UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4605

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DENNIS EARL LEDBETTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:08-cr-00482-LO-1)

Submitted: May 21, 2010 Decided: June 7, 2010

Before SHEDD and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Arif, MARTIN, ARIF & GREEN, PLC, Springfield, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States 

Attorney, Benjamin L. Hatch, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A federal grand jury indicted Dennis Earl Ledbetter,

charging him with conspiracy to commit armed robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); armed bank robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) and (2) (Count 2); and 

use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3). Ledbetter pleaded 

guilty to Count 2 and was convicted, after a bench trial, of 

Counts 1 and 3. On appeal, Ledbetter contests the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting the convictions on Counts 1 and 3 

and, for the following reasons, we affirm. 

I.

On the morning of October 23, 2008, at approximately 

10 a.m., a short, somewhat heavyset black male, later identified 

as John Wayne Morton, entered the Commerce Bank in Dumfries, 

Virginia, wearing sunglasses and a ski mask. The man brandished 

a firearm, ordered all of the patrons on the ground, and 

commanded the tellers to empty their tills. At least one teller 

handed Morton money that included a dye pack. Morton also took 

a black shaving kit that a customer had left on the counter, 

which contained roughly $1100 in cash, mostly small 

denominations. In total, Morton took about $8500 from the bank. 
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A second black male, later identified as Ledbetter, 

wore a mask over his face and stood by the door, holding it open 

for their escape. One of the tellers made eye contact with 

Ledbetter during the robbery, and the teller testified that 

Ledbetter was looking into the bank. Ledbetter also drove the 

getaway car, a Lincoln Town Car belonging to Morton’s mother,

from the bank. While in the car, one of the dye packs exploded, 

burning Morton’s leg. 

About thirty minutes prior to the robbery, an employee 

with a self-storage facility located on the street behind the 

bank saw a dark-colored Lincoln Town Car or Cadillac parked on a 

small incline on the street. After the car sat for fifteen 

minutes, the employee became concerned, and approached the 

vehicle, where he saw two men: a heavy-set black male in the 

front seat and another person in the back seat, who appeared to 

be putting something over his face and then taking it off. The 

employee watched the car move down the hill and park near his 

own vehicle; he returned to the self-storage facility to assist 

a customer and, by the time he returned, the car was gone.

Later that day, around 3 p.m., Ledbetter entered the 

Rent-A-Center in Landover, Maryland, near his home, to pay an 

overdue account. According to the clerk, Ledbetter, who worked 

at an International House of Pancakes (IHOP) restaurant, was 

wearing his uniform. The clerk requested three weeks of 
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payments, but Ledbetter informed her that he was low on money; 

they eventually agreed to a two-week payment of $99.48. 

Ledbetter paid the amount in mostly tattered five and ten dollar 

bills, although the clerk saw Ledbetter holding a one-and-a-half 

inch roll of money.

One week later, on October 31, 2008, agents with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Morton, who lived 

in Prince George’s County, Maryland, for the crime. Several 

days later, Ledbetter, Morton’s cousin, turned himself into 

authorities for his participation in the robbery.

Based upon these events, a federal grand jury indicted 

Ledbetter on December 4, 2008, charging him with conspiracy to 

commit armed robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); 

armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) 

and (2) (Count 2); and use of a firearm during a crime of 

violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 

3). On January 23, 2009, Ledbetter pleaded guilty to Count 2, 

armed bank robbery. As part of the guilty plea, Ledbetter 

agreed to a statement of facts that provided that “[b]efore 

entering the bank, John Wayne Morton put on a mask and Dennis 

Earl Ledbetter tied a shirt around his face to disguise his 

identity.” The statement of facts also provided that Morton 

brandished a firearm during the robbery, that Ledbetter stood by 
5

the front door to act as a lookout, and that Ledbetter drove the 

getaway car, Morton’s mother’s vehicle.

On February 10, 2009, Ledbetter, who had waived a 

jury, was tried by the district court on Counts 1 and 3. Both 

Morton and Ledbetter testified extensively at the trial, 

although their accounts differed dramatically as to the planning 

of the crime, the ownership of the gun used in the crime, and 

the aftermath of the robbery. Specifically, Morton, testifying 

for the Government, stated that Ledbetter supplied the gun for 

the robbery and chose the bank.1

In contrast, Ledbetter testified that he did not 

supply the gun for the robbery, did not know that Morton was 

going to use a gun, did not see Morton brandishing the gun 

during the robbery, and did not want Morton to rob the bank. 

 According to Morton, Ledbetter 

forced Morton to commit the robbery, drove the getaway car, and 

burned the stained clothing and money behind Morton’s apartment 

in Suitland, Maryland. Morton also testified that after the 

robbery Ledbetter took $500 in cash when he left for work and 

that Ledbetter returned one week later and advised Morton’s 

mother to remove the license plates from her car. 

 1 In support of the claim that Ledbetter chose which bank to 

rob, Morton noted that Ledbetter had previously lived in 

northern Virginia, while Morton had never lived outside of 

Prince George’s County, Maryland, and was unfamiliar with the 

northern Virginia area. 
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Ledbetter conceded that he pulled his shirt over his face and 

assisted Morton by holding the door and driving the getaway car. 

Ledbetter testified that he made the decision to help Morton 

just prior to the robbery. Ledbetter also testified that he did 

not receive any money from the robbery and that when they 

returned to Morton’s apartment he left to report for work at 

IHOP.

Ledbetter testified that when he returned to Morton’s 

apartment one week after the robbery, he advised Morton’s mother 

to take off her car’s tags and then removed them while she 

watched. Ledbetter also admitted that, during his pretrial 

incarceration, he told his grandmother what he termed the 

“original truth,” that he knew Morton was going to use a gun in 

the robbery and that it made him nervous. 

The district court found Ledbetter guilty on both 

counts. The district court first announced that it did not 

“credit Mr. Morton’s testimony that he was threatened by 

[Ledbetter] or that this was purely [Ledbetter’s] idea and that 

he went kicking and screaming into his participation.” Instead, 

the district court found “the evidence makes clear . . . that 

this was a bank robbery committed by two cousins who have known 

each other for 25 years who together planned and executed this 

robbery in a conspiracy.” The district court first found 

Ledbetter guilty under the principles announced in Pinkerton v. 
7

United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946), because Morton 

brandished a gun in furtherance of their conspiracy to rob the 

bank. In the alternative, the district court found that 

Ledbetter knew that Morton had a gun and was going to use it 

during the robbery. The district court noted that the bank 

surveillance video showed Ledbetter looking into the bank during 

most of the robbery and that Morton consistently displayed the 

gun during the robbery. 

The district court also found that portions of 

Ledbetter’s testimony were “undermined by several 

inconsistencies.” These inconsistencies included the testimony 

of Aaron Hammond, the self-storage facility employee, that he 

saw Ledbetter pulling a shirt over his face trying out disguises 

thirty minutes before the robbery — testimony that suggested to 

the district court “a plan, a calm and calculating participation 

. . . long before you’ve admitting knowing that there was going 

to be a bank robbery.” Moreover, the district court found 

Ledbetter’s testimony that he did not know the area inconsistent 

with his ability to drive “without error” back onto the 

interstate after the robbery. In addition, the district court 

found incredible Ledbetter’s testimony that he did not see the 

bank proceeds in Morton’s hands as he exited the bank. The 

district court stated that the surveillance video clearly showed 

the money “literally taking up his entire midsection” while 
8

Ledbetter “[was] looking at him and making sure that he gets out 

of that door.” 

Furthermore, the district court found that Ledbetter’s 

testimony that he did not take any of the robbery proceeds was 

undermined by his presence at the Rent-A-Center with small 

denominations of money and an additional stack of bills. 

Likewise, the district court noted Ledbetter’s conduct in

telling Morton’s mother to remove her license plates was 

“consistent with somebody who is a knowing participa[nt] in the 

conspiracy to rob the bank.” Finally, the district court noted 

Ledbetter’s criminal history included the possession of firearms 

and that “the version of events as you laid out in your 

discussion with your grandmother is a significant admission that 

in fact you knew that the gun was going to be used in the bank 

robbery.” 

The district court ultimately sentenced Ledbetter to 

108 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 24 months’ imprisonment 

for Counts 1 and 2, and 84 months for Count 3, to run 

consecutively to Counts 1 and 2. Ledbetter filed a timely 

notice of appeal.

II.

On appeal, Ledbetter contests the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his convictions on Count 1 and 3. “In 
9

assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a bench 

trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most 

favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to 

support the verdict.” Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 

760-61 (4th Cir. 2003). “[S]ubstantial evidence” is “evidence 

that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). We “consider[s] circumstantial as 

well as direct evidence, and allow[s] the government the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those 

sought to be established,” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 

1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982), and we assume that the fact finder

resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the 

Government. United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 519 (2008). We “can reverse a 

conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution's 

failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 

(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Ledbetter first contests his conviction on Count 1, 

which charged Ledbetter with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371. That 

statute makes it a criminal offense if “two or more persons 

conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States, 
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. . . and one or more such persons do any act to effect the 

object of the conspiracy.” Id. We have reviewed the evidence 

in this case and conclude that the Government produced 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 

conclude that Ledbetter conspired to rob the Commerce Bank with 

Morton. In addition to Morton’s testimony regarding Ledbetter’s 

role in planning the robbery, the Government produced 

circumstantial evidence supporting the verdict.2

Likewise, the fact that Ledbetter drove the getaway 

car and was able to drive directly to the interstate despite the 

presence of multiple turns supported Morton’s testimony that it 

was Ledbetter who chose the bank to rob, having previously lived 

in northern Virginia. In addition, Ledbetter’s presence at the 

Rent-A-Center with small denomination bills and an additional 

stack of cash as well as his comments to Morton’s mother 

 For instance, 

Hammond testified that he saw a man, Ledbetter, attempting to 

put something on over his face while sitting in a car behind the 

bank. This testimony corroborated Morton’s testimony that he 

and Ledbetter parked behind the bank for a period of time and 

that Ledbetter tried on different disguises in the back seat. 

 2 The district court found incredible Morton’s testimony 

that Ledbetter forced him to rob the bank. Contrary to 

Ledbetter's assertions, however, the district court did not 

discredit Morton’s testimony that the idea and planning for the 

bank robbery originated with Ledbetter. 
11

regarding the car’s license plate were, as the district court 

found, “completely consistent with somebody who is a knowing 

participa[nt] in and taken part of the proceeds of the bank 

[robbery].” 

Ledbetter also challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction on Count 3, which charged him

with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2 and § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 

924(c)(1)(A) creates a graduated penalty scheme for any person 

who “during and in relation to any crime of violence” “uses or 

carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 

possesses a firearm.” Id. Ledbetter was charged with a 

violation of subsection (ii), which sets forth a mandatory 

minimum of seven years imprisonment if the firearm was 

“brandished.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 

Ledbetter contends that there is insufficient evidence 

to convict him of the § 924(c) violation on the basis of 

Pinkerton liability. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 

640, 646-47 (1946) (holding fellow conspirators liable for 

substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator in 

furtherance of the conspiracy). “A defendant may be convicted 

of a § 924(c) charge on the basis of a coconspirator's use of a 

gun if the use was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was 

reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” United States v. 

Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 1998). See also United 
12

States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying 

Pinkerton doctrine that “conspirators liable for all reasonably 

foreseeable acts of their co-conspirators done in furtherance of 

the conspiracy” to 924(c) convictions).3

We have reviewed the evidence in this case and 

conclude that the Government produced sufficient evidence to 

sustain the conviction. Ledbetter overlooks the fact that the 

district court did not discredit Morton’s testimony that 

Ledbetter, not Morton, brought the gun. Indeed, the district 

court plainly stated that it did not credit Ledbetter’s 

testimony regarding the presence of the gun, in large part 

because Ledbetter told his grandmother that he knew Morton had a 

gun. Also, the district court found, both from testimony and 

the surveillance videos, that Ledbetter was not testifying 

truthfully when he said that he did not see Morton using the gun 

 

 3 Ledbetter argues that Pinkerton liability for 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) offenses requires the Government to prove to a 

“practical certainty” that Ledbetter knew Morton would have a 

firearm. Ledbetter culls this language from United States v. 

Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 239 (1st Cir. 1995), which required the 

Government to meet that burden of proof in aider and abettor 

liability under § 924(c). In contrast, every circuit, including 

this court, has applied the familiar Pinkerton liability 

standard to § 924(c) conspiracy charges. See, e.g., United 

States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1998); United 

States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 1998); United 

States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 

United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1240 (2d Cir. 1996); 

United States v. Myers, 102 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 1996); 

United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1464 (10th Cir. 1995).
13

during the robbery. See United States v. Johnson, 444 F.3d 

1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying motion for acquittal of 

§ 924(c) charge for getaway driver who never entered bank during 

robbery because he was present at planning meetings and evidence 

was presented that the two robbers were wielding firearms in an 

obvious fashion during the entrance and exit from the bank). 

Ledbetter also overlooks that, prior to trial on 

Counts 1 and 3, he pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery. Armed 

bank robbery requires the Government to establish that the 

defendant, in committing bank robbery, “assaults any person, or 

puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a 

dangerous weapon or device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). It is thus 

somewhat incongruous for Ledbetter to plead guilty to a crime 

with the element of “use of a dangerous weapon” but then argue 

that he did not know Morton would have a gun. See, e.g., United 

States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 679 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming 

sentence enhancement because it was reasonable foreseeable that 

bank robbery would use a firearm given the “nature of the 

offense”); United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 

2005) (affirming § 924(c) conviction under Pinkerton where 

defendant was present at a “morning of” meeting where guns were 

present and their use was discussed; had a longstanding

friendship with a co-conspirator who had participated in 

previous armed bank robberies; and, finding that “it [wa]s 
14

reasonable to infer from the nature of the plan - the overtaking 

of a bank by force and intimidation - that guns would be 

used.”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment. Ledbetter’s motion to substitute counsel is 

denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED