Ford Explorer Sport Collision

With Ford Windstar Minivan

and Jeep Grand Cherokee

on Interstate 95/495

Near Largo, Maryland

February 1, 2002

Highway Accident Report

NTSB/HAR-03/02

PB2003-916202

Notation 7561

National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

Highway Accident Report

Ford Explorer Sport Collision 

With Ford Windstar Minivan 

and Jeep Grand Cherokee 

on Interstate 95/495 

Near Largo, Maryland

February 1, 2002

NTSB/HAR-03/02

PB2003-916202 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7561 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted June 3, 2003 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2003. Ford Explorer Sport Collision With Ford Windstar

Minivan and Jeep Grand Cherokee on Interstate 95/495 Near Largo, Maryland, on February 1, 2002.

Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-03/02. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On February 1, 2002, on Interstate 95/495 near Largo, Maryland, a 1998 Ford Explorer Sport,

traveling northbound, veered off the left side of the roadway, crossed over the median, climbed up a

guardrail, flipped over, and landed on top of a southbound 2001 Ford Windstar minivan. Subsequently, a

1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee ran into the minivan. Of the eight people involved in the accident, five adults

were fatally injured, one adult sustained minor injuries, and two children were uninjured.

The following safety issues were identified in this accident: the accident driverís speed, operating

inexperience, and unfamiliarity with the vehicle; the use of a wireless telephone while operating a vehicle;

the need for technology to aid vehicle stability; and the adequacy of the existing barrier system.

As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued

recommendations to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 49 States (exclusionóNew

Jersey), the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, and The Advertising Council, Inc.

The Safety Board also reiterates Safety Recommendations H-98-12 and -24 to the Federal Highway

Administration and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, respectively.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2003-916202 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Accident Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Windstar Occupants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Jeep Occupants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Toxicological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Accident Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Explorer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Windstar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Jeep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Accident History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Physical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Median Barrier Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Marylandís Median Barrier Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Wind Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Surface Weather Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

NWS Weather Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Vehicle Component Examinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Pavement Coefficient of Friction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Wireless Telephone Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Wireless Telephone Use and Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Regulations Regarding Wireless Telephone Use While Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Wireless Telephone Use Warnings and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Virginia Driverís Education Curriculum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

NHTSA Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Accident Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Other Accidents Involving Wireless Telephone Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Provisional or Graduated Licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Electronic Stability Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Weather Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Collision Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Driver Speed, Inexperience, and Unfamiliarity With Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Wireless Telephone Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Vehicle Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Existing Barrier System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Appendix A: The Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

ABS antilock braking systems

Andrews AFB Andrews Air Force Base

BWI Baltimore-Washington International Airport

DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

ESC electronic stability control

ESP electric stability program

Explorer Ford Explorer Sport

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

HVE Human Vehicle Environment

I-95/495 Interstate 95/495

Jeep Jeep Grand Cherokee

MMUCC Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria

MTA Maryland Transportation Authority

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NWS National Weather Service

psi pounds per square inch

SHA (Maryland) State Highway Administration

SIMON Simulation Model Non-linear

SUV sport utility vehicle

Windstar Ford Windstar minivan
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On February 1, 2002, about 8:00 p.m., on the outer lanes of Interstate 95/495 near

Largo, Maryland, a 1998 two-door Ford Explorer Sport, traveling northbound at an

estimated speed of 70 to 75 mph, veered off the left side of the roadway, crossed over the

median, climbed up a guardrail, flipped over, and landed on top of a southbound 2001

four-door Ford Windstar minivan. Subsequently, a 1998 four-door Jeep Grand Cherokee

ran into the minivan. Of the eight people involved in the accident, five adults were fatally

injured, one adult sustained minor injuries, and two children were uninjured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the February 1, 2002, collision of the Ford Explorer Sport with the Ford Windstar minivan

and Jeep Grand Cherokee was the Explorer driverís failure to maintain directional control

of her high-profile, short-wheelbase vehicle in the windy conditions due to a combination

of inexperience, unfamiliarity with the vehicle, speed, and distraction caused by use of a

handheld wireless telephone. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the lack of

an effective median barrier at the accident site.

The following safety issues were identified in this accident: the accident driverís

speed, operating inexperience, and unfamiliarity with the vehicle; the use of a wireless

telephone while operating a vehicle; the need for technology to aid vehicle stability; and

the adequacy of the existing barrier system.

As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board

makes recommendations to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 49 States

(exclusionóNew Jersey), the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association,

and The Advertising Council, Inc. The Safety Board also reiterates Safety

Recommendations H-98-12 and -24 to the Federal Highway Administration and the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, respectively.
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

About 4:00 p.m. on February 1, 2002, the accident driver left her workplace in

Springfield, Virginia, accompanied by a male and a female friend.1

 The male friend drove

them in his vehicle to a mall in Arlington, Virginia, and then to the Import Express

automobile dealership in Arlington. The three arrived about 5:15 p.m. at the dealership,

where the accident driver finalized the purchase of a two-door 1998 Ford Explorer Sport

(Explorer). About 6:45 p.m., they left the automobile dealership in the two vehicles for the

accident driverís home in Arlington. They left the male friendís vehicle there, and the

accident driver drove with her two friends to another female friendís home to show her the

Explorer. The three friends stayed there about 10 minutes and then went back to the

accident driverís home, where the male friend retrieved his vehicle. The three set out for

the female friendís home in Fort Washington, Maryland, in the two separate vehicles. The

female friend rode with the accident driver. (See figure 1.)

1 The Safety Board interviewed the male friend on February 3, 2002, and the female friend on

February 6, 2002. The accident events are reconstructed from these and other witness interviews.

Figure 1. Area map showing location of accident site and origin and 

destination points for the accident driver.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

According to the female friend, the male friend, using a wireless telephone, called

the accident driver ìa couple of timesî during the trip on the accident driverís wireless

telephone. The female friend stated that she answered the telephone on these occasions

and relayed the conversations to the accident driver. About 7:50 p.m., the two vehicles

arrived at the female friendís home.

According to the female friend, the accident driver, operating the accident vehicle

alone, and the male friend, operating his vehicle, departed the female friendís home about

7:55 p.m. for the male friendís home in Glenn Dale, Maryland. (See figure 1.) The

accident driver followed the male friend, and while traveling northbound on Interstate

95/495 (I-95/495), the two had a wireless telephone conversation, during which, according

to the male friend, the accident driver told him she thought that her car needed a tune-up.

While proceeding in the left (inside) lane, the male friend lost sight of the accident driver

and said he called her2 again to find out her location. He said the accident driver answered

and, during a 2-minute conversation, indicated that she was ìbehind a big truckî and could

not then see him. He also stated that ìshe suddenly yelled twice, and the call

disconnected.î

A witness in a Lexus sedan, traveling northbound on I-95/495 three- to four-car

lengths behind the Explorer, indicated that south of the accident site he had experienced

several wind gusts, which seemed to come from the left. He stated that just before the

accident, he felt a ìstrong gust of wind hit his vehicle from the left.î The witness said the

wind was ìso strong it scared himî and he decelerated his vehicle. He said that he saw the

Explorer veer off the left side of the roadway, climb up the guardrail, and flip over, at

which point he lost sight of it. He estimated that the speed of the Explorer at the time of

the accident was between 70 and 75 mph and his own speed was between 60 and 65 mph.

Meanwhile, a 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee (Jeep), occupied by the driver and two

children, was southbound on I-95/495 in the left lane following a 2001 Ford Windstar

minivan (Windstar), occupied by the driver and three adults. The Jeep driver stated that

she was traveling three to four car lengths behind a white minivan. She said she saw the

Explorer in the air (she could only see the undercarriage) and then it landed on top of the

minivan. She stated that she did not have time to apply the brakes and her Jeep struck the

minivan. The Jeep driver said that at impact, her air bag released and she hit her face on it.

She indicated that her children in the back seat were her primary concern. She was unable

to open the door so she ìlet the window down, crawled out, and got her children out.î She

also stated that the wind was blowing very strongly just before the accident. She estimated

her speed to be 65 mph. (See figure 2.)

2 According to the wireless telephone records, the accident driver placed the last call.
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

Figure 2. Accident scene.

Explorer's final 

rest position 

Windstar's final 

rest position 

Jeep's final 

rest position 

 Tire

 furrows

 Tire

 marks

 Scrape

 marks

 Liquid

 debris

 trail

 Van

 occupant

Explorer operator's 

final rest position 

N

0 10 20 40 60

FEET
Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

Several witnesses, also traveling southbound on I-95/495, saw the Explorer

become airborne and observed windy conditions. One witness, driving a 1995 Mitsubishi

Galant, said that he saw the Explorer ìgo 10 to 15 feet in the airî and land in the inside

lane. This witness also stated that the wind was very strong and ìhe could feel the pull of

the wind.î Another witness, driving a 1988 Oldsmobile Sierra, said that before the

accident, the wind was ìwhipping her around.î She indicated that before she left

Pennsylvania, she had heard a weather alert with wind advisories. Another witness,

driving a small sports car, said that he saw the Explorer at least 10 feet in the air and had to

steer to avoid it. He also indicated that, at the time of the accident, ìit was cold and

windy.î

The Windstar driver and three passengers and the accident driver, who was ejected,

were fatally injured. The Jeep driver sustained minor injuries, and her two children were

not injured.

Emergency Response

At 8:08 p.m., a citizen notified the Prince Georgeís County Communication Center

of the accident. About 8:15 p.m., Prince Georgeís County Fire Station engine 46 arrived

on scene, followed by two ambulances, a medical unit, and the Maryland State Police.

Injuries

The following table is based on the International Civil Aviation Organizationís

injury criteria, which the National Transportation Safety Board uses in accident reports for

all transportation modes.

Table 1. Injuries.

Injury type Drivers Passengers Others Total

Fatal 2 3 0 5

Serious 0 0 0 0

Minor 1 0 0 1

None 0 2 0 2

Total 3 5 0 8

Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 830.2 defines fatal injury as ìany injury which results in death within 30 days of 

the accidentî and serious injury as ìan injury which: (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing 

within 7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of 

fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or 

(5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.î
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

Medical and Pathological Information

Accident Driver

The Explorer driver was not wearing her three-point lap/shoulder belt restraint,

was ejected, and was fatally injured. According to the Office of the Chief Medical

Examiner in Baltimore, Maryland, she sustained multiple injuries that included extensive

lacerations of the left side of the forehead, multiple fractures of the skull, massive trauma

to the torso, ribs, spinal column, and vital organs, and fractures of both arms.

Windstar Occupants

All of the occupants in the Windstar sustained fatal injuries. The restrained driver

sustained multiple frontal skull fractures, lacerations of the neck, multiple rib fractures in

the upper torso, and fractures of the upper arms. The unbelted front-seat passenger was

ejected through the windshield. The restrained right rear seat passenger sustained multiple

traumatic head injuries, multiple rib fractures, and other significant injuries. The

restrained left rear seat passenger sustained multiple injuries, including a laceration to the

front scalp and spinal and left rib fractures.

Jeep Occupants

The driver was secured with a lap/shoulder belt and sustained a minor bruise on

her right leg. The passengers, a 3-year-old and an infant, were secured in child safety seats

in the rear and were not injured.

Toxicological Information

The accident driverís toxicological specimens were split and examined by two

laboratories: (1) the Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner found the specimen

negative for drugs and ethanol and reported that its carbon dioxide levels were normal,

and (2) the Federal Aviation Administrationís Civil Aeromedical Institute Toxicological

Laboratory found the specimen negative for drugs and ethanol.

Survival Aspects

The accident driver was ejected during the accident sequence and sustained fatal

injuries. The Explorer was equipped with three-point lap/shoulder belt restraints in the

four outboard seat positions and a two-point lap belt in the rear center seat position. The

driverís restraint system was equipped with a belt pretensioner in the retractor, which

activated when the supplemental air bag restraints deployed. The driverís seat belt and the

webbing showed no evidence of use3

 at the time of the accident. The driver and front right

3 Evidence of use is usually crash-induced loading marks, such as stretch marks and abrasions.
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

seat positions were equipped with frontal supplemental air bags that deployed as a result

of the accident.

The four occupants of the Windstar sustained fatal injuries. The front seat

passenger was ejected during the accident sequence. The vehicle was equipped with threepoint lap/shoulder belt restraints in the front and rear seats. The driverís and both rear seat

restraint systems exhibited signs of use. The front seat passengerís restraint system did not

show signs of use. An examination of the front seat tracks revealed significant damage;

however, the tracks remained attached to their anchorage points. The Windstar was

equipped with front dual-threshold air bags, which deployed.

The Jeep driver sustained minor injuries; the two rear seat occupants were

uninjured. The Jeep was equipped with three-point lap/shoulder belt restraint systems in

the outboard positions and a lap belt in the center rear seat, which were functional. The

driverís three-point lap/shoulder belt showed signs of use. The right rear seat occupant

(the 3-year-old) was secured in a child safety seat that met U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) standards, and the center rear seat occupant (the 11-week-old) was

secured in an infant safety seat that met DOT standards. The child safety seat had been

removed before the National Transportation Safety Boardís inspection. The base of the

detachable infant safety seat was attached and connected to the center lap belt.

Accident Driver Information

At the time of the accident, the 20-year-old driver held a valid Virginia driverís

license issued February 2, 1999. (Her driving license instruction permit was issued July 1,

1997.) A review of her Virginia driving record revealed no history of previous traffic

violations or accidents. The driver successfully completed a high school driverís

education class, which included classroom and on-the-road instruction, while in the 10th

grade during the 1997-98 school year.

According to the driverís mother, with whom she resided, the driverís actual

driving experience consisted of the infrequent use of vehicles that she borrowed from

friends during the 3 years before the accident. She had not previously owned a motor

vehicle, and her mother did not own one at the time of the accident. She had not driven the

accident vehicle before picking it up from the automobile dealer 2 hours before the

accident.

The driverís mother said that her daughter was in good general health and was not

using any type of medication. A review of the driverís medical records found no history of

chronic or acute ailments or illnesses. The Safety Board compiled a 72-hour work-rest

history for the accident driver from interviews with her mother and male friend. On

Tuesday, January 29, 2002, she worked for 7 hours and slept 7 hours Tuesday night. She

had Wednesday off from work and slept 7 hours Wednesday night. On Thursday, she

worked 8 hours and slept 7 hours Thursday night. On Friday, the day of the accident, she

worked 7 hours.
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

Explorer

The 1998 two-door Ford Explorer Sport was manufactured in May 1998. The

vehicle had an automatic transmission and four-wheel drive and was equipped with fourwheel antilock brakes and with driver and passenger air bags as standard equipment.

Traction control and stability control were not available on this vehicle; it was not

equipped with any event data recording capability. Table 2 displays the vehicleís

dimensions, axle weight ratings, and tire size.

Table 2. Explorer dimensions, axle weight ratings, and tire size.

The body damage was catastrophic; contact with the Windstar resulted in major

loading to the right upper body structure. The A- and B-pillars and roof header were

severely displaced rearward and downward. (See figures 3 and 4.) The wheelbase was 101

inches on the left (driver) side and 97 inches on the right (passenger) side. The interior

space of the Explorer was severely compromised, particularly the front seat area. The

windshield was destroyed. The driverís and right front seat anchorage and seat tracks were

fractured.

The Safety Board examined the vehicleís brake systems and did not find any

anomalies. The tires on the accident vehicle were new Dunlop Rover Touring LT,

P255/70x16, 109S M&S, with 2,271 pounds maximum loading at 35 pounds per square

inch (psi) maximum tire pressure. The four matching tires, 1 1/32-inch-deep across the

full tread, were installed on factory alloy wheels. The spare tire was the original and was

installed on the original equipment steel wheel. The left and right front and right rear tires

were all deflated due to damage commensurate with wheel and tire impact damage. No

evidence of a blowout or run-flat condition was found. The left rear tire was still inflated;

postaccident pressure measured 25 psi. The accident damage to the rim in the bead seat

area indicated possible loss of tire pressure during the collision.

Description Dimension

Overall length 179.6 inches

Width 70.2 inches

Height 67 inches

Wheelbase 101.7 inches

Curb weight 3,919 pounds

Front axle weight rating 2,510 pounds

Rear axle weight rating 2,650 pounds

Gross vehicle weight rating 4,900 pounds

Tire size P255/70Rx16SL

Recommended tire pressure for both front and rear 30 pounds per square inch
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

Figure 3. Explorer body damage.

Figure 4. Overhead view of Explorer structural damage.

101"

97"

Left side wheelbase

Right side wheelbase

Passenger

compartment

Imprint from right 

side A-pillar of 

Windstar 

Imprint from left 

side A-pillar of 

Windstar 
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Safety Board investigators examined the suspension system and found damage

consistent with the accident. The left tie rod connection and the left upper ball joint were

severed at the steering knuckle and at the connection with the upper control arm,

respectively, and the steering column slip joint was severed. These suspension system

components were taken to the Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory for fracture mode and

impact analysis. In addition, the steering components were removed from the vehicle and

taken to the supplier for bench testing and teardown. The postaccident examination

revealed no anomalies in the steering or suspension systems. (See the Tests and Research

section of this report for further information.)

The accident driverís male and female friends both stated that after she picked up

the Explorer, the accident driver commented that the car made a grinding or humming

noise when she turned the steering wheel. The Safety Board examined National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and other sources for relevant service manuals,

parts pictorials, recalls, Ford service bulletins, defect investigations, and owner

complaints. The Safety Board reviewed more than 1,000 owner complaints on Explorers

from all sources for sudden loss of control, particularly under windy conditions. The

search yielded no similar complaints of loss of control from wind force. Staff did find

notations from owners and media referencing a general ìlack of precision in vehicle

handling,î as well as squeaks and groans while steering; such statements were not unique

to Explorers.

Windstar

The 2001 four-door Ford LX Extended Sport Windstar minivan, manufactured in

November 2000, was equipped with four-wheel antilock brakes and driver and passenger

air bags as standard equipment. Table 3 displays information about dimensions, axle

weight ratings, and tire size.

Table 3. Windstar original dimensions, axle weight ratings, and tire size.

The Windstar sustained severe damage to its front, sides, rear, and roof, which was

partially detached. The floor was fractured and collapsed rearward. The wheelbase

Description Dimension

Overall length 200.9 inches

Width 75.2 inches

Height 68.2 inches

Wheelbase 120.7 inches

Curb weight 4,058 pounds

Front axle weight rating 2,809 pounds

Rear axle weight rating 2,663 pounds

Gross vehicle weight rating 5,420 pounds

Tire size P215/70R15

Recommended tire pressure for both front and rear 35 pounds per square inch
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

measured 120 inches on the left side and 117 inches on the right side. The interior was

severely compromised; the firewall and dash were collapsed aft. The front area of the roof

was collapsed downward below the window frame and detached from the windshield to

the rear passenger seats. In addition, the rear door and cargo area were deformed forward

to the rear axle. (See figures 5 and 6.)

Figure 5. Windstar body damage.

Figure 6. Overhead view of Windstar structural damage.

120"

117"

Left side wheelbase

Right side wheelbase

 Rear bumper

 (impact from

 Jeep)

Passenger 

compartment 

Hood assembly 

(impact from 

Explorer) 
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

Postaccident examination revealed no anomalies with the steering, suspension, or

brake systems. The Windstar was equipped with electronic event data recording as part of

the air bag sensing and diagnostic module. In addition, tests were performed on the

tachometer and speedometer. (See the Tests and Research section of this report for further

information.)

Jeep

The 1998 four-door Jeep Grand Cherokee, manufactured in April 1998, was

equipped with four-wheel antilock brakes and driver and passenger air bags as standard

equipment. The tires installed on the vehicle were Kelly Safari SUV 225/70x16; tire

pressures measured 28 psi (left front), 26 psi (left rear), 29 psi (right rear), and 27 psi

(right front), and tread depth averaged 10/32 inch on the four tires. Table 4 displays the

vehicleís dimensions and axle weight ratings.

Table 4. Jeep original dimensions, axle weight ratings, and tire size.

The Jeep sustained substantial damage to the front and hood areas and to the right

side of the windshield. The hood had fabric imprints leading up to the area of contact

damage on the right side of the windshield. The interior sustained minor damage,

primarily on the front right side. The windshield was broken and displaced aft with part of

the A-pillar. The interior floor, sidewalls, and ceiling were intact. (See figures 7 and 8.)

The postaccident examination revealed no suspension, brake, or steering system

anomalies.

Description Dimension

Overall length 167.7 inches

Width 69.3 inches

Height 63.8 inches

Wheelbase 101.6 inches

Curb weight 3,025 pounds

Front axle weight rating 2,500 pounds

Rear axle weight rating 2,950 pounds

Gross vehicle weight rating 5,000 pounds

Tire size P225/70x16

Recommended tire pressure for both front and rear 36 pounds per square inch
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

Highway Information

The accident began in the outer loop on the eastern side of I-95/495, also known as

the Capital Beltway, about 0.2 mile south of Maryland State Highway 214 in Prince

Georgeís County, Maryland. (See figure 1.) Built in 1962, this section of I-95/495 is

Figure 7. Jeep body damage.

Figure 8. Overhead view of Jeep structural damage.

106"

105"

Left side wheelbase

Right side wheelbase

Front bumper and 

body damage 

(impact with 

Windstar) 

Fabric 

imprints 

Body impact 

with windshield 
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

owned and operated by the Maryland State Highway Administration (SHA), an agency

within the Maryland Department of Transportation. The 10-lane, divided, controlled-access,

principal arterial highway had 8 through lanes, acceleration and deceleration lanes for State

Highway 214, left and right shoulders in both directions, and a depressed earthen median.

The roadway ran north-south and was aligned at a compass heading of about 355°.

The approximate grade for the northbound lanes was +2.5 percent with a 1.5-percent cross

slope on the inside lanes. (See figure 9.) The pavement markings consisted of

thermoplastic retroreflective white lane lines (10 feet long, spaced 30 feet apart) and

yellow and white painted edgelines on the left and right, respectively. The annual average

daily traffic count was 203,343 vehicles; 14 percent were trucks.4 The posted speed limit

on the Capital Beltway was 55 mph. According to a January 2002 speed survey, the median

speed near the accident site was 66.75 mph and the 85th-percentile speed5

 was 75 mph.

At the accident site, both sides of the depressed center median had semirigid

roadside barriers.6

 (See figure 10.) The barriers were installed in 1962 to shield a drainage

culvert and two metal posts supporting an overhead highway sign from errant traffic. On

the northbound side, the single W-beam rail barrier was approximately 483 feet long; it

incorporated a turned-down end treatment (also known as a ìTexas twistî) on the south

terminal and a cable end treatment on the north terminal. On the southbound side, the

single W-beam rail barrier continued about 0.4 mile south of the accident site, where it

transitioned to a double-sided W-beam (a W-beam on both sides of the post) longitudinal

barrier system. At the accident site, the barrier systems had blocked-out metal posts; both

the posts and the blockouts consisted of 4- by 6-inch metal I-beams supporting a single Wbeam metal rail. The top of the W-beam rail was mounted about 26 inches above the

pavement surface; the rail faced the traffic lanes.

4 The SHA conducted a 48-hour traffic count on March 6, 2002.

Figure 9. Interstate 95/495 cross section at accident site.

5 Eighty-fifth percentile speed is the speed below which 85 percent of the traffic is traveling.

6 A roadside barrier is a longitudinal system used to shield the motorist from hazards along the

roadside or to shield hazards in the median of a divided highway. Typically, a roadside barrier is designed to

redirect a passenger carís 60-mph impact at a 25°, or less, impact angle from one side only. Roadside

barriers may be flexible, semirigid, or rigid.

Earthen median

Two inside northbound

traffic lanes 

55'

1:6 Slope 1:7 Slope

Northbound

shoulder

Southbound

shoulder

Two inside southbound

traffic lanes 
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

Figure 10. Roadway design features at accident site.

11'

11' 10'

59.5'

11'

58'

33.5'

W-beam roadside

barrier with turneddown end treatment

Access lane to

State Highway 214

Concrete

roadside

barrier

W-beam

roadside

barrier

Access lane from

State Highway 214

Concrete

drainage

culvert

W-beam

roadside

barrier

Northbound

Southbound traffic lanes

traffic lanes Earthen

median
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

On April 24, 2002, Safety Board investigators conducted an informal driving

survey of the median barrier systems on the Capital Beltway in both Virginia and

Maryland. Virginia had almost exclusively concrete median barriers. The accident site was

one of a few locations in Maryland that did not have either a double-sided guardrail or a

concrete median barrier in place.

Accident History

The SHA accident records for the 7.76-mile section of I-95/495 between Maryland

State Highway 4 and U.S. Highway 50, which includes the accident location, showed that

1,301 motor vehicle traffic crashes occurred between January 1, 1998, and September 30,

2001. These accidents resulted in 5 fatalities and 944 injuries (see table 5).

Table 5. Accident records for 7.76-mile section of I-95/495 that includes the accident site.

Of the 1,301 reported accidents, about 2 percent (30) involved vehicles that had

encroached into the center median (see table 6). Two of the encroachment accidents

involved vehicles that collided with the median barrier and continued into the opposing

traffic lanes; one involved a minivan and the other involved a commercial motor vehicle.

Year

Fatal 

accidents

Injury 

accidents

Property damage 

accidents

Total 

accidents

Number of 

fatalities

Number

of injuries

1998 0 148 151 299 0 249

1999 1 136 178 315 1 212

2000 1 159 219 379 1 271

2001 3 132 173 308 3 212

Total 5 575 721 1,301 5 944
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

Table 6. Center median accidents near the accident site.

Physical Evidence

On February 3, 2002, Safety Board investigators, assisted by personnel from the

SHA, conducted a detailed mapping of the accident location. (See figure 2.) In the

northbound inside lane and left shoulder, they found four distinct tire marks. Two of the

tire marks began in the inside lane; the longest started about 6 feet east of the left shoulder

edgeline. Both tire marks curved off to the northwest and terminated at the western edge

of the paved surface. The remaining two tire marks were on the left shoulder; the longest

of these started 2 feet west of the edgeline, and both followed the same path, terminating

at the edge of the pavement. An examination of the tire marks revealed a series of

striations running perpendicular to the direction of the tire marks.

In the center median, a set of four tire furrows were found beginning adjacent to

the termination points of the pavement tire marks. The furrows traversed the median in a

Accident

location

Vehicle

direction

Collision

with barrier

Barrier description Resulted in

crossover

MP 10.78 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 10.78 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) Yes

MP 10.79 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 10.82 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 10.84 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 10.87 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 11.28 Northbound No Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 11.28 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 11.70 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 12.45 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing NB) No

MP 13.04 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.08 Northbound No Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.10 Northbound No Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.14 Northbound No Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.15 Northbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.16 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.17 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.18 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.20 Northbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 13.64 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 14.68 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 14.72 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 14.75 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) Yes

*MP 14.78 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

*MP 14.78 Southbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 14.82 Northbound Yes Single-sided W-beam (facing SB) No

MP 17.64 Northbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 17.86 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 17.88 Southbound Yes Double-sided W-beam No

MP 18.45 Southbound Yes Concrete wall No

*Accident location
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

northwest direction. Tire imprints from the Explorer were documented on the turned-down

end treatment of the longitudinal barrier that was adjacent to the northbound traffic lane.

The tire furrows terminated near the roadside barrier at the east side of the center median.

(See figures 11 and 12.)

Figure 11. Explorer path down the northbound cross slope, over the turned-down guardrail end treatment, through the depressed earthen median, and over the backside of the 

southbound guardrail.

Figure 12. Backside of the southbound guardrail.
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

The Explorer struck and deformed a 50-foot section of the southbound barrierís

metal W-beam, pushing it out in a westerly direction. Four metal support posts were

detached from the W-beam rail and pushed over toward the southbound traffic lanes. The

southernmost post, bent at a 33-degree angle, was the most severely deformed. The Wbeam rail was attached to the metal blockouts with a single nut and bolt assembly. Three

of the four posts detached from the W-beam when the attachment boltís head was pulled

through the W-beamís mounting hole. The fourth post detached when the mounting hole

in the blockout split, allowing the bolt to pull through the blockout.

The evidence in the southbound traffic lanes, as documented by the Maryland

State Police, included pavement scrape marks and a liquid debris trail. The scrape marks

began in the inside lane, approximately 102 feet north of the termination point of the

center median tire furrows. The scrape marks continued south about 86 feet. The liquid

debris trail began in the inside lane, approximately 49 feet north of the termination point

of the center median tire furrows. The trail continued southeast about 72 feet and ended on

the left shoulder, about 8 feet east of the edgeline near the final rest position of the Jeep.

Median Barrier Guidelines

In 1962, when this segment of the Capital Beltway was built, no specific warrants

for median barriers were in effect. Traditionally, barriers have not been used in medians

that were 30 feet or more in width. According to the Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA), the 1967 American Association of State Highway Officials7

 report, Highway

Design and Operational Practices Related to Highway Safety,8 suggested that median

barriers be used in medians up to 30 feet wide when traffic volume exceeded 20,000

vehicles per day. Specific guidelines relating median barrier warrants to median width and

traffic volumes first appeared in the 1977 American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Guide for Selecting, Locating, and Designing Traffic

Barriers. The guidelines were incorporated, unchanged, into the 1989, 1996, and 2002

editions of the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide.

The AASHTO 2002 Roadside Design Guide, which is the most recent edition,

suggests guidelines for the installation of median barriers on high-speed roadways based

on a combination of the average daily traffic count and the center median widths. In light

of the 2002 Roadside Design Guide criteria, both the 203,343 average daily traffic count

and the 55-foot-wide median at the accident location place the site in the category in

which a ìmedian barrier would not normally be considered.î (See figure 13.)

The 2002 Roadside Design Guide acknowledges that several States have

developed guidelines more stringent than its own. For example, Florida has considered

median widths under 64 feet as candidates for a median barrier. In addition, a 1997

California study suggested that medians as wide as 75 feet on roadways with traffic

volumes up to 60,000 vehicles per day would be candidates for a median barrier review.

7 This association has been renamed and is now the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials. 

8 The report is often referred to as the ìYellow Book.î
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

California also used a study warrant to identify sections of freeways that might require

installation of a median barrier. This warrant required a minimum of three cross-median

accidents within a 5-year period on a 1-mile segment of highway.

Marylandís Median Barrier Policies

In 1990, according to SHA officials, because of concerns resulting from median

crossover accidents, the SHA reviewed its policy on median barriers on the Maryland

interstate system. The SHA found that the number of such accidents was ìfairly small.î

Regardless, the SHA still considered it beneficial to install additional median barriers on

its highway system, given the severity of opposite-direction accidents. The SHA decided

to position barriers along sections of highway having median widths of less than 75 feet.

The first installations were targeted for those sections of highway that had a history of

median crossover accidents.

The SHA has used various median barrier systems, including concrete barriers and

single- and double-sided W-beam barriers. During the 1990 policy revision, the agency

developed specific criteria regarding the use of single-sided W-beam rail as a median

barrier. Among the factors considered were results of an analysis of the existing highway

features and the construction costs associated with median installation. Part of the

decision-making process also involved an assessment of median width. Since the SHA

had identified several studies indicating that 80 to 90 percent of errant vehicles leaving the

Figure 13. ìMedian Barrier Warrants for Freeways and Expressways,î American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Roadside Design Guide, 2002.
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

roadway recovered within a distance of 30 to 35 feet, the agency believed that if the width

of existing medians met these criteria, a single-sided W-beam system could be used, since

a vehicle driver would most likely recover before striking the barrier. The SHA has since

revised its policy concerning the use of single-sided W-beam rail as a median barrier.

Double-sided barriers provide protection on both sides of the post so that errant vehicles

that traverse the median encounter the W-beam rail instead of the semi-rigid support post.

According to agency officials, they have mandated the use of double-sided barriers in all

new W-beam, median barrier system installations in the last 8 to 10 years.

In 2002, the Maryland General Assembly asked the SHA to provide an inventory

of all ìTexas twistî guardrails in the State and to specify the schedule and cost to replace

these guardrails. In November 2002, the SHA estimated the cost of replacing or upgrading

the 3,400 turned-down terminals and upgrading the guardrail system along high-speed

highways at $34.3 million.9 In addition, the Maryland Department of Transportation

committed $2 million in fiscal year 2003 to a program to eliminate turned-down terminals

and upgrade guardrails along the Baltimore and Capital Beltways (I-695 and I-95/-495,

respectively), the remaining SHA portion of I-95, and the Baltimore-Washington Parkway

(MD 295). Contracts to upgrade these terminals and guardrails were let in May 2003 and

are expected to be completed during fiscal year 2003.

After the Largo accident, as was its policy, the SHA replaced the damaged

guardrail, including the northbound end treatment, at the accident site ìin kind,î that is,

with the same type of installation that was in place before the accident. In its November

2002 report to the General Assembly, the SHA also indicated that it has changed its policy

and now replaces obsolete terminals that have any damage, even cosmetic; previously, the

agency replaced only heavily damaged terminals. 

Meteorology

Wind Advisories

Traffic on bridges is more exposed to the effects of wind. On the day of the

accident, the Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA)10 placed a wind-warning advisory

in effect at all MTA bridges from 9:45 a.m., February 1, 2002, until 7:16 a.m., February 2,

2002, due to high winds in the region. Wind advisories were broadcast over the local

media. 

9 Maryland Department of Transportation, Report to the Maryland General Assembly Senate and

Taxation Committee and House Appropriations Committee, ìStudy of Guardrail End Treatment and Height

Deficiencies,î November 1, 2002.

10 Established in 1971, the MTA is responsible for constructing, managing, and operating Marylandís

toll facilities. The MTA oversees seven toll facilities: a turnpike (a 50-mile section of I-95), two tunnels

(Fort McHenry Tunnel and Baltimore Harbor Tunnel), and four bridges (Thomas J. Hatem Memorial

Bridge; Francis Scott Key Bridge; William Preston Lane, Jr. Memorial Bridge; and Governor Harry W. Nice

Memorial Bridge).
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

Surface Weather Observations

The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a Surface Analysis Chart for 7:00

p.m. on February 1, 2002, showing that the accident site was on the western, or cold-air,

side of a complex-occluded frontal system.11

The closest surface weather observation stations to the accident site were at

Andrews Air Force Base (Andrews AFB), about 5.5 miles south; Ronald Reagan

Washington National Airport (DCA), about 10 miles to the southwest; and BaltimoreWashington International Airport (BWI), about 22 miles to the northeast. (See figure 14.)

Andrews Air Force Base. Andrews AFB reported the following weather

conditions at 7:55 p.m.: wind from 310° sustained at 23 mph, gusting to 39 mph; visibility

7 miles; few clouds at 3,000 feet, scattered clouds at 10,000 and 20,000 feet; temperature

of 46° F; dew point 27° F; and altimeter 29.98 inches of mercury. Remarks: peak wind

recorded from 300° at 41 mph at 7:17 p.m.; peak wind from 300° at 44 mph reported at

7:56 p.m.; wind from 310° sustained at 24 mph, gusting to 32 mph, reported at 8:55 p.m.;

and visibility and sky conditions unchanged.

11 A front formed by a cold front overtaking a warm front and lifting the warm air above the earthís

surface.

Figure 14. Area map showing location of surface weather observation 

facilities relative to the accident location.
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. DCA reported the following

weather conditions at 7:51 p.m.: wind from 310° sustained at 29 mph, gusting to 40 mph;

visibility unrestricted at 10 miles; few clouds at 10,000 feet; temperature 47° F; dew point

27° F; and altimeter 30.02 inches of mercury. Remarks: peak wind from 310° at 41 mph at

7:34 p.m., and pressure rising rapidly. Peak wind from 300° at 44 mph at 8:03 p.m.

Baltimore International Airport. BWI reported the following conditions at 7:54

p.m.: wind from 290° sustained at 26 mph, gusting to 41 mph; visibility unrestricted at 10

statute miles; few clouds at 15,000 feet; temperature 46° F; dew point 28° F; and altimeter

29.98 inches of mercury. Remarks: peak wind from 320° at 41 mph at 7:47 p.m. Peak

wind from 300° at 39 mph at 8:02 p.m.

NWS Weather Advisories

On February 1, 2002, the NWS forecast office in Sterling, Virginia, which is

responsible for the Baltimore/Washington area, issued two weather advisories warning of

high winds. The advisory current at the time of the accident was issued at 3:30 p.m. and

indicated that a strong cold front was crossing the region that afternoon with strong west

to northwest winds that would continue into the evening. The winds were expected to

gradually decrease after midnight. The wind advisory warned of ìwest to northwest winds

at 25 to 35 mph that will continue late this afternoon and this evening. Wind gusts to 45

mph at times through the early evening hours.î The NWS warned citizens ìto secure loose

objectsî and that the wind gusts could bring down small trees and branches and possibly

cause isolated power outages.

Tests and Research

Vehicle Component Examinations

Explorer Suspension Components. The Safety Boardís Materials Laboratory

examined the Explorer suspension components and determined that the fractured steering

knuckle and ball joint were the result of overload failure from crash forces. Evidence

indicated that crash-induced deformation caused the severing of the steering column slip

joint. All other front and rear suspension attachment points were tight and fully connected,

and all attachment hardware was in place. The front suspension sway bar links were in

place, tight, and fully connected, and all attachment hardware was in place.

Explorer Steering Components. The rack-and-pinion steering gear, power

steering pump, and steering column were removed from the vehicle. The steering column

was unbolted from the vehicle after the steering wheel and air bag had been removed. The

other components were torch-cut from the vehicle under Safety Board supervision, taking

care not to heat the components. The rack-and-pinion steering gear, pump, and steering

column were subsequently taken to Visteon (a Ford steering component supplier) in

Dearborn, Michigan, for bench testing and teardown under Safety Board supervision.
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

The steering gear aluminum housing was fractured due to internal overpressuring

caused by crash forces consistent with extensive damage from impact with the second

guardrail. Teardown of the rack and pinion revealed an absence of contamination; all

components showed negligible wear, and damage to the rack was consistent with highforce impact with the guardrail. The power steering pump was operational on the Visteon

pump test fixture and exhibited flow rates, output pressure as a function of pump rpm, and

pulse frequencies consistent with new pump specifications. The power steering pump

teardown revealed no wear patterns, scoring, galling, or evidence of operation with

insufficient fluid.

Windstar Tachometer and Speedometer. The Fairfax County, Virginia, Police

Department Accident Reconstruction Unit laboratory conducted variable-frequency

ultraviolet examination to test for tachometer and speedometer needle slap.12 The

laboratory analysis showed a precrash tachometer needle position of 2,800 rpm.

Using Ford data on Windstar gear ratios and tire revolutions per mile, staff

calculated a speed of 88.2 mph at 2,800-rpm engine speed. Examination of the

speedometer showed an initial needle slap mark interpolated between 83 and 85 mph,

based on mph scribes on the cluster of 80 and 120 mph, respectively. As a Canadianspecified vehicle, the Windstar had a metric (kph) speedometer and mph as the

subordinate scale. The speedometer needle postcrash was fixed at 180 kph, corresponding

to an approximate speed of 110 mph. 

Windstar Air Bag Event Recording Data Retrieval. The Windstar had an

electronic event-recording device as part of the air bag sensing and diagnostic system.

This system was designed primarily to assess crash severity, to decide whether a crash

warrants air bag deployment, and to store that information, rather than to capture

information necessary to analyze the total event. The electronic device was taken to

Takata (a Ford restraint supplier) in South Field, Michigan, for data retrieval. Output from

the sensor was minimal due to a power severance to the device early in the crash. The

downloaded data indicated a high-severity crash, warranting air bag deployment, and

revealed belt use for the driver and no belt use for the right front passenger.

Pavement Coefficient of Friction

On February 5, 2002, the SHA Structures and Pavement Inspection Division

performed dry pavement friction tests at the accident site. Using a trailer-mounted testing

device, personnel conducted five dry pavement friction tests in each direction. On May 15,

2002, the SHA carried out both wet and dry pavement tests using a treaded tire that

conformed to American Society for Testing and Materials standard E274-97.13 Before the

accident, as part of its annual pavement performance-monitoring program, the SHA had

12 A transfer of phosphorus from the needle to the dial at impact.

13 Standard test method for skid resistance of paved surfaces using a full-scale tire. This test method

uses a measurement representing the steady-state friction force on a locked test wheel as the wheel is

dragged over a wet paved surface under constant load and at constant speed while its major plane is parallel

to its direction of motion and perpendicular to the pavement.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

conducted friction tests at three locations within a mile of the accident site. Table 7 shows

the results of these tests.

Table 7. Pavement friction tests.

Simulation

The Safety Board evaluated the Explorerís controllability in crosswinds and the

potential effects of a driver-delayed reaction time due to wireless telephone use.

Investigators used Simulation Model Non-linear (SIMON) software14 to calculate the

vehicleís movement, Human Vehicle Environment (HVE) software15 to visualize the

vehicleís movement, and AutoCAD Land Development Desktop software16 to build the

accident scene based on three-dimensional mapping data obtained at the accident site.

Safety Board staff modeled the two-door accident vehicle using the 1991-1994

four-door Explorer in the HVE vehicle library and modifying its wheelbase, fore and aft

center of gravity, vehicle weight, and sprung mass moments of inertia to match data

provided by Ford Motor Company for a 1998 two-door Explorer. The two wind speeds

used in the simulations were the 23-mph-sustained wind measured at Andrews AFB and

the 44-mph wind gust. Investigators used various wind gust durations in the simulation,

since the exact duration of the gusts at the time of the accident was unknown. Ford Motor

Company also provided wind tunnel-derived aerodynamic coefficient data.

The two ranges of driver reaction times used in the simulation were (1) for an alert

driver reaction (0.30 to 0.59 second) based on the median reaction times of young drivers

to abrupt wind gusts17 and (2) for a wireless telephone user driver reaction (0.685 to 1.15

Date Direction Friction number*

February 5, 2002 Northbound 61.0 (dry)

Southbound 57.0 (dry)

May 15, 2002 Northbound 72.0 (dry)

Northbound 43.0 (wet)

2000 Northbound 46, 47, 50 (wet)

Southbound 45, 45, 47 (wet)

*A friction number represents the frictional properties of the pavement. These numbers are used to evaluate the 

pavementís skid resistance relative to other pavements and/or to evaluate the change in the pavementís skid 

resistance over time. The higher the number, the more skid resistance the pavement provides.

14 SIMON allows users to simulate the response of one or more vehicles to driver inputs and factors

related to the environment, including terrain, atmosphere, and wind. The SIMON software is threedimensional and includes 6° of freedom for both independent and solid-axle suspension systems. 

15 HVE allows users to study vehicle and occupant kinematics. 

16 The scene was built with AutoCAD Land Development Desktop release 2i and AutoCAD release

2000.

17 Walter W. Wierville, John G. Casali, and Brian S. Repa, ìDriver Steering Reaction Time to AbruptOnset Crosswinds, as Measured in a Moving-Base Driving Simulator,î 1983, Human Factors, 25(1), 103-

116.
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

seconds) based on delays in simple reaction situations such as braking response to a

braking maneuver in a lead vehicle (0.385 to 0.560 seconds).18 The effects of having only

one hand on the steering wheel while using a handheld wireless telephone could not be

quantified and were not included in the simulation.

In this computer simulation study, Safety Board staff evaluated the controllability

of the Explorer traveling at 70 mph in crosswinds of 23 mph, gusting to 44 mph. The

results indicated that:

ï the winds would have initially caused the Explorer to move to the right and

rotate clockwise; 

ï the exact amount of lateral movement caused by the wind depended on the

duration of the gust, the driver reaction time, and the steering input; 

ï the wind gusts would not have made the Explorer uncontrollable for an alert

driver who had two hands on the steering wheel; and

ï the delays in driver reaction time could have increased the lateral movement of

the Explorer to such an extent that the vehicle intruded into the next lane.

Other Information

 Wireless Telephone Use

Accident Driver. After the accident, Safety Board investigators found the accident

driverís wireless telephone, without any hands-free apparatus, in the median. The accident

driverís mother stated that her daughter had used the same wireless telephone for 2 years

before the accident and that it was programmed with frequently called numbers. The

Safety Board obtained the telephone records for both the accident driver and the male

friend. The records show that on February 1, 2002, starting at 4:00 p.m., the accident

driver placed or received 15 telephone calls, 12 of which were either to or from the male

friendís wireless telephone number. (See table 8.) 

18 (a) Hakan Alm and Lena Nilson, ìChanges in Driver Behavior as a Function of Hands-Free Mobile

PhonesñA Simulator Study,î 1994, Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 26, No. 4, 441-451 and (b)

Hakan Alm and Lena Nilson, ìThe Effects of a Mobile Telephone Task on Driver Behavior in a Car

Following Situation,î 1995, Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 27, No. 5, 707-715. 
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

Table 8. Accident driverís wireless telephone record for February 1, 2002.

Nationwide and Worldwide. According to the Cellular Telecommunications &

Internet Association, the number of wireless telephone subscribers in the United States in

April 2003 was 144,770,650.19 This figure represented about 76 percent of the 191 million

licensed U.S. drivers.20 (Not all wireless telephone subscribers were driverís license

holders.) Also, according to the association, nearly 118,000 wireless telephone calls are

made to 9-1-1 and other emergency numbers each day, totaling more than 43 million calls

annually.

In its 1997 study, An Investigation of the Safety Implications of Wireless

Communications in Vehicles, NHTSA estimated that at any given time during daylight

hours, 3 percent of U.S. drivers were talking on a handheld wireless telephone.

Observational studies21 in Dallas, Texas, (during an afternoon rush hour) found a 5-percent

use rate and in Washington State a 3.5-percent use rate. In a 2002 North Carolina study,22

Number Time Incoming or Outgoing Length in Minutes

1 4:00 p.m. Outgoing to a number in Arlington 1

2 4:03 p.m. Outgoing to voice mailbox 3

3 4:43 p.m. Outgoing to a number in Occoquan, Virginia 3

4 6:16 p.m. Incoming from the male friendís number 1

5 6:22 p.m. Incoming from the male friendís number 1

6 6:23 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

7 6:33 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

8 6:34 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

9 6:57 p.m. Incoming from the male friendís number 1

10 6:59 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

11 7:07 p.m. Incoming from the male friendís number 1

12 7:23 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

13 7:24 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 1

14 7:55 p.m. Incoming from the male friendís number 2

15 *8:00 p.m. Outgoing to the male friendís number 3

*The accident occurred about 8:00 p.m.

19 Information accessed on May 19, 2003, from <http:www.wow-com.com>.

20 U.S Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety

Facts 2001 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2002).

21 Anne T. McCartt, Elisa R. Braver, and Lori L. Geary, Driversí Use of Handheld Cell Phones Before and

After New York Stateís Cell Phone Law, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (Arlington, VA: June 2002).

22 Jane C. Stutts, Herman F. Huang, and William W. Hunter, ìCell Phone Use While Driving in North

Carolina: 2002 Update Report,î University of North Carolina, Highway Safety Research Center, December 2002.
Factual Information 27 Highway Accident Report

the authors estimated that 58.8 percent of the Stateís licensed drivers had used a wireless

telephone while driving. A recent survey23 performed by The Gallup Organization for

NHTSA indicated that 25 percent of the 4,010 drivers interviewed had used a wireless

telephone while driving.

According to a U.S. General Accounting Office report24 on wireless telephone

health issues, the number of wireless subscribers increased from 16 million in 1994 to 110

million in 2001. The report also states that some experts project that worldwide wireless

telephone use will reach 1.2 billion subscribers in 2005. In Austria, Finland, Italy, Norway,

South Korea, and Sweden, more than half of the populations subscribe now.

Wireless Telephone Use and Driving

In its 1997 report, NHTSA characterizes wireless telephone use while driving a

form of driver distraction. According to NHTSA research, driver distraction occurs when

a driver ìis delayed in the recognition of information needed to safely accomplish the

driving task because some event, activity, object, or person within or outside the vehicle

compels or induces the driverís shifting attention away from the driving task.î25 Other

researchers have defined driver distraction as ìany activity that takes a driverís attention

away from the task of drivingî26 and have identified four categories of distraction: visual,

auditory, biomechanical, and cognitive. For example, talking on a handheld wireless

telephone might involve auditory, biomechanical, and cognitive distraction.

During the 1990s, the use of wireless telephones and other wireless

communication devices while driving became the subject of debate as government

agencies considered restrictive legislation. Research established that when auditory and

visual tasks are performed simultaneously, performance on both tasks is degraded through

slowed responses, reduced accuracy, or both.27 Research performed in driving simulators28

and in actual driving environments29 suggested that the cognitive demands of wireless

telephone conversations may lead to driver distraction. A Canadian study concluded that

wireless telephone units that allow hands-free operation offer little, if any, safety

23 Dawn Royal, National Survey of Distracted and Drowsy Driving Attitudes and Behaviors: 2002,

Volume 1-Findings Report, The Gallup Organization, DOT NHTSA 809566, March 2003.

24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: Research and Regulatory Efforts on Mobile

Phone Health Issues, May 2001 (GAO-01-545).

25 J.C. Stutts, D.W. Reinfurt, L. Staplin, and E.A. Rodgman, ìThe Role of Driver Distraction in Traffic

Crashes,î University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center, 2001. Prepared for AAA

Foundation for Traffic Safety.

26 T.A. Ranney, E. Mazzae, R. Garrott, and M. Goodman, ìNHTSA Driver Distraction Research: Past,

Present and Future,î 2000. Submitted to the NHTSA Driver Distraction Internet Forum. 

27 M.A. Just, P.A. Carpenter, T.A. Keller, L. Emery, H. Zajac, and K.R. Thulborn, ìInterdependence of

Nonoverlapping Cortical Systems in Dual Cognitive Tasks,î 2000, NeuroImage, 14, 417-426.

28 D.L. Strayer and W.A. Johnston, ìDriven to Distraction: Dual-Task Studies of Simulated Driving and

Conversing on a Cellular Telephone,î Psychological Science, 12(6), 2001, 462-466.

29 T. Hagiwara, R.A. Tokunaga, K. Nonami, S. Kagaya, and A. Shimojyo, ìEffects of Using a Cellular

Telephone While Driving on Reaction Time and Subjective Mental Workload,î Transportation Research

Board 78th Annual Meeting, January 10-14, 1999, Washington, DC.
Factual Information 28 Highway Accident Report

advantage over handheld units.30 Other researchers found that laws restricting handheld

devices are not likely to reduce driver distraction because the distraction is due to the

cognitive impact of the conversation, as well as the physical aspects of holding the

telephone and dialing.31 Additional simulator research32 conducted at the University of

Utah suggested that using a wireless telephone disrupts performance by diverting attention

from the external environment, immediately associated with driving, toward an engaging

cognitive context, resulting in ìinattention blindness.î

The use of wireless telephones (both handheld and hands-free) while driving has

been shown to significantly increase driversí reaction times,33 speed variability,34

subjective mental workload,35 and risk of collision,36 as well as to degrade situational

awareness.37 In the 2001 Parkes and Hooijmeijer study in a simulated road environment,

subjects engaged in a telephone conversation were unaware of traffic movements around them.

30 D.A. Redelmeier and R.J. Tibshirani, ìAssociation Between Cellular-Telephone Calls and Motor

Vehicle Collisions,î New England Journal of Medicine, 1997.

31 D. Strayer, F. Drews, R. Albert, and W. Johnston, ìDoes Cell Phone Conversation Impair Driving

Performance?î University of Utah, Psychological Science, 2001.

32 David L. Strayer, Frank A. Drews, and William Johnston, ìCell Phone-Induced Failures of Visual

Attention During Simulated Driving,î 2003, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, University of

Utah.

33 (a) H. Alm and L. Hilsson, ìThe changes of a mobile telephone task on driver behavior in a car

following situation,î 1995, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 27, 707-716. (b) D. Lamble et al, ìCognitive

Load and Detection Thresholds in Car Following Situations: Safety Implications for Using Mobile

(Cellular) Telephones While Driving,î 1999, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 617-623.

34 G. Pachiaudi and A. Chapon, ìCar Phone and Road Safety,î XIVth International Technical

Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 1994, Munich, Germany, No. 94-S2-0-09.

35 K.A. Brookhuis, G. De Vries, and D. De Waard, ìThe Effects of Mobile Telephoning on Driving

Performance,î 1991, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 23, 309-316.

36 Redelmeier and Tibshirani, 453-458.

37 A.M Parkes, and V. Hooijmeijer, ìDriver Situation Awareness and Carphone Use,î First HumanCentered Transportation Simulation Conference, 2001, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, November 4-7,

2001.
Factual Information 29 Highway Accident Report

The relationship between poor situational awareness and poor performance has

been documented in several modes of transportation.38 Safety Board investigations have

shown that when airline pilots, railroad engineers, and ship crews lose situational

awareness, they make operational errors that lead to accidents.

In addition, The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, which completed a

study39 of research commissioned by the British Department for Transport, Local

Government and the Regions, found that using a mobile telephone while driving impairs

driving performance. The study states:

Many studies, using a variety of different research techniques, have reached the

same conclusions. Using a mobile telephone while driving adversely affects driver

performance in a number of different ways. It impairs: maintenance of lane

position, maintenance of appropriate and predicted speed, maintenance of

appropriate following distances from vehicles in front, reaction times, judgment

and acceptance of safe gaps in traffic and general awareness in traffic.

The same study concluded ìthere is evidence that using a mobile telephone while

driving causes greater problems for those drivers who already have a higher accident risk,

namely young, novice drivers and elderly drivers.î

Recent research40 conducted on the Ford Motor Companyís Virtual Test Track

Experiment (a large, 6-degree-of-freedom moving base simulator) provided further evidence

of the vulnerability of young, novice drivers to distractions while driving. The experiment

involved 63 test participants: 48 subjects between the ages of 25 and 66 and 15 teenagers

recently licensed to drive (ages 16, 17, and one 18-year-old). The researchers observed:

38 (a) National Transportation Safety Board, Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 2 on the CSXT Big Bayou

Canot Bridge Near Mobile, Alabama, September 22, 1993, Railroad-Marine Accident Report NTSB/RAR94/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994). (b) National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, 1993, Aviation Accident Report NTSB/AAR-94/04 (Washington, DC:

NTSB, 1994). (c) National Transportation Safety Board, Controlled Flight Into Terrain, Korean Air Flight

801, Boeing 747-300, HL7468, Nimitz Hill, Guam, August 6, 1997, Aviation Accident Report NTSB/AAR00/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000). (d) Aeronautica Civil of the Government of Colombia, Controlled

Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia,

December 20, 1995, Aircraft Accident Report. (e) National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the

Spanish Bulk Carrier URDULIZ by the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69), Hampton Roads,

Virginia, August 29, 1988, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-90/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1990). (f)

National Transportation Safety Board, Grounding of the U.S. Tank Ship STAR CONNECTICUT, Pacific

Ocean, Near Barbers Point, Hawaii, November 6, 1990, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-92/01

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1992). (g) National Transportation Safety Board, Grounding of the Panamanian

Passenger Ship ROYAL MAJESTY on Rose and Crown Shoal Near Nantucket, Massachusetts, June 10, 1995,

Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-97/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1992). (h) National Transportation

Safety Board, Collision of Two Burlington Northern Santa Fe Freight Trains Near Clarendon, Texas, on May

28, 2002, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-03/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2003).

39 ìThe Risk of Using a Mobile Phone While Driving,î July 18, 2002, The Royal Society for the

Prevention of Accidents, Birmingham, England.

40 J. Greenberg et al, ìEvaluation of Driver Distraction Using an Event Detection Paradigm,î Presented

in Session 320, Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, January 13, 2003, Ford Research

Laboratory, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan.
Factual Information 30 Highway Accident Report

The teen drivers exhibited behaviors that may place them at higher risk even when

no distraction was present and . . . distraction from the secondary tasks [retrieving

voice mail, dialing and answering both handheld and hands-free wireless

telephones] was more pronounced with this group.

Also, the researchers concluded:

The combination of poor judgment in following distance, poor vehicle control

skills and more severe distraction seen in teen drivers is a serious cause for

concern. Cellular telephones, pagers and other devices are popular among teens.

The results of this study indicate that, at a minimum, driver education curricula

should be revised to address the use of communication technology while driving.

The use of handheld telephones by teens, in particular, should be strongly

discouraged.

Regulations Regarding Wireless Telephone Use While Driving

Federal. The Federal Government has no regulations on the use of mobile

telephones or wireless technologies in motor vehicles. In 2001, Federal lawmakers

proposed legislation to curb wireless telephone use in automobiles (Senate Bill 927 and

House of Representatives Bill 1837) that would require States to prohibit handheld

wireless telephone devices in motor vehicles or risk losing Federal highway funds. The

Congress did not pass that legislation.

In March 2002, the U.S. General Services Administration recommended that

Federal agencies discourage employees from using a handheld device while driving

Government-owned or -leased vehicles.41 It also recommended that employees be

provided access to hands-free devices and safety information.

State and Local. On November 1, 2001, New York became the first State to

prohibit drivers from talking on handheld wireless telephones while operating a motor

vehicle unless the driver is calling for assistance or to report a dangerous situation.

Additionally, New York passed legislation that banned taxi drivers from using any type of

a wireless telephone. California requires that rental cars equipped with wireless telephones

include written instructions for the safe operation of a wireless telephone while driving.

Florida and Illinois permit wireless telephone use as long as the device does not impair

sound to both ears of the driver. Arizona and Massachusetts prohibit school bus drivers

from using wireless telephones while operating a school bus. In 2001, 43 State

legislatures, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico considered approximately 140 bills

regarding the use of wireless telephones while driving. The legislation varied in each

jurisdiction and none of the bills passed, either failing in committee or carrying over to

2002. This number of legislatures was an increase from the 27 that considered wireless

telephone measures in 2000 and the 15 that did so in 1999.

41 GAO-01-545.
Factual Information 31 Highway Accident Report

Eight States42 have introduced legislation to prohibit young drivers from using

wireless telephones while driving.43 In 2002, New Jersey enacted a law44 prohibiting

holders of driver examination permits from using any interactive wireless device while

operating a motor vehicle. A similar law, which would prohibit drivers holding only a

driverís permit from using a wireless telephone while driving, was introduced in the

Pennsylvania legislature.45 On May 23, 2003, the Governor of Maine signed a law

restricting drivers under age 18, including persons with an instruction permit and holders

of a restricted license, from ìoperating a motor vehicle while using a mobile phone.î 46

At least 22 municipalities or counties47 have limited their drivers to using only

hands-free devices while operating a motor vehicle. Several other large cities, including

Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco,

California, have considered or are considering wireless telephone legislation.

International. Many countries have restricted or prohibited use of wireless

telephone or other wireless technology in motor vehicles. Some countries fine drivers who

are involved in a crash while talking on a wireless telephone, and other countriesí drivers

lose their insurance coverage if they are involved in an accident while talking on a

wireless telephone. Japan and Ireland impose a penalty of up to 3 months in jail, as well as

a fine. France and New Zealand are considering legislation that would restrict wireless

telephone use. Table 9 lists countries and their legislative limitations on the use of wireless

telephones while operating a motor vehicle.

42 Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

43 Susan A. Ferguson, ìOther High-Risk Factors for Young DriversóHow Graduated Licensing Does,

Doesnít, or Could Address Them,î 2003, Journal of Safety Research, 34, 71-77.

44 Bill AB 3241 was enacted January 14, 2002. 

45 The Governor vetoed Bill HB 1553 on December 16, 2002. 

46 Legislative Document 1439. 

47 Miami Dade County, Pembroke Pines, and Westin, Florida; Brookline, Massachusetts; Carteret,

Marlboro, and Nutley, New Jersey; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Suffolk County, Nassau County, Rockland

County, and Westchester County, New York; Brooklyn, North Olmstead, and Walnut Hills, Ohio;

Conshohocken, Hilltown, Lebanon, West Conshohocken, and York, Pennsylvania; and Sandy, Utah.
Factual Information 32 Highway Accident Report

Table 9. Countries and their legislative limitations on the use of wireless telephones while 

operating a motor vehicle.

Country Legislation

Australia Can only use hands-free device and only when vehicle is parked with engine 

turned off.

Austria Handheld telephone use banned.

Belgium Handheld telephone use banned, except in a stationary (parked) vehicle. 

Brazil Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Czech Republic Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Chile Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving

Denmark Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

England Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving. 

Germany Handheld telephone use banned, except in a stationary vehicle with the engine 

turned off.

Greece Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Hong Kong Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Hungary Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Ireland Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Israel Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

India (New Delhi only) Prohibits use of any wireless telephone while driving.

Italy Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Isle of Man Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Japan Prohibits use of handheld telephone unless vehicle is stationary or in an 

emergency situation.

Isle of Jersey Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Jordan Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Malaysia Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Norway After March 15, 2000, all telephones in cars must be hands-free and firmly 

mounted on dashboard.

Philippines Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Poland Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Portugal Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Romania Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Russia Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Singapore Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Slovak Republic Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Slovenia Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

South Africa Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.
Factual Information 33 Highway Accident Report

Effectiveness. A recent observational study48 of the effectiveness of the New

York law examined use of handheld wireless telephones before and after November 1,

2001, when the law was implemented. The researchers found that the handheld wireless

telephone use rate decreased from 2.3 percent of observed drivers (before) to 1.1 percent

(after); the researchers did not examine crash rates.

In fall 2003, the Institute for Traffic Safety Management and Research at the

University at Albany, State University of New York, plans to conduct a crash analysis of

the Stateís wireless telephone accidents for the 18-month period from July 2001 through

December 2002.49 New York started coding such accidents for data collection purposes on

July 1, 2001.

Wireless Telephone Use Warnings and Training

Most wireless telephone manufacturers include warnings in their product user

guides regarding safe use of a wireless telephone while operating a vehicle. For example,

the AT&T wireless product welcome guide warns consumers to carefully consider

whether they should use their telephone while driving and to avoid accidents by not

reaching for the telephone or talking on the device. The guide states that factors to

consider while using a wireless telephone include driving skill and experience, familiarity

with the vehicle, and traffic and weather conditions.

State Farm Insurance Company recently included with its insurance renewal

notices a warning about wireless telephone use while driving. The warning indicates that

drivers using wireless telephones are more likely to be involved in automobile accidents

than those not using them. Also, the warning states that even telephones with hands-free

features may not offer safety advantages over traditional handheld units. The warning

concludes that to ìprotect yourself and others, donít become distracted while driving.î

South Korea Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Spain Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Switzerland Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Taiwan Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Thailand Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Turkey Prohibits use of handheld telephone while driving.

Sources: (a) The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, îThe Risk of Using a Mobile Phone While Driving,î 

Birmingham, England, July 18, 2002, and (b) National Conference of State Legislatures, ìAlong for the Ride: Reducing 

Driver Distractions,î March 2002 (ISBN 1-58024-207-3).

48 McCartt, Braver, and Geary.

49 Anne M. Dowling, ìDistracted Driving: The New York State Experience,î March 10, 2003,

presentation at Lifesavers 2003, Chicago, Illinois.
Factual Information 34 Highway Accident Report

The Shell Oil Company published an eight-page pamphlet50 on ìDeadly

Distractionsî that warned drivers about the use of wireless telephones and other

distractions in vehicles while driving.

On behalf of the American Automobile Association, Glencoe/McGraw Hill

published Responsible Driving, a driver education book51 for high school students, that

includes the chapter, ìDistractions Can Increase Driving Risk.î It states that using a

wireless telephone while driving is not recommended because statistics show that wireless

telephones are distracting and increase the risk of accidents and that dialing and talking

divert a driverís attention from controlling the vehicle and watching the road. In addition,

it recommends keeping the wireless telephone in the glove compartment with the ringer

off and states that if the driver must place a call, he or she should stop the vehicle off the

road.

Virginia Driverís Education Curriculum

The 1997-1998 State of Virginiaís Driverís Education curriculum did not address

wireless telephone use or driver distraction. The 1991 Virginia Driverís Education

Standards of Learning, which were in effect during the 1997-1998 school year, did not

include a driver distraction objective. In 2001, Virginia updated its Driverís Education

Standards of Learning and added the following objective: ìThe student will identify

distractions that contribute to driver error. Key concepts include (a) passengers and pets,

(b) vehicle accessories, and (c) cell phones and other portable technology devices.î The

instructorís guidebook does not have specific information on driver distraction. A driver

education instructor in the Fairfax County school system indicated that he used the Shell

Oil Company pamphlet, noted above, to teach the risks of driver distraction. 

The 2003-2004 program of studies for the accident driverís high school indicates

that the driver education course comprises 90 periods of instruction. This instruction is

divided between theory, provided in a classroom setting, and laboratory work, which

includes student experiences in simulators and at the controls of a driver education car,

either on the road or in an off-street driving area.

NHTSA Activities

In 1997, NHTSA compiled An Investigation of the Safety Implications of Wireless

Communications in Vehicles, a report that discusses the scientific research on use of

wireless devices, as well as the limited crash data then available. The report also offers a

number of recommendations for addressing the issues identified: 

ï Improving data collection and reporting.

ï Improving consumer education.

ï Initiating a broad range of research to better define and understand the

problem.

50 Available at <www.countonshell.com>.

51 Accessed from the Web site <www.glencoe.com>.
Factual Information 35 Highway Accident Report

ï Addressing issues associated with use of wireless telephones to access

emergency services.

ï Encouraging enforcement of existing State laws to address inattentive driving

behavior.

ï Working with States on legislative options.

ï Using the National Advanced Driving Simulator52 and recording-instrumented

vehicles to study optimal driver-vehicle interfaces.

ï Developing a sound basis for carrying out cost-benefit analyses.

In August 2001, Virginia Tech Transportation Institute began a 3-year study, ì100-

Car Naturalistic Driving,î funded by NHTSA, the Virginia Department of Transportation,

and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The project, using 100 recordinginstrumented vehicles on the road for 1 year, is expected to provide a meaningful sample

of crash and near-crash data. NHTSA hopes to use the data collected to address issues

involving different crash types and safety concerns, including distraction, fatigue, lane

change maneuvers, and other driver behaviors.

According to the studyís experimental design statement,53 data collection in a

ìnaturalisticî setting is a preferred approach for obtaining necessary human factors data to

develop crash countermeasures and the associated supporting models of driver behavior

and performance. The study plan calls for equipping 100 vehicles (20 leased vehicles and

80 privately owned) with 5 cameras and 23 sensors. The vehicles are being driven in the

Washington, D.C., and northern Virginia area by high-mileage drivers, whose

occupations, such as real estate agent and salesperson, require driving at least 27,000

miles per year. The age and gender distribution of the 100 drivers is:

ï 18-20 years ñ 18 males and 12 females,

ï 21-24 years ñ 18 males and 12 females,

ï 25-34 years ñ 6 males and 4 females,

ï 35-44 years ñ 6 males and 4 females,

ï 45-54 years ñ 6 males and 4 females, and

ï 55-64 years ñ 6 males and 4 females.

Data from the vehicle sensors are being downloaded periodically, and NHTSA and

Virginia Tech Transportation Institute researchers respond to accident sites to collect

additional data. To date, more than 80 of the 100 vehicles are on the road. This study was

initially designed to collect rear-end collision information in support of collision

52 The National Advanced Driving Simulator, located at the University of Iowaís Oakdale Research

Park, is a national, shared-use facility owned by NHTSA and operated by the University of Iowa.

53 V.L. Neale, S.G. Klauer, R.R. Knipling, T.A. Dingus, G.T. Holbrooke, and A. Peterson, The 100 Car

Naturalistic Driving Study, Phase I-Experimental Design, U.S. Department of Transportation, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT-HS-809-536, December 2002. 
Factual Information 36 Highway Accident Report

avoidance countermeasures; the researchers believe that the study will also provide

valuable human factors information on the effects of wireless communication devices. 

In 2002, NHTSA awarded a $1.5 million contract to the University of Iowa to

conduct two National Advanced Driving Simulator projects on driver distraction and the

use of wireless telephones. The first project will address issues relating to the effects of

telephone interface on driver performance. The second project will study how distraction

caused by wireless telephone usage varies, depending on the content, length, and intensity

of the telephone call.

Also, NHTSA began developing a public education and information campaign in

fall 2002 to inform drivers and the public at large about the risks of distracted driving. In

addition, NHTSA is working with the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education

Association and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators to develop a

generic driving manual for the Statesí use. It expects that this manual and an

accompanying parent-teen guide will be available December 2003. The American Driver

and Traffic Safety Education Association is developing a new drivers education manual as

well.

Accident Statistics

Young Drivers. In 2001, 6.8 percent of the driving population was age 20 years or

younger (13 million drivers of 191 million total drivers).54 Of all drivers involved in fatal

accidents, 14.3 percent were age 20 years or younger (8,253 of 57,480 total drivers).55

According to NHTSA, when driver fatality rates are calculated on the basis of estimated

annual travel, teen drivers (16 to 19 years old) have a fatality rate about four times higher

than the fatality rate for drivers 25 to 69 years old. In addition, NHTSA estimated that all

highway crashes cost society about $231 billion a year, which includes $42 billion for

crashes involving drivers between 15 and 20 years old. 

Distraction, Particularly, Wireless Telephone Use. The reported incidence of

wireless telephone use in accidents is low. According to Congressional testimony,56

NHTSA Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)57 data for the year 2000 indicated

that 37,409 fatal crashes occurred; in 101 of those crashes a wireless telephone was

present. At the time of the testimony, only Minnesota and Oklahoma included on their

accident reports a data field for wireless telephone use as a contributing factor.

54 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2001

(Washington, DC: FHWA, 2002).

55 NHTSA, Traffic Safety Facts.

56 NHTSA testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee

on Highways and Transit, on May 9, 2001.

57 FARS, maintained by NHTSA, is a census of all crashes involving a motor vehicle traveling on a

traffic way customarily open to the public that results in the death of a person (occupant or nonmotorist)

within 30 days of the crash.
Factual Information 37 Highway Accident Report

According to the NHTSA testimony, before a data field for wireless telephone use

was added to accident reports, the data were obtained from accident report narratives,

provided the investigating officer had added that information to the report. Now, driver

distractions are included in the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria Guideline 2003.

58

The codes for these data elements are for a driver who is:

ï Not distracted.

ï Distracted by an:

ï Electronic communication device (wireless telephone or pager),

ï Other electronic communication device (navigation device or palm pilot),

ï Other distraction inside the vehicle (radio or another passenger), and

ï Object outside the vehicle (road sign or another vehicle).

According to the Governors Highway Safety Association, as of November 2002,

16 States59 code wireless telephone use as a data element on their accident investigation

forms.

The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety funded a study by the University of North

Carolina Highway Safety Research Center60 to examine the role of driver distraction in

traffic crashes. This study, issued in 2001, used 1995 through 1999 narrative data from the

NHTSA crashworthiness data system and 2 years of North Carolina police-reported crash

narratives. Researchers found that driver distraction was involved in 8.3 percent of

accidents and that the reported cases of using or dialing a wireless telephone were 1.5

percent of the distractions among distracted drivers. In addition, the researchers reported

that young drivers (under 20 years of age) were the most likely to be involved in

distraction-related crashes.

In a 2002 North Carolina study,61 researchers did a computerized narrative search

of all reported crashes that occurred in the State from January 1, 1996, through August 31,

2000. They identified 452 wireless telephone-related crashes and nearly 1.1 million that

did not involve wireless telephones.

58 The Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC) represent a ìmodelî minimum crash data

set and have specific attributes for each data element. The Governors Highway Safety Association, NHTSA,

the FHWA, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration jointly developed the MMUCC in

collaboration with State and local agencies.

59 California, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New

Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.

60 Stutts, Reinfurt, Staplin, and Rodgman.

61 Stutts, Huang, and Hunter.
Factual Information 38 Highway Accident Report

Pennsylvania crash data62 for 1999 and 2000 indicated that 10,315, or 3.5 percent,

of all traffic crashes involved citations for driver distractions. Using or dialing a wireless

telephone accounted for 5.2 percent of driver distractions.

The California Highway Patrol examined driver distraction and inattention

accident data in California for the 6-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2002.63 The

law enforcement agency found that 6 percent (5,677 of 491,083) of drivers in all accidents

were inattentive. Of the accidents related to inattention, the largest category (611 of

5,677), or 11 percent, involved wireless telephones. 

According to Virginiaís accident records, 12.5 and 12.1 percent of drivers involved

in accidents in 2000 and 2001, respectively, were inattentive at the time of the crash. A

Virginia study64 examined driver distraction accidents from June 15 to November 30,

2002, in which the police had reported the type of distraction in driver inattention crashes.

The study included information on 2,792 crashes involving 4,494 drivers, of whom 2,822

were distracted drivers. Driver fatigue or drivers who fell asleep accounted for 17 percent

of the distractions reported, and wireless telephone use accounted for 3.9 percent.

The Safety Board analyzed the 1991-2000 FARS data to identify driver distraction

factors and utility vehicle65 involvement in accidents. Driver distraction factors, as coded

under FARS and used in this analysis, included wireless telephones, fax machines,

computers, on-board navigation systems, two-way radios, and heads-up displays.

Distraction factors accounted for about 0.09 percent of the coded factors (553 of 601,002);

wireless telephones accounted for 88.5 percent of the distraction factors (489 of 553).

Driver distraction factors accounted for about 0.15 percent of the coded driver

factors in both single-vehicle accidents involving a utility vehicle (38 of 28,140 coded

driver factors) and all utility vehicle accidents (66 of 43,195 coded driver factors).

Wireless telephone use accounted for all distraction factors in the single-vehicle accidents

involving a utility vehicle and all but two of the coded distraction factors for utility vehicle

accidents overall.

Other Accidents Involving Wireless Telephone Use

The Safety Board investigated three other 2002 accidents in support of the Largo

accident investigation. All three involved drivers who were engaged in a wireless

telephone conversation at the time of the accident.

62 ìDriver Distractions and Traffic Safety,î Staff Report Pursuant to 2000 Senate Resolution No. 127,

General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Joint State Government Commission, December

2001.

63 California Highway Patrol, ìDriver Distractions and Inattention Data Summary,î Report to the

Governor and Legislature, November 2002.

64 Andrea L. Glaze and James M. Ellis, ìPilot Study of Distracted Drivers,î Center for Public Policy at

Virginia Commonwealth University, Virginia, January 2003.

65 Utility vehicle categories are compact utility, large utility, utility station wagon, and utility unknown

body type.
Factual Information 39 Highway Accident Report

About 9:10 a.m. on April 11, 2002, a 1998 Chevrolet passenger car was traveling

southbound on State Route 5 near Korona, Florida, when the driver lost control and the

vehicle ran off the road, colliding with two trees.66 The unbelted 16-year-old driver,

unbelted 14-year-old left rear seat passenger, unbelted 14-year-old center rear seat

passenger (ejected), and unbelted 7-year-old right rear seat passenger (ejected) all

sustained fatal injuries. The lap/shoulder-belted 6-year-old right front seat passenger

sustained serious injuries. At the time of the accident, the Chevrolet was following another

vehicle, and the accident driver was engaged in a wireless telephone conversation with

that vehicleís driver.

About 8:08 a.m. on June 24, 2002, southbound Amtrak train 68 struck an

eastbound 1996 Toyota Camry on the highway-rail grade crossing at Baseline Road near

Little Rock, Arkansas.67 None of the 142 passengers and 11 crewmembers aboard the train

sustained injures. The 44-year-old Toyota driver sustained fatal injuries. Witnesses

reported that the crossing gates were down and that the Toyota driver was talking on a

handheld wireless telephone as she approached the crossing, changed lanes to go around a

stopped vehicle, and drove around the crossing gates into the path of the approaching

train. Her wireless telephone records indicated that she had placed three calls between

8:02:31 a.m. and 8:08:01 a.m.

About 7:13 p.m. on November 10, 2002, a 2002 Dodge Dakota pickup truck was

traveling northbound on North Road, in Raymond Township, Illinois, when the vehicle

failed to stop at a stop sign, entered the intersection with North 21st Avenue, and collided

with an eastbound 1996 Freightliner tractor-semitrailer.68 The 55-year-old pickup truck

driver sustained fatal injuries, and the tractor-semitrailer driver sustained minor injuries.

Witnesses and wireless telephone records indicated that the pickup truck driver was

engaged in a wireless telephone conversation at the time of the accident.

Provisional or Graduated Licenses

A provisional license system is a three-stage graduated licensing system

comprising a learnerís permit; a provisional, probationary, or intermediate licensed

period;69 and, eventually, full, unrestricted driving. The duration of time for the

intermediate stage varies from State to State but is less than 2 years in all States.

According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,70 35 States, the District of

Columbia, and 4 Canadian provinces have adopted three-stage graduated licensing

systems.

If certain conditions are violated under a provisional license system, the

provisional license can be suspended or revoked or issuance of an unrestricted license can

66 Docket Number HWY-02-IH-016.

67 Docket Number HWY-02-IH-027.

68 Docket Number HWY-02-IH-008.

69 The terms ìprovisional,î ìprobationary,î and ìintermediateî are used interchangeably to describe the

second stage of the three-stage graduated licensing system throughout the States.

70 Information accessed on February 13, 2003, from <http://wwwhighwaysafety.org.>.
Factual Information 40 Highway Accident Report

be deferred. A three-stage system imposes restrictions that limit teenage driving to less

dangerous circumstances until the driver has had an opportunity to gain driving

experience. Examples of such restrictions include limiting driving to daytime or to driving

with adult supervision, mandatory seat belt usage, passenger restrictions, and remaining

accident or violation free during the learner and intermediate stages.

Virginia adopted a graduated licensing system in 2001. It sets the minimum age for

a learnerís permit at 15 years 6 months, and the driver must hold the learnerís permit for at

least 9 months. During the learnerís permit phase the driver must complete at least 40

hours of supervised driving (10 hours at night). After passing a driverís test, the

provisional or intermediate phase lasts until the driver is age 18 and includes a night

driving restriction from midnight to 4:00 a.m. and a passenger restriction (one passenger

under age 18 if the driver is under age 17 and three passengers under age 18 if the driver is

17 or older).

The Safety Board has been a proponent of provisional or graduated licensing. On

March 11, 1993, the Board issued Safety Recommendations H-93-1 through -9 asking the

States to take action to reduce the number of youth-related highway crashes and fatalities.

The Board identified several actions the States could take, including improving minimum

drinking age laws and enforcement, instituting a zero blood alcohol content requirement

for drivers under age 21, and crafting changes in driver licensing and restrictions. The

Safety Board urged the States to:

H-93-8

Enact laws to provide for a provisional license system for young novice

drivers.

H-93-9

Enact laws that prohibit driving by young novice drivers between certain

hours, especially midnight to 5:00 a.m.

In addition, on November 8, 2002, the Safety Board issued Safety

Recommendations H-02-30 and -31 asking the States71 to expand graduated licensing

programs as follows:

71 The Safety Board also issued Safety Recommendations H-02-31 and -32 to the 14 States (Alaska,

Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,

Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming) that have not implemented the three-stage graduated licensing system and

the passenger restrictions recommended by the Safety Board. For these 14 states, Safety Recommendation

H-93-8 has been classified ìClosed ñSupersededî by these new recommendations.
Factual Information 41 Highway Accident Report

H-02-30

Restrict young, novice drivers with provisional (intermediate) licenses,

unless accompanied by a supervising adult driver who is at least 21 years

old, from carrying more than one passenger under the age of 20 until they

receive an unrestricted license or for at least 6 months (whichever is

longer).

H-02-31

Require that the supervising adult driver in the learnerís permit stage of

your graduated licensing law is age 21 or older.

A paper72 presented at the Graduated License Symposium on November 6, 2002,

summarized several research projects in States with graduated licensing systems that show

the effectiveness of these systems in reducing accidents and fatalities. California,

Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio all recorded

substantial reductions (ranging from 9 to 33 percent) in crashes and fatalities.

Electronic Stability Control73

The automotive industry has developed various technological systems to assist

drivers in maintaining control of their vehicles. In recent decades, antilock braking

systems (ABS) and traction control have become commonplace in both heavy- and lightduty vehicles. These systems function by monitoring wheel rotational speeds and

selectively releasing or applying the braking force, when necessary, to control wheel

lockup or wheel spin. When the wheel speed exceeds preset slippage values, the systems

engage.

Another system, electronic stability control (ESC), which builds upon existing

ABS and traction control hardware, has recently become available. The ESC feature

increases vehicle stability through electronic processing of the vehicleís motion and

precise application of brake force at selected wheels, when necessary. Currently, ESC

systems are most commonly found on some luxury passenger cars and sport utility

vehicles.

ESC systems utilize the ABS hardware and provide two additional sensors for

steering wheel angle and yaw.74 The steering wheel angle sensor, which measures driver

input through the steering wheel, monitors the driverís intended path. The yaw sensor,

72 Herb M. Simpson, ìThe Evolution and Effectiveness of Graduated Licensing,î Journal of Safety

Research (34), 2003.

73 The Safety Board is using the Society of Automotive Engineersí term for this system, which is also

known as electronic stability program (Mercedes), as seen in figure 15; roll stability control (Volvo); vehicle

stability enhancement system or StabiliTrak, Precision Control, and Active Traction (General Motors);

AdvanceTrac (Ford); and vehicle skid control (Toyota). 

74 Yaw is the movement of an object rotating about its vertical axis. For example, when a vehicle turns,

it rotates, or continually changes its heading angle, and is yawing. If a vehicle spins out of control on a slick

roadway, the yaw rate is excessive and would be noted by an ESC yaw sensor.
Factual Information 42 Highway Accident Report

which measures rotation of the vehicle around its vertical axis, monitors how quickly a

vehicle is beginning to rotate, or spin out of control. The ESC computer algorithm then

brings the vehicleís actual path in line with the driverís intended path, unless the yaw

acceleration is so severe that it cannot be corrected.

ESC systems act by selectively applying braking force at the appropriate wheel to

return the vehicle to driver control. For example, when a vehicle is beginning to spin out

(oversteering), the ESC momentarily brakes the outside front wheel to straighten the

vehicle and prevent spinning, and when a vehicle is not turning quickly enough for the

driverís steer input (understeering), the ESC momentarily brakes the inside rear wheel to

provide greater path curvature. (See figure 15.) In addition to selective brake control,

some systems incorporate throttle control to reduce engine power, as necessary, and each

system is tuned to the individual vehicle. The ESCís intervention requires no active driver

participation, and most drivers do not realize that the ESC has intervened.

Figure 15. Detection of oversteer and understeer by the 

ESC system known as the electronic stability program (ESP). 

(Illustration courtesy of Continental Teves.)
Factual Information 43 Highway Accident Report

According to the Electronic Stability Control Coalition, an organization of ESC

manufacturers, the cost of installing ESC as standard equipment on vehicles ranges from

$150 to $400 depending on the existing standard equipment ($350 to $400 for vehicles

that do not have ABS, $250 to $300 for vehicles that have ABS, and $150 to $200 for

vehicles that have ABS and traction control). Currently, 6 percent of vehicles produced in

the United States have ESC. For the 2003 model year, most European passenger cars sold

in the United States have ESC as standard equipment, and ESC is offered on many

Japanese cars as optional equipment. ESC is also optional equipment on some Ford Motor

Company and General Motors Corporation luxury models.

Daimler-Chrysler Corporation recently completed an accident study that compared

Mercedes products in European service equipped and not equipped with ESC systems.75

Researchers examined statistics from more than 1.5 million accidents that had been

compiled by the German Government Statistics Office. They compared 1998-1999

accidents involving Mercedes models without ESC to 2000-2001 accidents involving

Mercedes models with ESC. The results indicated a 15-percent reduction in overall

accidents, a 10-percent reduction in rollover accidents, and a 12-percent reduction in the

most serious injury accidents.

75 November 26, 2002, press release.
44 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

General

This accident involved multiple risk factors, some of which are associated with

young drivers. A 20-year-old, inexperienced, unbelted driver was operating a high-profile,

short-wheelbase, sport utility vehicle, with which she was unfamiliar, 15 to 20 miles over

the speed limit, while talking on a handheld wireless telephone. The driver encountered

wind gusts, oversteered for a number of reasons that will be discussed below, and lost

control. The vehicle yawed off the left side of the roadway, drove over an obsolete

guardrail end treatment through a depressed median, hit the back of a guardrail, and

vaulted into an oncoming minivan.

This analysis first discusses the factors and conditions that the Safety Board was

able to exclude as neither causing nor contributing to the accident. It then provides a brief

overview of the accident events and a detailed discussion of the issues.

The major safety issues identified were: the accident driverís speed, operating

inexperience, and unfamiliarity with the vehicle; the use of a wireless telephone while

operating a vehicle; the need for technology to aid vehicle stability; and the adequacy of

the existing barrier system.

Exclusions

The accident driverís postaccident toxicological tests were negative for alcohol

and drugs, and she appeared to have received adequate rest in the 72 hours before the

accident. Postaccident inspection of the Explorer revealed no mechanical anomalies. The

Safety Board specifically examined the Explorer components that could have contributed

to the vehicleís rapid swerving motion. Although severely damaged as a result of the

accident, the steering and suspension apparatus showed no signs of preaccident defects.

Likewise, the tires were closely examined. Although they too were severely damaged as a

result of the accident, the tires showed no signs of preaccident shredding or tearing that

would indicate tire failure. While accident damage prevented investigators from

determining the pressure in three of the four tires, none of the tires exhibited wear due to

low tire pressure prior to the accident. The Prince Georgeís County Fire Department was

on scene within 7 minutes of notification. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the

accident driver was not impaired due to alcohol, drugs, or fatigue; the mechanical

condition of the Explorer did not contribute to the accident; and the emergency response

was adequate and timely.

Neither the driver of the Explorer nor the right front passenger of the Windstar was

using the available restraint systems. However, the collision forces between the two
Analysis 45 Highway Accident Report

vehicles, as well as the occupant compartment intrusions for both vehicles, were severe.

The Injury Assessment Reference Values found in 49 Code of Federal Regulations

571.208, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, indicate that in a 30-mph barrier

crash, the typical forces occur in 85 to 100 milliseconds. These values further indicate that

forces exceeding 60 gís (acceleration of gravity) on the chest, chest compression of more

than 3 inches, a femur load of more than 2,250 pounds, and head injury criteria [HIC]

above 1,000 are considered to exceed human tolerances. In this accident, the Explorerís

vault speed off the guardrail was at least 40 mph, and the Windstar was traveling between

80 and 90 mph. The closing speed in such circumstances would have been approximately

120 mph, the equivalent of a 60-mph barrier crash, or about twice as much as that required

to exceed human tolerances. Furthermore, the Explorer collided with the Windstar while

inverted and struck the Windstar in its windshield and A-pillar area, causing major

intrusion of the occupant compartments. The Safety Board concludes that the collision

forces and intrusion into the occupant compartments of both the Explorer and Windstar

rendered the vehiclesí occupant spaces unsurvivable. 

The Accident

Weather Conditions

On the day of the accident, the NWS issued weather advisories warning of high

wind conditions, including strong west to northwest winds expected into the evening

hours. Wind speeds of 25 to 35 mph and wind gusts of up to 45 mph were predicted.

About 10 minutes before the accident, Andrews AFB recorded winds of 23 to 24 mph and

gusts of 39 mph from a heading of 310°. These winds would have come from an angle

about 35° to the left of the Explorer.76 Shortly thereafter, Andrews AFB recorded a wind

gust of 44 mph from a heading of 300°, about 45° to the left of the Explorerís direction of

travel. (See figure 16.) Additionally, a witness traveling behind the Explorer at the time of

the accident described wind gusts that were sufficiently severe to cause him to reduce his

vehicleís speed. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that at the time of the accident, the

Explorer experienced strong winds, including potential gusts between 39 and 44 mph,

from the left at an approximate angle of 35° to 45°. 

76 At the time of the accident, the Explorer was traveling at a heading of 355° magnetic or 345° true.
Analysis 46 Highway Accident Report

Figure 16. Explorerís path from the northbound lanes through the median.

Northbound I-95/495

N

0 10 20 40 60

FEET

Wind

direction
Analysis 47 Highway Accident Report

Collision Events

The Explorer was proceeding northbound in the left lane of I-95/495, when it

abruptly departed the roadway. A witness traveling behind the Explorer reported that the

accident vehicle was traveling between 70 and 75 mph at the time.

Shortly before the Explorer left the roadway, it probably encountered severe wind

gusts from the left that would have pushed it to the right. Tire marks on the roadway

indicated that a sharp swerve to the left preceded the vehicleís departure from the

roadway. Investigators found no mechanical anomalies that would account for the swerve.

In response to the wind gust, which would have pushed the vehicle to the right, the driver

apparently made a sharp steering maneuver to the left. This sharp steering maneuver was

quite likely the culmination of several factors, as outlined below.

Shortly before the accident, the driver made a wireless telephone call to her male

friend and was talking on the telephone when the accident occurred. Since no hands-free

devices were found with the telephone, the driver was probably holding the telephone in

one hand and steering with the other hand at the time of the accident. Given the content of

the telephone conversation as reported by the male friend, the driver was probably

scanning the roadway ahead and searching for his vehicle, which was somewhere on the

highway ahead of her. Therefore, not only did the cognitive process of the conversation

probably distract her, but her attention was likely to have been redirected from the driving

task to a searching task. As a result, when the Explorer encountered the wind gust, the

driver was most likely not attending to the driving task, was instead focused on the

conversation and a searching task, and was further hampered by physically holding the

wireless telephone, which left only one hand for driving this unfamiliar vehicle. 

The driver, not expecting the wind gust that probably pushed her vehicle to the

right, would have had to perceive what was happening and then react. Typical driver

perception-reaction time77 ranges from 0.9 to 2.1 seconds78 and the 95th-percentile79

reaction time is 1.6 seconds. Previously noted research suggests that drivers may respond

more quickly to crosswinds than to other driving tasks. Conversely, a driverís perceptionreaction time can be greater if other factors, including surprise, inexperience, and

distraction, are present. Because the accident driver was distracted, may not have been

expecting the wind gust, and was inexperienced, 1 to 2 seconds may have elapsed before

she reacted to the wind gust. If she was driving 70 mph at the time of the wind gust, the

driver may have traveled 100 to 200 feet before she reacted.

Due to the lack of physical evidence, the Safety Board was unable to determine

precisely how far the wind may have pushed the Explorer during this 1- to 2-second

period; however, given the length of time and the velocity of the wind, the Explorer may

have intruded into the adjacent lane. Because the driver was focused on the telephone

77 Thomas A. Dingus, Steven K. Jahns, Abraham D. Horowitz, and Ronald Knipling, ìHuman Factors

Design Issues for Crash Avoidance Systems,î eds. Woodrow Barfield and Thomas A Dingus, Human

Factors in ITS (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates, 1998).

78 The time a person needs to perceive the object ahead and react to it.

79 The 95th percentile means that 95 percent of all drivers will react in this amount of time or less.
Analysis 48 Highway Accident Report

conversation and the searching task, she may have lost situational awareness and been

unaware of the proximity of traffic to the right. All of these factors, in combination with

her relative inexperience and unfamiliarity with the vehicle, may have led the driver to

steer abruptly to the left in an effort to correct the vehicleís movement, or perceived

movement, to the right. Further, she may have had reduced control of the steering wheel

because she only had one hand on it. Once she made the steering maneuver, the resulting

lateral forces may have been severe enough to dislodge her from her seating position,

since she was not using her lap/shoulder belt restraint system, limiting her ability to regain

control of the vehicle.

The accident driver quite likely took her foot off the gas pedal as she steered to

compensate for the crosswind. This throttle release and the speed loss from steeringinduced tire forces would have reduced the Explorerís speed slightly before it left the

roadway. Using evidence gathered on scene, the Safety Board calculated the Explorerís

speed, when it left the road, at 68 to 69 mph. As the vehicle traveled through the center

median, it rotated counterclockwise. After the vehicle had traveled about 38 feet through

the median, the right front tire struck the turned-down end treatment of the roadside

barrier adjacent to the northbound traffic lanes. At this point, the vehicle was aligned

about 41° to the barrier and 36° to the edge of the northbound pavement. Subsequently,

both the left and right side rear tires also struck the turned-down end treatment, and the

vehicle began rotating in a clockwise direction, as evidenced by the change in spacing

between the four tire marks in the median leading up to the barrier impact area. That

spacing, which had continually increased, indicating a counterclockwise rotation,

increasingly diminished after impact with the barrier, indicating a clockwise rotational

direction. Both right side tires struck a more elevated section of the barrier end treatment

than the left rear tire did, causing the change in direction.

The vehicle continued an additional 48 feet through the center median before

colliding with the back of the W-beam barrier system adjacent to the southbound lanes. At

this point, the Explorer was aligned about 30° to the southbound pavement edge. At so

shallow an angle, had the barrier not been in place, the vehicle most likely would have

proceeded into the southbound lanes and remained upright. During impact with the

backside of the barrier system, the W-beam railing became detached from the support

posts. The vehicle struck three support posts, which were bent approximately 33 to 37°

and acted as a ramp, launching the Explorer into the air. (See figure 17.)
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

Figure 17. Explorerís vault path.

 101 feet

0 10 20 40 60

FEET

N

 Take-off

 point
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

The Explorer traveled about 101 feet through the air before striking the Windstar,

which was southbound in the left lane of the interstate. While airborne, the Explorer

rotated counterclockwise about its vertical axis and clockwise about its longitudinal axis.

As a result of this rotation, the right passenger side and roof struck the front of the

Windstar at an angle. The area of impact was above the minivanís frame and engine

compartment. The Windstarís two A-pillars left distinct indentations on the sheet metal

along the Explorerís right side door and front hood panel. The configuration of the

vehicles at impact resulted in extreme crush to the passenger compartments of both

vehicles. (See figure 18.)

Taking into account the horizontal distance that the Explorer traveled through the

air, the vertical distance between its takeoff and landing points, and the possible takeoff

angles indicated by the damaged guardrail posts, the Safety Board calculated airborne

vehicle speeds of 40 to 41 mph. Postcrash analysis of the Windstarís tachometer and

speedometer showed that the minivan was traveling 80 to 90 mph at the time of impact

with the Explorer.

Driver Speed, Inexperience, and Unfamiliarity With Vehicle 

One witness, whose vehicle was following the Explorer, estimated that the

accident driver was traveling 70 to 75 mph before she lost control. The Safety Board

calculated the accident driverís speed to be about 69 mph when her vehicle left the

roadway. Thus, at the time of the accident, she was traveling 15 to 20 mph over the 55-

mph speed limit. The older, more experienced Lexus driver, who was following in a

vehicle less prone to the effects of wind forces, said he was ìscaredî by the wind gusts and

had reduced his speed to 60 or 65 mph.

The accident driver may have been speeding, despite the windy conditions, for

several reasons. She was young (20 years old), and research has shown that younger

drivers (16 to 20 years old) are more likely to be involved in speed-related fatal

accidents.80 Also, although the accident driver had presumably visited her male friendís

Figure 18. Side view of Explorerís vault path showing collision with Windstar.

80 U.S. General Accounting Office, Highway Safety Research Continues on a Variety of Factors That

Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes, GAO-03-436, March 2003.

101'
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

home before this trip, she is unlikely to have driven there herself; at the time of the

accident, she was following and probably trying to keep up with him. Her youth and focus

on not losing the lead driver may have affected her decisions concerning speed, even in

windy conditions. 

In addition, the accident driver had limited driving experience. Although she had

been licensed for 3 years, she did not own an automobile until purchasing the Explorer.

Her mother, with whom she resided, also did not own an automobile. The driver had

occasionally borrowed a vehicle, and her driving experience apparently did not extend

beyond that. She was, in effect, a novice driver. 

The accident driver was also unfamiliar with the Explorer. The night of the

accident was the first time she had driven this vehicle, and during the approximately 2

hours before the collision, she drove the car less than 50 miles. A 1983 NHTSA study81

examined the relationship between vehicle unfamiliarity and safety. One of its findings

was:

Drivers having less than 500 miles familiarity with their vehicles are about 2 to 3

times more likely to become involved in a crash than familiar drivers. In the case

of very young or novice drivers, their limited overall driving experience may

interact with limited vehicle familiarity to contribute to accident causation.

In the Largo accident, the driver traveled at a high rate of speed, oversteered, and

failed to maintain directional control. A landmark study of accident causation82 found that

ìunfamiliarity with the vehicle was associated with accidents where maintaining adequate

directional control could have prevented the crashî and unfamiliarity was ìalso associated

with excessive speed and improper evasive action.î The Safety Board concludes that due

to her unfamiliarity with the vehicle, operating inexperience, and distraction, the accident

driver exercised poor judgment in maintaining a speed too fast for the existing, windy

conditions and was unable to maintain directional control of her vehicle.

Wireless Telephone Use

At the time of the collision, the accident driver was engaged in a handheld wireless

telephone conversation. Her male friend stated that ìshe suddenly yelled twice, and the

call disconnected.î Wireless telephone records confirm that the accident driver placed a

call moments before the accident. She was following her male friend and lost sight of him.

The cognitive effect of this conversation may have been greater than that of a casual

conversation. Additionally, she was probably scanning the traffic ahead, looking for her

male friend, and her attention to the task of driving was probably diverted. 

81 M. Perel, ìVehicle Familiarity and Safety,î NHTSA Technical Note, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, DOT HS-806-509, July 1983.

82 J.R. Treat and others, ìTri-Level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents: Final Report,î Institute

for Research in Public Safety, Indiana University, NHTSA Contract DOT-HS-034-3-535, May 1979.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

Research has shown that the cognitive effects of conducting a conversation on a

wireless telephone can decrease situational awareness and that wireless telephone use can

increase reaction time. In their 2001 study, Parkes and Hooijmeijer reported that drivers

engaged in wireless telephone conversations were unaware of traffic movements around

them. Safety Board accident investigations in several transportation modes have

documented the relationship between poor situational awareness and poor performance.

These investigations found that when airline pilots, railroad engineers, and ship crews lose

situational awareness, they sometimes make operational errors that lead to accidents. In

the case of the Largo accident driver, the potential decrease in situational awareness is

likely to have delayed her awareness of the effects of the wind on her vehicle. This

delayed recognition of and reaction to the effects of wind probably precipitated her

steering overreaction. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the accident driverís

distraction due to the wireless telephone conversation with her friend contributed to her

loss of control of the vehicle. 

This accident involved multiple risk factors, and the Safety Board could not

determine the exact extent of the role of distraction due to wireless telephone use.

However, use of a wireless telephone while driving is inherently dangerous, as is any

distraction that diverts oneís attention from the driving task. Young, inexperienced drivers

are particularly vulnerable to accidents, are easily distracted, and are known to engage in

risk-taking behavior. In 2002, the Safety Board investigated two accidents, Largo and

Korona,83 in which young drivers were following another vehicle, lost control, and ran off

the road. The Largo and Korona accident drivers were 20 and 16 years old, respectively;

both were unbelted and engaged in wireless telephone conversations when they lost

control of their vehicles. Young drivers continue to be overrepresented in traffic crashes

and deaths. In 2001, according to NHTSA, drivers under age 20 constituted only 6.8

percent of the driving population but were involved in 14.3 percent of fatal accidents.

While the Board recognizes that having access to communication in oneís vehicle can be

valuable, drivers in this age group, in particular, should attend only to the task of driving.

Eight States84 have introduced legislation to prohibit young drivers from using

wireless telephones while driving.85 In 2002, New Jersey enacted a law86 prohibiting

holders of driver examination permits from using any interactive wireless device while

operating a motor vehicle. A similar law, which would prohibit drivers holding only a

driverís permit from using a wireless telephone while driving, was introduced in the

Pennsylvania legislature.87 On May 23, 2003, the Governor of Maine signed a law

restricting drivers under age 18, including persons with an instruction permit and holders

of a restricted license, from ìoperating a motor vehicle while using a mobile phone.î The

Safety Board concludes that current State laws are inadequate to protect young, novice

83 HWY-02-IH-016.

84 Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

85 Susan A. Ferguson, ìOther High-Risk Factors for Young DriversóHow Graduated Licensing Does,

Doesnít, or Could Address Them,î 2003, Journal of Safety Research, 34, 71-77.

86 Bill AB 3241 was enacted January 14, 2002. 

87 The Governor vetoed Bill HB 1553 on December 16, 2002. 
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

drivers from distractions that can lead to accidents. Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that the other 48 States should enact legislation to prohibit holders of learnerís permits and

intermediate licenses from using interactive wireless communication devices while

driving.

The use of wireless communication devices is becoming increasingly prevalent. In

May 2003, according to the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, the

number of U.S. wireless telephone subscribers was approximately 145 million. The 2003

Gallup Organization study88 and the 2002 North Carolina study,89 which indicated that 25

percent and 58 percent of drivers interviewed, respectively, had used a wireless telephone

while driving, suggest that the public may not be aware of the dangers associated with

using a wireless telephone while driving. Considering the widespread use of wireless

communication devices in vehicles today and the associated risks of an accident, the

Safety Board concludes that all drivers should be educated about the risks of distracted

driving, including the cognitive demands associated with use of interactive

communication devices. This instruction can be accomplished through media campaigns

and driver education courses. NHTSA is already developing a public information

campaign. The Advertising Council, Inc., represents the media in public service

advertising and has worked with NHTSA before in disseminating public safety messages,

particularly regarding drunk driving and seat belt use. Therefore, the Safety Board

believes that NHTSA and The Advertising Council, Inc., should jointly develop a media

campaign stressing the dangers associated with distracted driving. 

Although the Virginia 2001 Driverís Education Standards of Learning has an

objective regarding distractions that contribute to driver error, including wireless

telephones and other portable technology devices, the instructorís handbook provides no

specific guidance or materials. Other driver education course materials discuss the risks of

distractions while driving, but the material is general in nature and does not stress the

cognitive demands of using a wireless telephone, whether handheld or hands-free. This

accident underscores the vulnerability of young, inexperienced drivers and involves many

risk factors commonly present in accidents involving 16- to 20-year-old drivers. The

importance of not engaging in distracting behavior is critical, especially for this age group,

given its low experience level. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that driver

education materials should emphasize the risks of distracted driving, including the

cognitive demands associated with use of interactive communication. The American

Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association represents the providers of driverís

education and is compiling a new driverís education curriculum. NHTSA is developing a

generic driverís manual for the Statesí use. The Safety Board believes that the American

Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association and NHTSA should jointly develop a

module for driver education curriculums that emphasizes the risks of engaging in

distracting behavior.

88 Royal.

89 Stutts, Huang, and Hunter.
Analysis 54 Highway Accident Report

Since NHTSA compiled its 1997 study of the safety implications of wireless

communications in vehicles, the use of wireless devices has more than doubled (from 60

million subscribers in 1998 to more than 144 million in 2003), and further research has

confirmed the detrimental effects of wireless telephone use while driving. This research

has shown that drivers who use a wireless telephone while driving can lose situational

awareness and experience ìinattention blindness,î suggesting that the cognitive effects, as

well as the physical demands, of handheld telephone use are dangerous. Existing accident

data pertaining to driver distraction, particularly wireless telephone use, may be

misleadingly low. 

Several reasons could account for this apparent discrepancy: (1) drivers are

unlikely to self-report wireless telephone use during an accident; (2) police officers are not

necessarily trained to detect wireless telephone use, nor are they required to report it in the

majority of State accident reports; (3) obtaining and analyzing wireless telephone records

is time consuming; (4) culling wireless telephone use from existing accident reports is

difficult; and (5) currently, only 16 States have codes for driver distraction, including

codes for wireless telephone use, on their traffic accident investigation forms. The Safety

Board therefore concludes that available data are insufficient to determine the magnitude

of risks associated with wireless telephone use. Given the growing use of wireless

telephones while driving and the need for greater research regarding the associated risks

of such activity, the Safety Board believes that the 34 States that do not have distraction

codes should add them, including codes for interactive wireless communication device

use, to their traffic accident investigation forms. 

Additionally, the traditional method of establishing public policy based on

accident statistics alone may not be appropriate for the issue of driver distraction resulting

from wireless telephone use. This safety risk is not the first to be substantially

underrepresented in the available data sources because of underreporting by investigating

agencies. In its 1992 safety study,90 Heavy Vehicle Airbrake Performance, the Safety

Board reported that in 9 of its 15 brake-related accident investigations, State and local

agencies had failed to identify deficient brakes as a factor in their final accident reports.

Thus, the available data did not permit the role of braking deficiencies in accidents to be

accurately evaluated. 

A new approach may be necessary to develop appropriate and effective accident

countermeasures. Many researchers believe that data collection in a naturalistic setting is

the preferred means for obtaining human factors data, particularly on precrash driver

behavior. The NHTSA, Virginia Department of Transportation, and Virginia Polytechnic

Institute and State University study, ì100-Car Naturalistic Driving,î which uses data

collected for 1 year on 100 drivers in vehicles instrumented with 5 cameras and 23

recording sensors, should provide the more accurate precrash driver behavior information

needed to develop accident countermeasures. In addition, the NHTSA and University of

Iowa National Advanced Driving Simulator projects should provide specific and more

reliable information on distraction and wireless telephone use. Such research will help

redress the underreporting of wireless telephone use and other driver distractions. 

90 National Transportation Safety Board, Heavy Vehicle Airbrake Performance, Highway Safety Study,

NTSB/SS-92/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1992).
Analysis 55 Highway Accident Report

The Congress and State and local legislative bodies have expressed heightened

concern regarding the growth of wireless communication device use and the effects it has

on highway safety. The proliferation of restrictions on wireless telephone use worldwide

shows similar concern. NHTSA can provide guidance to policymakers regarding the

safety implications of wireless communication devices by updating the 1997 report, An

Investigation of the Safety Implications of Wireless Communications in Vehicles, and

combining its findings with preliminary results from both the ì100-Car Naturalistic

Drivingî study and National Advanced Driving Simulator research. The Safety Board

believes that NHTSA should determine the magnitude and impact of driver-controlled, invehicle distractions, including the use of interactive wireless communication devices, on

highway safety and report its findings to the U. S. Congress and the States.

Vehicle Stability

The Explorer involved in this accident is an example of vehicle design that is

inherently susceptible to wind gusts because of its relatively short wheelbase91 and large

side area, or profile, compared with most passenger cars. As previously discussed, the

Safety Board conducted computer simulations to evaluate the controllability of the

Explorer traveling at 70 mph in crosswinds of 23 mph, gusting to 44 mph. The simulations

showed that the wind gusts were not severe enough to have made the Explorer

uncontrollable for an alert driver who had two hands on the steering wheel. But the

accident driver was distracted and, most likely, holding the telephone in one hand. Under

these circumstances, the winds would have initially caused the Explorer to move to the

right and rotate clockwise away from the driverís intended path of travel. However, the

amount of lateral movement depended on the duration of the gust, the driver reaction time,

and the steering input, none of which could be precisely determined from the available

evidence. The driver most likely attempted to compensate for the wind gust by steering

sharply to the left, causing the vehicle to swerve off the road.

The Explorer was not equipped with an ESC system, nor was one available for the

vehicle. Such a system may have assisted the driver in maintaining control of the vehicle.

Hence, the Safety Board assessed whether such a system might have made a difference in

this accident. In collaboration with Continental Teves, a manufacturer of ESC systems, the

Safety Board initiated several simulations to evaluate how an ESC system might have

responded to a series of vehicle movements and wheel inputs similar to that of the accident

sequence. The simulations compared a standard sport utility vehicle (SUV) with an ESCequipped SUV.92

91 Vehicle stability, or the tendency to continue traveling in a straight line, is directly affected by the

vehicle's wheelbase, or length between the front and rear axles. The greater the wheelbase, the less the

vehicle is affected by wind perturbations or sharp steering inputs.

92 The simulation modeled a generic SUV that had a wheelbase similar to that of the accident vehicle;

however, the ESC system applied was not specifically tailored to the vehicle model. Therefore, the results

represent the minimum benefits of the ESC system.
Analysis 56 Highway Accident Report

The first comparison evaluated both vehicle models traveling straight at 70 mph

with a driver-initiated quick left steering input, followed by a counter-steer to the right,

then hard left steering, and, finally, quickly reducing the steering angle to zero, or straight.

In this comparison, the standard SUV continued to sideslip and yaw at the end of the

simulation, even though the driver steering input was straight ahead. This yawing and

sideslip indicated that the vehicle was not yet under control or stable when the simulation

ended. However, in the ESC-equipped vehicle, the sideslip and yaw velocities were zero at

the end of the simulation, indicating that the stability control system brought the vehicle

under control and that the vehicle was steering along the path intended by the driver. 

In the second comparison, the same type of steering maneuver was assumed (left

steer, right steer, left steer); however the final steering input was modified to return the

vehicle to its original path. The standard SUV was unable to regain its original path but

instead crossed that path, and the sideslip increased and the vehicle yawed, indicating that

the vehicle would be very difficult to control through steering alone. In contrast, the ESCequipped vehicle intersected its original path at a slight angle with essentially zero yaw

velocity and sideslip, and the vehicle could be easily steered back onto that path. 

The simulations demonstrated that ESC systems can reduce sideslip and yaw in

situations in which steering or lateral movements are encountered, allowing a driver to

regain control of a vehicle. Additionally, the simulations showed that ESC may assist

drivers of errant vehicles to not only regain control, but also return to their intended path.

In both cases, the amount of time available to a driver to steer the under-control vehicle to

avoid an accident increased significantly.

Moments before the actual crash, the accident driver probably had the steering

wheel positioned so that the Explorer would remain in its travel lane as the wind gust

began pushing it to the right. Had the Explorer been equipped with ESC, once the vehicle

was pushed to the right by the wind, and assuming the sideslip and yaw rotation associated

with the path deviation to the right were great enough, the sensors would have signaled the

ESCís computer that a correction was necessary to maintain the driverís intended path

straight ahead. The ESC system would then have applied the appropriate braking to

intervene and reduce the yaw acceleration, thereby greatly increasing the vehicleís

responsiveness to steering inputs. Such an ESC intervention may have been sufficient to

allow the driver to maintain control of her vehicle.

Following the wind gust, the driver probably attempted to steer sharply to the left,

causing the vehicle to swerve off the road. As the Explorer departed the road, an ESC

system would have been monitoring the vehicleís rotational motion and in this situation,

as in the wind gust situation, may have applied braking to compensate. Such an ESC

intervention could have provided the driver with enough additional reaction-response time

to steer her vehicle back onto the roadway.

The Safety Board cannot conclusively determine the degree to which an ESC

system might have affected either the vehicleís initial reaction to the wind gust or the

vehicleís reaction to the driverís sharp, high-speed steering input. Detailed driver inputs,

exact wind forces, and precise vehicle dynamics are unknown. Additionally, ESC system
Analysis 57 Highway Accident Report

design is tailored to each individual vehicle. An ESC application was not available for the

Explorer. Nonetheless, ESC systems can make a difference in accidents by providing

drivers with added stability and tracking control that may prevent loss of control. As

demonstrated by the simulations, ESC systems can increase vehicle stability and control

so that drivers in situations such as this accident may have more time to react and regain

control of their vehicle. The driverís loss of control in this accident is similar to many such

occurrences each year. The Safety Board concludes that an ESC system may have helped

the accident driver maintain control of her vehicle during the Explorerís initial response to

the wind gust and during the subsequent reaction by the driver.

As noted earlier, European experience with ESC-equipped vehicles suggests that

this technology may provide safety benefits to drivers in the United States. NHTSA has

not analyzed accident data related to ESC-equipped vehicles in the U.S. fleet;

consequently, the benefits of ESC in reducing crashes cannot be determined. The

composition of the U.S. fleet is somewhat different from the European fleet because the

former includes more SUVs, light trucks, and vans, which are more susceptible to rollover

and to the effects of wind than passenger cars.93 Thus, the potential benefits of ESC are

quite likely greater in the United States. For the 2003 model year, most European

passenger cars sold in the United States have an ESC system as standard equipment;

however, non-European manufacturers only offer ESC systems as optional equipment on

some luxury models or, sporadically, on other models in their fleets.

On October 15, 2002, as a result of its 15-passenger van safety report,94 the Safety

Board issued Safety Recommendation H-02-28 to NHTSA and an identical

recommendation (H-02-29) to Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation

asking them to:95

93 According to NHTSA, in 2001, the rollover occupant fatality rate per 100,000 registered sport utility

vehicles was three times higher than that for passenger cars. Rollover fatalities represented more than 60

percent of sport utility vehicle fatalities and 22 percent of passenger car fatalities. In addition, 46 percent of

sport utility vehicle serious injuries took place in rollover crashes, and 16 percent of passenger car serious

injuries took place in rollover crashes. (Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator, NHTSA, from his speech,

ìMeeting the Safety Challenge,î Automotive News World Congress, Dearborn, Michigan, January 14,

2003.)

94 National Transportation Safety Board, Evaluation of the Rollover Propensity of 15-Passenger Vans,

Safety Report NTSB/SR-02/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002).

95 Dodge no longer manufactures 15-passenger vans, effective model year 2002.
Analysis 58 Highway Accident Report

H-02-28 and -29

Evaluate, in conjunction with [each other], and test as appropriate, the

potential of technological systems, particularly electronic stability control

systems, to assist drivers in maintaining control of 15-passenger vans.

NHTSA responded on December 23, 2002, that it was considering how to best

accomplish the tests and was refining test protocols. Safety Recommendation H-02-28 to

NHTSA was classified ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî on June 30, 2003. General Motors

Corporation and Ford Motor Company responded on February 14, 2003, and February 21,

2003, respectively. General Motors Company indicated that it will implement an ESC

system, known as the Vehicle Stability Enhancement System, in the near future for its 15-

passenger vans. Consequently, on May 6, 2003, Safety Recommendation H-02-29 to

General Motors was classified ìClosedóReconsidered.î Ford Motor Company reported

that it had researched ESC technology, but it did not state any intention of applying the

technology to 15-passenger vans. Safety Recommendation H-02-29 to Ford Motor

Company was classified ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî on June 30, 2003, pending

receipt of further information.

In light of the potential for accident reduction and the comparatively low cost of

installing ESC on vehicles ($150 to $400, depending on existing standard equipment), the

Safety Board believes that NHTSA should expand its current evaluation of ESC systems

and determine their potential for assisting drivers in maintaining control of passenger cars,

light trucks, SUVs, and vans. NHTSA should include in this evaluation an accident data

analysis of ESC-equipped vehicles in the U.S. fleet. Furthermore, the Safety Board

believes that if the results of the evaluation of ESC systems are favorable, NHTSA should

initiate a phased-in ESC mandate for passenger cars, light trucks, SUVs, and vans.

Existing Barrier System

When the accident driver lost control of her vehicle and the Explorer left the

roadway, it swerved to the left, struck, and traveled over the obsolete guardrail end

treatment. The impact with the end treatment caused the vehicle to change rotational

direction, and it proceeded another 48 feet through the median, struck the back of the

guardrail for the southbound lanes, and vaulted 101 feet into the left lane of opposing

traffic. The existing barrier system was inadequate to redirect the Explorer and prevent the

incursion into the opposing lanes of travel. If the existing system had been upgraded to

incorporate an adequate end treatment designed to redirect or stop vehicles, or if an

effective median barrier had been in place, the vehicle might have been redirected and the

accident outcome might have been less severe. The Safety Board concludes that the

barrier system in place at the accident site was ineffective because it failed to redirect the

accident vehicle and prevent it from entering the opposing lanes of traffic.

The Safety Board identified three issues related to the ineffective barrier system at

the accident location: the turned-down end treatment, the replacement ìin kindî of the
Analysis 59 Highway Accident Report

damaged end treatment, and the use of a single-sided guardrail as a median barrier. In 1962,

when this segment of the Capital Beltway was constructed, the turned-down end treatment

was an accepted guardrail terminus. Today, however, that end treatment does not meet the

National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 350 evaluation criteria for a

crashworthy end treatment, and both AASHTO and the FHWA consider it unacceptable for

installation on new or reconstruction projects. Urged by the Maryland General Assembly,

the SHA has started a statewide program to replace turned-down end treatments with

terminals that meet NCHRP 350 criteria. In May 2003, the Maryland Department of

Transportation let a contract to eliminate turned-down terminals and upgrade the guardrails

along the Baltimore and Capital Beltways, the SHA portion of I-95, and the BaltimoreWashington Parkway; that project should ameliorate this condition at the accident site.

Shortly after the accident, however, the SHA replaced the turned-down guardrail

end treatment ìin kind,î and thus lost an opportunity to upgrade the installation.

Subsequently, the SHA changed its policy and now replaces obsolete terminals that have

any damage. The Safety Board is encouraged by the SHAís new policy.

This section of the Capital Beltway did not have an effective median barrier system

in place. The guardrail at the accident site was originally installed not as a median barrier,

but to protect north and southbound traffic from the drainage structure. The single-sided

guardrail on the southbound side was not intended to redirect vehicles that hit it from

behind. The Safety Boardís survey of the Capital Beltway indicates that this location is one

of very few that lacked a median barrier system. Under the May 2003 contract, according

to the SHA, the guardrail on the southbound side of the Capital Beltway at the accident

location will be upgraded to a double-sided guardrail.

Specific guidelines relating median barrier warrants to median width and traffic

volumes first appeared in the 1977 AASHTO Guide for Selecting, Locating, and Designing

Traffic Barriers. The guidelines were incorporated, unchanged, into the 1989, 1996, and

2002 editions of the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. These 26-year-old warrants would

place the 55-foot median width at the accident location in the ìbarrier not normally

consideredî category. Yet the average daily traffic count at the accident site was more than

200,000, 14 percent of which was truck traffic. And although the median barrier warrants

do not address speed, the 85th percentile speed at this location was 75 mph. In addition,

SHA accident records indicate that two other median accidents occurred at this location.

Thus, traffic volumes, speed, and the history of median encroachment accidents warrant the

installation of an effective median barrier system at the accident location. The Safety Board

concludes that the median barrier warrant guidance in the AASHTO 2002 Roadside Design

Guide is inadequate to cover todayís high-speed, high-volume roadways.

The Safety Board addressed the issue of median barrier warrants in its report of the

Slinger, Wisconsin, accident investigation.96 On February 12, 1997, a doubles truck with

empty trailers was traveling on a four-lane, limited-access highway when it lost control.

The truck crossed a 50-foot depressed median and struck a flatbed loaded with lumber

96 National Transportation Safety Board, Multiple Vehicle Crossover Accident, Slinger, Wisconsin,

February 12, 1997, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-98/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1998).
Analysis 60 Highway Accident Report

that, in turn, lost control, crossed the median, and was hit by a passenger van and a

refrigerator truck. Eight of the nine passenger van occupants were fatally injured. As a

result of the investigation, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation H-98-12 to

the FHWA and the identical Safety Recommendation H-98-24 to AASHTO to:

H-98-12

Review, with the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials, the median barrier warrants and revise them as

necessary to reflect changes in the factors affecting the probability of crossmedian accidents, including changes in the vehicle fleet and the percentage

of heavy trucks using the roadway.

H-98-24

Review, with the Federal Highway Administration, the median barrier

warrants and revise them as necessary to reflect changes in the factors

affecting the probability of cross-median accidents, including changes in the

vehicle fleet and the percentage of heavy trucks using the roadway.

On November 18, 1998, the FHWA responded that it and AASHTO were awaiting

the completion of two NCHRP projects that would specifically address the median barrier

warrant issue: NCHRP Project 17-14, ìImproved Guidelines for Median Safety,î and

NCHRP Project 22-12, ìGuidelines for the Selection, Installation, and Maintenance of

Highway Safety Features.î The FHWA expected these projects to be completed before the

2002 Roadside Design Guide was issued. On February 2, 1999, the Safety Board classified

Safety Recommendation H-98-12 ìOpenóAcceptable Response.î

To date, the NCHRP projects have not been completed, and the 2002 Roadside

Design Guide was issued with virtually no changes to the median barrier warrants.

ìMedian Barriers,î chapter 6 of the new guide, states that ìa more definitive study is

currently underway, through NCHRP, to more clearly define warrants for median barriers.

Completion of this study is not expected until sometime after publication of this guide.î

The FHWA indicated that it expects completion of Project 17-14 in fall 2003. The second

phase of Project 22-12 was scheduled to begin in spring 2003.

The tragic consequences of this accident and the number of fatalities occurring

nationally in median crossover accidents on high-speed, high-volume roadways add

urgency to the Safety Boardís 1998 recommendations to revise the median barrier warrants.

Therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation H-98-12 and the

companion Safety Recommendation H-98-24, quoted above, to the FHWA and AASHTO,

respectively.
61 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The accident driver was not impaired due to alcohol, drugs, or fatigue; the mechanical

condition of the Explorer did not contribute to the accident; and the emergency

response was adequate and timely.

2. The collision forces and intrusion into the occupant compartments of both the

Explorer and Windstar rendered the vehiclesí occupant spaces unsurvivable.

3. At the time of the accident, the Explorer experienced strong winds, including

potential gusts between 39 and 44 mph, from the left at an approximate angle of 35°

to 45°.

4. Due to her unfamiliarity with the vehicle, operating inexperience, and distraction, the

accident driver exercised poor judgment in maintaining a speed too fast for the

existing, windy conditions and was unable to maintain directional control of her

vehicle.

5. The accident driverís distraction due to the wireless telephone conversation with her

friend contributed to her loss of control of the vehicle.

6. Current State laws are inadequate to protect young, novice drivers from distractions

that can lead to accidents.

7. All drivers should be educated about the risks of distracted driving, including the

cognitive demands associated with use of interactive communication devices.

8. Driver education materials should emphasize the risks of distracted driving, including

the cognitive demands associated with use of interactive communication devices.

9. Available data are insufficient to determine the magnitude of risks associated with

wireless telephone use.

10. An electronic stability control system may have helped the accident driver maintain

control of her vehicle during the Explorerís initial response to the wind gust and

during the subsequent reaction by the driver. 

11. The barrier system in place at the accident site was ineffective because it failed to

redirect the accident vehicle and prevent it from entering the opposing lanes of traffic.

12. The median barrier warrant guidance in the American Association of State Highway

and Transportation Officials 2002 Roadside Design Guide is inadequate to cover

todayís high-speed, high-volume roadways.
Conclusions 62 Highway Accident Report

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the February 1, 2002, collision of the Ford Explorer Sport with the Ford Windstar minivan

and Jeep Grand Cherokee was the Explorer driverís failure to maintain directional control

of her high-profile, short-wheelbase vehicle in the windy conditions due to a combination

of inexperience, unfamiliarity with the vehicle, speed, and distraction caused by use of a

handheld wireless telephone. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the lack of

an effective median barrier at the accident site.
63 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the

following safety recommendations:

To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

Develop, in conjunction with The Advertising Council, Inc., a media campaign

stressing the dangers associated with distracted driving. (H-03-03)

Develop, in conjunction with the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education

Association, a module for driver education curriculums that emphasizes the risks

of engaging in distracting behavior. (H-03-04)

Determine the magnitude and impact of driver-controlled, in-vehicle distractions,

including the use of interactive wireless communication devices, on highway

safety and report your findings to the U. S. Congress and the States. (H-03-05)

Expand your current evaluation of electronic stability control systems and

determine their potential for assisting drivers in maintaining control of passenger

cars, light trucks, sport utility vehicles, and vans. Include in this evaluation an

accident data analysis of electronic stability control-equipped vehicles in the U.S.

fleet. (H-03-06)

If the results of your evaluation of electronic stability control systems are

favorable, initiate a phased-in electronic stability control mandate for passenger

cars, light trucks, sport utility vehicles, and vans. (H-03-07)

To the 48 States that do not have legislation prohibiting holders of learnerís permits and intermediate licenses from using interactive wireless communication 

devices:

Enact legislation to prohibit holders of learnerís permits and intermediate licenses

from using interactive wireless communication devices while driving. (H-03-08)

To the 34 States that do not have driver distraction codes on their traffic accident 

investigation forms:

Add driver distraction codes, including codes for interactive wireless

communication device use, to your traffic accident investigation forms. (H-03-09)

To the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association:

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, a module for driver education curriculums that emphasizes the

risks of engaging in distracting behavior. (H-03-10)
Recommendations 64 Highway Accident Report

To The Advertising Council, Inc.:

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, a media campaign stressing the dangers associated with distracted

driving. (H-03-11)

The National Transportation Safety Board also reiterates the following

recommendations:

To the Federal Highway Administration: 

Review, with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation

Officials, the median barrier warrants and revise them as necessary to reflect

changes in the factors affecting the probability of cross-median accidents,

including changes in the vehicle fleet and the percentage of heavy trucks using the

roadway. (H-98-12)

To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Review, with the Federal Highway Administration, the median barrier warrants

and revise them as necessary to reflect changes in the factors affecting the

probability of cross-median accidents, including changes in the vehicle fleet and

the percentage of heavy trucks using the roadway. (H-98-24)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Ellen G. Engleman John J. Goglia

Chairman Member

Mark V. Rosenker Carol J. Carmody

Vice Chairman Member

Richard F. Healing

Member

Adopted: June 3, 2003
65 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

The Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Largo, Maryland,

accident about 6:00 a.m. on February 2, 2002. An investigative team was dispatched that

included members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; and Arlington, Texas,

offices. Groups were established to investigate human performance aspects; highway,

vehicle, and survival factors; and motor carrier operations (wireless telephone use issues).

Participating in the investigation were representatives of the Federal Highway

Administration, the Maryland State Highway Administration, and the Maryland State

Police.