United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

VOLUNTARY 

ORGANIZATIONS 

FEMA Should More 

Fully Assess 

Organizations’ Mass 

Care Capabilities and 

Update the Red Cross 

Role in Catastrophic 

Events 

September 2008 

 

GAO-08-823 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2008

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS 

FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations’ Mass

Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in 

Highlights of GAO-08-823, a report to Catastrophic Events

congressional requesters 

Voluntary organizations have 

traditionally played a major role in 

the nation’s response to disasters, 

but the response to Hurricane

Katrina raised concerns about their 

ability to handle large-scale

disasters. This report examines (1) 

the roles of five voluntary 

organizations in providing mass 

care and other services, (2) the

steps they have taken to improve 

service delivery, (3) their current 

capabilities for responding to mass 

care needs, and (4) the challenges 

they face in preparing for largescale disasters. To address these 

questions, GAO reviewed the 

American Red Cross, The Salvation 

Army, the Southern Baptist 

Convention, Catholic Charities 

USA, and United Way of America;

interviewed officials from these 

organizations and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA); reviewed data and laws; 

and visited four high-risk metro 

areas—Los Angeles, Miami, New

York, and Washington, D.C.

The five voluntary organizations we reviewed are highly diverse in their focus 

and response structures. They also constitute a major source of the nation’s 

mass care and related disaster services and are integrated into the 2008

National Response Framework. The Red Cross in particular—the only one 

whose core mission is disaster response—has a federally designated support 

role to government under the mass care provision of this Framework. While 

the Red Cross no longer serves as the primary agency for coordinating 

government mass care services—as under the earlier 2004 National Plan—it is

expected to support FEMA by providing staff and expertise, among other 

things. FEMA and the Red Cross agree on the Red Cross’s role in a 

catastrophic disaster, but it is not clearly documented. While FEMA 

recognized the need to update the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement to 

conform with the Framework, it does not yet have a time frame for doing so. 

Since Katrina, the organizations we studied have taken steps to strengthen 

their service delivery by expanding coverage and upgrading their logistical

and communications systems. The Red Cross, in particular, is realigning its 

regional chapters to better support its local chapters and improve efficiency 

and establishing new partnerships with local community-based organizations. 

Most recently, however, a budget shortfall has prompted the organization to 

reduce staff and alter its approach to supporting FEMA and state emergency 

management agencies. While Red Cross officials maintain that these changes

will not affect improvements to its mass care service infrastructure, it has also

recently requested federal funding for its governmental responsibilities. 

Capabilities assessments are preliminary, but current evidence suggests that 

in a worst-case large-scale disaster, the projected need for mass care services

would far exceed the capabilities of these voluntary organizations without 

government and other assistance—despite voluntary organizations’ 

substantial resources locally and nationally. Voluntary organizations also 

faced shortages in trained volunteers, as well as other limitations that affected 

their mass care capabilities. Meanwhile, FEMA’s initial assessment does not 

necessarily include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations 

and does not yet address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. In addition, 

the ability to assess mass care capabilities and coordinate in disasters is

currently hindered by a lack of standard terminology and measures for mass 

care resources, and efforts are under way to develop such standards. 

Finding and training more personnel, dedicating more resources to 

preparedness, and working more closely with local governments are ongoing

challenges for voluntary organizations. A shortage of staff and volunteers was 

most commonly cited, but we also found they had difficulty seeking and 

dedicating funds for preparedness, in part because of competing priorities. 

However, the guidance for FEMA preparedness grants to states and localities

was also not sufficiently explicit with regard to using such funds to support 

the efforts of voluntary organizations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FEMA 

update and document the Red 

Cross’s role in a catastrophic event, 

take steps to incorporate voluntary 

organizations’ capabilities in its 

assessments, and clarify funding

guidance for certain disaster 

preparedness grants. In 

commenting on the draft report,

FEMA agreed with two 

recommendations, but disagreed 

with the recommendation to better

incorporate voluntary 

organizations in assessments. We 

continue to believe such efforts are 

important for preparedness.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-823. 

For more information, contact Cynthia 

Fagnoni at (202) 512-7215 or 

fagnonic@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

Voluntary Organizations Are a Major Source of Mass Care and 

Other Services in Disasters and Have Significant Support Roles 

under the National Response Framework 15 

Voluntary Organizations Have Taken Steps to Expand Coverage 

and Strengthen Their Service Delivery Structures 28 

Although Early Assessments Are Limited, a Worst-Case Large-Scale 

Disaster Would Likely Overwhelm the Current Ability of Major 

Voluntary Organizations to Provide Mass Care in Four Metro 

Locations without Government and Other Assistance 35 

Shortages in Personnel, Preparedness Funding, and Connections to 

Government Remain a Challenge 50 

Conclusions 56

Recommendations for Executive Action 58 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 59 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 64 

Appendix II NVOAD Members 68 

Appendix III Comments from DHS 70 

Appendix IV American Red Cross 77 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 80 

Bibliography 81 

Page i GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
GAO Related Products 82 

Tables 

Table 1: Disaster-Related Services Provided by the Five Voluntary 

Organizations In Our Review 16 

Table 2: Disaster Services Provided during and after the Gulf Coast 

Hurricanes 18

Table 3: Voluntary Organizations’ National Office Disaster 

Response Functions in Large-Scale Disasters 19 

Table 4: Voluntary Organizations’ Regional and Local Response 

Structures 20

Table 5: Current and Ongoing Assessments of Disaster Response 

Capabilities by FEMA and the Red Cross 37 

Table 6: Examples of Federal and Other Estimates of the 

Magnitude of Mass Care Needs in Worst-Case Large-Scale 

Disasters 42

Table 7: Shelters Operated by the American Red Cross and 

Potential Capacity in Four Metropolitan Areas 44 

Figures 

Figure 1: Federal Framework for National Response to Large-Scale 

Disasters 10

Figure 2: Voluntary Organizations, Governments, and Private

Sector Roles under the National Response Framework 12 

Figure 3: Red Cross Role under the National Response Framework 24 

Figure 4: Voluntary Organizations’ Scaling Up Process in LargeScale Disasters 36 

Page ii GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Abbreviations 

CAN Coordinated Assistance Network 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ESF-6 Emergency Support Function 6—Mass Care, Emergency 

Assistance, Housing and Human Services Annex

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GAP Gap Analysis Program 

MRE meal ready-to-eat 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NVOAD National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

NRF National Response Framework 

VAL voluntary agency liaison 

VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

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Page iii GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 18, 2008 

Congressional Requesters: 

Voluntary organizations have long played a critical role in providing care

to people affected by emergencies or natural disasters—no more so than 

in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Recently, the

catastrophic loss of life from a major cyclone in Burma was also a sober 

reminder of the need for such organizations. In the United States, 

hundreds of voluntary organizations, most often locally or regionally 

based, routinely assist disaster victims with mass sheltering and feeding 

and other services. Among those able to provide resources nationally are 

the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist 

Convention, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. In terms of funding, 

alone, following the 2005 hurricanes, the Red Cross raised more than $2.1

billion; The Salvation Army, $325 million; Catholic Charities USA, $150 

million; the United Way, $28 million; and the Southern Baptist Convention,

about $20 million. 

While our nation’s voluntary organizations have been critical complements 

to local, state, and federal government agencies during disasters, the 

magnitude of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and Hurricane 

Katrina, in particular, revealed the need to further build a national system

of emergency management that better integrates voluntary agencies’ 

efforts and capabilities. A national blueprint for such a system that 

coordinates voluntary, government, and private sector responders is 

outlined by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 2008 National 

Response Framework (the Framework). National planning has been a 

complex process on many fronts—local, state, and federal government, 

and private—and many questions arise in the process. In particular 

Congress and others have raised concerns regarding the capabilities of 

voluntary organizations, in support of governments, to provide mass care 

and other assistance when there is a large-scale disaster. To provide 

insight into the readiness of these organizations to respond to large-scale 

disasters requiring a federal response, we examined the following 

questions: 

1. What are the roles of major national voluntary organizations in 

providing mass care and other human services in response to largescale disasters requiring federal assistance? 

Page 1 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
2. What steps have these organizations taken since Katrina to strengthen 

their capacity for service delivery? 

3. What is known about their current capabilities for responding to mass 

care needs in such a large-scale disaster? 

4. What are the remaining challenges that confront voluntary 

organizations in preparing for such large-scale disasters? 

Overall, to address these objectives, we reviewed federal and voluntary 

organization documents; conducted site visits; interviewed local, state, and 

national governmental and voluntary agency officials; and reviewed 

relevant laws. More specifically, we reviewed governmental and other 

reports on the lessons learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina as 

well as key federal disaster management documents, including the 2008

National Response Framework; the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to 

the Framework, which describes the federal government’s detailed 

strategy for coordinating a national response to a catastrophic disaster; 

and Emergency Support Function 6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 

Housing, and Human Services Annex (ESF-6), which together describe the 

federal coordination of the delivery of federal mass care and other human 

services. We also interviewed officials from the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA)—a federal agency within DHS that is the 

lead agency for responding to disasters. For five major voluntary 

organizations—the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist 

Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and United Way of America—we 

reviewed documents including their disaster response plans, 

memorandums of agreement, and various data, such as data on shelters 

and other mass care resources. We also interviewed voluntary 

organization officials at their national headquarters as well as the Director 

of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), an 

umbrella group of nationwide nonprofit organizations. To examine 

voluntary organizations’ capabilities—especially in mass care—we 

conducted site visits to four metropolitan areas considered at high risk for 

different types of disasters, such as major earthquakes, hurricanes, or 

terrorist attacks: (1) Los Angeles, California; (2) Miami, Florida; (3) New 

York City, New York; and (4) Washington D.C. For each of these areas, we 

reviewed documents and obtained available data from the voluntary 

organizations on their sheltering and feeding capabilities. We also 

interviewed officials from the selected voluntary organizations; local and

state government emergency management agencies; NVOAD’s local 

affiliates, known as Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD); 

and FEMA’s regionally based liaisons to the voluntary sector, known as 

voluntary agency liaisons. In discussing voluntary organizations’ 

Page 2 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
capabilities in this report, we do not attempt to assess the total disaster 

response capabilities in any single location that we visited or the efficacy 

of any responses to particular scenarios, such as major earthquakes versus 

hurricanes. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to 

September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for 

more information on our scope and methodology. 

The voluntary organizations in our review are a major source of mass care 

and other services in large-scale disasters and play key roles in national 

response, in coordination with local, state, and federal governments, under 

the National Response Framework. Four of these organizations provide a 

variety of services such as mass care feeding, case management, and 

cleanup, while the fifth—the United Way—mostly conducts fund-raising 

for other organizations. The organizations’ response structures also vary, 

from more centralized, with a high level of authority at the national level, 

to more decentralized, in which local units are autonomous. Most of the 

organizations coordinate their services with each other and governments 

at various levels through formal written agreements and equally important 

informal working relationships. The newly issued National Response 

Framework recognizes the importance of voluntary organizations in 

disaster response and specifically designates the American Red Cross as 

one of the support agencies for the mass care functions of ESF-6. This 

support role represents a change from the Red Cross’s role in the earlier 

national plan as the primary agency for mass care, because FEMA and the 

Red Cross agreed that the Red Cross—as a nongovernmental entity—

cannot legally direct federal resources. Recently, in response to a major 

budget deficit, the Red Cross made staffing cuts and other changes in its 

operations and also sought federal funding to assist it with the cost of its 

support agency responsibilities under the Framework. The Catastrophic 

Incident Supplement to the Framework, which describes the federal vision

of the national response to a catastrophic disaster, still characterizes the 

Red Cross as the primary agency for mass care, although both FEMA and 

Red Cross officials agreed that the Red Cross would serve as a support 

agency in accordance with the more recent ESF-6 role change. FEMA and 

Red Cross officials also agreed that the Red Cross would continue to 

provide mass care services in a catastrophic disaster, acting as a private 

service provider, regardless of any future revisions to this Supplement. 

While FEMA is revising an annex to the Framework on catastrophic 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
incidents, according to agency officials, it does not currently have a time 

frame for revising the more detailed, operationally specific Supplement, 

although agency officials said they are in the process of establishing a 

review timeline. Although the Red Cross and FEMA told us that they 

understand the Red Cross’s role as a support agency in a catastrophic 

event, there is no interim agreement documenting these expectations. 

In response to weaknesses evident during Katrina, the four direct service 

providers in our review—Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern 

Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities—have taken steps to 

strengthen their service delivery by expanding service coverage and 

improving collaboration with each other on services, logistics, and 

communications. To address its gaps in service coverage, the Red Cross is 

in the process of implementing two main strategies: reorganizing its 

chapters and developing stronger partnerships with local community and 

faith-based organizations, particularly in rural areas with hard-to-reach 

populations. According to Red Cross officials, these initiatives are 

expected to improve service delivery while expanding services to 

communities that do not have established Red Cross chapters. While the

Red Cross has made staffing cuts and other changes in response to its 

budget deficit, Red Cross officials reported that these service delivery

initiatives would continue; nevertheless, the effect of these changes 

remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the national and four local offices of the 

direct service providers to varying degrees also strengthened their ability 

to coordinate services by collaborating more on feeding and case 

management and improving their logistical and communications systems. 

For example, to prevent future breakdowns in resource deployment and 

management, the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist 

Convention are working together to improve management of their supply 

chains. 

Initial assessments have not fully captured the collective capabilities of 

major voluntary organizations; however, evidence suggests that without 

government and other assistance, a worst-case large-scale disaster would 

overwhelm voluntary organizations’ current sheltering and feeding 

capabilities, according to voluntary organization officials and data we 

reviewed. The federal government and voluntary organizations in our 

review have started to identify mass care capabilities, but most existing 

assessments are locally or regionally based and do not provide a picture of

nationwide capabilities. For example, FEMA’s 2007 survey of disaster 

capabilities in selected states assesses sheltering but has not yet begun to 

address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. Moreover, it does not 

include all voluntary organization capabilities, since participating states 

only include information from organizations with which they have formal 

Page 4 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
agreements, according to FEMA officials. In the metro areas we visited, 

these agreements were generally limited to the Red Cross. Except for the 

Red Cross, the other voluntary organizations we reviewed have not yet 

assessed their own nationwide capabilities, and some do not use standard 

terms or measures for characterizing mobile kitchens and other disaster 

resources. In the four metro areas we visited, the Red Cross, The Salvation 

Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention were able to provide data on

their local sheltering and feeding resources, and they also report having 

substantial nationwide resources that can be brought to bear in an 

affected area for a large-scale disaster. Nevertheless, the need for mass 

care services in a worst-case large-scale disaster, as projected by 

government and the Red Cross, would likely overwhelm their current 

capabilities, according to voluntary organization officials as well as our 

analysis. For example, a major earthquake in a metropolitan area could

necessitate shelter for as many as 300,000 people, according to DHS, but 

Red Cross officials in Los Angeles—a city prone to earthquakes— told us 

their local sheltering capacity is 84,000 people under optimal conditions.

Voluntary organization officials also said developing additional capability 

is constrained by the limited availability of personnel and other logistical 

challenges. In recognition of these challenges, local governments we 

visited and FEMA officials told us they are planning to use government 

employees and private sector resources to help address sheltering and 

feeding needs. Red Cross and FEMA officials also told us that in a 

catastrophic situation, assistance will likely be provided from many 

sources, including the general public, as well as the private and nonprofit 

sectors, that are not part of any prepared or planned response. 

National and local voluntary organizations, including local VOADs, in our 

study continue to face challenges in increasing the number of trained 

personnel, identifying and dedicating financial resources for preparedness, 

and strengthening governmental links. Officials from these organizations 

told us that they found it difficult to dedicate staff to planning and 

coordination activities for future disasters. In addition, shortages of 

trained mass care volunteers continue to be an ongoing concern despite 

the efforts of voluntary organizations and government agencies to build a 

cadre of trained personnel. Identifying and dedicating financial resources 

for disaster planning and preparedness becomes increasingly difficult for 

organizations in light of competing priorities. For example, while the Red 

Cross raised more than $2 billion following Katrina, currently the Red 

Cross commented that it has been difficult to raise public donations to 

support its capacity-building initiatives. Additionally, while DHS 

emergency preparedness grants are another potential source of such 

funding, voluntary organization officials told us they typically do not 

receive funding from these grants. According to a senior official from 

Page 5 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
FEMA’s grant office, FEMA considered voluntary organizations as among 

the eligible subgrantees for several emergency preparedness grants, but 

federal guidance to states who distribute these grants did not clearly 

indicate this. Finally, although the service providers in our review took 

steps to increase coordination with each other, coordination and 

interaction with government agencies at all levels remain a challenge for 

organizations we visited. While local VOADs in the areas we visited helped

voluntary organizations coordinate with each other and local government 

agencies, the ability of these VOADs to effectively work with government 

agencies varied. For the Red Cross, it is too soon to tell how its recent 

staffing cuts and other changes will affect its ability to coordinate with 

FEMA and state governments during disasters. 

In this report we are making recommendations to FEMA to update and

document FEMA’s expectations for the Red Cross in a catastrophic 

disaster, take steps to better incorporate voluntary organizations’ 

capabilities into its assessments of mass care capabilities, and clarify 

states’ ability to consider voluntary organizations and local VOADs as 

among the potential recipients of federal preparedness funds. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA agreed with our 

recommendations on establishing a time frame for updating the role of the 

American Red Cross in the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and 

clarifying federal guidance to states on potential recipients of

preparedness grants. However, FEMA criticized certain aspects of our 

methodology, asserting that the draft did not address the role of states in 

coordinating mass care. As stated in our objectives, the focus of our 

report, by design, is on voluntary organizations’ roles and capabilities in 

disaster response. While focusing on voluntary organizations, our draft 

report also acknowledges the disaster response role and responsibilities of 

governments—local, state, and federal—under the National Response 

Framework. Accordingly, we interviewed local, state, and federal 

government emergency management officials, as described in the more 

detailed description of our report’s methodology. FEMA also raised 

concerns about whether the voluntary organizations discussed in our 

report provided a comprehensive picture of mass care capabilities. 

However, our report does not attempt to address all the services and 

capabilities of the voluntary sector but acknowledges that other voluntary 

organizations also provide mass care and other services. It also includes 

the caveat that we do not attempt to assess the total disaster response 

capabilities in any single location we visited. FEMA also disagreed with 

our recommendation to better incorporate voluntary organizations’ 

capabilities in assessments because the government cannot command and 

control private sector resources. However, FEMA is required under the 

Post-Katrina Act to establish a comprehensive assessment system to 

Page 6 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
assess the nation’s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. A 

comprehensive assessment of the nation’s capabilities should account as 

fully as possible for voluntary organizations’ capabilities in mass care. 

Assessing capabilities more fully does not require controlling these 

resources but rather cooperatively obtaining and sharing information. 

Without such an assessment, the government will have an incomplete 

picture of the mass care resources it can draw upon in large-scale 

disasters. In its comments, FEMA also asserted that our report incorrectly 

assumes that if funding was made available, it would enable voluntary 

organizations to shelter and care for people in catastrophic events. 

However, we discuss potential federal funding in relation to voluntary 

organizations’ preparedness and planning activities, not direct services. 

As noted in the report, such funding could be used to strengthen voluntary 

organizations’ disaster preparedness, such as coordination with FEMA, 

training of personnel, and developing continuity of operations plans. 

FEMA also provided some technical clarifications, which we incorporated 

as appropriate. 

We also provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross as well 

as excerpts from the draft report, as appropriate, to The Salvation Army, 

the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and NVOAD. In 

its comments, the Red Cross further explained its role in providing postevacuation sheltering under New York City’s coastal storm plan and 

provided technical clarifications. We added information as appropriate to 

further clarify the American Red Cross’s role in providing sheltering in 

New York City. In addition, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, 

and NVOAD provided us with technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. 

State and local governments generally have the principal responsibility for 

meeting mass care and other needs in responding to a disaster; however,

governments largely carry out this responsibility by relying on the services 

provided by voluntary organizations. Voluntary organizations provide 

sheltering, feeding, and other services, such as case management, to 

disaster victims and have long supported local, state, and federal 

government responses to disasters. 

Voluntary organizations have historically played a critical role in providing 

services to disaster victims, both on a routine basis—in response to house 

fires and local flooding, for example—and in response to far rarer 

Background 

Voluntary Organizations in 

Disasters 

Page 7 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
disasters such as devastating hurricanes or earthquakes.1

 Their assistance 

can vary from providing immediate services to being involved in long-term 

recovery efforts, including fund-raising. Some are equipped to arrive at a 

disaster scene and provide immediate mass care, such as food, shelter, and 

clothing. Other charities address short-term needs, such as providing case

management services to help disaster victims obtain unemployment or 

medical benefits. Other voluntary organizations provide long-term disaster 

assistance such as job training or temporary housing assistance for lowincome families. In addition, local organizations that do not typically 

provide disaster services may step in to address specific needs, as 

occurred when churches and other community organizations began 

providing sheltering after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

The American Red Cross, a nongovernmental organization founded in 

1881, is the largest of the nation’s mass care service providers. Operating 

under a congressional charter since 1900, the Red Cross provides 

volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serves as a 

medium of communication between the people of the United States and 

the armed forces, and provides direct services to disaster victims, 

including feeding, sheltering, financial assistance, and emergency first aid.2

An additional key player in the voluntary sector is NVOAD, an umbrella 

organization of nonprofits that are considered national in their scope. 

Established in 1970, NVOAD is not itself a service delivery organization but 

rather coordinates planning efforts by many voluntary organizations 

responding to disaster, including the five organizations in this review. In 

addition to its 49 member organizations, NVOAD also coordinates with 

chartered state Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) and 

their local affiliates. (See app. II for NVOAD members.) 

The occurrence in 2005 of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita revealed many 

weaknesses in the federal disaster response that were subsequently 

 1

Voluntary organizations—also called charities—are organizations established to address

the needs of the poor or distressed and other social welfare issues and represent a 

substantial presence in American society. Federal, state, and private agencies monitor how 

well voluntary organizations are meeting these needs. At the federal level, the Internal 

Revenue Code Section 501(c) establishes categories of tax-exempt organizations and

recognizes charitable organizations, among others, for this purpose. See also GAO,

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’

Contributions in Disasters, GAO-03-259 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002).

2

Congress repealed the Red Cross’s 1900 charter and adopted a new charter in 1905, which

has been amended several times. 

Page 8 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
enumerated by numerous public and private agencies—including the GAO, 

the White House, and the American Red Cross. These weaknesses 

included a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities among and between 

voluntary organizations and FEMA and a need for the government to 

include voluntary organizations in national and local disaster planning. 

According to several post-Katrina reports, the contributions of voluntary 

organizations, especially faith-based groups, had not been effectively 

integrated into the earlier federal plan for disaster response—the 2004 

National Response Plan. These reports called for better coordination 

among government agencies and voluntary organizations through 

cooperative relationships and joint planning and exercises. (See 

bibliography.) 

National Approach to 

Disaster Response 

Under the Homeland Security Act, which President Bush signed in 2002, as 

amended by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 

(Post-Katrina Act),3

 FEMA has been charged with responsibility for leading 

and supporting a national, risk-based, comprehensive emergency 

management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and 

mitigation. In support of this mission, FEMA is required to partner with the 

private sector and nongovernmental organizations, as well as state, local, 

tribal governments, emergency responders, and other federal agencies. 

Under the act, FEMA is specifically directed, among other things, to 

• build a comprehensive national incident management system; 

• consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans 

into a single, coordinated national response plan;

• administer and ensure the implementation of that plan, including 

coordinating and ensuring the readiness of each emergency support 

function under the plan; and 

• update a national preparedness goal and develop a national

preparedness system to enable the nation to meet that goal. 

As part of its preparedness responsibilities, FEMA is required to develop 

guidelines to define risk-based target capabilities for federal, state, local, 

and tribal preparedness and establish a comprehensive assessment system

to assess, on an ongoing basis, the nation’s prevention capabilities and 

 3

Pub. L. No. 107-296, as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-295. 

Page 9 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
overall preparedness. FEMA is also required to submit annual reports 

which describe, among other things, the results of the comprehensive 

assessment and state and local catastrophic incident preparedness. FEMA 

may also use planning scenarios to reflect the relative risk requirements 

presented by all kinds of hazards. As we noted in previous reports and 

testimony, the preparation for a large-scale disaster requires an overall

national preparedness effort designed to integrate what needs to be done 

(roles and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should 

be done.4

 The principal national documents designed to address each of 

these questions are the National Response Framework, the National 

Incident Management System, and the National Preparedness

Guidelines. A core tenet of these documents is that governments at all 

levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the 

Red Cross and other voluntary organizations, coordinate during disasters 

that require federal intervention. (See fig. 1.) 

Figure 1: Federal Framework for National Response to Large-Scale Disasters 

National 

Response 

Framework

Source: GAO analysis.

What needs

to be done 

and who needs

to do it?

National 

Incident 

Management 

System

How should

it be done?

National 

Preparedness

Guidelines

How well

should it be

done?

 4

See for example GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to 

Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 

Recommendations and Legislation, GAO-07-1142T (Washington, D.C. : July 31, 2007). 

Page 10 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
DHS’s National Response Framework, which became effective in March 

2008, delineates roles for federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the 

private sector; and voluntary organizations in responding to disasters. The 

new framework revises the National Response Plan, which was originally 

signed by major federal government agencies, the Red Cross, and NVOAD 

in 2004. Under the National Response Framework, voluntary organizations

are expected to contribute to these response efforts through partnerships 

at each level of government. In addition, FEMA, in conjunction with its 

voluntary agency liaisons, acts as the interface between these 

organizations and the federal government. (See fig. 2.) 

National Response Framework 

Page 11 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Figure 2: Voluntary Organizations, Governments, and Private Sector Roles under 

the National Response Framework 

Directs the 

response of all 

necessary federal 

department and 

agency capabilities

and coordinates with 

other responders

when an incident 

occurs that exceeds

or is anticipated to 

exceed local and 

state resources.

Has primary

responsibility for

community

preparedness

and response

Source: GAO analysis.

National

Response

Framework

(NRF)

Federal 

government

Local 

governments

Voluntary organizations

and private sector

State and tribal 

governments

Voluntary organizations perform vital service missions such as

➤ providing shelters

➤ coordinating volunteers

➤ interfacing with government response officials at all levels

Private sector 

➤ supports community response

➤ organizes business to ensure resiliency

➤ protects and restores critical infrastructure and commercial activity

➤ Supplements and facilitates local efforts

 before, during, and after incidents

➤ Coordinates resources and capabilities

➤ Obtains support from other states and 

 federal government

The Framework also creates a flexible and scalable5

 coordinating 

structure for mobilizing national resources in a large-scale disaster. Under 

the Framework, local jurisdictions and states have lead responsibility for 

 5

A scalable response refers to one that is adaptable to change in size, scope, and 

complexity, with resources from all levels of government, appropriately scaled to need, 

according to the Framework. 

Page 12 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
responding to a disaster and can request additional support from the 

federal government as needed.6

In addition, for catastrophic incidents that almost immediately overwhelm 

local and state resources and result in extraordinary levels of mass 

casualties or damage, the Framework—through its Catastrophic Incident

Supplement—specifies the conditions under which the federal government 

can proactively accelerate the national response to such disasters without 

waiting for formal requests from state governments.7

 The Supplement was 

published in 2006 after Hurricane Katrina.8

The National Framework organizes the specific needs that arise in disaster 

response into 15 emergency support functions, or ESFs. Each ESF 

comprises a coordinator, a primary agency, and support agencies—usually 

governmental agencies—that plan and support response activities. 

Typically, support agencies have expertise in the respective function, such 

Sheltering, Feeding, and Other 

Human Services under the ESF6 in the National Framework 

 6

The primary authority under which the federal government provides assistance to states 

after a disaster is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 5121-5201. Under the act, the President may issue a major disaster or emergency

declaration when a governor, whose state resources are overwhelmed, requests federal 

assistance. The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford Act so that the President could 

provide accelerated federal assistance and support without a governor’s request where 

necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage. Pub. L. No. 

109-295, § 681. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA provides assistance for mass care, debris 

removal, restoration of facilities, and financial aid to families and individuals, among other 

activities. The Stafford Act also specifies that in providing relief and assistance, FEMA

may use—with consent—the personnel and facilities of voluntary disaster relief 

organizations in distributing food, supplies, or other items, among other things. 

7

Catastrophic incidents are defined differently from major disasters. Under the Stafford

Act, a major disaster is defined as “any natural catastrophe....or regardless of cause, any

fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 5122(2). The PostKatrina Act added a definition of catastrophic incident as “any natural disaster, act of 

terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or 

damage or disruption, severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations), 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an

area.” Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 602(4). The 2008 National Response Framework contains the

same definition of a catastrophic incident. In this report, we also use the term “catastrophic 

disaster” or “catastrophic event” to refer more generally to large-scale disasters of great 

magnitude that may or may not meet the definition of a catastrophic incident. 

8

The 2005 draft version of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement had not yet been fully 

adopted when Hurricane Katrina occurred and was not invoked at the time to guide the

federal response to the disaster. 

Page 13 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
as in mass care, transportation, communication, or firefighting.9

 In a 

disaster, FEMA is responsible for activating the ESF working groups of 

key federal agencies and other designated organizations that are needed. 

For the voluntary organizations in our review, Emergency Support 

Function 6 (ESF-6) is important because it outlines the organizational 

structure used to provide mass care and related services in a disaster. 

These services are 

• mass care (e.g., sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution of emergency 

relief items), 

• emergency assistance (e.g. evacuation, safety, and well-being of pets), 

• disaster housing (e.g., roof repair, rental assistance), and 

• human services (e.g., crisis counseling, individual case management). 

Under ESF-6, FEMA is designated as the primary federal agency 

responsible for coordinating and leading the federal response for mass 

care and related human services, in close coordination with states and 

others such as voluntary organizations—a role change made in 2008 in 

response to issues that arose during Katrina. FEMA carries out this 

responsibility by convening federal ESF-6 support agencies during 

disasters and coordinating with states to augment their mass care 

capabilities as needed. Under ESF-6, the Red Cross and NVOAD are each 

named as support agencies to FEMA, along with numerous federal 

departments, such as the Department of Health and Human Services. 

FEMA’s voluntary agency liaisons, located in FEMA regions, are largely 

responsible for carrying out these coordinating duties with voluntary 

organizations. 

 9

Support agencies are assigned based on their authorities, resources, and capabilities in a 

given functional area, according to the National Framework. State governments often

operate response structures with similar emergency support functions.

Page 14 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
As private service providers fulfilling their humanitarian missions, the 

voluntary organizations in our review have historically served as 

significant sources of mass care and other services in large-scale disasters 

and play key roles in national response—in coordination with local, state, 

and federal governments—under the National Response Framework. 

While their response structures differ in key ways—with some having 

more centralized operations than others, for example—these voluntary 

organizations coordinate their services through formal written agreements

and through informal working relationships with other organizations. In 

recognition of their long-standing leadership in providing services to 

disaster victims, these organizations, especially the American Red Cross 

and NVOAD, have considerable roles in supporting FEMA under the 

nation’s National Response Framework. While this new Framework 

shifted the Red Cross from a primary agency for mass care to a support 

agency, largely because the Red Cross cannot direct federal resources, the 

2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement has not been updated to reflect 

this change. FEMA does not currently have a timetable for revising the 

Supplement, as required under the Post-Katrina Act, and while FEMA and 

Red Cross officials told us that they have a mutual understanding of the 

Red Cross’s role as a support agency in a catastrophic disaster, this 

understanding is not currently documented. 

While the major national voluntary organizations in our review differ in 

their types of services and response structures, they have all played 

important roles in providing mass care and other services, some for over a 

century. According to government officials and reports on the response to 

Katrina, the Red Cross and the other voluntary organizations we reviewed 

are a major source of mass care and other disaster services, as was evident 

in the response to Hurricane Katrina.

10

The five voluntary organizations we reviewed differ in the extent to which 

they focus on providing disaster services and in the types of services they

provide. Four of the five organizations directly provide a variety of mass 

care and other services, such as feeding and case management, while the 

Voluntary

Organizations Are a 

Major Source of Mass 

Care and Other 

Services in Disasters 

and Have Significant 

Support Roles under 

the National 

Response Framework 

While the Voluntary 

Organizations Differ in Key 

Ways, They Have 

Traditionally Been Major 

Providers of Mass Care 

and Other Services 

Types and Focus of Disaster 

Services Vary Among the 

Voluntary Organizations 

 10Other sources of these services include the private sector, through contracts with various

levels of government, and government agencies and employees at local, state, and federal 

levels. In addition, other voluntary organizations that are outside the scope of this report, 

such as America’s Second Harvest, also provide services. America’s Second Harvest is a 

charitable hunger relief organization, comprising a network of more than 200 member food 

banks and food rescue organizations across the nation. 

Page 15 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
fifth—the United Way—focuses on fund-raising for other organizations. As 

the nation’s largest disaster response organization, the Red Cross is the 

only one of the five in our review the core mission of which is to provide 

disaster response services.11 In providing its services, the Red Cross 

typically coordinates with state and local governments to support their 

response and has formal agreements with state or local emergency 

management agencies to provide mass care and other disaster services. 

For example, the Red Cross serves as a support agency in the Washington, 

D.C., disaster response plan for mass care, feeding, and donations and 

volunteer management. In contrast to the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, 

the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities are faith-based 

organizations that provide varying types and degrees of disaster services –

some for decades—as an extension of their social and community service 

missions.12 The United Way raises funds for other charities and provides 

resources to local United Way operations, but does not directly provide 

services to survivors in response to disasters. (See table 1.) 

Table 1: Disaster-Related Services Provided by the Five Voluntary Organizations In Our Review

Organization Mass care services provided Human services provided

Other disaster-related services 

provided

American Red Cross • sheltering 

• feeding 

• emergency first aid 

• bulk distribution of emergency 

items 

• collection and provision of 

information on disaster 

victims to family members 

• health and mental services 

• emergency financial assistance 

• blood services

 11According to the Red Cross’s mission statement, the Red Cross will provide relief to 

victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. 

12For example, Catholic Charities’ mission—exercising leadership in assisting its 

membership in their mission of service, advocacy, and convening—does not refer to 

disaster response or relief, and the organization has become more active in disaster 

response since 1990. In contrast, The Salvation Army has provided emergency services to 

individuals and communities since its first charter was enacted in the United States in 1899,

and the first major U.S. disaster that The Salvation Army responded to was in 1900 in

response to the Galveston, Texas, hurricane, while the Southern Baptist Convention began 

its disaster work in 1967. 

Page 16 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Organization Mass care services provided Human services provided

Other disaster-related services 

provided

The Salvation Army • feeding 

• sheltering 

• bulk distribution of emergency 

items 

• disaster social services • spiritual and emotional care 

• cleanup and restoration services 

• donations management 

• missing persons services 

• medical assistance 

Southern Baptist 

Convention

• feeding Not applicable • chainsaw crews who clear trees 

and other obstructions following a 

disaster 

• child care

• showering units for volunteers 

and victims 

• chaplaincy and counseling 

• “mud out” operations in which

volunteers assist in removal of

debris from buildings following a 

flood 

• temporary repairs 

• bilingual services 

Catholic Charities 

USA 

• Not applicable • individual and family case 

management, which may include 

mortgage or rent assistance, home 

repair assistance, and 

transportation 

• referrals to other organizations for 

benefits 

• medical and cash assistance 

• disaster crisis counseling 

• temporary housing 

United Way of 

America 

Not applicable Not applicable • fund-raising for other disaster 

service providers 

• participates in local committees to 

address unmet needs 

• sponsors information and referral 

system (2-1-1 Hotline)a

• helps coordinate unaffiliated or

spontaneous volunteers 

Source: Data provided by charities.

Note: In this table, the terms “mass care” and “human services” characterize types of services in line 

with these terms as used in the federal Emergency Support Function-6 under the National Response 

Framework. 

a The number 2-1-1 is a telephone number that, where available, connects people with community

and human services and volunteer opportunities (e.g., food banks, shelters, counseling, child-care). 

Its implementation is being spearheaded by the United Way and information and referral agencies in 

states and local communities. As of June 2007, 2-1-1 coverage serves approximately 198 million 

Americans, or about 65 percent of the United States population, according to the United Way. 

Page 17 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
While voluntary organizations have traditionally played an important role 

in large-scale disasters, their role in response to Hurricane Katrina, the 

largest natural disaster in U.S. history, was even more significant,13

especially for the three mass care service providers in our study—the Red 

Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention. For 

example, after Katrina, the Red Cross provided more than 52.6 million 

meals and snacks and opened more than 1,300 shelters across 27 states, 

while the Southern Baptist Convention provided more than 14.6 million 

meals and The Salvation Army provided 3.8 million articles of clothing. 

While Catholic Charities USA and its affiliates do not generally provide 

mass care services, during Katrina it assisted with feeding by donating 

food. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Disaster Services Provided during and after the Gulf Coast Hurricanes

Organization Sheltered Meals provided Money raised Volunteers 

American Red Cross 3.4 million overnight 

staysa

52.6 million meals and 

snacks 

$2.1 billion Volunteers: 245,000 

The Salvation Army 91,400 lodging spaces 

provided 

7.7 million meals and 

snacks 

$365 millionb Volunteer hours served: 

506,443 

Southern Baptist 

Convention

Not applicable 14.6 million meals $20 millioncVolunteer days: 165,748 

Catholic Charities USA Not applicable 51 million pounds of food 

provided 

$150 million More than 110 Catholic 

Charities dioceses 

responded during Katrina

United Way of America Not applicable Not applicable $28 million Not applicable

Source: Data provided by charities.

Note: Since voluntary organizations report these data differently, the data are not necessarily 

comparable. 

a

Overnight stays provided by the Red Cross from August to December 2006. 

b

Money raised by the Red Cross as of May 2006. 

c

Money raised by The Salvation Army as of February 2006. 

 13The role of voluntary organizations was particularly important in Katrina because state 

and local resources were overwhelmed and the Interagency Incident Management Group,

within the Department of Homeland Security, was not activated until roughly 36 hours after 

Katrina made landfall. 

Page 18 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
The four direct service providers in our study—the Red Cross, The 

Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic

Charities14—each have distinct disaster response structures, with their 

national offices having different levels of authority over the organization’s 

affiliates and resources, reflecting a continuum from more centralized 

operations, such as the Red Cross, to more decentralized operations, such 

as Catholic Charities USA. For example, in a large-scale disaster, the 

national office of the Red Cross directly sends headquarters-based trained 

staff, volunteers, and equipment to the affected disaster site, while 

Catholic Charities USA’s disaster response office provides technical 

assistance to the affected member dioceses but does not direct resources. 

(See table 3.) Similarly, to facilitate its ability to direct a nationwide 

response from headquarters, the Red Cross has a national headquarters 

and service area staff of about 1,600 as of May 2008, maintains a 24/7 

disaster operations center at its headquarters, and has a specially trained 

cadre of over 71,000 volunteers who are nationally deployable, according 

to the Red Cross. In contrast, the Southern Baptist Convention and 

Catholic Charities each have 1 or 2 staff at their national offices who are 

responsible for disaster response coordination for their organizations. 

These differences in the national offices’ roles within the voluntary 

organizations means that when voluntary organizations respond to 

disasters of increasing magnitude by “ramping up”—a process similar to 

the scalable response described in the National Response Framework—

they do so in different ways and to different extents. 

Voluntary Organizations’ 

Response Structures Differ 

Table 3: Voluntary Organizations’ National Office Disaster Response Functions in Large-Scale Disasters 

Directs response

Provides personnel 

and equipment 

Coordinates

personnel and 

equipment 

Provides technical 

assistance 

American Red Cross X X X X

The Salvation Army X X 

Southern Baptist Convention X 

Catholic Charities USA X 

Source: GAO analysis of voluntary organization data. 

 14For the purposes of this report, we are focusing on the four organizations in our review

that provide direct services in disasters, especially mass care; consequently, unless 

otherwise noted, the United Way will not be included in general statements about the

voluntary organizations. 

Page 19 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
While the voluntary organizations in our review coordinate with one 

another and with the government, their disaster response structures are 

not necessarily congruent with the response structures of other voluntary 

organizations or aligned geographically or jurisdictionally with those of 

government. In essence, the voluntary organizations’ response structures 

do not necessarily correspond to the local, state, and federal structures of 

response—as described in the National Framework. For example, The 

Salvation Army and Catholic Charities are not aligned geographically with

states, while the Southern Baptist Convention is aligned roughly along 

state lines, called state conventions, and the Red Cross’s organizational 

structure supports regional chapter groupings, which are also aligned 

generally by state. Furthermore, while the Red Cross and The Salvation 

Army have regional or larger territorial units, these are not necessarily 

congruent with FEMA’s 10 regions. (See table 4).

Table 4: Voluntary Organizations’ Regional and Local Response Structures 

Regional level 

• American Red Cross—has four regions, each comprising between four and eight 

disaster offices.

• The Salvation Army—has four territorial offices that coordinate regional disaster 

response through 40 divisions. Each division can encompass one or more states 

depending on density and population. 

• Southern Baptist Convention—does not have a regional level. Neighboring state 

conventions coordinate as needed, but each is independent. 

• Catholic Charities USA—does not have a regional level. 

Local level 

• American Red Cross—has 733 local chapters. 

• The Salvation Army—has local command centers located in communities that 

report to the divisions. 

• Southern Baptist Convention—has 42 autonomous state conventions organized 

loosely according to state boundaries. 

• Catholic Charities USA—has 180 member dioceses, each owned and operated 

independently.

Source: Data provided by charities.

In a similar vein, these service providers do not necessarily follow the 

command and control structure typical of the federal incident command 

system set forth in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) for 

Page 20 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
unifying disaster response.15 These organizations vary in the extent to 

which they have adopted this command system, according to officials we 

spoke with. For example, organization officials told us that the Red Cross, 

The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention use this 

command system, while Catholic Charities does not. 

Mutual Aid Agreements 

and Informal Working 

Relationships Link the 

Organizations to One 

Another 

The voluntary organizations in our review coordinate and enhance their 

service delivery through formal written agreements at the national level. 

While not all of the voluntary organizations have such agreements with 

each other, the Red Cross maintains mutual aid agreements with the 

national offices of The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention,

and Catholic Charities USA, as well as 39 other organizations with 

responsibilities under ESF-6. For example, under a 2000 agreement 

between the Red Cross and the Southern Baptist Convention, a feeding 

unit addendum describes operations and financial responsibilities when 

the two organizations provide mass feeding services cooperatively. 

According to Southern Baptist Convention officials, the general premise of 

this agreement is that the Convention will prepare meals in its mobile 

feeding units, while the Red Cross will distribute these meals using its 

emergency response vehicles. 

According to many of the voluntary organization officials we interviewed,

another essential ingredient for response is to have active, informal 

working relationships with leaders of other organizations that are well 

established before disasters strike. These relationships are especially 

important when organizations do not have formal written agreements16 or 

when the agreements do not necessarily represent the current relationship 

 15NIMS provides a standardized structure for command during disasters. The incident

command system is able to be applied in a variety of settings as a management system that 

is intended to assist in making incident management more effective. The system 

accomplishes this through an integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, 

and communications that operate within one organizational structure. While voluntary 

organizations are not required to adopt this incident command structure, FEMA 

encourages voluntary organizations to adhere to NIMS procedures and terminology to help

facilitate their integration into government preparedness and response efforts. 

16As we previously reported, voluntary organizations can better assist those in need of

disaster assistance through coordination and collaboration, as well as understanding each 

other’s roles and responsibilities. This requires effective working relationships with 

frequent contacts. Collaborative working relationships are essential building blocks of 

strategies that ease access to disaster assistance. GAO-03-259. 

Page 21 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
between two organizations.17 Regular local VOAD meetings and joint 

training exercises with local and state governments facilitate these 

working relationships by providing an opportunity for relationship 

building and informal communication. For example, a Florida catastrophic 

planning exercise in 2006-2007 brought together 300 emergency 

management professionals and members of the Florida VOAD to develop 

plans for two types of catastrophic scenarios. According to disaster 

officials, relationships built through this type of interaction allow 

participants to establish connections that can be drawn upon during a 

disaster. 

The ESF-6 under the 

National Framework 

Recognizes the Important 

Role of the Red Cross and 

NVOAD Members in 

Disasters 

The National Response Plan that was instituted after September 11, and 

the 2008 National Response Framework, which superseded it, both 

recognized the key role of the Red Cross and NVOAD member 

organizations in providing mass care and other services by giving the Red 

Cross and NVOAD responsibilities under the ESF-6 section of the 

Framework. 

The Red Cross Role The 2008 National Response Framework, which revised the National 

Response Plan, clarified some aspects of the Red Cross’s role that had 

been problematic during the Katrina response. Under the 2008 ESF-6 

section of the Framework, the Red Cross has a unique federally designated

role as a support agency to FEMA for mass care. As noted in our recent 

report, the Red Cross was previously designated as the primary agency for

mass care under ESF-6 in the 2004 National Response Plan, but the Red 

Cross’s role was changed under the 2008 Framework to that of a support 

agency.

18 This role change was made in large part because FEMA and the 

Red Cross agreed—in response to issues that arose during Katrina—that 

 17Some of the organizations in our review maintain formal written agreements that predate 

September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and the development of the NRF. For example, the

written agreement between the Red Cross and Catholic Charities was created in 1991 and 

the agreement between the Red Cross and The Salvation Army was established in 1994. 

These agreements confirm long-term relationships between the organizations, but do not

necessarily reflect their current working relationships, according to officials we spoke

with.

18GAO, National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and 

Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors, GAO-08-369 (Washington, D.C: 

Feb. 27, 2008). 

Page 22 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
the primary agency responsible for coordinating mass care nationwide 

needs to be able to direct federal resources. 

As a support agency under ESF-6, the Red Cross helps FEMA and the 

states coordinate mass care activities in disasters. In particular the Red 

Cross is charged with providing staff and specially trained liaisons to work 

at FEMA’s regional offices and other locations, and providing subject 

matter expertise on mass care planning, preparedness, and response. In 

addition, the Red Cross is expected to take the lead in promoting 

cooperation and coordination among government and national voluntary 

organizations that provide mass care during a disaster, although it does 

not direct other voluntary organizations in this role. (See fig. 3.) ESF-6 also 

acknowledges the Red Cross’s separate role as the nation’s largest mass 

care service provider, which is distinct from its role under the Framework. 

When providing mass care services, the Red Cross acts on its own behalf 

and not on behalf of the federal government, according to the ESF-6. 

Page 23 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Figure 3: Red Cross Role under the National Response Framework 

Source: GAO analysis; images, Art Explosion.

American 

Red Cross

American Red Cross

as an ESF-6 support agency under the NRF 

FEMA States

• Provides Red Cross staff to work daily at DHS/FEMA 

 regional offices in support of ESF #6 Mass Care activities

• Provides specially trained liaisons to work at designated 

 DHS/FEMA locations to support ESF #6 Mass Care 

activities as requested

• Provides subject-matter expertise on general mass care 

 planning, preparedness, and response activities, as well as

 Red Cross-specific activities in these areas

• Provides information on current Red Cross mass care 

activities as requested prior to and during response operations

• Supports DHS/FEMA in working with designated state lead

agencies for mass care in planning preparedness and response 

activities, to include exercise participation

In recent months, the Red Cross has reported a significant budget deficit 

that has led it to substantially reduce its staff, including those assigned to 

FEMA and its regional offices, and to seek federal funding for its ESF-6 

responsibilities—a major policy shift for the organization. According to 

Red Cross officials, the Red Cross has experienced major declines in 

revenues in recent years, and the organization reported a projected 

operating budget deficit, for fiscal year 2008, of about $150 million. To 

address this shortfall, in early 2008 the Red Cross reduced the number of 

its staff by about 1,000, with most of these staffing cuts made at its 

national headquarters and in service areas, in departments that support all 

Red Cross functions, such as information technology, human resources, 

and communications. These cuts included eliminating its full-time staff at 

FEMA’s 10 regional offices and reducing staff that supported state 

emergency management agencies from 14 to 5. While it is too soon to tell

the impact of these changes, Red Cross officials we spoke with told us 

Page 24 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
these staffing cutbacks will not affect its ability to provide mass care 

services. For example, several positions were also added to its Disaster 

Services unit to support local chapters’ service delivery, according to Red

Cross data, including area directors and state disaster officers—a new 

position at the Red Cross. However, with regard to its ESF-6 

responsibilities, Red Cross officials also said that while the organization 

will continue to fulfill its ESF-6 responsibilities, it is changing the way it 

staffs FEMA’s regional offices during disasters by assigning these 

responsibilities, among others, to state disaster officers and using trained 

volunteers to assist in this role. According to the Red Cross, its costs for 

employing a full-time staff person in each FEMA regional office and for 

staffing its headquarters to support federal agencies during disasters is $7 

million annually, for an operation that the Red Cross says is no longer 

sustainable. Consequently, in May 2008 testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Red 

Cross requested that Congress authorize and appropriate funding to cover 

these positions and responsibilities under the ESF-6.19 In addition, the Red 

Cross requested $3 million to assist it in funding its role of integrating the 

mass care services provided by the nongovernmental sector, for a total of 

$10 million requested. 

In addition to the Red Cross, NVOAD is also designated as a support 

agency under the 2008 ESF-6 section of the Framework, as it was in the 

previous national plan. In its role as a support agency for mass care, 

NVOAD is expected to serve as a forum enabling its member organizations

to share information, knowledge, and resources throughout a disaster; it is 

also expected to send representatives to FEMA’s national response center 

to represent the voluntary organizations and assist in disaster 

coordination. A new element in the 2008 ESF-6 is that voluntary 

organizations that are members of NVOAD are also specifically cited in

ESF-6 under NVOAD, along with descriptions of their services or functions 

in disaster response. According to NVOAD and FEMA officials, listing the 

individual NVOAD members and their services in the ESF-6 does not 

change organizations’ expected roles or create any governmental 

obligations for these organizations to respond in disasters, but rather 

recognizes that NVOAD represents significant resources available through

the membership of the voluntary organizations. 

Role of NVOAD and Its 

Members 

 19Testimony of Joseph Becker, Senior Vice President, Disaster Services, American National

Red Cross, May 15, 2008, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs. 

Page 25 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
While the Red Cross’s role for ESF-6 has been changed from that of a 

primary agency under the National Response Plan to that of a support 

agency under the new Framework, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 

still reflects its earlier role, requiring the Red Cross to direct federal mass 

care resources. The Supplement provides the specific operational 

framework for responding to a catastrophic incident, in accordance with 

federal strategy. When the Supplement was issued, in 2006, the Red Cross 

was the primary agency for coordinating federal mass care assistance and 

support for the mass care section of ESF-6 under the National Response 

Plan.20 As previously mentioned, in January 2008 the Red Cross’s role 

under ESF-6 changed from that of a primary agency to that of a support 

agency, partly because the Red Cross lacks the authority to direct federal 

resources. The Supplement has not yet been updated to reflect this recent 

change in the Red Cross’s role. However, FEMA and Red Cross officials 

agreed that in a catastrophic incident, the Red Cross would serve as a 

support agency for mass care—not as the lead agency—and therefore 

would not be responsible for directing federal resources. According to 

FEMA, in a catastrophic incident, the management, control, dispensation, 

and coordination of federal resources will change, shifting this 

responsibility from the Red Cross to FEMA, so as to be consistent with the 

National Response Framework and the ESF-6. 

Under the Catastrophic 

Incident Supplement, the 

Red Cross Is Still 

Described as the Lead 

Agency for Mass Care, 

Which Is Inconsistent with 

Changes Made to ESF-6 

In addition to describing its ESF-6 support agency responsibilities in a 

catastrophic disaster, the Supplement lays out the mass care services the 

Red Cross would provide in a catastrophic disaster—acting as a private 

organization—and FEMA and Red Cross officials agreed that the Red 

Cross would continue to provide these services as part of its private 

mission, regardless of the change to its role in the ESF-6 or any future 

revisions to the Supplement. The Red Cross’s services and actions as a 

private service provider are integrated into the Supplement for responding 

to catastrophic disasters. In an event of catastrophic magnitude, the Red

Cross is expected to directly provide mass care services to disaster 

victims, such as meals and immediate sheltering services to people who 

are denied access to their homes. The Supplement also includes the Red 

Cross in a schedule of actions that agencies are expected to automatically

take in response to a no-notice disaster, such as a terrorist attack or 

devastating earthquake. For example, within 2 hours after the Supplement 

is implemented, the Red Cross is expected to inventory shelter space in a

250-mile radius of the disaster using the National Shelter System, dispatch 

 20The 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement was a supplement to the 2004 National 

Response Plan for catastrophic incidents. The Supplement remains in effect under the 2008

National Response Framework. 

Page 26 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
specially trained staff to assess needs and initiate the Red Cross’s national 

response, coordinate with its national voluntary organization partners to 

provide personnel and equipment, and deploy Red Cross kitchens and 

other mobile feeding units. However, according to the ESF-6, in providing 

these mass care services, the Red Cross is acting on its own behalf and not 

on the behalf of the federal government or other governmental entity, and 

the Supplement similarly states that the Red Cross independently provides 

mass care services as part of its broad program of disaster relief. 

According to Red Cross officials, if the Supplement were implemented, the 

Red Cross would continue providing the same mass care services that it 

has always provided as a private organization. FEMA officials agreed that 

its expectations of the services the Red Cross would provide in a 

catastrophic event have not changed, and that its role as a service provider 

has not been affected by the changes to the ESF-6. According to FEMA, 

FEMA will augment the Red Cross’s resources in a catastrophic disaster, 

and the two organizations are working together to develop a memorandum 

of agreement to ensure that the Red Cross is provided with adequate

federal support for logistics, human resources, and travel in a catastrophic 

event. 

Although FEMA is charged with revising the Supplement under the PostKatrina Reform Act,21 agency officials told us that the agency does not 

currently have a time frame for updating the Supplement and does not 

have an interim agreement documenting FEMA’s and the Red Cross’s 

understanding of the Red Cross’s role as a support agency under the 

Supplement. FEMA officials told us that the agency was revising the 2004 

Catastrophic Incident Annex—a brief document that establishes the 

overarching strategy for a national response to this type of incident—but 

that it does not yet have a time frame for updating the more detailed 

Supplement, which provides the framework for implementing this 

strategy, although the agency told us that it is in the process of 

establishing a review timeline. According to FEMA, future revisions to the 

Supplement will shift responsibility for directing federal mass care 

resources from the Red Cross to FEMA, in order to remain consistent with 

the National Response Framework and ESF-6. Furthermore, FEMA and 

the Red Cross told us that they have a mutual understanding of the Red 

Cross’s role as a support agency in a catastrophic disaster. However, this 

understanding is not currently documented. As the experience in 

responding to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, it is important to have a 

clear agreement on roles and responsibilities. Crafting such agreements in 

 21Pub.L. No. 109-295, §611(13). 

Page 27 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
writing ahead of time—before the need to respond to a catastrophic 

event—would help clarify potentially unknown sources of 

misunderstanding and communicate this understanding not just to FEMA 

and the Red Cross, but also to FEMA’s many support agencies for ESF-6 

and the Red Cross’s partner organizations in the voluntary sector. There is

also precedent for having an interim agreement on changed roles: In 2007, 

while the National Response Plan was being revised, FEMA and the Red 

Cross developed an interim agreement on roles and responsibilities that 

set forth the Red Cross’s shift from primary to support agency.

In response to weaknesses in service delivery that became evident during 

Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the 

Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities have acted to expand

their service coverage and strengthen key aspects of their structures. The 

Red Cross has reorganized its chapters and established new partnerships 

with local community and faith-based organizations, particularly in rural

areas with hard-to-reach populations. While Red Cross officials did not 

expect these improvements to be undermined by the organization’s budget 

deficit, the effect of recent staff reductions at headquarters and elsewhere 

remains to be seen. Meanwhile, all four organizations, to varying degrees, 

have made changes to strengthen their ability to coordinate services by 

collaborating more on feeding and case management and improving their 

logistical and communications systems. 

In recognition of the fact that its service coverage had been inadequate 

during the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes,22 the Red Cross subsequently 

reorganized its service delivery structure and initiated or strengthened 

partnerships with local community organizations—a process that is still 

ongoing. During Katrina, when approximately 770,000 people were 

displaced, the Red Cross was widely viewed as not being prepared to meet 

the disaster’s unprecedented sheltering needs, in part because some 

areas—particularly rural areas—lacked local chapters or were not offering

services; furthermore, the Red Cross had weak relationships with faithbased and other community groups that stepped in during this crisis to 

Voluntary

Organizations Have 

Taken Steps to 

Expand Coverage and 

Strengthen Their 

Service Delivery 

Structures 

The Red Cross Is Taking 

Steps to Expand Service 

Coverage by Reorganizing 

Its Response Structure 

 22See the American Red Cross’s self-assessment: From Challenge to Action: American Red 

Cross Actions To Improve and Enhance its Disaster Response And Related Capabilities For 

the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond: (Washington, D.C.: June 2006). 

Page 28 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
assist disaster victims.23 To address these problems, the Red Cross is 

implementing two main initiatives: 

First, to expand and strengthen its service delivery, including its capacity

to respond to catastrophic disasters, the Red Cross is reorganizing its field 

structure by 

• Establishing a more flexible approach to service delivery to 

accommodate varying needs of diverse communities within the same 

jurisdiction. According to the Red Cross, the jurisdiction of many chapters

consisted of urban, suburban, and rural counties. Previously, chapter 

services were based on an urban model, but this one-size-fits-all approach, 

according to the Red Cross, did not well suit the needs and capacities of 

suburban and rural areas. The Red Cross now differentiates among three 

service levels, and each chapter can match service levels to the 

communities within its jurisdiction according to the community’s 

population density and vulnerability to disasters.24 As part of this 

differentiated approach, the chapters also use a mix of methods for 

providing services—from teams of disaster-trained volunteers to toll-free 

numbers and the Internet to formal partnerships—depending on the 

service level needed. 

• Realigning its regional chapter groupings—each consisting of three to

eight local chapters—to cover larger geographic areas, additional 

populations, and better support their local chapters. Regional chapters 

were established based on factors such as population density, total 

geographic area, and community economic indicators. According to the 

Red Cross, streamlining administrative back-office functions, such as 

human resources and financial reporting, through an organization-wide 

initiative to reduce duplication will free up chapter resources for service 

delivery. With this realignment, regional chapters now are expected to 

provide their local chapters with technical assistance, evaluate local 

 23See the bibliography for a list of studies and reports on the response to Hurricane Katrina.

24The different service levels are for (a) large metropolitan centers with substantial disaster

vulnerability, (b) areas with medium population densities with moderate vulnerability, and 

(c) rural areas and isolated communities with limited vulnerability. According to the Red 

Cross, chapters will identify a service delivery plan for rural and isolated areas. In some

isolated, remote areas, for example, Red Cross services may be offered by means of a

partnership with a local volunteer fire district and access to Internet and telephone support 

while in other areas, services may be offered through a trained disaster action team, health

and safety providers, and occasional visits by Red Cross staff. 

Page 29 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
chapters’ overall service delivery capacity, and identify strategies to 

maximize service delivery, according to the Red Cross. 

Second, the Red Cross is working to strengthen its local chapters’ 

relationships with local faith- and community-based organizations so as to 

help better serve diverse and hard-to-reach populations. During Katrina, 

the Red Cross lacked such relationships in certain parts of the country, 

including hurricane-prone areas, and did not consistently serve the needs 

of many elderly, African-American, Latino, and Asian-American disaster 

victims and people with disabilities. To remedy this, the Red Cross 

initiated a new community partnership strategy under which local 

chapters identify key community organizations as possible disaster 

response partners and enter into agreements with them on resources to be 

provided, including reimbursements for costs associated with sheltering 

disaster victims. The partnership strategy’s goals include improving 

service to specific communities by overcoming linguistic and cultural 

barriers; increasing the number of possible facilities for use as shelters, 

service centers, and warehouses; and enlisting the support of 

organizations that have relationships with the disabled community. 

According to Red Cross officials, local chapters around the country have 

initiated thousands of new partnerships with faith-based and local 

community organizations. However, because these partnerships are 

formed at the local chapter level, the national office does not track the 

exact number of new agreements signed, according to the Red Cross. 

In addition, the Red Cross has also taken some actions to better address 

the mass care needs of disaster victims with disabilities—a particular 

concern during Katrina—although concerns still remain about the nation’s 

overall preparations for mass care for people with disabilities. For 

example, the Red Cross developed a shelter intake form to help volunteers 

determine if a particular shelter can meet an individual’s needs as well as 

new training programs for staff and volunteers that specifically focus on 

serving the disabled, as we previously reported.25 It has also prepositioned 

items such as cots that can be used in conjunction with wheelchairs in 

warehouses to improve accessibility to shelters. However, as we reported 

in February 2008, Red Cross headquarters officials told us that some local 

chapters were not fully prepared to serve people with disabilities and that 

it was difficult to encourage local chapters to implement accessibility 

policies. In the report we also noted that FEMA had hired a disability 

coordinator to improve mass care services for the disabled, but it had not 

 25See GAO-08-369. 

Page 30 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
yet coordinated with the National Council on Disability, as required under 

the Post-Katrina Act. More specifically, we recommended that FEMA 

develop a set of measurable action steps, in consultation with the 

disability council, for coordinating with the council. According to the 

National Disability Council, while FEMA and the council have met on 

several occasions to discuss their joint responsibilities under the PostKatrina Act, FEMA has not yet developed action steps for coordination in

consultation with the council. FEMA officials told us they are preparing an 

update for us on their response to the recommendation. 

Although the Red Cross recently significantly reduced its staffing levels, 

the staffing cutbacks were designed to uphold the organization’s delivery 

of disaster services, according to the Red Cross. Red Cross national 

officials told us that overall, these and other staffing cuts were designed to 

leave service delivery intact and that the Red Cross plans to maintain the

reorganization of its chapter and service level structure as well as its 

community partnership initiative. However, since these changes are so 

recent, it remains to be seen how or whether the cuts and realignment of

responsibilities will affect the organization’s post-Katrina efforts to expand 

and strengthen its service delivery. 

On the basis of their experiences with large-scale disasters, including 

Katrina, the national offices, and to some extent the local offices, of the 

direct service providers in our study reported to varying degrees 

increasing coordination with each other. 26 In particular, they collaborated 

more on feeding operations and information sharing and made logistical

and communications improvements to prevent future problems, according 

to organization officials.

To Improve Their Service 

Delivery Structures, the 

Red Cross and Other 

Organizations Increased 

Coordination and 

Strengthened Their

Logistics and 

Communications Systems 

 26While the national offices of the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist 

Convention, Catholic Charities, and United Way made direct contributions to the Hurricane

Katrina response and relief effort, in the four metropolitan areas we visited, the Katrina

experiences of the voluntary organizations’ local offices varied, such as sending their staff 

and volunteers to affected areas or providing evacuees with housing assistance and case 

management services in their own area. In addition, the local voluntary organizations we 

met with discussed their service delivery improvements based on their experiences during

other large-scale disasters in their regions, such as the September 11 attacks in the New 

York and Washington, D.C., metro region or the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake. 

Page 31 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
With regard to mass care services, officials from the national offices of the 

Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention—the 

three mass care providers in our review—reported increasing their 

collaboration on delivering mass feeding services. During Katrina, mass 

care services were duplicated in some locations and lacking in others, 

partly because voluntary organizations were unable to communicate and 

coordinate effectively. One reason for this confusion, according to the 

Southern Baptist Convention, was that many locally based volunteers 

were unaware that the national offices of the Red Cross and the Southern

Baptist Convention had a mutual aid agreement to work with each other 

on feeding operations and as a result did not coordinate effectively. Since 

Katrina, the Southern Baptist Convention and the Red Cross have 

developed a plan to cross-train their kitchen volunteers and combine their 

core curricula for kitchen training. Similarly, The Salvation Army and the 

Southern Baptist Convention—who also collaborate on mass feeding 

services—created a joint training module that cross-trains Southern 

Baptist Convention volunteers to work in Salvation Army canteens and 

large Salvation Army mobile kitchens. The two organizations also agreed

to continue liaison development. 

In addition, the voluntary organizations in our study told us that they 

shared case management information on the services they provide to 

disaster survivors through the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN)—

which is a partnership among several national disaster relief nonprofit 

organizations.

27 After September 11, CAN developed a Web-based case 

management database system that allows participating organizations to 

reduce duplication of benefits by sharing data about clients and resources 

with each other following disasters. This system was used in Katrina and 

subsequent disasters. The Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the United

Way were among the seven original partners that developed and 

implemented CAN. According to officials from the Red Cross’s national 

headquarters office, CAN has served as a tool for improving coordination 

and maintaining consistency across organizations and has also fostered 

collaboration at the national level among organization executives. An 

official from Catholic Charities USA told us it has seen a reduction in the 

duplication of services to clients since it began participating in CAN. Two 

Coordination on Provision of 

Services 

 27After September 11, GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working group to

encourage voluntary organizations involved in disaster response to integrate several 

lessons learned from the attacks, including easing access to aid for those eligible and 

enhancing coordination among charities and with FEMA. See GAO-03-259. Following our

report, seven of the largest disaster response organizations— including the Red Cross, The 

Salvation Army, and the United Way—in partnership with FEMA, formed CAN to ease 

collaboration and facilitate data sharing. 

Page 32 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
of the local areas we visited participated in CAN—New York City and 

Washington, D.C.—and officials from some local voluntary organizations 

and VOADs in these two cities said they participate in CAN.28 In New York 

City, Red Cross officials said CAN was used to support the Katrina victims 

who were evacuated to the area. Catholic Charities officials told us that 

following September 11, CAN helped ease the transition between the Red 

Cross’s initial case management services and longer-term services 

provided by other organizations. In addition, an official from the local

VOAD said using CAN is a best practice for the sector. 

The three voluntary organizations that provide mass care services have 

taken steps to improve their supply chains by coordinating more with each 

other and FEMA to prevent the breakdown in logistics that had occurred 

during Hurricane Katrina, according to officials we spoke with. In 

responding to Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross, FEMA, and others 

experienced difficulties determining what resources were needed, what 

was available, and where resources were at any point in time, as we and 

others reported. Since then, the Red Cross and FEMA’s logistics 

department have communicated and coordinated more on mass care 

capacity, such as the inventory and deployment of cots, blankets, and 

volunteers, according to national office Red Cross officials. The Red Cross 

also said the logistics departments of the Red Cross and FEMA meet 

regularly and that the two organizations are working on a formal 

agreement and systematically reviewing certain areas, such as sharing 

information on supplies and warehousing. In addition to the Red Cross, 

the Southern Baptist Convention and The Salvation Army made changes to 

improve their supply chain management systems. In Katrina, the Southern 

Baptist Convention experienced a breakdown in the system that prevented 

it from replenishing its depleted mobile kitchen stock, according to 

officials from the organization. While FEMA ultimately helped with 

supplies, the Southern Baptist Convention has since collaborated with the 

Red Cross and The Salvation Army to develop a supply chain management 

system to minimize logistical problems that could interfere with its ability 

to provide feeding services, according to national office officials from the 

Southern Baptist Convention. 

Coordination on the Logistics 

of Mass Care Supplies and 

Services 

 28Currently, six communities nationwide participate as pilot communities that will lead to 

the development of new models of community readiness and response. The six pilot 

communities are the District of Columbia; San Francisco, California; New York City, New

York; New Orleans, Louisiana; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Seattle, Washington. In

addition to pilot cities, CAN has the capacity to deploy throughout the United States for 

large-scale disasters and is available through a request process. According to an official 

from the Red Cross’s national headquarters office, CAN is available all across the country 

and CAN partner organizations are encouraging their local affiliates to use it. 

Page 33 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
To ensure that disaster staff and volunteers can receive and share 

information during a disaster, the voluntary organizations in our review 

told us they had to varying degrees strengthened their communications 

systems since Katrina. Hurricane Katrina destroyed core communications 

systems throughout the Gulf Coast, leaving emergency responders and 

citizens without a reliable network needed for coordination.29 Since then, 

to prevent potential loss of communication during disasters, the Red Cross 

increased the number of its disaster response communications equipment 

and prepositioned emergency communications response vehicles that had 

Global Positioning Systems. According to organization officials, the Red 

Cross prepositioned communications equipment in 51 cities across the 

country, with special attention to hurricane-prone areas. The Red Cross 

also provided some communications equipment to the Southern Baptist 

Convention for its mobile kitchens and trucks. According to Red Cross 

national office officials, the organization’s long-term goal for 

communications is to achieve interoperability among different systems 

such as landline, cellular, and radio networks. Furthermore, the Red Cross 

reported that it can communicate with FEMA and other federal agencies 

during a disaster through its participation in the national warning system 

and its use of a high-frequency radio program also used by federal 

agencies; in contrast, communication with nonfederal organizations is 

through liaisons in a facility or by e-mail or telephone. In addition to these 

Red Cross efforts, the Southern Baptist Convention enabled its ham radio 

operators throughout the country to directly access its national disaster 

operations center through a licensed radio address, began including a 

communications officer in each of its incident command teams, and 

established a standard communications skill set for all of its local 

affiliates, among other improvements. Local Salvation Army units also 

reported upgrading their communications system since Katrina. In 

Washington, D.C., The Salvation Army began developing an in-house 

communications system in the event that cellular and satellite 

communications networks are down, and in Miami, The Salvation Army 

equipped its canteens with Global Positioning Systems to help disaster 

relief teams pinpoint locations if street signs are missing due to a disaster.

In addition, Catholic Charities in Miami purchased new communications 

trailers with portable laptop computer stations, Internet access, a 

generator, and satellite access, according to a Catholic Charities official. 

Changes to Strengthen 

Communications Systems 

 29The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

(Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

Page 34 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Although initial assessments do not yet fully capture the collective 

capabilities of major voluntary organizations, the evidence suggests that 

without government and other assistance, a worst-case large-scale disaster 

would overwhelm voluntary organizations’ current mass care capabilities 

in the metropolitan areas we visited. The federal government and 

voluntary organizations have started to identify sheltering and feeding

capabilities. However, at this point most existing assessments are locally 

or regionally based and do not provide a full picture of the nationwide 

capabilities of these organizations that could augment local capabilities. 

Furthermore, attempts to develop comprehensive assessments are 

hindered by the lack of standard terms and measures in the field of mass 

care. In the four metro areas we visited, the American Red Cross, The 

Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention were able to provide 

information on their local sheltering and feeding resources, and in largescale disasters their substantial nationwide resources could be brought to

bear in an affected area. Nevertheless, the estimated need for sheltering 

and feeding in a worst-case large-scale disaster—-such as a Katrina-level 

event—would overwhelm these voluntary organizations. We also found, 

however, that many local and state governments in the areas we visited, as

well as the federal government, are planning to use government employees 

and private sector resources to help address such extensive needs. Red 

Cross and FEMA officials also told us that in a catastrophic situation, 

assistance will likely be provided from many sources, including the 

general public, as well as the private and nonprofit sectors, that is not part

of any prepared or planned response.

Because the assessment of capabilities among multiple organizations 

nationwide is an emerging effort—largely post-Katrina—it does not yet 

allow for a systematic understanding of the mass care capabilities that 

voluntary organizations can bring to bear to address large-scale disasters 

in the four metropolitan areas in our review. Assessments help 

organizations identify the resources and capabilities they have as well as 

potential gaps. To assess capabilities in such disasters in any metro area, it 

is necessary to have information not only on an organization’s local 

capabilities but also its regional and nationwide capabilities.30 Under this 

scalable approach—which is a cornerstone of the Framework and the 

Catastrophic Supplement as well—local voluntary organizations generally

ramp up their capabilities to respond to large-scale disasters, a process 

that is shown in figure 4. Voluntary organizations are generally able to

Although Early 

Assessments Are 

Limited, a Worst-Case 

Large-Scale Disaster 

Would Likely 

Overwhelm the 

Current Ability of 

Major Voluntary 

Organizations to 

Provide Mass Care in 

Four Metro Locations 

without Government 

and Other Assistance 

Capabilities Assessment 

for Mass Care Is an 

Emerging Effort That Has 

Yet to Fully Include 

Voluntary Organizations 

 30This is particularly important for catastrophic disasters that would trigger a proactive 

national federal response under the Catastrophic Incident Supplement. 

Page 35 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
handle smaller disasters using locally or regionally based capabilities, but

in a large-scale disaster their nationwide capabilities can be brought to 

bear in an affected area. While our focus in this review is on voluntary 

organizations’ resources and capabilities, governments at all levels also 

play a role in addressing mass care needs in large-scale disasters. 

Figure 4: Voluntary Organizations’ Scaling Up Process in Large-Scale Disasters 

Increasing scale of response

Increasing scale of disaster

Category 3

hurricane Significant 

tornadoes

Request for 

assistance

House fire

Local response

Regional response

National response

Request for 

assistance

Source: GAO analysis; images; Art Explosion.

In anticipation of potential disasters, the federal government and the Red 

Cross have separately started to assess sheltering and feeding capabilities, 

but these assessments involve data with different purposes, geographic 

scope, and disaster scenarios. Consequently they do not yet generate 

detailed information for a comprehensive picture of the capabilities of the 

voluntary organizations in our review. (See table 5.) 

Page 36 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Table 5: Current and Ongoing Assessments of Disaster Response Capabilities by FEMA and the Red Cross 

Source Title Goal or purpose 

Geographic

scope

Type(s) of 

disasters Date completed Limitations

FEMA/ DHS Gap Analysis 

Program (GAP) 

To identify states’ 

existing disaster 

capability and 

potential gaps in

seven critical 

areas: sheltering, 

debris removal,

evacuation, 

temporary 

housing, medical 

needs, commodity 

distribution, and 

fuel availability. 

Once gaps are

identified, FEMA 

works with the 

states to address 

any deficiencies. 

Phase I: 21 

hurricane-prone 

states and 

territories along 

the Eastern and

Gulf Coasts 

Phase II: 

Expanding to all 

states 

Phase I: Category 

III Hurricane 

Phase II: States 

can choose the 

types of disasters 

they want to use 

for the 

assessment. 

Phase I: 2007 

Phase II: 2009 

(tentative) 

Does not assess 

feeding 

capabilities 

outside of shelters 

Does not 

incorporate data 

from voluntary 

organizations if

they do not have 

formal agreements 

with state or local 

governments 

FEMA/ DHS 

American 

Red Cross 

National Shelter

Systema

 

To provide 

information using 

a Web-based 

system on shelter 

facilities, capacity, 

and population

counts. 

Nationwide Not applicable Red Cross version 

was released in

2006. New FEMA 

version scheduled 

for release in 2008 

Primarily includes 

data on shelters 

operated by the 

Red Cross, and

states have 

recently entered 

new data on nonRed Cross 

shelters 

American 

Red Cross 

Risk-Based 

Capacity 

Building 

Initiative 

To address 

catastrophic risks 

by identifying 

existing 

capabilities and 

creating a 

response strategy 

to address the 

unique 

requirements of

selected 

catastrophic 

events. 

Six high-risk areas 

of the countryb

 

The most likely, 

worst-case 

catastrophic 

disaster scenario 

for each area. 

2007 Limited to six highrisk areas of the 

country 

Page 37 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Source Title Goal or purpose 

Geographic

scope

Type(s) of 

disasters Date completed Limitations

American 

Red Cross 

Chapter 

Disaster 

Readiness 

Assessments 

To gain a clear

understanding of 

each chapter’s 

ability to respond 

and deliver 

services should a 

disaster occur 

within its 

jurisdiction. 

All Red Cross 

chapters 

The assessment 

determines the

chapter’s 

readiness to 

respond to 

disasters of 

different 

magnitudes 

ranging from a 10 

family event to a 

major disaster.c

Conducted 

annually starting in 

2003. Most recent 

assessment was 

in spring 2007.

Looks at each 

chapter 

individually rather 

than assessing the 

organization as a 

whole 

Source: GAO analysis 

a

An initial shelter system that is owned and was paid for by the Red Cross, with FEMA as a partner 

agency, is currently operational. The federal National Shelter System—operated by FEMA in 

partnership with the Red Cross— is owned and housed at FEMA and scheduled for release in August 

2008. When completed, the plan is for the Red Cross to enter and verify data for Red Cross shelters, 

and for states to enter and verify data for all other shelters. 

b

The six areas were Southern California, National Capital Region, New York City Metropolitan Area, 

Gulf Coast, California Bay Area, and Southeast Coast. 

c

In its Chapter Readiness Assessments, the Red Cross defines a major disaster as the largest, most

likely event that could have an impact on the chapter. Each chapter is expected to meet with local 

emergency managers to discuss the largest most likely event. The minimum service delivery 

requirements for this scenario is for a chapter to be able to operate two shelters with a total of 200 

residents, prepare and serve 1,000 meals per day, and staff one government liaison office. 

FEMA is currently spearheading two initiatives that to some extent 

address the mass care capabilities of voluntary organizations in our 

review. FEMA’s Gap Analysis Program, which has so far looked at state 

capabilities in 21 hurricane-prone states and territories, has begun to take 

stock of some voluntary organizations’ capabilities. According to FEMA 

officials, states incorporated sheltering data from organizations with 

which they have formal agreements. In the four metro areas we visited, 

however, we found that—unlike the Red Cross—The Salvation Army and 

the Southern Baptist Convention did not generally have formal agreements 

with the state or local government.31 For this reason, it is unlikely that their 

resources have been included in this first phase, according to FEMA 

officials.32 Also, this initial phase of analysis did not assess feeding 

 31The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention primarily provide feeding 

services, but The Salvation Army also has some shelter facilities it can operate during largescale disasters, according to officials we met. 

32Red Cross officials said they have provided states with capabilities data that included 

some information from other voluntary organizations, but it is not known the extent to

which states incorporated these data into their GAP assessments. 

Page 38 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
capabilities outside of those available in shelters, a key facet of mass care 

for which voluntary organizations have significant resources.33 Another 

form of assessment under way through FEMA and the Red Cross—the 

National Shelter System database—which collects information on shelter 

facilities and capacities nationwide—largely consists of shelters operated 

by the Red Cross, and states have recently entered new data on non-Red 

Cross shelters as well.34 While The Salvation Army and other voluntary 

spokesmen told us they have shelters at recreation centers and other sites 

that are not listed in this database, FEMA officials told us the accuracy of 

the shelter data is contingent upon states reporting information into the 

system and updating it frequently. FEMA has offered to have its staff help 

states include non-Red Cross shelter data in the database and has also 

provided or facilitated National Shelter System training in 26 states and 3 

territories. As of July 2008, shelters operated by the Red Cross account for 

about 90 percent of the shelters listed, and according to FEMA officials, 47 

states and 3 territories have entered non-Red Cross shelter data into the 

database. In commenting on the draft report, FEMA noted that in addition

to these assessments, the agency is conducting catastrophic planning 

efforts to help some states develop sheltering plans for responding to 

certain disaster scenarios. For example, the states involved in planning 

efforts for the New Madrid earthquake are developing plans to protect and 

assist their impacted populations and identifying ways to augment the 

resources provided by voluntary organizations and the federal

government.

Of the voluntary organizations in our review, the Red Cross is the only one

that has, to date, undertaken self-assessments of its capabilities. First, its 

annual readiness assessments of individual local chapters provide an

overview of locally based capabilities for disasters of various scales and 

identify shortfalls in equipment and personnel for each chapter. Second, 

the Red Cross has also conducted comprehensive assessments of its 

 33The GAP analysis began by having states and territories identify existing disaster 

capabilities and potential gaps in seven critical areas: sheltering, debris removal,

evacuation, temporary housing, medical needs, commodity distribution, and fuel 

availability. Since the first phase focused on hurricane- prone areas of the country, it did 

not include one of the four locations in our review — the Los Angeles metro area—in the

analysis. 

34An initial shelter system that is owned and was paid for by the Red Cross, with FEMA as a 

partner agency, is currently operational. However, FEMA has developed a federal National 

Shelter System that will be owned and housed at FEMA and is scheduled for release in 

August 2008. When the federal shelter system is completed, the plan is for Red Cross to 

enter and verify data for Red Cross shelters, and for states to enter and verify data for all 

other shelters. See GAO-08-369. 

Page 39 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
sheltering and feeding capabilities in six high-risk areas of the country as 

part of its capacity-building initiative for those areas. Focusing on the most 

likely worst-case catastrophic disaster scenario for each area, this 

initiative reflects the Red Cross’s primary means of addressing its 

responsibilities under the federal Catastrophic Supplement. Red Cross 

officials said that while they incorporated data from The Salvation Army 

and the Southern Baptist Convention into this assessment, many of their 

other partner organizations were unable to provide the Red Cross with 

such information. The Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention 

officials with whom we spoke said they have not yet assessed their 

organizations’ nationwide feeding capabilities, although they were able to 

provide us with data on the total number of mobile kitchens and other 

types of equipment they have across the country.

Also underlying the problem of limited data on voluntary organizations is 

the lack of standard terminology and measures for characterizing mass 

care resources. For example, voluntary organizations do not uniformly use 

standard classifications for their mobile kitchens. This makes it difficult to 

quickly assess total capacity when dozens of mobile kitchens from 

different organizations arrive at a disaster site or when trying to assess 

capabilities. While DHS requires all federal departments and agencies to 

adopt standard descriptions and measures—a process defined in NIMS as 

resource typing—voluntary organizations are not generally required to 

inventory their assets according to these standards. Red Cross officials 

report that their organization does follow these standards, but The 

Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention officials said their 

organizations currently do not, although the latter has taken steps to do 

so. Specifically, national Southern Baptist officials said they are working 

with the Red Cross and The Salvation Army to standardize their mobile 

kitchen classifications using NIMS resource definitions. We also found 

indications of change at the local level in California with regard to The 

Salvation Army. Officials there told us they used NIMS resource typing to 

categorize the organization’s mobile kitchens in the state and that they 

have provided these data to California state officials. 

Meanwhile, FEMA is also working with NVOAD to standardize more ESF-6 

service terms, in accordance with its responsibilities under the PostKatrina Reform Act.35 This initiative currently includes terms and 

 35The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to collaborate with state, local, and tribal 

governments, and organizations that represent emergency response providers on

developing standards for deployment capabilities, including typing of resources likely 

needed in disasters. Pub. L.. No. 109-295, §611(13). 

Page 40 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
definitions for some mass care services such as shelter management and 

mobile kitchens.36 However, FEMA officials said it may be several years 

before additional standard terms and measures are fully integrated into 

disaster operations. 

While Voluntary 

Organizations’ Resources 

Are Substantial, Their 

Sheltering and Feeding 

Capabilities Would Likely 

Fall Short of Estimated 

Needs in a Worst-Case 

Large-Scale Disaster 

without Government and 

Other Assistance 

Although systematic assessments of mass care capabilities are limited, it is 

evident that in large-scale, especially worst-case, catastrophic disasters, 

the three mass care voluntary organizations would not likely be able to 

fulfill the need for sheltering and feeding in the four metropolitan areas in

our review without government and other assistance, according to 

voluntary organization officials we interviewed as well as our review of 

federal and other data. Red Cross officials, as well as some officials from 

other organizations we visited, generally agreed that they do not have

sufficient capabilities to single-handedly meet all of the potential 

sheltering and feeding needs in some catastrophic disasters. While the 

mass care resources of these voluntary organizations are substantial, both 

locally and nationally, our analysis indicates a likely shortage of both 

personnel and assets. Anticipating such shortages, the voluntary 

organizations we spoke with are making efforts to train additional 

personnel. According to local, state, and federal government officials we 

spoke with, government agencies—which play key roles in disaster 

response—told us that they were planning to use government employees 

and private sector resources in such disasters in addition to the resources 

of voluntary organizations. Red Cross and FEMA officials also told us that 

in a catastrophic situation, assistance will likely be provided from many 

sources, including the general public, as well as the private and nonprofit 

sectors, that are not part of any prepared or planned response. 

Within the past few years, DHS, the Red Cross, and others have developed 

estimates of the magnitude of mass care services that might be needed to 

respond to worst-case catastrophic disasters, such as various kinds of 

terrorist attacks or a hurricane on the scale of Katrina or greater. The 

estimates vary according to the type, magnitude, and location of such 

Federal and Other Estimates of

Needs in Worst-Case LargeScale Disasters 

 36FEMA has so far developed definitions for 120 kinds of resources used in disaster 

response, but only a few of these are related to mass care. 

Page 41 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Page 42 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

disasters and are necessarily characterized by uncertainties.37 (See table 

6.) 

Table 6: Examples of Federal and Other Estimates of the Magnitude of Mass Care Needs in Worst-Case Large-Scale Disasters 

Estimated needs 

Source Methodology Geographic scope Type(s) of disasters 

Sheltering 

(people) Feeding 

Department of 

Homeland 

Security 

—Target 

Capabilities List 

(September 2007) 

The estimates were 

developed by DHS 

after an in-depth 

analysis of the 

Major Earthquake 

scenario in the 

National Planning 

Scenarios.a

A major metropolitan 

area with a 

population of 

approximately 10 

million people 

7.2-magnitude earthquake with a 

subsequent 8.0 earthquake 

(Richter scale) 

 313,000 1.5 million 

meals per 

day 

American Red 

Cross 

—Risk-Based 

Capacity Building 

Initiative (July 

2007) 

Red Cross worked 

with state and local 

officials and other 

disaster experts to 

develop worst-case 

disaster scenarios 

in six high-risk 

areas of the 

country. 

Six high-risk areas of 

the county, 

encompassing the 

four metropolitan 

areas in our study: 

Southern California 

National Capital 

Region 

New York City metro 

area 

Gulf Coast 

California Bay area 

Southeast Coast 

Southern California: 7.2 to 7.5 

magnitude earthquake 

Washington, D.C., region: 

chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, or major explosion terrorist 

attack 

New York metropolitan area: 

category III/IV hurricane 

Gulf Coast: Category V hurricane 

 564,113

300,000

605,000c 

328,646d 

2.5 million 

people will 

need 

feeding 

—b 

4 million 

people will 

need 

feedingc 

657,292 

meals per 

dayd

 37Red Cross officials emphasized to us that estimating needs for scenarios is very 

speculative because of the unknowns and varying aspects of mass care needs. For 

example, one official noted that pre-event evacuation shelter needs are different from 

regular shelter needs for people whose homes are destroyed. He also noted that shelter 

needs can follow different trajectories after some types of disaster such as an earthquake, 

not reaching maximum levels until several days after an initial impact. 
Page 43 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Estimated needs 

Source Methodology Geographic scope Type(s) of disasters 

Sheltering 

(people) Feeding 

Florida Division of 

Emergency 

Managemente

—Hurricane Ono 

planning project 

(November 2007) 

The estimates were 

developed by a 

team of state and 

federal subject 

matter experts for 

use at a 

catastrophic 

planning workshop. 

South Florida Category V hurricane 885,000 3 million 

meals per 

day 

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

The National Planning Scenarios were developed by the Homeland Security Council—in partnership 

with DHS; other federal departments and agencies; and state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments—to illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of a range of major events. 

The 15 scenarios include terrorist attacks and major disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 

b

The Red Cross’s assessment for a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or major explosion 

terrorist attack in the Washington, D.C., region does not include an estimate for the number of people 

needing feeding services. 

c

Estimates are specifically for New York, New York. 

d

Estimates are specifically for Florida. 

e

The Hurricane Ono planning project is a joint initiative by FEMA and the state of Florida. It is part of 

the Florida catastrophic planning project that started in the fall of 2006.These estimates provide the 

basis for analyzing the ability of voluntary organizations— particularly the Red Cross—to provide 

sheltering and feeding in response to large-scale, especially catastrophic disasters. In a catastrophic 

disaster, government agencies are expected to work together with voluntary organizations and the 

private sector to collectively meet the substantial need for mass sheltering and feeding, according to 

the National Framework and Catastrophic Supplement. 

Although sheltering resources are substantial, in a worst-case large-scale 

disaster, the need for sheltering would likely exceed voluntary 

organizations’ current sheltering capabilities in most metro areas in our 

study, according to government and Red Cross estimates of needs. The 

preponderance of shelters for which data are available are operated by the 

Red Cross in schools, churches, community centers, and other facilities 

that meet structural standards, but The Salvation Army and other 

organizations also operate a small number of sheltering facilities as well. 

The Red Cross does not own these shelter facilities, but it either manages 

the shelters with its own personnel and supplies under agreement with the 

owners or works with its partner organizations and others to help them 

manage shelters. At the national level, the Red Cross has identified 50,000 

potential shelter facilities across the country, as noted in the National 

Shelter System database. In addition, the Red Cross has enough sheltering 

supplies, such as cots and blankets, to support up to 500,000 people in 

Sheltering Resources and 

Capabilities 
shelters nationwide.38 However, while disaster victims can be evacuated to 

shelters across the country if necessary, as happened after Katrina, Red 

Cross officials told us they prefer to shelter people locally. In the four 

metro areas we visited, the Red Cross has identified shelter facilities and 

their maximum or potential capacities, as shown in table 7. 

Table 7: Shelters Operated by the American Red Cross and Potential Capacity in

Four Metropolitan Areas 

Washington, 

D.C.

New York, 

N.Y. 

Los Angeles,

Calif.

Miami, 

Fla.

Number of shelter 

facilities 386 623 341 65

Total bed space 

capacity 13,000 311,500a

84,000 38,000

Source: Data provided by the Red Cross. 

Note: The actual number of people the Red Cross can shelter in these facilities after a large-scale 

disaster would be affected by such things as the location and scope of the disaster-impacted area, 

the availability of trained personnel, the condition of utilities and other infrastructure, and the 

availability of transportation. 

a During the initial evacuation phase of the response, these same shelters would be operated by the 

New York City government and would have the capacity to shelter more than 600,000 people. The

evacuation shelters have higher capacities because they provide fewer services and need less space

per person than the shelters that are operated by the Red Cross that provide more comprehensive 

services. 

Despite local and nationally available resources, the kinds of large-scale

disasters for which estimates of need exist would greatly tax and exceed 

the Red Cross’s ability to provide sheltering. For example, for a major 

earthquake in a metropolitan area, DHS estimates that 313,000 people

would need shelter,39 but in Los Angeles—a city prone to earthquakes—

Red Cross officials told us they are capable of sheltering 84,000 people 

locally under optimal conditions. The Red Cross’s own analyses of other 

types of worst-case disaster scenarios also identified shortages in 

 38The Red Cross estimated that 500,000 people would need shelters in a worst-case 

scenario, or approximately three times the highest number of people sheltered during a 

single night during the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

39The catastrophic estimate is not for a specific geographic location but is based on an

earthquake along a fault zone in a major metropolitan area with a population of

approximately 10 million people, which is about the population of Los Angeles County.

This estimate is from DHS’s Target Capabilities List (September 2007). A key element of the 

DHS National Preparedness Guidelines, the Target Capabilities List defines specific 

capabilities that communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should 

collectively possess in order to respond effectively to disasters. 

Page 44 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
sheltering capacity in New York and Washington, D.C., as well.40 For 

example, for a nuclear terrorist attack in Washington, D.C., the Red Cross 

estimates that 150,000 people would need sheltering in the National 

Capital Region and identified a gap of over 100,000 shelter spaces after 

accounting for existing capabilities. 

The ability to build or strengthen sheltering capabilities depends on 

several elements, including the availability of trained personnel and 

supplies, the condition of shelter facilities, and the particular disaster 

scenario and location, among other things. Chief among these constraints, 

according to national and local Red Cross officials, is the shortage of 

trained volunteers. Red Cross officials said there are 17,000 volunteers and 

staff in the Red Cross’s national disaster services human resources 

program that have received extensive training in sheltering as of May 2008 

and an additional 16,000 Red Cross workers trained in mass care that can 

be deployed across the country.41 However, local chapters are still 

expected to be self-sufficient for up to 5 days after a large-scale disaster 

occurs, while staff and volunteers are being mobilized nationwide. 

According to the Red Cross’s annual chapter assessments, personnel 

shortages limit the ability of all four chapters we visited to manage the 

local response beyond certain levels. In New York City, Red Cross officials 

noted that it has identified enough shelters to optimally accommodate 

more than 300,000 people, but that it has only enough personnel locally to 

simultaneously operate 25 shelters, for a total sheltering capability of 

12,500 people. The Red Cross is working with its local chapters to develop 

action plans to address personnel shortages. For example, in New York, 

the Red Cross has set a goal of recruiting 10,000 additional volunteers—in 

addition to the 2,000 it had as of December 2007 to operate shelters—and 

plans to attract 850 new volunteers each quarter. In addition, supply chain

and warehousing challenges affect the ability to maximize sheltering 

capabilities. According to Red Cross officials, it is not necessary to 

maintain large inventories of some supplies, such as blankets, if they can

be quickly and easily purchased. However, obtaining other supplies such 

as cots requires a long lead time since they may need to be shipped from 

as far away as China, a fact that can be particularly problematic in no-

 40The Red Cross’s risk-based capacity-building initiative assessment of a category V 

hurricane in the Gulf Coast identified a surplus of sheltering capacity in all of Florida of 

approximately 113,000 bed spaces over estimated needs. However, a Red Cross official said 

that since this initiative was state focused, it did not specifically assess sheltering capacity 

in the Miami metropolitan area. 

41Red Cross officials also said that more volunteers could be trained and deployed after a

disaster.

Page 45 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
notice events such as major earthquakes. While purchasing supplies as 

needed can reduce warehousing costs, this approach can also be affected 

by potential disruptions in the global supply chain, according to officials 

we spoke with. 

In DHS’s Catastrophic Incident Supplement, an underlying assumption is 

that substantial numbers of trained mass care specialists and managers 

will be required for an extended period of time to sustain mass care 

sheltering and feeding activities after a catastrophic disaster. In 

recognition of the need to increase the number of trained personnel to 

staff existing shelters, state and local governments in the four 

metropolitan areas we visited told us they are planning to train and use 

government employees to staff shelters in such large-scale disasters. For 

example, in New York City, the Office of Emergency Management is 

preparing to use trained city government employees and supplies to 

provide basic sheltering care for up to 600,000 residents in evacuation 

shelters. The city-run evacuation shelters would be located at schools for 

the first few days before and after a catastrophic hurricane. After this 

initial emergency plan is implemented, the city expects the Red Cross to 

step in and provide more comprehensive sheltering services to people who 

cannot return to their homes.42 As Red Cross officials told us, the New 

York City government is the only local organization with the potential 

manpower to staff all the available shelters, but the Red Cross will also 

provide additional personnel to help operate some of the city’s evacuation

shelters and special medical needs shelters. As of November 2007, 22,000 

New York City employees had received shelter training through a local 

university, with some additional training from the Red Cross. Similarly, in 

Los Angeles, as of January 2008, approximately 1,400 county employees 

had been trained in shelter management so far, and the Red Cross has set 

a goal to train 60,000 of the county’s 90,000 employees. In addition, state 

governments have resources, equipment, and trained personnel that can 

be mobilized to provide mass care, according to state and FEMA officials. 

States can also request additional resources from neighboring states 

through their mutual aid agreements. According to Red Cross and FEMA 

officials, in a catastrophic disaster, sheltering assistance would likely be

provided from many sources, such as churches and other community 

 42The Red Cross does not currently have the capability to shelter all the people that would 

be unable to return to their homes, according to the Red Cross’s own analysis. The New 

York City government plans to return the evacuation shelters, which include schools and

other city-owned facilities, to their normal functions as soon as possible after a disaster,

but would extend the use of these facilities for sheltering if needed. The number of people

needing comprehensive sheltering services is expected to be smaller than the 600,000 who 

may need sheltering during the evacuation phase of a catastrophic hurricane. 

Page 46 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
organizations, as occurred in the aftermath of the Katrina hurricanes, and 

they also noted that such assistance was not part of any prepared or 

planned response. 

Although voluntary organizations’ feeding resources are also substantial, 

the feeding needs in a worst-case large-scale disaster would likely exceed

the voluntary organizations’ current feeding capabilities for most metro 

areas in our review, according to government and Red Cross estimates of 

needs. In their feeding operations, voluntary organizations make use of 

mobile kitchens or canteens to offer hot meals and sandwiches, 

prepackaged meals known as meals-ready-to-eat (MRE), and hot and cold

meals prepared by contracted private vendors.43 The Red Cross, The 

Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention have locally based 

resources for feeding disaster victims in the four metro areas we visited. 

For example, The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention 

have mobile kitchens stationed in close proximity to each of the four 

metro areas we visited. Some of these mobile kitchens are capable of 

producing up to 25,000 meals per day. The Red Cross also has feeding 

resources in these metro areas including prepackaged meals, vehicles 

equipped to deliver food, and contracts with local vendors to prepare 

meals. In addition, by mobilizing nationwide resources, such as mobile 

kitchens and prepackaged meals, the Red Cross reports that it currently 

has the capability, together with the Southern Baptist Convention, to 

provide about 1 million meals per day—about the maximum number of 

meals served per day during Katrina. Across the country, The Salvation

Army has 697 mobile kitchens and other specialized vehicles and the 

Southern Baptist Convention has 117 mobile kitchens that can be 

dispatched to disaster sites, according to organization officials.44

Furthermore, Red Cross officials also said they have 6 million 

prepackaged meals stockpiled in warehouses across the country that can

be quickly distributed in the first few days after a disaster, before mobile 

kitchens are fully deployed to the affected area. Red Cross officials also 

said that they can tap into additional food sources, such as catering 

contracts with food service providers, during prolonged response efforts. 

Feeding Resources and 

Capabilities 

 43Mobile kitchens, also known as canteens, are essentially kitchens on wheels that can 

prepare and serve two to three hot meals per day. For example, a typical Salvation Army 

mobile kitchen has a griddle, four burner stove top, oven, microwave, refrigerator/freezer,

and generator.

44The Salvation Army also has buildings located across the country that can be used during 

disasters as feeding sites and distribution centers. 

Page 47 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Despite these substantial resources nationwide, in a worst-case large-scale 

disaster, feeding needs would still greatly exceed the current capabilities 

of these voluntary organizations, according to government and Red Cross 

estimates of needs under different scenarios. For example, DHS estimates 

that feeding victims of a major earthquake would require approximately 

1.5 million meals per day, but this need is considerably greater than the 1 

million meals per day currently possible, leaving a shortfall of about 

500,000 meals per day.45 According to state government estimates, the gap 

is even larger for other types of disaster scenarios. For example, according 

to Florida state estimates, a category IV hurricane could produce the need

for 3 million meals per day, which is considerably greater than the 1 

million meals per day that the Red Cross can provide. In addition, a 

nuclear terrorist attack in Washington, D.C., would require 300,000 meals 

per day more than the Red Cross’s current capabilities allow, according to 

the Red Cross’s internal assessments.

The ability to build or strengthen feeding capabilities depends on the 

availability of trained personnel, equipment, and supplies. As with 

sheltering, some voluntary organization officials told us that the key 

constraint is the limited availability of trained personnel. Feeding services 

are a labor-intensive process. For example, Southern Baptist Convention 

officials said it takes a team of 50 trained people to operate a large mobile 

kitchen, and an additional 50 people are needed every 4 days because 

teams are rotated in and out of disaster sites. Southern Baptist Convention

officials said that although they have 75,000 trained volunteers in their 

organization, there are still not enough trained volunteers, especially 

experienced team leaders. They said the shortage of experienced team 

leaders is particularly challenging because mobile kitchens cannot be 

deployed without a team leader. The voluntary organizations are 

addressing these personnel shortages by promoting training programs for 

new staff and volunteers and also utilizing additional unaffiliated, 

untrained volunteers who join during response efforts. For example, 

according to The Salvation Army, its national disaster training program 

has trained more than 16,000 personnel throughout the United States since 

2005. In addition, supply disruptions are also a major concern in largescale disasters because mobile kitchens and other feeding units need to be

restocked with food and supplies in order to continue providing meals. 

Red Cross officials told us they are in the process of expanding their food

supply by contracting with national vendors to provide additional meals 

during disasters. In addition, as previously mentioned, the Southern 

 45This DHS estimate of feeding needs is from the Target Capabilities List (September 2007). 

Page 48 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Baptist Convention faced problems resupplying its mobile kitchens during 

the response to Hurricane Katrina and has since taken steps to develop a 

supply chain management system with the Red Cross and The Salvation 

Army to minimize future logistical problems. 

In the four metro areas we visited, some state and local government 

officials we met with told us they are planning to fill these gaps in feeding 

services by contracting with private sector providers. In Florida, the state

is planning to use private sector contractors to fill gaps in feeding services 

in preparation for a catastrophic hurricane. A Florida state official said 

obtaining and distributing the estimated 3 million meals per day that 

would be needed is a huge logistical challenge that would require the state 

to use 20 to 40 private vendors. In Washington, D.C., the emergency 

management officials said they are also establishing open contracts with 

private sector providers for additional prepackaged meals and other food

supplies. 

As a result of FEMA’s new responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act and 

its new role as the primary agency for mass care under the National 

Framework, FEMA officials have told us that the agency was working to 

identify additional resources for situations in which the mass care 

capabilities of government and voluntary organizations are exceeded. 46

FEMA officials said that FEMA has developed contracts with private 

companies for mass care resources for situations in which the needs 

exceed federal capabilities. After Katrina, FEMA made four 

noncompetitive awards to companies for housing services. Since then,

contracts for housing services have been let through a competitive process 

and broadened in scope so that if a disaster struck now they could also 

include facility assessment for shelters, facility rehabilitation—including 

making facilities accessible—feeding, security, and staffing shelters. 

According to the FEMA official in charge of these contracts, the contracts 

gave the federal government the option of purchasing the resources it 

needs in response to disasters. FEMA officials said, however, that they 

prefer using federal resources whenever possible because private sector 

contract services are more expensive than federal resources. FEMA also 

has a mass care unit that is responsible for coordinating ESF-6 partner 

agency activities and assessing state and local government shelter 

shortfalls. According to FEMA, the members of the mass care unit based 

in Washington, D.C., are composed of subject matter experts trained in 

various mass care operations, including sheltering. Mass care teams have

Federal Government’s 

Supplementary Efforts 

 46See GAO-08-369. 

Page 49 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
been deployed to assist with sheltering operations, such as the California 

wildfires of 2007 and the Iowa floods of 2008. FEMA regional offices have 

also begun to hire staff dedicated to mass care.

Shortages in trained personnel, identifying and dedicating financial 

resources for preparedness activities, and strengthening connections with 

government agencies continue to challenge the voluntary organizations in 

our study. Voluntary organizations in our review continue to face 

shortages in trained staff to work on preparing for future disasters, among 

other things, and volunteers to help provide mass care services, even 

though voluntary organizations and government agencies we met with 

made efforts to train additional personnel. Identifying and dedicating 

financial resources for disaster planning and preparedness become 

increasingly difficult as voluntary organizations also strive to meet 

competing demands. In addition, the level of involvement and interaction 

of voluntary organizations in disaster planning and coordination with 

government agencies is an ongoing challenge, even for the American Red 

Cross, which has recently changed the way it works with FEMA and state 

governments. 

The most commonly cited concern that voluntary organizations have 

about their capabilities is the shortage of trained staff or volunteers, 

particularly for disaster planning and preparedness, according to voluntary 

organization officials. State and local governments are primarily 

responsible for preparing their communities to manage disasters locally—

through planning and coordination with other government agencies, 

voluntary organizations, and the private sector. However, voluntary 

organization officials we met with told us it was difficult for them to 

devote staff to disaster planning, preparedness activities, and

coordination. At the national level, the Southern Baptist Convention and 

Catholic Charities USA maintained small staffs of one or two people that 

work on disaster preparedness and coordination, which they said made 

preparedness and coordination for large-scale disasters challenging. At the

local level, we also heard that staff who were responsible for disaster 

planning for their organization had multiple roles and responsibilities, 

including coordinating with others involved in disaster response as well as 

daily responsibilities in other areas. This was particularly an issue for the 

faith-based organizations, such as The Salvation Army and the Southern 

Baptist Convention, for whom disaster response, while important, is 

generally ancillary to their primary mission. For example, in Florida the 

state Southern Baptist Convention has a designated staff member solely 

focused on disaster relief and recovery, but other state Southern Baptist 

Conventions expect disaster staff to split their time among other 

Shortages in 

Personnel, 

Preparedness 

Funding, and 

Connections to 

Government Remain a 

Challenge 

Personnel Shortages 

Continue to Be a Common 

Concern 

Page 50 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
responsibilities, such as managing the men’s ministry, and generally do not 

have the time or ability to interact with the state emergency management 

agency, according to an official from the Florida Southern Baptist 

Convention. Similarly, a Salvation Army official in Miami commented that 

The Salvation Army could do more if they had a dedicated liaison 

employee to help with their local government responsibilities, including 

coordinating the provision of mass care services, which the organization 

provides in agreement with the local government. According to a national 

official from Catholic Charities USA, local Catholic Charities that provide 

disaster services usually have one employee to handle the disaster training 

and response operation, in addition to other responsibilities. While it 

would be ideal for all local Catholic Charities to have at least two or three 

employees trained in disaster response, she said, the organization 

currently does not have resources for this training. In New York and Los 

Angeles, officials from Catholic Charities confirmed that the lack of 

personnel capable of responding to disasters is an ongoing challenge for 

their organization. 

These shortages in trained staff affected the ability of some local voluntary 

organizations and VOADs we met with to develop and update business 

continuity and disaster response plans, according to officials from these 

organizations.

47 In Los Angeles, an official from Catholic Charities told us 

that it does not have a disaster or continuity-of-operations plan tailored to

the organization’s needs, because it does not have dedicated disaster staff 

to develop such plans. Voluntary organization officials in Miami 

emphasized the importance of having such continuity plans, because after 

Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma struck Florida in 2005, most of the local

voluntary organizations in the area were unable to provide services due to

damage from the storm. In addition, organizations and VOADs we visited 

said that they struggle to update their disaster response plans. For 

instance, in Los Angeles, an official from the local VOAD told us that the 

organization’s disaster response plan needed to be updated, but that the 

VOAD has not addressed this need because of staffing limitations. This 

official also told us the VOAD was planning to hire two full-time staff 

 47Business and continuity-of-operations plans are important for maintaining essential 

services, since a large-scale disaster could disrupt operations by damaging shelter facilities, 

making equipment inaccessible, and displacing volunteers and staff. 

Page 51 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
sometime in 2008 using federal pandemic influenza funds received through 

the county public health department.48

In addition, as mentioned earlier, voluntary organization officials both 

nationally and locally told us that they face a shortage of trained 

volunteers, which limits their ability to provide sheltering and feeding in 

large-scale, and especially catastrophic disasters. This continues to be an

ongoing concern despite the efforts of voluntary organizations and 

government agencies to build a cadre of trained personnel. 

Voluntary Organizations 

Face Difficulties in 

Identifying and Dedicating 

Funding for Disaster 

Preparedness and Capacity 

Building 

Identifying and dedicating funding for disaster preparedness is a challenge 

for voluntary organizations in light of competing priorities, such as 

meeting the immediate needs of disaster survivors. Officials from 

voluntary organizations in our review told us that they typically raised 

funds immediately following a disaster to directly provide services, rather 

than for disaster preparedness—or, for that matter, longer-term recovery 

efforts. Although the Red Cross raised more than $2 billion to shelter, feed, 

and provide aid to disaster survivors following Katrina, the Red Cross 

recently acknowledged that it is less realistic to expect public donations to

fund its nationwide disaster capacity-building initiatives. Similarly, the 

biggest challenge for Catholic Charities USA is identifying funds for 

essential disaster training—a key aspect of preparedness, according to an 

official. At the local level, an official from Catholic Charities in New York 

noted also that incoming donations tend to focus on funding the initial 

disaster response. As we previously reported, vague language and 

narrowly focused definitions used by some voluntary organizations in their 

appeal for public donations following the September 11 attacks 

contributed to debates over how funds should be distributed, particularly 

between providing immediate cash assistance to survivors or services to 

meet short- and long-term needs.49 An indication of this continuing 

challenge is that officials from Catholic Charities in Washington, D.C., and 

New York reported that they are still working with September 11 disaster 

victims and communities, and that they struggle to raise funds for longterm recovery work in general. 

 48The Pandemic Influenza Funding program is administered by the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Funding under 

this program is intended to improve state and local capacity to prepare for and respond to

an influenza pandemic through projects such as engaging the public as part of the public 

health decision-making process and initiating collaborative planning among health care

providers to ensure the delivery of essential services during a pandemic influenza outbreak. 

49See GAO-03-259. 

Page 52 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Besides public donations, while federal grant programs could provide 

another potential source of preparedness funding for voluntary 

organizations, local voluntary organization officials told us it was difficult 

to secure funding through these programs without support from the local

government.50 Local voluntary organizations officials we met with said that 

federal funding for disaster preparedness, such as the Urban Area Security

Initiative Grant Program, could be useful in helping their organization 

strengthen their capabilities. For example, such grants could be used to 

coordinate preparedness activities with FEMA and other disaster 

responders, better enable voluntary organizations to develop continuity of

operations plans, and train staff and volunteers. However, although 

voluntary organizations are among those that play a role in the National 

Response Framework—especially in relation to ESF-6—these 

organizations received little to no federal funding through programs such 

as the Homeland Security Grant Programs, according to some local 

voluntary organization and VOAD officials we visited. Under most of these 

grants, states or local governments are the grant recipients, and other 

organizations such as police and fire departments can receive funds 

through the state or local governments. Of the local voluntary

organizations and VOADs in our study, two Red Cross chapters received 

DHS funding in recent years, according to the Red Cross. In Los Angeles, 

Red Cross officials told us that the chapter had to be sponsored and 

supported by the local government in order to receive DHS funding for 

shelter equipment and supplies. 

While the director of FEMA’s grant office told us that FEMA considered 

voluntary organizations as among the eligible subgrantees for several 

preparedness grants under the Homeland Security Grant Program, the 

grant guidance does not state this explicitly. According to fiscal year 2008

grant guidance, a state-designated administrating agency is the only entity

eligible to formally apply for these DHS funds. The state agency is required 

to obligate funds to local units of government and other designated 

recipients, but the grant guidance does not define what it means by “other

 50DHS provides states and local governments with technical assistance and funding to

enhance emergency management and homeland security. Specifically, DHS provides a

range of grant programs administered by FEMA to states and local governments for

emergency management under the Homeland Security Grant Program, which funds 

planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise activities in support of national

preparedness and response. The programs under Homeland Security Grant Program

include the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. In 

particular, the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant is awarded to some states with highthreat and high density urban areas that need planning, exercises, equipment, and training

to respond to acts of terrorism. 

Page 53 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
designated recipient.” In addition, FEMA strongly encourages the timely 

obligation of funds from local units of government to other subgrantees, as 

appropriate, but possible subgrantees are not identified. State agencies 

have considerable latitude in determining how to spend funds received 

through the grant program and which organizations to provide funds to, 

according to the FEMA grant director. However, for fiscal year 2005,

approximately two-thirds of Homeland Security Grant Program funds 

were dedicated to equipment—such as personal protective gear, chemical

and biological detection kits, and satellite phones—according to DHS, 

while 18 percent were dedicated to planning activities.51 An official from 

FEMA’s grants office told us that following the September 11 attacks, the

grant program focused on prevention and protection from terrorism 

incidents, but it has evolved since Katrina. According to this official, the

fiscal year 2008 grant guidance encourages states to work with voluntary 

organizations, particularly for evacuations and catastrophic preparedness. 

Furthermore, this official said it is possible that DHS grant funding has not 

yet trickled down to local voluntary organizations. It is possible that the

tendency of DHS funding programs to focus on equipment for prevention

and protection rather than on preparedness and planning activities could 

also shift as states and localities put equipment and systems into place and

turn to other aspects of preparedness. 

Voluntary Organizations’ 

Connections with Local 

Governments and FEMA 

Remain a Challenge 

Local VOADs can play a key role in disaster preparation and response 

through interactions with local emergency management agencies of local 

governments, although the local VOADS in the areas we visited varied in 

their ability and approach to working with local governments on disasters. 

Like NVOAD, local VOADs are not service providers. Instead, like NVOAD 

nationally, local VOADs play an important role in coordinating response 

and facilitating relationship building in the voluntary sector at the local 

level, according to government officials. Generally, most of the voluntary

organizations in the locations we visited were members of their local 

VOADs. Several local government emergency managers told us they relied 

on the local VOADs as a focal point to help them coordinate with many 

voluntary organizations during disasters. Some local VOADs in our review

met regularly and were closely connected to the local governmental 

emergency management agency—including having seats at the local

emergency operations centers. More specifically, the Red Cross was a 

 51Since 2005, DHS has produced an Annual Report on Preparedness Funding, which 

includes data on the obligation, expenditure status, and use of funds for all major federal 

preparedness grants—including non-DHS grants—awarded to states, localities, and other 

nonfederal entities. 

Page 54 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
member of the local VOADs in the areas we visited. It also directly 

coordinated with government agencies during a disaster and had a seat at

the local emergency operations center in all four locations. In New York 

and Miami, The Salvation Army units were VOAD members and had seats 

as well. Other VOADs were less active and experienced and were not as 

closely linked to governmental response. In Washington, D.C., the local 

VOAD has struggled to maintain a network and continually convene since 

its inception, according to the current VOAD Chair. In Miami, a local 

VOAD member told us that the VOAD had little experience with large-scale 

disasters, because it re-formed after Hurricane Katrina and the area has 

not experienced major hurricanes since then. In addition, one of the local 

VOADs was tied to a local ESF-6 mass care operating unit, while others 

were more closely connected to an emergency function that managed 

unaffiliated volunteers and donations. The local VOAD in Los Angeles 

worked with the local government on ESF-6, issues while the VOADs in 

Miami and Washington, D.C., coordinated with government agencies 

through managing volunteers and donations during disasters. 

Currently, NVOAD has few resources to support state and local VOADs. 

NVOAD’s executive director told us that NVOAD plans to provide state 

and local VOADS with more support using Web-based tools and guidance,

but these plans are hindered by a lack of funding to implement them. As 

we recently reported, NVOAD is limited in its ability to support its national 

voluntary organization members, and also lacks the staff or resources to 

support its affiliated state and local VOADs.52 Because of these limitations, 

we recommended that NVOAD assess members’ information needs, 

improve its communication strategies after disasters, and consider 

strategies for increasing staff support after disasters. NVOAD agreed with

this recommendation and reported that the organization is looking to 

develop communications systems that take better advantage of current 

technologies. Since our previous report was issued, NVOAD has expanded 

its staff from two to four members, some of whom are working to build 

the collective capacity of state and local VOADs and providing training and

technical assistance to state VOADs. 

At the federal level, although FEMA plays a central role in coordinating 

with voluntary organizations on mass care and other human services, its 

difficulties in coordinating activities with the voluntary sector due to 

staffing limitations were also noted in this earlier report. At the time of our 

report, FEMA only had one full-time employee in each FEMA region53—a 

 52See GAO-08-369. 

53There are 10 FEMA regional offices and each can include up to eight states. 

Page 55 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
voluntary agency liaison—to coordinate activities between voluntary 

organizations and FEMA, and FEMA liaisons did not have training to assist 

them in fully preparing for their duties. In light of FEMA’s responsibilities 

for coordinating the activities of voluntary organizations in disasters under 

the National Framework, we recommended that FEMA take additional 

actions to enhance the capabilities of FEMA liaisons in order to fulfill this 

role. FEMA agreed with our recommendation; however, it is too early to 

assess the impact of any changes to enhance liaisons’ capabilities. 

Last, because of its current budget deficit, the Red Cross faces new 

challenges in fulfilling its ESF-6 role as a support agency. The Red Cross 

noted that it is working closely with its government partners in leadership

positions to manage the transition, following its staffing reductions at 

FEMA’s regional offices and elsewhere and the subsequent realignment of 

staff responsibilities. The Red Cross reported that it will monitor the 

impact of these changes and make adjustments as needed. At the same 

time, as was previously mentioned, the Red Cross has also requested $10 

million in federal funding to cover its staffing and other responsibilities 

under the ESF-6. According to FEMA officials, FEMA funded 10 regional 

positions to replace the Red Cross mass care planner positions that were 

terminated. FEMA also said that while it is too early to assess the longterm impact of these Red Cross staffing changes, FEMA was experiencing

some hindrance to effective communications and limits on the Red Cross’s 

participation in planning at FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and field 

offices. Regarding the Red Cross strategy of relying on shared resources 

and volunteers instead of full-time dedicated staff in FEMA regional 

offices, FEMA officials noted that dedicated staff has proven to be a more

reliable source for an ongoing relationship and interaction between 

agencies. They expressed concern that the lack of dedicated staff, frequent 

rotations, and inconsistent skill level of volunteers—used instead of fulltime Red Cross staff—will hamper communications and may impede 

coordination efforts. These concerns are similar to the difficulties Red 

Cross ESF-6 staff faced during Katrina, as we noted in a previous review.54

Because the American Red Cross and other major voluntary organizations

play such a vital role in providing mass care services during large-scale Conclusions 

 54During Katrina, the Red Cross’s ESF-6 staffing strategies made it difficult for ESF-6 staff 

to develop and maintain effective working relationships with staff from other 

organizations. See GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and

the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712

(Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006). 

Page 56 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
disasters, the importance of having a realistic understanding of their 

capabilities cannot be underestimated. FEMA has taken initial steps by 

having states assess their own capabilities and gaps in several critical 

areas and has completed an initial phase of this analysis. However, this 

broad assessment effort has yet to fully include the sheltering capabilities 

of many voluntary organizations and has not yet begun to address feeding 

capabilities outside of shelters. We understand that when a large-scale 

disaster strikes, some portion of mass care services will be provided by 

local voluntary organizations that did not specifically plan or prepare to do 

so, and that their capabilities cannot be assessed in advance. However, 

without more comprehensive data from voluntary sector organizations 

that expect to play a role, the federal government will have an incomplete 

picture of the mass care resources it could draw upon as well as of the 

gaps that it must be prepared to fill in large-scale and catastrophic 

disasters. Unless national assessments more fully capture the mass care 

capabilities of key providers, questions would remain about the nation’s 

ability to shelter and feed survivors, especially in another disaster on the 

scale of Katrina. 

To the extent that local, state, and federal governments rely on voluntary 

organizations to step in and care for massive numbers of affected people, 

the challenges these organizations face in preparing for and responding to

rare—but potentially catastrophic—disasters are of national concern. 

Reliant on volunteers and donations, many of the organizations we visited 

said that federal grant funding could help them better prepare for and 

build capacity for large-scale disasters, because they struggle to raise 

private donations for this purpose. Federal grants, while finite, are 

available to assist in capacity building, and voluntary organizations can be

among those who receive federal grant funds from states and localities, 

according to FEMA officials. However, most of the voluntary organizations

in our review have not received such funding, although they told us it 

would be beneficial. While there are many competing demands and 

priorities for such funds, clearer grant guidance could at least ensure that 

those making grant decisions consider voluntary organizations and VOADs 

as among those able to be subgrantees under these grants. Unless 

voluntary organizations are able to strengthen their capabilities and 

address planning and coordination challenges, the nation as a whole will 

likely be less prepared for providing mass care services during a largescale disaster. 

An additional area of concern is the expected role of the Red Cross in a 

catastrophic disaster of a scale that invokes the federal government’s 

Catastrophic Incident Supplement. As the experience with responding to

Katrina showed, it is important to agree on roles and responsibilities, as 

Page 57 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
well as have a clear understanding of operating procedures in the event of

a catastrophic disaster. However, FEMA officials said they have not yet 

revised or updated the Supplement, as required under the Post-Katrina 

Reform Act, with the result that the mass care section of the Supplement 

still reflects Red Cross’s previous role as primary agency for mass care, 

and not its current role as a support agency under ESF-6. While both 

FEMA and the Red Cross told us they expected the Red Cross to play a 

support agency role in a catastrophic event—consistent with the ESF-6—

unless this understanding is confirmed in writing and incorporated into 

federal planning documents for responding to a catastrophic event, the 

nature of that understanding cannot be transparent to the many parties 

involved in supporting mass care. 

Finally, while it is too early to assess the impact of the changes in how the 

American Red Cross expects to coordinate with FEMA in fulfilling its 

responsibilities under ESF-6, its capacity to coordinate with FEMA is 

critical to the nation’s mass care response in large-scale disasters. As a 

result, the continued implementation, evolution, and effect of these 

changes bear watching. 

To help ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement reflects the 

American Red Cross’s current role under ESF-6 as a support agency for 

mass care, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct

the Administrator of FEMA to establish a time frame for updating the mass 

care section of the Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in

the ESF-6 under the new Framework, and no longer requires the Red 

Cross to direct federal government resources. In the meantime, FEMA 

should develop an interim agreement with the Red Cross to document the 

understanding they have on the Red Cross’s role and responsibilities in a 

catastrophic event. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To more fully capture the disaster capabilities of major voluntary 

organizations that provide mass care services, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take 

steps to better incorporate these organizations’ capabilities into 

assessments of mass care capabilities, such as FEMA’s GAP Analysis, and 

to broaden its assessment to include feeding capabilities outside of 

shelters. Such steps might include 

• soliciting the input of voluntary organizations, such as through NVOAD; 

• integrating voluntary organization data on capabilities into FEMA’s 

analyses; and 

Page 58 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
• encouraging state governments to include voluntary mass care 

organization data in studies. 

To help these voluntary organizations better prepare for providing mass 

care in major and catastrophic disasters, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to 

clarify the Homeland Security Grant Program funding guidance for states 

so it is clear that voluntary organizations and local VOADs are among 

those eligible to be subgrantees under the program. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. 

Overall, in its response, FEMA acknowledged the importance of mass care 

planning among governmental and nongovernmental partners and stated 

that the report provides a broader understanding of the mass care support 

capabilities of several national voluntary organizations. FEMA also agreed

with our recommendation on establishing a time frame for updating the 

Catastrophic Incident Supplement and with our recommendation on 

clarifying Homeland Security Grant Funding guidance. However, FEMA 

criticized certain aspects of the draft report, asserting, for example, that 

our methodology did not address the role of states in coordinating mass 

care. FEMA also disagreed with our recommendation to better incorporate 

voluntary organizations’ capabilities in assessments. FEMA provided 

technical clarifications and additional examples of its planning activities, 

which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. FEMA’s 

written comments are provided in appendix III of this report. 

In its comments, FEMA stated that our understanding of mass care service 

delivery and the report’s scope and methodology was flawed partly 

because, in the agency’s view, the draft report did not adequately reflect 

the role of state governments in disaster response. As stated in our 

objectives, the primary focus of our report, by intention and design, is on

voluntary organizations’ roles and capabilities in disaster response. Our 

report accordingly discusses selected voluntary organizations’ services 

and roles, actions in response to past disasters such as Katrina, their mass 

care capabilities, and the main challenges they face. As noted in our 

report, the National Response Framework and the Catastrophic Incident 

Supplement recognize the importance of voluntary organizations’ role in 

disaster response, particularly with regard to mass care. While focusing on

voluntary organizations, our draft report also acknowledges and discusses 

the disaster response role and responsibilities of governments—local, 

state, and federal—under the Framework. In line with this, we therefore 

interviewed local, state, and federal government emergency management 

officials, as stated in the more detailed description of our report’s 

Page 59 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
methodology. We have added clarifying language as appropriate to our 

report to make clear our consideration of state governments’ role. 

In its comments, FEMA also raised concerns about whether the voluntary

organizations discussed in our report provided a comprehensive picture of

mass care capabilities. However, our report does not attempt to address 

all the services and capabilities of the voluntary sector. The report 

acknowledges that other voluntary organizations also provide mass care 

and other services and includes the caveat that we do not attempt to 

assess the total disaster response capabilities in any single location we 

visited. As described in our section on scope and methodology, we 

selected the five voluntary organizations in our report because of their 

contributions to the Hurricane Katrina response and congressional 

interest in these particular organizations. While mass care represents a 

significant focus—and is the only focus in discussing capabilities—other 

findings are not limited in this way. For example, we discuss all five 

organizations’ services and contributions during Katrina. However, for the 

purpose of discussing mass care capabilities, we specifically focused on 

the three voluntary organizations in our review that provide mass care—

the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist 

Convention. We did not include the United Way or Catholic Charities in 

our finding on capabilities because we agree that they do not provide mass 

care services. The draft report explicitly states this narrower scope and 

our reasons for it in key places. 

FEMA also commented that two tables in the draft report were 

incomplete. FEMA stated that table 5, on assessments of capabilities, did 

not include FEMA’s catastrophic planning efforts. Since the table focuses 

on assessments rather than broader planning initiatives, we have 

incorporated this information into our report as an example of FEMA’s 

planning efforts. FEMA also stated that table 6, on estimated mass care 

needs in worst-case disasters, represents a limited view of mass care 

capabilities and coordination. However, the table’s purpose is to provide 

estimates of the magnitude of mass care services that would be needed to 

respond to worst-case disasters, and not to identify gaps in capabilities or 

coordination issues, which we address in later sections of our report. We 

have modified the table’s title to clarify the information it contains. 

Regarding FEMA’s response to our recommendations, FEMA agreed with 

our recommendation that it should establish a time frame for updating the 

mass care section of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement so that it is 

consistent with the changes in ESF-6 under the new Framework. In its 

comments, FEMA noted it is in the process of establishing a timeline for 

updating the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and will change the role of 

Page 60 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
the Red Cross from that of a primary to support agency when the 

document is updated. We have noted this in the report accordingly. FEMA 

also agreed with our recommendation to clarify the Homeland Security 

Grant Program Funding guidance so that it is clear voluntary organizations

and VOADs are considered eligible subgrantees. 

FEMA disagreed with our recommendation that it should take steps to 

better incorporate the capabilities of voluntary organizations’ into 

assessments of mass care capabilities. Specifically, FEMA said that 

federal, state, and local governments cannot command and control private 

sector resources. We understand the limitations of governmental authority 

over voluntary organization’s resources; however, as we mention in the 

draft report, under the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is required to establish a 

comprehensive assessment system to assess the nation’s prevention 

capabilities and overall preparedness, including its operational readiness. 

While the act does not specifically include voluntary organizations’ 

capabilities, a comprehensive assessment of the nation’s capabilities 

should account as fully as possible for voluntary organizations’ capabilities 

in mass care. Taking steps to assess capabilities more fully does not 

require controlling these resources but rather cooperatively obtaining and 

sharing information. This could be done as an extension of FEMA’s 

ongoing partnerships with voluntary organizations to help strengthen 

coordination and collaboration in preparation for future disasters. We 

continue to think that it is important for FEMA to assess the significant 

capabilities that voluntary organizations can bring to bear in support of 

governmental efforts to prepare for and respond to disasters. As we noted 

in our report, without such an assessment, the government will have an 

incomplete picture of the mass care resources it can draw upon in largescale disasters. 

In its comments, FEMA also asserted that our report incorrectly assumes 

that if funding were made available, it would enable voluntary 

organizations to shelter and care for people in catastrophic events. 

However, our report discusses potential federal funding in relation to 

voluntary organizations’ preparedness and planning activities, not direct 

services. As noted in the report, such funding could be used to strengthen

voluntary organizations’ disaster preparedness, such as coordination with 

FEMA, training of personnel, and developing continuity-of-operations 

plans. If FEMA provided clearer guidance to states on voluntary 

organizations’ potential eligibility for these grants as subgrantees, 

voluntary organizations might be able to strengthen planning and 

coordination for future disasters and better utilize their substantial 

capabilities. A key premise of the National Response Framework is that 

voluntary organizations play a vital role in times of need, and recent 

Page 61 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
experience has demonstrated that voluntary organizations already play 

significant roles in providing shelter and care in large-scale disasters. 

We also provided a copy of our draft report to the American Red Cross 

and excerpts from the draft report as appropriate to The Salvation Army, 

the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and National 

Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. In its comments, the American 

Red Cross further explained its role in New York City’s coastal storm plan. 

We have added this information as appropriate to further clarify the Red 

Cross’s role under this scenario. In addition, the Red Cross, The Salvation 

Army, and NVOAD provided us with technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. The American Red Cross’s written comments 

are provided in appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the 

Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities, the United Way, and

NVOAD. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your 

staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V.

Cynthia M. Fagnoni 

Managing Director, Education, Workforce, 

 and Income Security Issues 

Page 62 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
List of Congressional Requesters 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Finance 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 

Chairman 

The Honorable Michael B. Enzi 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Herb Kohl 

Chairman 

Special Committee on Aging 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable David E. Price 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 63 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 64 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We designed our study to provide information on (1) what the roles of 

major national voluntary organizations are in providing mass care and 

other human services in response to large-scale disasters requiring federal 

assistance, (2) what steps these organizations have taken since Katrina to

strengthen their capacity for service delivery, (3) what is known about 

these organizations’ current capabilities for responding to mass care needs 

in such a large-scale disaster, and (4) what the remaining challenges are 

that confront voluntary organizations in preparing for such large-scale

disasters. We focused our review on the following five major voluntary 

organizations based on their contributions during Hurricane Katrina and 

congressional interest: the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the 

Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and the United Way 

of America. Since the United Way of America does not provide direct 

services in disasters, we did not include it in our analysis of recent 

improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining 

challenges. For our review of voluntary organizations’ response 

capabilities, we limited our focus to the three organizations in our study 

that provide mass care services: the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and 

the Southern Baptist Convention. To obtain information for all of the 

objectives, we used several methodologies: we reviewed federal and 

voluntary organization documents; reviewed relevant laws; interviewed 

local, state, and federal government and voluntary agency officials; 

conducted site visits to four selected metropolitan areas; and collected 

data on the voluntary organizations’ capabilities. 

Reviews of Governmental 

and Voluntary Agency 

Documents 

We reviewed governmental and voluntary organization documents to 

obtain information on the role of voluntary organizations, recent 

improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining 

challenges. To obtain an understanding of the federal disaster 

management framework, we reviewed key documents, such as the 2008 

National Response Framework, the Emergency Support Function 6—Mass 

Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services Annex (ESF6), the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, and the 2007 National 

Preparedness Guidelines, which collectively describe the federal 

coordination of mass care and other human services. We also reviewed 

pertinent laws, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of October 2006. In addition, we reviewed documents for each of the

five voluntary organizations in our review, which describe their roles in 

disasters and explained their organizational response structures. These 

documents included mission statements, disaster response plans, and 

statements of understanding with government agencies and other 

voluntary organizations. We also reviewed key reports written by federal 

agencies, Congress, voluntary organizations, policy institutes, and GAO to 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

identify lessons learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina and steps

voluntary organizations have taken since then to improve service delivery.

1

We interviewed federal government and national voluntary organization 

officials to obtain information on the role of voluntary organizations, 

recent improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and 

remaining challenges. At the federal level, we interviewed officials from 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the ESF-6 Mass 

Care Unit, the FEMA Grants Office, and the Disaster Operations 

Directorate. We also interviewed the executive director of the National 

Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD). We interviewed 

these officials regarding the role of the voluntary organizations in disaster 

response, grants and funding offered to voluntary organizations, voluntary 

organization and government logistics in disasters, assessments of 

capabilities, and the types of interactions each of them has with the 

organizations from our review. We also interviewed national voluntary 

organization officials from the five organizations in our review about the 

roles of their organizations in disaster response, improvements the 

organizations had made to coordination and service delivery since 

Hurricane Katrina, their organizations’ capabilities to respond to disasters, 

and what remaining challenges exist for the organizations in disaster 

response. 

We visited four metropolitan areas—Washington, D.C.; New York, New 

York; Miami, Florida; and Los Angeles, California—to review the roles, 

response structures, improvements to service delivery, response 

capabilities, and challenges that remain for the selected voluntary 

organizations’ in these local areas. We selected these metropolitan areas 

based on their recent experiences with disaster, such as September 11; 

their potential risk for large-scale disasters; and the size of their allotments 

through the federal Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program. The 

metropolitan areas that we selected also represent four of the six urban 

areas of the country considered most at risk for terrorism under the 2007 

Urban Areas Security Initiative. 

Interviews of Federal 

Government and National 

Voluntary Organization 

Officials 

Visits to Four Major 

Metropolitan Areas 

During our visits to the four metropolitan areas, we interviewed officials 

from the five voluntary organizations, local and state government 

emergency management agency officials, the heads of the local Voluntary 

 1

See the bibliography for a complete list of the “lessons learned” reports we reviewed. 

Page 65 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), and FEMA’s regionally based

liaisons to the voluntary sector, known as voluntary agency liaisons (VAL). 

During our interviews, we asked about the roles and response structures 

of voluntary organizations in disaster response, improvements the 

organizations had made to coordination and service delivery since 

Hurricane Katrina, the organizations’ capabilities to respond to disasters, 

and what challenges exist for the organizations in disaster response. 

Capabilities Data and 

Catastrophic Estimates 

To review voluntary organizations’ sheltering and feeding capabilities, we 

collected data through interviews and written responses from the three 

organizations in our study that provide mass care: the Red Cross, The 

Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention. By capabilities we 

mean the means to accomplish a mission or function under specified 

conditions to target levels of performance, as defined in the federal 

government’s National Preparedness Guidelines. We collected data on 

both their nationwide capabilities and their locally based capabilities in 

each of the four metropolitan areas we visited. To obtain capabilities data 

in a uniform manner, we requested written responses to questions about 

sheltering and feeding capabilities from these organizations in the 

localities we visited, and in many of these responses, voluntary 

organizations described how they derived their data. For example, to 

collect data on feeding capabilities, we asked voluntary organization 

officials how many mobile kitchens they have and how many meals per 

day they are capable of providing. To assess the reliability of the capability 

data provided by the voluntary organizations, we reviewed relevant

documents and interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data.

However, we did not directly test the reliability of these data because the 

gaps between capabilities and estimated needs were so large that greater 

precision would not change this underlying finding. It was also not within 

the scope of our work to review the voluntary organizations’ systems of 

internal controls for data on their resources and capabilities. 

To identify potential needs for mass care services, we used available 

estimates for catastrophic disaster scenarios in each of the selected 

metropolitan areas: Washington, D.C.—terrorism; New York, New York—

hurricane; Miami, Florida—hurricane; and Los Angeles, California—

earthquake. We reviewed federal, state, and Red Cross estimates of 

sheltering and feeding needs resulting from these potential catastrophic 

disasters: 

• Federal catastrophic estimates—We reviewed the earthquake estimates 

from the Target Capabilities List that were developed by the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) after an in-depth analysis of the Major 

Page 66 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Earthquake scenario in the National Planning Scenarios. The National 

Planning Scenarios were developed by the Homeland Security Council–-in 

partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, other federal 

departments and agencies, and state and local homeland security agencies. 

The scenario assumes a 7.2 magnitude earthquake with a subsequent 8.0

earthquake occurs along a fault zone in a major metropolitan area with a 

population of approximately 10 million people, which is approximately the 

population of Los Angeles County. 

• State catastrophic estimates—We reviewed catastrophic hurricane 

estimates from the Florida Division of Emergency Management’s 

Hurricane Ono planning project. The project assumes a Category V 

hurricane making landfall in South Florida, which has a population of 

nearly 7 million people. 

• Red Cross catastrophic estimates—We reviewed catastrophic estimates 

from the Red Cross’s risk-based capacity building initiative. To develop

these estimates, the Red Cross worked with state and local officials and 

other disaster experts to develop “worst case” disaster scenarios in six 

high-risk areas of the country, including the four metropolitan areas in our 

study. The scenarios for these four metropolitan areas were: a 7.2 to 7.5 

magnitude earthquake in Southern California; a chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, or major explosion terrorist attack in the 

Washington, D.C. region; a Category III/IV hurricane in the New York 

metropolitan area; and a Category V hurricane in the Gulf Coast. 

To identify general findings about nationwide preparedness, we compared 

the capabilities data provided by the voluntary organizations to these 

catastrophic disaster estimates. We did not attempt to assess the total 

disaster response capabilities in any single location that we visited or the 

efficacy of any responses to particular scenarios, such as major 

earthquakes versus hurricanes. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to September 2008 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 67 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix II: NVOAD Members

Page 68 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Appendix II: NVOAD Members 

• Adventist Community Services 

• America’s Second Harvest 

• American Baptist Men/USA 

• American Radio Relay League, Inc. (ARRL) 

• American Red Cross 

• Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team (AMURT) 

• Catholic Charities USA 

• Christian Disaster Response 

• Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) 

• Church of the Brethren—Brethren Disaster Ministries 

• Church of Scientology Disaster Response 

• Church World Service 

• City Team Ministries 

• Convoy of Hope 

• Disaster Psychiatry Outreach 

• Episcopal Relief and Development 

• Feed the Children 

• Friends Disaster Service, Inc. 

• Habitat for Humanity 

• HOPE Coalition America 

• Humane Society of the United States

• International Aid 

• International Critical Incident Stress Foundation

• International Relief and Development (IRD) 

• International Relief Friendship Foundation (IRFF) 

• Latter Day Saints Charities 

• Lutheran Disaster Response 

• Mennonite Disaster Service 

• Mercy Medical Airlift (Angel Flight)

• National Association of Jewish Chaplains 

• National Emergency Response Team 

• National Organization for Victim Assistance 

• Nazarene Disaster Response 

• Operation Blessing 

• Points of Light Foundation and Volunteer Center National Network 

• Presbyterian Church (USA) 

• REACT International, Inc. 

• Samaritan’s Purse 

• Save the Children 

• Society of St. Vincent de Paul 

• Southern Baptist Convention 

• The Salvation Army 

• Tzu Chi Foundation 

• United Church of Christ—Wider Church Ministries 
Appendix II: NVOAD Members

• United Jewish Communities 

• United Methodist Committee on Relief 

• United Way of America 

• Volunteers of America 

• World Vision 

Source: NVOAD as of July 2008 

Page 69 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 70 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 71 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 72 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 73 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 74 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 75 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 76 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix IV: American Red Cross 

Page 77 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Appendix IV: American Red Cross 
Appendix IV: American Red Cross 

Page 78 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix IV: American Red Cross 

Page 79 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Appendix V: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 80 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, (202) 512-7215 or 

fagnonic@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Gale C. Harris, Assistant Director; 

Deborah A. Signer, Analyst-in-Charge; William W. Colvin; Amanda M. 

Leissoo; and Lacy Vong made significant contributions to this report. In 

addition, Susan Bernstein provided writing assistance, Jessica Botsford 

and Doreen Feldman provided legal assistance, Walter Vance provided 

technical assistance, and Mimi Nguyen assisted with the graphics. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Bibliography Bibliography 

The American Red Cross. From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross 

Actions To Improve and Enhance its Disaster Response And Related 

Capabilities For the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond (Washington, 

D.C.: June 2006). 

The Aspen Institute, Weathering the Storm: The Role of Local Nonprofits

in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort (Washington, D.C.: 2006). 

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, FEMA’s 

Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, OIG-08-34 (Washington,

D.C.: March 2008). 

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 

2006). 

National Council on Disability, The Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita on People with Disabilities: A Look Back and Remaining 

Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2006) 

The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government and the Public Affairs 

Research Council of Louisiana, GulfGov Reports: Response, Recovery, and 

the Role of the Nonprofit Community in the Two Years Since Katrina 

and Rita (Albany, NY: 2007). 

United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 

Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, 

D.C.: 2006).

The Urban Institute. After Katrina: Public Expectation and Charities’ 

Response (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 

Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

Page 81 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
Related GAO Products 

Page 82 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 

Related GAO Products 

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ 

Allocation and Management Methods, but Measuring Programs’ Impact 

on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve 

Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors. 

GAO-08-369. Washington, D.C: February 27, 2008.

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,

D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed 

Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional 

Federal Guidance. GAO-07-609. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 

GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. February 2007. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Systems. GAO-06-618. 

Washington, D.C.: September 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red

Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 

June 8, 2006.

Homeland Security Assistance for Nonprofits: Department of Homeland 

Security Delegated Selection of Nonprofits to Selected States and States 

Used a Variety of Approaches to Determine Awards. GAO-06-663R. 

Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 
Related GAO Products 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February

1, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. 

GAO-06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable 

Organizations’ Contributions in Disasters. GAO-03-259.Washington, 

D.C.: December 19, 2002.

(130791) Page 83 GAO-08-823 Voluntary Organizations in Disasters 
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