# Poland - United States Department of State

- Online Press Briefing with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy Jennifer Bachus Brussels HubMODERATOR:  Okay, and good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub.  I would like to welcome everyone joining us for today’s virtual press briefing.  Today, we are very honored to be joined by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy Jennifer Bachus. Finally, a reminder that today’s briefing is on the record.  And with that, let’s get started.  Thank you so much for joining us today, and I’ll turn it over to you, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Bachus, for your opening remarks.  MS BACHUS:  Thank you very much.  It’s a real pleasure to be on this call with you all as, if you’ve read my bio, you know I have spent significant time in Europe, so it’s an area I know and appreciate quite well.  I’m also very excited to be able to do this call this week because I hope you all have seen that we released the U.S. International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy this week.  The Secretary of State spoke at RSA and sort of announced this.   To sort of spend a couple of minutes on this before I get into the main purpose of the call today, the strategy is recognizing the growing role that technology and technology policy is playing across foreign policy issues, and it focused on building what we’re calling broad digital solidarity to work with international partners to advance a digital future that is rights-respecting for tech safety and security online and leverages technology to address some of the most profound global challenges.   Essentially, digital solidarity is a willingness to work together on shared goals, to stand together, to help partners build capacity, and to provide mutual support.  It recognizes that all who seek to use digital technologies in a rights-respecting manner are made more secure, resilient, self-determining, and prosperous when we work together to shape the international environment and innovate at the technological edge.  So, we have three guiding principles that are laid out by this strategy and four action areas.  I will not spend more time on that unless you all want to, but just to say that this concept of digital solidarity aligns very closely with what we’re here to talk about today, which is the attack that Germany came to us to – that the United States joined Germany in attributing malicious cyber activity.  Just a little bit of background:  Due to our longstanding close relationship with Germany that’s been built up over a decade of close cooperation, Germany came to us after it detected malicious cyber activity carried out by the Russian group APT28 that was targeting a German political party.  It came to us; it asked us to join in attributing this activity; it gave us information that we were able to verify; and we were very pleased to be able to support this attribution both bilaterally and through NATO.  And as I’m sure you saw in our statement, we came together with the EU and NATO Allies condemning the activity and supporting efforts to counter disruptive cyber activities and hold malicious cyber actors accountable.   I know there are some questions to this extent, but maybe I’ll just start out by saying that APT28, which has a lot of other known acronyms – Fancy Bear, Strontium, Forest Blizzard – is part of the Russian Federation’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, GRU, and is a well-known malicious cyber entity with a very long history of engaging in destabilizing and disruptive behavior.   I think it’s also important to recognize the United States has previously indicted and sanctioned actors associated with APT28 for their involvement in a wide range of malign cyber activities such as the sustained hack-and-leak operations that targeted the World Anti-Doping Agency and cyber activities aimed at interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.  Of course, these are just a few of the many malign, disruptive, and destabilizing activities associated with APT28.  And we’d just note that this pattern of behavior blatantly disregards the framework of responsible safe behavior in cyberspace, which was affirmed by all UN member states. I will stop there.  I know some of those – some of my opening statement hopefully answers some of the questions you all have, but happy to go into more detail.  MODERATOR:  Okay, thanks very much.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Okay, so the first question goes to Lisa O’Carroll at The Guardian, Europe/UK.  “Have you any knowledge of APT attacks on other countries other than Germany and Czechia in the EU?  How concerned are you about attacks on infrastructure and transport such as jamming air traffic control?”   MS BACHUS:  So we recognize or we understand that there were attacks in Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden that have all been targeted by this malicious cyber actor.  On the question of our concern on critical infrastructure, I will say, broadly speaking, we have seen increasing efforts both by state-sponsored actors such as APT28 as well as non-state actors such as ransomware actors targeting critical infrastructure, and therefore we continue to encourage all critical infrastructure owners to continue to upgrade their basic cybersecurity. I don’t have any specific information on the question of jamming and traffic control.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Thanks very much.  Let’s move on to one of the next questions.  So, we have Jakub Lucky from Czech Radio.  And the question is: “What kind of cooperation has there been with Czechia?”   MS BACHUS:  So great question.  I served in the Czech Republic for three years, so I can tell you from personal experience have a very close and deep relationship with the Czech Republic on all things cyber related.  We actually held our first cyber dialogue with the Czech Republic – I believe it was last month – which was held on the margins of the 5G Cybersecurity Conference.  So for a long time we, of course, exchanged information, supported the Czech agencies in their own investigations, and just broadly had deep cooperation both at the sort of law enforcement level as well as the diplomatic level.  And so we will – we have and we will continue to have such a strong relationship, recognizing that the Czech Republic itself has very strong cyber actors.   MODERATOR:  Great.  Thanks very much.  Let’s go on to our next question, and it is from Karol Darmoros from Polish Radio in Poland.  And the question is: “Recent North Atlantic Council’s statement concerning malicious activities points directly to Germany and Czechia.  Does the U.S. see specific threats to Poland in this area?  Could you elaborate on this?  Is Belarus, with its relatively strong IT sector, a possible Russian proxy?” MS BACHUS:  We do not have specific information about this threat actor and doing similar to what it did in Germany and Czechia.  But, of course, I think we all need to recognize that there are malicious, persistent cyber actors out there who will continue to seek opportunities to carry out destabilizing cyber intrusions.  And therefore, as I said earlier, it is critically important that every country continues to improve its cyber hygiene, that it continues to undertake the sort of needed basics that are being done. Again, we’ve had very strong, longstanding cooperation with Poland.  My boss, Ambassador Fick, was in Poland a few months ago.  I had a series of engagements with the Polish Government.  We know the Polish Government is taking this very seriously, and we would encourage them to continue to do so.   In terms of the relationship between Belarus and Russia, I personally don’t have any further comment on that.  We see that there are malicious cyber actors that are spread in many countries around the world, and, again, this is why it’s so critically important that every country does the sort of cyber 101 that’s necessary to strengthen its own systems.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Great.  Thanks very much.  Let’s go to the next question.  So, we have Momchil Indjov from Club Z Media in Bulgaria: “Do you have any information about any cyber attack of the APT28 against Bulgaria?  And if so, could you provide any details?” MS BACHUS:  So, again, I – we do not have specific – in this particular situation we do not have specific information on Bulgaria; but, again, I think that the – that it is a very pernicious actor which is likely to seek any accesses it can, regardless of which country it is.  So, I have no specific information when it comes to Bulgaria, but that doesn’t mean that the APT28 is not active in Bulgaria.   MODERATOR:  Thanks very much.  Okay.  We do have quite a few questions here, so let me go on to another one here.  And we have Llazar Semini, Associated Press out of Albania.  And the question is: “Earlier this week Kosovo suffered a cyber attack from what they said was a Russian hacker.  Are you aware of that incident?  Any specifics?  And is Kosovo considered a target for Russia?”   MS BACHUS:  I am not personally able to attribute the attack in Kosovo to APT28.  Again, we have seen the actor actively engaged in activities throughout Europe, and so it is possible that APT28 has been active in Kosovo.  We have similarly spent significant time and energy trying to support Kosovo in strengthening its cybersecurity, and we will continue to do so.   MODERATOR:  Great.  Thanks very much.  Okay.  So, we have another question here, and this question comes from Stella Venohr from DPA in Germany.  And the question is: “To what extent is cyberspace considered national territory?  So is there a scenario in which a Russian cyberattack could fall under Article 5 of NATO?””   MS BACHUS:  First of all, I would say that we believe that there is a critical importance to the open, interoperable, secure, and reliable internet, which means that information will continue to flow across borders.  The question of whether a cyber attack falls into Article 5 is one that’s been discussed for many years.  I think that ultimately it would depend upon the level of the activity.  There is those that create destabilizing downstream impacts onto, for example, critical infrastructure; there are those that are hack-and-leak operations.  So there is not a one-size-fits-all answer to the question.  It really would depend on what is the actual ultimate activity, what is the outcome of the attack, and what is the impact on civilian or other infrastructure. So again, I know people want answers on when does it reach into Article 5.  I will say this is an ongoing conversation that we have throughout the Alliance.  We do recognize that there is the possibility that significant malicious, cumulative cyber activities might in some circumstances be considered an armed attack that would lead to the invocation of Article 5, but this would be on a case-by-case basis and, again, it would require a real analysis. MODERATOR:  Thanks very much.  And let’s move on to the next question.  We have Alexej Hock from CORRECTIV in Germany.  And the question is: “Could you please provide a few details about how APT28 is disguising its own infrastructure, and how attribution works then?” MS BACHUS:  So, there are a variety of ways that actors such as APT28 disguise their activities.  And essentially, they – in this particular case, APT28 was using the exploitation of a particular cybersecurity vulnerability, which I can name if anyone actually cares.  It’s CBE-2023-23397.  Essentially, what it was, was there was a network of hundreds of small office and home office routers, and these were being used to carry out the attack. So, there was work that was done with the U.S. Department of Justice in Germany to help remediate this network and to block the GRU from regaining access to the remediated devices.  We will continue to take action against APT28 to protect itself   – to protect ourselves, our citizens, and foreign partners, and we will continue to do so. I don’t know if I missed the last part of that question.  I apologize if I did. MODERATOR:  No, I think you did get the whole question, so thanks very much.  I’m going to move to one of the next questions that we have here.  And so we have Maggie Miller from Politico, and the question is this:  “Various European countries are seeing attacks from Russia in recent weeks.  Can you talk about the trend in attacks by Russia against Europe?  And how are you expecting Russian cyber attacks to evolve against Europe this year?” MS BACHUS:  Thank you, Maggie, always good to have questions from you.  I think that, yes, we are seeing an increase in the frequency and type of activity coming out of Russia.  This, I think, aligns with its full-scale invasion and illegal war in Ukraine, and I think we can expect that this will continue to happen. And I think that the reality is, is that Russia does try to calibrate what it’s doing to avoid escalatory impacts, but nonetheless is carrying out destabilizing intrusions into cyber networks around Europe and into the United States, as well.  And so I think this is a trend that we expect will continue.  I think it aligns similarly with what has become a really frightening increase in the amount of ransomware attacks, as well. And again, it just goes to show the importance of addressing known vulnerabilities of the private sector and the public sector, catching these vulnerabilities, working together to find them, to remediate them, and then also just to do the basics when it comes to cyber hygiene.  I think the only way to address this is to continue to up our preventative game. MODERATOR:  Okay, thanks very much for that answer.  We’re going to go now to an actual live question from Lisa O’Carroll from The Guardian Europe/UK. QUESTION:  Thank you for the second chance.  It’s actually a follow-up, really, to that previous question.  What is your nightmare scenario?  There’s an election coming up here in four weeks’ time, and we all know and can see the disinformation is proliferating, and the cyber attacks and ransomware.  Our own company is being – has been a victim of ransomware 18 months ago.  It’s a pretty severe attack.  What is the nightmare scenario that you have in Europe at the moment that you’ve game-planned for? MS BACHUS:  It’s a really good question.  I think I’m always worried about giving a nightmare scenario because, if you give a nightmare scenario, does that then give ideas to our adversaries on what to do? I think, of course, we’re both concerned about influence, operations which we see coming out of Russia, and particularly in this massive election year, both in the UK but also in the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere.  It’s a huge election year for us.  So, I think you have the question of malign influence, and then you have the question, of course, of destabilizing cyber intrusions.  I think we will continue to be concerned, as you noted, both about state-sponsored but as well about ransomware actors carrying out such attacks. And I think that we’ve seen – I mean, in the United States we’ve already seen some really terrible ransomware activity.  The attack against the U.S. health care industry, which essentially brought down the ability of people to make appointments, to receive prescriptions, et cetera, I think these are already some pretty bad scenarios that are impacting our everyday life.  I think we could see that on a large scale, again, not necessarily from state actors, but also potentially from non-state actors.  And I think that it’s critically important that we recognize that these vulnerabilities can be used by both, and that’s why it’s so critically important to address them. So, I guess I would not have a specific nightmare scenario I would want to highlight, but to just say that there’s already a lot of very bad scenarios out there that we need to continue to guard against. MODERATOR:  Okay.  And it looks like we have two more questions, and we have just about enough time to answer two more questions, so that fits well.  So let me get to the first of the final two questions.  And this comes from Novika Mikhailovic from an outlet in the Western Balkans, and the question is:  “How resilient to cyber attacks from Russia are the Western Balkan countries?” MS BACHUS:  I would say the Western Balkan countries have done a lot of work to increase their cyber hygiene, but I think that there is more work to be done – not just in relation to the attack that happened this week in Kosovo, but also to the massive cyber intrusion that occurred in Albania, I guess almost two years ago.  I know Montenegro has also had cyber intrusions that have been quite destabilizing.  I think that there is continued basic work that needs to happen throughout the Western Balkans.   I can tell you the United States and Europe have come together to try to continue to improve the ability of the Western Balkans to protect its own infrastructure; we will continue to do so.  It’s an area that we have devoted significant resources to and that we will continue to do so, again, in close cooperation with the EU and European member states. MODERATOR:  Okay.  And if – if we can, we’ll go to the final question for today’s briefing.  And it’s a question – so a second question from Alexej Hock from CORRECTIV in Germany.  And the question is:  “Are the activities of APT28 hack-and-leak activities?  And do you have any signs that correspondence from the hacked mail inboxes of the SPD in Germany is being used already?” MS BACHUS:  I think that I would defer on that question to Germany.  We – we – our role in this really was to support and to reaffirm Germany’s information.  So, I would recommend you engage with the German Government on that question. MODERATOR:  All right.  And unfortunately, that’s all the time we have for today.  Thank you for your questions, and thank you, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Bachus, for joining us.  But before we close the call, I’d like to see if our speaker has any final remarks or wrap-up thoughts for the group. MS BACHUS:  Thank you very much.  We came here today to talk about what’s really malicious cyber activity.  But I just hope you all walk away recognizing the critical importance that – of the collaboration between the United States and Europe both to address when these types of incidents occur, but also to try to prepare for them, try to prevent them, and essentially to come together around a shared vision of the internet and how we can work together.  I think that this collaboration between the United States and Europe ultimately makes both sides stronger and allows us to continue to stand up for the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which is a critically important element of our shared commitment to a stable cyberspace.   So, thank you very much for joining us, and thank you very much for your interest in what’s a critically important topic.   MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  So shortly we’ll send the audio recording of this briefing to all the participating journalists, and we will provide a transcript as soon as it’s available.  We’d love to hear any feedback at TheBrusselsHub@state.gov.  Again, that’s one word, TheBrusselsHub@state.gov.   So, thanks again for everyone’s participation, and we hope you can join us for another press briefing soon.  This ends today’s press briefing. # # # 
- The United States Condemns Malicious Cyber Activity Targeting Germany, Czechia, and Other EU Member States Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States strongly condemns the malicious cyber activity by Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), also known as APT28, against Germany, Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden.  We join Germany in attributing specific malign activity carried out by APT28 that targeted a German political party.APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, Strontium, and Forest Blizzard, is a well-known threat actor with a long history of engaging in malicious, nefarious, destabilizing and disruptive behavior.  The United States has previously indicted and sanctioned actors associated with APT28 for their involvement in a wide range of malign cyber activity, including cyber activities aimed at interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, and sustained hack-and-leak operations targeting the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) that intended to undermine and sow doubt in the integrity of the organization.The U.S. Department of Justice has worked with Germany to remediate a network of hundreds of small office/home office routers that APT28 was using to conceal and carry out malicious activity, including the exploitation of CVE-2023-23397 against targets in Germany.  The DOJ action further blocked the GRU from regaining access to remediated devices.Russia’s pattern of behavior blatantly disregards the Framework for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace, as affirmed by all United Nations Member States.  The United States is committed to the security of our allies and partners and upholding the rules-based international order, including in cyberspace.  We call on Russia to stop this malicious activity and abide by its international commitments and obligations.  With the EU and our NATO Allies, we will continue to take action to disrupt Russia’s cyber activities, protect our citizens and foreign partners, and hold malicious actors accountable.
- Poland National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the government and people of Poland on your Constitution Day.When Poland adopted the first modern constitution in Europe, 233 years ago today, the friendship between our peoples was already well-established. That friendship, based on ties of family and shared values, has never been on firmer footing. We salute the Republic of Poland for your leadership in NATO, your multifaceted and committed support for Ukraine, and your dedication to defending democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.This year, we also celebrate the 25th anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO. President Biden commemorated this historic occasion when meeting with President Duda and Prime Minister Tusk in the White House on March 12 to underscore our two nations’ ironclad commitment to the NATO Alliance. In twenty-five short years, Poland has grown from a NATO aspirant to a country demonstrating stalwart leadership on NATO’s eastern flank, helping chart the course for the Alliance’s next 75 years. Poland’s welcome embrace of more than one million refugees from Ukraine will stand as a lasting testament to the kindness and generosity of the Polish people.We join with you in celebrating this joyous occasion and look forward to many further centuries of friendship.
- Joint Statement on U.S. – Poland Strategic Dialogue HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Joint Statement on U.S. – Poland Strategic Dialogue				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Joint Statement on U.S. – Poland Strategic Dialogue																																		Media Note																														April 22, 2024																																							The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Poland on the occasion of U.S. – Poland Strategic Dialogue.Begin Text:The Governments of the United States and Poland held the 15th session of the U.S.-Poland Strategic Dialogue in Washington on April 22, 2024.&nbsp; The Strategic Dialogue took place one year after the previous session in Warsaw and two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.&nbsp;The Dialogue focused on shared values and interests, reaffirming the strong, steady, and broad bilateral cooperation between the United States and Poland. &nbsp;The working groups of the Dialogue discussed regional security and collective defense; political-military issues; energy security, including nuclear energy cooperation; economic prosperity; and renewing democracy and rule of law at home and regionally in Eurasia.&nbsp;The United States and Poland reiterate our unwavering commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory.&nbsp; We discussed security arrangements on NATO’s eastern flank and further developing capabilities and forces that will reinforce NATO’s interoperability, readiness, and modernization.&nbsp; Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense, especially in light of the latest NATO airspace violations.&nbsp;The United States congratulates Poland on the recent 25th anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO on March 12, which was marked by the historic visit of President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk to the White House, reinforcing our shared commitment to NATO and the democratic values it underpins.&nbsp; Both sides look forward to the July 2024 NATO Washington Summit marking 75 years of the most successful and enduring alliance in history and reaffirming Allied unity in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine.&nbsp; The United States welcomes Poland’s leadership and commitment to robust defense spending – at a level equivalent to four percent of Polish GDP – and its ongoing efforts to modernize its military, including through the use of U.S. Foreign Military Financing loans to purchase cutting-edge military equipment and technology.&nbsp; Both sides seek to further strengthen defense industrial cooperation.&nbsp;The United States and Poland are committed to ensuring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine remains a strategic failure.&nbsp; We affirmed our support to Ukraine’s self-defense, humanitarian relief efforts, and Ukraine’s economic recovery.&nbsp;The United States and Poland will continue to cooperate closely with Allies and partners in support of Ukraine’s efforts to repel Russia’s invasion and win the war.&nbsp; We reiterate our commitment to continued joint efforts to address Ukraine’s critical energy security needs. The United States welcomes Poland’s longstanding bilateral military assistance to Ukraine, signing of the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, Poland’s commitment to negotiate a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine, and Poland’s close coordination with the European Union on Ukraine, as well as Polish financial and material contribution to EU support to Ukraine.&nbsp; The United States commends the continued strong support of Poland and Polish society for Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, welcoming about one million into their homes. By the same token, Poland commends the strong U.S. support for Ukraine and continued U.S. leadership in aiding Ukraine’s defense.&nbsp; Both sides underline the necessity to secure sustainable financial and military support for Ukraine.&nbsp; The two welcomed recent efforts to shield European states from Russian influence operations seeking to undermine European Parliament elections and faith in democracy.&nbsp;We are determined to apply economic sanctions to continue raising the cost to Russia while it wages war against Ukraine.&nbsp; We will continue consultations and cooperation on further restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, bilaterally and within other formats, such as the G7+.&nbsp; To bolster the sanctions regime targeting Russia, we are committed to identifying and tracking the practice of sanctions circumvention through third countries’ jurisdictions, especially in Belarus, which provides support to Russia both in circumventing sanctions and as a logistical base for Russian activities in Ukraine.&nbsp; By imposing further restrictive measures and ensuring their implementation, we continue to demonstrate to Russia, its enablers, and other potential aggressors that starting a war is not only morally wrong, but also leads to economic consequences.&nbsp; We will continue to stand together against Russia&#8217;s attempts to destroy the rules-based international order.&nbsp;The U.S.-Polish economic and trade partnership is strong, resilient, and expanding.&nbsp; The United States and Poland strive to strengthen cooperation on energy security, increase bilateral and transatlantic trade and investment, and improve supply chain resiliency in key sectors.&nbsp; Our governments welcome deepening collaboration with the private sector to bolster commercial ties, boost economic prosperity, and address collective challenges.&nbsp;Participants in the Dialogue discussed immediate energy security concerns and the imperative of the transition to clean, safe, and sustainable energy to combat the climate crisis.&nbsp; The United States and Poland reaffirm their readiness to further develop our already strong cooperation in the civil-nuclear energy field. The participants welcomed progress under our Intergovernmental Agreement advancing the construction of the first large nuclear power plant in Poland by a U.S.-led consortium and Polish consideration of future sites to develop further reactor projects.&nbsp; Participants also took note of the efforts by private sector partnerships to develop and deploy other advanced technologies especially small modular reactors under the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation, including through the support of the State Department’s Project Phoenix.&nbsp;The participants welcomed the recent launching of the Polish-U.S. Regional Clean Energy Training Center, which can contribute to the development of skills and competency of Polish workforce needed for the successful implementation of the Polish nuclear power projects. The United States and Poland intend to continue to work together to further diversify Europe’s natural gas supplies and to encourage partners in the region to follow Poland’s example in reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels as part of its clean energy transition.&nbsp;&nbsp;The two sides also discussed expanding cooperation in the field of innovation and technology and the importance of secure 5G networks and telecommunications infrastructure.&nbsp; Participants welcomed opportunities for further engagement on robust, transparent investment screening to protect sensitive assets from potential national security risks that may arise as a result of certain foreign direct investments.&nbsp; In view of the rapidly evolving cyberthreat landscape, the United States and Poland are steadily strengthening and extending cooperation in cybersecurity in bilateral and multilateral formats and fora, including through cross-agency cyber consultations.&nbsp;The United States and Poland reiterated their deep commitment to the protection and promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, including support to civil society. Both parties discussed their concerns about deepening authoritarianism in Russia and Belarus, and their shared commitment to the human rights of those facing repression.&nbsp; The United States and Poland affirmed their commitment to expand collaboration to counter the malign influence of foreign state-sponsored information manipulation based on common approaches, such as dedicated strategies, joint initiatives, and multilateral engagement.&nbsp;&nbsp;The two sides also exchanged views on the current situation in the Indo-Pacific and the mounting challenges the region faces, particularly those which undermine the rules-based international order. &nbsp;In the face of those challenges, we reaffirm our commitment to work with our partners in and beyond the region.&nbsp;The 15th U.S.-Poland Strategic Dialogue was hosted by the U.S. Department of State and included interagency and inter-ministerial representatives from both governments.&nbsp; Polish Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Robert Kupiecki and U.S. State Department Counselor Derek Chollet jointly opened the Strategic Dialogue, which featured representatives from the Polish Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense.&nbsp; On the American side, representatives participated from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy.&nbsp;Both sides expressed a strong interest in deepening the bilateral strategic partnership in the year ahead and through future strategic dialogues.&nbsp; We aim to hold the next annual meeting in Warsaw in early 2025.&nbsp;&nbsp;End Text.						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- Poland HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Poland				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Poland																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				In October, voters turned out in historic numbers in parliamentary elections, topping even the turnout numbers for the first election in the post-Communist period.  Human rights issues, including women’s rights, reproductive rights, and the rule of law were among top issues for voters, according to exit polls.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; substantial barriers to accessing sexual and reproductive health services; and crimes motivated by antisemitism.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, but there were isolated reports government officials employed them.  The law lacked a clear legal definition of torture, but all actions that could be considered torture were prohibited under the law and prosecuted.  The law outlined disciplinary actions for police, including reprimand, demotion in rank, and dismissal.  The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), an independent monitoring team operating under the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner, carried out visits intended to prevent torture in national institutions.On January 17, the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner published a report listing cases in which prison guards mistreated prisoners in a detention facility in Barczewo.  The commissioner published the report based on the NPM’s October 2022 visit to the facility.  The report noted prisoners claimed instances of violence and inhuman, degrading treatment, beating, and torture, including so-called waterboarding and suffocation during interviews.  Following the visit, the commissioner notified the prosecutor’s office in Olsztyn, which confirmed it was investigating the abuse of power and mistreatment of detainees.According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, there was a concern over cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of persons taken into police custody.  The foundation stated police might have lacked sufficient knowledge of proper techniques to use against persons under the influence of drugs or other intoxicants, which might have led to excessive use of force against detainees.Impunity for such acts was not a significant problem in the security forces.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Overall physical conditions in prisons and detention centers were not abusive.Administration:  There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.Independent Monitoring:  The government allowed on a regular basis independent monitoring of prison conditions and detention centers by local human rights groups, international organizations, and the NPM.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government generally observed these requirements, although the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights noted an increase in the overall use of pretrial detention.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The constitution and law allowed detention of a person for 48 hours before authorities were required to file charges and an additional 24 hours for a court to decide whether to order pretrial detention.  The law allowed authorities to hold terrorism suspects without charges for up to 14 days.  The law set a five-day limit for holding a juvenile in a police establishment for children if the juvenile escaped from a shelter or an educational or correctional facility.  It allowed police to hold for up to 24 hours in a police establishment a juvenile who was being transferred to a shelter or an educational or correctional facility, in the case of a “justified interruption of convoy.”  These rights were respected.There was a functioning bail system, and authorities released some detainees on bail.The law stated defendants and detainees had the right to consult an attorney of their choice at any time.  The government provided free counsel to indigent defendants at the judicial stage of proceedings.  According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, most individuals did not have immediate access to legal assistance when they were initially detained.The law provided that police were required immediately to notify a detained person of the reasons for their detention and of their rights.  Authorities generally respected these rights.  According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, detained persons often were given several sheets of paper in small print and asked to sign a statement; in the foundation’s opinion, this practice meant detained persons often were not informed of their rights in an effective way.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, although the United Right government continued to implement judiciary-related measures that drew strong criticism from the European Commission, most legal experts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations.  Those groups also expressed concern the government’s ability to transfer judges without their consent could have been used to punish or deter certain rulings and erode judicial independence.  They expressed concern that the same individual held the position of minister of justice and prosecutor general, allowing that individual to have authority for personnel matters for both judges and prosecutors.  Legal experts and NGOs criticized this structure for providing insufficient protection from political influence over criminal cases.  A minister of justice, appointed in December, created a task force to “restore the rule of law and constitutional order” and began procedures to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which some observers said would limit future efforts to undermine prosecutorial independence.According to a Eurobarometer survey published in June, during the year only 23 percent of respondents perceived the judiciary to be independent.																Trial Procedures						The constitution and law provided for the right to a fair and public trial and the judiciary generally enforced this right.Civil society observers noted concern that delays in court proceedings infringed on the right to a timely trial.  Delays were attributed to several factors, including the United Right government’s judicial reforms, which they said increased judicial vacancies and lowered morale among judges, and a lack of sufficient alternative dispute mechanisms to handle simple cases.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government had some laws or mechanisms in place, but NGOs and advocacy groups reported the government did not make significant progress on resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens.  No comprehensive law addressed the return of, or compensation for, private property.  Legislation remained in place that significantly restricted the ability of individuals to seek the return of private property seized under Nazi occupation or during the Communist era.  The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in July 2020, can be found on the Department’s website:   https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress/.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions but allowed electronic surveillance with judicial review for crime prevention and investigation.  There were no reports the government failed to respect those prohibitions during the year.A case alleging the government accessed, collected, or used private communications arbitrarily and employed technology including spyware, specifically Pegasus spyware, continued.  On September 8, the Council of Europe issued a provisional report claiming the country used Pegasus spyware to influence political processes in 2019.  On September 7, the upper house of parliament’s (the Senate, controlled by the opposition) commission investigating Pegasus released a report that concluded the United Right government’s purchase of Pegasus in 2017 was unlawful.  On September 7, the minister of internal affairs and administration, a member of the then ruling party, told media surveillance operations conducted by special services were legal.  A European Parliament report on the use of Pegasus concluded there were serious breaches and inadequate implementation of EU law in the country.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right.  Independent private media, the judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members, although some legal and practical restrictions on freedom of expression existed.Freedom of Expression:  The law prohibited hate speech, including the dissemination of antisemitic literature, the public promotion of fascism, communism, or other totalitarian systems, and the intentional offense of religious feelings.  According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the government’s use of public insult laws and some politician’s comments created a chilling effect on civil society and media members’ expression in some cases.In April, the District Court in Sokolka ruled a journalist from media outlet TOK FM was guilty of defaming the Border Guard.  The case referred to a 2021 tweet in which the journalist compared the Border Guard with the Nazi German Schutzstaffel.  The journalist was ordered to pay a fine of 3,000 zlotys (PLN) ($755) in addition to court costs.  The verdict was subject to appeal.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  Laws regulating broadcasting and media prohibited, under penalty of fines, license revocation, or other authorized sanctions, the promotion of activities endangering health or safety, or the promotion of views contrary to law, morality, or the common good.  The law also required that all broadcasts “respect the religious feelings of the audiences and, in particular, respect the Christian system of values.”  Critics alleged persistent progovernment bias in state-owned television news broadcasts and other public media.During the year, the National Broadcasting Council imposed fines or initiated proceedings against private media outlets in relation to the content of their broadcast.On April 1, the National Broadcasting Council initiated proceedings against television outlet TVN for its March 6 broadcast of a documentary that alleged Karol Wojtyla had covered up instances of pedophilia prior to becoming Pope John Paul II, arguing the documentary violated the broadcasting law.In July, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights reported state-controlled energy company PKN Orlen’s 2021 purchase of Polska Press newspapers negatively affected journalistic freedom in these regional newspapers.  The report noted the purchase led to a decrease in journalistic independence in some of these newspapers when editorial management limited the choice of topics covered by the outlets and interfered in journalists’ texts.  In some individual cases, the appointment of editors in chief was politically motivated.  In some cases, this resulted in stories favoring the ruling party and marginalizing the political opposition, according to the report.Libel/Slander Laws:  Defamation by print and broadcast journalists was a criminal offense, punishable if convicted by a fine and community service.  In addition to defamation laws, laws covered public insult or slander of the president, members of parliament, government ministers and other public officials, the nation, foreign heads of state and ambassadors, and private entities and persons, as well as insult or destruction of the national emblem, the flag, other state symbols, monuments, and sites that commemorate historical events or persons.  The criminal code also criminalized offending religious sentiment by publicly insulting an object of religious worship or a place dedicated to public observance of religious services.Laws were enforced, although courts rarely applied maximum penalties, and persons convicted of defamation and public insult generally faced fines or community service.  Even if a court case ended with a conviction without punishment or with a small penalty, the person convicted had an official criminal record, which limited the person’s ability to hold public positions or access public funds.  According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, a considerable number of defamation and public insult cases, especially with respect to offending religious sentiment, posed a risk of limiting freedom of expression and stifling free public debate.  It assessed the criminal defamation law had a chilling effect on journalists, especially in local media, because local authorities might use the law against journalists.  Media owners, particularly of small local independent newspapers, were aware that potentially large fines could threaten the financial survival of their publications.According to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and other civil society actors, there was a continuing problem regarding strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), which were used by public institutions and officials, media companies, politicians, and individuals to suppress opposing opinions.  The civil society organizations claimed the use of SLAPPs created an unfriendly environment for media to operate and had a chilling effect on journalists, who might be reluctant to tackle sensitive topics due to fear of being prosecuted.On May 23, the Supreme Court rejected a prosecutor’s final appeal against the September 2022 Warsaw Appeals Court’s decision to dismiss a case against Jakub Zulczyk for publicly insulting the president by posting a message on a Facebook account in which he referred to the president as a “moron.”  The Supreme Court noted the court’s recognized the insulting meaning of the word, but it agreed the social harm of this behavior was negligible.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.  The law authorized the Internal Security Agency to block websites without a prior court order in cases relating to combating, preventing, and prosecuting terrorist crimes; to shut down telecommunications networks when there was a terrorist threat; and to conduct surveillance of foreign nationals for up to three months without a court order.On April 13, the government Plenipotentiary for Information Space Security, Stanislaw Zaryn, responded to Human Rights Commissioner Marcin Wiacek’s concerns regarding the number of cases of website blocking in 2022 and the fact that the process of blocking websites and verifying the legitimacy of blocking remained opaque.  The plenipotentiary noted all actions undertaken by authorities were within the limits of the law.  The law against defamation and all other public insult laws applied to the internet.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution and law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.  The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and other human rights organizations expressed concern asylum seekers and other persons of concern on the border with Belarus did not have adequate access to protection and assistance.On June 27, the law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with armed conflict was revised and entered into force.  It protected the rights of refugees from Ukraine and provided for their access to services.  The revised law provided for Ukrainian citizens to stay in the country legally until March 4, 2024, and provided the same protections for spouses without Ukrainian citizenship who had entered the country after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  Children born in Poland to Ukrainian women who fled the war were granted legal status as Ukrainians.  The law provided Ukrainians the right to work and free access to health care and education.A deputy interior minister continued to function as the government plenipotentiary for war refugees from Ukraine until the government changed on December 13.  The plenipotentiary was responsible for coordinating activities undertaken by government ministries to assist refugees, as well as for cooperation with local authorities, NGOs, and international organizations.  The prime minister’s chancellery included a minister for social integration to coordinate refugee integration until November 13.During the year, media, civil society, and international organizations noted cases of discrimination against Romani refugees from Ukraine.  The International Organization for Migration and UNHCR partnered with Romani civil society organizations on the humanitarian response to address the community’s needs.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees.There were allegations the country prevented access to its territory and pushed back to Belarus migrants and asylum seekers from third countries, where they were likely to face abuse, including severe beatings.  There were no reports or allegations that the country expelled Belarusian citizens seeking asylum back to Belarus or expelled individuals from third countries back to the countries from which they sought asylum.While EU leaders expressed support for the country’s efforts to protect its borders, the EU did not issue a finding on whether the pushbacks of migrants and asylum seekers on the border with Belarus complied with EU law.  Human rights organizations stated pushbacks violated international obligations regarding protection of asylum seekers in the country’s territory.  During the year, the government continued to use 2021 legal changes permitting the Border Guard to push back to Belarus migrants who crossed the border irregularly.  Migrants were primarily of African or Middle Eastern descent and were attempting to enter the EU via Belarus, frequently by way of Russia.  The government contended the presence of the Wagner mercenary group in Belarus near the border increased the possibility malign actors could attempt to enter the country disguised as migrants.Refoulement:  On June 22, Polish authorities deported Tajik asylum seeker Sorbon Abdurahimzoda despite a European Court of Human Rights ruling in May that stated he might face torture in Tajikistan.  According to media reports, his lawyer stated he was deported to Bulgaria and then onwards towards Tajikistan.  Legal experts and media reported the government deported him as threat to state security.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  UNHCR reported no major or persistent problems with abuse in centers for asylum seekers.  Some incidents of gender-based violence occurred in the centers, but UNHCR reported local response teams of doctors, psychologists, police, and social workers addressed these cases.Freedom of Movement:  Authorities placed some asylum seekers in guarded centers while they awaited deportation or decisions on their asylum applications.  Border guards could place an individual in a guarded center only by court order.  According to the Legal Intervention Association and human rights commissioner’s office, courts automatically approved most legal motions of the border guards, resulting in many vulnerable migrants, including families with children, being placed in guarded centers.  According to the association, the courts also automatically extended detention beyond the initial three months, which meant many migrants stayed in guarded detention centers for extended periods of time.  Children placed in guarded centers did not have access to public education and could participate only in limited educational activities organized on site.  The law prohibited the placement of unaccompanied children younger than 15 in guarded centers.  Border guards typically sought to confine foreigners who attempted to cross the border illegally, lacked identity documents, or committed a crime during their stay in the country.Temporary Protection:  The government provided temporary protection to individuals who might not qualify as refugees.  According to UNHCR, as of December 12, there were approximately 950,000 registered Ukrainians benefitting from temporary protection under the EU temporary protection mechanism in the country.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										UNHCR reported it was difficult to estimate the number of stateless persons in the country but estimated 1,425 stateless persons were in the country as of mid-2022.The law afforded the opportunity for stateless persons to obtain nationality.  A 2019 UNHCR report noted, and UNHCR confirmed at the end of the year, however, the government’s lack of a formal procedure of identifying stateless persons led to protection gaps and exposed stateless persons to many negative consequences, including detention.The 2019 UNHCR report noted, and UNHCR confirmed at the end of the year, several problems resulting from stateless status, including the inability to undertake legal employment or to access social welfare and health care.  Stateless persons often lacked identity documents, which limited their ability to perform many legal actions, such as opening a bank account or entering a marriage.  According to UNHCR, such problems made this group particularly vulnerable to poverty and marginalization.The October 16 report by Halina Niec Legal Aid Center on Stateless Persons from Ukraine Seeking Protection in Poland noted the weakness of the country’s system regarding statelessness, due to the lack of a legal definition of statelessness and the lack of a dedicated stateless determination procedure.  The report noted this weakness was one of the reasons for a very low number of stateless persons from Ukraine registered for temporary protection in the country.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were widely reported to be fair and free of irregularities, although the United Right government enjoyed an advantage.  According to the preliminary report of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the government exercised undue influence over the use of state resources, public media, and a government-initiated referendum held concurrently that served to amplify the ruling party’s campaign message and give it access to funding and publicity rights outside electoral rules.The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which ran an election observation mission, reported the October 15 parliamentary elections were characterized by record-high voter participation with a wide choice of political options and candidates able to campaign freely.  The ODIHR mission found the Supreme Court handled election-related complaints transparently and ruled in favor of greater election observer participation.  The ODIHR mission stated the campaign was characterized by the wide use of intolerant, xenophobic, and misogynistic rhetoric.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.  There were isolated reports of high-profile government corruption during the year.Corruption:  In March, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau reportedly began investigating the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ role in an alleged cash-for-visas scheme.  In September, news outlets alleged members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs systematically sold multiple-entry Schengen visas through the country’s embassies and consulates in Africa and Asia.  Early reports suggested malfeasance on the part of VFS Global, the world’s largest visa administrative outsourcing company and the country’s largest contractor.  VFS Global denied these allegations.  The number of unqualified applicants who were issued visas was unknown and the investigation continued at year’s end.On February 27, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau detained a former treasury minister, who at the time was the secretary of the city of Warsaw.  Police charged him with accepting bribes in connection with performing a public function.  Following his arrest, the Warsaw mayor recalled him from his position.  In November, he was released from pretrial detention to take a position as a member of the European Parliament.  His lawyer assured he would cooperate with the investigation.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings.  Government officials were rarely cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Some human rights groups alleged the United Right government used legal proceedings and SLAPPs to threaten human rights defenders.  On March 14, the Warsaw Praga-Poludnie District Court found Justyna Wydrzynska, a women’s rights activist, guilty of “aid to perform an abortion” and sentenced her to eight months of community service.  In May, Wydrzynska appealed the judgment.  The case was pending at year’s end.  Aiding in an abortion was illegal and conviction carried a penalty of up to a three-year prison term.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The constitution and the law entrusted the commissioner for human rights with defending human and civil rights.  The law stated the children’s rights ombudsperson was responsible for protecting the rights of children.  The law entrusted the government plenipotentiary for equal treatment with the task of “implementing the principle of equal treatment” prior to December, when the position was elevated to a cabinet minister by the prime minister.In December, the government appointed a minister of equality and published a regulation specifying the minister’s role.  According to the regulation, the minister was responsible for implementing the government’s policy on equality, including antidiscrimination policy, particularly on the grounds of gender identity; race, ethnic, and national origin; religion; belief; age; disability, and sexual orientation.  The minister was also responsible for drafting action proposals to counter equality abuses, monitoring best practices to promote equality, initiating and conducting dialogue with civil society on nondiscrimination, and implementing tasks related to countering domestic violence.In December, the government also appointed a minister of civil society and published a regulation specifying the tasks of the position.  According to the regulation, the minister of civil society was empowered to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of legal solutions for civil society; develop policy for the sustainable development of civil society; support civic initiatives; monitor and promote good practices in the field of civil society; and to draft and review draft legislation and other government documents on civil society.Observers and commentators generally expected these cabinet ministers would improve relations with civil society and would positively impact the overall human rights situation in the country.  According to media, the minister of civil society was tasked with rebuilding trust between nongovernmental organizations and the state.The law entrusted the government plenipotentiary for persons with disabilities with monitoring activities aimed at inclusion of persons with disabilities into society.Civil society observers continued to assess the office of the commissioner for human rights as independent and effective in defending human and civil rights.  The previous children’s rights ombudsperson was assessed as not independent or effective, and the ombudsperson’s term ended in December.  Civil society observers considered the previous government’s plenipotentiary for equal treatment ineffective and not independent.  Human rights experts considered the plenipotentiary for persons with disabilities effective and competent.Both chambers of parliament had committees on human rights and the rule of law.  The committees served a primarily legislative function and consisted of representatives from multiple political parties.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  Rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal rape, was illegal.  On October 1, a revision of the criminal code that increased the maximum penalty for conviction of rape to up to 15 years in prison entered into force.  The law also introduced a three- to 20-year prison term for conviction of group rape, rape of a family member, rape with the use of a gun, rape of a pregnant woman, or recording rape.  In addition, the criminal code increased penalties up to a life sentence for conviction of rape of a minor and rape with particular cruelty.  While domestic violence was illegal and courts could sentence a person convicted of domestic violence to a maximum of five years in prison, most of those found guilty received suspended sentences.  The law permitted authorities to place restraining orders without prior approval from a court on spouses to protect against abuse.  The government enforced the law effectively.  On March 15, the president signed into law the revision of a law on combating family violence that expanded protections for survivors of domestic violence to include those who suffered economic, cyber violence, or both.  The revision also replaced the preexisting legal definition of “family violence” with the broader term “domestic violence” and introduced a rule that children who witnessed violence should be treated as survivors.  On August 15, the revised law entered into force.The Women’s Rights Center reported police were occasionally reluctant to intervene in domestic violence incidents, sometimes arguing there was no need for police intervention.  The law required every municipality in the country to set up an interagency team of experts to deal with domestic violence.Centers for survivors of domestic violence operated throughout the country.  The centers provided social, medical, psychological, and legal assistance to survivors; training for personnel who worked with survivors; and “corrective education” programs for abusers.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law prohibited sexual harassment, and conviction of violations carried penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment.  According to the Polish Anti-Discrimination Law Society, sexual harassment continued to be a serious and underreported problem, and the government did not enforce the law effectively.Discrimination:  The constitution provided the same legal status and rights for women as for men, and although few specific laws existed to implement the provision, those laws were generally respected.  The constitution required equal pay for equal work, but according to trade union representatives, discrimination against women in employment existed.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The law obliged both central and local governments to provide citizens with access to methods and means serving “conscious procreation,” implemented by the government as gynecological counseling for women and girls and access to contraception, including access to emergency contraception, by prescription only.  Individual patients faced differentiated challenges in accessing contraception, according to NGOs.  The Federation for Women and Family Planning noted the government excluded almost all prescription contraceptives from its list of subsidized medicines, making them less affordable, especially for poor women in rural areas.  The law also provided for doctors to refrain from performing health services inconsistent with their conscience.Although women had the right to comprehensive medical services before, during, and after childbirth, home birth, while legal, was not subsidized by the National Health Fund.  Women legally had access to emergency health care, including services for the management of complications arising from abortion.  Civil society reported some women preferred to receive care in foreign countries for late-term abortions due to concerns regarding the standard of care.  According to the Childbirth with Dignity Foundation, standards for perinatal and postnatal care written into the laws were adequate, but the government failed to enforce them effectively.In the latest report published by the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights in February 2022, emergency contraception was rated as “being unavailable” because it was available only by prescription.  The report also pointed out the lack of sufficient access to gynecologists, especially in small towns and villages, a lack of reliable sexual education in schools, and high costs of contraceptives.The law allowed the government to provide access to sexual and reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors, including emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis for survivors of rape.  According to women’s rights NGOs, women’s access to care was limited, including for refugee women from Ukraine, due to survivors’ fear of social stigma, some legal constraints, and the use of the conscience clause by medical doctors who refused to provide such services.Civil society reported restrictive laws on comprehensive sexual and reproductive care could have resulted in a chilling effect on medical practitioners and harmful outcomes for women; however, there was no legal certainty that medical decisions were linked to this chilling effect.  In one case, in May, a pregnant woman known as Dorota, age 33, died in a hospital in Nowy Targ.  She was in Nowy Targ to receive medical treatment after her water broke when she was 20 weeks pregnant.  She died three days later from septic shock, and some politicians and women’s rights groups, including the Federation for Women and Family Planning, alleged she should have received a possibly lifesaving abortion.  The Katowice Regional Prosecutor’s Office was investigating the case and the Patient Rights Ombudsperson initiated ex officio an investigation into the woman’s death.The plight of refugee women from Ukraine who fled to the country during the year heightened challenges in accessing sexual, reproductive, and maternal health care and created a difficult operating environment for civil society service providers.  According to civil society and international organizations, refugees from Ukraine who fled to the country typically went to other countries or back to Ukraine to receive reproductive health-care services during the year.  On May 16, the Center for Reproductive Rights and eight partner organizations issued a report on gaps and barriers in access to sexual and reproductive health care and gender-based violence support services facing Ukrainian refugees in the country and others.  The report noted restrictive laws and procedural rules heavily constrained abortion care and access to emergency contraception, which made it difficult for many refugees to access affordable, good quality sexual and reproductive health care and gender-based violence support services.  The report also noted the near-total ban on abortion in the country had negative implications for refugees’ access to abortion.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution prohibited discrimination in political, social, and economic life.  The law on discrimination in employment covered nationality, ethnic origin, and race.  The law also banned discrimination against members of national and ethnic minorities and penalized incitement to hatred, public insult, and violence against others on the grounds of national, ethnic, and racial differences.  The government did not enforce these laws effectively.Romani leaders alleged discrimination against Romani persons in employment, housing, banking, the justice system, media, and education.  The government continued to implement a 10-year program on social and civic integration of Romani persons, with particular focus on education and living conditions of the Romani community.Although a small percentage of the country’s non-Polish Slavic minorities continued to experience some harassment and discrimination, most of these communities were treated with equality under the law.During the year, there were isolated incidents targeting the Ukrainian minority in the country.  For example, on August 1, a group of 17 men armed with clubs, sticks, and a machete beat and robbed two Ukrainian men in their apartment in Kamieniec Zabkowicki.  One of the victims was taken to a hospital.  Police identified all 17 participants of the incident and pressed charges against six perpetrators.  One of the men was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, attack on the basis of national identity, and causing bodily harm to the victim.  He was placed in pretrial detention.  Also in August, a man verbally attacked a Ukrainian woman and her children referring to them as “less than trash.”  Police were investigating the case at year’s end.																																				Children										Education:  On August 31, a Council of Europe report on the country’s implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages urged the country to support minority-language education and criticized authorities’ reduction of the number of hours of German language classes available to members of the ethnic German minority.  In 2022, the lower house of parliament reduced the education subsidy to local authorities for such classes, and the minister of education and science limited German language classes to one hour per week, while maintaining three hours of classes per week for other regional or minority languages.Child Abuse:  The law banned all forms of violence against children, and the government implemented the law effectively.  The law required the ombudsperson for children’s rights to undertake actions aimed at protecting children from violence, cruelty, exploitation, demoralization, neglect, or other ill treatment.  The ombudsperson’s office also operated a 24-hour free hotline for abused children.  On August 4, the president signed into law a revision of the Family and Guardianship Code, which was intended to enhance the protection of children against domestic violence.  The revision obliged the Ministry of Justice to create an expert team to analyze the most serious cases of violence and implement comprehensive child protection standards.  Several provisions of the revised legislation entered into force on August 28.  As published in the official journal, the law stated the remaining provisions were scheduled to enter into force in 2024.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age of marriage was 18, although courts were permitted to grant permission for girls as young as 16 to marry under certain circumstances.  The government effectively enforced this law.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law prohibited the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking.  Child pornography was illegal.  Conviction of the production, possession, storage, or importation of child pornography involving children younger than 15 was punishable by three months to 10 years’ imprisonment.  During the year, police conducted several operations against child pornography and alleged pedophiles.The law prohibited sexual intercourse with children younger than 15.  Under the revised criminal code that entered into force on October 1, the penalty for conviction of statutory rape ranged from two to 15 years’ imprisonment.																																				Antisemitism										The Union of Jewish Communities estimated the Jewish population at 20,000, while other estimates, including by Chief Rabbi of Poland Michael Schudrich, put the number as high as 40,000.  Isolated antisemitic incidents involving desecration of significant property, including Jewish cemeteries, and sometimes involving antisemitic comments on television and social media, continued to occur.  Some Jewish organizations expressed concern regarding the physical safety and security of their members.  During the year, there were some attacks on Jewish properties and houses of worship.  For example, in June, four men desecrated 26 tombstones at the 150-year-old Jewish cemetery in Zabrze.  Police detained the perpetrators, and prosecutors charged two men with insulting a burial site and destroying historical monuments.  In July, the National Institute for Monument Preservation allocated 50,000 PLN ($12,575) for the renovation of the vandalized tombstones.In April, top government officials criticized Barbara Engelking, a well-known Holocaust historian, who said in a television interview that modern Poles falsified history by exaggerating the amount of help provided to Jews by Poles during World War II.  Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki wrote on social media these were “scandalous words” that had nothing to do with reliable historical knowledge.  Education and Science Minister Przemyslaw Czarnek announced he would not provide new funding for the Polish Center of Holocaust Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences, where Engelking worked.  Some civil society observers said the government’s reaction furthered efforts to distort Holocaust history and politicize Holocaust education.In April, Ostrowiec Wielkopolski prosecutors indicted five men for organizing antisemitic marches and inciting hatred on the grounds of national identity during an antisemitic demonstration in the city of Kalisz in 2021.  During the demonstration, participants burned a book symbolizing the Statute of Kalisz, a 13th-century document that regulated the legal status of Jews in Poland and granted them special protections.  Some march participants also chanted “Death to Jews.”On December 12, Grzegorz Braun, a member of parliament from a small conservative-libertarian opposition party, used a fire extinguisher to put out Hanukkah candles in a menorah in parliament.  The incident was widely denounced as antisemitic in media and social media and by a broad spectrum of political leadership.  On December 13, prosecutors opened an investigation into the incident.  On May 30, Braun attacked Polish-Canadian historian Jan Grabowski and halted his lecture on the Holocaust entitled “Poland’s (growing) problem with Holocaust history.”  Braun refused to leave the building when police arrived.  In a June 1 statement, Yad Vashem Chair Dani Dayan remarked, “This incident represents a new low in attempts to stifle discussion about the complicity of Poles in the persecution and murder of their Jewish neighbors during the Holocaust.  This act of vandalism is more than an ugly attack on an internationally renowned scholar.  It is an attack on academic freedom, on the historical record, and on Holocaust remembrance.”  The government did not condemn the incident.According to civil society organizations, antisemitic discourse appeared in the public sphere and on social media.For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at   https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-reports/.																																				https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or any other sexual or gender characteristic-related behavior.Violence and Harassment:  Media reported isolated cases of physical and verbal attacks against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons by nonstate actors, and civil society members reported concerns regarding their physical safety.  Dozens of equality (pride) parades were held peacefully throughout the country throughout the year.  On May 20, media and NGOs reported a participant in Olsztyn’s equality (pride) parade was hit by a pellet shot in the head from an air gun a few hours after the event.  NGOs and equality activists alleged the incident was associated with the parade.  Police did not associate the incident with the equality parade.  The incident happened while the woman was walking with a friend carrying a rolled-up rainbow flag.Authorities often investigated, prosecuted, and punished those complicit in violence and abuses by state or nonstate actors against LGBTQI+ persons.  Civil society representatives reported LGBTQI+ persons did not always report cases of violence or harassment to police.Discrimination:  The law did not specifically prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, except for in employment.  The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families.  Nonetheless, the constitution prohibited discrimination “for any reason whatsoever.”  Laws on discrimination in employment covered sexual orientation and gender identity but hate crime and incitement laws did not.  Discrimination and lack of equal rights for LGBTQI+ persons continued to be a problem.  LGBTQI+ advocacy groups criticized the plenipotentiary for equal treatment’s office for a lack of interest and engagement in LGBTQI+ matters; the commissioner for human rights, however, continued to work on LGBTQI+ human rights cases.The law did not allow LGBTQI+ couples to adopt.  Single persons were permitted to adopt; however, adoption centers prioritized married couples.  The legal system did not recognize surrogate agreements and same-sex parenthood.The law did not recognize marriage equality.On January 26, the European Commission closed an infringement procedure against the country for failure to respond fully and appropriately to the Commission’s inquiry regarding the nature and impact of what LGBTQI+ activists and critics called “LGBT-free zone” resolutions adopted by dozens of local governments across the country in 2019 and 2020.  These resolutions did not explicitly call for “LGBT-free” zones but focused in varying degrees on preventing “LGBT ideology” in schools, called for protection of children against moral corruption, and declared marriage as a union between a woman and a man only.  The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights reported sustained and successful efforts to assure local governments repealed the discriminatory resolutions.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  The law provided for legal gender recognition, but according to LGBTQI+ NGOs, the process was lengthy, cumbersome, and cost prohibitive for many persons.  A person who wanted to change their legally recognized gender was required to sue their parents through a civil procedure, and if the parents were deceased, a court was required to appoint someone to represent their interests.  A person was required to present two opinions to a court confirming their transsexuality:  one prepared by a psychologist-sexologist, and the other by a doctor with a specialty in sexology or psychiatry.  To change identity documents, a transgender person was required to present the final verdict of the court that legalized the change of gender.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Civil society groups reported there were instances in which some parents compelled their children younger than age 16 to attend so-called conversion therapy with an individual phycologist or psychotherapist.  Christian-affiliated psychological centers, priests and pastors, and individual psychologists and psychotherapists offered the practice of so-called conversion therapy to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression on a voluntary basis.  Media reported there were almost 7,000 surgeries performed on intersex children in 2021.  On September 19, the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance reported that according to civil society activists in the country, more than half of surgeries performed in recent years on children with so-called variations of sex characteristics were not therapeutically necessary.  There were no media reports of efforts by the government and medical associations to limit such practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  During the year, there were no media reports of the government restricting the rights of expression, association, or peaceful assembly of those speaking out on LGBTQI+ matters.  Greatly reduced but still extant local government nonbinding resolutions with exclusionary language against the LGBTQI+ community were still in force in some local areas.  The commissioner for human rights asked all local authorities to repeal discriminatory resolutions.  NGOs reported anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric in the public sphere caused a chilling effect on expression, especially in education.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, employment, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  The law stated buildings should be accessible for persons with disabilities, but many buildings remained inaccessible.  Public buildings and transportation generally were accessible, although older trains and vehicles were often less so, and many train stations were not fully accessible.The 2019 accessibility law required all public institutions to provide access for persons with special needs, including persons with disabilities, in three main areas:  access to buildings, digital services, and information and communication services.  During the year, the government continued implementing the Accessibility Plus program for the years 2018-25, whose main goal was to provide for unlimited access to goods and services and to create the possibility of full participation in social and public life for individuals with special needs.  The government plenipotentiary for persons with disabilities, who also served as deputy minister in the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, monitored the implementation of the government’s policy regarding vocational and social inclusion and employment of persons with disabilities.The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities.  The government did not effectively enforce these provisions, and there were reports of societal discrimination against persons with disabilities.  The government restricted the right of persons with certain mental disabilities to vote or participate in civic affairs.The law stated education was obligatory for all children, including those with disabilities.  Children with disabilities could attend schools where they were integrated with children without disabilities, or their parents could choose to send them to schools where they were segregated, depending on the significance of the disability.  According to NGO Kulawa Warszawa, implementation of reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities varied, hindering integration.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										According to trade union representatives, discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to age and trade union membership.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the rights of workers to form and join independent trade unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes.  The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and provided legal measures under which workers fired for union activity might demand reinstatement.  Individuals who were self-employed or in an employment relationship based on a civil law contract were permitted to form a union.According to trade unions, the government did not effectively enforce applicable laws.  The penalties for violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and the right to strike were less than those for analogous violations such as the denial of civil rights and were rarely applied against the violators.  Resources, inspections, and remediation efforts were not adequate, and according to trade unions, the penalties allowed by law were too small to deter future violations.  Administrative and judicial procedures were subjected to lengthy delays and appeals.  Government workers, including police officers, border guards, prison guards, and employees of the Supreme Audit Office, were limited to a single union.The law prohibited collective bargaining for key civil servants, appointed or elected employees of state and municipal bodies, court judges, and prosecutors.The law limited the legal objectives of strikes to resolving disputes regarding wages and working conditions, social benefits, trade union rights, and worker freedoms.  Workers in services deemed essential, such as security forces, the Supreme Audit Office, police, border guards, and fire brigades, did not have the right to strike.  These workers had the right to protest and to seek resolution of their grievances through mediation and the court system.Trade union representatives stated violations of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining occurred.  While many workers exercised the right to organize and join unions, some companies discriminated against those who attempted to organize.  Union discrimination typically took the forms of intimidation, attempts to challenge the legality of trade union activity, or termination of work contracts without notice or without a justified reason.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all of the worst forms of child labor.  The law prohibited the employment of children younger than 15, with exceptions in the cultural, artistic, sporting, and advertising fields when parents or guardians and the local labor inspector gave their permission.  The labor inspector issued a permit based on psychological and medical examinations.  Child labor was not allowed if the work could pose any threat to life, health, or physical and mental development of the child, or conflict with the child’s education.  The government effectively enforced the labor code provisions prohibiting employment of children younger than 15 and penalties were commensurate with those of other serious crimes and were sometimes applied against the violators.There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law provided for the monthly minimum wage and the minimum hourly wage for formal work agreements.  The minimum wage met the social minimum monthly income level.  Monthly and hourly wage regulations covered all categories of workers who had labor agreements or civil contracts.  The law provided for a standard workweek of 40 hours, with an upper limit of 48 hours including overtime.  It required premium pay for overtime.  It prohibited excessive or compulsory overtime and set a maximum of 150 hours of overtime per year.According to trade union representatives, the most common labor rights violations concerned failure to pay wages, delayed payment of wages, and failure to formally register and pay for overtime work.  According to the 2022 National Labor Inspector’s annual report, most wage payment violations occurred in trade and repair services as well as in industrial processing industries and transport and storage services.  Seasonal and migrant workers were particularly vulnerable to such violations.Occupational Safety and Health:  The law defined strict and extensive minimum conditions to protect worker occupational health and safety (OSH).  OSH standards were appropriate for the main industries in the country.  According to trade unions, OSH experts actively identified unsafe conditions.Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, and authorities effectively protected employees in this situation.  According to the 2022 annual report of the National Labor Inspector (NLI), the majority of work-related accidents took place in industrial processing, construction, and trade and repairs.Employers rarely exceeded exposure standards for limits on chemicals, dust, and noise.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The NLI was responsible for enforcement of wage, hour, and OSH laws.  Labor inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.  According to trade union representatives, the NLI was committed to eliminating violations of wage, hour, and OSH laws, but due to an insufficient number of labor inspectors and limitation of resources to conduct inspections, the NLI was not able to effectively enforce existing laws.  Penalties were commensurate with those for similar crimes and were regularly applied against the violators.The NLI’s report did not cover domestic workers because inspectors could only conduct inspections in businesses, not private homes.Workers in the informal sector were not covered by wage, hour, and occupational safety and health laws and inspections.  The informal economy was estimated to constitute 22.4 percent of the total economy, which represented approximately $354 billion at GDP and purchasing power parity levels.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Poland
- Senior Official for the DPRK Pak’s Travel to Romania, Poland, and Sweden Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Senior Official for the DPRK Dr. Jung Pak will travel to Bucharest, Romania; Warsaw, Poland; and Stockholm, Sweden April 8-12 to discuss the threats posed by the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, malicious cyber activity, and deepening military and political partnership with Russia. She will also discuss opportunities for promoting dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK. Her travel is part of ongoing U.S. efforts to coordinate closely with allies and partners on the global security implications of the DPRK threat.
- Department Press Briefing – March 25, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; March 25, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; March 25, 2024																																																					March 25, 2024																																																								1:07 p.m. EDTMR MILLER:&nbsp; Good afternoon, everyone.QUESTION:&nbsp; Good afternoon.MR MILLER:&nbsp; Especially for those of you I see – actually just one of you – who traveled with us on this most recent trip.&nbsp; Humeyra, hope you got some rest over the weekend.&nbsp; I don’t see anyone else; Matt’s not here.&nbsp; Hope you got some rest over the weekend, and I &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; (Off-mike.)MR MILLER:&nbsp; Looks like your colleagues who were on that trip did not show up today.&nbsp; So anyway, I don’t have any opening statements, so Humeyra, you want to start us?QUESTION:&nbsp; Yeah, sure.&nbsp; So on Rafah, Matt, Israeli delegation’s not coming here.&nbsp; How will the U.S. be able to present its alternative proposals to Israel, since they’re not going to be here this week?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I saw the statement from the Government of Israel.&nbsp; I would say it was a bit surprising and unfortunate.&nbsp; The UN Security Council resolution that passed today from which the United States abstained, there were issues that we had concern – issues with which we had concerns related to that resolution, the fact that it did not condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks of October 7th; that’s why we didn’t vote for it.&nbsp; But the reason we didn’t veto it is because there were also things in that resolution that were consistent with our long-term position; most importantly, that there should be a ceasefire, and that there should be a release of hostages, which is what we understood also to be the Government of Israel’s position.&nbsp;&nbsp;So it is a bit surprising and unfortunate that they are not going to apparently attend these meetings.&nbsp; Because, as you heard the Secretary say in Tel Aviv on Friday after he met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and other members of the Israeli Government, we believe that, number one, a full-scale invasion of Rafah would be a mistake.&nbsp; It would be a mistake not just because of the civilian harm that it would cause, which would be immense – there are somewhere around 1.4 million people in Rafah now, and the Government of Israel has not presented a credible plan to evacuate those people to other areas and take care of them once they were moved – but also – and this was, I think, an important thing that the Secretary said – we also think that this type of invasion would weaken Israel’s security.&nbsp; It would make Israel less safe, not more safe.&nbsp; It would undermine its standing in the world.So we are ready to present to them plans that we believe would achieve their legitimate goal, which is the defeat of Hamas, but would do so in a way that does not cause undue civilian harm and does not weaken Israel’s overall security.&nbsp; So we will look forward to continuing to have those discussions with them.QUESTION:&nbsp; But I mean, do you have a plan right now, like, when that would happen?&nbsp; Would that be over the phone?&nbsp; Would Secretary Blinken go?&nbsp; Would you try to – and also has there been any communication with the Israeli Government at a high level following this decision?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So a few things in order.&nbsp; So first of all, we started these discussions with them last week in Tel Aviv.&nbsp; As you know, the Secretary discussed the potential invasion of Rafah with Prime Minister Netanyahu and the war cabinet in Tel Aviv, and laid out our very serious concerns.&nbsp; Defense Minister Gallant is here today; he’ll be meeting with the Secretary in a little over two hours, and I would expect that will be the subject of conversations in that meeting.&nbsp; And I understand he has a meeting with other officials in the government over the course of today and tomorrow.&nbsp; So we will have those discussions there.And then I am sure we will find other ways to make our concerns known to the Government of Israel at very senior levels, but I don’t have anything to announce with respect to that today.&nbsp;&nbsp;And then with respect to your final question – so we have had ongoing communications with officials from the Israeli Government about this UN Security Council resolution going back multiple days, going back to last week.&nbsp; And we had talked about different versions.&nbsp; As you may recall, there was a different draft that was put forward first that called for a permanent ceasefire, which is not something that we supported.&nbsp; We, as you know, want to see an immediate ceasefire, but linked to hostages, and then we want to build that into something more enduring.&nbsp; So we had been in close contact with them about this resolution.&nbsp; And as I said, we believe this resolution is consistent with our policy on this matter, and consistent with what we believe to be the Government of Israel’s policy, so we have had conversations with them over the last 24 hours, and I’m sure those will continue.QUESTION:&nbsp; Yeah, just – just one – a couple of other things.&nbsp; Just to be sure, so will the Secretary discuss with Defense Minister Gallant the alternatives that the United States was going to – no?MR MILLER:&nbsp; That will not be the main – I am sure that it will come up to some extent, but we do not have a presentation, a detailed presentation along those lines planned for this meeting today.QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp; And I hope you don’t call this a hypothetical; this is now very much a high possibility, that everybody has the sense that whatever happens regardless of you presenting alternative options or not, Israel will just go ahead with this offensive the way it sees it appropriate.&nbsp; They have said this publicly.&nbsp; Actually, Prime Minister Netanyahu said it on the day that Secretary Blinken – we were there on Friday – we will go alone if need be.&nbsp; So what is the – is the United States going to try to stop it if that would be the case?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I think I would answer that by saying we will make clear to them what the Secretary made clear on Friday, which is that we believe this type of full-scale invasion would be a mistake.&nbsp; It would be a mistake not just because of the extraordinary impact it would have on the somewhere around 1.4 million civilians who are in Rafah now, but it would also be a mistake because it would harm Israel’s overall security.&nbsp; We think there is a better way to do it that would accomplish, as I said, what is a very legitimate national security goal of Israel’s, which is to defeat the Hamas battalions that remain in Rafah.So we will continue to make that case to them.&nbsp; I expect that we will have other ways to do so over the coming days, but I would not want to make any predictions about what will come after that.&nbsp;Matt.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So last week when you guys presented your resolution at the UN, there were complaints from people who said that it delinked the ceasefire from the release of hostages, and U.S. officials were rather vociferous in saying that that is not the case.&nbsp; However, what you guys abstained on today does appear to delink them.&nbsp; Is that your understanding of &#8212;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we don’t believe it delinks them.&nbsp; You see in the same paragraph it – the resolution calling for both a ceasefire and the release of hostages.&nbsp; It’s not the exact language that we would have put forward, obviously, because the language that we would put forward is the language that we did put forward last week, but it is language that is consistent with our policy to call for both a ceasefire and the release of hostages, and that’s why we did not exercise a veto today.&nbsp;As I said, we did have concerns about the lack of other provisions in the resolution, but as it pertains to a ceasefire and the release of hostages, both the things that we called for were there in the resolution.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; The other provisions you’re referring to – is there something more than just a condemnation of Hamas?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; That is the – that is our &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Or were they plural?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; That is our chief objection.&nbsp; I’ll refer to the UN ambassador &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay, but the abstention means that you’re &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; &#8212; for any &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; &#8212; okay with it, you’re willing to go along with it.&nbsp; And so what do you expect now to happen as a result of the passage of this resolution?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I think &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Do you expect that Israel is going to announce a ceasefire?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I do not.&nbsp; So &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; And then do you expect that Hamas is going to release hostages?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I’m glad you get – you mentioned that, because one of the things that we have objected to for some time is that most of the people that call for a ceasefire we believe are calling for Israel to unilaterally stop operations, and not calling for Hamas to agree to a ceasefire where they would release hostages.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Well, I think it goes both ways, doesn’t it?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So – it could.&nbsp; But so the &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So wait, wait, wait, wait.&nbsp; The &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; No, the – but the resolution today is a non-binding resolution, but we do think &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So what’s the point?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Well &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Why did you &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; &#8212; you could ask that &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Why did you abstain?&nbsp; Why didn’t you veto?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; We didn’t veto because we thought the language in it was consistent with something that – the language as it relates to the ceasefire and release of hostages was consistent with the longstanding United States position.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So you don’t believe anything is going to happen as a result of the passage of this resolution.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I think that separate and apart from this resolution, we have active, ongoing negotiations to try to achieve what this resolution calls for, which is the – an immediate ceasefire and the release of hostages.&nbsp; I don’t – I can’t say that this – this resolution is going to have any impact on those negotiations.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; But those negotiations are ongoing.&nbsp; They’ve been ongoing over the weekend and they’ve made progress.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; All right.&nbsp; So I don’t expect you to answer this now, but maybe just stick this in&nbsp; your pocket.&nbsp; If that’s the case, what the hell is the point of the UN or the UN Security Council?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we think it plays an important role on a range of – a range of security &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Oh, it does, even though its action does absolutely nothing?&nbsp; I mean, and that you’re going to get what you would like to see not out of the UN, but out of discussions in Doha?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we believe it’s important that the UN speak – the UN Security Council speak on matters of international security.&nbsp; It’s why we’ve been engaged in this process.&nbsp; It’s why we thought we were going to have a successful vote on Friday that Russia and China unfortunately and quite cynically vetoed, but I do believe that ultimately, if we were able to achieve a ceasefire and the release of hostages, it’s going to come not through a UN process but through the process with which we’ve been engaged – yes – in Doha.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Could I just follow up on that?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Just to put it in other words, I mean, do you expect not just Israel but Hamas – do you expect compliance that Israel would actually – and Hamas for that matter – would actually say, hey, look, here’s a ceasefire in the month of Ramadan?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I don’t think you’re going to see Hamas complying with any United Nations Security Council resolutions.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; But do you want them to?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; But I would say – as I said, it’s a non-binding resolution, but we do believe that the ceasefire and release of hostages that the resolution calls for is not only the United States position but has been Israel’s position.&nbsp; This is what Israel has been trying to achieve through these negotiations.&nbsp; So I would hope that we could get to that agreement through these negotiations, and I would hope we get that in the near future.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Let me just put it one more way. I mean, if the fighting continues, I mean on both sides, is that – again, saying it’s non-binding, but is that a violation of the Security Council resolution?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Again, it’s a non-binding resolution and I would defer to international lawyers to speak in detail to that question.&nbsp;Yeah, go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Matt, I know what you said yesterday, that Israel told him that they will no longer allow UNRWA convoys to enter northern Gaza.&nbsp; I mean, if we add to this that there are so many incidents where Israelis fired on people queueing for aid in northern Gaza, do you – do you still believe or do – is it still the U.S. assessment that Israel is not using food or assistance as a tool of war?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we have not made an assessment or draw the conclusion that they are in violation of international humanitarian law when it comes to the provision of humanitarian assistance into Gaza.&nbsp; That said, we do believe there is very much more that they can do to let humanitarian assistance go in, both through Kerem Shalom and Rafah and also through the new 96 gate that opened up week before last, to allow convoys to move directly into the north without having to transit the somewhat perilous route inside Gaza.&nbsp; So we do believe that there is more that they can do, probably more that they can do – and I should say it’s not just with respect to UNRWA but with respect to other UN agencies that are operating and providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in Gaza today.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; The budget deal that was passed in the Congress also prevents you – prevent the United States Government from funding UNRWA.&nbsp; And you’ve been asked about this here in this – asking you on this podium before, and you said that you wanted – you don’t want to talk about something that didn’t happen.&nbsp; But now it seems that it’s happening.&nbsp; What is your plan to give aid to Gaza now that you cannot deal with UNRWA?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So first of all, I should make very clear that we’re going to comply with the law.&nbsp; And you’ve heard me speak about the fact that we had to prepare for the possibility that this might become law because it’s something that you’ve seen members of Congress propose, and you’d seen it in a bill that had previously passed the United States Senate.&nbsp; So we have been working to identify alternatives to provide humanitarian assistance to UNRWA.&nbsp;&nbsp;UNRWA will continue its work.&nbsp; There are other countries that are funding UNRWA.&nbsp; There are other countries that have lifted their pauses on funding of UNRWA over the past few weeks, and we expect that their important work will go forward.&nbsp; As for the United States, we still will provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.&nbsp; That is our commitment, it’s something that we have done for decades, and it’s something that we will continue to do.&nbsp;&nbsp;And so we have had a process ongoing to identify how we can best deliver that funding and that assistance outside of UNRWA if Congress did take the step that it has now taken, and I expect you’ll see us move along in that process over the coming weeks and months.&nbsp; But UNRWA is not now the only humanitarian provider that’s operating in Gaza.&nbsp; We’ve seen, for example, the World Food Program that has run some of these convoys that have moved up inside Israel and crossed into northern Gaza through the 96 gate.&nbsp; So we’ll look to work with WFP and other programs – UNICEF, perhaps – on ways to get the humanitarian assistance that we can provide, that we can fund, in to the people who need it.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; One last question, Matt.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; I’m seeking if you have any comment about the video that Al Jazeera broadcast on Friday about Israeli drone attacking Palestinian, five men, with drone missiles.&nbsp; I don’t know if you’ve see the video or not, but clearly in the video, at least from the way that we see it, they were unarmed, they look civilian, and they were targeted numerous time by rockets from a drone.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I’ve seen the video.&nbsp; I’m not able to offer an assessment as to the identity of the individuals in the video or any of the circumstances surrounding it.&nbsp; But it is something that we’ve asked the Israelis for more information about.&nbsp;Said.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you, Matt.&nbsp; A couple of follow-ups.&nbsp; Now, you were saying, I think in response to Humeyra, on you will show the Israelis ways to target Hamas without having a full invasion.&nbsp; Is that what you said, sir?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yes.&nbsp; We’ve made that clear for some time.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay, all right.&nbsp; You made that very clear.&nbsp; Does that mean that the United States will actually go into combat against Hamas?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; No.&nbsp; That is not at all what that means.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; What does that mean?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; It means that we will provide advice to Israel &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; Right.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; – about ways that they can accomplish their legitimate objective &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; Right.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; – which is to defeat the remaining Hamas battalions that are operating in Rafah, but without a full-scale invasion that would lead to mass humanitarian suffering.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Right.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; But we have been very clear that there will be no U.S. combat troops on the ground.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; And that would be also and the sharing of intelligence and things of that nature?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Those are conversations we’re going to have privately &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; You have practically &#8212;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Hold on – with the Government of Israel.&nbsp; I’m certainly not going to read them out here.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; All right.&nbsp; I have a couple questions to you on the resolution.&nbsp; Now, does this resolution have any practical future?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; What do you mean, does it have any practical future?&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; I mean does it have – I mean, it’s a nonbinding resolution, right?&nbsp; So does it have – could it be like a step forward towards a bigger binding resolution?&nbsp; Is that how you see it?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I’m not going to speculate about what steps the United Nations Security Council are going to take next.&nbsp; But we have been clear about what we are trying to achieve with respect to the conflict in Gaza, and that is to achieve an immediate, sustainable ceasefire linked to the release of hostages that we can then build into something more enduring.&nbsp; That has been something we have been pursuing for some time.&nbsp; It’s something that we have pursued in negotiations in Doha over the weekend.&nbsp; And as I said, we believe that we’ve made progress in that, including progress in – over the weekend.&nbsp; And we’ll continue to pursue it.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp; Now, a couple more things on UNRWA in response to Ahmad’s questions and so on, on UNRWA.&nbsp; Now, Israel, with the new law, that defunding UNRWA has become law, they can say we don’t want any UNRWA operations anywhere in Gaza or the West Bank, where that – are really totally dependent on the UNRWA operation.&nbsp; I know you mentioned the World Food Program and so on, but it does not have the kind of mechanism and logistics in place and the history behind it that UNRWA has.&nbsp; So do you expect that the Israelis will just throw out UNRWA lock, stock, and barrel?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I am not going to make any predictions about what the Government of Israel – what steps the Government of Israel might take.&nbsp; I will make clear, as we have, that we continue to support the important work that UNRWA does to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; All right.&nbsp; And lastly, I don’t know if you are following up on the West Bank.&nbsp; The Israelis confiscated or ordered an issue to confiscate 3,000 dunams.&nbsp; It’s the largest in many decades and so on.&nbsp; Do you have any comment on that?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; We have been very clear in our position that these settlements are inconsistent with international humanitarian law and that they are ultimately a barrier to peace.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; International law.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; International law.&nbsp; Excuse me.&nbsp; I’m so – I’m so used to &#8212; I’m so used to talking about humanitarian law in the context of the rest of this.&nbsp; International law.QUESTION:&nbsp; Yeah, international law.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Extremely briefly, did you see this report about some Israeli general saying that he had been told by a State Department official that there was incontrovertible evidence that IDF troops had raped a Palestinian woman?MR MILLER:&nbsp; I did see that report.&nbsp; It is not accurate.QUESTION:&nbsp; What does that mean?MR MILLER:&nbsp; My understanding &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; What is not accurate?MR MILLER:&nbsp; My understanding of the meeting is that you had a State Department official who said in these meetings what we have said consistently publicly, which is that Israel must thoroughly and transparently investigate credible allegations of wrongdoing and assure – ensure accountability for any abuses or violations.&nbsp; That’s what the – what this official said, which is what we’ve said publicly.&nbsp; You’ve heard me say it from this podium many times.&nbsp; Nothing more.QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Could I pick up another aspect of the Gaza – of the issue of NSM-20.&nbsp; Could we discuss that in terms of what &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Sure.QUESTION:&nbsp; &#8212; what the communication has been so far with Israel?&nbsp; `This was all done on – of course, over the weekend.&nbsp; Has Israel presented assurances, if you want to call it that, and what’s the U.S. response?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; So there was a deadline actually yesterday for us to receive assurances from all seven countries, not just Israel but all seven countries, to whom the United States provides defense articles and are in active conflict.&nbsp; There is a separate provision of the memo that provides a separate timeline.&nbsp; I think it’s six months for countries to whom we provide defense articles but are not in active conflict.But for these seven countries – which are Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine – we have received written assurances that are required in the memo.&nbsp; In each case, these assurances were made by a credible high-level official in the partner government who has the ability and authority to make decisions and commitments about the issues at the heart of the assurances.&nbsp; And the next step, as provided in the national security memorandum, is that we will be compiling a public – compiling a report and issuing it to Congress by May 8th.QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp; So you – so they’re credible assurances.&nbsp; I know you’re aren’t saying anything about just Israel, but all of these countries involved.&nbsp; I mean, obviously the – there’s a lot of interest in Israel in light of what’s happening in Gaza.MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.QUESTION:&nbsp; So it’s in the interest of the United States that what Israel is doing, it’s credible in terms of their assurances, but U.S. weapons.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; So first of all, I should be clear that these assurances are prospective.&nbsp; But of course our view on them is informed by our ongoing assessments of Israel’s conduct in the war in Gaza.&nbsp; So we have had ongoing assessments about their compliance with international humanitarian law.&nbsp; I’ve spoken to them from this podium before.&nbsp; We have the CHERG process, that is examining specific incidents.&nbsp; We have not found them to be in violation of international humanitarian law, either when it comes to the conduct of the war or when it comes to the provision of humanitarian assistance.&nbsp; So we view their assurances through that ongoing work that we have done.And I should make clear those ongoing assessments are not something that started because of the national security memorandum, and they’re not something that stop because we got these assurances from Israel yesterday.&nbsp; They will be ongoing.&nbsp; When we get credible reports or credible allegations of misconduct, we look at them through the process that we have ongoing, and ultimately we will make the appropriate conclusions.&nbsp; And to the extent that we are able to do so in the report that’s due on May 8th, they will be provided to Congress through that report.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Sorry, I just heard – you said every – all seven countries had submitted?MR MILLER:&nbsp; All seven, yes.QUESTION:&nbsp; I mean, you yourself have discussed the civilian casualties, the civilian toll there in Gaza.&nbsp; So I mean, is that consistent with that?&nbsp; I mean, so you think that even though there’s a civilian toll, that the U.S. – that the use of U.S. weapons – that they’re credible assurances that have been given there?&nbsp; Is that not inconsistent at all to say that they’re &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So they have given us assurances.&nbsp; I would say, when it comes to finding a violation of international humanitarian law, that requires a fact-intensive analysis of relevant factors related to international humanitarian law.&nbsp; So you’ve heard me speak to this before:&nbsp; If you’re to assess whether a particular strike is in compliance with international humanitarian law, you have to know who was the target of the strike.&nbsp; You have to know what steps they took to minimize civilian harm.&nbsp; You have to know to what extent they were successful.&nbsp;&nbsp;And so we have ongoing processes to look at those things, and those were processes that started before this memorandum was signed by the President.&nbsp; They were processes that were ongoing before we received these assurances.&nbsp; And they’re processes that will continue to be ongoing.&nbsp; But as of yet, we have not made a conclusion that Israel is in violation of international humanitarian law.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So could I follow up, Matt?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.QUESTION:&nbsp; Do you have this – does this response from 11 NGOs saying that Israel is in breach of the national security memorandum, does that feed in at all to the U.S. assessment?&nbsp; Is the U.S. listening to NGOs that have had experience or on-the-ground experience in Gaza?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we welcome reports.&nbsp; We welcome credible information from NGOs or anyone else who has credible allegations about potential violations of international humanitarian law.&nbsp; And we would urge NGOs or anyone else to submit them to the United States Government, to submit them to the State Department, and it’s part of what we will look at in our ongoing assessments.&nbsp;&nbsp;Anything else on Gaza before I move on?&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Yes.MR MILLER:&nbsp; Janne, I know you’re not asking about Gaza.&nbsp; (Laughter.)&nbsp; Go ahead.QUESTION:&nbsp; Yes, this is North Korea.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Go ahead.&nbsp; I’ll come back to you.QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; Following up on the UN Security Council resolution, you said that it’s nonbinding, but some others are also arguing that it is binding, like other – several other UN Security Council resolutions.&nbsp; Has there been any – is there an ongoing discussion about this at the UN between the U.S. representatives and others on that?And also the – I remember it was last November the UN Security Council also adopted a resolution calling for extended and urgent humanitarian pauses and corridors in Gaza, which was binding and which was rejected by Israel, like several UN Security Council resolutions in the past.&nbsp; So will the U.S. encourage Israel to comply with UN resolutions and international law if Israel is not above the law?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So with respect to the first resolution, it is our interpretation of this resolution that it is non-binding.&nbsp; And for any detail on that, I would refer you to the office of our ambassador to the United Nations, who can of course speak in more detail of how we’d reach that conclusion.&nbsp; With respect to the other resolution, of course we always expect all of our partner nations to comply with international law, and I’ll leave at that.&nbsp;&nbsp;Gaza?&nbsp; Gaza.&nbsp; Gaza.&nbsp; Go ahead, Michel.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; What did the Secretary discuss this afternoon with the Israeli defense minister?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So it will be a continuation of the discussions that we had on Friday in Israel when the Secretary met with the Israeli war cabinet.&nbsp; Defense Minister Gallant was in those meetings where we talked about our concerns about Rafah.&nbsp; We talked about the need to increase the level of humanitarian assistance making it into Gaza and make sure that, that increase in assistance is sustained.&nbsp; And then I’m sure that the defense minister will have other things on his mind, and we’ll have a readout of the meeting afterwards.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; In this – in a video statement that he made in front of the White House, Minister Gallant has said:&nbsp; We have no moral right to stop the war until we return all the abductees to their homes; stopping the war in Gaza before a clear decision is made endangers Israel’s security and may bring us closer to war from the north.MR MILLER:&nbsp; So &#8212;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Do you have – do you have any comment on that?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I haven’t seen his full statement, so I’m always reluctant to respond when I see a – or when I have a brief quote read out to me of what may be a larger statement.&nbsp; But of course we want to see all the hostages returned home.&nbsp; That has been something we have tried to achieve from the beginning, and of course it was the negotiations that led to the first pause that – in which the United States was an active player that secured the release of over 100 hostages.&nbsp; And the United States has been actively engaged, including this weekend, to try to secure the release of every remaining hostage, and we will not let up on that goal.&nbsp;&nbsp;I would add, as you heard me say, that we also – I’ve said this two or three times already, but when you hear officials from the Israeli Government say that they want to see the defeat of the Hamas battalions in Rafah and they will not stop the war before that, we also want to see the defeat of those Hamas battalions in Rafah.&nbsp; We share that same goal, but we think it’s a false choice to say that there’s not a better way to do it than smashing into Rafah in a way that would lead to an inordinate amount of human suffering.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; And what about when he said that any ceasefire will endanger Israel’s security and may bring us closer – as Israel is – to war from the north?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So, again, I’m a little reluctant to respond specifically to that comment because I haven’t seen the rest of what he – the defense minister said.&nbsp; But it has been the position of the Government of Israel to try and reach a ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages.&nbsp; That’s what they’ve been pursuing in these hostage negotiations; it’s what we’ve been pursuing.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; On Gaza?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Shannon, go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Just to put a fine point on the resolution, you said a couple times that you were surprised by the Israeli Government’s reaction to the U.S. abstention, but we do know the U.S. was involved in negotiations basically up to the vote.&nbsp; So is there some kind of disconnect for that surprise to be there?&nbsp; Did Israel not say they were against this kind of resolution?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I’m not going to get into our private conversations with officials from the Government of Israel, but we had been in close contact with them about this resolution going back into last week.&nbsp; We obviously were in contact with them about the resolution that the United States put forward that was ultimately vetoed on Friday.&nbsp; And when you kind of come down to brass tacks, the text of the resolution is something that calls for what we believe has been the Government of Israel’s position, which was a ceasefire and the release of hostages, so that’s why we found their statement today unfortunate and a bit surprising.&nbsp;&nbsp;All right.&nbsp; Is this Gaza?&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I just want to finish up – finish up – go ahead.&nbsp; I want to – and then I’ll come to you next, Ryan. Yeah, go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; I have two questions on Gaza.&nbsp; And the first question, you said to Mr. Said there will not be, like combat or any military troops on the ground.&nbsp; But do you will have military advisors and intelligence advisor on border from Gaza?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I would defer to the Pentagon to speak about – in detail about military matters.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp; The second question on Palestine and the resolutions.&nbsp; Like I mean, last question from me like 10 days ago you told me like there – there are many Arab countries that recognized Israel, even the border issues.&nbsp; Israel doesn’t have a border.&nbsp; So why USA doesn’t, like, take initiative and recognize Palestine, regardless this border issue, and, like, recognize it as a state and that may be – like help people feel that there is a hope that they will have a country, whether it is, like, one-state solution, two-state solution &#8212;&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Sure.&nbsp; It is – it &#8212;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Like as Arab countries recognized Israel without borders &#8212;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp; Because &#8212;&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; &#8212; why don’t you recognize Palestine without borders?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Because it has been the longstanding position of the United States that recognition of a Palestinian state is something that should be negotiated between the relevant parties.&nbsp;&nbsp;Ryan, go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; So with Netanyahu cancelling this delegation and promising to go into Rafah anyway, is the U.S. taking any precautions to make sure that U.S. weapons are not going to be used in that invasion that he is promising?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So let me answer that in two ways.&nbsp; Number one, to say – which is – it has always been our expectation that United States weapons be used in full compliance with international humanitarian law.&nbsp; I know that’s a different question than what you asked, but I think it’s important to put on the record.&nbsp;&nbsp;With respect to what might happen in an ultimate invasion of Rafah, I said this a little bit in response to Humeyra’s question – I really don’t want to get ahead of the facts.&nbsp; We do still expect to have discussions about this matter with the Government of Israel.&nbsp; We believe there is a better way to do it.&nbsp; And beyond that, I don’t want to speculate about what may happen down the road.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; And real quickly.&nbsp; I don’t know if you’ve seen this report, but Shin Bet has sort of threatened an American citizen who posted, I think, on social media about the location of Netanyahu’s son.&nbsp; Is that okay?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah, so I’ve seen the reports.&nbsp; I – we’ve not talked to the individual in question.&nbsp; I don’t – we don’t have the ability or have not yet verified, on behalf of the United States Government, the underlying allegations.&nbsp; But I would say that as a general matter the United States would oppose any effort by any foreign government attempting to intimidate any individuals in the United States from engaging in protected free speech activities.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Not Gaza.MR MILLER:&nbsp; All right.&nbsp; Wrap up Gaza &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; On Gaza?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Do you want – all right, let’s move – all right, go ahead.&nbsp; Go ahead.&nbsp; We’ll move on.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; On Mexico, the President Lopez Obrador was interviewed over the weekend and explained some hesitancy to go after cartels at the request or at the behest of foreign governments.&nbsp; He called it part of his “Mexico first” policy.&nbsp; I wanted to see if you had any response to that.&nbsp; And then separately, a little more specific, there was some investigative reporting over the weekend that drug cartels are targeting seniors, Americans and Canadians, with timeshares, and extorting them to sell – or pressuring them to sell and then extorting them with upfront fees.&nbsp; I wanted to see if you were aware of that issue, if you had any comment outside of the standard Travel Advisory.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I don’t have any comment on the second.&nbsp; I have seen those reports but I just don’t have a comment.&nbsp; With respect to the first, I’m not aware what the specific comment refers to, but the United States has been – made very clear that we want to work with the Mexican Government to stop cartels from smuggling dangerous drugs into the United States.&nbsp; And we’ve had long – a longstanding productive partnership with the Government of Mexico to accomplish just that.&nbsp; You’ve seen the Secretary travel to Mexico a number of times to further our work together to try and take on the cartels that are trafficking fentanyl and other drugs that do so much harm to the American public.&nbsp;&nbsp;Janne.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you, Matt.&nbsp; Two questions on Russia, North Korea, and Ukraine.&nbsp; North Korea announced that they expected Russia to recognize it as a nuclear state.&nbsp; And the Russia’s Kremlin said that the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula was due to United States deterrence power.&nbsp; He also said that the Russia would guarantee a nuclear umbrella to North Korea.&nbsp; So if Russia alone guarantees North Korea’s nuclear weapons, do you think North Korea will be recognized as a nuclear state?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I will say what we have said before but – that is we are committed to the complete and total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.&nbsp; And of course we continue to remain concerned about the growing and burgeoning partnership between the Russian Government and North Korea.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; On Ukraine, Russia used a a large number of North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine.&nbsp; However, Ukraine Government announced that defective with North Korean-made weapons.&nbsp; How does the U.S. assess North Korea’s weapons?&nbsp; Do you have any (inaudible) this?MR MILLER:&nbsp; I don’t have any particular assessment to offer from here.&nbsp;&nbsp;Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you, Matthew.&nbsp; Welcome back.&nbsp; A couple of questions on Russia-Ukraine.&nbsp; Staying on Moscow first and the Friday attack.&nbsp; Kremlin continues to either pin the blame on Ukraine without evidence, and Putin’s ambassador to Washington has denied the fact that the U.S. has tipped off prior to the attack.&nbsp; Can you please walk us through sort of the &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m sorry, what was the – with respect to &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; There was a tip-off from the U.S. – he denied that there was any tip-off from Washington.&nbsp; Can you please walk us through some of your communications with the Russians in the run-up to last Friday?&nbsp; And what do you know, when did you know it, and how did you communicate?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So two things.&nbsp; With respect to the first question, there was no Ukrainian involvement – period.&nbsp; You’ve seen the Ukrainian Government make that clear?&nbsp; And of course, with respect to these statements the Russians have offered zero evidence, because there is no evidence of Ukrainian involvement.&nbsp; With respect to the warnings that we provided to the Government of Russia, yes, we did offer warnings to the Government of Russia in early March about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow, specifically potentially targeting large gatherings, including concerts.&nbsp;&nbsp;We gave them that private warning consistent with our duty to warn that we have when we see – or when we gather intelligence of terrorist attacks or potential terrorist attacks.&nbsp; You might recall that several months ago, we warned the Government of Iran about a potential terrorist attack by ISIS-K in Iran, one that ultimately, quite tragically, also came to be true.&nbsp; And it was because of that warning that we passed onto the Russian Government that we issued a security warning on March 7 where we, again, said to U.S. citizens that we had information about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow, potentially including – potentially targeting large gatherings, including concerts.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Was it communicated through diplomatic channels, through the DOD, or &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m not going to speak to the specific channels through which we communicated.&nbsp;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; As you know, France today raised its threat security level to the highest.&nbsp; Is there any concern on your end that U.S. interests, U.S. companies –&nbsp;diplomats&nbsp;– might be under increasing danger abroad&nbsp;– in Europe,&nbsp;in this case?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Look, we always encourage United States companies operating overseas to be vigilant to threats in their area, and we issued security alerts in various countries around the world, but I don’t have any updates to offer today.QUESTION:&nbsp; And back to Ukraine, heavy bombardments we have seen during past five days in a row – what is your reading of Putin’s motivation at this very moment?MR MILLER:&nbsp; His motivation?QUESTION:&nbsp; And is it – maybe because he is encouraged by the fact that Ukraine is – has a shortage of air defense.MR MILLER:&nbsp; So look, I think Vladimir Putin’s motives have not changed.&nbsp; He wants to conquer Ukraine and subjugate the Ukrainian people.&nbsp; He’s made very clear that his motivations haven’t changed, and you’ve seen him publicly reference just in the past 10 days or so that he has no interest in negotiating with Ukraine right now because he’s seeing the ammunitions shortages that they are suffering.&nbsp; So from the perspective of this administration, it only highlights the need for the United States Congress to pass the President’s supplemental funding request and provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to defend itself against Russia’s aggression.QUESTION:&nbsp; I’ve got one more, if you don’t mind.MR MILLER:&nbsp; Let me – let me go – that’s three, Alex, and we’ve been – we’ve gone around a lot.&nbsp; So &#8212;&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Please come back to me too, please (inaudible).MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m not making any promises.&nbsp; (Laughter.)&nbsp; Go ahead.QUESTION:&nbsp; The Polish Government says that for the third time already, a Russian cruise missile flew through Polish airspace, and the Russian ambassador was called in and he just refused to show up.&nbsp; Do you have to – do you have any response to that?&nbsp; And did you have any contacts with the Polish authorities regarding that incident?MR MILLER:&nbsp; We have been in close communication with the Polish authorities about this matter, and we have said to them the – privately what I will reiterate publicly from this podium, which is our commitment to NATO and the security of our NATO Allies, which of course includes Poland, is ironclad and it will not waver.QUESTION:&nbsp; So would Poland be within its right to strike it down next time that &#8212;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m just not going to speak on behalf of decisions made by a foreign country.Go ahead.QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you, Matt.&nbsp; In 30 days, the Iraqi prime minister will be here in Washington D.C., and the Iraqi foreign minister (inaudible) Secretary Blinken.&nbsp; What the Iraqi official says that they are saying that we are in negotiation with the U.S. Government and in post U.S. coalition forces to defeat ISIS relations with the U.S.&nbsp; Is there any discussion with the Iraqi Government about the post-U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq?MR MILLER:&nbsp; I don’t want to get into our private conversations.&nbsp; We do have the meeting with the foreign minister come up – coming up, and we will have a readout of that meeting afterwards.QUESTION:&nbsp; And have you got any understanding with the Iraqi Government, especially about the HMC meetings about the future and the evolution of your forces in Iraq?MR MILLER:&nbsp; I just don’t have any announcements with respect to meetings.Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION:&nbsp; Just a little bit more on Gaza, Matt.&nbsp; You talked about relationship with Poland, right?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.QUESTION:&nbsp; You called it ironclad.&nbsp; So how would you characterize the relationship with Israel right now?&nbsp; Is that ironclad as well?MR MILLER:&nbsp; We have a close relationship with the Government of Israel.&nbsp; They are a major non-NATO ally of ours.&nbsp; It’s why you’ve seen us in such close communication with them.QUESTION:&nbsp; Sure.MR MILLER:&nbsp; Secretary’s been to Israel seven times now since October 7th.QUESTION:&nbsp; Think six.MR MILLER:&nbsp; There are things with – there are broad areas on which we agree.&nbsp; The defeat of Hamas is one of them, a commitment to Israel’s security is another, and then there are of course areas where we have disagreements.QUESTION:&nbsp; Do you think there was any negative impact after the – the disagreements have been piling up, but today we saw Israel threatening to do something if U.S. policy wouldn’t change or if U.S. wouldn’t act in a certain way that it wants, and U.S. didn’t act that way and they followed through on their threat.&nbsp; And right now a conversation that Washington thought was important is not happening.&nbsp; How would you – is there any lasting impact on this, or how would you characterize the relationship right now based on that?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I will leave it to professional pundits to make those types of characterizations.&nbsp; I will just talk about &#8212;QUESTION:&nbsp; I’m not seeking professional pundits’ opinion.&nbsp; I’m seeking &#8212;MR MILLER:&nbsp; No, no, no, I understand.&nbsp; I will just talk about the facts of our relationship, which is we have very direct, candid discussions.&nbsp; I was sitting in the meeting between the Secretary and the prime minister and the war cabinet on Friday, and I can tell you those conversations are at times quite direct on areas where we have disagreement, and that – disagreements, and that has been the case not just back to October 7th but since before October 7th.And it is – I’ll just say it is partly because of our longstanding relationship with Israel.&nbsp; It’s a relationship that is not just between this administration and the Israeli Government; it is a relationship that goes back between multiple governments, administrations both in the United States and Israel.&nbsp; It’s a relationship between the American people and the Israeli people, and so it is because we have that kind of longstanding relationship that we can be pretty frank with each other.QUESTION:&nbsp; Right.MR MILLER:&nbsp; We don’t make threats to them.&nbsp; We don’t expect them to make threats to us.&nbsp; We have direct, honest conversations about areas where we disagree, and of course honest conversations when we agree.QUESTION:&nbsp; Right.&nbsp; You said you’d expect to present the alternatives for Rafah at some point.&nbsp; I mean, are you – is the U.S. determined to present them no matter what?&nbsp; I guess what I’m trying to understand is do you think Israel is genuinely willing to hear them out, or did you get any sense from them that this week was a bit of an exercise and the UN resolution saga gave them an out out of this.MR MILLER:&nbsp; So I’m not going to speak for what the Government of Israel intends or what they – but I will say that when we met with them in Israel on Friday, they made clear that they did want to see the options, the alternatives that the United States was going to present.&nbsp; We think it’s important too that they see those options, because we do believe that the path that they are currently on towards a full-scale invasion of Rafah is one that would weaken Israel’s security and hurt the Palestinian people and cause inordinate human suffering that doesn’t need to happen.&nbsp; So we will continue to have conversations with them about this.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; And after today it’s still your understanding that they’re still willing to hear out those alternatives?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I – this is something that just broke in the last few hours, so I’m not going to speak to what future conversations that we’re going to have with them, but we talk to the Government of Israel every day at different levels.&nbsp; The Secretary has conversations with officials in the Israeli Government.&nbsp; Our ambassador is in and out of the Israeli Government all the time, talking about things that they want from us and oftentimes presenting things that we want them to do.&nbsp; And I do expect that those conversations will continue on multiple levels between our government and theirs about multiple topics, including a potential invasion of Rafah.&nbsp;Shaun.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Completely different topic – Senegal.&nbsp; The election results, after quite a bit of controversy on it, the outgoing president, President Sall, has congratulated the opposition candidate, Mr. Faye, on this.&nbsp; Do you have a reaction?&nbsp; Is it a happy ending?&nbsp; Is it democracy triumphing?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we congratulate the people of Senegal on their enthusiastic participation in yesterday’s well-run election.&nbsp; We look forward to congratulating Senegal’s new president once the results are official.&nbsp; And we note that both domestic and international observers have characterized election day as predominantly peaceful and that election officials, polling staff, party agents, and security forces were generally professional.&nbsp; The commitment of the Senegalese people to the democratic process is part of the foundation of our deep friendship and strong bilateral ties.&nbsp; So yes, when you ask the question about are we pleased with how this has proceeded, look, you had several months ago, a month ago, six weeks – I don’t remember the exact timing – potential suspension of elections.&nbsp; We made very clear that we wanted to see elections take place as soon as possible, and you saw ultimately the courts in Senegal make that clear, and we’re pleased that those elections have proceeded.&nbsp;Nick, I call on you with some trepidation.&nbsp; Whenever someone leaves the room and then comes back to ask a question, I get – I get worried what’s coming at me.&nbsp; But go ahead.&nbsp; I hope I don’t regret this.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; This is on Afghanistan, and it’s a little old.&nbsp; There’s a SIGAR report that said of the 2.9 billion that the UN has provided to Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal there, some of that – including U.S. taxpayer money – has gone into Taliban-controlled banks.&nbsp; Are you familiar with that report?&nbsp; And &#8212;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I have – yeah, go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; &#8212; what’s being done to prevent stuff like that from happening?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So let me take that question and get back to you.&nbsp; I have seen the report.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m sure there’s more we have to say about it, but let me just take it back and get you a complete answer.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Follow-up?&nbsp; Follow-up, Matt.&nbsp; Thanks.&nbsp; Follow-up.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Go ahead.&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you, Matt.&nbsp; In light of the Moscow attack, does the United States have any plans to boost security cooperation with Moscow?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; No, obviously, I think.&nbsp; So when it comes to the attack, a few things.&nbsp; Number one, you saw the Secretary in a statement that he issued on Saturday express his deep condolences on behalf of the United States to the loss of life and the suffering by the Russian people.&nbsp; Number two, when we have – if we have – intelligence in the future like the intelligence we had with respect to this attack, we will of course make it available to the Russian Government because we don’t want to see terrorist attacks be successful anywhere in the world.&nbsp; We don’t want to see the Russian people suffer.&nbsp; We have never had any quarrel with the Russian people.&nbsp;&nbsp;So we will of course provide – if we have intelligence information about potential attacks, we will provide that information to the Russian Government just as we provide it to the Government of Iran, a country with which we have deep, lasting disagreements – because we don’t want to see the people of Iran suffer.&nbsp; And just like as our quarrel is not with the Russian people, our quarrel is not with the Iranian people.&nbsp;Hold on, I’m still answering another question.&nbsp;But that said, obviously we are not going to boost our security – or boost any security agreements or start any security agreements with the Government of Russia, a government that we have seen invade one of its neighbors unprovoked, kill thousands and thousands of people for no reason at all except to pursue the personal conquest objectives of the Russian president.&nbsp; So no, we will not be taking that step.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; One more?&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; Yeah.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; One more.&nbsp; As you probably know, Volodymyr Zelenskyy presidential term expires on May 20th, and there is no election on the horizon.&nbsp; Will Zelenskyy still be the legitimate president of Ukraine for you past May 20th?&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So ultimately these are questions for the Ukrainian people to decide.&nbsp; We want to see presidential elections and all elections in Ukraine.&nbsp; But we recognize that it’s a difficult thing to conduct in the middle of the war.&nbsp; This isn’t a question that’s unique to Ukraine; it’s a question that pertains to any country that is in the middle of a war, especially when you don’t just have the question of soldiers on the front lines being able to vote – you have the question of how you deal with these occupied territories where the Russian military is occupying Ukrainian land and would prevent Ukrainian citizens from making their voices heard in the election.&nbsp; So it’s a very difficult issue to work through, and ultimately it’s a decision for the Ukrainian people to make.&nbsp;Go ahead.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; Which?MR MILLER:&nbsp; No.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; There is the fear among Palestinian that the new planned seaport will be built by U.S. Army, will be used as a U.S. military base, and also will be used to displace Palestinian from Gaza to other country, and also indicate that Rafah will be attacked because the aid, it’s much easier to bring it through the Egyptian borders, not from the port.&nbsp;&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp; So two things.&nbsp; One, with respect to the pier that the U.S. military is constructing, it is for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.&nbsp; It is not to displace the Palestinian people.&nbsp; It is not to facilitate the arrival of U.S. troops in Gaza.&nbsp; The President has made clear that there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Gaza.&nbsp; It is just to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance.The second point I would make is what you have heard from the President to the Secretary on down to little old me, and that is that the provision of humanitarian assistance through that port is the same as the provision of humanitarian assistance that we’re providing through air drops.&nbsp; It is meant to supplement, not replace, the delivery of humanitarian assistance through Rafah, but also through Kerem Shalom and through the 96 gate that Israel has recently opened to provide humanitarian assistance directly to the north.&nbsp; Those cannot be turned off; they have to be not just kept open, but they have to be increased and sustained so – because ultimately that is the best way to deliver humanitarian assistance.&nbsp; But the other options we’re pursuing are to supplement that assistance.QUESTION:&nbsp; And also not to take the gas in Gaza, or &#8212;MR MILLER:&nbsp; And not to what?QUESTION:&nbsp; The gas in Gaza, in the Sea of Gaza.MR MILLER:&nbsp; I’m not sure to what you’re – the gas?&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp; The gas, yes.MR MILLER:&nbsp; The gas?&nbsp; No, no, of course not.&nbsp; It has nothing to do with that.QUESTION:&nbsp; Okay.&nbsp; The other question, please.&nbsp; Is it logic to cut off the fund for the UNRWA, regarding to UNRWA, even if there is 12 employees, they are cooperate with Hamas in October&nbsp;7th, there is more than 30,000 served employees in UNRWA.&nbsp; So is it logic to cut off that arm because this reason?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So –QUESTION:&nbsp; Unless there is another reason to get rid of the UNRWA and to release or to get rid of the refugees’ issues?MR MILLER:&nbsp; So we have made clear that we support the work that UNRWA does.&nbsp; We paused our funding because of the very serious allegations that UNRWA found credible; it’s not just that Israel found them credible, it’s that UNRWA did.&nbsp; But as it pertained – I think you’re probably referring to the action that the United States Congress took.&nbsp; We ultimately will follow the law because that’s our duty to do so.All right, we’ll take one more up front, and then we’ll wrap for the day.QUESTION:&nbsp; Thanks, Matt.&nbsp; Can you give an update on the number of evacuees from Haiti and on the helicopter lifts, and whether you anticipate any more charter flights to be going from&nbsp;Cap-Haïtien for Americans?MR MILLER:&nbsp; Sure.&nbsp; So we have three flights, helicopter flights leaving today.&nbsp; We have four that are planned for tomorrow.&nbsp; We have facilitated the safe departure of over 340 U.S. citizens out of Haiti since March 17th.&nbsp; That includes approximately 250 U.S. citizens who have departed Port-au-Prince, and another hundred that have departed through Cape – Cap-Haïtien.&nbsp; We continue to explore other alternatives to evacuate American citizens from Haiti, but I don’t have anything further to announce today.QUESTION:&nbsp; Thank you.MR MILLER:&nbsp; With that, we’ll wrap.&nbsp; Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 1:59 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Haiti																								Iraq																								Israel																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Poland																								Russia																								The Secretary of State																								Senegal																								Ukraine
- NATO Accession Anniversary for Czechia, Hungary, and Poland Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States, I want to congratulate Czechia, Hungary, and Poland on the 25th anniversary of your accession to NATO.As then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said to mark your accession in 1999, “NATO is joined by three proud democracies – countries that have proven their ability to meet Alliance responsibilities, uphold Alliance values, and defend Alliance interests.”For 25 years, we have stood together as Allies – united and fully committed to our collective security.  Today, NATO stands as the most successful and enduring alliance in history.  As we adapt to address the evolving challenges of the future and uphold our ironclad commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory, our Alliance is stronger than ever.
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski																																		Readout																														February 26, 2024																																							The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in Washington.&nbsp; Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Sikorski discussed deepening U.S.-Polish bilateral relations across a wide range of mutual interests, including defense cooperation, our shared democratic values, and energy security and civil-nuclear energy cooperation.&nbsp; The United States and Poland stand united as NATO Allies in support of Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself against Russia’s ongoing aggression.						Tags																					Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Poland																								The Secretary of State
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski Before Their Meeting HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski Before Their Meeting				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski Before Their Meeting																																		Remarks																														February 26, 2024																																							SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; Well, good afternoon, everyone.&nbsp; And it’s a particular pleasure, Radek, to welcome you back to Washington, back to the State Department.&nbsp; This is an important occasion in a number of ways.&nbsp; First and foremost, of course, we have both President Duda and Prime Minister Tusk coming together to the White House and to Washington on March the 12th, and I look forward to talking about that very important visit – one that shows, I think again, the fact that the relationship between the United States and Poland is, at least in my judgment, stronger than it’s ever been.&nbsp; And this comes at a critical time, but it’s also reinforced by the fact that we are proceeding on a basis of shared values, shared interests, and shared determination to meet the challenges of this moment.&nbsp; So I look very much forward to talking about that visit and talking about the work we’re doing together to prepare for it.But this is also an auspicious day in another way.&nbsp; A short while ago, the Hungarian parliament approved the admission of Sweden to NATO.&nbsp; And so with that process now being completed, we very much look forward in the days ahead to finalizing everything and bringing Sweden into our Alliance, our shared Alliance.&nbsp;I think this only underscores yet again the strategic debacle that Putin’s invasion or reinvasion of Ukraine has produced for Russia: a NATO Alliance that is both stronger and larger with the accession of both Finland and now Sweden; the Ukrainian people more unified than ever, and unified in opposition to Russia and everything that Putin has done since 2014; and a Europe that has shown extraordinary solidarity both with Ukraine and with the imperative of dealing with the threat and aggression posed by Russia, including in the space of two years by moving itself off of energy dependence on Russia extraordinarily quickly, extraordinarily effectively; and of course, the work that all of us are doing to make sure that Ukraine will stand on its own two feet militarily, economically, democratically for many, many years to come.We see time and again that Mr. Putin has managed to precipitate everything he said he was trying to prevent.&nbsp; And today’s historic work by the Hungarian parliament only underscores that.But from day one it has been Poland, its leadership, its solidarity with Ukraine, its work within our NATO Alliance, that has made and continues to make a profound difference.&nbsp; And so, Radek, I know we’ll have occasion to talk about that as well, but we couldn’t be more grateful both, again, not just for the solidarity but the leadership that Poland has shown when it comes to this aggression against so many of our interests and so many of our values.FOREIGN MINISTER SIKORSKI:&nbsp; Thank you for the invitation to the State Department.&nbsp; Thank you for your kind words.&nbsp; And thank you above all for what the United States has already done for Ukraine and therefore the security of Europe, even though Ukraine was not a formal ally when Putin invaded in full scale.&nbsp; We appreciate what your intelligence services have done with the strategic use of intelligence and the way you’ve sustained Ukraine in its hour of need.Indeed, as you said, the Polish-American relationship is excellent.&nbsp; I’m looking forward to discussing with you the upcoming visit of our president and our prime minister.&nbsp; But above all, I’m looking forward to discussing what we can do to make sure that Putin doesn’t conquer Ukraine, because that would be a disaster not only for Ukraine but for Poland and I believe for the West.Poland has bold plans to strengthen its defenses, but America is our essential security partner.&nbsp; We have done what we pledged to do in the successive NATO summits.&nbsp; We are now, I believe, in proportion to GDP, the biggest spender on defense in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and so we are trying to give a good example.But times are dramatic, and therefore this moment is sublime because we are coming up to a fork in the road, and depending on where we go history will be different.&nbsp; So I’m really looking forward to talking to you.&nbsp; Thank you.SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp; Thank you.&nbsp; Thanks, everyone.						Tags																					Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																																North Atlantic Treaty Organization																															Office of the Spokesperson																								Poland																								The Secretary of State