Kerry, 

you said the United Nations is not available to us. If it was, would 

we be on a different strategy, or is this all that is left to us? 

Secretary KERRY. If the Russians were to join in and be willing 

to pass this, with the Chinese, I guarantee the President would 

want to see it passed. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. But could I just also—Congressman Holding 

left a question on the table, and I want to make sure it is not hanging out there. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Please. 

Secretary KERRY. Foreign Minister Lavrov of Russia has made it 

clear, quote, I mean, pretty much quote, paraphrased, Russia does 

not intend to fight a war over Syria. And I have had personal conversations with President Putin and with the Foreign Minister that 

have indicated that Syria doesn’t rise to that level of potential conflict. 

And so I just don’t—you know, their ships are kind of staying out 

of the way. They are not threatening that. And I don’t think that 

would be what would happen here. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right. Thank you. 

So if the U.N. is not available to us, the international community 

is rising up—and I want to thank you for reaching out to them and 

bringing in the coalition. If we don’t lead, is there anyone else who 

will lead to hold the Assad regime accountable? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is conceivable that the French, if others 

were to join them, might decide and others in the region might decide. But, you know, we are not putting that to the test because 

we don’t believe that that is appropriate. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. 

As we look forward—and Mr. Cicilline touched on this, the other 

options on the table. You have evaluated, you have seen where we 

are. This, as I said, is one of the biggest decisions we are going to 

make. 

Can you state definitively that the strategy laid out that you are 

considering will achieve the goals we have, to deter and diminish 

the ability of the Assad regime to use chemical weapons going forward? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, militarily, I can state that we can 

achieve the goal of deterring and degrading. Take note that I didn’t 

say we can prevent. I mean, that is the challenge here. We are trying to change the calculus of the regime. 

62

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I understand. And what I believe is that for us 

to prevent would require us isolating, identifying, and putting boots 

on the ground, which I think uniformly we have said we stand 

against. 

All right. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Randy Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, these are for you. In your remarks that you 

submitted to this committee, there was five options you laid out: 

Advising and assisting the opposition; conducting limited standoff 

strikes; establishing a no-fly zone; establishing buffer zones; and, 

number five, control chemical weapons. 

Now, I have been through that and I have studied it, and I am 

going to go back through that. Training, advising, and assisting the 

opposition costs several hundred troops to several thousand, in 

your words, $500 million annually. The risks were that extremists 

would gain access to additional capabilities. Do you remember writing that? 

General DEMPSEY. I do. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Perfect. 

You also said a risk was retaliatory attacks. You also said insider 

attacks was a risk, where those troops, the people that we are 

seeking to help, would actually wind up turning their guns on us 

and killing our troops. 

Number two, you said conduct limited standoff strikes. Your cost 

was in the billions, especially depending on the duration. You also 

said, and I am quoting you, ‘‘Regime could withstand limited 

strikes by dispersing its assets.’’ It is as if we gave them a 2-week 

notice. You also said retaliatory attacks were possible, and the 

probability of collateral damage would impact civilians and foreigners inside the country. 

Number three, you said establish a no-fly zone. Your estimate 

was it costs $500 million initially and averaging as much as $1 billion a month. You said there was a risk of losing a U.S. aircraft, 

which would then, ‘‘which would require us to insert personnel recovery forces,’’ a.k.a., boots on the ground. You also said, ‘‘It may 

also fail to reduce the violence or shift the momentum because the 

regime relies overwhelmingly on surface-fired mortars, artillery, 

and missiles.’’ In other words, it is not a very good option, in my 

estimation. 

Number four, you said establish buffer zones. You estimated that 

at $1 billion a month. 

And number five, you said control chemical weapons. Risks: 

Boots on the ground, American women and men; $1 billion a 

month, which I understand the Secretaries of State and Defense 

are not advocating that. 

But I have a simple question for you. Everything I read from 

your summary indicated to me that there is absolutely no guarantee of a lasting peace in Syria or in the region and nor that they 

are American-friendly after we have a gargantuan outlay of American money, resources, and maybe American blood and even lives 

if they retaliate—absolutely no guarantee. Would you say that is 

a fair statement? 

63

General DEMPSEY. I just would remind you, the answer to the 

letter that I sent to Representative Engel was related to the question that I received, which is, what would it take to tip the balance 

in favor of the opposition and lead to the overthrow of the Assad 

regime? 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

General DEMPSEY. So I want to make sure we are separate from 

what we are doing here today. 

Mr. WEBER. No, I got that. I appreciate that. I will direct that 

to Mr. Hagel. 

Would you say that is a fair statement, no guarantee of an outcome on the other end? 

Secretary HAGEL. No guarantee of the outcome——

Mr. WEBER. Of peace in Syria, peace in the region, and that whoever comes out on the other side will be our friends—no guarantee. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, but that is not the stated objective of 

what we are talking about. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, that wasn’t my question, sir. My question was, 

would you guarantee that after trying to establish the objective 

that you are seeking to establish, we still do not have a guarantee 

on the other end of a stable Syria, a stable region, and whoever 

comes out on the other side would be our friends? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I wouldn’t guarantee anything. This is, 

as I believe the last 3 hours have been very clear about, this is unpredictable, it is complicated, it is dangerous. There are many interests that are surging through the Middle East, in particular 

Syria. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Secretary HAGEL. What we are thinking through diplomatically, 

militarily, international coalition, all the other factors that we have 

talked about today, are——

Mr. WEBER. Forgive me, but I am running out of time. 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. To get to one thing, and that is a 

diplomatic settlement. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Secretary Kerry, your response, please? 

Secretary KERRY. I can’t give you a guarantee about the outcome 

in Syria as a whole, but I can give you a guarantee that the United 

States of America can make it clear to Assad that it is going to cost 

him to use chemical weapons and we can have an impact on deterring and degrading his capacity. That guarantee is what I can give 

you, and that is what the President is seeking to do. 

Mr. WEBER. But at what price, I would add. 

In my last 15 seconds——

Secretary KERRY. Well, not at the price that you described, absolutely not at the price that you described. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, let me just say, if American credibility is at 

stake here, let there be no mistake: If anybody were to attack us, 

this Congress, in my view, would respond, would authorize the full 

force and fury of our very capable military. 

Secretary KERRY. But, Congressman—Mr. Chairman, this is important. 

But, Congressman, not everything comes down in terms of threat 

or potential future, you know, threat to our country to somebody 

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attacking us. Lots of things we do we do in preparation and as a 

matter of deterrence. And we also do it in the context, on occasion, 

as we did in Bosnia, to make peace, to have a settlement, to save 

lives. That is what we achieved. 

And so we have achieved that previously, and I believe in the 

long run it is vital for the United States to assert this principle and 

to begin to move this troubled part of the world in a different direction. That is what we are working on. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Bera from California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses for their patience. Obviously, 

this has been a long day. It has been a long week, but it is of critical importance that we are having this discussion. I applaud the 

President for including Congress in this debate. 

I agree that we have to show resolve and we have show that we 

are committed to our allies, but my constituents and I still need to 

be convinced not that atrocities have occurred—you know, we all 

are unanimous in our condemnation of what Assad has done—but 

we need to know exactly what our goals are and our objectives, because this is increasingly a complex situation. 

And to that extent, you know, let me ask Secretary Hagel a question. When I was home in Sacramento County this past weekend, 

people were stopping me in the grocery stores, my neighbors were 

pulling me aside on the street. You know, I think all of my colleagues have been inundated with phone calls, emails. And almost 

unanimously, people don’t want us to strike Syria. They are fatigued. 

And I answer to these people. These are the people that I represent. So my question, Secretary Hagel, is, what can I tell my constituents about why these strikes are in our national security interests, why these strikes matter to these folks that are struggling 

every day? How do I effectively communicate what our plan is? 

Secretary HAGEL. I understand your question clearly, and I understand the responsibility you have to give those you represent a 

clear answer. So that is partly why the President wanted to bring 

this before the Congress, so the American people would have an opportunity to hear all the questions and get the answers. 

My answer to you is, for you to give to your constituents, is it 

is clearly in the interest of our country because, as we have noted 

here today, the use of chemical weapons, if it becomes a norm, if 

it becomes a standard, if it becomes an art of war, a method of war 

that is accepted by the world, which it is has not been for the last 

100 years, it jeopardizes our country, our homeland, our troops, our 

people all over the world. 

When you look at the nations that have stockpiles, one nation in 

particular, Syria, that we are talking about, has used those. North 

Korea has them. What about Iran’s threat to all of us? So this is 

in the interest of the United States, aside from the international 

norm. 

Mr. BERA. So, listening to those concerns, listening to what the 

strategic goals are here and why it is in the national security interest, again, listening to my constituents, you know, they understand 

the importance of maintaining our credibility and our standing as 

65

a Nation. But, again, Syria seems so far away for them. These 

issues seem very far away from them. 

And, you know, as we discuss it here, we are sending a message 

to Assad, but we are not securing these chemical stockpiles. We are 

not—and I think, General Dempsey, you in your testimony and in 

the past have indicated how difficult it would be to secure chemical 

stockpiles, to make sure that they don’t fall in the hands of terrorists, of individuals who would want to use them against us here on 

our own homeland as well as with our allies. 

But that is not our stated goal. Our stated goal is not to make 

sure that we are securing our homeland, that we are making sure 

our neighborhoods are safe. It is a very difficult goal to articulate 

to my constituents. 

Secretary HAGEL. Let me just remind us of something which has 

been noted earlier here in this hearing. Next week we are going to 

celebrate—not celebrate—we are going to remember what happened in this country on that September day in 2001. And we all 

recall where we were. 

How many of my constituents, during those days, in Nebraska or 

your constituents in California ever thought about or even knew 

where Afghanistan was or had ever even heard of this organization 

called al-Qaeda? 

There is a clear, living example of how we are not insulated from 

the rest of the world, how things can happen to the United States, 

in this country, if we are not vigilant and think through these 

things and stay ahead of these things and take action to prevent 

these things from occurring. 

Maybe something would not happen in this country for a couple 

of years. I don’t know. But it has been noted up here that the next 

President, the next chairman and ranking, the next group of Members who will occupy your seats may have to deal with this in a 

bigger way if we are not paying attention to it now. 

But the 9/11 anniversary I think is a very clear example you can 

use with your constituents. 

Chairman ROYCE. Scott Perry, Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, each of you, for your military service. 

I would just like to start out with some corrections for the record 

since it has been a topic of discussion. I have got the quote here 

from the President: ‘‘A red line for us is we start seeing a whole 

bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That 

would change my calculus. That would change my equation.’’ That 

is the President, August 20th of 2012, just because some folks like 

to revise history. 

Secretary Kerry, if you could, just one question to start out and 

then a couple more quotes. Would you consider sarin gas a weapon 

of mass destruction? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. VX gas, a weapon of mass destruction? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So those two were used in Iraq, found in Iraq 

before I got there and found in Iraq when I got there, for those who 

say that the past administration lied about weapons of mass destruction. 

66

Now, some quotes here for you. This is from the President:

‘‘The President does not have the power under the Constitution 

to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that 

does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the 

Nation.’’

That was in 2007.

‘‘If the U.S. goes in and attacks another country without a 

U.N. mandate and without clear evidence that can be presented, then there are questions in terms of whether international law supports it.’’

And that was August 23, 2013. 

August 31, 2013:

‘‘While I believe I have the authority to carry out this military 

action without specific congressional authorization, I know that 

the country will be stronger and our actions will be even more 

effective if the strike is authorized by Congress.’’

Now, Secretary Kerry, you, President Obama, and Vice President 

Biden have all previously expressed your support for the War Powers Resolution. Section 2(c) of the statute asserts that the President 

may constitutionally use U.S. Armed Forces abroad only pursuant 

to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, a national 

emergency created by an attack on the United States. 

We have a credibility and trust issue here. I questioned Ambassador Ford right here in this room in March about our strategy, 

and I could get no clear answer regarding the crossing of a red line, 

which I think was a capricious statement based on the lack of a 

strategy. However, we are here right now with this situation in 

front of us. 

My direct question to you, Secretary, is, will the President abide 

by the wishes of the representatives of the American people if there 

is a ‘‘no’’ vote on a resolution in this Congress? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I can’t—look, I can’t answer for the President. He answers for himself, obviously, and I answer to him. 

But I can guarantee that the President has made it clear that 

he believes he has the authority within the Constitution in the executive branch to be able to take an action without congressional 

approval. And that has happened again and again under Presidencies of both parties. 

So, you know, I don’t think we are going to advantage ourselves 

with that constitutional debate here right now——

Mr. PERRY. But I think that is pivotal and critical. While we talk 

about how we are going to do what we are going to do, we haven’t 

talked enough about if we have the authority——

Secretary KERRY. Rather than talk about——

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. If the President has the authority to do 

it. 

And with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, with all the—you know, 

I am glad that the President came to Congress to get this question 

answered and have us involved. He made the statement that he 

was going before he came to Congress. And it is my opinion that 

when the American people said we don’t want you to do this and 

when the international community said we are not with you on this 

67

and the British Parliament said no, then he came to the Congress——

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman——

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Not because he had this shining vision 

at the beginning of a grand strategy which would involve the Congress once the red line was crossed. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, look, we can have a discussion 

here. Needless to say, you don’t agree with the President’s approach to some of these issues over a period of time, maybe many 

of them, maybe all of them. And you are a Member of the other 

party, and the President isn’t your President of choice; he is the 

President we have. 

It doesn’t do us any good here to debate those differences with 

the President. What is important is to discuss here whether or not 

the fact that he has come to you and he is requesting this authority 

and he has made his decision as President of the United States. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And I would say that that is fair. Thank 

you——

Secretary KERRY. So now let’s decide whether or not together we 

can find the common ground in the interests of our country to do 

what is necessary to hold a man accountable for his use of chemical 

weapons of mass destruction. That is the question. 

Chairman ROYCE. We have with us Tulsi Gabbard, who flew a 

long way from Hawaii to be with us today. 

Tulsi? 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I have a tremendous 

amount of respect for the three of you and your service and commitment to our country on so many levels. 

I also have the privilege and honor of serving our country in uniform and deployed with the Hawaii Army National Guard to Iraq 

back in 2005. And one of my daily responsibilities there serving in 

a medical unit was going through a list every single day of every 

injury and casualty throughout the entire region, looking for and 

taking care of our Hawaii soldiers. 

And it is those experiences and those memories, as well as the 

knowledge of the many innocents who have been killed in Syria, 

that I carry with me every day but through this discussion that we 

have and take our responsibility very seriously, as do you. 

I think there is no question, we have seen it clear today, that the 

use of these chemical weapons is horrifying. My concerns that I 

would like to address with you lie in the fact that the path that 

you are advocating for us forward still remains unclear to me on 

many levels: The right course of action, the most effective course 

of action, and whether or not the stated objectives that you have 

spoken about today and previously, as well as making sure that we 

have a very realistic and honest understanding of what the next 

steps are and what the unintended consequences of this action 

could be. And that is really where my concern is, is the answer to 

the question of what happens next. 

I think that we can place many limitations on what role the 

United States will play, both through resolutions and in other 

means. But whether we like it or not, the consequences of our actions will impact the civil war, a very complicated region. And once 

68

we are involved with our military, it is likely that we will have to 

consider the extended role that we will play in any escalation or 

retaliations that occur. 

So I have three major questions that I would like you to address. 

One is the very realistic possibility that a limited strike will not 

achieve your objective, the targeted strike to debilitate Assad, resulting in a deterrence of his further use of the weapons of mass 

destruction, both for him and around the world. 

And I ask just to look back in Iraq, where there were thoughts 

that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, he was deposed, captured, and hanged. And what you are advocating for falls 

very short of that action. Why would taking this lesser action deter 

him or other dictators around the world, when, clearly, that example of Saddam Hussein has not deterred Assad? 

Secondly, each of you has made a distinction between this limited strike and providing aid to opposition forces. By weakening 

Assad with this blow, are we not indirectly assisting the opposition 

forces in gaining strength? 

And, lastly, with the control and use of chemical weapons, General Dempsey, you stated that the targets you are talking about 

will be directly linked to means of control of these chemical weapons without actually releasing the weapons themselves. And I am 

wondering what your strategy and objectives are regarding securing these weapons across Syria, especially if Assad loses control or 

if the regime falls, how we secure them, given the nonsupport from 

Russia and China, in particular from al-Qaeda and terrorists, people who have stated very explicitly their desire to harm our people 

and American interests. 

Secretary KERRY. Very good questions, Congresswoman. And, 

first of all, thank you for your service very, very much. 

General, do you want to just take the last one, and then we can 

take the other two? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, I can do that. 

I guess this is what we get for training you how to ask questions 

about military operations. And thanks for your service. 

I will take on the question of security of the weapons in the 

event of the fall of the regime. We do have, at the classified level, 

contingency plans with regional partners to secure a finite, a limited number of sites. 

The challenge we have with that is the number of potential sites. 

And the regime has a tendency to move their chemical weapons 

around, we think to secure them but at some point it may not be 

to secure them. 

And so I would just tell you that we do have contingency plans 

with regional partners for the security of the weapons, but it is a 

very heavy lift. 

Secretary KERRY. With respect to the limited strike, not achieving the objective, I think the General has spoken to that earlier, 

that he has confidence that we have the ability to be able to 

achieve our objective. If not in the first, you know, volley, certainly 

we have the ability to achieve that objective. 

And, secondly, you said would it inadvertently or would it not, 

in fact, help the opposition? And I have said many times, as a collateral component of this, any degradation of Assad’s military will, 

69

of course, be a benefit to the opposition. But that is not the fundamental purpose of the initiative the President is asking you to engage in. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ron DeSantis from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all the witnesses, and thank you all for your service, 

particularly military service. 

Secretary Kerry, you spoke about how the use of this gas 

breached the norms of civilized behavior, international norms, and 

that we need to enforce this norm kind of like you would enforce 

lessons learned by children and bullies I think that you had said. 

And I know you got a little irritated about the Benghazi issue, 

and it was not on your watch, and you are not responsible. But as 

I look at this, that same line of reasoning should have applied to 

Benghazi. The assassination of a diplomat breaches norms that 

were recognized probably far longer than norms against use of 

sarin gas, and yet the U.S. has not acted to avenge the deaths of 

the four Americans, including our Ambassador, who were massacred in Benghazi. And that lack of response, I think, using the 

same line of reasoning, certainly could embolden terror groups and 

Islamic malcontents that they can do this and that we may not respond forcefully. 

Now, you are not responsible for that, but there is a frustration 

among some of my constituents about how we have handled that, 

not on your watch, but I just wanted to clear up how some of us 

view that. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, let me speak to that, because I 

appreciate completely—I think that is a little different from the 

earlier question, so to speak—I appreciate and respect completely 

the need for justice to be done. 

And believe me, we have this discussion in the State Department 

and in the White House about the steps that are being taken. And 

there are steps being taken. That is not a back-burner issue. And 

in an appropriate setting, I would be delighted to share with you 

exactly what is going on. But that accountability is a priority for 

the President, it is a priority for us——

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, we appreciate that, and we are waiting for 

that. 

Secretary Kerry, do you think that striking Syria for Assad using 

poison gas will have an effect on whether Iran decides to continue 

with its nuclear program or abandon it? 

Secretary KERRY. I think whether or not the United States 

stands up at this moment, as I have described earlier, to enforce 

this almost-century-old prohibition on the use of weapons will, in 

fact, affect not only Iran but loads of people’s thinking about 

whether the United States is good for its word. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So you think that it is possible that Iran, seeing 

a limited strike against Assad, that they will actually decide to 

abandon their weapons——

Secretary KERRY. No, I didn’t say that. I said it will affect their 

thinking about how serious the United States is. I can’t predict 

what they are going to decide to do or whether they will abandon 

it or not. But I will tell you this: It will enter into their calculation 

about what we might or not be prepared to do. 

70

And if we don’t do anything, I absolutely guarantee you that, too, 

will enter into their calculation. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I guess my fear is that they have already made 

their determination and they are going to continue with it, but I 

guess we will find out. 

In terms of these opposition groups—and I think it is true that 

when you degrade Assad, you are benefitting the opposition groups. 

And I think that the bulk of that energy right now is with Sunni 

supremacists and al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists. But it is difficult to 

kind of figure out where everybody is on all this. 

And there was a quote that you had given about when we were 

evaluating the Libyan opposition. You said,

‘‘We didn’t know who all the people were in Eastern Europe either. We don’t always know who they all are. If you asked Lafayette the question if he knew everyone here when he helped 

us during the American Revolution, what he would say. I think 

that you have to kind of have a sense of the course of history 

and what they are fighting for.’’

Is that pretty much—do you stand by that quote and, kind of, the 

difficulty in evaluating? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me——

Mr. DESANTIS. And I ask that because, you know, we have seen, 

with the Arab Spring, we have seen the reaction to us going into 

Afghanistan and Iraq. And, kind of, what is the animating impulse 

in these Muslim countries? And there was a comment about we 

would like to see a pro-Western government take the place of 

Assad, and I have not seen any evidence to suggest that that is 

what would be the primary impulse motivating the people in a 

post-Assad Syria. Indeed, I fear that what would motivate them 

would be the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni Islamism, of course alQaeda-type terror groups. 

And so that is the sense of history that a lot of us see. And that 

is why, when we are looking at a potential strike, how that could 

affect the civil war, we don’t want to be doing something that is 

going to lead to an outcome that is as bad as having Assad or potentially even worse. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, a very good question. And the 

answer is there are some really bad actors in some of these groups 

in Syria. Al-Nusra is not the worst, but they are really bad. And 

there are a couple of other groups that, you know, some people 

characterize as worse. 

But one of the things that is concentrating the President’s thinking about Syria and the reason for supporting the moderate opposition is to have a buttress against those folks who, if Syria continues to move in the direction it has been going, if there is an implosion, they will be strengthened, there will be more of them. 

This is, in fact, something that does bring Russia and the United 

States together. When I was in Russia and met with Putin, he discussed specifically their concerns about the extremists. 

But Syria, traditionally, historically, in the recent years, has 

been a secular country. And the vast majority of the opposition, 75 

percent, 70 percent of it, is hopeful to have a very different Syria—

a free Syria, a Syria that has minority rights protected, that is inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
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clusive. And that is what the opposition has in written form committed themselves to and is talking about wherever they go in the 

world. 

So I hope you will recognize that the best way to isolate the extremist components of the Syrian fabric is to more rapidly build up 

the opposition and diminish Assad’s capacity to prolong this. 

Chairman ROYCE. Joaquin Castro of Texas. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service, first of all, and for 

your testimony today. 

You know, there have been a lot of strong arguments made on 

both sides, both in favor of taking action and, quite frankly, against 

taking action. I have had a chance to hear about 1,500 comments, 

from social media posts to emails, calls, faxes, et cetera. 

And just to recap, I think I have boiled it down to the big arguments for, for example: First, that there is a moral imperative to 

act because of the use of chemical weapons; second, that we need 

to strike to prevent repeat behavior; third, that inaction will embolden others, specifically Iran and North Korea; fourth, that the 

U.S. reputation is on the line, that we need to show that we are 

not bluffing and that the world can count on our word; and, five, 

the effect on our allies. 

The arguments against include that this war is not worthwhile, 

that there are extremists on both sides, that America should focus 

on its own problems; that military action will have no real effect, 

that the scope is not enough, that these actions are not enough to 

change things; third, that military action will make things worse, 

that there will be collateral damage, increase in refugees, war will 

lead to more war; fourth, that we should take alternative action. 

You have heard folks say that we should try diplomacy or try to 

do this with a coalition if that is possible. And then, fifth, that the 

war is too expensive and, again, that America should focus on its 

own issues at home. 

And in making this decision, you know, I publically stated in San 

Antonio, the town that I represent, which is Military City, USA, 

that I am open to the idea of military strikes but that I want to 

review the evidence. And that is where I still stand today. 

And so, with that in mind, I have a few quick questions for you. 

The first is, if we do act militarily or if we decide not to, if this 

Congress votes yes or no, what is the policy that we are establishing or the precedent that we are establishing? 

And, important for me, what will this mean for future generations of Americans, post-baby-boomer generations of Americans, 

Generation X and millennials, and Americans that have not been 

born yet? Where will that leave America for them. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, those are all very appropriate considerations, each of the ones that you have listed. 

Where will we be? I believe that we would be not establishing a 

precedent; we would be upholding a precedent. We would be upholding the unbelievably committed global reaction to the horror of 

World War I, to the use of gas rampantly, and to the world’s condemnation of that and the fact that over 180 countries have signed 

on to this convention. We would be upholding it. 

72

And from the perspective of, as you say, Generation X or baby 

boomers or whatever you want to assign as a concept, I think it is 

a vital statement about multilateral, international commitment to 

norms by which you and your generation and the future generations would want to live. And I would hope it would be something 

you would overwhelmingly support, because it is a matter of values 

and interests coming together in an appropriate manner. And I 

think the absence of our willingness to enforce that would be very 

dangerous for our country for the long term. 

Mr. CASTRO. And, Mr. Secretary, let me ask you, what precedent 

do we set if we don’t act? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, for the United States of America, it 

would be a very unusual statement of our unwillingness to uphold 

something that we have fought for and been part of for a long, long 

period of time. I think we would be walking away from a responsibility and perhaps signaling a new moment of confrontation and 

difficulty for our country in many other respects, on many other 

issues. 

Mr. CASTRO. Do you feel that it would fundamentally start to 

change America’s role in the world? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it would change the world’s perception of 

America’s willingness to live up to its traditional role in the world, 

and it would certainly have a profound impact on people’s judgments about what we are willing to stand up for and not stand up 

for. 

And I caution you politely and humbly, I believe very, very deeply it will invite other contests of conflict that will put us to the test 

and potentially with much graver consequences. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Doug Collins of Georgia. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

And I thank you for being here. I thank you for your service. 

And I associate myself with the Representative from Hawaii, in 

serving in Iraq and knowing the issues going on. One of the benefits of sitting down here on the bottom row is you get to listen. You 

hear a lot of things, and you can get a lot of questions asked. 

Secretary KERRY. The only benefit. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I am not going to steal the thunder of some 

others that may come, but there is some—what I have heard today, 

though, still concerns me greatly. And I walked into this hearing 

concerned and very deeply concerned about the actions we are taking; I am still there. 

Many of those have to do with military questions and the questions that come from the, you know, statements such as, Secretary 

Hagel, you made, that there is no clarity on the ground, that there 

are no good options in Syria, these kind of things that lead me to 

an understanding of what happens is, you know, the limited-involvement nature, which has been talked about over and over here, 

and the high confidence that that limited nature would be effective. 

But if it would not, your statement just a moment ago, ‘‘well, after 

the first volley’’ leaves an open ending, well, there is another volley 

and another volley that would come if it did not achieve the end. 

I want to address, though, for a few questions on this issue. According to the unclassified assessment that was given, there was 

73

information that suggested that a possible chemical attack was imminent on August 21st. In fact, what was said was from August 

18th, Sunday, through Wednesday the 21st there were Syrian 

chemical weapons personnel operating in the area. 

The report goes on to say that 3 days prior to the attack there 

were strings of human signals and geospatial intelligence gathered 

showing the Assad regime preparing for a chemical attack. 

With over 48 hours’ notice and the recent history of chemical 

weapons being used in Syria, did the U.S. military not take action 

or quickly enough to convene the U.N. Security Council? Why did 

we not act, knowing the history—and I am going to come back to 

this part later—as quickly as possible? Why was there nothing 

done at that point? 

Secretary KERRY. Because that information isn’t real time in 

terms of the way it comes in. It goes through a process. So it 

wasn’t—there wasn’t time. 

Mr. COLLINS. Then you really—and I appreciate that answer, but 

you really now concern me even more that our intelligence operation, without getting into a, in this setting, discussion of this, that 

if it was not real time, we were finding out after the fact, then 

some of my concern, General Dempsey, would be that the limited 

engagement to, as you said, take out the operation or the engagement of the chemical weapons and not destroy all the chemical 

weapons, what is the confidence level? Although you have stated 

high, why should I or anybody else in this committee say that there 

is a concern that our intelligence is not real time enough to answer 

your question? 

General DEMPSEY. Different kinds of intelligence, sir. As you 

probably know—and thanks for your service, too, by the way—so 

there is signals intelligence, which is what you are referring to. 

There is full motion video. There is national technical means that 

allow us to establish pattern of life. It is different kinds of intelligence. 

Mr. COLLINS. But with the movement, there is a concern that the 

initial assessment could be wrong and there would be—I guess 

what I am getting at here is there seems to be a lot of thought out 

there that this is a one-strike operation. Although I am getting, you 

know, rumor now—and they are not rumor, but there are discussions of a 30-day or 40-day or 60-day, 90-day window. I guess that 

is the concern I am having. Many in America are simply saying, 

are we going to throw a few cruise missiles or a shot across the 

bow, is the term that was used? That is not what we are looking 

at here. This could be a—are we saying this could be a sustained 

attack? And or is this a one—and, you know, without getting in or 

telegraphing, that is the concern. 

I will stop it there. I won’t ask you to answer that. But that is 

a concern that I think many should have. 

In this atmosphere, also, very quickly, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel, how we, after the initial gas attacks earlier in the 

year, we upped our ante to those that were fighting against Assad. 

Do we have—and, again, how much of that has actually got there? 

In a real short answer. How much of that equipment or assistance 

is actually making a difference? Because I think one of the SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:43 Mar 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\090413\82640 SHIRL
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ators and others have said we have not actually been able to get 

that equipment to them. 

Secretary KERRY. I think we have made a difference but not as 

much yet as we would like. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. But I don’t want to go into any other details 

here. 

Mr. COLLINS. I understand that, and I appreciate that. 

But in light of what we are doing here, I think it is very pertinent information. Because like I said, if we do this——

Secretary KERRY. Well, one of the reasons, if I can just tell you 

very quickly, it is because it wasn’t authorized——

Mr. COLLINS. I understand. 

Secretary KERRY. [continuing]. Until a couple months ago. 

Mr. COLLINS. I get that. 

Secretary KERRY. So we are just getting up on it. 

Mr. COLLINS. But if we were to do this, it goes back to the saying 

of a former Secretary, that if we break it, we own it. And this is 

a concern here. 

Also, I want to go back to something here that you said earlier——

Secretary KERRY. We didn’t break it. 

Mr. COLLINS. I understand. 

Secretary KERRY. It is broken. 

Mr. COLLINS. But if we shoot missiles in there, we are involving 

ourselves in degrading stock. 

One quick question. And I want to give you a chance to walk 

back something. And it disturbed me when you said it, and I think 

it was a misspeak, so I am going to give you a chance. Basically, 

you said, at this point in time, the reason we are acting now is the 

level of death or the level of carnage had risen to a level in which 

you felt like you needed to act. 

In my mind, what you just said a little while ago was that we 

had to have a lot of bodies to make a compelling case and that one 

didn’t matter. And I don’t believe that is what you meant. 

Secretary KERRY. No——

Mr. COLLINS. So I am going to give you a chance to walk that 

statement back. Because if we are truly doing this because of 

death, then one would matter, when he has been doing this for several months. 

Secretary KERRY. I appreciate it, Congressman. I don’t want to 

leave any misinterpretation with respect to that. 

In the first instances, we had a lot of difficulty getting a lock 

down on the level of intelligence that made everybody comfortable. 

And partly because it was a smaller event, you didn’t have the kind 

of evidence, there wasn’t the kind of immediacy, social media, other 

things that we have here, signatures, SIGINT, and so forth. We 

just didn’t have it. In this instance, we do, and it happens also to 

be an even more egregious event. 

But that is not—the body numbers aren’t the distinction. It is the 

level of the evidence, the quality, and the comfort level. And, at 

that point in time, the President, you know——

Mr. COLLINS. Right. 

75

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Didn’t want to rush into something. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I think these are the very things that caused 

my concern——

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mark Meadows of North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank each of you for your patience and your tenure here 

at this hearing. 

I want to ask you specifically and go into some of the questions 

with Hezbollah and let’s look at their involvement. 

If there was an attempt on their part to gain access or the intelligence to chemical weapons, under the authorization that the 

President seeks, would you see them as an acceptable target for 

having the ability to acquire that or the attempt to acquire that? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, again, I don’t want to get into targeting 

here. It is inappropriate, except to say to you the President’s——

Mr. MEADOWS. Would that be covered under his authorization? 

Secretary KERRY. No. The President’s authorization does not 

apply to Iran or Hezbollah or other entities. It is not entity-specific. 

It is with respect to the Assad regime’s capacity with respect to 

chemical weapons. And it is solely focused on the degrading and 

the preventing of the use by the Assad regime. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So are we actively engaged to make sure that 

Hezbollah is not gaining access to these chemical weapons to be 

used in another theater? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, General, do you want to——

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. We do know a little about that, whether 

they even want any part of chemical weapons and, if so, what 

might be the instrument. I can tell you our regional partners are 

very interested in that question. But it really would be classified. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So you are saying, then, if Syria transferred their chemical weapons to Iran, to a state-controlled entity, 

the receiving of those chemical weapons would not be one that 

would dictate action from us? 

Secretary KERRY. No, it is not. These are not externally focused 

at all, and I want to emphasize that. I will add that there is evidence that both Iran and Hezbollah have opposed the use of chemical weapons. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. 

So let me go on further, because I think, Secretary Kerry, your 

quote was, ‘‘Do we mean what we say?’’ And so I think that is a 

critical question today, because is this a new departure? Are we 

going to start a new foreign policy where we truly mean what we 

say? 

Because about 6 minutes into your testimony, you mentioned 

that there were 11 other events where gas or chemical weapons 

was used there in Syria, and yet we have done nothing. And so, 

when we start to look at that, is this a new day for foreign policy 

where we are going to start to say something and mean it and 

draw a red line that truly is a red line? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me say with respect to those other incidents, this is an intelligence community assessment——

Mr. MEADOWS. But this is not new intelligence. 

76

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no——

Mr. MEADOWS. I mean, we have known this——

Secretary KERRY. No, I know this. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. For many months. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, I know this, because I have been 

at the forefront. I was here——

Mr. MEADOWS. I have read your reports, yeah. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Arguing this and talking about it 

last year, too. 

The problem was, again, with many of those, the quality of the 

evidence, the level of the event, and people were uncomfortable 

with the notion that that, in fact—it called for action, but it didn’t 

necessarily rise to the level of what the President has decided——

Mr. MEADOWS. So what is that level? Is it 1,000 deaths? Is it——

Secretary KERRY. No, it is not based on deaths. It is based on, 

I think, an exhaustive——

Mr. MEADOWS. Because either a use requires action or it doesn’t. 

Secretary KERRY. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Either when they use——

Secretary KERRY. Well, I don’t know, what was the date when 

the President drew the red line publicly? I don’t recall that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, but it had been, you know——

Secretary KERRY. I think some of those events were prior to that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Sure. 

Secretary KERRY. And so I think there has been a steady effort——

Mr. MEADOWS. Because we go back all the way to August of last 

year. 

Secretary KERRY. And I think there was a steady effort by the 

administration and others to try to send messages, and they were 

sent very powerfully, I might add. Messages were sent to the Russians. They were sent directly through to Iranians. The messages 

were sent——

Mr. MEADOWS. But today we are talking about military action. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. In an effort to try to ratchet it 

down. 

Now I think there is a sense of those efforts all having been exhausted and this, therefore, being a remedy of last resort. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So when do we ultimately get—when can 

our enemies and our allies depend on us to take action when we 

have these kinds of things that happen? Because CIA reports——

Secretary KERRY. When the House of Representatives passes the 

President’s request for this resolution. 

Mr. MEADOWS. As it relates to Syria and everybody else? Because 

this is just Syria, but I am talking about internationally. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, internationally, Congressman, I think we 

have been proving our word good on everything the President has 

said he is going to do. He has drawn down in Iraq. He is drawing 

down in Afghanistan. We are working on a Middle East peace process. We have been involved with Egypt and many other countries. 

We are continuing to prosecute al-Qaeda in Yemen and elsewhere. 

We have decimated al-Qaeda in Pakistan. We are working on a bilateral security arrangement with Afghanistan. 

77

I mean, these are things that are all going on. And I think, you 

know, these broad, sweeping assessments don’t actually do justice 

to what is happening. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for enduring the length of time here. And 

I hope you men are men of prayer and that we seek guidance and 

wisdom as we work through this. 

And I agree with many of my colleagues that our foreign policy 

is confusing to the world, our allies, and to the American people. 

And that is why I think we are sitting here today. The primary role 

of the U.S. Government, according to our Constitution, is national 

security. I do not see a direct threat to the U.S. from the internal 

civil war in Syria, as deplorable as it is. 

You know, we have got 1,400 to 2,000 people killed by chemical 

weapons. I think that is despicable. But what about the 108,000 

that have been killed by conventional warfare? Is that not just as 

despicable? 

I cannot, I will not, nor shall not support intervention in this 

conflict. Our action would be one of attacking a sovereign nation, 

a nation that did not attack us, an act of war. And if we start war, 

we invite war, do we not? And I view this as unconstitutional, to 

attack a country that did not attack us. I and the people I represent said not just ‘‘no’’ but something like ‘‘heck, no,’’ don’t get 

involved in this. 

And the same thing I hear over and over here. The CWC agreement signed by 189 countries states that any country that produces, transports, stores, sells, or uses chemical weapons are in violation of that agreement. Who are those countries? You have North 

Korea, possibly Russia, as Secretary Hagel said, was supplying 

Syria with possible chemical weapons. Maybe Iran or China, the 

U.S. There are probably other countries. 

So if we act now against Syria, does that mean we act against 

other nations? And do we act in totality? And do we act now? You 

know, where does this stop? I mean, once you cross a red line—and 

this goes back to our confusing foreign policy. It was a red line; it 

wasn’t a red line. I just think we need clarity in this. 

And I want to know where the 188 countries are that signed the 

agreement, the U.N., the Arab League, and NATO demanding that 

we come to the table on one side and Mr. Assad on the other side. 

I implore you guys and the administration to find a diplomatic 

solution. Because all I have heard is military intervention. And I 

know you guys have talked about diplomatic solutions, but the 

clout of the United States and that we supply the majority of the 

foreign aid around the world, that we need to bring people and demand people come to the table. And this is a moment in time, in 

history, where we, America, can lead in a new direction, a direction 

where we can bring together a coalition of countries that the other 

188 that signed the CWC agreement and negotiate a political and 

diplomatic solution. It is a time for a new direction in our foreign 

policy, especially in the Middle East. And we can win this, and it 

can be done and won with diplomacy and not with guns and bombs. 

Senator Kerry, you said yesterday that you could not guarantee 

that U.S. troops would not be on the ground. 

78

Secretary KERRY. No, I did guarantee that they wouldn’t be, and 

I guaranteed it again today. 

Mr. YOHO. I have the transcripts right here, and——

Secretary KERRY. I think if you read the whole transcript, I said 

clearly there will be no troops on the ground. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, even if the weapons fell into the hands of 

the bad people? 

Secretary KERRY. There is nothing in this resolution——

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Whatsoever——

Mr. YOHO. All right. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. That would put troops on the 

ground. Nothing. 

Mr. YOHO. I just wanted clarity on that. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, you stated that we would need thousands of 

support troops on the ground, you didn’t say in Syria but close by. 

Where would they be? 

General DEMPSEY. Not related to this resolution. That is related 

to whether we took a decision to support the opposition. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Well, the way I read this briefing out of the 

CRS as of 2 days ago, it said in Syria, if we attack Syria. 

General DEMPSEY. No. No, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Do we have support and authorization from Turkey to use their 

air bases, or can that not be divulged? 

General DEMPSEY. That is something we should talk about in a 

classified setting. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

General DEMPSEY. Same with Jordan and other places. 

Mr. YOHO. Does the CWC or, according to you, Secretary Kerry, 

the world’s resolve or the international community, is there a doctrine that the U.S. should lead in moral conflicts like this? Why is 

it always America out front? I know we have the best military, and 

I am very proud of that. But why are we out leading this again? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me answer that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I have to take more than 40 seconds to do 

it, but it is a vital, vital question for Americans and for this issue. 

Congressman, I wish the world were a little more simple. I grew 

up in the cold war; I think all of us did. And it was pretty EastWest, communism, you know, the West. That is not the world we 

live in today. When the Berlin Wall fell, so did all of the things 

that tamped down a lot of sectarian, religious, and other kinds of 

conflict in the world. 

And the truth is, you know, we are 1 week away from 9/11 commemoration. Nine-eleven happened because there were ungoverned 

spaces in which people who wanted to fight the West, who are culturally and historically opposed to modernity wanted to attack us. 

And they did. 

And I think most people, in making judgments about how to keep 

our country safe, make the judgment that there are a lot of folks 

out there who are committed to violent acts against lots of different 

people because that is what they want to do. And we have to defend ourselves differently today and work to deal with these issues 

in a different way than we ever have before. 

79

Now, I would just say to you, you know, we do have direct interests in what is happening in Syria. There is a direct interest in our 

credibility with respect to this issue. And you asked the question, 

you know, why does the United States have to be out there? Well, 

because what our forebears and, you know, what those—have you 

ever been to the cemetery in France, you know, above those beaches? Why did those guys have to go do that? Because we were standing up with people for a set of values and fighting for freedom. 

And no country has liberated as much land or fought as many 

battles as the United States of America and turned around and 

given it back to the people who live there and who can own it and 

run it. We are the indispensable nation. This is because of who we 

are and what we have achieved, and we should be proud of it. And 

we have a great tradition to try to live up to, in terms of trying 

to help people to see a peaceful road, not a road of jihadism. 

A lot of people out in the Middle East count on us. Moderate 

Arab world, not religious extremists, they count on us to help them 

be able to be able to transition. That is part of what the Arab 

Spring is about. And it is not going to end quickly. It is not going 

to be over just like that. Our own struggle for freedom took a long 

time. 

So I think we have to have a longer view here. And I think we 

have to think about the ways in which we can protect ourselves. 

And I guarantee you, if we don’t stand up against chemical weapons in this instance, we are not serving our national security interests. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Luke Messer of Indiana. 

Mr. MESSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think someone has to 

go last today. That is me. I certainly thank my colleagues for sitting here on the front row with me. Thank the chairman for calling 

us all back to what I think is very important work. Thank you for 

your service and your stamina today as well. We are entering almost the fourth hour of this hearing. 

I appreciate and respect the President’s decision to bring this 

matter of authorization before Congress. I was one of a broad group 

of 150 folks that signed on to a letter that requested that. I appreciate the President heeding that request. I understand the legal arguments about whether or not it was necessary for him to do that. 

I would associate myself with Congressman Perry’s comments that 

that decision has now been made, and the President has brought 

this before Congress, and I believe it is very important that the 

President abide by that vote. 

I won’t revisit all the other questions that others have asked 

today. I will tell you that I make that comment as someone who, 

if I had to vote today on whether or not to authorize force against 

Syria under the circumstances presented before me, I would vote 

yes. I certainly believe it is a vote of conscience. I recognize that 

people of good conscience can come to different conclusions based 

on the facts. And there is no more somber responsibility for a Member of Congress than the decision about whether or not to send 

men and women into combat, because we all know what the inevitable result of that can be. 

The facts, as I see them, are that chemical weapons were used, 

innocent children were gassed. Clearly, our allies, like Israel, in the 

80

region believe action is needed. Clearly, evil dictators in Iran, 

North Korea, and elsewhere are watching. And undoubtedly, inaction will embolden them. 

I am no fan of this President’s foreign policy. Frankly, I believe 

that mismanagement in many instances over the course of the last 

several years have made the problems in Syria worse. 

But I want to make a point to all of you, and it may lead to a 

question, but it is just simply this: That that being my belief, the 

President, and the three of you as a team and others, have a lot 

of work to do to explain the necessity for this action with the American people. Much of what you say the American people understand. We are all aghast at the atrocities that occurred in Syria. 

America doesn’t like to watch bullies stand by and do evil things 

to their people. 

But the American people inherently understand, intuitively understand that there are high risks to action here, too. And if I were 

to make a suggestion, I think we have got a lot of work to do to 

help the American people understand why the risks of action are 

less than the risks of inaction. 

And the question I would ask is this: What more can be done to 

further communicate with the American people? For example, will 

the President make a speech from the Oval Office to the American 

people in one of the coming evenings? 

Secretary KERRY. I have no doubt the President will. 

Mr. MESSER. Thank you. I have no further questions. 

Chairman ROYCE. A minute remaining. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think for all of us, we 

just want to thank you. We want to thank, again, the colleagues 

for taking the time to come back. It is serious. We are not going 

to disagree with you that we don’t need to take advantage of these 

next days to communicate to our fellow Americans about why this 

is so critical. 

I would just leave you with this. You know, I think, look, General 

Dempsey and I could—you know, he is correct when he says something technically may be an act of war, and I understand what he 

is saying, but I don’t believe we are going to war. I just don’t believe that. Going to war is mobilizing a force, asking people to join 

up, fighting a long campaign, committing your troops on the 

ground, fighting to win, and so forth. That is not what we are doing 

here. 

We are asking for permission, the President is asking for permission to take a limited military action, yes, but one that does not 

put Americans in the middle of the battle, no boots will be on the 

ground, whereby we enforce a standard of behavior that is critical 

to our troops, critical to our country, critical to the world. 

And most importantly, I mean, if you look at what the option is, 

if you don’t want more extremism, then you should vote for this, 

because to not vote for it is to guarantee a continuation of this kind 

of struggle that will encourage extremists, that will even encourage 

some friends of ours to support them in order to achieve their goal 

of removing Assad. And that will make that region far, far more 

dangerous, it will increase the humanitarian crisis, you will see 

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larly, who are reeling under that pressure today, and more threat 

to Israel in the process, more threat to Lebanon in the process. 

So I would simply urge, you know, do not send a message to 

somebody like Bashar al-Assad that he will have impunity now because the one country that can lead this effort, that is the indispensable Nation, is going to walk away from its responsibility. And I 

think the American people know when you say, do you want to go 

to war in Syria, no, of course. It should be 100 percent. We don’t 

want to go to war in Syria. We are not going to war in Syria. We 

are taking an action that is in our interest, in our national security 

interest in order to enforce a longtime standard. And if that is not 

enforced, the world will be less safe, and our citizens, no matter 

where you live in this country, will be less safe because the likelihood is greater that somebody, somewhere, will get their hands on 

those materials as a result of our inaction. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. And on behalf 

of the committee, I want to take the opportunity to thank all three 

of you for what has been a long, but productive, and I think certainly a necessary hearing here today before the House. And I 

would ask also that the State and Defense Departments be prepared to respond promptly to the requests from the committee, requests from our members as they continue to weigh this weighty 

decision whether to authorize the use of military force against 

Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons. 

This hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(83)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

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Æ


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