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LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMANT PRACTICES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 19, 2007 

Serial No. 110–112 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOSEPH GIBSON, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL VOLKOV, Minority Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 19, 2007 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 3 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, 

Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties ............. 4 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, FBI, 

Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Patrick O’Burke, Commander, Texas Public Safety Commission Narcotics 

Service, Austin, TX 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Ms. Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 

CA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 66 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 68 

Reverend Markel Hutchins, Philadelphia Baptist Church, Atlanta, GA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Ronald E. Brooks, President, National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition, San Francisco, CA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 76 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 79 

Ms. Dorothy Johnson-Speight, founder and Executive Director, Mothers in 

Charge, Philadelphia, PA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 96 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 98 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Law Review aritcle entitled ‘‘Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 

Consequences,’’ written by Alexandra Natapoff, submitted by the Honorable 

John Conyers, Jr. ................................................................................................. 129 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 191 

(1) 

LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMANT PRACTICES 

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2007 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 

Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert 

C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) presiding. 

Present from Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 

Security: Representatives Scott, Delahunt, Nadler, Johnson, Jackson Lee, Davis, Sutton, Gohmert, Coble, Chabot, and Lungren. 

Present from Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 

and Civil Liberties: Representatives Nadler, Davis, Conyers, Scott, 

Watt, Cohen, Franks, and Jordan. 

Staff present: Mario Dispenza, Counsel, BATFE Detailee; Rachel 

King, Majority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Majority Professional 

Staff Member; Michael Volkov, Minority Counsel; and Caroline 

Lynch, Minority Counsel. 

Mr. SCOTT. [Presiding.] The hearing will now come to order. 

I would like to welcome you to the joint oversight hearing. The 

House Judiciary Committee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 

Security and the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 

and Civil Liberties are eager to hear testimony by witnesses today. 

This oversight hearing is the first in a series that will explore 

law enforcement practices and their impact on civil and constitutional rights. Today’s hearing is on the use of confidential informants, particularly in drug enforcement and in capital cases. Law 

enforcement officials find informants to be a vital part of investigatory work as they gather information, work undercover and gain 

general background information on crime. 

However, an informant’s agreement to work for the government 

can have an enormous negative effect on the criminal justice system and on the community. Moreover, departmental oversight of 

local and State use of informants seems to be weak and has sometimes led to disastrous civil rights abuses. 

It is important to be clear that the type of informant that this 

hearing is being convened to discuss is not the ones addressing— 

2 

we are not addressing the ones concerned with members of the 

community who work with the police to improve their neighborhoods. Nor are we addressing criminal defendants who as a part 

of their plea bargain provide law enforcement with factual information and work undercover to expose their associates in crime. 

Today we are discussing those who seek to avoid punishment for 

their own crimes or dishonest people who seek payments from law 

enforcement and then provide false information that implicates innocent people. We are also addressing the lack of departmental 

oversight over some offices and departments which has enabled 

some officers and informants to perpetrate some of the more heinous civil rights violations in recent memory. 

For example, in 2002, an uncorroborated word of an informant 

led to the arrest of 15 percent of a town’s African-American men 

between 18 and 34. In another city, a corrupt police officer’s informant planted phony drugs on mostly Mexican immigrants who 

spoke little English. Using bogus field drug tests and capitalizing 

on a defendant’s lack of English skills, police officers enticed the 

defendants to plead guilty before the actual lab results uncovered 

the ruse. The informant had been paid approximately $220,000 for 

his services. 

One of the more shocking violations recently is the tragedy that 

befell the 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston of Atlanta, Georgia. Last 

year, Ms. Johnston, an innocent woman, was shot to death in her 

Atlanta home when police officers burst into her house to execute 

a search warrant obtained through a false affadavit. Police officers 

claimed that an informant had bought drugs at Ms. Johnston’s 

home, which was a fabrication. 

Perhaps most disturbing is the effect the false testimony has in 

death sentences. One study has shown that almost half of the documented wrongful capital convictions have included false information from an informant. In at least one instance, a death row inmate was within a week of execution before DNA testing uncovered 

the truth that a jailhouse informant seeking leniency for her own 

crimes invented her testimony to send an innocent man to death 

row. 

Despite the impact informants have in the criminal justice system, their use has been subject to scant oversight. And thanks to 

the get tough on crime policies and the war on drugs, police departments are under increasing pressure to make arrests and recruit 

more informants. Without increasing supervisory personnel and enhancing internal controls, departmental oversight of informants 

and rogue police officers will not be sufficient. 

To be sure, confidential informants are certainly a critical part 

of police work. And most law enforcement officers do not engage in 

the activity described here. However, we cannot ignore the fact 

over the past two decades law enforcement has made more drug arrests and turned more defendants into informants than ever before. 

The war on drugs has pressured law enforcement into using a 

great many informants with little internal control over their officers and over vetting informants and their information. The consequences have not only been outrageous, but sometimes deadly. 

The object of these hearings is to consider testimony possibly 

leading to legislation that will increase the oversight requirements 

3 

of informants to prevent abuses like the ones that we will hear 

about today. 

With that said, it is now my pleasure to recognize the former attorney general from California, the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Lungren, who is substituting for my colleague, Randy Forbes, the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Crime. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

you and Chairman Nadler holding this hearing today on law enforcement confidential informant practices. 

And I welcome all of our witnesses and thank you for taking the 

time out of your busy schedules to be with us today. Confidential 

informants and other human sources are a critical investigatory 

tool for America’s law enforcement. Successfully dismantling a terrorist network, drug trafficking organization or a violent gang often 

hinges on tips provided by confidential informants, including members of the criminal organization oftentimes. 

In May, six Islamic militants were arrested for attempting to attack the Fort Dix Army Base in New Jersey. In a period of just 3 

months, the FBI was able to gather information about the group 

from a video and then infiltrate the group using a confidential informant. The informant joined the group in March 2006 and spent 

the next 15 months aiding the investigation, recording the group’s 

plans in detail. 

The informant recorded a number of alarming conversations, including one discussing how the group could kill at least 100 soldiers using a variety of different assault weapons. The six men 

were arrested by the FBI and ICE officials when they tried to purchase assault weapons from another man working with the FBI. 

Authorities also thwarted the plot to blow up JFK International 

Airport with the help of a convicted drug trafficker, who following 

his second arrest began supplying information to Federal investigators. He, too, infiltrated the terrorist group and even traveled overseas to meet supporters of the plot and assured them that he wanted to die as a martyr. I underscore the fact he was a convicted drug 

trafficker who cooperated with officials after his second arrest. 

It is clear that without the help of confidential informants in 

both those cases the attacks on Fort Dix and JFK would have been 

very different and very devastating results. Like many other investigative tools, the use of human sources is not perfect. And we 

should always understand that and work against its imperfections. 

Working with confidential informants and other sources is a delicate business. It is no secret that many sources are themselves 

criminals who will lie and manipulate law enforcement for their 

own personal gain. So law enforcement must be savvy in its assessment of its sources and the accuracy of their information. 

Unfortunately inaccurate tips from confidential sources or misuse 

of such information by police can have negative, even devastating 

consequences. The 2002 sheetrock scandal in Dallas, Texas, where 

18 people were arrested and falsely accused with cocaine possession 

demonstrates how corrupt human sources combined with dirty cops 

can lead to the arrest of innocent citizens. 

Furthermore, Mr. Delahunt of this Committee and I have co-authored legislation to require the FBI to report violent offenses of 

confidential informants to State and local law enforcement officials. 

4 

As the inspector general reported, one or more guideline violations 

were found in 87 percent of the confidential informant files that 

they examined. 

And while today’s hearing is likely to provide insight into the 

role confidential informants play at the local level, I would submit 

an examination of the use of confidential informants at the Federal 

level should be the principle oversight responsibility of our Subcommittee. And I hope we will take action on that this year. 

The proper training and oversight of the use of human sources 

can ensure the validity of confidential informants and the accuracy 

of their tips. The fact is that in most instances, the use of human 

sources by Federal, State, and local law enforcement successfully 

assists a criminal prosecution with little incident. 

Confidential informants are a necessary if sometimes unattractive part of law enforcement. And I hope that today’s hearing will 

provide guidance for the effective use of human sources. 

As I say, I welcome all the witnesses. But I would especially like 

to welcome Ron Brooks, the distinguished law officer of the state 

of California who has worked for over three decades primarily in 

the area of trying to get drugs off our streets and save many of our 

people. I am proud to say that he was, in fact, an employee of mine 

at the time I was the attorney general of California. 

He not only has done an exceptional job as a law enforcement officer, but as a leader of California Narcotics Officers Association. 

And I think it will be very beneficial for us to hear his point of 

view of over three decades of service and particularly with—while 

we are obviously not perfect in California, and we have mistakes. 

And we have had our number of bad cops. 

The training program, the standards that we establish, particularly through our post-training, post officers standard and training 

commission, which I was a chairman at one time, which attempts 

to establish criteria to be used in the training of officers through 

all departments in the state of California and the requirement that 

the leaders of those organizations, that is, all police chiefs and 

sheriffs in the state of California must be post certified. And maybe 

that is where we ought to be looking, at the quality of the training 

and certification and the ongoing certification process as it affects 

law enforcement agencies across the country. 

And I thank the Chairman for the time. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Does the Chairman of the full Committee have a statement? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, the Chairman would love to make an introductory statement. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman is recognized. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

I commend Chairman Scott, Chairman Nadler for what they are 

doing. And I reach out across the Committee room to thank Dan 

Lungren and Bill Delahunt for the bill they have introduced. 

We have got a serious problem here that goes beyond coughing 

up cases where snitches were helpful. The whole criminal justice 

system is being intimidated by the way this thing is being run and 

in many cases, especially at the local level, mishandled. 

5 

Now, I have met with Reverend Hutchins earlier. And that may 

be how the genesis of this hearing. But we have got some really 

big problems here because now we have got Web sites that are 

doing this stop snitching campaign where formerly confidential information is now easily accessibly and people’s lives are being intimidated. 

The whole court system, the criminal justice system, especially at 

the local level—it is easy for us to oversight the feds. They are 

right here, and we are right here. So we will watch them. 

But we need a uniform system that emanates from what the Department of Justice is doing that will guide a lot of this business 

that is going on that is totally intimidating, is coercing the process. 

People are getting killed with great regularity. 

I have just called Elijah Cumming and Chaka Fattah in Baltimore and Philadelphia. This business that we are looking, listening 

at and these wonderful witnesses that are here is out of control. 

I just called the Wayne County prosecutor in Detroit because we 

think that it is out of control in Detroit as well. And it is probably 

the case across the country. 

So these are very important hearings. And a lot of people have 

died because of misinformation, starting with Kathryn Johnston in 

Atlanta getting the wrong house that cost a 92-year-old woman her 

life. But then law enforcement tried to intimidate the confidential 

informants to clean the mess up. 

So then you get law enforcement involved in perpetrating the 

cover-up of what is clearly criminal activity. So this is not a small 

deal that brings these two Subcommittees together today. And we 

are going to do something about it. And that is why I am glad that 

Professor Natapoff is here and people that have been personally involved in this system. 

So I thank the Chairman for indulging me. And I yield to Judge 

Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I just had a quick question, Chairman. I wasn’t 

sure if my ears heard right. Did you say it was easy to oversee the 

Feds here? I just wasn’t sure I heard that. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, it is easy to oversee the Feds here since I became Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman yields back. 

We would like to welcome to the Subcommittee a new Member, 

the gentlelady from Ohio, Betty Sutton. I think this is her first 

meeting. 

And welcome to the Subcommittee. 

We are also joined by the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, 

the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watts, the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Coble. And we just heard from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert. 

Without objection, the other statements will be made part of the 

record. We have a distinguished panel of witnesses here today to 

help us consider the important issues we currently have before us. 

Our first witness will be FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence 

Wayne Murphy. He joined the FBI after more than 22 years of 

service at the National Security Agency in a variety of analytic, 

staff, and leadership positions. The bulk of his career has been involved with direct responsibility for intelligence, analysis, and reVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
6 

porting. He has a bachelors degree in political science from John 

Hopkins University. 

Our next witness will be Commander Pat O’Burke from the 

Texas Department of Public Safety, Criminal Law Enforcement Division Narcotics Service. He has more than 23 years of service in 

the Texas Department of Public Safety and more than 25 years 

total in law enforcement experience, 16 of which is in narcotics enforcement. 

He has been deputy commander for 4 years, supervising field enforcement groups for counter-narcotics operations as well as supervising multi-county drug task forces as required by Texas law. He 

has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Lamar University 

in Beaumont, TX, and is also a licensed polygraph examiner. 

Our next witness will be Alexandra Natapoff of Loyola Law 

School in Los Angeles. She has received numerous awards for her 

legal scholarship and is a nationally recognized expert on the use 

of informants in the criminal justice system. Prior to joining Loyola 

faculty, Professor Natapoff worked as a legal advocate in low-income neighborhoods in Baltimore as the founder and director of the 

Urban Law and Advocacy Project. She received her bachelor’s degree from Yale and J.D. from Stanford. 

Our next witness will be Reverend Markel Hutchins from Atlanta. And the gentleman from Atlanta has asked to present Reverend Hutchins. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to present to you the Reverend Dr. Markel Hutchins, 

who is a nationally regarded civil rights leader and an ordained 

minister. A protege of numerous veteran civil rights icons at just 

29 years old, he has emerged as a recognized artist around the 

country and is widely regarded as the new kid on the national civil 

rights leadership block. 

An authority on non-violence and conflict resolution as taught by 

the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and successfully practiced by himself as a high profile activist, Reverend Hutchins has 

led the advocacy efforts to bring forth truth about the shooting 

death of 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston who was killed on November 21st of last year by Atlanta police officers in a botched drug 

raid. Since that evening of that now infamous police shooting, he 

has worked tirelessly to bring justice and policy change serving as 

the designated spokesperson for the Johnston family. 

And whenever there is a similar episode that occurs in Georgia 

or in the Atlanta area, those families generally call upon Reverend 

Markel Hutchins to come to their aid so that they can guarantee 

that justice is done. And we have had a spate of police shootings 

in Atlanta. In one county, there were 12 killings last year at the 

hands of police officers. And not all of those were unjustified. 

Reverend Hutchins has and continues to serve on boards, committees, and commissions for numerous institutions. A sought after 

public speaker, he is a frequent lecturer to corporate labor, government, and academic audiences. 

Ebony Magazine, Black America’s premier publication, once featured him as one of our Nation’s top leaders under 30 and most recently as one of America’s most eligible bachelors. Reverend Hutchins is managing principal of MRH, LLC Consulting, chairman of 

7 

Markel Hutchins Ministries, and senior advocate of 

civilrightsleader.org. 

Please join me in welcoming the Reverend Markel Hutchins. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you. 

And welcome, Reverend Hutchins. 

The next witness will be Mr. Ronald E. Brooks, president of the 

National Narcotic Officers Association Coalition representing 44 

State narcotics officers associations with a combined membership of 

over 60,000 law enforcement officers around the Nation. He is a 32- 

year California law enforcement veteran with 24 years of those 

being in drug, gang, and violent crime enforcement. He has been 

primary investigator, supervisor or manager for thousands of law 

enforcement operations and has written policies and procedures for 

managing undercover operations and for managing informants. 

Our final witness will be Ms. Dorothy Johnson-Speight, founder 

of Mothers in Charge. She is the mother of a 24-year-old Khaaliq 

Jabbar Johnson who was murdered in December of 2001 over a disagreement about a parking space. 

In 2003, she, along with other grieving mothers, organized Mothers in Charge to prevent violence, educate and intervene with our 

youth, young adults, families, and community organizations. There 

are now over 200 members and supporters of Mothers in Charge 

with chapters in Northtown and Chester and Delaware County and 

in Atlantic City. 

Each of our witnesses’ written statements will be made part of 

the record in its entirety. I would ask of each of our witnesses summarize his or her testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help stay within that time, there is a timing device at the table. When you have 

1 minute left, the light will go from green to yellow then finally to 

red when the 5 minutes are up. 

Assistant Director Murphy? 

TESTIMONY OF WAYNE M. MURPHY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, FBI, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MURPHY. Good morning. My thanks to Chairman Scott and 

Chairman Nadler as well as the Ranking Members of both of the 

Committees for this opportunity to answer your questions today 

about the FBI’s confidential human source program. I would also 

like to acknowledge today the presence of the full Committee 

Chair, Chairman Conyers. 

I have a very brief statement I wish to make. As the assistant 

director for intelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I 

am responsible for managing the FBI’s human source programs on 

behalf of Director Mueller and the executive assistant director of 

the National Security Branch, Mr. Willie Hulon. Most important of 

all, I believe I am accountable to the American people for managing 

a program that is worthy of their trust and their confidence. 

I am joined today by Deputy General Counsel Elaine Lammert, 

also from the FBI. The general counsel is a persistent and inseparable partner for us in undertaking this responsibility. Their sober, 

deliberate, and objective counsel is vital to preserving the integrity 

of this process. They are a conscience and a guide helping to shape 

both strategic policy and inform day-to-day tactical activity in the 

field. 

8 

The human source program is the life blood of the FBI. Our ability to acquire and responsibly manage sources is central to the success of our mission. Actions that result from information acquired 

through our human source program have profound consequence, 

not just in terms of the potential for operational success, but for 

how they reflect on the extent to which we are an organization that 

first and foremost honors our commitment to uphold and defend 

the Constitution and protect the rights and civil liberties of Americans. 

Key elements of a successful program are sophisticated trade 

craft, thorough documentation, redundant oversight, consistency 

and accountability, measures of effectiveness, and a process that 

confronts assumptions and complacency. We have endeavored to invest all of these qualities in our program. And we have worked 

closely with the director of national intelligence to ensure that our 

program is compliant and compatible with intelligence community 

standards. 

The importance of the integrity of this program extends to our 

relationship with law enforcement and intelligence partners in the 

State, local, tribal, and private sector environments. Today more 

than ever those partnerships are enabling the kind of transparent 

and seamless collaboration that is expected of us by the people we 

serve and protect. 

Increasingly we rely on one another’s sources to guide actions 

and to trigger operations. It is essential, therefore, that in this 

partnership we work together to secure the integrity of that reliance through programs that allow for all of us to share best practices for effective human source programs. 

The FBI is committed to playing our part. Working closely with 

elements of the Department of Justice to make human source management part of the range of issues we address in our constantly 

evolving partnerships at the State, local, tribal, and private sector 

level. 

These challenging times, coupled with the pressure to fully implement the expanded expectations for the FBI, create a tempting 

environment for compromise. But such compromise would only 

serve the interests of those who would do us harm. 

Our strength as an organization is reflective of our strength as 

a Nation that is reflected so well in our ability to balance liberty 

with security. I hope today that you will find that we have honored 

that commitment. 

Mr. Chairman, since this is an open hearing, certain elements of 

our policy and our validation program are classified. I may be challenged to fully respond to some of your questions. I would like to 

say in advance that if it becomes the case, I will take your questions offline in a timely and full follow-up and appropriate channels. 

Thank you again. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WAYNE M. MURPHY

Good morning, Chairman Scott, Chairman Nadler and Members of the Subcommittees. 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

(FBI’s) Confidential Human Source Program. As the FBI relies heavily on its large 

9 

contingent of human sources to collect information not accessible by other means, 

both the Attorney General and the Director have made clear their expectations that 

the FBI’s Confidential Human Source Program must rise to the challenge of our current mission, integrate fully with the broader Intelligence Community, and set a 

standard for integrity and quality. 

As the Assistant Director for the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, I am responsible for coordinating and establishing standards for human source development, 

source validation and evaluation, and targeting and exploitation across the FBI and 

ensuring standards are met. I set the framework in place for policies and procedures 

that translate our authorities and the direction set forth by the Attorney General, 

into guidance upon which we spot, assess, recruit, sustain and validate FBI human 

sources. On December 13, 2006, the Attorney General signed Attorney General Guidelines 

Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources, mandating FBI compliance 

by June 2007. To that end, the FBI formulated an implementation plan to ensure 

compliance with the Attorney General Guidelines as they pertain to the utilization 

and administration of FBI confidential human sources. This implementation plan 

consists of a number of initiatives that have reshaped the FBI’s Confidential Human 

Source Program, both in respect to its processes but also in its application to our 

mission. Today I would like to talk briefly about these endeavors. 

Confidential Human Source Re-engineering Project 

In October 2004, the FBI initiated the FBI’s Confidential Human Source Re-engineering Project. Described as the ‘‘one-source concept,’’ its key goals were to enhance 

the consistency, efficiency, and integrity of our Confidential Human Source Program 

across the FBI and better align source management with our current mission. 

The one-source concept focused on creating a Confidential Human Source Program 

that operated consistently across locations and across investigative programs. Aside 

from the direct goal of implementing more efficient operation and oversight of the 

program, this approach allows for greater efficiency in training and continuity of 

performance as personnel work across individual mission boundaries. Moreover, this 

enables the FBI to more effectively contribute to partnerships as we increase our 

focus on joint operations. 

Core elements of the re-engineering project included the development and deployment of a new policy manual, a disciplined validation process, and rigorous training 

and oversight to ensure compliance with the guidelines. The guidance set forth in 

the Confidential Human Source Policy Manual and the Confidential Human Source 

Validation Manual went into effect in June 2007. 

The Confidential Human Source Policy Manual establishes FBI policy and procedure for the operation and administration of confidential human sources. This manual ensures the FBI fulfills its intelligence collection and information dissemination 

mission in compliance with the Attorney General Guideline requirements, protocols, 

rules, regulations, and memorandums of understanding with various law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners governing the FBI’s Confidential 

Human Source Program. Specifically, the manual defines issues such as the criteria 

for source administration, the development and use of privileged and sensitive 

sources, source participation in otherwise illegal activity, joint operations with other 

agencies, source payments, a source’s domestic and foreign travel, witness security, 

and immigration-related matters. 

The Confidential Human Source Validation Manual establishes standardized policy and guidance regarding the validation process for confidential human sources. 

Specifically, this manual codifies the process and standards by which the FBI assesses the reliability, authenticity, integrity, and overall value of a given source. The 

new validation procedures also provide for a comprehensive and objective FBI Headquarters review. In conjunction with the one-source concept, the validation process 

will ensure every FBI source is subjected to a level of validation and provides the 

capability to evaluate sources in a broader national context and make decisions accordingly. 

In preparation for the implementation of the Attorney General Guidelines in June 

2007, the FBI set forth in its implementation plan training for all personnel involved in confidential human source matters. Central to this effort was an emphasis 

on training the FBI Confidential Human Source Coordinator personnel located in 

each of the 56 field divisions. The FBI hosted two identical Confidential Human 

Source Coordinator conferences in Quantico, Virginia, to accommodate personnel. 

These conferences were interactive train-the-trainer sessions based on a comprehensive curriculum that included presentations, information-sharing resource tools, job 

aids, and group exercises on the new Attorney General Guidelines, FBI confidential 

human source policy, validation, and other pertinent issues related to policy. The 

conference materials and resources were made available to the Confidential Human 

10 

Source Coordinators so they could return to their field offices to conduct training 

by the compliance date of June 13, 2007. 

In addition to the above initiatives, the FBI has worked closely with our Intelligence Community counterparts to ensure we are building standards that will meet 

or exceed the expectations established for the Intelligence Community regarding the 

handling of human sources. The FBI recently developed a comprehensive human intelligence (HUMINT) development and collection course to significantly enhance our 

ability to routinely and systematically identify, target, develop, and operate human 

sources of high intelligence value. The Domestic HUMINT Collectors Course is a 

six-week certification course designed to inculcate Special Agents with the ability 

to engage in the full cycle of clandestine human source acquisition, to use passive 

and aggressive countersurveillance techniques, and to conduct clandestine acts from 

an overt platform. The first iteration of the Domestic HUMINT Collectors Course 

began in June 2007; participants included 26 HUMINT collectors from five field offices and two task force officers—one from the New York Joint Terrorism Task 

Force and one from the Washington Field Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

COMMITMENT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

The success of our Confidential Human Source Program is dependent upon a 

strong and trusted partnership with our Intelligence Community and state and local 

law enforcement colleagues. 

Over the past year, the FBI enhanced its relationships with the CIA and various 

military entities, to include Counterintelligence Field Activity, Foreign Counterintelligence Activity, Special Operations Command, and the US Army, US Air Force, Office of Special Investigations, and Defense Intelligence Agency. In particular, the 

FBI is building upon its relationship with the CIA and the US Department of Defense to ensure we undertake a program that leverages individual strengths, incorporates the benefit of our collective experiences, and supports the goals of the Intelligence Community. These efforts at increased cooperation are made with due regard for the appropriate role of the CIA and the military in the United States. 

We have engaged across a range of fronts to strengthen our own program and contribute to the broader human source capacity of the Intelligence Community at 

large. Efforts to date have included establishing trusted professional working relationships with our counterparts, joint training and training development, joint duty 

assignments, joint targeting and source development, and joint reporting. Our relationships are marked by recurring meetings at the working level and a commitment 

on the part of leadership to meet the expectations for a truly national service. 

Furthermore, the FBI recognizes the need to engage our state and local law enforcement counterparts. We have begun training federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that provide representatives to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

and the Field Intelligence Groups located in field offices around the country. The 

FBI utilizes Confidential Human Source Coordinators in the field as trainers to instruct all FBI agents and task force officers regarding compliance with the Attorney 

General Guidelines, the Confidential Human Source Manual, and the Confidential 

Human Source Validation Manual as well as techniques in the identification, assessment, recruitment, and operation of human sources. Task force officers are cocase agents for numerous confidential human sources operated by FBI agents and 

jointly manage sources’ activities in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, 

and criminal investigations. The ability to address HUMINT in a cooperative working environment encourages other law enforcement agencies to share their intelligence base with the FBI, resulting in an enhanced macro view of the local and regional domains. 

CONCLUSION

The American people have entrusted us with a tremendous responsibility, and we 

are committed to living up to their expectations. To that end, we must be an engaged, forward-leaning partner in the broader Intelligence Community as well as 

with our state and local law enforcement counterparts; we must ensure our standards and processes meet the criteria of integrity and quality; and we must conduct 

our mission with an unwavering commitment to the defense of civil liberties and 

the protection of privacy rights. 

Thank you for time. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. O’Burke? 

11 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICK O’BURKE, COMMANDER, TEXAS PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION NARCOTICS SERVICE, AUSTIN, TX 

Mr. O’BURKE. Good morning. I would like to thank the Chairman 

and honored Committee Members for inviting me to appear before 

this hearing. In 2002, Texas Governor Rick Perry recognized significant problems that occurred within drug task forces that were 

funded through the Edward Byrne Memorial Fund in Texas. 

In a sweeping reform, Governor Perry directed that the Texas 

Department of Public Safety undertake operational oversight of all 

such Byrne-funded drug task forces in Texas. There have been 

other examples cited here today and in Texas. 

However, the problems that occurred in Tulia, Texas most underscore the core issues that eroded public confidence in drug law enforcement in Texas. The Department of Public Safety Narcotics 

Service quickly identified factors such as poorly defined output 

measures for program management, a lack of standardized operating policies and procedures, and poor informant control and management as key contributors to Tulia and other similar failed drug 

enforcement efforts. 

Measuring police performance and achieving results and reductions or absence of crime, in particular, violent crime, is a difficult 

task. We work closely with the governor’s Office of Criminal Justice 

Division to develop meaningful strategies and performance measures that we could link to such drug enforcement efforts. 

It is always necessary for an effort to have activities monitored 

such as work products in order to determine if the initiative is 

working within the scope and mission of its direction. And as such, 

we have defined output measures that have been typically recorded 

for drug law enforcement. These usually included numbers of investigations or investigative reports written, numbers of arrests for 

narcotics law violations, and amounts of illegal drugs seized. 

However, the above output measures alone cannot adequately 

gauge if any success is being achieved in actually disrupting the illegal distribution of drugs. To define success by measuring only 

sheer volumes of arrest numbers would mean that more arrests 

must equate with greater success. This clearly does not move us toward the goal of crime reduction. 

Arrest numbers also do not attach any value to that arrest when 

one drug user equals the arrest of one drug kingpin. Consequently, 

reliance on output measures alone for grant funding mechanisms 

or police performance evaluations may actually cause drug enforcement initiatives to fail to seek out reductions in crime. 

Consequently, the narcotics service worked to develop outcome 

measures that will more adequately define if we are achieving desired results. And we looked at other measures such as changes in 

overall crime rate, reduction in drug overdoses, changes in pricing 

and purity of illegal drugs, and surveys of drug use by certain population as other outcomes that have been reported. 

However, these are very rarely linked uniquely to the individual 

law enforcement effort. As such we work to define that law enforcement was most uniquely suited to working against drug traffickers 

who we defined as individuals who are operating and dealing drugs 

for criminal profit as a motive and drug trafficking organizations 

12 

as five or more who worked together in concert to sell drugs outside of their immediate group. 

We then looked at intelligence collection as a method of how initiatives drove their investigations, how they directed their resources, and how they could subsequently impact these criminal 

groups. As such, we defined the number of drug trafficking organizations dismantled, the percentages of arrests that could be attributed to proactive work against targeted trafficking organizations 

and members. And lastly, we looked at percentages of total arrests 

that we defined as end users. 

The narcotics service worked to define the end user as the intended user of illegal who is generally motivated by addiction. Impacting the behavior of end users may involve law enforcement actions, but are generally more effectively treated and managed by 

treatment, corrections, and rehabilitation options. As such, directing law enforcement investigations against these individuals should 

receive limited or no priority from drug enforcement initiatives that 

seek to disrupt illegal trafficking of drugs. 

This overall change in strategy was necessarily accompanied by 

standardized operational policies that mandated professional standards, including background checks, ethical conduct practices, informant management requirements and protocols, and best practices for conducting investigations. 

Lastly, we developed an outcome measurement tool that adequately defined and collected data in order that we could look at 

program evaluation and accountability. I think it is timely and appropriate for us to clearly define the role of law enforcement in 

comprehensive drug control policy efforts to achieve reductions in 

drug abuse. 

Drug control policy efforts must view law enforcement as only a 

piece of comprehensive programs, complemented by drug education, 

treatment, and rehabilitation. Partnerships with legislative bodies 

and law enforcement leadership are necessary to properly develop 

purpose-driven enforcement strategies. And these must have effective outcome measures to positively identify and reward professional police efforts and provide for accountability. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Burke follows:] 

13 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. PATRICK O’BURKE


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

We have been joined by the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee of Constitution, Jerry Nadler—excuse me, Chairman of 

the Subcommittee—okay, Jerry Nadler from New York. And he will 

have comments in a few minutes. 

And the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, has also joined 

us. Thank you. 

Professor Natapoff? 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, LOS ANGELES, CA 

Ms. NATAPOFF. I would like to thank Mr. Chairman and the 

Members of these Committees for the honor of appearing before 

you today. As everyone has acknowledged this morning, the use of 

criminal informants is an important part of our legal system. It is 

a broad topic. I would like to focus on just one facet of it today. 

And that is the facet that makes the Kathryn Johnston tragedy a 

common and predictable occurrence. 

The government’s use of criminal informants is largely secretive, 

unregulated, and largely unaccountable. This is especially true in 

connection with street crime and urban drug enforcement. It is this 

lack of oversight and quality-control that leads to wrongful convictions, to more crime, to disrespect for the law, and even sometimes 

official corruption. At a minimum, we need more data on and better oversight of this important public policy. 

The Kathryn Johnston tragedy reveals the special dangers associated with the use of criminal informants or snitches in poor, highcrime, urban communities. Informants are a cornerstone of drug 

enforcement. It is sometimes said that every drug case involves a 

snitch. 

And drug enforcement is most pervasive in poor urban communities like the so-called Bluffs where Mrs. Johnston lived. In these 

neighborhoods, high percentages of the young male population are 

under criminal justice supervision at any given time. Here in the 

District of Columbia, for example, it is estimated to be over half. 

And a high proportion of these arrests are drug related where, 

it is common for police to pressure drug arrestees and addicts to 

provide information in exchange for lenience. As a result, many 

people are likely to be informing at any given time. 

What does this mean for law abiding citizens like Mrs. Johnston? 

It means that they must live in close proximity to criminal offenders looking for ways to work off their liability. It means that police 

in these neighborhoods will often tolerate low-level drug offenses 

and other offenses in exchange for information. 

It means that law enforcement may be less rigorous. Police who 

rely heavily on informants are more likely to act on an 

uncorroborated tip from a suspected drug dealer, as occurred in 

this case. In other words, a neighborhood with many criminal informants in it is a more dangerous and less secure place to live. 

The negotiations between criminals and the government take 

place largely off the record, without rules or public scrutiny. The 

Atlanta police could plant drugs on Fabian Sheats—you recall the 

suspected drug dealer and the first informant in this case—because 

the culture of snitching told them that it would never come to light. 

67 

The fact that the information he gave them was wrong is also a 

common and infamous aspect of snitching. The Atlanta police could 

fabricate an informant in order to get a warrant because the culture of snitching told them that they would never have to produce 

an actual person in court. In other words, it is this culture of secrecy, of rule breaking, of disrespect for the law and for the truth 

that led to the Kathryn Johnston tragedy. 

I have made several recommendations for legislative action in my 

written testimony. I would like to mention just one. We need to 

start collecting aggregate data on the use of confidential informants 

at the State and local as well as Federal level. Even police and 

prosecutors in the main do not know the extent of the use of informants in their own jurisdictions, how many crimes they help us 

solve, how many crimes they themselves get away with. 

Most State and local jurisdictions have no mechanism for evaluating or regulating the ways that informants are used. The Federal 

Government has begun to address this problem. And so, I would 

like to conclude with an insight from the FBI. 

In its budgetary request to Congress this year, the FBI is seeking 

funds to create a new data monitoring system for confidential informants. And it tells us, ‘‘that without the personnel necessary to 

oversee the monitoring system, the FBI will be unable to effectively 

ensure the accuracy, credibility, and reliability of information provided by more than 15,000 confidential human sources.’’ 

I submit to these Committees that if the FBI cannot ensure the 

reliability of its confidential informants without better data and 

monitoring, then State and local law enforcement agencies like the 

Atlanta Police Department cannot be expected to, either. And we 

will see more tragedies like Kathryn Johnston. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Natapoff follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Reverend Hutchins? 

TESTIMONY OF MARKEL HUTCHINS, REVEREND, 

PHILADELPHIA BAPTIST CHURCH, ATLANTA, GA 

Reverend HUTCHINS. Good morning, Mr. Scott, Mr. Nadler, Mr. 

Lungren, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Johnson. Perhaps one of the greatest 

civil rights tragedies of this century happened on November 21st 

when 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston was gunned down in a hail of 

bullets in a botched drug raid at the hands of Atlanta police officers. 

The evening of that shooting I received a telephone call from one 

of the members of my organization saying that a 92-year-old had 

been killed and that police were lying. As it turned out, the police 

not only lied to get the search warrant, they lied about the existence of drugs. 

We later learned that they fabricated a story in order to go 

around an overt police and procedure. Instead of going through the 

appropriate channels of actually having a confidential informant to 

purchase drugs, they decided to cut corners and go and lie to a 

magistrate and say that a C.I. had purchased drugs when no such 

C.I. existed. We began to get involved with Ms. Johnston’s family, 

found that she was a star person at 92 years old, had never been 

in the hospital, took no medication at all, not even aspirin. 

Ms. Johnston represented in some real sense every American’s 

mother and grandmother and great grandmother. We appealed to 

the Justice Department to launch a full investigation. They granted 

that investigation. 

The Justice Department’s investigation found that the officers involved were not the only officers that were engaged in this kind of 

behavior. Therefore, subsequent to the three police officers who 

were indicted, two pleading guilty in the Johnston shooting, there 

have been other police officers who have now been held and will 

continue to be held criminally responsible for their actions. 

The Atlanta police officers involved in the Johnston shooting 

sought to cover up their actions by planting drugs in the home of 

a 92-year-old woman. These same police officers called upon one of 

their star confidential informants, an experienced long-time paid 

C.I. from the Atlanta Police Department, and tried to convince him 

and intimidated him wanting him to lie to cover their tracks. When 

he refused to do so, he was threatened. 

In fact, he was kidnapped by Atlanta police officers, placed in the 

back of a patrol car, and ended up having to run, open the door 

of a police car from the inside, jump out and run through the 

streets of Atlanta, a long time paid confidential informant. I am 

happy to say to you that that confidential informant joins me today 

and stands—and sits right behind me, 25-year-old, Alex White. 

Shortly after the announcement of the Johnston—of the police officers’ guilty pleas in the Johnston shooting, Mr. Chairman, we 

began to hear from people across the country that this was not an 

isolated incident, that confidential informants were being lied on to 

judges by narcotics officers in major and smaller police departments across this Nation. Therefore, we came to Washington, met 

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mittee and asked that we would go forward with hearings like this 

one and others around the country that would expose a pattern of 

abuse of people’s civil rights and civil liberties at the hands of 

those who are entrusted to serve and protect. 

I agree with the gentleman from California. Confidential informants are an invaluable tool in law enforcement. However, we suggest that we need better restrictions, more appropriate guidelines, 

and necessary parameters around the use of confidential informants. And Kathryn Johnston’s life and legacy will be furthered if 

we are able to do that. 

Confidential informants, on our view, ought to be forced to appear before judges. That will, on some level, help to eliminate the 

kinds of tragedies that we have seen in Atlanta and we have seen 

in other parts of the country. 

Chairman Conyers, you spoke of this so-called stop snitching 

hysteria that is spreading across the Nation, especially in my generation, the hip hop generation. But I would submit that if we are 

to further the cause of the betterment of the use of confidential informants, we have got to make confidential informants mean more 

than just snitches. 

They have got to be used as appropriate tools in the fighting of 

crime. And that can only happen when there are necessary and appropriate parameters and guidelines placed around their use. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Brooks? 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD E. BROOKS, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 

NARCOTIC OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION COALITION, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 

Mr. BROOKS. Chairmen Scott and Nadler, Mr. Lungren, Members 

of the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to testify before 

you on this very important topic. I represent the National Narcotic 

Officers Association’s Coalition, some 60,000 police officers on the 

front lines of drug enforcement around this Nation. 

I have served as the primary investigator, supervisor or manager 

for literally thousands of drug and gang investigations during my 

career. I have been a police officer my entire adult life. And in 

those 32 years, I have known very few police officers who set out 

to break the rules or do anything that would discredit them, their 

families or our profession. 

Unfortunately I do know of officers who have unwittingly made 

poor decisions involving the use of informants due to insufficient 

policies, a lack of supervision or inadequate training. Some of these 

regrettable decisions have resulted in the arrest of innocent persons or even much worse. 

We must reduce the risk of using informants. And I believe the 

solution lies with training officers, supervisors, and managers to 

use sound informant policies which include corroborative evidence. 

The mere thought of using an informant is distasteful for many 

people. The use of informants by law enforcement agencies invokes 

the thoughts of big brother, political spying, and the government’s 

efforts to undermine the anti-war movement during Vietnam. But 

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portant to be mindful of the reality of conducting drug, gang, and 

terrorism investigations. 

Drug trafficking organizations, street gangs, domestic and international terrorist organizations and closed and violently guarded 

societies. The trade craft employed by modern career criminals is 

often as sophisticated as those employed by law enforcement and 

intelligence professionals. Confidential informants, most working 

for pay or legal consideration and based upon their truthful and 

honest cooperation with law enforcement have the bona fides that 

allow them access to criminal organizations. 

I have worked undercover on hundreds of occasions. And in almost every case where I was the undercover officer and in the vast 

majority of the thousands of other investigations that I have conducted or supervised there would not have been a successful conclusion had it not been for the information provided or access 

gained through the use of an informant. 

On a few occasions, however, this authority has been severely 

misused. The 1999 arrest of 46 persons in Tulia, Texas, has rightfully been called one of the worst miscarriages of justice in memory. These arrests were based on the work of a rogue mercenary 

cop and an informant working under the legal authority of a small 

town sheriff without benefit of policy, direction or supervision. And 

there are certainly other cases where the improper use of informants exacerbated by a lack of adequate policies and training has resulted in the serious miscarriage of justice, including the one recently described in Atlanta, Georgia. 

But like most other professions, law enforcement and the use of 

informants by police officers should not be judged or condemned 

simply because of a relatively few instances of mismanagement and 

wrongdoing. One example of a program that has been successful in 

addressing drug and gang crimes and in protecting our communities are the multi-jurisdictional task forces funded through the 

Byrne justice assistance grants. These task forces are co-located in 

shared facilities with common policies, consistent supervision, and 

governance provided by all of the participating executives. 

This arrangement has increased the professionalism of drug enforcement and reduced the incidents of misconduct or wrongdoing. 

We must focus on training. When used in conjunction with wellwritten policies and effective supervision, good training has demonstrated that a professional environment and adequate supervision can dramatically reduce the potential for the abuse of law 

enforcement’s authority. 

Unfortunately many States don’t have the standardized policies 

or training mandates or even the funds available. Fortunately a 

successful example of a training program that can dramatically 

mitigate the risk of using informants is free of charge to State, 

local, and tribal officers throughout the U.S. through the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance Center for Task Force Training. This intensive 3-day workshop dedicates most of its time and curriculum to 

the development and implementation of sound policies, risk management, and informant procedures and ethics. 

Unfortunately funding for this program has not been included in 

the House CJS appropriations bill for 2008. The program is critical 

and is a necessary step toward stopping these abuses. 

78 

It is important to strive to improve law enforcement professionalism and to reduce instances where innocent people suffer because of improper police. But when regrettable events occur, the 

answer is not to regulate or hinder the appropriate use of informants. The solution is to provide adequate resources and training. 

There has long been a saying in law enforcement. Good informant, good case. Bad informant, bad case. No informant, no case. 

And that saying captures the critical nature of our work. 

When it comes to the proper use of informants, we must do more 

on training, supervision, and implementation of sound policies. 

When we appropriately manage informants, great cases, the ones 

that make our communities safer, are the results. 

But when informants are not properly used, the results could be 

devastating. But without the ability to freely use informants, law 

enforcement would have very few significant successes, organized 

criminals would operate with impunity, and the safety of our Nation would be in jeopardy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:] 

79 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD E. BROOKS


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

We have been joined by the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Delahunt. His legislation has been already referenced earlier today. 

And the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee has joined us. 

Ms. Speight? 

TESTIMONY OF DOROTHY JOHNSON-SPEIGHT, FOUNDER AND 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MOTHERS IN CHARGE, PHILADELPHIA, PA 

Ms. JOHNSON-SPEIGHT. Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to speak before this Committee this morning. My name 

is Dorothy Johnson-Speight and I am the executive director and 

founder of Mothers in Charge. 

As a mother of a teenager living in urban America, I always lived 

with some level of fear. The statistical data provides the grim facts. 

Homicide is the leading cause of death among African-American 

males between the ages of 14 and 24. 

These homicides are often perpetuated by offenders with long 

lists of criminal activity that also includes murder. I don’t think 

any mother or father should live with the fear and fact that their 

children may not be alive to see 25 because of violence in the community. 

My son Khaaliq graduated from the University of Maryland, and 

a few years later was going back to complete his graduate degree. 

Our plan was that we would work together and work with children 

at risk. He would get his master’s, and I would get my Ph.D., and 

we would practice together. 

In December, only 6 months after his 24th birthday, I experienced my worst nightmare. My son became one of those statistics. 

At age 24 and-a-half, he was shot to death on the streets of Philadelphia over a parking space. 

This is my son Khaaliq. This is his picture graduation from the 

University of Maryland in 1999. 

The person responsible for my son’s death was caught over the 

next few days. A month later, while watching the news, I saw a 

plea from a mother who lost her son in the same neighborhood. She 

was looking for someone to step up and speak up with information 

in the fatal stabbing of her 19-year-old son, Justin. She had only 

a few clues, but those clues seemed to be familiar to me. 

Because of my need to come forward with any information that 

may be pertinent to her case, I went in search to find this mother. 

After our meeting, we learned that the same angry man that murdered my son, Khaaliq, had murdered her son, Justin Donnelly, 5 

months earlier. 

This man was seen in the community several times after Justin’s 

death. And because he was known as such a violent person in that 

community, the people of that community were afraid to come forward. They had information, but he walked the streets for 5 

months until he murdered my son. 

I am constantly reminded that if one person had provided the 

necessary information after Justin’s murder, maybe Khaaliq would 

still be alive today. I live with that awful pain every day. 

The murderer was ultimately found guilty of first degree murder 

for both crimes and is currently serving two life sentences. AlVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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though justice was served, it does not stop the pain that I feel 

every day, and it will not bring back our son. 

This is a picture of 19-year-old Justin Donnelly. And his mother 

is here with me today. 

Both of our children were killed by the same person four blocks 

away. And people had information, but they were afraid to come 

forward. 

In 2003, Ruth and I took our anger and our pain and joined 

other mothers who had lost children and started Mothers in 

Charge. We now have a membership of over 300 women, mainly 

mostly mothers who have lost children facilitating violence prevention and intervention programs for children, parent education programs, and other various community support services. 

These services include a mentoring program with the juvenile offenders housed in the House of Corrections, grief and loss group 

counseling sessions with children at Carson Valley School. And we 

are currently administering a reading STARS program, a program 

where we tutor and challenge young people to increase their reading skills and run two female rites of passage programs. 

We have chapters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and its surrounding communities, as well. And we will soon open a chapter in 

New York, North Carolina, Georgia, and California. 

Potential witnesses need support to come forward. They need to 

be supported to provide information. They need to not be intimidated by crime, by criminals who are often in our communities 

committing the same crime over and over again. 

In addition to Mothers in Charge, starting our organization, we 

have become an integral part of a campaign called Step Up, Speak 

Up. Step Up, Speak Up began as a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Philadelphia Division’s Community Relations Unit, Mothers in Charge, and Clear Channel Outdoor in an effort to encourage citizens living in the Philadelphia 

area to cooperate with law enforcement. The SUSU initiative is an 

outreach program to reduce community-wide fear and intimidation 

and to encourage citizens to cooperate and provide information to 

law enforcement. 

The campaign was created as a response to the Stop Snitching 

and the Don’t Talk 2 Police t-shirts, video and music. Law enforcement agencies rely and depend on the cooperation and testimony 

of witnesses and recognize that witnesses sometimes feel intimidated even when there is no actual danger of retaliation. The Step 

Up, Speak Up campaign is not a structured organization, but a 

process to support goals and activities that emerge from grass roots 

community organizations attempting to encourage witness cooperation. 

Although there is no legal obligation to contact the police or law 

enforcement agencies, the information provided by witnesses could 

make the difference in bringing a criminal to justice. Citizen cooperation could prevent further crimes and protect others from becoming victims. 

It is a criminal offense to intimidate a witness or anyone assisting law enforcement in an investigation. Some forms of intimidation are community-wide and subtle, such as the Stop Snitching 

apparel and the display of this apparel and those messages that 

98 

are popular through music and video. The SUSU campaign is a response to those subtle forms of intimidation. 

However, there needs to be more of a concerted effort to address 

the undermining of the work of law enforcement with this Stop the 

Snitching culture that has emerged across this country and are 

claiming lives because of it. Mothers in Charge and Step Up, Speak 

Up is an example of what can happen when we make a commitment to make a difference. 

We have to understand the importance of witness intimidation 

and create ways to counteract it by protecting our Nation’s citizens 

against violent criminals. If we are unable to protect and support 

our communities and wanting to speak up about criminal activity, 

it will continue to undermine the hard work of law enforcement 

agencies and grass roots organizations. 

We need judicial and legislative assistance to rid our communities of witness intimidation with stricter legislation that will in 

turn allow law abiding citizens to feel safer in coming forth with 

information that will rid our streets of violent and repeat criminals. 

Today in Philadelphia there are 220 murders to date. A lot of 

them are unsolved because people are afraid to come forward. 

Human sources are a key to law enforcement. I ask that you support people who want to come forward and provide information to 

address the issue of violence in our communities across this country. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson-Speight follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOROTHY JOHNSON-SPEIGHT

Good morning. My name is Dorothy Johnson-Speight and I am the Executive Director and Founder of Mothers In Charge. As the mother of a teenager living in 

Urban America, I always lived with some level of fear. The statistical data provides 

the grim facts: homicide is the leading cause of death of African American males 

between the ages of 14 and 24. These homicides are often perpetuated by offenders 

with long lists of criminal activity that also includes murder. I don’t think any 

mothers or fathers should live with the fear and fact that their children may not 

be alive to see their 25th birthday. 

My son Khaaliq graduated from college a few years earlier and was going back 

to complete his graduate degree in January. Our plan was that we would work with 

children at risk, I would get my Doctorate, and we would go into practice together. 

In December, only six months after his 24th birthday, I experienced my worst nightmare. My son became one of the statistics. At age 241⁄2 he was murdered; shot to 

death on the streets of Philadelphia over a parking space. 


MIC.eps
99 

My story is like too many stories in all urban communities. December 6, 2001 just 

after midnight my phone rang. It was my stepson. He told me to come quickly - 

Khaaliq had been shot. My son had been shot 7 times by an angry man over a parking space that stopped only because his gun jammed. Because this man was so filled 

with hate, he stood over my bleeding son and kicked him in the face. 

The person responsible for my son’s death was caught over the next few days. A 

month later, while watching the late news I saw a plea from a mother who lost her 

son in the same neighborhood. She was looking for someone to step up and speak 

up with information in the fatal stabbing of her 19 year old, Justin. She had only 

a few clues that seem to be familiar to me. Because of my need to come forward 

with any information that may be pertinent to her case, I went in search to find 

this mother. After further investigation we learned that the same angry man that 

murdered my son Khaaliq had murdered her son Justin Donnelly, 5 months earlier. 

This man was seen in the community several times after Justin’s death and because 

he was known as such a violent person in that community - the people of that community were afraid to come forward. They knew what he was capable of, and did 

not want to suffer the same fate. Because no one came forward and provided information, he walked the streets every day until he murdered my son. I am constantly 

reminded that if one person had provided the necessary information before my son’s 

murder, Khaaliq would still be alive today. I live with that awful pain everyday. 

His murderer was ultimately found guilty of first degree murder for both crimes and 

is currently serving two life sentences. Although justice was served it does not stop 

the pain I feel each day and it will not bring back my son. 

In 2003, Ruth and I took our anger and pain and joined other mothers in starting 

Mothers In Charge. We now have a membership of over 300 people and facilitate 

violence prevention and intervention programs for children, parent education programs, and other various community support services. These services include a mentoring program with the juvenile offenders housed in the House of Corrections, grief 

and loss group counseling sessions with the Carson Valley School and Residential 

Facility, as well as countless violence prevention workshop presentations throughout 

the school district and the city of Philadelphia. We are currently administering the 

Reading STARS program, a program where we tutor challenged young people to increase their reading skills, as well as run two female rites of passage programs to 

encourage self-esteem and self-respect among the young female population. We have 

chapters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and its surrounding communities, as well as 

chapters soon opening in New York, North Carolina, Georgia, and California. 

In addition, Mothers In Charge has become a integral part of The Step Up, Speak 

Up (SUSU) Campaign. SUSU began as a partnership between the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) Philadelphia Division’s Community Relations Unit, Mothers 

In Charge and Clear Channel Outdoor in an effort to encourage citizens living in 

the Philadelphia area to cooperate with law enforcement. 

The SUSU initiative is an outreach program to reduce community-wide fear and 

intimidation and to encourage citizens to cooperate and provide information to law 

enforcement. The campaign was created as a response to the ‘‘Stop Snitching’’ and 

the ‘‘Don’t Talk 2 Police’’ t-shirts, video and music. Law enforcement agencies rely 

and depend on the cooperation and testimony of witnesses and recognize that witnesses sometimes feel intimidated even when there is no actual danger of retaliation. 

The Step Up, Speak Up campaign is not a structured organization, but a process 

to support goals and activities that emerge from grass roots community organizations attempting to encourage witness cooperation. 

Although there is no legal obligation to contact the police or other law enforcement agencies, the information provided by witnesses could make the difference in 

bringing a criminal to justice. Citizen cooperation could prevent further crimes and 

protect others from becoming victims. It is a criminal offense to intimidate a witness 

or anyone assisting law enforcement in an investigation. Some forms of intimidation 

are community-wide and subtle, such as the ‘‘Stop Snitching’’ apparel and the display of this apparel and those messages through popular music and videos. The 

SUSU campaign is a response to those subtle forms of intimidation. 

In addition to fear, a witness may be deterred from providing information and testifying because of strong community ties and a distrust of therefore, in addition to 

providing a resource list for the public with the contact numbers of law enforcement 

agencies they can call if they have information about a violent crime, the Step Up, 

Speak Up brochure specifically contains a resource list with the contact numbers for 

government witness programs and community groups which support and affirm the 

role of witnesses in solving and reducing violent crime. 

Mothers In Charge and SUSU is an example of what can happen when we make 

a commitment to make a difference. We have to understand the importance of witVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
100 

ness intimidation and create ways to counteract it in protecting our nation’s citizens 

against these violent criminals. If we are unable to protect and support our communities in wanting to speak up about criminal activity, it will continue to undermine 

the hard work of law enforcement agencies and grassroots organizations. We need 

judicial and legislative assistance to rid our communities of witness intimidation 

with stricter legislation; this will in turn allow law abiding citizens to feel safer in 

coming forward with information that can rid our streets of violent, repeat offenders. 

Thank You. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

And I failed to reference when I mentioned the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, the bill introduced by the gentleman from Massachusetts the gentlelady from Texas has introduced H.R. 253 entitled No More Tulias: Drug Enforcement Evidentiary Standards Improvement Act to try to avoid situations that happened in Tulia. 

We will now have questions from Members. And we will subject 

ourselves to the 5-minute rule. And I will begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Murphy, has the Department of Justice changed policy in 

use of confidential informants in the last few years? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, we have, Chairman Scott. We have implemented a comprehensive series of changes associated with managing our human sources more effectively, more responsibly, and 

more efficiently. 

Mr. SCOTT. Has the change made a difference? 

Mr. MURPHY. I would say it is too early to tell. The formal 

changes only took place in June of this year in terms of the implementation of those. But they are a rigorous set of changes, both in 

terms of how we manage human sources and how we validate and 

continue to sustain human sources. And we have confidence that 

they will over time improve and allow us to continually improve 

our human source program. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does the department have resources to investigate 

situations like Atlanta? You have investigated that alleged abuse 

and uncovered after the allegation that it was, in fact, rogue police 

officers. Do you have sufficient resources to respond to similar allegations? 

Mr. MURPHY. Chairman Scott, I believe Director Mueller has 

made that issue a priority. And he will make resources available 

for this type of issue. 

Mr. SCOTT. Professor Natapoff, you have indicated data collection 

being one legislative suggestion and also judicial review and reliability hearings. You mentioned the data collection. Can you make 

comment on the judicial review and reliability hearings? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Excuse me. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The judicial review recommendation is directed toward the fact that in the Federal system, there is very little, if any, judicial review or public airing available for defendants who are cooperating with the government. My written testimony references the aspects of the Federal 

code and the rules of Federal criminal procedure that constrain the 

court’s ability to review a defendant’s cooperation under current 

law. It requires a government motion submitted to the court to permit the review of any cooperator. 

The sentencing commission has issued a report indicating that 

over half of all defendants actually provide some cooperation to the 

101 

government and yet never receive any on-the-record credit for that 

cooperation. What that does is it draws a veil over the Federal 

process of cooperation and it makes the prosecutor the gatekeeper 

for our ability to view the operation of this important public policy. 

The suggestions I have made would permit a more open airing 

of the work of defendants and the work of the government in the 

process of cooperation, which is central, of course, to our investigatory and our sentencing processes and reduce the availability of the 

opportunity for abuse, for manipulation, and also for inconsistencies. As this Committee is well aware, the main purpose of the 

U.S. sentencing guidelines was to reduce inconsistencies in sentencing across the board in Federal sentencing. And there is a lot 

of data that indicates that the secrecy surrounding cooperation and 

the use of confidential informants in criminal cases radically increases the kind of inconsistencies that we see in that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, is there a question of reliability of the testimony when people are being rewarded for coming up with testimony? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes, Your Honor, sir, that is a separate question. 

I and other scholars have—and researchers—have recommended 

that as in a few jurisdictions that the Federal Government institute the ability of Federal courts to act as gatekeepers to the use 

of informants as witnesses at trial much as the Federal system provides for reliability hearings for paid experts, we have suggested 

that this would be a powerful tool for ensuring the reliability of 

paid, compensated confidential informants if they are to be used at 

trial as witnesses. 

I would note, however, that since very few cases in the Federal 

or for that matter, in the State system actually proceed to trial, 

this important reform would affect a relatively small number of 

cases. What it would do, however, is it would open up the process 

to more scrutiny, to more accountability, and it would send the 

message that we will not tolerate the kind of unaccountable, unreliable or confidential informants in our most important judicial processes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can training or setting of standards or professional 

development make a difference in the use of informants? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Absolutely. I think everyone today is in agreement that we need more training, that we need more resources for 

the handling and the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. And what form would that training take place? 

Would it be setting standards, credentials, seminars? How would 

you actually do the training? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. I would incorporate by reference the recommendations of the other witnesses on the panel. And I would 

suggest, however, most importantly that what training and accountability does is it changes the culture of snitching in our criminal justice system. 

It sends the message that this is an important public policy that 

we take seriously, that we will not permit these kinds of deals for 

information and lenience to take place off the books at the untrained or unconstrained discretion of individual officers and that 

instead this is a public policy that we are going to rationalize, that 

102 

we are going to treat as we would any other important public policy 

in our criminal justice system. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an 

important hearing, also a very difficult one for me because I see 

and I hear Ms. Speight and the pain that you have for the loss of 

your son and the failure of the system and the failure of people to 

assist the system to get a murderer off the streets before he struck 

your son. 

And then I hear Reverend Hutchins. And we had a death in that 

case of a law abiding citizen who did nothing more than live in her 

own home. And she died at the hands of what appears to be rogue 

cops in a rogue police operation. 

And when I hear from Mr. Brooks, who I have known for many 

years, and I know whereof he speaks of the importance of these 

kinds of legitimate law enforcement efforts to try and protect 

against what we heard from an aggrieved mother. And at the same 

time, we have a case that has gotten national attention that didn’t 

involve a death, but involved improper actions by Federal law enforcement officers on our border. 

And in the midst of that discussion, some people are saying, 

‘‘Well, all they did was they didn’t file proper reports.’’ And I think 

we lose sight of the fact of how important training, proper procedure, supervision, follow-up, and consequences are in the entire 

system. We don’t speak about it enough, it seems to me. 

And I am not certain that, Professor Natapoff, the idea of the 

Federal courts getting further involved in it is as important as 

training, supervisions, standards, certification, and oversight. And 

I have a little concern about the idea that if we on the Federal 

level do something, that will make the matters necessarily better 

because I have had a particular concern, shared with Mr. 

Delahunt, about the performance of the FBI, a bureau that I have 

great respect for, but a bureau that has fallen down tremendously 

in the area of confidential informants, a bureau that has, by the 

report of its own inspector general, in 87 percent of the cases that 

they reviewed not followed their own procedures. 

Now, I realize some of those are probably very minor technical. 

But others are very important. And as a former law enforcement 

official at the State level, my concern and the focus of the legislation that Mr. Delahunt and I have come up with is the failure of 

the FBI to control its confidential informants such that those confidential informants are allowed to commit serious violent felonies 

in local jurisdictions. And our legislation would make it a requirement that the FBI notify local law enforcement or the chief law enforcement officer of the State when that has occurred. 

Because just as we could hamper proper law enforcement operations by getting rid of confidential informants, we hamper local 

and State law enforcement operations when the FBI refuses to 

alert people to the fact that confidential informants working with 

the FBI are allowed to commit serious violent felonies, including 

murder. That is where I think the system goes awry. 

103 

So with all due respect, Professor, the idea that maybe with Federal guidance we do better doesn’t always sit well with me as a 

former chief law enforcement officer of a State. 

And, Mr. Murphy, I loved to hear what you had to say because 

I hope that it is true. But tell me exactly what the FBI has done, 

exactly. Don’t just tell me you need more money. What have you 

done specifically to ensure that the problems we saw in the Boston 

office, the New York office, some other offices around the country 

where the failure to respect local law enforcement to the extent of 

telling them of C.I.s who had committed violent felonies, failure to 

share that information occurred? 

Is that still occurring today? And is there a policy in the FBI to 

alert local and/or State law enforcement where C.I.s have—you 

have reasonable evidence that C.I.s working with you have committed serious violent felonies? 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you for that question. The specifics in terms 

of what we have accomplished under the direction of Director 

Mueller asking us in 2004 to undertake a reengineering of both our 

policy and our validation process and then to ask the attorney general to provide additional guidelines to introduce into that process 

additional checks and balances to ensure that we are conducting 

this process in a manner that was consistent with expectations, has 

put what I would describe as a series of layered defenses against 

the kind of abuses and the kind of problems that were presented 

in some of the cases that you refer to in your remarks. 

It is not just a matter of periodically revisiting your processes. 

It is a matter of stepping outside of them and aggressively challenging them and ensuring that you are implementing procedures 

that are protecting against the potential for those sorts of activities 

to occur. 

I think those activities in combination with the substantial 

change in the nature of the relationship between Federal, State, 

local, and tribal law enforcement partners through our partnerships in the joint terrorism task force, our partnerships in fusion 

centers, our partnership in gang task forces has transformed the 

nature of the relationship that we have with our State and local 

partners. 

And I think the opportunities for the sort of incidents that you 

characterized to occur are substantially diminished and that the 

policies and procedures that we have in place, specifically those 

with regard to activity of a source that may have the occasion to 

engage in activity that is otherwise illegal, are designed specifically 

to address the concerns that you spoke to. 

Mr. LUNGREN. If I could just ask my question once again very 

simply. And that is is there a policy in the FBI to share information with local and State law enforcement officials when you have 

become aware, that is, the FBI, that your confidential informants 

have engaged in serious violent felony activity, not all criminal activity, serious violent felony activity in the jurisdiction of the local 

or the State authorities. 

Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding, Congressman, that there 

is not a specific documented policy, directly to answer your question, sir. 

104 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I thank you for that because you may have 

given me the basis for enacting our legislation to require that— 

well, do you think it should be? 

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is difficult to make a generalization that 

will fly in every circumstance. And, in fact, in some cases, there are 

activities which are closely coordinated with the local law enforcement activity but have equities that affect other local law enforcement activities we are being asked to respect and support the equities of one local law enforcement agency against another. 

And when I say against, I don’t mean in a confrontational, but 

in terms of balancing the equities and the interests, the long-term 

interests of a particular investigation. So I don’t think it would be 

fair or accurate for me to try and characterize a general solution, 

particularly if there is legislation that is under consideration. Our 

process and our approach is to take onboard criticism and observations about how we conduct our procedures and to consider whether or not we have appropriate measures in place to ensure and preserve the integrity of our process. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman’s time is expired. But this is such an 

important point. And I think we need to follow-up because the 

question was violent, felonious activity. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes, all I can say is if I were still a law enforcement officer in the state of California and you were to tell me that 

the FBI was reserving judgment as to whether you could tell me 

that you have C.I.s in my jurisdiction that are committing serious 

violent felonies, I would be more than offended. 

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is a very fair response, Congressman. 

But let me clarify in terms of how I understood your question and 

how I answered your question. You asked directly if we do, in fact, 

have a policy. And to my knowledge, there is not a policy. 

That does not mean that it is not a common practice or an appropriate practice to convey that information. And I would want to be 

certain about the nature of that response to make sure that you 

are comfortable with what we do in practice. 

Now, saying trust me or saying it is going to happen every time 

isn’t the same as having a policy in place. And I recognize and acknowledge that. And I will take your concerns back with me. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. And I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

Obviously, Mr. Murphy, I don’t think this is the last you are 

going to hear of this issue. So we will follow through when the legislation is introduced. 

I apologize to the other Members for allowing the gentleman to 

take so much time, but I think that was an extremely important 

issue that we are all interested in. 

The gentleman from Michigan, the Chairman of the full Committee and recent recipient of the Spingarn award from the 

NAACP, the highest award that that organization gives, just last 

week. Congratulations, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank you very much, Bobby Scott. 

And Mr. Nadler has given me permission to go next. The discussion is so important. 

105 

And the reason I am so proud of the Judiciary Committee is that 

Dan Lungren is the former attorney general of the state of California. Bill Delahunt, top prosecutor in—former top prosecutor in 

the state of Massachusetts. They are working on this issue. 

And the first thing I want you to know is that the head of the 

FBI, Mr. Mueller, and the deputy director met with me last week. 

And so, we are all working together on this. 

And I thank you for your contribution, Mr. Murphy. It is not just 

what you are doing now. It is what you are going to be doing in 

the future. And that is what we are working toward. 

Because I happen to believe that the Federal law enforcement 

policy is a very important guideline for all the State and local activities of informants and snitches that is going on that is totally 

out of control. We can’t even record it. We don’t have any idea. It 

is every law enforcement agency for itself. 

Now, in this hearing, there are two big issues. Boy, if it was only 

informants and snitches out of control. We have a problem, a history in America. And listen to me, Members of this Committee, of 

police lawlessness in American history. 

So let us not be naive about this thing. July 23rd is the 40th anniversary of the biggest riot in American history in Detroit, Michigan. Forty-three people lost their lives. President Lyndon Johnson 

called me to tell me we were sending in the Army on top of the 

Michigan State Police on top of the Detroit Police. 

He sent in a special representative, yes, Cy Vance. And I had 

never in my life thought I—I will never forget this. Tanks rolling 

down the street I lived on in Detroit, American tanks. And the National Guard was activated. People lost their lives. They were 

shooting off rooftops, snipers, Watts riot just before this. This is 

1967, the 40th anniversary. 

Police lawlessness caused that riot and many of those riots that 

went through it. So that is why I say that this is an important part 

of it. But getting police, the only people that are authorized to 

carry weapons and use them to protect Americans—this is a huge 

issue. And that is why I am proud of this Committee that can bring 

in attorney generals and State prosecutors and have these kinds of 

activities that are going on. 

Now, we need an off-the-record hearing with the FBI on this 

question. We are not going to be able to get into this now. 

We are being stiffed on how much money the Byrne grant money, 

which goes for informants. We can’t get that right now. But don’t 

worry, we are going to get it. 

And I want to commend both Committees, Nadler’s and Scott’s. 

Here are six witnesses. We need to meet again when we are not 

in the formal strictures of the back and forth of a formal Committee hearing. 

We have got to talk about this thing, Reverend Hutchins. 

And the lady here—we really have seven witnesses. And then we 

look at this young man here that risked his life from Atlanta. That 

is eight witnesses. 

We have got the congresswoman from Texas who brought the 

Tulia incident. There is another incident. It isn’t police just there. 

It is criminal justice out of control there because they imprisoned 

13 percent of the whole population before they found out that evVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
106 

erybody that they wanted to put in prison they just accused them 

of selling drugs. 

So I am saying this is a small problem inside of a bigger problem. And we have been addressing it. We are trying to do what we 

can about it. I talked to our prosecutor in Wayne County or the office of the prosecutor. And we got back this information. 

They use confidential informants in 50 percent of all the homicide cases. But they have guidelines built in. The problem at the 

local level is that everybody has got their own guidelines. There are 

15,000 guidelines. And, of course, there are a lot of them that don’t 

have any guidelines. So we have got to get this organized. 

Now, I close with this, Reverend Hutchins. What has happened 

with these Web sites going up now to stop snitches is that they 

started homicides to retaliate to the snitches. Now, that is just promulgating the problem. That is making it worse. 

And that is why we have got to bring this thing under control. 

The answer is not to start assassinating people that are snitches. 

And this is corrupting the entire criminal justice process in America, Federal and State. And I ask for unanimous consent to merely 

have Reverend Hutchins and Professor Natapoff respond to my 

comment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Without objection. 

Reverend HUTCHINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. White just 

slipped me a note, Chairman Conyers, that if police step up like 

they should be, there would be no room for confidential informants 

to mess up, as he put it, to start with. I could not agree more. 

As a young African-American man, there is a problem with policing and police behavior, the attitude, the disposition, the demeanor 

of police officers, even the police officer who was not white but a 

Black man that stopped and harassed and talked to us in a very 

unpleasant manner as we entered this very building for this very 

hearing. There is a problem with the culture of policing in America. 

And because of that culture, far too often police officers feel that 

they can do what they want to under the cover of law. 

Mr. Scott, this Committee has a unique opportunity to help, even 

protect the law enforcement officers themselves that engage in this 

kind of behavior by insulating them from the capacity and the potential they have to engage in this kind of corrupt behavior. One 

of the most tragic aspects of the Johnston shooting was that these 

were fundamentally good police officers. They were veterans, most 

of them. 

They were not corrupt in the sense that they had criminal intent. 

They were corrupt only in the sense that they engaged in a pattern 

of behavior that violated police and procedure and in turn, violated 

Ms. Johnston’s civil rights and then tried to cover it up. The most 

tragic aspect of this case is that these were decent, reasonable police officers. 

I would submit to this Committee that if the fabricated confidential informant that was mentioned and feloniously used in the 

Kathryn Johnston case had been required to appear before a judge, 

Ms. Johnston would still be alive today and we would not have had 

to bury a 92-year-old woman. Magistrate judges, Mr. Chairman, 

are charged and most often trained to make sound judgments and 

107 

decisions based on evidence deemed as reliable and truthful from 

the officers’ perspective. 

I would submit to you finally that the judgment of said magistrate is severely impaired without the ability to directly corroborate the statements of certified confidential informants. It was just 

too easy for these police officers to go in front of a judge and to lie 

and say we have a confidential informants. And they have been engaged in this kind of practice for years. And it is happening all over 

the country. 

Mr. SCOTT. Professor Natapoff, could you make a very brief statement? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Not so brief. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. If I might very briefly respond back to something 

that Mr. Lungren said earlier. I didn’t intend to suggest at all that 

fixing and improving matters at the Federal level would take care 

of the State and local problem. Of course, only about 10 percent of 

all of our criminal justice system is Federal. Ninety percent is 

State. So, I agree with your proposition that data collection and 

guidance monitoring at the State and local level is of paramount 

importance. 

Mr. Conyers, of course, I agree that your proposition—that this 

question about the use of confidential informants goes to the heart 

of the problem in police community relations. Of course, this is a 

historic problem in this country. It is not reducible to the problem 

of snitching or stop snitching. 

But I would submit that the 20-year policy on the part of State, 

local, and Federal Governments of using confidential informants 

and sending criminals back into the community with some form of 

impunity and lenience and turning a blind eye to their bad behavior has increased the distrust between police and community, it has 

worsened the perception in the community that the police and the 

government are not responsive to the dangers and the needs that 

we live with every day. 

So, we need measures at the Federal as well State and local level 

to remedy, not just the reality of the violence and the lack of control, but the perception that the government is not going to regulate this matter. It is of paramount importance and would go to 

that question of police community trust. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. I was going to introduce two 

of the Members that have shown up, but both of them have disappeared. 

The gentleman from Texas, Judge Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the witnesses all being here. I appreciate your testimony. 

It is a difficult problem, but a bit put off by the assertion that 

there is a problem in the culture of policing right now because 

there just simply too many fine, upstanding law enforcement officers who put their lives on the line. And as Reverend Hutchins 

said, you know, in that case he referenced, that tragedy, there were 

good, decent people involved in that. So it is important to have procedures in place to help people avoid going from being good, decent, 

108 

and upstanding to falling into traps and being tempted to do otherwise. 

But the old saying when it comes to informants, since everyone 

wants a perfect angel to come in and testify and to be the witness 

is that transactions in hell are not witnessed by angels. And so, 

you have to work with what you have got. 

But confidential informants do require a relationship with somebody they can trust because especially when you see violence on 

people that come forward and do their patriotic, civic duty and indicate there has been a crime so that you don’t end up having to 

lose a family member in such a needless way. So that relationship 

is important. People can feel comfortable coming forward. 

That takes relationship growth. It takes a while to build. And 

many such relationships have been built, I have seen, with FBI 

agents who were there for a long enough period of time where local 

law enforcement is also comfortable with them and they are comfortable with local law enforcement where they do work hand in 

hand. 

But unfortunately we had a new brilliant, innovative policy with 

the personnel in the FBI that was put in place called the 5-year 

up or out policy. That may not be the official name. And I know 

just in my little town of Tyler small FBI office. 

We have already had one of the best agents, extremely experienced, well-trained, good common sense. Well, he wasn’t going to 

move to Washington, so it was—if it wasn’t up, it was out. 

We have got another retirement of another young agent that is 

not coming to Washington. So if it is not up, it is out. 

We are losing them all across the country. When we saw the 

abuses with the NSL letters and our FBI director said, ‘‘Hey, we 

should have made sure we had more experienced and well-trained 

people in place.’’ And I am thinking, ‘‘Well, you are just running 

off your best ones right now.’’ And that relationship is so important. 

So I am still urging—and I know when Mike Rogers tried to talk 

to somebody with the FBI, they came in and made everybody in his 

office leave so they could do a search of his office before they would 

allow the conversation, a little bit of an intimidation tactic. But 

anyway, that apparently is not well-received to question this policy. 

But I think it is one that is creating problems. 

As far as the gatekeeper policy, you know, as a judge, I had a 

lot of those hearings in both civil and criminal cases. But I am concerned about that if you have too widespread a requirement because from my own experience, it seemed like the people that were 

most adamant to find out the identity of a confidential informant 

whose identity may not have even been necessary at all because of 

all the evidence that was gathered otherwise that they were the 

most violent and unethical defendants, as was proven after trial. 

But those are the ones that always wanted to get at it. And you 

got the impression it was so they could go after the informants and 

they wouldn’t go to trial. And, you know, we have seen the movies 

from the 1920’s and what not where gangs used to do that kind of 

thing. 

So it is an interesting suggestion, Professor. But I have concerns, 

would be interested in any input. But when you hear that 87 perVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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cent of the FBI cases with confidential informants do not have 

proper procedures that were followed, then it does kind of stagger 

the conscience and make me want to see that there isn’t just a feeling maybe we ought to do something, that we do something, that 

the FBI has policies in place. 

We had some poor folks out in Smith County, my home, that had 

their home broken into a few years ago. I didn’t even know you 

could get an oral warrant until this happened. But they called a 

Federal magistrate, got an oral warrant and broke into these people’s home. If the father had been home, he would have pulled a 

gun and probably been shot like the terrible incident before. 

But since he wasn’t home, his wife and his adult daughter were 

thrown to the floor, their house ransacked and then eventually 

they realized it was the wrong home, sorry, and then they went to 

another home and had the good sense, an hour or so later, not to 

bust the door down like they did the prior one. It was a good thing 

because it was the wrong home, too. 

So anyway, it really helps—well, and that was the Dallas office 

that took over because they knew more than Tyler FBI agents. So 

anyway, it is good if you work with local law enforcement officers. 

You have that relationship. You have some kind of safeguard with 

confidential informants. I am hopeful that we get input from the 

FBI, we get input from professors like Natapoff. 

Appreciate your input. 

But we have got to come up with a policy. I think it would be 

better if we had your help because you know what happens when 

we do it on our own. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

I would like to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, the Ranking Member on the Constitution Subcommittee who has joined us. 

Well, I was just recognizing his presence. Okay. The gentleman 

from New York, the Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, 

Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

Professor Natapoff, you state in your testimony that according to 

Northwestern Law School Center on Wrongful Convictions, nearly 

half of all wrongful capital convictions in this country are due to 

bad information obtained from a criminal informant. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, before I ask you the question, let me say, also, 

that so you have got a problem with criminal informants who are 

either wrong or lying. Obviously you have a whole culture in which 

informants are promised more lenient sentences or perhaps not to 

be prosecuted at all in response to the information that the prosecution wants to hear. Hopefully it is truthful, although no guarantees. We see from these statistics that a lot of times it is not truthful. 

We also have a problem, not with most cops, but with too many, 

of what has become at least in the New York area known as 

testilying. We have actually formed a verb, testilying, that is lying 

in testimony by cops who arrest someone usually for drugs. The 

drugs are in plain sight on the car seat. How often is that going 

to happen? 

110 

Yet it happens in about two-thirds of all cases. I don’t believe 

that—that really happens in two-thirds of all cases. But convictions 

are gained on the basis of that. 

So my question, first of all, is how do you think we can deal with 

the question, aside from putting into place procedures and having 

the Federal Government inform the local government when they 

are having an informant. We hear that 87 percent of the time in 

the FBI they don’t even follow the procedures that they have. 

What changes in the law should we make to minimize the odds 

that there will be wrongful convictions from either a deliberately 

dishonest or mistaken testimony or information from an informant 

or even from a police officer that is not, as has been said before, 

a bad guy. He knows that these guys have done multiple wrongs. 

If he has to shade the law a little, the marijuana was out in plain 

sight, to get them, it is not a terrible thing. How do we get around 

those two problems? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. The short answer, sir, is transparency. The long 

answer—— 

Mr. NADLER. What does that mean? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Transparency in the way that we handle criminal 

informants from the very beginning of the process from the street 

encounter between a police officer and an addict on the street corner to the use of the information of that addict to the arrest, the 

obtaining of warrants, to prosecutions and ultimately in a very 

small number of cases in our system, potentially a trial. The recommendations I have made for data collection and monitoring 

would seek to make transparent the public policies that we use to 

handle informants. 

As a number have noted—— 

Mr. NADLER. When you say the public policies, if an informant 

is telling you that someone is doing something and in return for 

that he is not being prosecuted for something, should that be public 

in that instance? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes. The fact that the government is trading 

away criminal liability with an informant should be made public, 

not the name of that informant, not—— 

Mr. NADLER. Not the name of the informant? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. No, I am not recommending that kind of data be 

made widely public. What I am recommending is that State and 

local law enforcement agencies as well along the model of the FBI 

create aggregate data that will reveal the contours of this national 

public policy. I see the point of your question is that it does not tell 

us whether that particular informant is lying at that moment. I acknowledge that it is not a perfect solution to the lying informant. 

But as a number of members have indicated, the use of informants 

is itself a risky tool. 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. But I have always been bothered—and the 

more I am hearing this testimony, I am being bothered more and 

more. But I have always been bothered by the notion, not only of 

an informant as in the background, but an informant as a witness. 

An informant as a witness who says I saw him commit the murder, I saw him do whatever it was he is alleged to have done and 

is, in effect, paid for that by not being prosecuted for something 

else or by getting leniency in a sentence and the protection we have 

111 

is that we tell the jury—we let that information come out and the 

jury can judge the truthfulness of it. I mean, the jury is left to 

judge the reliability information in light of the fact that we are 

bribing the witness, in effect, to implicate the defendant. 

Yet we know that a large proportion—and that is supposed to be 

the defense. And yet we know that a large proportion of convictions 

that we now know were wrongful convictions are because, it turned 

out, the informant was lying in order to get not prosecuted or to 

get a reduction. 

Is there any further protection we can have aside from letting 

the jury know that the testimony is purchased? Because obviously 

juries believe the testimony very often anyway. We wouldn’t put 

him on the stand if we didn’t think they would. Very often that testimony is not truthful. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Right. 

Mr. NADLER. So how do you protect the system from that? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. But the vast numbers of wrongful convictions 

that come about as a result of trial indicate that jurors do believe 

lying informants, even when they are informed that they are getting a deal. 

Mr. NADLER. So should we prohibit informants—should we prohibit that testimony or prohibit them from being paid for that testimony in any way? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. I am not recommending that, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Why not? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Because I think that as the number of Members 

and witnesses today have indicated, there are going to be some 

cases—in my view, not as many as we currently use them in. But 

there will be some cases in which a public policy judgment could 

be made that it is worth it to tolerate the risk of using an informant in pursuit of a larger social good. I think—— 

Mr. NADLER. So it is worth it. But let me rephrase that. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. It is worth it to tolerate a certain number, an unknown number of wrongful convictions for serious crimes because 

we know that juries in most cases will believe purchased testimony, even when informed it is purchased in order to get the convictions of people who are guilty who we couldn’t otherwise convict. 

It is worth it to convict innocent people in a certain number, an unknown number of cases. That is what you are saying. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Sir, we already tolerate the conviction of many 

innocent people in our criminal and justice system, not only those 

convicted—— 

Mr. NADLER. So we should understand, that is the tradeoff we 

are making? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. That is the tradeoff we make in our system that 

is based on an adversarial process and due process. We tolerate 

that all the time. I am suggesting that in acknowledgement of the 

reality of our criminal justice system that we recognize that fact, 

that we regulate that fact. We barely regulate the process. Now, it 

is anomaly in our—— 

Mr. NADLER. Let me ask you the last question because I see the 

red light is on. Is there anything other than transparency that we 

could do? And I am not talking about the background informant 

112 

now. I am talking about the witness, the informant who is testifying that I saw the defendant do whatever it is. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Is there anything we can do and in return for 

that—now? Isn’t it true, Mr. Foreman, Mr. Witness, that you made 

a plea deal with the prosecutor in order to get this testimony. Yes, 

sir. The jury believes the testimony anyway? Is there anything we 

could do to lessen the odds that we are not doing to lessen the odds 

of false testimony being elicited by this process or being believed 

by a jury? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Yes, there are a number of things included in my 

written testimony. One, we can encourage courts to hold reliability 

hearings, pre-trial reliability hearings so that if a judge decides 

that the rewards given to that informant and the history of that 

informant indicate that they are insufficiently reliable, that witness will never go to the jury. By making the court the gatekeeper 

for the question of reliability and not relying on the jury. 

Mr. NADLER. You said encourage. Why should we not require 

that? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. I would suggest that this Committee could require in Federal court, certainly. 

Mr. NADLER. To require it. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. We can have corroboration requirements. A number of States already require that, including Texas. We could also 

strengthen the discovery requirements. Currently prosecutors are 

not required under constitutional law to reveal impeachment Brady 

material to defense attorneys prior to trial or if the defendant is 

pleading guilty. This Committee could propose legislation that 

would require that information to be provided. 

We could strengthen the adversarial process, which is our traditional way of ensuring the truth of witnesses to make sure that the 

deals and the criminal history of informants are earlier and better 

provided to defense and to the court. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me ask one final of Mr. O’Burke and Mr. Murphy. 

Do you object to anything that she just suggested? 

Mr. SCOTT. You are trying my patience. 

Mr. NADLER. That is my last question. 

Do you object to anything that Professor just suggested? 

Mr. O’BURKE. Well, you asked a fairly simple question, which is 

what can we do. I would say we ought to criminally prosecute those 

who lie under oath. 

Mr. NADLER. No, no, but the professor just made a number of 

suggestions of required reliability hearings, give Brady material 

earlier and a few other things. Is there anything that she said that 

you think is not a good idea? 

Mr. O’BURKE. I am not sure how practical some of those things 

would be. I think it is very important that we recognize that the 

informant is merely a tool or a resource used by law enforcement. 

We need to change some of the paradigms or thinking about which 

law enforcement operates under to produce arrests. 

Otherwise, you know, the two dangers with an informant is that 

he obviously will lie and then secondarily that law enforcement believes it operates appropriately to achieve higher arrests. I think 

113 

that we need to change that type of paradigm or thinking so that 

it doesn’t occur. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to have you all with us. From the human source tree, 

I see three tentacles or limbs extending therefrom: confidential informant, witness intimidation and dirty cops or dirty law enforcement. 

Mr. Brooks, how profoundly does the witness intimidation issue 

impact criminal investigations? 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Coble. It does provide a significant 

impact, especially in our inner cities in America. These are, you 

know, oftentimes very violent communities where persons cooperating with law enforcement are at significant risk. 

We saw the issue of the Dawson family in inner city Baltimore, 

Maryland. And so, that is a significant issue. And what I am concerned about is if we not only will some of the proposed reliability 

hearings clog the system, but that will go further to reduce the cooperation. 

I mean, some of these witnesses, these informants are already 

afraid of their cooperation with law enforcement. And if we parade 

them in and out of courthouses exposing them to potential exposure in their own communities, that will thwart our efforts more. 

I think the answer really is ensuring that we have better standards 

of corroboration and better controls over these informants. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, you jump ahead of me because that was going 

to be my next question about parading before. And I could see some 

risk involved there. 

Ms. Speight, let me put a two-part question to you. How has the 

stop snitching movement affected the city of Philadelphia, A? And 

B, how does the step up, speak up campaign attempt to counter 

that movement? 

Ms. JOHNSON-SPEIGHT. I think the stop the snitching t-shirts is 

a culture that is very prevalent in the city of Philadelphia and 

probably other urban cities across the country. And it intimidates, 

first of all, sends a message not to speak, not to talk, not to trust 

law enforcement. So it undermines the whole process of people 

coming forward with information. 

There have been key trials, murder trials that the witness has 

gotten on the stand and not remembered anything because of the 

stop snitching culture and the intimidation piece that is associated 

with that. The step up, speak up campaign in Philadelphia is a collaboration of Mothers in Charge and many other community organizations working to get a message out that it is important to 

stand up. 

Snitching saves lives. And you have got to come forward with information and not to be afraid. But we do need—we need more support around folks who want to come forward. 

We need the kind of support that would encourage them to come 

forward with information. We have many unsolved murders in the 

city of Philadelphia because of the stop snitching and the fear of 

intimidation as a result. 

114 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. 

Mr. Murphy, at the outset you made it clear that much information that this Subcommittee will seek is classified. And with that 

in mind, I think Chairman Conyers’ suggestion that we meet again 

with you offline or off the record, I think, has merit, and we would 

probably follow-up on that. 

Mr. Murphy, let me put this question to you. I don’t think you 

have answered this. What are the instructions for opening a confidential human source? And how often does a validation process 

occur? 

Mr. MURPHY. The instructions actually overall talk first about 

challenging whether you need to open a confidential source at all, 

that there are circumstances under which you should consider 

whether or not you can acquire the information more effectively, 

more efficiently, and more consistently without proceeding into that 

process. But generally the reasons and the circumstances under 

which you would open a confidential source is to protect the identity of the source, to protect the information that they are providing or the integrity of the information that they are providing. 

The validation process, the review process, particularly that 

which has been implemented since we started our reengineered 

process in June 2007, not only requires a series of steps by the 

agent originally opening the source, but there is at a minimum a 

quarterly review by their immediate supervisor. 

There are a series of checks that are associated with determinations about the specific nature of the source that will require or invoke additional checks and additional reviews. And then there is 

an annual review process for all sources and a revalidation for all 

sources that is done both at the field level and at the headquarters 

level by a variety of objective players who make judgments about 

the appropriateness of the source and the continuation of the 

source. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. 

And, Mr. Chairman, before the red light illuminates, I would like 

to yield what time I have left to the gentleman from California. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. Brooks, there has been discussion here or statements made 

about wide-scale misuse of confidential informants or a culture of 

the misuse of confidential informants. Can you give us your assessment as to how prevalent the problem is? 

Mr. BROOKS. Certainly. You know what happens? In these cases, 

and rightfully so, we live in a free and transparent society in the 

cases such as in Atlanta and in Tulia and in Dallas. The public 

sees this on the front page of the newspapers and as the lead story 

in the press. But there are 870,000 police officers roughly in America, most of whom are out there trying to do the job correctly, most 

of whom will do the job correctly if we give them the right training 

and guidance. 

Thousands and thousands of criminal cases, street gang cases, 

drug cases, violent crime cases are made every day by America’s 

State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers across this country. 

By NIJ statistics, some 98 percent of all arrests and prosecutions 

are made by our Nation’s State, local, and tribal law enforcement 

officers. 

115 

And so, it is my experience, not only as a 32-year cop in California, but as the leader of a 60,000-plus-member organization that 

while these instances are extremely troubling and they definitely 

need attention, they are not nearly as widespread as one might be 

led to believe by the press and by some of the testimony that has 

occurred here today. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I will reclaim and yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Murphy, I was pleased to hear that you are 

going to take back our concerns to the director in response to observations by my friend and colleague from California, Mr. Lungren. 

I guess my question is where have you been. Where have you been? 

The scandal in the Boston office of the FBI occurred in the late 

1990’s, about a decade ago. And these issues have existed for decades now. 

I can’t remember—well, maybe I am incorrect. Have you or the 

director reached out to any Member of Congress to discuss these 

issues? 

Mr. MURPHY. I personally have not. I know the director has had 

numerous conversations with Members about the issue of the confidential human source program and our management of the confidential human source program. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I don’t know. Maybe he had conversations 

with Mr. Conyers, the director of the FBI. Mr. Lungren, did he 

have conversations with you? 

Mr. LUNGREN. He has. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me just say as someone who spent 22 

years in law enforcement, who spent considerable time participating in the hearings conducted by the Boston office of the FBI, 

I never heard a word, which leads me to the conclusion that—and 

you have acknowledged it today again in response to the Ranking 

Member, that there is no policy. But it confirms my own conclusion 

that it is time for legislation. It is time for legislation to ensure 

that confidential informants are used appropriately. 

You indicated that the FBI has no policy regarding the need to 

report or cooperate or provide information relative to the commission of violent crimes to local or State law enforcement agencies. 

Is there a legal responsibility on the part of the FBI in the case 

of murder to report information to local or State law enforcement 

agencies? 

Mr. MURPHY. Congressman, the attorney general guidelines and 

our implementation—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not talking about the attorney general 

guidelines. Do they have a legal responsibility currently to report 

evidence both exculpatory or evidence of a crime that has been 

committed when a homicide is being investigated? 

Mr. MURPHY. If you will indulge me, Congressman, I would like 

the opportunity to answer that question offline because there are 

various circumstances in which that question might be answered 

differently that would include some of the aspects about how we 

manage sources and how we make decisions about the management of sources. And I will appreciate the opportunity to answer 

that question for the record offline from this hearing. 

116 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I find it—and again, I am not asking about 

policy or equities or guidelines of consideration. Does there exist 

today, in your opinion, a legal responsibility for the FBI to communicate in a homicide investigation either exculpatory information to 

the State and local authorities or evidence that would indicate that 

an individual is responsible for murder? 

Mr. MURPHY. Congressman, I appreciate the—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is a yes or no answer. 

Mr. MURPHY. I would prefer to answer that question for the 

record offline, if you wouldn’t mind. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I do mind. And I don’t see the reason why 

that answer has to be provided offline. That is a legal question. 

Well, I think you have given me all the information that I have 

needed. 

Do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SCOTT. You have 2 seconds. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will yield it back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you. And we will follow-up on that 

question. 

The Ranking Member of the Constitution Subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. I know that it is always a difficult environment when we are dealing with this adversarial legal 

system that we have that has served us pretty well. But it creates 

some friction around the interface. So, I know you deal with some 

pretty complex issues. 

Professor Natapoff, you know, it is the contention of the FBI that 

confidential informants are critical to having the ability to carry 

out counterterrorism, national security, and criminal law enforcement missions and that a confidential source could have a singular 

piece of information that the FBI would otherwise be unable to obtain and that are critical to that case. It obviously enables the FBI 

to execute their primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks and 

crime. 

You cite one example of a case that went wrong, I think is the 

quote in your testimony. And at the same time we have quite a few 

pieces of evidence of thwarted terrorist attacks based on tips from 

confidential informants. How do we bring those two realities together? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. I would also direct your attention to the Department of Justice office of inspector general’s report, oversight report 

of the FBI’s handling of confidential informants. The reference is 

contained in my written testimony. The OIG provides actually numerous examples of informants gone wrong, if you will, in its investigation of the FBI’s own files and cases. 

I would suggest that there are many record incidences of informants gone wrong. And I think nobody here today is disputing the 

fact that the practice can often go wrong. On the other hand, it is 

clearly of benefit in some limited set of cases. I would refer back 

to Mr. Nadler’s question about whether we should ban the process 

altogether, at least in some cases. 

I think that your question indicates the potential value of the 

use. In my view, the public policy question is when do the costs and 

117 

benefits recommend that we permit law enforcement, permit the 

government to use this dangerous and risky tool. And my recommendations here today have been that legislative bodies and the 

public need more information, particularly about cases that go 

wrong. 

A number of individuals today have made statements such as, 

‘‘There are relatively few cases in which’’—and I would suggest 

that that is not a statement that is currently supportable across 

the board. We simply don’t have enough information about how informants are used at the State, local, and Federal level to make 

founded statements about the general state of usefulness and safety of the use of informants. And I am suggesting that this Committee consider legislation to make that mandatory. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would you have any suggestions, I mean, related to 

any alternatives that would be as effective in many cases as the 

confidential informant in dealing with these very difficult cases 

where critical intelligence or information is—perhaps the entire 

case hinges on that and the ability to pursue the case hinges on 

that? What are our alternatives? What are our best alternatives? 

And do we have any true alternatives to using confidential informants? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Sir, I think the answer is yes. A number of law 

enforcement experts here testifying today have indicated several 

times that the use of confidential informants is merely a tool in the 

arsenal of law enforcement. We have many tools. We have other investigative resources. 

We have undercover operations run not by criminals, but by law 

enforcement agents themselves. We have wiretaps. We have an increasing array of technology in this world that we live in, ways of 

obtaining information. 

I would suggest that to make a responsible decision about the 

use of informants requires us to know better what the costs of the 

use of that particular tool is. And there may be many cases where 

the responsible judgment is it is not worth the potential for a 

wrongful conviction. It is not worth the potential for more crimes 

to be committed. It is not worth the threat of additional violence. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Professor. 

Mr. Murphy, what is your contention as to the importance to law 

enforcement, to the FBI of confidential informants? I am sure that 

that has been said a dozen ways today. But, you know, sometimes 

people say there are no simple answers. Usually there are some 

simple answers, but they are not easy ones. 

I know this is one of those cases. Can you give me some perspective of how important do you think confidential informants are to 

the investigative process? And do we really have a way to essentially deal without them entirely? 

Mr. MURPHY. I don’t think it would be possible to perform the 

mission of the FBI without the capability to have confidential 

human sources. And I believe that we would suffer as a Nation if 

we didn’t have that capacity. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson? 

118 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While first taking the 

opportunity to offer my condolences on the losses of your sons, Ms. 

Speight and Ms. Donnelly, I would take this time to point out that 

there is a big difference between citizens who witness a crime occurring in their neighborhood and then they speak up to the police 

and give information about the crime. And they do that from the 

standpoint of being good citizens. And that is not snitching. 

Then on the other hand, you have the situation where police, law 

enforcement officers develop confidential informants for use in 

long-term investigations, say, of mid-level or high-level drug dealers. And it takes time to make the case. 

So, you have a confidential informant that infiltrates the organization and then accumulates enough information to cause law enforcement to be able to take the organization down. It might be a 

drug organization. It could be espionage. It could be any number 

of crimes. 

The use of confidential informants in that situation is distinguished from the use of what is called a snitch on the street, in 

a street war on crime, war on drugs, if you will, street war on 

drugs where local police officers are charged with cleaning up the 

streets of crime. So, the local police officers go after low-level drug 

dealers. They recruit persons who are often engaged in criminal activity themselves to give them information, sometimes under coercion and under duress and threat of arrest. They cause that person—and they develop information about, say, drug sales taking 

place in a house, street level drug sales. 

So, an informant, a confidential informant then says that I witnessed at, say, Ms. Johnston’s house, Reverend Hutchins, I witnessed the sale of a small amount of cocaine, of a couple of $10 

rocks of cocaine at Ms. Johnston’s house. And then the police then 

take that information, go to a neutral and detached magistrate and 

say that I have a confidential informant who has been reliable in 

the past, given me information that has resulted in arrests and 

perhaps some convictions. 

That person told me that they witnessed not too very long ago 

the sale of cocaine in that house. So, based on that uncorroborated 

information from a person engaged in crime on the streets, the police are able to then obtain a search warrant to go in and search 

Ms. Johnston’s home looking for additional cocaine. 

So, in the Kathryn Johnston case, that is exactly what happened. 

Isn’t that true, Reverend Hutchins? 

So, when the police got that warrant, they went into Ms. Johnston’s house. They were issued a no-knock search warrant, went 

into the house. Ms. Johnston, who is a 92-year-old lady who happens to live in a community where there is a lot of drug use, a lot 

of drug sales, typical inner city neighborhood in the war on drugs. 

She has got burglar bars on her house to try to maintain her 

safety. It is dark. Police use a battering ram to bust their way in. 

She, being a citizen with a weapon, fires at the police because she 

doesn’t know who they are. It is a no-knock search warrant, no announcement. 

She fires off a shot. Then, boom, they riddle her with bullets and 

kill her. So, it was all based on the police officers saying that they 

119 

had a confidential informant. But they did not have a confidential 

informant at that time who gave them information. 

So, the whole process is flawed. It puts citizens like Ms. Johnston 

right in the middle of this war on crime, war on drugs between the 

police and the drug dealers. Then the drug dealers are being recruited by the police to help them in the war on drugs. 

Who is the victim? People like Ms. Johnston. So, that is the issue 

that we really need to address. 

I believe that there needs to be some standards, some parameters, as you say, Reverend Hutchins, that are put on the police in 

their use of confidential informants in that situation. Because I believe in situations—the second scenario that I pointed out, the 

long-term investigations where police are working with informants 

under Department of Justice guidelines—the Department of Justice 

has some guidelines that regulate the use of those types of individuals. 

But I don’t believe there are any States that regulate the use of 

confidential informants or, i.e., snitches in the last scenario that I 

pointed out. Then when that case comes to court, if there is a jury 

trial, of course, confidential informant is not available because they 

didn’t actually participate in the arrest of the accused. 

So no testing, no corroboration, nothing there to help the victim 

in that case, which might be an innocent citizen. And I don’t know 

if any of you have anything you would like to comment on about 

what I have said. 

But I certainly believe that citizens should come forward when 

they have information about a murder or any other crime that took 

place in their community just as good citizens. But we should not 

allow a situation where police are able to accumulate snitches, if 

you will, in this low-level war on drugs that puts people in communities at risk. 

Reverend HUTCHINS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to briefly 

respond, if I might. 

Mr. Johnson, you are correct. Fabien Sheets was a known drug 

dealer. Mr. Sheets, in fact, was stopped by these same police officers that eventually killed Ms. Johnston. And he said to them, ‘‘If 

you will let me go for selling the small amount of marijuana that 

I have sold on the street, what I will do is I will tell you where 

you can go get a kilo of cocaine.’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. And that ended up being—— 

Reverend HUTCHINS. And that is exactly—— 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. False information. 

Reverend HUTCHINS. Absolutely, it was false information. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Because everybody knows Ms. Johnston did not 

have half a kilo or any amount of drugs at her home. 

Reverend HUTCHINS. She did not have—and not only that, as we 

have suggested and as we have been able to build consensus, at 

least locally in Atlanta, if police officers do due diligence, they 

would have known that a 92-year-old woman lived there by herself. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So there was no corroboration? 

Reverend HUTCHINS. There was no corroboration. There was not 

any appropriate investigative work done. But I think, Ms. Jackson 

Lee, probably the most poignant thing about what happened to Ms. 

Johnston is had she not been 92-year-old and had she been my age, 

120 

29-, 30-year-old and a young Black man, then we might not be having this hearing right now. 

Mr. JOHNSON. She would have been—— 

Reverend HUTCHINS. The real issue, in my view—and I respectfully disagree with Mr. Brooks, is that this problem is much, much 

more widespread than our news headlines would suggest. And that 

is because far too often those who are most likely to be victimized 

by a system like the one that we have now that misuses confidential informants tend to be younger, in lower income communities. 

They tend to be those that have fewer resources. They are most 

likely to be profiled and least likely to have the resources to fight 

against these criminal charges that are put on them because of the 

misuse of this informant system. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I will yield the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I think Ms. Speight wanted to briefly 

make a brief comment. 

Ms. JOHNSON-SPEIGHT. While I understand that it is very important for citizens to come forward, you know, law abiding citizens 

do that. Oftentimes they are in fear of their lives because of retaliation because of folks who are remaining on the street committing 

crime over and over again. Oftentimes the same people are committing these murders over and over again because they are not taken 

off the street because no one will come forward. 

Oftentimes that is because of the stop snitching piece. People are 

afraid. And it is sending a message throughout the communities 

and throughout the cities that you should not cooperate with law 

enforcement. 

That undermines the whole process of citizens wanting to do the 

right thing, the fear and the lack of the trust of the police officers, 

especially on county levels, that they will be protected from the 

people who are going to retaliate. So again, the whole culture of 

stop snitching is sending a message that undermines the whole 

process of people wanting to do the right thing. 

I went to Ms. Donnelly when I saw her on the news, you know, 

asking for help because I wanted to—I knew her pain. I knew what 

she was feeling as the result of the death of her son. I wanted to 

do the right thing. But oftentimes people want to do the right 

thing, but because they are not going to, one, be protected and, 

two, not be supported to do that, they don’t come forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me start by thanking you and Chairman Nadler and the Chairman of the full Committee for having a hearing like this. 

I was here for the original testimony of all the witnesses. One 

of the pervasive thoughts that I had during that process was that 

we have spent 6, 8, 10, 12 years unable to have a hearing of this 

kind that exposes a problem that I think everyone of the witnesses, 

law enforcement and non-law enforcement people who are here recognize is a serious problem because we have been preoccupied with 

criminalizing or categorizing Members of Congress as being soft on 

crime, Black males as being predators, you know, the whole process 

that we have been going through. 

121 

And having a hearing of this kind in that political atmosphere 

and with the leadership that we have had of the Committee has 

been impossible. So I think it is wonderful that our Chairs are taking this opportunity to expose a problem and bring light on it because we can’t deal with it in the legislative context. Law enforcement is not likely to deal with it in an aggressive law enforcement 

context unless light and transparency is there and oversight is 

there. 

Professor Natapoff, Mr. Murphy was unwilling to give his legal 

opinion in a public venue about the legal and ethical responsibilities of law enforcement if they have a snitch who delivers evidence 

that exonerates. I suppose at some point we will get that information from Mr. Murphy in a private setting. 

Help me form the context for it in a public setting. What is the 

legal and ethical responsibility of law enforcement, Federal law enforcement to provide exculpatory evidence to State law enforcement 

if they obtain it from a snitch or otherwise? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Thank you, sir. I am unaware of any free-standing legal obligation that law enforcement would have, either police 

or prosecutors. Of course, we are aware that the rules and ethical 

obligations pertaining to those two groups might be somewhat different. But I am aware of no free-standing obligation that either 

group would have to provide that information outside the context 

of an actual criminal prosecution. 

Of course, our Constitution provides the due process right to 

Brady exculpatory material if indeed a defendant is prosecuted for 

a crime. That would trigger the obligation of the Federal prosecutor’s office, if it were a Federal case, or a State prosecutor’s office, 

if it were a State case, to produce to the defendant any exculpatory 

information in the possession of that office or agency. 

It would not extend to a cross-jurisdictional obligation to go looking for exculpatory evidence, as I mentioned in response to Mr. 

Nadler’s question earlier, about 4 or 5 years ago, the Supreme 

Court decided a case called the United States vs. Ruiz which went 

to the question of what are the governmental obligations to provide 

such exculpatory information when a defendant pleads guilty. 

Of course, that is the bulk of our criminal justice system. And 95 

percent of all cases, including cases involving snitches, involve a 

guilty plea. And the courts curtailed the government’s obligation to 

produce such exculpatory information, for example, like the compensation paid to the informant witness in that case because that 

witness, of course, would never go to trial. 

One of the things that these Committees could consider is 

amending the Federal rules or passing legislation that would require at least Federal U.S. attorneys to provide that information in 

connection with plea bargaining so that light could be shed on the 

use of confidential informants in Federal cases in the majority of 

cases that will, in fact, never be litigated in open court. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is expired. But I 

also saw that everybody else seemed to be abusing their time. 

So—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you going to abuse your time, too? The gentleman is recognized. 

122 

Mr. WATT. If I might explore one other area. Because the other 

thing that struck me, especially in Mr. Brooks’ testimony, was that 

there seemed to be an attitude that if 99 percent of law enforcement was handling this appropriately there is some occupational 

risk. And they are acceptable. 

It strikes me that in cases such as Ms. Johnston’s, for example, 

and other cases where snitches really violate and law enforcement 

violate, this is one of those circumstances where there ought be a 

legal term applied in the criminal justice context zero tolerance. 

How do you get to what would be necessary to get to a zero tolerance, zero error posture in this area? Because I think it is one of 

those areas. I mean, you can’t bring Ms. Johnston back. For Ms. 

Johnston, this is not a cost-benefit analysis. When somebody makes 

an error, when somebody goes awry in law enforcement, you can’t 

do a cost-benefit analysis. 

So how do you at least get to a State where you absolutely minimize, if not prevent, these kinds of injustices from happening, Mr. 

Brooks, Reverend Hutchins, Professor, Mr. Murphy? Maybe if I 

could get you all to tell me what you think would be a reasonable 

approach to getting to as close to a zero tolerance posture as we 

could get to. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for the question. I think, you know, first 

we need to take an absolute hard line posture when law enforcement breaks the rules, like in any other profession. 

The conduct at first blush committed in Atlanta and in Tulia and 

in Dallas and in a host of other places was criminal conduct by law 

enforcement officers. That conduct should be punished vigorously. 

You know, we should have robust and vigorous investigation and 

prosecution of cops when they do wrong because it taints the 

public’s trust in us. We have been charged with a very solemn duty 

and a solemn trust. And we cannot violate that trust. 

But I can tell you in 32 years in California while there were 

some small procedural errors in the units that I worked within, we 

never had a scandal like that, not even close. The reason we didn’t 

was we had strong oversight, strong policies, good training, a California peace officer and standards commission that mandated that. 

So, you will never—you know, there is never going to be a point 

where there are not issues of corruption. There is never going to 

be a point where there are not cops that are too zealous and carry 

their charge too far. 

But we need to have the oversight, the training, the ethical culture. You know, we need to instill an ethical culture that says that 

the ends never justify the means. 

I have supervised narcotic cops since 1981. When I bring new officers into my unit, you know, I explain to them, you know, we are 

never going to shade the truth. We are never going to lie on the 

stand. We are never going to push the envelope because we are 

going to have a chance to arrest these people again if they are truly 

out violating crimes. But we only have one opportunity to have 

credibility in our courts and in our communities. 

That is the kind of ethical culture that comes from strong leadership, good policies, and a lot of training and reinforcement of those 

policies. I wish I could say there would never be a Tulia, there 

would never be an Atlanta. There will, just like we will always 

123 

have abuses in other professions. But we can dramatically reduce 

that if we change. 

One of the other witnesses—I think Mr. O’Burke—talked about 

a paradigm shift. We certainly need to do this. We don’t need to 

be in a place where everybody is competing for numbers. This 

should not be where your grant dollars or your stature in the criminal justice community is based on how many people you arrested, 

how many drugs or guns you took off the street. It is the quality 

of the work you can do. 

Let me just finish by saying while it may be distasteful to use 

informants, I worked in a community, was called in to help in a 

community in 1992, the city of East Palo Alto on the San Francisco 

peninsula. Most of you have probably never heard of it. But in 1992 

it was the per capita murder capital of the United States, a city 

of 15,000 people with 47 drug-related murders. 

In 1 year of aggressive enforcement, most of which started with 

information from informants but led to law enforcement undercover 

buys and corroborated information, we arrested a lot of drug dealers, the murders were all related to drug turf and gang turf. In 

1992, we had 47 murders. In 1993, we had two murders. 

It is a valuable tool. It saved lives. But it has got to be used correctly. And I think this Committee has taken the right step in taking a look at ways that we can prevent these abuses. 

Reverend HUTCHINS. Mr. Watt, Kathryn Johnston was the highprofile scandal that exposed the problem. But the problem existed 

long before the scandal came. The Federal prosecutor, David 

Nahmias put it as a powder keg. He said it was a problem in Atlanta that was waiting to happen but it took the scandal to bring 

the light. I think that now we have the light. 

The real issue, on my view, is that the possibility for not confidential informants, but ghost informants or non-existent informants is far too great. There needs to be a mechanism put in place 

that while recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of the 

informant, also certifies that the informant actually exists and that 

he or she acknowledges the voracity of the law enforcement professionals’ assertions to the magistrate. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Thank you. You asked how can we best minimize 

the impact of the dangers of the use of informants. It is really a 

two-part answer. The first is we need to fix our adversarial system, 

the procedures by which we litigate cases in court with reliability 

hearings, corroboration hearings, the new rules. 

We need to fix our investigative and law enforcement system, 

which, of course, is a much larger and more difficult process to address. And the various witnesses have spoken to that today. 

I would like to second the comments of Commander O’Burke and 

Officer Brooks that the direction that we give to law enforcement, 

the goals that we set for them will determine the outcomes and the 

kind of criminal justice system we have. The tools that we give 

them shape the outcomes that we get. 

If we make it easy to use snitches, they will use snitches and we 

will get the kinds of cases that snitches produce. If we make it 

more accountable, transparent, and rigorous to use snitches, then 

we will get cases that reflect that policy decision. Those are the 

kinds of decisions that cannot be made by the lone officer on the 

124 

street corner. They need to be made collectively by the executive, 

judicial, and legislative branches. 

Mr. O’BURKE. Thank you. I would like to point out something 

that also occurred in Texas, that Tom Coleman, the officer involved 

in the Tulia scandal was nominated by his supervisors for police 

officer of the year and was actually given that award. And that is 

what I am speaking of when I refer to paradigm shifts. 

Mr. WATT. I hope that was before Tulia broke. 

Mr. O’BURKE. Yes, sir. And I think that is part of Governor Perry’s recognition of the problem of just sheer numbers of counting 

widgets or arrests without accomplishing anything with drug law 

enforcement was a failed policy. He worked aggressively to change 

that. 

But I think that we need to look at adequate policies and procedures. We also need to look at collaboration among law enforcement agencies because there is also issues with informants who are 

able to move freely among law enforcement agencies without some 

abilities to track that. 

You know, we have policies and procedures that cover establishment, you know, utilization, and motivation. They require supervisory oversight and continual review of those things. I think that 

if all agencies are required to have established policies and training 

and at least direction of their programs and the goals and objectives they are trying to accomplish by using that informant, I think 

you can certainly work toward that zero tolerance. 

My fear is when you ask of zero tolerance that we are still dealing with human behavior, whether that be for the officer or for the 

informant being used. So I think we have to shed light on the problem and then work toward those issues and resolutions, as you discussed. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I think 

it is a very important question. I would say I most closely associate 

my own views with those that were presented by Mr. Brooks. But 

I think every member of the panel has offered some alternatives 

that are worth thinking about and deliberating about if we are 

going to approach zero tolerance, as you suggested, which I think 

is an honorable goal. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. WATT. I apologize for abusing—— 

Mr. SCOTT. You did better than everybody else. 

The gentlelady from Texas? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman of the Subcommittee and the Ranking Member and allow me to echo to this 

Committee and to this room that we have been living in shades of 

gray and darkness in being able to respond to a question like this 

for a number of years in this room. We owe a great deal of gratitude to John Conyers who has made a commitment to go to places 

where others would not have gone. 

I am reminded, since he is from Detroit, of Marvin Gaye’s words, 

what is going on. 

Reverend, in your instance, mercy, mercy. 

This is a systemic problem. The reason why I say that is because 

I remember coming as a very, very new Member of Congress and 

joining Chairman Conyers and Chairman Scott and a number of 

125 

others circulating around America and holding police brutality 

hearings, which had a number of nuances to them. 

Some of them were gun incidences, obviously. But brutality is 

one word. It is the invasiveness or the untowardness of law enforcement. 

Now, our founding fathers had it right. Their basic premise 

wherein the fifth amendment, due process, the eighth amendment, 

cruel and unusual punishment, the sixth amendment, the right to 

a trial by jury by your peers—they understood that there had to 

be legitimate basis that the people could feel that their justice system worked. 

I would not trade our justice system for any other kind around 

the world. But we have a system that is fractured. And until we 

understand that and accept that as both advocates and law enforcement and legislators, it will continue to be fractured. 

So, I join with my colleague from Massachusetts about legislation 

needs to be—and let me just put on the record because I think the 

people of Tulia need to be put on the record again, as Ms. Johnston 

and as Ms. Speight. Let me say to you that as I look at the legislation that I have, No More Tulias, which is the Law Enforcement 

Evidentiary Standards Improvement Act of 2007, your point of protecting witnesses and funding resources has to be addressed. 

And my deepest sympathy to you for the loss of your son. But 

my greatest joy that you have chosen your work, your life’s work 

to be dedicated to him. would like to work with you, as your 

congressperson, Congressman Johnson, who has shown such leadership on this Committee, to be able to see how we can protect or 

provide resources for witnesses. 

Because I know that while we speak here in this room—and I always say that the lights are on, we are secure—it is not so easy 

to tell a witness come forward. Because we are not in their shoes. 

We need to give them the comfort, the protection, the support. 

It should not be for 24 hours. It should not be for the time for 

the trial. It should be ongoing. I know there is a witness protection 

program. But in our communities, it has to be a little different. 

So, the Tulias need to be on record. Our friend is here from 

Texas. Fifteen percent of that population were persecuted by 

uncorroborated testimony of a rogue cop. Lives were broken. 

Grandmommas lost their life savings to get their children out. I 

don’t think the state of Texas responded as quickly as it should because they went through the judicial system, collaborated with a 

prosecutor who relied on one voice. 

So, the premise of the No More Tulias said, in particular—and 

I read this one sentence, which it has to do with Federal Byrne 

grants. The States that do not have laws that prevent conviction 

for drug offenses based solely on uncorroborated testimony of law 

enforcement officers or informants. So it goes to the next step of 

prosecution. 

In the instance, Reverend, of your circumstance, I believe there 

is a trigger as well to the instance of kicking in someone’s door not 

on uncorroborated evidence, no matter how rehabilitated and how 

much rebornism this so-called informant says that he or she has 

partaken in. 

126 

So my question, Reverend, to you—and I ask this on the basis 

of my good friend’s No More Tulias or zero tolerance. One, I would 

commend you to H.R. 253, which lays a premise for legislative action. And I look forward to its refining based upon this hearing. 

But isn’t it tragic that through Federal funding we encourage 

law enforcement officers to have incentives or competition or pressure to make convictions to keep Byrne grants or Federal funding? 

That is my first question. 

Second, as a municipal court judge, I gave out probable cause 

warrants. And I don’t have the fineness of the points that Ms. 

Johnston, whether these guys were going with a warrant. It seems 

that they were no-knock. 

But based upon cops coming in undercover, I remember sitting 

at 11 p.m. at night, 12 midnight on the basis of their evidence. I 

thought they were good guys. I didn’t condemn them. They saw 

somebody sitting somewhere or somebody had just told them their 

guy was out in the car, their guy was on the corner that had just 

given them the word. 

This is a very difficult and seedy process. I understand we have 

got to protect the innocent. 

But if you would speak to that question of the pressure of Federal funding that requires you to make deals and get prosecutions 

to keep that money flowing. And I would appreciate the FBI speaking to it, the professor speaking to it, and Mr. Brooks speaking to 

it, please. 

Reverend? 

Reverend HUTCHINS. I think, Congresswoman, that anytime 

funding and money is tied to arrests and convictions poses a serious problem, particularly for those that look like I look, that live 

where I live, and that deal with what I deal with on a daily basis. 

As I suggested before, the people who are most often victimized because of the tying and the inextricably linked resources around arresting and prosecuting people on these kinds of drug charges cannot be removed. 

We have to understand that it is directly tied to the kind of misconduct and behavior that led to Tulia, led to Kathryn Johnston, 

so on, so on, so on, and so on. I think there has not been enough, 

quite frankly, calling a spade a spade, the way you have done here 

today. The reality is that most often when resources are tied to arrests and conviction, people that are Black and brown and in lower 

incomes suffer exponentially and disproportionately. 

But I think to further your point, to in some way tie this issue 

of ‘‘stop snitching’’ to the use and misuse of legitimate citizens who 

step forward and say I have evidence, I saw something, I heard 

something, that is a serious disgrace to everyday, ordinary citizens. 

So I think we have to be clear that there is a distinction between 

the use and misuse of confidential informants and this so-called 

stop snitching foolishness that has created a hysteria. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am going to ask—and I thank you, Reverend. And not in reference to you, but I am going to ask the next 

witnesses just to be brief in their answer because I will finish on 

that with two questions to Ms. Speight and the gentleman from 

Texas, a quick question. 

If you would just be very brief, Mr. Brooks. 

127 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, Congresswoman. You are absolutely right that 

we should not tie performance to dollars. When we are out chasing 

dollars based on numbers of arrests, numbers of seizures, that creates a serious problem. And we need—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think it is fair to have corroboration? 

Mr. BROOKS. Absolutely. In fact, I have never done a case where 

we didn’t have corroboration. I have done thousands. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Ma’am, just go quickly on to the other witnesses. Can you just 

go on, Professor, please? I can’t see your names there. Just go on 

quickly. 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Thank you. I agree with the other witnesses. I 

would also recommend that while we are tying requirements to 

Federal funding, we considered tying that Federal funding to accountability and transparency and record keeping at the State and 

local level. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excellent. Do you think corroboration of law 

enforcement and informant evidence is important? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

The FBI? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, ma’am. I believe it is a problem that we need 

to be conscious of the behavior that we are creating when we tie 

funding to statistics. We need to make certain that we are using 

an informant program that is based on corroboration. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. 

Ms. Johnson-Speight, would the protection of witnesses’ money— 

I don’t mean to use the term money—resources and assistance to 

those, as the reverend has indicated, good citizens who come forward that would help in your son’s case—is that a valuable consideration for this Committee? 

Ms. JOHNSON-SPEIGHT. Absolutely. I think that you expect people 

to come forward. But they have to be supported. They have to know 

that they can be supported in that effort legislatively or however 

it can be done. You shouldn’t have a witness coming into a courtroom with a stop snitching t-shirt on. That is absurd. So those are 

the kind of things that are happening. It is a culture that has just 

gone crazy. And it has sent a message throughout the communities 

that you don’t talk because of retaliation. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And we should separate that out from informants? 

Ms. JOHNSON-SPEIGHT. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We thank you much. 

My last question is to my good friend from Texas. Let me thank 

you for being here. I would look forward to working with you. My 

question to you is were there civil compensation by the State to 

Tulia victims out of the reform that the governor offered. 

Mr. O’BURKE. I am not aware if the governor offered that. I believe—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No, no, no. Out of the reforms that the governor encouraged you to have, were there suggestions of civil compensation to those victims? 

Mr. O’BURKE. I am unaware of that. I know that there was a 

lawsuit settlement to some of those victims. But I am not privy to 

128 

the details of that. I know the city of Amarillo, I believe, paid out 

a settlement to some of those victims. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you agree with corroboration of law enforcement testimony? 

Mr. O’BURKE. We currently have a corroboration law in Texas. 

But it only extends to cover the informant. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. 

Mr. O’BURKE. But as a general practice, we include that for officers as well. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you. I look forward to working 

with you. I want to read this more extensively on some of your reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I hope that we can move 

swiftly to responding to the excellent testimony that we had here 

today to save lives and to be able to cease the abuses that we have 

seen over the years on these cases. I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I think the gentleman from Michigan wanted to be recognized for 

a unanimous consent. 

Mr. CONYERS. I would like to introduce into the record the Law 

Review article of Professor Natapoff which deals with informants 

and the institutional and communal consequences into the record. 

Mr. SCOTT. Without objection. 

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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

I had one other question. 

Mr. Brooks, we have heard that the benefit that could be obtained if we eliminate these ghost informants if the confidential informant would just show up in court before the magistrate for the 

warrant. Are there practical, real life problems with having the 

confidential informant show up downtown in front of the magistrate? 

Mr. BROOKS. I think there is a couple of problems. First of all, 

the sheer volume of law enforcement work, I believe, would clog the 

State and local courts, perhaps not the Federal courts because the 

volume is different. And also there are many informants that are 

providing background information only never plan on appearing as 

a witness that certainly may be intimidated and dissuaded from cooperating with law enforcement. 

I think the solution probably lies in good record keeping, solid 

identification of those informants. We identify our informants by 

photograph, by fingerprint, by a full bio. We keep records on every 

single case that they do. And those records are available for review 

by magistrates in every case. 

In the case where the magistrate has a concern, we certainly 

make those informants available in camera for review by the magistrate having jurisdiction. But I think as a regular course, parading informants in and out—they are going to be concerned for their 

safety. 

And by sheer volume, our courts are overloaded. They have trouble keeping up with the volume they currently deal with. 

Mr. SCOTT. Professor Natapoff, is there a problem with requiring 

confidential informants to show up before the magistrate? 

Ms. NATAPOFF. Well, it is certainly a logistical burden. But all 

due process is a logistical burden. I certainly think there are instances of certain kinds of crimes. There are certain kinds of allegations where it would make sense to have heightened requirements that law enforcement actually produce an informant, not 

only in the individual case, but it would also change the culture of 

the idea that ghost informants are a possible option. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Does the gentleman from Georgia, the gentleman from Michigan 

have any final questions? 

The gentleman from Michigan? 

Mr. CONYERS. I merely want to commend you, Chairman Scott, 

and Nadler as well and the witnesses. As was observed by Congressman Watt, this is the first time we have got into this matter 

in more than a dozen years. And as good as this hearing was—and 

I want to commend the law enforcement people that are here because outside of that one question that Mr. Murphy declined to answer posed by Mr. Nadler, there has been a lot of forthcoming here. 

But this is only the tip of the iceberg. I mean, we have got to 

hold the most fair hearings in recent American history on the 

whole question of the criminal justice system, which goes way beyond informants. It has been picked up and articulated by many 

of the witnesses that we are talking about the culture of the law 

enforcement system and how it has got to be changed. 

189 

And one hearing starts us off. I am very, very proud of what we 

have accomplished here. I compliment all of those who have come 

forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I am advised that we have to very quickly adjourn to allow another Subcommittee. But I will recognize the 

gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I just simply wanted to commend first you, 

Chairman Scott, Chair of this Subcommittee, and also the Chair of 

the full Committee, Chairman Conyers, for the way that you have 

conducted our proceedings during my short 7 months here. I don’t 

know what happened before then, but I do know we have made a 

tremendous amount of progress at bringing light to issues that 

have been held in the dark for so long. I just want to commend you 

both for your activities. I look forward to serving with you further. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony today. 

Members may have additional written questions for the witnesses. 

If they are forwarded to you, we ask that you answer them as 

promptly as you can to be made part of the record. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 1 week for submission 

of additional materials. 

I will ask all of the audience to vacate the room as quickly as 

possible. There is another Subcommittee meeting that is about to 

convene. 

We want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(191) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Confidential informants play a unique role in law enforcement. With proper guidance and practices, they can provide valuable leads to help law enforcement officers 

better target their investigations and prosecute criminals. Without such guidance 

and practices, however, serious consequences may result. 

Unfortunately, today’s hearing is prompted by a series of incidences involving the 

abusive, unethical, and unlawful use of confidential informants by law enforcement 

officers. 

In particular, there have been repeated reports where confidential informants 

were improperly incentivized to fabricate leads after being offered plea bargains, financial awards, and other inducements. There are also reports that law enforcement 

officers, in some instances, have misused confidential informants to increase and 

justify arrests and grant funding. 

This problem was brought home to me in May, when I met with Reverend Markel 

Hutchins, one of today’s witnesses, and former confidential informant, Alex White, 

regarding the case of Kathryn Johnston. The circumstances surrounding Ms. Johnston, particularly as it pertains to confidential informants, is extremely troubling. 

It is one of the reasons why we wrote to the Department of Justice, held a press 

conference, and holding this oversight hearing. 

Ms. Johnston, a 92 year old woman, was shot and killed in her Atlanta home after 

police obtained a no-knock warrant based on a false affidavit allegedly from a confidential informant. When things went terribly wrong, the police tried to coerce the 

confidential informant, who was the apparent source of the false affidavit, to lie. 

Fortunately, the informant refused and the truth came to light. 

Sadly, this incident in Atlanta is not an isolated case. Similar incidents have occurred in cities across the Nation. For example, an informant’s uncorroborated 

statement led to the arrest in 2002 of 15 percent of the African American men, aged 

18 to 34, in Hearne, Texas. 

That same year, the Dallas ‘‘Sheet Rock Scandal’’ occurred in which an informant 

was payed $200,000 to provide a false story. The police used that informant and 

crushed gypsum made to look like cocaine to arrest 86 Mexican immigrants with 

limited English language skills. 

In many of these cases, federal taxpayer money—including Byrne grants—was 

used. These funds should be used to fight crime, not to subsidize killing a 92 year 

old woman and arresting innocent people with false evidence obtained from improperly influenced confidential informants. Practices such as these severely undermine 

the integrity of law enforcement, results in invalid convictions, violates the rights 

of innocent civilians, and does nothing to make the public any safer. 

We should know what, if any, standards exist with respect to how federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies use confidential informants to prevent abuse. If 

federal money and agencies are used in an investigation, we must insist that those 

investigations abide by reliable and credible guidelines on the use of confidential informants. These guidelines should apply at the state and local level. 

I look forward to getting answers to these questions and others today. I thank 

Mr. Nadler and Mr. Scott for convening today’s hearing on this matter, as well as 

the witnesses who will offer substantial insight through their testimony today. 

f 

192 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this very important hearing on the law 

enforcement confidential enforcement practices. As members of the Judiciary Committee, one of the most important roles we collectively serve is that of guardian of 

civil and constitutional rights of all individuals. In that respect, where there are 

questions of misuse or abuse of individual civil rights or other rights protected 

under the United States Constitution, it is our duty as Members of the Judiciary 

Committee to diligently and vigorously investigate to decipher whether the alleged 

abuses or concerns merit such scrutiny. 

This Committee has the opportunity to gain insights into the allegations of the 

increasing number of civil rights abuses carried out through the law enforcement 

confidential informant practices. I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses: 

Mr. Wayne Murphy, Professor Alexander Natapoff, Commander Pat O’Burke, Ms. 

Dorothy Johnson Speight, Mr. Ronald E. Brook and Reverend Markel Hutchins. I 

hope that your testimony here today will prove fruitful in guiding this Committee 

in its findings with regard to whether law enforcement officers have engaged in confidential informant practices that intentionally violate the civil or constitutional 

rights of any individual. 

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this hearing is to examine law enforcement practices and their impact on civil and constitutional rights. Of particular concern is the 

continuing controversy of the use of confidential informants in drug enforcement. 

Despite its impact on the criminal justice system, the practice has been subject to 

minimal federal oversight. Through this hearing, we also hope to explore three 

pressing concerns with respect to how the use of confidential informants has (1) influenced the practice of plea bargaining, (2) increased the potential for abuse due 

to the inherent secrecy of the practice, and (3) has affected poor and minority communities. This Committee will also explore policies designed to limit the potential 

for abuse. 

The use of confidential informants in the U.S. justice system has become an evergrowing, unchecked practice which has given rise to civil rights abuses. Every year, 

law enforcement officials create convenient alliances with criminal suspects who become informants, many of them drug offenders concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods. These criminal offenders informally negotiate information and undercover 

work for promises of leniency. In many cases, however, law enforcement hastily and 

carelessly rely on what is often self-serving information from criminal offenders. 

As a result, the criminal offenders are wrongly granted leniency and other individuals are falsely implicated in criminal activity. Thus, the alliance between the 

law enforcement officer and the informant is fraught with peril, being nearly without judicial or public scrutiny as to the propriety, fairness, or impact the deals have 

on the community. What is even more disturbing is that law enforcement officers 

often fail to corroborate the veracity of informant information, the ‘‘get tough’’ policies of the ‘‘war on drugs’’ pressure police departments to increase arrests, and departmental informant policy and oversight is the exception not the norm. Not surprisingly the alliance between law enforcement and informants has resulted in tragic civil rights violations. 

Mr. Chairman, there is also enormous potential for abuse due to the inherent secrecy of the practice. As law enforcement has increased its dependency on informants, the quality of investigations has declined and scrutiny of the informants has 

receded. Prosecutors have complained that there is no way of knowing whether the 

information that the informant provides is true and their concern is well founded. 

One study has shown that 45.9 % of documented wrongful capital convictions have 

been from false informant testimony. 

There have been a number of truly disturbing cases where informants have intentionally wrongly implicated individuals in criminal activity for the soul reason of receiving leniency. Of the most notorious informants was Leslie Vernon White, an admitted ‘‘jail house snitch.’’ White had made a career of creating false testimony to 

gain leniency for his own crimes by learning the details of his fellow inmates’ 

crimes. In one 36-day period, he gave Los Angeles County prosecutors information 

about three murder cases, all from information he learned from fleeting encounters 

with inmates. In another case, Ron Williamson became one of 13 death row inmates 

who were ultimately freed because DNA proved his innocence—in Oklahoma alone. 

We must ask ourselves how many more defendants are on death row and in the 

prison population at large have who not been fortunate enough to have DNA evidence overcome an informant’s lies. 

193 

One of the most egregious cases of civil rights abuse occurred in 2006 when 92- 

year-old Kathryn Johnson was shot to death in her Atlanta home when the Atlanta 

Police Department officers burst into her house to execute a search warrant obtained through a false affidavit. In the affidavit to obtain the warrant for Ms. Johnson’s home, police officers Gregg Junnier and Jason Smith claimed that an informant had bought drugs inside the home while they waited outside. After the shooting, 

the informant in question, Alex White denied ever making a drug purchase in Ms. 

Johnson’s home. The officers threatened White and gave him a fabricated story to 

tell investigator but White refused to lie for the officers. Instead, he went to federal 

authorities, exposing the officers. The officers pled guilty to manslaughter on April 

27th of this year. In other examples, informants’ fabricated evidence falsely accusing 

citizens of Hearne, Texas and Dallas, Texas. In 2002, in the town of Hearne, the 

uncorroborated word of an informant led to the arrest of 15% of the Hearne’s African-American men ages 18–34; Hearne is a 5,000 person rural community in East 

Texas. 

Mr. Chairman, the informant institution has a disproportionate negative impact 

on low-income, high-crime, urban communities in which many residents—as many 

as 50% of African American males in some cities—are in contact with the criminal 

justice system. They are therefore potentially under pressure to provide information 

to gain leniency. 

In recent years, it has become clear that programs funded by the Edward Byrne 

Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program unintentionally have exacerbated racial 

disparities, led to corruption in law enforcement, and resulted in civil rights abuses 

across the country. This is especially the case when it comes to the program’s funding of hundreds of regional narcotics task forces. These task forces, which have often 

lacked meaningful state or federal oversight and therefore are prone to corruption, 

are at the center of some of the most egregious law enforcement scandals. 

One of the better known federally-funded drug task force scandals occurred in 

Tulia, Texas several years ago. In Tulia, 15% of the African American population 

was arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to decades in prison based on the 

uncorroborated testimony of a federally-funded undercover officer who had a record 

of racial impropriety in enforcing the law. The Tulia defendants have since been 

pardoned, but similar scandals continue to plague the Byrne grant program. 

These scandals are not the result of a few ‘‘bad apples’’ in law enforcement; they 

are the result of a fundamentally flawed bureaucracy that is prone to corruption by 

its very structure. Byrne-funded regional anti-drug task forces are federally-funded, 

state managed, and locally staffed, which means they do not really answer to anyone. In fact, their ability to perpetuate themselves through asset forfeiture and federal funding makes them unaccountable to local taxpayers and governing bodies. 

That is why I introduced H.R. 253, (the ‘‘No More Tulias: Drug Law Enforcement 

Evidentiary Standards Improvement Act’’) to address the issue of confidential informant abuse. The bill prohibits a state from receiving for a fiscal year any drug 

control and system improvement (Byrne) grant funds under the Omnibus Crime 

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, or any amount from any other law enforcement assistance program of the Department of Justice, unless the state does not 

fund any anti-drug task forces for that fiscal year or the state has in effect laws 

that ensure that: (1) a person is not convicted of a drug offense unless the facts that 

a drug offense was committed and that the person committed that offense are supported by evidence other than the eyewitness testimony of a law enforcement officer 

(officer) or individuals acting on an officer’s behalf; and (2) an officer does not participate in a anti-drug task force unless that officer’s honesty and integrity is evaluated and found to be at an appropriately high level. The bill also requires states 

receiving federal funds under this Act to collect data on the racial distribution of 

drug charges, the nature of the criminal law specified in the charges, and the jurisdictions in which such charges are made. 

We need to continue to seek solutions that will put in place effective guidelines 

for using confidential Informants in order to avoid civil rights abuses. I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today in our attempt to gain some guidance on this 

very serious matter. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

f 

194 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BETTY SUTTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Thank you very much, Chairman Scott and Chairman Nadler for holding this 

hearing to call attention to an issue of vital importance. 

And I would like to thank you, Congressman Forbes, Congressman Franks and 

all of my colleagues for the very warm welcome I’ve received as a new Member of 

the Committee and of the Crime Subcommittee. I’m deeply honored by the chance 

to serve with all of you. 

It’s my hope that today’s hearing will shed some shed some light on a part of our 

criminal justice system that has not received the kind of Congressional scrutiny it 

deserves. 

The relationship between confidential informants and law enforcement resides in 

a bit of a grey area. The very nature of those relationships precludes total transparency, but the lack of oversight and accountability may be inviting abuse. 

There is no doubt that the use of confidential informants is critical to law enforcement. There is also no doubt that the practice contains a substantial risk of error. 

Striking the right balance, and applying the right standards is critical. 

It’s critical because, when that balance is not struck, innocent third parties sometimes pay the price. 

At the state and local levels, we lack uniform standards to deal with confidential 

informants, and, as such, there is little evidence that speaks to the reliability of informants, the propriety of deals that are made, and other important considerations. 

What’s missing from our current system is a way to ensure all parties involved 

remain accountable. This hearing is a first important step in exploring the best way 

to accomplish this. 

The Department of Justice has formulated a set of guidelines for the use of confidential informants that have been successfully employed at the federal level; the 

state of Texas has reevaluated their system of task forces in order to provide better 

oversight. 

By learning from the successes of these and other systems, I hope we will be able 

to find a way to implement appropriate federal guidelines on confidential informants 

that will strengthen the integrity of our criminal justice system. 

I look forward to the testimony of today’s panelists as we explore this issue, and 

I would like to thank all of them for taking the time to join us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

f 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TRENT FRANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Thank you, Chairman Scott and Chairman Nadler for holding this joint oversight 

hearing on law enforcement confidential informant practices. 

Human sources play an important role in criminal investigations. On July 17th, 

police in California arrested a Mexican immigrant one year to the day after a hitand-run in Oregon that killed a young jogger. A confidential source informed police 

that the suspect had fled back to Mexico. Luckily, a subsequent tip from a second 

confidential source led police to Lodi, California, where the suspect was arrested. 

In Port Richey, Florida, a tip from a confidential informant led police to the house 

of a man who had been holding a 19-year-old mentally ill woman as a sex slave for 

himself and eight other men. 

A confidential source also tipped off police in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, that a 

man charged with threatening to kill three police officers was plotting to shoot 

courthouse employees and blow up the courthouse. 

These are but three examples of the numerous criminal cases that are aided or 

even solved with the help of confidential sources. I welcome the opportunity today 

to review the use of confidential informants and to discuss ways that law enforcement can improve their procedures for human sources. 

The nation’s law enforcement agencies have the tremendous responsibility of balancing the use of human sources with the protection of civil liberties and due process rights. Any law enforcement tool that is misused to the detriment of these rights 

does a disservice to our criminal justice system. 

We will hear today about the 1999 drug arrests in Tulia, Texas. In one day, ten 

percent of the African American population of Tulia was arrested on drug charges 

stemming from an undercover drug operation. The court later threw out the thirtyVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00200 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\071907\36784.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
195 

eight convictions from this sting finding that they were based solely on the unreliable testimony of one person. 

Although the convictions were tossed and the remaining arrestees were released, 

the damage had been done. Damage to the reputations and civil rights of those who 

were wrongly accused and damage to the community’s trust in law enforcement. 

My hope today is to learn what steps can be taken by state and local law enforcement agencies to prevent these tragedies and ensure accurate, comprehensive investigating of criminal offenses. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

f 

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