J-S53009-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTOINE JAMES MABLE,

Appellant No. 3211 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000723-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 01, 2018

Appellant, Antoine James Mable, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of 30-60 months’ incarceration, imposed following his 

conviction for promoting prostitution, conspiracy to promote prostitution, and 

transporting a prostitute. After careful review, we affirm on the basis set forth 

in the trial court’s opinion. 

The trial court set forth a summary of the facts adduced at trial in its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/19/17, at 11-

13. Briefly, the Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated that Appellant and 

his codefendant coaxed the victim to travel from Scranton to Monroe County, 

promising her protection in exchange for a share of her earnings as a 

prostitute. The codefendant then transported the victim from Scranton to 

Monroe County, picking up Appellant along the way. When the trio arrived at 
J-S53009-17

- 2 -

a trailer home in Monroe County, the victim began to express reservations 

about the arrangement. In response, Appellant and the codefendant abused 

the victim, and detained her against her will overnight. The Commonwealth 

presented expert testimony that Appellant and his codefendant were members 

of a gang known for engaging in human trafficking for the purposes of 

prostitution. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with rape, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121; 

conspiracy (promoting prostitution), 18 Pa.C.S. § 903; involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121; aggravated indecent assault, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3125; promoting prostitution (encouragement), 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5902(b)(3); unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902; indecent assault, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3126; and promoting prostitution (transportation), 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5902(b)(6). On March 9, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of all the 

prostitution-related offenses (conspiracy, encouraging prostitution, and 

transporting a prostitute), but “was hopelessly deadlocked on the remaining 

charges[,]” leading the trial court to declare a mistrial with respect to the 

remaining counts. Post-Sentence Motion Opinion, 9/19/16, at 1. On May 23, 

2016, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of 15-30 months’ 

incarceration for conspiracy and encouraging prostitution, and to a concurrent 

term of 6-12 months’ incarceration for transporting a prostitute. On June 2, 

2016, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The trial court held a 

post-sentence motion hearing on July 13, 2016. The trial court ultimately 

denied the motion in an opinion and order dated September 19, 2016.
J-S53009-17

- 3 -

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely, court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. However, it appeared to this Court that the trial 

court issued neither a Rule 1925(a) opinion, nor a statement in lieu thereof, 

in response to Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement; accordingly, this Court 

remanded for the trial court to issue its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion by 

Judgment Order dated October 10, 2017.

1

 The trial court complied, filing its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 19, 2017. Accordingly, this appeal is now 

ripe for our review. 

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the Commonwealth should have been precluded 

from relying on expert testimony regarding gang affiliation, 

any reference to gang affiliation and/or activity and 

statements made by [Appellant] regarding said affiliation[?] 

Further, testimony from a “gang expert” and any mention 

of gang affiliation by any witness is irrelevant, more 

prejudicial than probative, and inherently inadmissible 

pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b).

II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant]’s omnibus 

pretrial motion seeking, inter alia, to preclude the 

conclusory term of “victim” when referencing the 

complaining witness[?]

III. Whether Appellant[’]s convictions are contrary to the weight 

and sufficiency of the evidence presented where the 

Commonwealth’s complaining witness testified in an 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court claims it issued a Rule 1925(a) statement on November 10, 

2016. For whatever reason, that statement, if it exists, was not available to 

this Court at the time we remanded this matter, although the trial court docket 

does reflect that such a statement was filed. How, why, or where a breakdown 

in inter-court communication occurred is now a moot point, as the trial court 

has provided this Court with a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
J-S53009-17

- 4 -

inconsistent manner and there was insufficient evidence 

presented that [Appellant] was involved in a conspiracy to 

commit or engaged in any overt act to promote 

prostitution[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 10. 

After a thorough review of the record, Appellant’s brief,

2

the applicable 

law, and the comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we 

conclude that there is no merit to Appellant’s claims on appeal, and do so 

based on the reasons set forth in that opinion. See TCO at 3-9 (rejecting

Appellant’s first claim, concerning the court’s decision to permit expert 

testimony regarding his gang affiliation); at 9-10 (rejecting Appellant’s second 

claim, regarding the Commonwealth’s use of the term “victim” during his 

trial); at 10-17 (rejecting Appellant’s third claim, as it pertains to the 

sufficiency of the evidence); at 17-18 (concluding that Appellant’s third claim, 

as it pertains to the weight-of-the-evidence, has been waived due to his failure 

to raise it before the trial court). 

Judgement of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/1/18

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth did not file a brief in this matter. 
Circulated 01/17/2018 11:59 AM

Mable, 723 CR 2015 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

COMivIONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

ANTOINE JAMES MABLE, 

Defendant 

723 CR2015 

3211 EDA 2016 

APPEAL 

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) 

We submit this second l.925(a) statement in response to the Superior Court's request that 

we address issues raised by Antoine James Mable (hereinafter "Appellant") in his brief. The 

issues come before the Court on Appellant's appeal of his judgment of sentence. The factual and 

procedural history of this case is as follows: 

On March 9, 2016, after trial by jury, Appellant was convicted of two counts of 

Promoting Prostitution and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Promoting Prostitution in 

relation to the transportation of Jessica Kishbaugh to Monroe County for the purposes of 

becoming a prostitute. The jury was hopelessly deadlocked on the remaining charges and this 

Court declared a mistrial on those charges for manifest necessity. 

1 The Commonwealth has not 

pursued further prosecution or otherwise disposed of those charges. 

A PSI was prepared and on May 23, 2016, this Court sentenced Defendant to 15 to 30 

months incarceration for the Conspiracy charge, 15 to 30 months incarceration for the felony 

Promoting Prostitution charge, and 6 to 12 months incarceration for the misdemeanor Promoting 

I The jury was hung on the following charges: Rape--Threat by Forcible Compulsion, Involuntary Deviate Sexual 

Intercourse-Forcible Compulsion, Aggravated Indecent Assault-Without Consent, Unlawful Restraint, and 

Indecent Assault-Without Consent. 

1 
\'· 

/· 

Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Prostitution charge. The sentences on Conspiracy and felony Promoting Prostitution were 

ordered to run consecutively while the misdemeanor Promoting Prostitution was ordered to run 

concurrently, giving Defendant a total aggregate sentence of 30 to 60 months incarceration. 

Defendant received a time credit of 417 days. 

On June 2, 2016; Defendant filed post-sentence motions which were denied by Opinion 

and Order dated September 19, 2016. On October 17, 2016, Appellant filed his timely Notice of 

Appeal. We received Appellant's timely concise statement on November 8, 2016. In his concise 

statement, Appellant raised the following issues on appeal: ( 1) whether this Court erred in 

denying Appellant's Motion in Limine regarding gang affiliation; (2) whether this Court erred in 

denying Appellant's pre-trial motions regarding gang expert testimony, a psychological or 

psychiatric examination of the complaining witness, and preclusion of the Commonwealth's use 

of the term "victim;" (3) whether this Court erred in denying Appellant's post-sentence motions 

regarding his sentence; and (4) whether this Court erred in denying Appellant's post-sentence 

motion regarding sufficiency of the evidence. 

On November 10, 2016 We issued a 1925(a) statement addressing all issues raised by 

Appellant in his l 925(b) statement. On October 11, 2017 the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

remanded for this court to file another l 925(a) statenent. The Superior Court requested we 

specifically address "claims as set forth in Appellant's brief." Com. v. Mable, 3211 EDA 2016, 

2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). However, under the rule announced in Com. v. Lord, when a notice 

of appeal is filed and the trial court orders the Appellant to file a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in the 1925(b) 

statement will be deemed waived. Therefore any issues raised in a brief and not defendant's 

1925(b) are waived and would not be addressed in this Court's statement. 

2 
) 

Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Nevertheless, the Superior Court has asked us to address three specific claims: 

I) Whether the Commonwealth should have been precluded from relying on 

expert testimony regarding gang affiliation, any reference to gang affiliation 

and/or activity and statements made by [appellant] regarding said affiliation? 

Further, testimony from a "gang expert" and any mention of gang affiliation by 

any witness is irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and inherently 

inadmissible pursuant to Pa.RE. 404(b); 

2) Did the trial court ell' in denying Appellant's omnibus pretrial motion seeking, 

inter alia, to preclude the conclusory term of "victim" when referencing the 

complaining witness; 

3) Whether Appellant's conviction is contrary to the weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence presented where the Commonwealth's complaining witness testified in 

an inconsistent manner and there was insufficient evidence presented that 

Appellant was involved in a conspiracy to commit or engage in any overt act to 

promote prostitution. 

Com. v. Mable, 3211 EDA 2016, 2-3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 

We have previously addressed all of the issues requested by Opinion and Order. We 

addressed Appellant's first and second issue in our Omnibus Opinion and Order dated2 August 

26, 2015 page 18-24.

3 Similarly, we addressed Appell�t's third issue in our Opinion and Order 

dated September 19, 2016 page 3-10 deciding appellants post-sentence motions. See both 

opinions attached hereto. 

However, in order to stem any further confusion, We will address those issues again, 

below: 

J. Request to bar expert testimony 011 gangs, in particular the Black Is-Stones 

Appellant asked this Court to bar the testimony of an expert on gangs. First, Appellant 

2 We note that the Order for our Omnibus Opinion is dated August 2, 2015, however, the docket reflects that it was 

filed August 26, 2015. We are unaware of the source of this discrepancy, however, we will hereinafter refer to this 

Opinion and Order by its docketing date for ease of reference. 

3 We further note that Appellant's first issue concerns his Motion in Limine regarding gang affiliation, however, in 

our Order dated December 4, 20 I 5, denying said motion, we relied on our reasoning in our Omnibus Opinion and 

Order dated August 26, 2015, and continue to do so. Again, we note the August 2/August 26 dating discrepancy 

with regard to our reference in the December 4, 2015, Order. 

3 
,,' 

Mable. 723 CR 2015 

argued that such testimony is irrelevant, particularly in his case, because there is no evidence in 

discovery that he is a part of the Black P-Stones. Appellant also posits that even if expert 

testimony on gangs is relevant, it is highly prejudicial and its admission would violate 

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. Appellant also states that an expert on gang 

activity would not be allowed under Rule 702 because gangs are not outside the knowledge of 

the average lay person. 

The Commonwealth responded that its proposed gang expert, Trooper William Patton, 

met the qualifications under Rule 702. Furthermore, the Commonwealth argued that testimony 

on gang activity is highly relevant because of the original conspiracy charges. Lastly, the 

Commonwealth agreed that Appellant should have known evidence of gang activity would be at 

issue because the affidavit of probable cause contains Appellant's street name. 

The Appellant identified three issues regarding evidence of gang activity: the relevance 

of evidence of Appellant's alleged gang affiliation, the admissibility of such evidence on grounds 

of prejudice and Rule 404(b), and the admissibility of Trooper Patton's proposed testimony as an 

expert on gangs. Because relevance is a threshold determination, we will address that issue first. 

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that 

is not relevant is not admissible." Pa.R.E. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that 

"has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . 

and . . the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. The admissibility of 

evidence on relevance grounds is a threshold determination. Com. v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 602 

(Pa. 2008). Furthermore, admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Com. v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa. 2005). 

The main argument Appellant advanced with regard to relevance is that, at that time, he 

4 
,. Mable, 723 CR 2015 

had not been charged with crimes that had anything to do with gang activity. Appellant argued 

that the Commonwealth's theory that these charges were indicative of a larger scheme among the 

gang to traffic humans, was not relevant to the events as charged. Appellant had only been 

charged with sexual assault crimes at that time and, according to Appellant, none of the charges 

reflected the Commonwealth's theory of human trafficking. 

Subsequently, Appellant's Criminal Information was amended to include two counts of 

Promoting Prostitution and one count each of Conspiracy. Proof of Promoting Prostitution under 

subsection (b)(3) requires a showing that a person "encouragejed], induc[ed], or otherwise 

intentionally caus] ed] another to become or remain a prostitute." 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5902(b )(3). 

Under subsection (b)(6), the Commonwealth must prove a person "transport[ed] a person into or 

'I 

within this Commonwealth with intent to promote the engaging in prostitution by that person, or 

procur[ed] or pay[ecl] for transportation with that intent." § 5902(b)(6). Proof of Conspiracy 

under subsection (a)(I) requires a showing that a person intends to promote or facilitate the 

commission of a crime and "agrees with [ another] person or persons that they or one or more of 

them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit 

such crime." § 903(a)(l). Appellant's gang involvement made it more probable that he 

conspired to promote another to engage in prostitution and transported that person with the intent 

to promote prostitution than if they had only done these things of their own accord. See Com. v. 

Gwalh1ey, 422 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982) (holding trial court did not err in admitting gang 

affiliation evidence because such activity was relevant to the charge of conspiracy). Thus, 

evidence of gang involvement is relevant. 

Appellant argued that ifwe found the gang evidence relevant, then the admission of such 

evidence would be unfairly prejudicial and thus violate Pa.R.E. 403. The Commonwealth did 

5 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

not address prejudice but did relate that to suppress evidence of gang activity "would be to 

severely hamper the prosecution and to take away from the jury the ability to view all the 

evidence an<l weigh[} the credibility of each witness as to the Defendants' role in the events of 

that evening." Commonwealth's Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Omnibus Pretrial Mots., p. 19. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 mandates that a court must "exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of . . unfair prejudice." Pa.R.E. 403. 

Unfair prejudice is defined as "a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert 

the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially." Rule 403, cmt. 

All evidence against a defendant in a criminal case will be prejudicial. Com. v. Peer, 684 A.2d 

1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 1996). Our determination must be whether evidence is unfairly 

prejudicial. Id.; see also Rule 403. While the trial court must exclude relevant but unfairly 

prejudicial evidence, we are "not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts 

from the jury's consideration where those facts form part of the history and natural development 

of the events and offenses with which (a] defendant is charged." Com. v. Owens, 929 A.2d 

1187, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotation omitted). In order for it to be excluded, relevant 

evidence must be "so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon 

something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case." Id. (quotation omitted). 

Additionally, the Supreme Court has instructed "that Rule 403 is a trial-oriented rule" and that 

pre-trial rulings weighing probative value and prejudice are best decided at trial, not pretrial. 

Com. v. Hicks, 91 A.3d 47, 53 (Pa. 2014). 

There is evidence that Appellant was associated with the Black P-Stones gang. There is 

also evidence that one of the criminal enterprises of this gang is promoting prostitution. 

Appellant's affiliation with a gang that is known to engage in the crimes for which he has been 

6 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

charged is highly probative to the case at bar, Such evidence "forms part of the history and 

natural development of the events and offenses" at issue. Furthermore, the Superior Court has 

commented that a jury can be instructed not to assume guilt simply because of gang affiliation .. 

See Com. v. Whitfield, 419 A.2d 27, 29 (Pa. Super. 1980). Based on the information available to 

us, we found that evidence of gang affiliation was more probative than prejudicial. 

Appellant also argued that evidence of gang affiliation would violate Pa.RE. 404(b) in 

that gang affiliation would be an inadmissible "prior bad act." The Commonwealth argues that 

evidence of gang activity is relevant to Appellant's plans as they relate to the charge of 

Conspiracy. 

4 

Pennsylvania Ru1e of Evidence 404(b) prohibits admitting evidence of a prior "crime, 

wrong, or other act" when such evidence is admitted to "show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character" required to commit such crime, wrong, or other 

act. Pa.RE. 404(b)(l). Such evidence may be admitted to show "motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Rule 404(b )(2 ). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that admission of gang affiliation is proper when the 

Commonwealth alleges conspiracy as such evidence is highly probative of the crime of 

conspiracy and goes to prove "motive, intent, plan, design," ill will or malice." Gwaltney, 442 

A.2d at 241. 

Here, Appellant was charged with Conspiracy and Promoting Prostitution. The 

Commonwealth alleges that part of the conspiracy entails Appellant's involvement with the 

Black P�Stones and the gang's activities regarding prostitution. While evidence of gang 

4 The Commonwealth also stated that Com. v. Fragassa, 122 A. 88 (Pa. 1923 ), allows the introduction of evidence of 

gang membership. Since Appellant did not challenge this evidence on the grounds relevant in Fragassa, see 

Fragassa, 122 A. at 89 (holding that a defendant's membership in a society is assumed to continue unless proven 

otherwise), and because we find such evidence is admissible on other grounds, we did not further address this 

argument. 

7 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

affiliation may be considered a prior bad act, such evidence was not being offered to show 

Appellant acted in accordance with the character associated with gang members. Instead, such 

evidence is highly probative of the Appellant's Conspiracy charges, motive, and his intent and 

plans to commit crimes involving prostitution. Thus, evidence of gang affiliation is admissible 

under Rule 404(b ). 

Having found that evidence of gang affiliation is properly admissible in this case, we turn 

to Trooper Patton and his proposed expert testimony. Appellant's only argument with regard to 

the admissibility of Trooper Patton's testimony under Rule 702 is that gang activity is not 

outside the knowledge of the average layperson. The Commonwealth responds that Trooper 

Patton's expertise and knowledge regarding gangs, in particular the Black P-Stones, is well 

beyond the knowledge of an average layperson and that Trooper Patton meets all the criteria 

under Rule 702 to testify as an expert. 

Rule 702 states that a qualified expert may testify if the expert's specialized knowledge 

"is beyond that possessed by the average layperson." Pa.R.E. 702(a). Appellant cites to Burton 

v. Hom & Harda1i Bakinll Co., 88 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1952) for the contention that "[e]xpert 

testimony is inadmissible when the matter can be described to the jury and the condition 

evaluated by them without the assistance of one claiming to possess special knowledge upon the 

subject." Id. at 875. Appellant further cites Dooner v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 30 A. 269 (Pa. 

1894): "The jury still have [sic] some duties to perform. Inferences drawn from the ordinary 

affairs of life ought not to be drawn for them, and turned over under oath from the witness 

stand." Id. at 271-72. 

Burton and Dooner was analyzed in the criminal context by the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court in Com. v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1986). In Seese, the Supreme Court held the trial 

8 
e. 

Mable, 723 CR 2015 

court erred when it admitted expert testimony on the credibility of children witnesses. Id. at 922. 

The Court held that verac�ty is not a subject "beyond the facility of the ordinary juror." Id. 

However, in the present case, Trooper Patton testified to the inner workings of a complex 

criminal organization. His professional experience as a police officer and member of various 

gang task forces as well as his numerous trainings on gang-related subjects shows that the 

knowledge he possess about gangs would be far beyond that of the average layperson. 

Inferences regarding gang activity are simply not "drawn from the ordinary affairs of life." 

Thus, Trooper Patton possessed specialized knowledge that is beyond that possessed by the 

average layperson and is able to testify as an expert under Rule 702. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' request to bar expert testimony on gangs, in 

particular the Black P-Stones, was denied. 

2. Request to preclude references to "gangs" or "gang activity" 

As we have found evidence of gang activity to be relevant and admissible Defendants, 

request to preclude any references to "gangs" or "gang activity" was denied. 

3. Request to bar lite use of the term "victim" 

Appellant asked this Court to bar the Commonwealth and its witnesses from using the 

term "victim" to describe Ms. Kishbaugh as it is conclusory and assumes a crime has been 

committed. It is well-established in Pennsylvania "that attorneys' statements or questions at trial 

are not evidence." Com. v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385, 413 (Pa. 2003). Furthermore, "[a]n opinion 

[from a witness) is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue." Pa.RE. 704. 

We understand that Appellant argues the term "victim" has been barred in other jurisdictions, 

however, use of the term "victim" in a criminal case in Pennsylvania is not objectionable. 

5 Thus, 

5 A trial court's use of language such as "victim" is not reversible error unless the contested language unduly 

prejudiced the defendant. Com. v. Parente, 440 A.2d 549, 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding trial court's use of 

9 
<· Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Appe1lant's Motion was denied. 

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Appellant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient for the jury to find 

him guilty of Promoting Prostitution because there was no evidence presented that Appellant was 

"engaged in the business of prostitution." Def. 's Br., p. 4. Similarly, Appellant argues that there 

was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of Conspiracy because the Commonwealth presented 

no evidence that Appellant entered into an agreement with Co-Defendant Klement, or any other 

person, to transport Ms. Kishbaugh to Monroe County for the purposes of promoting her 

prostitution. Def.'s Br., p. 9. 

The Commonwealth, having failed to file a brief or make argument at that hearing, had 

no response. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence, 

and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports the jury's finding of all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1130 (Pa. 2007); Com. 

v. Spotz, 759 A.2<l l 280, 1283 (Pa. 2000). "This standard is equally applicable to cases where 

the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links 

the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Com. v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (quoting Com. v. Sanders, 627 A.2d 183, 185 (Pa. Super. 1993)). Moreover, the 

facts and circumstances need not be absolutely incompatible with the Appellant's innocence. 

See Com. v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 539 (Pa. Super. 1995). The question of any doubt is 

word "victim" during trial was not so prejudicial to defendant as to warrant new trial). Any prejudice that might 

arise from the use of"victim" language is insignificant when the court gives jury instructions on the defendant's 

presumption of innocence, the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and the court's general role as impartial arbitrator. 

Id. 

10 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

for the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See id. 

To be found guilty of Promoting Prostitution under subsection (b)(3)� the Commonwealth 

had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant encouraged, induced, or otherwise 

intentionally caused another to become or remain a prostitute. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5902(b)(3). 

Similarly, to be found guilty of Promoting Prostitution under subsection (b)(6), the 

Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant transported a person into 

or within the Commonwealth with the intent to promote the engaging in prostitution by that 

person, or procuring or paying for transportation with that intent. § 5902(b)(6). 

The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

establishes the following: 

In June of 2014, Appellant and Co-Defendant Klement contacted Ms. Kishbaugh, asking 

if she would like to make money as a prostitute in Monroe County. Notes of Testimony, Jury 

Trial 3/7/16, pp. 54-56 [hereinafter ''N.T., Day I, p. _."). Over the course of several 

conversations with Appellant and Co-Defendant Klement, Ms. Kishbaugh was informed that the 

two men would be her pimps and that they would pick her up from Scranton and transport her to 

Monroe County. N.T., Day 1, pp. 56-58. Additionally, Ms. Kishbaugh understood that as part 

of this arrangement, Appellant and Co-Defendant Klement would protect her in exchange for 

half of the money she made as a prostitute. N.T., Day 1, pp. 58-59. Ms. Kishbaugh agreed to 

this arrangement and Co-Defendant Klement picked Ms. Kishbaugh up from her home in 

Scranton on June 24, 2014. N.T., Day 1, pp. 59, 69-70. On the way from Scranton to Monroe 

County, Co-Defendant Klement also picked up Appellant, and the group went to a trailer home.

6 

6 Through testimony other than Ms. Kishbaugh's, the Commonwealth presented evidence that this trailer home was 

in Polk Township, Monroe County, See N.T., Day 1, pp. 153, 155-160. 

11 

L. 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

N.T., Day 1, p. 60. While at this home, Appellant and Co-Defendant Klement sexually assaulted 

Ms. Kishbaugh.

7 N.T., Day 1, pp. 65-69, 77-79. Co-Defendant Klement forced Ms. Kishbaugh 

to perform oral sex on him and Appellant forced Ms. Kishbaugh to receive oral sex from him and 

to have vaginal sex with him. N.T., Day 1, pp. 65-69, 77-79. These assaults were in response 

to Ms. Kishbaugh changing her mind about the arrangement, making Appellant angry that he had 

put time and effort in to bringing Ms. Kishbaugh to Monroe County to make money as a 

prostitute. See N.T., Day 1, p. 65. 

Through the night of the 24th and into the morning of the 25th, Appellant and CoDefendant Klement did not permit Ms, Kishbaugh to leave the trailer home, despite her 

continued insistence that she had changed her mind. N.T., Day 1, pp. 70-74. Appellant and CoDefendant Klement hit Ms. Kishbaugh and restricted access to her cell phone in attempts to 

make her stay in the home. N.T., Day 1, pp. 73-74. Finally, Trooper William Patton testified as 

a gang expert, presenting evidence that Appellant and Co-Defendant Klement were members of a 

gang, 

the Black P-Stones, that participated in an activity known as "gorilla pimping," wherein 

young, impressionable girls would be lured into prostitution by gang members and not permitted 

to leave either by force, threat of force, or promise of drugs, while the gang members earned 

money, through the girls' prostitution, for the gang. 

8 Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial 3/8/16, pp. 

7 We understand that the jury did not find Appellant guilty of the alleged sexual assaults, however, in viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth on the charges the jury did find beyond a reasonable 

doubt, we do not decide the issue of Ms. Kishbaugh's credibility and consider the sexual activity as forced, per her 

testimony. See Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d at 539. ("It is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced." (quotation omitted)). 

8 Appellant avers in his brief that the jury rendered guilty verdicts solely on the basis of Trooper Patton's testimony 

regarding Defendant's gang activity. Def. 's Br., p. 6. We are cognizant that this evidence cannot form the basis of a 

guilty verdict on the grounds that Defendant has the propensity to commit crime, as such a conclusion would be 

against the Rules of Evidence. See Pa.R.E. 404(b). However, as we stated in our Omnibus Opinion in this case, such 

evidence can be used to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident." Omnibus Opinion, 8/26/15, p. 22 (quoting Rule 404(b)(2)). Furthermore, the jury was 

instructed to view such evidence only in this limited manner during the jury charge. Notes of Testimony, 3/9/16, pp. 

82-83 [hereinafter "N.T., Day 3, p. _."]. We presume the jury followed our instrnctions, see Corn. v. Jones, 668 

A.2d 49 J, 503--04 (Pn. 1995), and we now view the evidence of Appellant's gang membership in the same way. 

12 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

105-06, 112-13 [hereinafter "N.T., Day 2, p. �·"]. 

The above evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant committed both charges of Promoting 

Prostitution. Appellant's knowledge of and involvement in transporting Ms. Kishbaugh to the 

trailer home where she was subsequently forced to stay and perform sexual acts is sufficient to 

support such a conviction and is not so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See Crnz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 

al 539. These convictions are further supported by the evidence of Appellant's gang 

membership in that his actions in promoting Ms. Kishbaugh's prostitution were motivated by 

such membership, thereby also indicating his intent to engage in such promotion, his lack of 

mistake in doing so, and his knowledge that such promotion was occurring. We are satisfied that 

the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of both counts of Promoting Prostitution.9 

We further find the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of Conspiracy to commit 

Promoting Prostitution. "A conviction for criminal conspiracy is sustained where the 

Commonwealth establishes that the defendant entered an agreement to commit or aid in an 

unlawful act with another person or persons with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was 

done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Com. v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citing 18 Pa. C.S,A. § 903). In this case, Appellant was charged with Conspiracy, 

generally, but the jury found him guilty only of Conspiracy to commit Promoting Prostitution. 

Thus, the only agreement we need to consider would be an agreement between Appellant and 

another person to commit the crime of Promoting Prostitution. 

� Additionally, although Appellant did not physically drive the vehicle that transported Ms. Kishbaugh, he can still 

be guilty of the misdemeanor Promoting Prostitution charge through accomplice liability. See Com. v. Lambert, 795 

A.2d IO JO, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002). However, in any event, Appellant's individual participation in arranging for Ms. 

Kishbaugh's transportation, for the purposes of prostitution, makes him guilty of Promoting Prostitution. See 18 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 5902(b)(6). 

13 
'Mable, 723 CR 2015 

When presenting evidence to show a defendant made a criminal agreement with another, 

the Commonwealth will typically not have direct evidence of such agreement, and thus, H[a] 

conspiracy is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence." Id. The Superior Court 

has established four factors for courts to consider when deciding whether the evidence 

establishes that a conspiratorial agreement was formed: "(I) an association between alleged 

conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the 

crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy." Id. (quoting 

Com. v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072, 1075 (Pa. Super. 1983)). "The presence of such circumstances 

may furnish a web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable 

doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred." 

Id. Additionally, "[o'[nce there is evidence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. 

In the present case, the evidence presented showed "an association between alleged 

conspirators." Not only did co-defendant Klement pick up and drive Appellant to the trailer 

home, N.T., Day l, pp. 69-70, but the two had gone to the same high school> N.T., Day 1, p. 52, 

82, seemed to live in the same home, N.T., Day 1, p. 75, and were known to be members of the 

same gang. N.T., Day 1, p. 83. Furthermore, both Appellant and co-defendant Klement had 

been in contact with Ms. Kishbaugh about the same plan to bring her to Monroe County for 

prostitution. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-56. The evidence also showed Appellant had "knowledge of 

the commission of the crime." Appellant was involved in the initial communications with Ms. 

Kishbaugh and explained his role as a pimp. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-59. Indeed, in his brief, 

Appellant emphasizes that Ms. Kishbaugh was clear that her intentions upon arrival in Monroe 

County were to become a prostitute, Def.'s Br., p. 7, and Ms. Kishbaugh candidly testified to the 

14 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

same at trial. N.T., Day 1, pp. 57-58. Further, the evidence at trial clearly established, and 

Appellant does not deny, see Def.'s Br., pp. 8-10, his "presence at the scene of the crime." 

Lastly, the evidence showed Appellant's "participation in the object of the conspiracy." By 

arranging for transportation, not allowing Ms. Kishbaugh to leave, and forcing her to perform 

sexual acts, with the ultimate goal that she become a prostitute, Appellant participated in the 

conspiracy to promote Ms. Kishbaugh's prostitution. 

We understand that Appellant emphatically argues "mere presence at the scene of an 

incident involving purported criminal activity is insufficient to demonstrate an individual's 

guilt." Def.'s Br., p. 10. While we agree with that statement generally, see Lambert, 795 A.2d at 

I 016, the evidence in Appellant's case, as discussed above, shows much more than his "mere 

presence." The case Appellant cites to support this argument, Com. v. Mills, 478 A.2d 30 (Pa. 

Super. 1984), is readily distinguishable. 

In Mills, the defendant was charged with conspiring with his co-defendant, William Gola, 

to sell methamphetamine to a Confidential Informant (''CI") and an undercover agent from the 

Bureau of Narcotics Investigation ("agent"). Mills, 478 A.2d at 31. When Mills arrived at 

Gola's apartment, the CI and agent were already there and had spoken with Gola about procuring 

methamphetamine from a man named "Karl." Id. When "Karl" could not be reached, Mills 

offered to sell the two men methamphetamine from the shipment he was to receive later that 

evening, but the offer was declined and the CI and agent returned to their car. Id. at 32. At the 

agent's request, the CI reentered Gola's apartment and asked him to come to the car. Id. When 

Gola came outside, Mills came with him and the four men proceeded to drive around looking for 

"Karl" and a quantity of methamphetamine, Id. No drugs or money were exchanged, however, 

Mills and Gola were both charged with Conspiracy approximately one month later. Id. at 31-32. 

15 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

The Superior Court found that Mills could not be found guilty of Conspiracy because 

"the Commonwealth's evidence, direct and circumstantial, failed to prove the existence of a 

conspiracy between (Mills] and Gola." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The Superior Court noted 

that the evidence showed Mills was aware the Cl and agent were seeking methamphetamine and 

that Mills was willing to independently sell- this substance to them. Id. However, the Court 

could not conclude from the evidence before it that Mills and Gola had formed an agreement to 

sell the methamphetamine together or were working to accomplish that conunon goal. Id. The 

Court also noted that there was no evidence of prior dealings between Mills and the CI, no 

statements from Mills or Gola that they were, or had ever, worked together, and no evidence that 

Mills would participate or profit from the transaction between Gola and the CI and agent. Id. 

Appellant's case is distinguishable. While there may not have been direct evidence of 

statements indicating Appellant and co-defendant Klement were working together to accomplish 

a common, criminal goal, the circumstantial evidence indicates that these two men had an 

agreement. Appellant and co-defendant Klement were members of the same gang and engaged 

together in activity that correlated with the gang's methods of "gorilla pimping." See N.T., Day 

1, pp. 54-59; N.T., Day 2, pp. 105-06, 112-13. Both Appellant and co-defendant Klement were 

in contact with Ms. Kishbaugh to settle details of the arrangement. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-56. 

Both men reassured Ms. Kishbaugh that they would protect her and expect a cut of her profits in 

return. N.T., Day I, p. 58-59. Finally, both men accompanied Ms. Kighbaugh to the trailer 

home where she was subsequently assaulted and kept from leaving. N.T., Day I, pp. 59-60, 67. 

In Mills, there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that showed any connection between 

Mills and Gola. Mills, 478 A.2d at 33. Where the Superior Court in Mills faced a record devoid 

of connection between co-defendants, we face a very different scenario here. Thus, Mills is 

16 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

distinguishable and Appellant's argument in reliance thereon fails. 

Appellant also alleges the Commonwealth cannot rely on his "purported gang affiliation" 

to establish the existence of an agreement sufficient to support a conviction for Conspiracy. 

Def. 's Br., p. 11.

10 However, this argument has no merit as the four factors in Lambert were 

supported by independent, non-gang related evidence, which we have discussed above, at length. 

See Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016. Despite Appellant's insistence, evidence of his gang affiliation 

was not the only evidence presented against him. 

For the reasons stated above, Appellant's Motion for a New Trial or Jud�ment of 

Acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence was denied. 

5. Weight of the Evidence 

Finally, the Superior Court specifically requested we address Appellant's weight-of-theevidence claim.

11 This Court, however, was unaware of any weight-of-the-evidence claim on the 

part of the Appellant. "A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence must be 

raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial by one of the following: orally, on the 

record, at any time before sentencing, by written motion at any time before sentencing, in a postsentence motion." Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 (A). At no time did Appellant raise a weight-of-theevidence claim. A review of the transcript does not reveal any oral motions. See N.T., Trial, 

3/9/16. Further, Appellant filed a written motion only challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence. See Def s Motion for Mod. Of Sentence, p. 8 (In addition to the above, [Appellant] 

avers that the jury verdict was not based on sufficient evidence to substantiate same.). 

Appellant's challenge to only the sufficiency of the evidence is further supported by the 

10 Again, we note that the jury was instructed to view the evidence of Defendant's gang activity not us evidence that 

he committed a crime, but as evidence that his gang _affiliation may show his intent, motive, knowledge, etc. 

11 The Superior Court requests we preliminarily determine whether Appellant adequately preserved that matter in his 

post-sentence motion. 

17 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Appellant's own brief in support of his post-sentence motions. See Def. 's Br. in Sup. Post Sent. 

Motions. Under the section titled "Issue" Defendant states: 

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant, Antione Mable, was engaged in the business of prostitution 

and/or encouraged, induced, or caused the complaining witness to become a 

prostitute? ... 

Was all the evidence presented at trial, direct and circumstantial, sufficient to 

prove the elements of a conspiracy in that there was no proof that there existed an 

agreement between the defendant and his alleged co-conspirator? 

Def. 's Br. in Sup. Post Sent. Motions, p. 4. 

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence are separate 

and distinct. Boilerplate motions asserting either type of challenge will not warrant appellate 

review. Challenges to a verdict on weight of the evidence grounds must state with particularity 

why the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Com. v. Holmes, 461 A.2d 1268 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1983). Challenges to the weight of the evidence are distinct from sufficiency 

challenges and must be raised separately. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 12 

determined at this time. 

cc: District Attorney 

Thomas P. Sundmaker, Esq. 

Antoine James Mable, Defendant 

Clerk of Courts 

Prothonotary=-Superior Court 

MPW2017--060 

12 Unlike a sufficiency challenge, a challenge to the weight of the evidence requires the trial judge to assess the 

credibility of the testimony offered by the Commonwealth. For this reason, such challenges may not be raised for 

the first time on appeal but must always be raised initially with the trial judge. Com. v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 

2000); Com. v. Tapper, 675 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Com. v. Hodge, 658 A.2d 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1995); Com. v. Widmer, 689 A.2d 211 (Pa. l997)(distinguishing Commonwealth v. Hodge). 

18 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

vs. 

ANTOINE JAMES MABLE, 

Defendant 

OPINION 

: NO. 723 CR 2015 

: Omnibus Pre-Trial Motions 

This matter comes before the Court on the Omnibus Pre-Trial Motions of Antoine James 

Mable and Christopher John Klement (hereinafter "Defendants"), Defendant Mable and 

Defendant Klement, docketed separately at case number 1376 CR 2014, have been joined for 

trial. AJl charges arise out of the alleged sexual assault of Jessica Kishbaugh on June 24-25, 

2014. Defendant Mable has been charged by Amended Criminal Information with one count of 

Rape, 1 one count of Conspiracy.' one count oflnvoluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse ('�1osr

1),3 

one count of Aggravated Indecent Assault," two counts of Promoting Prostltution.' one count of 

Unlawful Restraint," and one count of Indecent Assault.7 Defendant Klement has been charged 

by Amended Criminal Information with two counts ofJDSI,

8 one count of Conspiracy,9 two 

counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault, 

10 two counts of Promoting Prostitution, 

11 one count of · 

1 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 312l(a)(2). 

1 § 903(a)(I ). 

3 § 3123(aXI ). 

4 § 3125(aXI). 

s § 5902(b)(3), (6). 

6 § 2902(aX2) 

1 §-3126(aXI). 

8 §3123(aXl). 

9 § 903(a)(l). · 10 § 3125(aX2). 

i 

l. 
Unlawful Restraint, 

12 two counts of Indecent Assault, 13 one count of Simple Assault, 

14 and two 

counts of Harassment." The facts according to the Commonwealth are as follows: 

Ms. Kishbaugh was picked up at her residence on June 24, 2014 by Defendant Mable and 

another male friend. Ms. Kishbaugh knew both of these men as they had all previously attended 

the same school. The male friend was dropped off at an unknown location and Defendant 

Klement was picked up. Ms. Kishbaugh voluntarily went with Defendants because they had 

promised Ms. Kishbaugh work as a waitress in the Pocono Mountains region. 

When the group arrived at their final destination, a residence in Monroe County, 

Defendants informed Ms. Kishbaugh that she would not be working as a waitress but as a 

· prostitute. Ms. Kishbaugh objected to this arrangement and was struck twice in the face by 

Defendant Klement. At this time, Ms. Kishbaugh's cell phone was taken from her. Defendant 

Klement then took Ms. Kishbaugh into the bathroom and forced her to perform oral sex on him. 

Thereafter, Defendant Mable forced Ms. Kishbaugh to have sexual intercourse with him in the 

shower. Ms. Kishbaugh was then locked in a bedroom overnight with Defendant Klement and 

was not allowed to leave the residence. 

The following morning, June 25, 2015, Defendant Klement again forced Ms. Kishbaugh 

to perf onn oral sex on him. While she was attempting to get dressed, Defendant Mable sexually 

assaulted her a second time. Ms. Kishbaugh then indicated to Defendants that if she was not 

allowed to use her cell phone to. call her sister, her sister would become suspicious. Under the 

guise of seeking cell phone reception, Ms. Kishbaugh exited the residence and fled to a 

neighboring house where she promptly called 911. 

II § 5902(b)(3), (6). 

12 § 2902(aX2). 

13 § 3126(aXI). 

14 § 2101(aXl). 

u § 2709(aXI). 

2 

;. 
6 

66" 3 col /1 

ulated 01A S3 PM 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Brin K. Cawley responded to the 911 call at 

approximately 2:30 p.m. on June 25, 2014. Ms. Kishbaugh was immediately transported to 

Pocono Medical Center. While at the hospital, a sexual assault examination was performed and 

Ms. Kishbaugh related the above events to Trooper Cawley. 

Charges were filed against Defendant Klement on June 28, 2014 and he was arrested the 

same day. Charges were filed against Defendant Mable on July 24, 2014 and an arrest warrant 

was issued the same day, Defendant Mable, however, was not arrested until December 13, 2014. 

On May 29, 2015, a detective from the Monroe County District Attorney's Office went to 

the Monroe County Correctional Facility for the purpose of talcing photos of Defendant Mablo's 

tattoos. While there, the detective initiated questioning regarding Defendant Mable's alleged 

gang activity and Defendant Mable answered those questions. There is no evidence that the 

detective informed Defendant Mable of his right have an attorney present for questioning, nor is 

there evidence Defendant Mable spontaneously waived that right. 

After other pre-trial matters, both Defendants separately filed the present Omnibus Pre - Trial Motions and each Defendant has joined in the Motions of the other. A hearing on said 

Motions was held on July 28, 2015. After review of the record, counsels' briefs, and argument at 

the hearing, we are ready to dispose of these motions. 

DISCUSSION 

1. Request for involuntary psychiatric evaluation of his. Kishbaugh and disclosure of her medical records, or, in the alternative, a competency evaluation by the court 

Both Defendants have asked this Court to order an involuntary psychiatric evaluation of 

Ms. Kishbaugh in order to determine her competency to testify at trial, Defendants aver that 

while at Pocono Medical Center, Ms. Kishbaugh related to the medical staff that she suffers from 

3 
schizophrenia and was under the influence of marijuana and alcohol during the events that led to 

the alleged sexual assault. Defendants argue that many of the symptoms of schizophrenia could 

cause Ms. Kishbaugh to falsely perceive and then report sexual assault, Furthermore, Defendants 

aver that her alleged mental condition coupled with admitted substance abuse would also render 

Ms. Kishbaugh incapable of being a competent witness. 

Defendants also argue that, minimally, this Court should order the disclosure of Ms. 

Kishbaugh's mental health and medical records, or conduct an in camera review of these 

records, so that a defense expert can evaluate whether Ms, Kishbaugh's mental condition, 

substance abuse, and/or relevant medications could have had an effect on her ability to perceive 

events accurately and to tell the truth. Defendants ask, in the alternative, for the Court to observe 

Ms. Kishbaugh's testimony and evaluate competency. 

The Commonwealth strongly opposes a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of Ms. 

Kisbbaugh. The Commonwealth represents in its brief that a psychological evaluation of and/or 

the disclosure of mental health records for Ms. Kishbaugh would serve to re -victimize her as 

well as contravene the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and relevant case law. The 

Commonwealth also argues that nothing in discovery indicates that Ms. Kishbaugh's mental 

health affected her ability to relate events that occurred in connection with these crimes. 

In Pennsylvania, witnesses are generally assumed to be competent to testify, regardless of 

mental condition, "unless [their testimony} contributes nothing at all because the witness is 

wholly untrustworthy." Commonwealth v. Anderson, 552 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Pa. I 988)(citation 

omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 601 enumerates the conditions under which a witness 

could be rendered incompetent to testify: 

A person is incompetent to testify if the court finds that because of 

a mental condition or immaturity the person: 

4 
(1) is, or was, at any relevant time, incapable of perceiving 

accurately; 

(2) is unable to express himself or herself so as to be 

understood either directly or through an interpreter; 

(3) has an impaired memory; or 

(4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to tell the 

truth. 

Pa.R.E. 601(b). "Mt is incumbent upon the party challenging the testimony to establish 

incompetence," Anderson, 552 A.2d at 1067, and the standard of proof is by clear and 

convincing evidence. Commomvealth v. Boich, 982 A.2d 102, 110 (Pa. Super. 2009). "A court - ordered, involuntary psychiatric or psychological examination should never be the starting point 

for a competency evaluation [of a witness]." Id. (quotation omitted)(emphasis added). 

Furthermore, substance abuse and use of antidepressant drugs at any relevant time are typically 

reserved for jury consideration as to witness credibility, not competency. Id at 111. 

Before a psychiatric or psychological evaluation is ordered, the Court should have an 

opportunity to observe the witness and continue to doubt the witness's competency, Anderson, 

552 A.2d at 1067. Indeed, we "don not have the duty to order any investigation into a witness' 

competency unless the court has some doubt after observing the witness." Commonwealth v. Henkel, 938 lad 433, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added) (holding the trial court did not 

err in denying a request for psychological examination of a witness and production of that 

witness's psychiatric records after the court observed the witness and found him competent). The 

Superior Court has suggested that a competency hearing should be held when the record reflects 

the witness would meet one or more of the factors under Rule 601 that would render that witness 

incompetent to testify. See Commonwealth v. Alston, 864 A.2d 539, 551 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(finding that "prior allegations of abuse, which appear to be false, raise[d] concerns about [the 

victim's] ability to tell the truth, and a hearing to explore competency certainly [was] 

5 
warranted"). "A decision on the necessity of a competency hearing is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court." Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39 (Pa. 2003). 

We find that Defendants have not met their burden with respect to Ms, Kishbaugh's 

alleged mental health issues affecting her ability to competently testify. First, the allegation of 

substance abuse is an issue of credibility properly reserved for the jury and we will not consider 

such alleged abuse in a competency evaluation. See Boich, 982 A.2d at 111. Second, based on 

the evidence before us, we do not doubt Ms. Kishbaugh's ability to testify competently. Ms. 

Kishbaugh's reiteration of events has been consistent in the police reports and affidavits that 

have been attached as exhibits to the various filings. There is no evidence to suggest she has, at 

any point, expressed an inability to remember. Nor have any of the reports indicated Ms. 

Kishbaugh is difficult to understand or to speak with, indicating she is able to adequately express 

herself. Furthermore, we have not been directed to any portion of Ms. Kishbaugh's testimony at 

the preliminary hearings in these matters that would raise a question as to her competency.16 

While Ms. Kishbaugh has self -reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia, Defendants have 

only offered a list of typical symptoms to show that Ms. Kishbaugh is unable to perceive 

accurately or to tell the truth. There is no evidence before us to indicate Ms. Kishbaugh suffers 

from the symptoms Defendants claim would affect her competency (e.g. delusions and 

hallucinations). On the information before us in affidavits and police reports, we are not 

convinced that Ms. Kishbaugh suffers from these particular symptoms. The police officers and 

medical professionals, while documenting a diagnosis of schizophrenia, have not commented 

that this diagnosis has affected Ms. Kishbaugh as it relates to this case in any way. 

16 While Defendant Mable asks this Court to conduct a competency hearing "Instead of relying simply on the transcripts us front the preliminary hearing," Def.'s Mem. on Def.'s Omnibus Pre -Tr. Mots., p. 19, he has not pointed to specific portions of the preliminary hearings that would establish a question as to Ms. Kishbaugh's competency. See Alston, 864 A.2d at 551. 

6 
We also understand Defendants aver the only way to determine Ms. Kishbaugh's 

medication regimen as it relates to her competency would be disclosure or an in camera review 

of her mental health records. We disagree. We are under no duty to order any investigation into a witness's competency unless we first doubt his or her competency and then continue to doubt his 

or her competency after observation. See Henkel, 938 A.2d at 440. Defendants have not met their 

burden with respect to Ms. Kishbaugh's competency and, thus, we have no reason to doubt she is 

able to competently testify. Therefore, a competency hearing would be inappropriate.11 

Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants' request for a competency hearing of Ms. 

Kishbaugh is DENIED. Defendants' requests for an involuntary psychiatric or psychological 

evaluation and for disclosure of Ms. Kishbaugh's mental health records are also DENIED. 

2. Request for expert fees 

Both Defendants have asked for fees to hire an expert to evaluate Ms. Kishbaugh and to 

counter the Commonwealth's § 5920 expert." The Commonwealth only opposes these fees as they relate to an involuntary evaluation of Ms. Kishbaugh. The appointment of an expert to assist an indigent defendant in the preparation of his defense is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Connnomvealth v. Gelormo, 475 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 1984). While "[Om state has 

an affirmative duty to furnish indigent defendants the same protections accorded those 

financially able to obtain them," "Where must be some showing as to the content and relevancy 

of the proposed testimony before such a request will be granted.'-' v. Curnutte, 

871 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2005)(citations and quotations omitted). 

As we are denying Defendants' motions for an involuntary psychiatric evaluation of Ms. 

"Moreover, the Commonwealth attached to its brief a document from discovery that clearly lists Ms. Kishbaugh's medications as -trazadone" and "lexapro." See Commonwealth Exhibit A. 

18 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920. 

7 
Kishbaugh,19 Defendants' motions for fees are DENIED for that purpose. However, as we are 

similarly denying Defendants' motions to bar the testimony of the Commonwealth's § 5920 

expert,2° the motions for fees are GRANTED for the purpose of addressing the Commonwealth 

expert's opinions. 

3. Request to bar expert testimony on Commonwealth's § 5920 expert or, in the alternative, a Frye hearing 

Both Defendants request that the Commonwealth be barred from offering an expert under 

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920. Defendants first argue that § 5920 is unconstitutional. Defendants further 

argue that even if § 5920 is constitutional, the expert's testimony should still be barred because 

the subject matter on which she will testify is not outside the understanding of the jury and 

would only serve to bolster the Commonwealth's main witness, Ms. Kishbaugh. Lastly, 

Defendants state that if the Court is inclined to allow the testimony of a § 5920 expert, they 

would request a Frye21 hearing to determine whether the science on which the expert will rely is 

generally accepted. 

The Commonwealth intends to call Shea Rhodes, Esquire, as an expert under § 5920. In 

its brief, the Commonwealth responds to the Defendants' arguments regarding the 

constitutionality of § 5920 with the holding in Commonwealth v. Carter, I 1 1 A.3d 1221 (Pa, 

Super. 2015). Furthermore, the Commonwealth avers that Attorney Rhodes possesses knowledge 

and expertise beyond the average layperson that would assist the trier of fact in this case and that 

such knowledge and expertise is clear from her curriculum vitae. Additionally, the 

Commonwealth argues that if an expert meets the qualification criteria in § 5920, such an expert 

cannot be challenged in a Frye hearing because the science used by such an expert is not novel 

19 SCC, supra, Section 1. 10 See, infra, Section 3. 21 A.2d 

Frye 

1277, v. United 

1281 

States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) adopted in Pennsylvania by Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 (Pa. 1977) and reaffirmed in Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A,2d 1038, 1043-44 (Pa. 2003). 

8 
and has been, to an extent, legislatively adopted. 

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence "govern proceedings in all courts ... except as 

otherwise provided by law." Pa.R.E, 101(a). Under these Rules, 

[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson; (b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and 

(c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field. 

Pa.R.E. 702. Thus, an expert must first be qualified based on particular knowledge or skill and 

then offer testimony that is outside the understanding of laypeople, would be helpful to a jury, 

and is based on generally accepted science. In other words, the qualifications of an expert and the 

parameters of the testimony to be offered are distinct issues that must be addressed separately. 

The burden rests on the proponent to show his or her expert meets the criteria under Rule 702, 

Common wealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 790 (Pa. 2014). 

Preliminarily, we must note that we will not address Defendants' arguments that § 5920 

is unconstitutional as the Superior Court has specifically upheld § 5920 as constitutionally sound 

in the face of the same arguments raised by Defendants. Carter, 111 A.3d at 1224. 

Section 5920 enumerates specific types of educational and experiential qualifications for 

an expert offered under this section. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920(b). A witness may be qualified as an 

expert under § 5920 

if the witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the 

average layperson based on the witness's experience with, or 

specialized training or education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to sexual violence, that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual 

9 
violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted. 

§ 5920(b)(0. According to this rule, an expert's educational and experiential qualifications must 

be "beyond that possessed by the average layperson" and "will assist the trier of fact." Id. These 

factors are two of the three testimonial standards required in Rule 702, See Pa,R.E. 702(a), (b). 

Section 5920 does not specifically overrule or replace any Rules of Evidence, Thus, we will read 

Rule 702 and § 5920 in conjunction with one another. See Pa.R.E. 101(a), (b), cmt. 

The Commonwealth argues that if an expert meets the qualifications under § 5920, then 

that expert's testimony is consequently admissible and, thus, cannot be challenged in a Frye 

hearing. Reading § 5920 and Rule 702 together, we disagree. 

In support of their argument, the Commonwealth cites to Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 

A,2d 372 (Pa. 2005). In Dengler, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that an expert's 

testimony as to Dengler's Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP") status could not be challenged in a 

Frye hearing because the science involved is not novel. Id at 383. In so holding, the Supreme 

Court analyzed, inter alia, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9795.4(b)22 which enumerates the specific areas an 

expert must assess when determining a defendant's SVP status. Id. at 374-75. We disagree with 

the Commonwealth's contention that the holding in Dengler is applicable to the present case 

because § 9795.4 and § 5920 are not analogous. Section 9795.4 enumerates a lengthy and very 

specific set of factors to be analyzed by an expert determining SVP status. See id. at 374-75 

(quoting 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9795.4(b)(I)-(4)). Moreover, the State Sexual Offenders Assessment 

Board is directed to "establish standards for evaluations and for evaluators conducting the 

assessments." Id. at 374 (quoting 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9795.4(b)). The Supreme Court stated that the 

science at issue in Dengler "is responsive to, indeed is a direct byproduct of, a specific 

n Section 9795.4 expired in December of 2012 but was replaced by § 979924. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.41. However, § 9799.24 is essentially identical to the portions of § 9795.4 quoted by the Court in Dengler. 

10 
legislatively -adopted scheme which sets forth the relevance and contours of the challenged 

evidence." Id. at 383. Furthermore, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[bjecause the legislature 

provided the framework for assessing whether an offender is an SVP, expert testimony tracking 

that framework, by definition, should be deemed generally accepted in the community of 

professionals who conduct SVP assessments." Id. at 383. 

Section 5920 does not contain a "framework" for assessment of victims of sexual 

violence nor does the statute direct a "Board" to establish standards for such evaluations. Section 

5920 merely enumerates the qualifications an expert must possess in order to testify regarding 

"dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual 

violence on victims during and after being assaulted." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1). Nothing in § 

5920 alters the factors for determining the admissibility of testimony under the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Evidence. 

In reviewing Attorney Rhodes' curriculum vitae, she appears to meet the educational and 

experiential qualifications under § 5920 as she has served in multiple capacities dealing with 

criminal justice and victim services issues. Attorney Rhodes will be subject to voir dire at the 

time of trial, however, for purposes of this Motion, on the curriculum vitae presented, she meets 

the qualifications. Our inquiry, however, cannot end there. We must determine whether the 

testimony to be offered by Attorney Rhodes meets the standards under the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence. 

The first criterion in Rule 702 is that "the expert's scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson." Pa.R.E. 702(a). 

Section 5920 also addresses this factor. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1). Attorney Rhodes has an 

extensive background in victim advocacy, particularly in sexual exploitation, prostitution, and 

11 
human trafficking cases. She has worked as an Assistant District Attorney, prosecuting cases 

involving sexual abuse and violence and working closely with victims in that capacity. She has 

also worked as an attorney for various victim assistance programs, providing assistance to 

victims of sexual assault, rape, and stalking. Furthermore, Attorney Rhodes has obtained relevant 

certifications, including a completion certificate from the "Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, 

Human Trafficking in PA Conummitie,s: Indicators, Outreach and Response" and certification as 

a Human Trafficking Instructor through the "Municipal Police Officers Education and Training 

Commission." Her knowledge of the dynamics of sexual violence in certain types of cases and 

the effect of sexual violence on victims appears to be well beyond what the average layperson 

possesses. Therefore, Attorney Rhodes meets the first standard under Pa.R.E. 702 and continues 

to qualify as an expert under § 5920. 

The second criterion is that "the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 

Pa.R.E. 702(b). Again, § 5920 also addresses this factor. 42 Pa: C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1). Defendants 

have alleged that any testimony Attorney Rhodes may offer as a § 5920 expert would not help 

the trier of fact because it would impermissibly encroach on the exclusive credibility - determining function of the jury. Defendants cite to Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 547 A.2d 355 

(Pa. 1988), to support this argument. In Gallagher, the Supreme Court held that an expert 

witness's testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" (RTS) was impertrtissible because such 

testimony encroached on the credibility -determining function of the jury. Id. at 358-59. 

Gallagher can be distinguished from the present case. The Supreme Court found in 

Gallagher that the expert's testimony was offered solely "to enhance the credibility of the 

victim." Id. The expert in Gallagher testified not only to generalSyriiptoinatid -reactions 

12 
associated with RTS but also that the victim in that case suffered from RTS and thus acted in 

accordance with the various symptoms. Id. at 356-57. hi the present case, an expert under § 5920 

is expressly prohibited from commenting on "the credibility of any other witness, including the 

victim" and thus cannot be offered to testify that a particular victim acted in accordance with 

general victim responses to sexual violence. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920(b)(3). Furthermore, the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently noted that "use of expert testimony in appropriate 

cases would permit jurors to make credibility determinations with full awareness [of a relevant 

issue] and, thus, assist the trier of fact in understanding evidence." Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 

A.3d 766, 789 (Pa. 2014) (holding that expert testimony as to general eyewitness identifications 

is no longer per se inadmissible as an abridgement of the jury's credibility -determining 

function). Thus, a § 5920 expert may testify to educate the jury as to general victim responses to 

sexual violence, but may not testify as the expert did in Gallagher-to a specific victim's actions 

and whether that victim acted in accordance with general victim behavior. 

We have already determined that Attorney Rhodes possesses specialized knowledge 

concerning the dynamics of sexual violence and the effects of such violence on sexual assault 

victims. Her testimony about these dynamics and effects, generally, would help the July to 

understand evidence introduced by the Commonwealth, specifically, concerning Ms. Kishbaugh 

and her reactions to the alleged assaults against her. Such testimony by Attorney Rhodes would 

not usurp the jury's credibility -determining function, as Attorney Rhodes cannot comment on 

Ms. Kishbaugh's credibility, but would merely educate and inform the jury generally regarding 

victims of sexual assault and their reactions. Thus, Attorney Rhodes' proffered testimony meets 

the second standard of Pa.R.E. 702 and she continues to qualify under § 5920. 

Lastly, we must determine whether "the expert's methodology is generally accepted in 

13 
the relevant field." Pa.R.E. 702(c). Section 5920 does not address this factor. To meet the burden 

imposed in subsection (c) of Rule 702, the proponent must show the expert's methodology meets 

the standard under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Grady v. Frito-Lay, 

Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003). However, a proponent will only be required to make a 

showing under bye when the court is convinced the expert's relied -upon methodology is novel. 

Dengler, 890 A.2d at 382 ("This Court has made it clear that Frye is not implicated every time 

science comes into the courtroom; rather, it applies only to proffered expert testimony involving 

novel science."). The Superior Court has described the Frye test as 

a two-step process. First, the party opposing the evidence must show that the scientific evidence is 'novel' by demonstrating that there is a legitimate dispute regarding the reliability of the expert's conclusions. If the moving party has identified novel scientific evidence, then the proponent of the scientific evidence must show that the expert's methodology has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community despite the legitimate dispute. 

Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotations omitted) appeal denied 

Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882 (Pa. 2013). The Supreme Court has held that "a 

reasonably broad meaning should be ascribed to the term 'novel' and a Frye hearing is warranted 

when a trial judge has articulable grounds to believe that an expert witness has not applied 

accepted scientific methodology in a conventional fashion in reaching his or her conclusions." 

Walker, 92 A.3d at 790 (quotations omitted). 

Defendants cite to Commonwealth v. Dunkie, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992), for the contention 

that the science on which Attorney Rhodes likely relies has previously been deemed unreliable 

and inadmissible by our Supreme Court. The Court in Dunkle held that expert witness testimony 

on general victim behavior in a child sexual abuse case was impermissible because the science 

behind "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" was not generally accepted in the scientific community. 

14 
Id. at 832, 835. 

Dunkle can be distinguished from the present case for several reasons. First, we note that 

Dunkle was decided in 1992. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that "[w]hat 

constitutes novel scientific evidence has historically been decided on a case -by -case basis, and 

there is some fluidity in the analysis; indeed, science deemed novel at the outset may lose its 

novelty and become generally accepted in the scientific community at a later date." Dengler, 890 

A.2d at 382. Second, the particular testimony at issue in Dunkle was on "Child Sexual Abuse 

Syndrome." Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 832, While there has been alleged sexual abuse in the present 

case, Ms. Kishbaugh is not a child. Thus, "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" is not relevant to the 

present case and neither is the science pertaining to that syndrome, Lastly, the Superior Court has 

specifically commented that "Dunkle predates [§] 5920 and was . . . based on existing case 

law and rules of evidence," Carter, 111 A.3d at 1224. 

In the present case, Defendants argue that the science they assume Attorney Rhodes 

utilizes is outdated, has been recently critiqued, and, thus, is not generally accepted in the 

relevant field. The determination we must make before ordering a Frye hearing is whether 

Attorney Rhodes has "applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional fashion." 

Defendants have not claimed that the studies they referenced at the hearing in this matter were 

conducted using methodologies that are novel to the relevant scientific community. Instead, 

Defendants argued the application of those studies to the present context has recently been 

critiqued. Such an argument is not the subject of a Frye hearing as the science involved is not 

novel. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that disputed conclusions are not subject to 

the Frye test. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 276 (Pa. 2008) ("Frye does not 

operate to bar disputed conclusions of an expert, so long as the methodology employed is not 

15 
novel."). 

Furthermore, Attorney Rhodes need not rely on any scientific studies to render an expert 

opinion. A witness may be qualified as an expert due to their "knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education." Pa.R.E. 702 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 808 

A.2d 215, 227 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sport, 756 A.2d 1139, 1160 (Pa. 

2000)) ("A witness may testify as an expert provided that he or she possesses a 'reasonable 

pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject matter in question.' It is well settled and 

established in this Commonwealth that expertise can be acquired though occupational experience as well as by scientific study."). As we have said, Frye is only implicated when an expert relies 

on novel scientific evidence to form an opinion. 

For the reasons stated above, a Frye hearing is inappropriate at this time?) 

Raving found that Attorney Rhodes meets all criteria under Pa.R.E. 702 and 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 5920 to testify as an expert, Defendants' Motion to conclusively bar her testimony is 

DENIED. Furthermore, Defendants not having presented sufficient evidence which would give 

us articulable grounds that the science, if any, on which Attorney Rhodes relies is novel, 

Defendants' request for a Frye hearing is DENIED. 

4. Request to compel an expert report from the expert on sexual violence 

Both Defendants request that Attorney Rhodes be required to produce an expert report 

pursuant to Pa.R.E, 573(B)(2)(b) so that the Defendants may be fully prepared in their defense. 

Currently, the only documentation that has been turned over to Defendants is Attorney Rhodes' 

curriculum vitae. Defendants aver that an expert under § 5920 is a fairly new type of expert in 

Pennsylvania and, specifically, in Monroe County. Furthermore, Defendants argue that they are 13 receipt 

We recognize 

of a report 

that Defendants have not yet had the benefit of an expert report from Attorney Rhodes. If, upon 

petition this Court 

from Aftomey Rhodes, Defendants continue to contend her methodology Is novel, they may again for a Frye hearing. 

16 
unable to determine what the substance of this expert's testimony will be at trial based solely on 

her curriculum vitae. Defendants explain that they simply need more information regarding this 

expert's testimony and the science on which she bases her opinions. 

The Commonwealth has represented that its expert, Attorney Rhodes, will only be 

testifying to general victim behavior in sexual assault cases, is not permitted under § 5920 to 

conduct an evaluation of Ms. Kishbaugh, and, thus, will not be preparing a report. 

As discussed above, § 5920 mandates specific qualifications for an expert called to testify 

generally about victim behavior in certain types of criminal cases. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920. Section 

5920 does not mention anything about reports from these types of experts. However, elsewhere 

in Pennsylvania law, we find instructive rules regarding expert discovery material. 

Pa.R.E. 573(13)(2)(b) states that, at the discretion of the trial court, where a 

Commonwealth expert has not previously prepared "a report of examination or tests," we may 

order that the expert prepare, and that the attorney for the 

Commonwealth disclose, a report stating the subject matter on which 

the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts to which the 

expert is expected to testify; and a summary of the expert's opinions 

and the grounds for each opinion. 

Pa.R.E. 573(B)(2)(b). This rule does not require an expert to conduct examinations or tests in 

order to prepare a report regarding his or her testimony. In fact, the Rule contemplates that a report under this section will be ordered in the absence of examinations or tests. Thus, regardless 

of whether Attorney Rhodes may or may not evaluate Ms. Kishbaugh under § 5920, we may still 

order her to prepare a report under Rule 573, Even an expert testifying to general behaviors in 

certain contexts can produce a report which states the subject matter of their testimony and the 

grounds for any opinions they may offer. 

We find that Defendants have shown a reasonable need for a report from Attorney 

17 
Rhodes. Therefore, Defendants' Motions for an expert report are GRANTED. Attorney Rhodes 

shall prepare a report pursuant to Pa.R.E. 573(B)(2)(b) and the attorney for the Commonwealth 

shall promptly disclose such report to defense counsel. 

5. Request to bar the use of the term "victim" 

Both Defendants have asked this Court to bar the Commonwealth and its witnesses from 

using the term "victim" to describe Ms. Kishbaugh as it is conclusory and assumes a crime has 

been committed. This Motion was denied from the bench at the hearing in this matter. However, 

by way of further explanation, it is well -established in Pennsylvania "that attorneys' statements or questions at trial are not evidence." Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385, 413 (Pa. 

2003). Furthermore, "[a]n opinion [from a witness] is not objectionable just because it embraces 

an ultimate issue." Pa.R.E. 704. We understand that Defendants argue the term "victim" has been 

barred in other jurisdictions, however, use of the term "victim" in a criminal case in 

Pennsylvania is not objectionable. Thus, Defendants' Motion is DENIED. 

6. Request to bar expert testimony on gangs, in particular the Black P -Stones 

Both Defendants have asked this Court to bar the testimony of an expert on gangs. First, 

Defendants argue that such testimony is irrelevant. Defendant Mable argues that gang evidence 

is especially irrelevant in his case because there is no evidence in discovery that he is a part of 

the Black P -Stones. Defendants also posit that even if expert testimony on gangs is relevant, it is 

overly prejudicial and its admission would violate Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 

403. Defendants also state that an expert on gang activity would not be allowed under Rule 702 

because gangs are not outside the knowledge of the average lay person. 

The Commonwealth responds that its proposed gang expert, Trooper William Patton, 

meets the qualifications under Rule 702. Furthermore, the Commonwealth states that it has 

IS 
provided all requisite notices to the defense and has no duty to disclose its theory of the case. 

The Commonwealth also argues that testimony on gang activity is highly relevant because of the 

original conspiracy charges. Lastly, the Commonwealth avers that Defendants should have 

known evidence of gang activity would be at issue for both of them because the affidavits of 

probable cause for arrest contain Defendants' street names. 

The parties have identified three issues in regard to evidence of gang activity: the 

relevance of evidence of Defendants' alleged gang affiliation, the admissibility of such evidence 

on grounds of prejudice and Rule 404(b), and the admissibility of Trooper Patton's proposed 

testimony as an expert on gangs. Because relevance is a threshold determination, we will address 

that issue first. 

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as othenvise provided by law, Evidence that 

is not relevant is not admissible." Pa.R.E. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that 

"has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . and ... the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. The admissibility of 

evidence on relevance grounds is a threshold determination, Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 

594, 602 (Va. 2008). Furthermore, admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa. 2005), 

At the time Defendants submitted their briefs, the Criminal Informations had not been 

amended. The main argument Defendants advanced with regard to relevance is that, at that time, 

neither Defendant had been charged with crimes that had anything to do with gang activity. 

Defendants argued that the Commonwealth's theory that these charges were indicative of a 

larger scheme among the gang to traffic humans, was not relevant to the present events. 

Defendants had only been charged with sexual assault crimes at that time and, according to 

19 
Defendants, none of the charges reflected the Commonwealth's theory of human trafficking. 

As of the date of this Opinion, Defendants' Criminal Informations have been amended to 

include two counts each of Promoting Prostitution and one count each of Conspiracy. Proof of 

Promoting Prostitution wider subsection (b)(3) requires a showing that a person "encourage[ed], 

induc[ed], or otherwise intentionally caused] another to become or remain a prostitute." 18 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 5902(b)(3), Under subsection (b)(6), the Commonwealth must prove a person 

"transport[ed] a person into or within this Commonwealth with intent to promote the engaging in 

prostitution by that person, or procur[ed] or pay[ed] for transportation with that intent." § 

5902(b)(6). Proof of Conspiracy under subsection (a)(1) requires a showing that a person intends 

to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime and "agrees with [another] person or persons 

that they or one or more of them wilt engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime." § 903(a)(1). Defendants' gang involvement would 

make it more probable that they conspired to promote another to engage in prostitution and 

transported that person with the intent to promote prostitution than if they had only done these 

things of their own accord. See Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 422 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982) 

(holding trial court did not err in admitting gang affiliation evidence because such activity was 

relevant to the charge of Conspiracy). Thus, evidence of gang involvement is relevant. 

Defendants argue that if we find gang evidence is relevant, then the admission of such 

evidence would be unfairly prejudicial and thus violate Pa.R.E. 403. The Commonwealth does 

not address prejudice but does relate that to suppress evidence of gang activity "would be to 

severely hamper the prosecution and to take away from the jury the ability to view all the 

evidence and weigh[] the credibility of each witness as to the Defendants' role in the events of 

that evening." Commonwealth's Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Omnibus Pretrial Mots., p. 19. 

20 
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 mandates that a court must "exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of... unfair prejudice." Pa.R.E. 403, 

Unfair prejudice is defined as "a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert 

the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially." Rule 403, cmt. All 

evidence against a defendant in a criminal case will be prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 

A.2d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 1996). Our determination must be whether evidence is unfairly 

prejudicial. Id.; see also Rule 403. While the trial court must exclude relevant but unfairly 

prejudicial evidence, we are "not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts 

from the jury's consideration where those facts form part of the history and natural development 

of the events and offenses with which [a] defendant is charged," Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 

A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotation omitted). In order for it to be excluded, relevant 

evidence must be "so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon 

something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case." Id. (quotation omitted). 

Additionally, the Supreme Court has instructed "that Rule 403 is a trial -oriented rule" and that 

pre-trial rulings weighing probative value and prejudice are best decided at trial, not pretrial. 

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 91 A.3d 47, 53 (Pa. 2014). 

There is evidence that Defendants were associated with the Black P -Stones gang.24 There 

is also evidence that one of the criminal enterprises of this gang is promoting prostitution. 

Defendants' affiliation with a gang that is known to engage in the crimes for which they have 

been charged is highly probative to the case at bar. Such evidence "forms part of the history and 

natural development of the events and offenses" at issue. Furthermore, the Superior Court has 

24 We understand that Defendant Klement avers there is no evidence to show he is associated with the Black P. 

Stones. However, a police report attached as Exhibit F to the Commonwealth's Brief indicates that Ms. Kishbaugh 

related that Defendant Klement, aka "Trillz," and Defendant Mable, aka "Ace," are alleged members of the Black 13 - Stones. Thus, evidence does exist to show both Defendants are members of this gang. 

21 
commented that a jury can be instructed not to assume guilt simply because of gang affiliation. 

See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 419 A.2d 27, 29 (Pa. Super, 1980). Based on the information 

presently available to us, we find that evidence of gang affiliation, at this juncture, is more 

probative than prejudicial. However, this issue may, and possibly should, be raised again at trial 

pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks. 

Defendants have also argued that evidence of gang affiliation would violate Pa.R.E. 

404(6) in that gang affiliation would be an inadmissible "prior bad act." The Commonwealth 

argues that evidence of gang activity is relevant to Defendant's plans as they relate to the charge 

of Conspiracy,25 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits admitting evidence of a prior "crime, 

wrong, or other act" when such evidence is admitted to "show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character" required to commit such crime, wrong, or other 

act. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Such evidence'may be admitted to show "motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Rule 404(b)(2). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that admission of gang affiliation is proper when the 

Commonwealth alleges conspiracy as such evidence is highly probative of the crime of 

conspiracy and goes to prove "motive, intent, plan, design, ill will or malice." Gwaltney, 442 

A.2d at 241. 

Here, both Defendants have been charged with Conspiracy and Promoting Prostitution. 

The Commonwealth alleges that part of the conspiracy entails Defendants' involvement with the 

Black P -Stones and the gang's activities regarding prostitution. While evidence of gang 

"The Commonwealth also states that Commonwealth v. Fragassa, 122 A. 88 (Pa. 1923), allows the introduction of 

evidence of gang membership. Since Defendants have not challenged this evidence on the grounds relevant in 

Fragassa, see Fragassa, 122 A. at 89 (holding that a defendant's membership in a society is assumed to continue 

unless proven otherwise), and because we find such evidence is admissible on other grounds, we will not further 

address this argument. 

22 
affiliation may be considered a prior bad act, such evidence is not being offered to show 

Defendants acted in accordance with the character associated with gang members. Instead, such 

evidence is highly probative of the Defendants' Conspiracy charges, motive for committing a 

conspiracy, and their intent and plans to commit crimes involving prostitution. Thus, evidence of 

gang affiliation is not excludable under Rule 404(b). 

Having found that evidence of gang affiliation is properly admissible in this case, we turn 

to Trooper Patton and his proposed expert testimony. Defendants' only argument with regard to 

the admissibility of Trooper Patton's testimony under Rule 702 is that gang activity is not 

outside the knowledge of the average layperson.26 The Commonwealth responds that Trooper 

Patton's expertise and knowledge regarding gangs, in particular the Black P -Stones, is well 

beyond the knowledge of an average layperson and that Trooper Patton meets all the criteria 

under Rule 702 to testify as an expert. 

Rule 702 states that a qualified expert may testify if the expert's specialized knowledge 

"is beyond that possessed by the average layperson." Pa.R.E. 702(a). Defendants cite to Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 88 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1952) for the contention that "[e]xpert 

testimony is inadmissible when the matter can be described to the jury and the condition 

evaluated by them without the assistance of one claiming to possess special knowledge upon the 

subject." Id. at 875. Defendants further cite Dooner v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 30 A. 269 (Pa. 

1894): "The jury still have [sic) some duties to perform. Inferences drawn from the ordinary 

affairs of life ought not to be drawn for them, and turned over under oath from the witness 

stand." Id. at 271-72. 

26 We note Defendant Klement also argues that Trooper Patton's expert testimony with regard to Defendant 

Klement's alleged involvement in the Black P -Stones would not be based on sufficient facts or data in violation of 

Pa.R.E. 703. Defendant Klement avers the only evidence linking him to the Black P -Stones Is Trooper Patton's own belief that he is a member. See Def 's Br. in Support of Omnibus, p. 22. As we discussed above, see supra n.23, independent evidence exists to show Defendant Klement is associated with the Black P -Stones as Ms. Kishbaugh has related the same to police. Thus, Defendant Klement's argument regarding Rule 703 holds no merit. 

23 
The cases Defendants cite were analyzed more recently in the criminal context by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1986). In Seese, the 

Supreme Court held the trial court erred when it admitted expert testimony on the credibility of 

children witnesses. Id. at 922. The Court held that veracity is not a subject "beyond the facility of 

the ordinary juror." Id. However, in the present case; Trooper Patton will be testifying to the 

inner workings of a complex criminal organization. His professional experience as a police 

officer and member of various gang task forces as well as his numerous trainings on gang -related 

subjects shows that the knowledge he possess about gangs would be far beyond that of the 

average layperson. Inferences regarding gang activity are simply not "drawn from the ordinary 

affairs of life." Thus, Trooper Patton possesses specialized knowledge that is beyond that 

possessed by the average layperson and is able to testify as an expert under Rule 702. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' request to bar expert testimony on gangs, in 

particular the Black P -Stones, is DENIED. 

7. Request to preclude references to "gangs" or "gang activity" 

As we have found evidence of gang activity to be relevant and admissible at this juncture, 

see, supra, Section 6, Defendants' request to preclude any references to "gangs" or "gang 

activity" is DENIED. 

8. Requests to suppress statements made by Defendant Mable to police 

Defendant Mable avers that the statements he made to the detective who questioned him 

on May 29, 2015 at Monroe County Correctional Facility should be suppressed because the 

statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. At the hearing in this matter, 

the Commonwealth agreed that the statements made by Defendant Mable on May 29, 2015 

would be appropriately suppressed and represented that those statements will not be used against 

24 
CirculatecrOVIV2' 018 02:13 PM 

Defendant Mable at trial. In its brief, the Commonwealth reserved the right to use the statements 

on rebuttal, if necessary. 

Defendants enjoy the right to an attorney and to have that attorney present for any and all 

custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Petrino, 480 A.2d 1160, 1165-66 (Pa, Super. 

1984) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). If a defendant asserts this right, such 

protections exist unless and until the defendant later waives such right. Id. at 1166-67. The 

remedy for statements obtained in violation of this right is suppression of those statements at 

trial. Commonwealth v. Abbas, 862 A.2d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)). When a defendant alleges that evidence was obtained in violation 

of Miranda, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right. Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Additionally, statements that have been suppressed, but are otherwise voluntary, may be used by 

the Commonwealth on rebuttal. See Commonwealth v, Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 39-40 (Pa. 2012) 

(citing PA. CONST. Art. 1, § 9). However, statements made absent a warning against selfincrimination are presumptively involuntary. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 579 

(Pa. Super. 2001). 

There is no question or dispute that Defendant Mable was under custodial interrogation 

when he was questioned at Monroe County Correctional Facility. See Commonwealth v. Chacko, 

459 A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1983) (stating that an incarcerated individual is "in custody" for purposes 

of Miranda). At the hearing, the Commonwealth conceded that Defendant Mable had previously 

invoked his right to an attorney but that his attorney was not present during the questioning. At 

no time has the Commonwealth alleged that the detective advised Defendant Mable of his 

Miranda rights or obtained a waiver of the same. Under these circumstances, any statements 

25 
made by Defendant Mable during that meeting should be suppressed and the Commonwealth 

will not be permitted to use them during its case -in -chief. Furthermore, the Commonwealth has 

also failed to allege and prove that despite a lack of Miranda warnings, Defendant Mable's 

statements were still voluntary. Statements made absent a warning against self-incrimination are 

presumptively involuntary and the Pennsylvania Constitution only allows for the use of 

suppressed voluntary statements on rebuttal. The Commonwealth, therefore, may not use the 

statements made by Defendant Mable on rebuttal. 

Defendant Mable also seeks to suppress the photographs taken during the interrogation 

on May 29, 2015. Defendant Mable avers the same argument regarding violation of his Miranda 

rights applies and requires the suppression of the photographs. The Commonwealth argues that 

the photographs could have been obtained with a search warrant and thus suppression would be 

inappropriate. 

By arguing his Miranda rights have been violated by the taking of these photographs, 

Defendant is essentially invoking his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See 

Commonwealth v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 679 (Pa. 1996). Only evidence that is testimonial in 

nature receives these constitutional protections. ld. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 

757 (1966)). After a diligent search, we are unable to find any precedent within Pennsylvania 

that addresses whether photographs of tattoos are testimonial evidence subject to constitutional 

protections. But see Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1040 (Pa. 2007) (finding 

photographs of gang tattoos were admissible on other grounds). 

However, Pennsylvania has determined that "the Fifth Amendment protection against 

self-incrimination is a bar against 'communications' or 'testimony,' not physical evidence which 

26 
the accused is compelled to produce, even if that physical evidence incriminates the accused." Id. 

at 679 (emphasis added). Furthermore, there is persuasive authority from other jurisdictions that 

have relied on this rationale, inter alia, to hold photographs of tattoos are not testimonial 

evidence. See, e.g., State v. Tiner, 135 P.3d 305, 311-12 (Or. 2006) Mille state and federal 

privileges apply to only testimonial evidence-the communication of a person's belief, 

knowledge; or state of mind-but not to [a] defendant's physical characteristics, such as identity, 

appearance, and physical condition." (citations omitted)); People v. Slavin, 807 N.E.2d 259, 263 

(N.Y. 2004) ("Indeed, it is a settled proposition that a person may be required to produce specific 

documents in response to a subpoena even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or 

belief because the creation of those documents was not `compelled' within the meaning of the 

privilege." (quotations omitted)). 

Without guidance from mandatory authority on this issue, we find the analysis from our 

sister states persuasive and agreeable with the law the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted. 

Thus, we hold that the photographs taken of Defendant Mable's tattoos were not testimonial 

evidence and thus not subject to constitutional protections against self-incrimination. Therefore, 

the fact that Defendant Mable was not read Miranda warnings prior to his tattoos being 

photographed does not render the photographs inadmissible at trial." 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Mable's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part. Any and all statements made by Defendant Mable to the detective on May 

29, 2015 are suppressed and are not available to the Commonwealth in its case -in -chief or on 

rebuttal. The photographs taken by the detective of Defendant Mable are not suppressed. 

27 We do not address the Commonwealth's argument that a search warrant could have been obtained for the photographs because such an argument involves Fourth Amendment privileges, see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA. CONST. art. I, § 8, which Defendant Mable has not raised. 

27 
9. Request to suppress information from Defendant Mable's Facebook page 

Defendant Mable asserts that a search warrant was executed for all information regarding 

his Facebook page. Defendant Mable maintains that this search warrant was unconstitutionally 

broad in content and timeframe. Specifically, Defendant Mable alleges that the search warrant 

was overly broad due to the following language describing the items to be seized: "basic 

subscriber information, user photos, group information, private messages, IP logs and any other 

content included on the Facebook profile." Def. 's Mem. on Def. 's Omnibus Pre -Trial Mots., p. 

15 (quoting Aff. of Probable Cause, May 1, 2015, ¶ 13), Furthermore, Defendant Mable avers 

there was no probable cause to seize any information from his Facebook page because the only 

reason given in the affidavit of probable cause was that the information "will greatly assist in this 

investigation." Id. (quoting Aff, of Probable Cause, May 1, 2015,1i 13). 

The Commonwealth responds that digital discovery rules have not yet been fully 

developed in Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth avers the only information it had with regard to 

Facebook was that Ms. Kishbaugh communicated with Defendants via Facebook. The 

Commonwealth argues that in order to obtain the precise information it seeks on a personal 

website like Facebook, "the Commonwealth is constrained to request enough to ferret through 

the information and find where the hidden messages may be or where the different forms of 

communication are stored." Commonwealth's Br. in Opp'n to Deis.' Omnibus Pretrial Mots., p. 

21. 

Search and seizure law as it pertains to digital information is still developing in 

Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1009 n.43 (Pa. Super. 2014). Currently, 

courts continue to rely on traditional constitutional rules when analyzing digital data. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, A.3d ---, 2015 WL 3533863, *6 (Fa. Super. 2015) (using 

28 
traditional rules regarding the definition of a search to conclude that the digital data stored on a 

computer is subject to constitutional protections); Orie, 88 A.3d at 1008-09 (ruling that a search 

warrant was overbroad due to traditional search and seizure jurisprudence where the items to be 

seized were, inter alio, "any contents contained [in a USB drive], including all documents, 

images, recordings, spreadsheets or any other data stored in digital format"); Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. Super. 2015) (relying on "fundamental rule[s] of law" in 

analyzing whether a search warrant for information from a cell phone was overbroad); 

Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 830 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding that, based on existing 

case law regarding reasonable expectation of privacy, chatroom conversations between a 

defendant and victim did not invoke constitutional protections). 

Generally, search warrants "must name or describe with particularity the property to be 

seized and the person or place to be searched." Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d at 827 (quoting Orie, 88 

A.3d at 1002-03). "Particularity" under the Pennsylvania Constitution means that "a warrant 

must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible." Id. (quoting Orie, 88 A.3d at 

1002-03). When a court is presented with a challenge to a search warrant for being overly broad, 

"[it] must initially determine for what items probable cause existed. The sufficiency of the 

description must then be measured against those items for which there was probable cause. Any 

unreasonable discrepancy between items for which there was probable cause and the description 

in the warrant requires suppression." Id. (quoting Orie, 88 A.3d at 1002-03). "Probable cause 

[for a search warrant] exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge 

and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted." Commonwealth v, Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 292 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 

29 
1972)), Determining the existence of probable cause is a totality of the circumstances test where 

the reviewing court views the affidavit "in a common-sense, non -technical manner." Id. 

The affidavit for the search warrant in the present case states that Ms. Kishbaugh gave 

police information regarding alleged sexual assaults by Defendants. Aff. of Probable Cause, May 

1, 2015, ¶ 12. Furthermore, Ms. Kishbaugh related to police that she was in contact with 

Defendant Mable via "Facebook messenger" prior to and after the alleged sexual assaults. Id. 

While Ms. Kishbaugh indicated that she was in the physical presence of Defendant Mable from 

approximately the evening of June 24, 2015 until the early afternoon of June 25, 2015, she 

relayed that her communications with Defendant Mable began and continued beyond that time 

frame. Aff. of Probable Cause, May I, 2015, $12, 5, 9, 10, 12. The search warrant was 

authorized for lap account information from the Facebook profile of Antoine James MABLE." 

Appl. for Search Warrant and Authorization, May 1, 2015, p. 1 (emphasis in original). 

Based upon the affidavit of probable cause, we find that probable cause existed only for 

Facebook messenger communications between Defendant Mable and Ms. Kishbaugh. The 

information available to the affiant was that when Ms. Kishbaugh communicated with Defendant 

Mable via Facebook, it was only through the Facebook messenger service, Aff, of Probable 

Cause, May 1, 2015, ¶ 12. Furthermore, according to the affidavit, Ms. Kishbaugh had contact 

with Defendant Mable via Facebook messenger "both prior to this crime occurring and after this 

crime occurred." Id. Such information would lead a person of reasonable caution to conclude 

that a search of the private messages between Defendant Mable and Ms. Kishbaugh should be 

conducted. There is no indication in the affidavit of probable cause that Ms. Kishbaugh 

communicated with Defendant Mable in any other manner on Facebook except via the 

messenger service. 

30 
Furthermore, while we understand Defendant Mable avers the timeframe is also overly 

broad, we disagree. A warrant must contain descriptions that are "as specifien as is reasonably 

possible?' Given the information the afliant gleaned from Ms. Kishbaugh, we find that a 

description of all private messages between Defendant Mable and Ms. Kishbaugh would be "as 

specific[] as is reasonably possible" under these circumstances. According to the information 

given by Ms. Kishbaugh as contained in the affadavit, she could have had relevant 

communications with Defendant Mable days or weeks prior to the alleged crimes. Thus, a 

tailored timeframe would be inappropriate. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Mable's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part. All information obtained from Defendant Mable's Facebook page is 

suppressed except for any and all Facebook messenger communications between Defendant 

Mable and Ms. Kishbaugh. 

Having addressed all issues before us, we enter the following order: 

31 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH 01? PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 723 CR 2015 

vs. 

ANTOINE JAMES MABLE, 

Defendant : Omnibus Pre -Trial Motions 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 2th day of August, 2015, upon review of Defendant Antoine James 

Mable's Omnibus Pre -Trial Motions, and in consideration of the record, the evidence presented 

at the hearing on said motions, and the parties' subsequent briefings: 

1. Defendant's "Motion to Bar 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920 Expert Testimony" is DENIED. 

2. Defendant's "Motion to Compel Expert Report" is GRANTED. Attorney Rhodes 

shall prepare and submit to the attorney for the Commonwealth a report pursuant to 

Pa.R.E. 573(13)(2)(b) and the attorney for the Commonwealth shall provide that report 

to defense counsel on or before September 15, 2015. 

3. Defendant's "Motion in Limine" to preclude reference to "Gang Affiliation" is 

DENIED. 

4. Defendant's "Motion to Suppress Statements Made by Defendant" to the detective 

from the Monroe County District Attorney's Office is GRANTED in part and , DENIED in part. All statements made by Defendant Mable on May 29, 2015 are 

hereby suppressed and may not be used by the Commonwealth in its case -in -chief or 

on rebuttal. Any photographs taken on May 29, 2015 are not subject to suppression. 

32 
5, Defendant's "Motion to Bar Gang Expert Testimony" is DENIED. 

6. Defendant's "Motion to Suppress-Facebook" is GRANTED in part and DENIED 

in part. All information obtained from Defendant Mable's Facebook page is hereby 

suppressed except for any and all Facebook messenger communications between 

Defendant Mable and Ms. Kishbaugh. 

7. Defendant's "Motion for Involuntary Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and 

to Compel Disclosure of Psychiatric and Psychological Treatment Records" is 

DENIED. 

8. Defendant's "Petition for Fees for Expert" is GRANTED. Defendant Mable is 

entitled to expert fees for the purpose of hiring a forensic psychologist. These fees 

have been granted by separate Order. 

9. Defendant's "Motion in Liming to Preclude Use of the Conclusory Term 'Victim' is 

DENIED. 

B 

Cc: Julieane Frey, Esq., ADA 

Hillary A. Madden, Esq., Counsel for An James Mable 

Holly B. Conway, Esq., Counsel for Christopher John Klement 

turw2015-o026 

33 

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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 723 CR 2015 

vs. 

ANTOINE JAMES MABLE, 

Defendant : Post -Sentence Motion 

OPINION 

This matter comes before the Court on Antoine James Mable's ("Defendant") Post - Sentence Motion. Defendant has filed one motion titled "Motion for Modification of Sentence" 

but seeks multiple forms of relief Defendant has asked for modification of his sentence,' 

redaction of his Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), and a judgment of acquittal or new 

trial. The facts and procedural history is as follows: 

On March 9, 2016, after trial by jury, Defendant was convicted of two counts of 

Promoting Prostitution2 and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Promoting Prostitution3 in 

relation to the transportation of the victim, Jessica Kishbaugh, to Monroe County for the 

purposes of becoming a prostitute.4 The jury was hopelessly deadlocked on the remaining 

charges and this Court declared a mistrial on those charges for manifest necessity.5 As of the date 

of this Opinion, the Commonwealth has not pursued further prosecution or otherwise disposed of 

In his brief, Defendant withdrew the issue of an incorrect Prior Record Score, and thus no longer offers an argument for modification of his sentence on that ground. 

2 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 5902(6)(3) (felony), (b)(6) (misdemeanor). 

§ 903(a)(1). 

Defendant's case was joined with CoDefendant Christopher Klement, 1376 CR 2014, however, Co -Defendant 

Klement entered a guilty plea in this case on October 5, 2015. 

5 The jury was hung on the following charges: Rape-Threat by Forcible Compulsion (§ 3121(a)(2)), Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-Forcible Compulsion (§ 3123(a)(I)), Aggravated Indecent Assault-Without Consent 

(§ 3125(a)(1)), Unlawful Restraint (§ 2902(a)(2)), and Indecent Assault-Without Consent (§ 3126(a)(1)). 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

those charges. 

A PSI was prepared and on May 23, 2016, this Court sentenced Defendant to 15 to 30 

months incarceration for the Conspiracy charge, 15 to 30 months incarceration for the felony 

Promoting Prostitution charge, and 6 to 12 months incarceration for the misdemeanor Promoting 

Prostitution charge. The sentences on Conspiracy and felony Promoting Prostitution were 

ordered to run consecutively while the misdemeanor Promoting Prostitution was ordered to run 

concurrently, giving Defendant a total aggregate sentence of 30 to 60 months incarceration. 

Defendant received a time credit of 417 days. 

On June 2, 2016, Defendant filed the present Post -Sentence Motion. We held a hearing on July 13, 2016, wherein no evidence was presented by either party. Counsel made argument 

and we directed briefs to be filed within 30 days. We allowed the Commonwealth an additional 

14 days to file a response.6 Defendant filed his brief a week late, on August 19, 2016. As of the 

date of this Opinion, the Commonwealth has failed to file a responsive brief. 

In his brief, Defendant breaks down his argument into the following issues: (1) whether 

the evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of Promoting Prostitution; (2) whether the 

evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of Conspiracy; (3) whether Defendant's PSI 

should be redacted; and (4) whether this Court should grant a judgment of acquittal or order a new trial on the charges of which Defendant was found guilty. As Defendant's first, second, and 

fourth issues are interrelated, we will address them together. We note that Defendant did not 

brief any argument with regard to modification of his sentence, however, as that request was 

included in his Post -Sentence Motion, we will address it last. 

6 We note that Defendant's brief was necessary in order for this Court to render an informed decision for the same reasons we gave the Commonwealth an additional 14 days to respond: Defendant's Motion was too vague to 

determine the specific relief Defendant sought, particularly with regard to Defendant's request to redact the PSI. 

Moreover, defense counsel was not able to sufficiently clarify any of the issues at the hearing. 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient for the jury to find 

him guilty of Promoting Prostitution because there was no evidence presented that Defendant 

was "engaged in the business of prostitution." Def.'s Br., p. 4. Similarly, Defendant argues that 

there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of Conspiracy because the Commonwealth 

presented no evidence that Defendant entered into an agreement with Co -Defendant Klement, or 

any other person, to transport Ms. Kishbaugh to Monroe County for the purposes of promoting 

her prostitution. Def.'s Br., p. 9. 

The Commonwealth, having failed to file a brief or make argument at the hearing, has no 

response. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence, 

and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports the jury's finding of all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1130 (Pa. 

2007); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 759 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 2000). "This standard is equally 

applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the 

combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sanders, 627 A.2d 183, 185 (Pa. Super. 1993)). Moreover, the facts and circumstances need not 

be absolutely incompatible with the defendant's innocence. See Commonwealth v. Cruz -Centeno, 

668 A.2d 536, 539 (Pa. Super. 1995). The question of any doubt is for the fact finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. See W. 

3 
Ntable, 723 CR 2015 

To he found guilty of Promoting Prostitution under subsection (b)(3), the Commonwealth 

had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant encouraged, induced, or otherwise 

intentionally caused another to become or remain a prostitute. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5902(b)(3). 

Similarly, to be found guilty of Promoting Prostitution under subsection (b)(6), the 

Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant transported a person into or within the Commonwealth with the intent to promote the engaging in prostitution by that 

person, or procuring or paying for transportation with that intent. § 5902(6)(6). 

The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

establishes the following: 

In June of 2014, Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement contacted Ms. Kishbaugh, asking 

if she would like to make money as a prostitute in Monroe County. Notes of Testimony, Jury 

Trial 3/7/16, pp. 54-56 [hereinafter "NT., Day 1, p. ."]. Over the course of several 

conversations with Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement, Ms. Kishbaugh was informed that the 

two men would be her pimps and that they would pick her up from Scranton and transport her to 

Monroe County. N.T., Day 1, pp. 56-58. Additionally, Ms. Kishbaugh understood that as part of 

this arrangement, Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement would protect her in exchange for half 

of the money she made as a prostitute. NJ., Day 1, pp. 58-59. Ms. Kishbaugh agreed to this 

arrangement and Co -Defendant Klement picked Ms. Kishbaugh up from her home in Scranton on June 24,2014. N.T., Day 1, pp. 59,69-70. On the way front Scranton to Monroe County, Co - Defendant Klement also picked up Defendant, and the group went to a trailer home.' N.T., Day 

1, p. 60. While at this home, Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement sexually assaulted Ms. 

Through testimony other than Ms. Kishbaugh's, the Commonwealth presented evidence that this trailer home was in Polk Township, Monroe County See N.T., Day 1, pp. 153, 155-160. 4 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Kishbaugh.s N.T., Day I, pp. 65-69,77-79. Co -Defendant Klement forced Ms. Kishbaugh to 

perform oral sex on him and Defendant forced Ms. Kishbaugh to receive oral sex from him and 

to have vaginal sex with him. N.T., Day 1, pp. 65-69,77-79. These assaults were in response to 

Ms. Kishbaugh changing her mind about the arrangement, making Defendant angry that he had 

put time and effort in to bringing Ms. Kishbaugh to Monroe County to make money as a prostitute. See N.T., Day 1, p. 65. 

Through the night of the 24th and into the morning of the 25th, Defendant and Co - Defendant Klement did not permit Ms. Kishbaugh to leave the trailer home, despite her 

continued insistence that she had changed her mind. N.T., Day 1, pp. 70-74. Defendant and Co - Defendant Klement hit Ms. Kishbaugh and restricted access to her cell phone in attempts to 

make her stay in the home. N.T., Day 1, pp. 73-74. Finally, Trooper William Patton testified as a 

gang expert, presenting evidence that Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement were members of a gang, the Black P -Stones, that participated in an activity known as "gorilla pimping," wherein 

young, impressionable girls would be lured into prostitution by gang members and not pemiitted 

to leave either by force, threat of force, or promise of drugs, while the gang members earned 

money, through the girls' prostitution, for the gang.9 Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial 3/8/16, pp. 

105-06,112-13 [hereinafter "N.T., Day 2, p. 

We understand that thejury did not find Defendant guilty of the alleged sexual assaults, however, in viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth on the charges the jury did find beyond a reasonable 

doubt, we do not decide the issue of Ms. Kishbaugh's credibility and consider the sexual activity as forced, per her 

testimony. See Cruz -Centeno, 668 A.2d at 539. ("It is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced." (quotation omitted)). 

9 Defendant avers in his brief that the jury rendered guilty verdicts solely on the basis of Trooper Patton's testimony regarding Defendant's gang activity. Def 's Br., p. 6. We are cognizant that this evidence cannot form the basis of a guilty verdict on the grounds that Defendant has the propensity to commit crime, as such a conclusion would be 

against the Rules of Evidence. See Pa.R.E.404(b). However, as we stated in our Omnibus Opinion in this case, such 

evidence can be used to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident." Omnibus Opinion, 8/26/15, p. 22 (quoting Rule 404(b)(2)). Furthermore, the jury was instructed to view such evidence only in this limited manner during the jury charge. Notes of Testimony, 3/9/16, pp. 82-83 [hereinafter "NJ., Day 3, p. We presume the jury followed our instructions, see Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491,503-04 (Pa. 1995), and we now view the evidence of Defendant's gang membership in tlIC MC way. 

5 
lvlable, 723 CR 2013 

The above evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant committed both counts of Promoting 

Prostitution. Defendant's knowledge of and involvement in transporting Ms. Kishbaugh to the 

trailer home where she was subsequently forced to stay and perform sexual acts is sufficient to 

support such a conviction and is not so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See Cruz -Centeno, 668 A.2d 

at 539. These convictions are further supported by the evidence of Defendant's gang membership 

in that his actions in promoting Ms. Kishbaugh's prostitution were motivated by such 

membership, thereby also indicating his intent to engage in such promotion, his lack of mistake 

in doing so, and his knowledge that such promotion was occurring. We are satisfied that the 

evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of both counts of Promoting Prostitution.1° 

We further find the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of Conspiracy to 

commit Promoting Prostitution. "A conviction for criminal conspiracy is sustained where the 

Commonwealth establishes that the defendant entered an agreement to commit or aid in an 

unlawful act with another person or persons with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was 

done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citing 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903). In this case, Defendant was charged with Conspiracy, 

generally, but the jury found him guilty only of Conspiracy to commit Promoting Prostitution. 

Thus, the only agreement we need to consider would be an agreement between Defendant and 

another person to commit the crime of Promoting Prostitution. 

When presenting evidence to show a defendant made a criminal agreement with another, 

I° Additionally, although Defendant did not physically drive the vehicle that transported Ms. Kishbaugh, he can still 

be guilty of the misdemeanor Promoting Prostitution charge through accomplice liability. See Comniomvealtb v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002). However, in any event, Defendant's individual participation in 

arranging for Ms. Kishbaugh's transportation, for the purposes of prostitution, makes him guilty of Promoting Prostitution. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 590.2(6)(6). 

6 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

the Commonwealth will typically not have direct evidence of such agreement, and thus, "[a] 

conspiracy is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence." Id. The Superior Court has 

established four factors for courts to consider when deciding whether the evidence establishes 

that a conspiratorial agreement was formed: "(t) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) 

knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) in 

some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072,1075 (Pa. Super. 1983)). "The presence of such circumstances may furnish 

a web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt when 

viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred." Id. 

Additionally, "[o]nce there is evidence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. 

In the present case, the evidence presented showed "an association between alleged 

conspirators." Not only did Co -Defendant Klement pick up and drive Defendant to the trailer 

home, N.T., Day I, pp. 69-70, but the two had gone to the same high school, N.T., Day 1, p. 52, 

82, seemed to live in the same home, N.T., Day I, p. 75, and were known to be members of the 

same gang. N.T., Day 1, p. 83. Furthermore, both Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement had 

been in contact with Ms. Kishbaugh about the same plan to bring her to Monroe County for 

prostitution. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-56. The evidence also showed Defendant had "knowledge of 

the commission of the crime." Defendant was involved in the initial communications with Ms. 

Kishbaugh and explained his role as a pimp. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-59. Indeed, in his brief, 

Defendant emphasizes that Ms. Kishbaugh was clear that her intentions upon arrival in Monroe 

County were to become a prostitute, Def.'s Br., p. 7, and Ms. Kishbaugh candidly testified to the 

same at trial. N.T., Day I, pp. 57-58. Further, the evidence at trial clearly established, and 

7 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Defendant does not deny, see Def's Br., pp. 8-10, his "presence at the scene of the crime." 

Lastly, the evidence showed Defendant's "participation in the object of the conspiracy." By 

arranging for transportation, not allowing Ms. Kishbaugh to leave, and forcing her to perform 

sexual acts, with the ultimate goal that she become a prostitute, Defendant participated in the 

conspiracy to promote Ms. Kishbaugh's prostitution. 

We understand that Defendant emphatically argues "mere presence at the scene of an incident involving purported criminal activity is insufficient to demonstrate an individual's 

guilt." Def.'s Br., p. 10. While we agree with that statement generally, see Lambert, 795 A.2d at 

1016, the evidence in Defendant's case, as discussed above, shows much more than his "mere 

presence." The case Defendant cites to support this argument, Commonwealth v. Mills, 478 A.2d 

30 (Pa. Super. 1984), is readily distinguishable. 

In Mills, the defendant was charged with conspiring with his co-defendant, William Gola, 

to sell methamphetamine to a Confidential Informant ("CI") and an undercover agent from the 

Bureau of Narcotics Investigation ("agent"). Mills, 478 A.2d at 31. When Mills arrived at Gola's 

apartment, the CI and agent were already there and had spoken with Gola about procuring 

methamphetamine from a man named "Karl." Id. When "Karl" could not be reached, Mills 

offered to sell the two men methamphetamine from the shipment he was to receive later that 

evening, but the offer was declined and the CI and agent returned to their car. Id. at 32, At the 

agent's request, the CI reentered Gola's apartment and asked him to come to the car. Id. When 

Gola came outside, Mills came with him and the four men proceeded to drive around looking for 

"Karl" and a quantity of methamphetamine. Id. No drugs or money were exchanged, however, 

Mills and Gola were both charged with Conspiracy approximately one month later. Id. at 31-32. 

The Superior Court found that Mills could not be found guilty of Conspiracy because 

a 
?viable, 723 CR 2015 

"the Commonwealth's evidence, direct and circumstantial, failed to prove the existence of a 

conspiracy between (Mills] and Gola." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The Superior Court noted that 

the evidence showed Mills was aware the CI and agent were seeking methamphetamine and that 

Mills was willing to independently sell this substance to them. Id. However, the Court could not 

conclude from the evidence before it that Mills and Cola had formed an agreement to sell the 

methamphetamine together or were working to accomplish that common goal. Id. The Court also 

noted that there was no evidence of prior dealings between Mills and the CI, no statements from 

Mills or Cola that they were, or had ever, worked together, and no evidence that Mills would 

participate or profit from the transaction between Gola and the CI and agent. Id. 

Defendant's case is very different, While there may not have been direct evidence of 

statements indicating Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement were working together to 

accomplish a common, criminal goal, the circumstantial evidence indicates these two men had an 

agreement. Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement were members of the same gang and engaged 

together in activity that correlated with the gang's methods of "gorilla pimping." See NT., Day 

1, pp. 54-59; N.T., Day 2, pp. 105-06,112-13. Both Defendant and Co -Defendant Klement 

were in contact with Ms. Kishbaugh to settle details of the arrangement. N.T., Day 1, pp. 54-56. 

Both men reassured Ms. Kishbaugh that they would protect her and expect a cut of her profits in 

return. N.T., Day 1, p. 58-59. Finally, both men accompanied Ms. Kighbaugh to the trailer home 

where she was subsequently assaulted and kept from leaving. N.T., Day 1, pp. 59-60,67. In 

Mills, there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that showed any connection between Mills 

and Gola. Mills, 478 A.2d at 33. Where the Superior Court in Mills faced a record devoid of 

connection between co-defendants, we face a very different scenario here. Thus, Mills is 

distinguishable and Defendant's argument in reliance thereon fails. 

9 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Defendant also alleges the Commonwealth cannot rely on his "purported gang affiliation" 

to establish the existence of an agreement sufficient to support a conviction for Conspiracy. 

Def.'s Br., p. 11.11 However, this argument has no merit as the four factors from Lambert were 

supported by independent, non -gang related evidence, which we have discussed above, at length. 

See Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016. Despite Defendant's insistence, evidence of his gang affiliation 

was not the only evidence presented against him. 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or Judgment of 

Acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence is DENIED. 

II. Redact Defendant's PSI 

Defendant argues there are certain portions of his PSI that should be redacted because 

they are prejudicial. Def.'s Br., pp. 15-16. In his Motion, Defendant alleges prejudice would 

come in the form of forced sexual offender treatment wherein he would have to "admit" to 

certain actions before he could be cleared as successfully completing the treatment. Def.'s Post - Sentence Mot., ¶ 16(e). Defendant argues that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 703(E) 

would allow this Court to redact these portions of his PSI so that he will not suffer any prejudice 

when said report is forwarded to the Department of Corrections. Def.'s Post -Sentence Mot., 

16(d). The Commonwealth, having failed to file a brief or make argument at the hearing, has no 

response. 

Rule 703 governs the disclosure of PSIs. Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 703. This Rule states that PSIs are not of public record and that they shall be disclosed to limited parties, under narrow 

circumstances. Id. Rule 703 further allows for a defendant or the Commonwealth to allege 

factual inaccuracies contained within the report and requires that the sentencing judge order any 

Again, we note that the jury was instructed to view the evidence of Defendant's gang activity not as evidence that 

he committed a crime, but as evidence that his gang affiliation may show his intent, motive, knowledge, etc. 

I0 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

necessary corrections. Rule 703(B). Subject to any corrections made at the time of sentencing, 

PSIs are subsequently forwarded to relevant correctional institutions and departments of 

probation and parole. Rule 703(C). The confidentiality and non-public nature of these reports 

remains throughout their dissemination. Id. Subsections (D) and (E) of the Rule allow for the 

sentencing judge to impose additional disclosures or confidentiality measures, as necessary. Rule 

703(D), (E). Specifically, subsection (E) states that Itjhe sentencing judge may at any time 

impose further conditions of confidentiality on a person or agency receiving a report" pursuant to 

Rule 703. Rule 703(E). 

We do not find that Defendant has provided sufficient evidence to warrant alteration of 

his PSI pursuant to Rule 703. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant and his counsel were given 

the opportunity to make any corrections to the PSI or to object to any portion of it. See Rule 

703(B). No corrections were requested nor any objections lodged and we imposed sentence.12 

The plain text of subsection (E) allows for this Court to "impose further conditions of 

confidentiality on a person or agency," not on the PSI document itself. Rule 703(E). 

Furthermore, Defendant has presented no evidence of the alleged prejudice he would suffer 

should his PSI remain unredacted, save for his own averments and counsel's "experience in the 

past." Def.'s Post -Sentence Motion, ¶ 16(e). Whatever "sexual offender treatment" Defendant 

alleges will be imposed by the Department of Corrections remains unknown. Defendant states 

that he "will likely be ordered to attend and complete sexual offender treatment by the DOC," 

Def.'s Post -Sentence Mot., ¶ 16(e) (emphasis added), but has provided no proof that such 

treatment has been or will be ordered. 

12 Defense counsel did indicate at sentencing that Defendant had an issue with one of the adult offenses listed in his PSI: the offense from October 21,2009, in Brodheadsville, Pennsylvania. Defendant indicated at sentencing that he did not believe that was an accurate record. Defense counsel indicated on the record that he would check into that offense and that if there was a problem, he would address it in his post -sentence motions. As no such objection or correction was raised in Defendant's PostSentence Motion, we do not consider this issue to be a requested correction. 
Mabie, 723 CR 2015 

According to our Sentencing Order, we have not required Defendant to participate in or 

complete any treatment offered by the Department of Corrections. See Sentencing Order, 

5/23/16. Furthermore, Defendant's incarceration, as far as this Court is concerned, is not 

contingent on the successful completion of any such treatment. Id. Lastly, Defendant's 

convictions do not carry a statutory requirement of sexual offender treatment, or even Megan's 

Law registration. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9718.1(a)(5) (requiring sexual offender treatment "if the 

person is incarcerated in a State institution for ... [p)rostituti on, as defined in section 5902 . . if 

the offense involved a minor under 18 years of age" (emphasis added)); § 9799.14(c)(2) 

(requiring Tier II registration only for Promoting Prostitution under subsection (b.1), relating to 

prostitution of minors). 

To the extent that the Department of Corrections and/or Board of Probation and Parole 

has imposed, or will impose, additional requirements on Defendant, he must take those issues up 

with the appropriate authority. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 

Parole, 532 A.2d SO, 53-54 (Pa. Cmwtth. 1987) (holding "a prisoner may not obtain judicial 

review of a Board order denying a parole application" but must instead follow the procedures 

established by the Board); Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151, 152-53 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(holding that civil actions, actions in equity, actions in mandamus, and petitions for review of 

governmental determinations, specifically those involving the Department of Corrections, fall 

within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court). 

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to redact his Pre -Sentence Investigation Report is 

DENIED. 

III. Modification of Sentence 

Defendant offers two reasons this Court should modify his sentence: (1) this Court 

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improperly relied on Defendant's conduct while incarcerated and out on bail as aggravating 

circumstances and (2) even if we properly considered Defendant's conduct while incarcerated 

and out on bail, such aggravating circumstances were greatly outweighed by mitigating 

circumstances. Defendant avers that in properly weighing the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, he should have received a lesser minimum sentence. The Commonwealth, having 

failed to file a brief or make argument at the hearing, has no response. 

Sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 275 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). Abuse of discretion will be found if the sentence is "manifestly unreasonable, or 

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill -will." Id. When fashioning a sentence, the trial court 

is directed by statute to consider certain factors. These factors are: (1) protection of the public; 

(2) "the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community;" and (3) Defendant's rehabilitative needs. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b). A sentence can 

be invalid if the sentencing court "relied in whole or in part on an impermissible factor." 

Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 535 A.2d 91, 105 (Pa. Super. 1987). Furthermore, when imposing a 

sentence for a misdemeanor or felony, the sentencing court must state on the record its reasons 

for the sentence imposed. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b). The sentencing judge may order a PSI report 

which must "include information regarding the_circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant sufficient to assist the judge in determining sentence." Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 702(A). 

A PSI was prepared by Probation Officer Kim Borger, wherein the following aggravating 

circumstances were listed: (I) Defendant was arrested, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced for 

Public Drunkeness while on bail in this case; (2) Defendant has had numerous disciplinary 

infractions in the Monroe County Correctional Facility while incarcerated in this case, resulting 

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Mable, 723 CR 2015 

in his confinement to the Restrictive Housing Unit on two occasions; and (3) Defendant was 

arrested, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced for Assault by a Prisoner and Simple Assault while 

incarcerated in this case. On May 23, 2016, we sentenced Defendant to 15 to 30 months 

incarceration for the Conspiracy charge, 15 to 30 months incarceration for the felony Promoting 

Prostitution charge, and 6 to 12 months incarceration for the misdemeanor Promoting 

Prostitution charge. The two felony sentences were run consecutively and the misdemeanor 

sentence was run concurrently for a total, aggregate sentence of 30 to 60 months incarceration. 

On the record at Defendant's sentencing hearing, we adopted the aggravating 

circumstances contained in the PSI. Defendant avers we improperly relied on irrelevant 

aggravating circumstances, namely, Defendant's behavior on bail and while incarcerated. As the 

Sentencing Court, we must consider not only the impact of a specific offense upon a specific 

victim and a specific community, but we must also consider the general protection of the public 

from a defendant and a defendant's individual rehabilitative needs. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b). By 

including Defendant's behavior while on bail as an aggravating circumstance, we were 

considering the general protection of the public. Defendant was clearly unable to conform his 

behavior to the laws which apply to all citizens or to the additional rules and regulations imposed 

upon him as conditions of his bail. Thus, our consideration of his behavior while on bail in this 

case was appropriate. Similarly, when we considered the numerous disciplinary infractions and 

criminal charges incurred by Defendant while he was incarcerated in this case, we were 

considering his rehabilitative needs. Such a lengthy disciplinary record while incarcerated for 

little over a year shows that Defendant had not yet reached a point within that year where 

incarceration was having a rehabilitative effect. Even as late as December of 2015, Defendant 

was still getting into fights and unable to conform his behavior to the rules and regulations of the 
Mable, 723 CR 2015 

Monroe County Correctional Facility. Thus, our consideration of Defendant's disciplinary 

history while incarcerated was appropriate. 

Having found that we relied on proper aggravating circumstances, we move on to address 

whether we should have found that said aggravating circumstances were outweighed by the 

mitigating circumstances.'3 On the record at Defendant's sentencing hearing, while we did not 

specifically state Defendant's age was a mitigating circumstance, we did consider Defendant's 

young age -25 years old-when we imposed sentence. Further, we considered that, prior to his 

adoption at 8 years old, Defendant had a troubled childhood:4 Nevertheless, we stated that the 

recommendations contained in the PSI were entirely appropriate for this case, given the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, we imposed aggravated range sentences 

on all three crimes.15 We clearly and concisely stated our reasons for imposing aggravated range 

sentences on the record and we have not been presented with any new or additional information 

that would warrant a different decision. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 

Sentence is DENIED. 

Having addressed all issues before us, we enter the following order: 

"The PST did not list any mitigating circumstances nor did defense counsel argue for any such circumstances at 

sentencing. 

14 We did note, however, that while Defendant may have had a rough life prior to his adoption, his life after adoption was markedly more stable and that from then on, Defendant had a good childhood. 

IS The Sentencing Guideline ranges for Defendant's Conspiracy and felony Promoting Prostitution charges were identical: with an Offense Gravity Score of 5, the standard range was 1 to 12 months, with an aggravated range of 

plus or minus 3. The standard Sentencing Guideline range for Defendant's misdemeanor Promoting Prostitution 

charge, with an Offense Gravity Score of 3, was restorative sanctions to 6 months, with an aggravated range of plus or minus 3. These calculations were provided correctly in the PSI, given that Defendant had a Prior Record Score of 

I. Additionally, Defendant does not seem to dispute these calculations, but instead challenges our discretion in 

imposing aggravated range sentences. See Def.'s Post -Sentence Mot., ¶'J 10-15. 

IS 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO.723 CR 2015 

vs. 

ANTOINE JAMES MAIILE, 

Defendant : Post -Sentence Motion 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2016, upon review of Defendant's Post - Sentence Motion, and in consideration of the record and the parties' subsequent briefings, 

Defendant's motion is DENIED. 

Defendant is advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of this Order within 

which to file an appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 

COURT 

cc: Julieane Frey, Esq., ADA 

Thomas Sundmaker, Esq., Counsel fo efendant 

Clerk of Courts 

MPW2016-0038 

HINGTON, P.J. 

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