T he H onorabl e Ro bert H ol mes B el l , D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he U

. S. D i s t r i ct * C o urt f o r t he W est ern D i st ri ct of M i chi gan, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

K AR EN L OGAN , Plaintif

f-Appellant ,

v.
U. S. B A N K N A T I O N A L A S S OC I ATI ON , as Trustee , Defendant- Appellee

. No. 10-55671

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-08950- M M M

- P LA

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Marg are t M. Morrow, District Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted Janu ary 10 , 2 01 3—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed July 16, 2013

Be fore : M. Marg are t McKeown and Milan D. Smith, J r., Circuit J udg es, and Rober t Holmes Be ll, District J udg e. * Opinion by

J udg e McK eownL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

P rote cting Tenants at F orec losure Act
Affir ming the dismissal of a complaint seekingdamag es and injunctive re lief ag ain st a bank that filed a n unlawful de ta in e r a c ti o n a g a in s t th e te n an t o f a f o r me r o wner

of fo re c los e d p ro pe rt

y , th e pa ne l he ld t hat th ere is no pr ivate rig ht of ac tion u n d er the ProtectingTena nts at Fore closure Act of 2009. The pa n el h eld that, despite the ba nk’s voluntary dismiss al of the unlawful detainer action, the a

ppeal wa s not moo t be c a

us e the ba

nk did no t sh ow that it was a bs olute ly clea r that the a lleg edly

wrong ful evic t i on could not
rea sonably

be expected to r ecur

. Ag ree ing w ith the T h i rd Circuit, the pane l held that abstention under Y

ou nge r v . H

arris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971), fr om the exercise of jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive r elief was not wa

rra nted bec ause the state detai n er ac tion did not imp lic a te imp or

tant s tate int e re sts

. Finally , the pane l held that the tenant did not have a cog nizable claim under the ProtectingTena nts at Fore closure Act bec ause the Act does not , ei t her e x plicitly or by imp lic a tio n, e vin c e a c on g re ssi on a l inte nt t o c re a te a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion.L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 3
CO UN SEL

J ay D. Tricke tt (argued), A rne D . Wagne r, an d J ames A. Q u a dr a , Ca lv o & Cl ar

k , L L P, Sa

n F r an c is c o , Ca li f

o r n ia , for Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt. Thomas H. Dupr ee, Jr. (ar g ued), G ibso n , Dunn & Crutcher L L P, Wa s h in g ton, D.C.; Theane E vang elis Kapur, AndrewG. Pa pp a s, Gi bs on , D unn & Cr utc her LL P, L os An g e le s, C a l i f o r n i a ; J o h n M

. S o r i c h , S

. C h r i s t o p h e r Y o o , an d J e n n y L. Merr is, Adorno Yos s Alvardo & Smit h, Santa Ana, California, for

Def endant- Appellee

. Kent Qian, N ation al Housing L aw Projec t, Oakland, California; Samantha Tuttle, Sarg ent Shriver National Center on Poverty

L aw, Chica g o, I llin ois, for Amicus Curiae National HousingL aw Projec t, Sar gen t Shriver National Center on Poverty L aw, Public J ustice Center , National L aw C en ter on Home lessness and Pover ty , Tena nts Toge ther, L ega l Services of

Norther n California, Housingand Economic Rights Advoca tes, Housing Umbrella G roup, and Commun ity

L e g a l Se rv ic e s.

OP IN ION McKEOWN, Circuit J udg e:
We consider he re a

n issue of first impression—whether the Pr o te c ti n g T e n an ts at F o r e c lo s ur e A c t o f 2 0 0 9 ( “ PT F A” or “the Act”) provides a private right of ac tion. Pub. L . No. 111-22, § 701–04, 123 Stat. 1 6 3 2 , 1 660–62 (2009). Ka ren L og an s ought inj un c tiv e re lie f a nd dama g e s a g a ins t U .S. Ba nk National A s s o ci ation (“U S Bank” ) af ter it filed anL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

4

W e t r ea t f

ac t s a l l eg ed i n Log an ’ s c ompl ai n t a s t r u e f or pu r pos es of 1

e v a lua ting the d ism issa l fo r l a c k o f su b je c t m a tter ju risd ic tio n

. W hi s nant
v. Uni t ed St at es , 400 F. 3d 117 7, 117 9 (9t h C i r

. 20 05 )

. Co ns equen t l y , we do not addres s t he f

act ual di s put e a r i s i ng f

r om U S B ank ’ s cont ent i on t hat Lo gan was ma rr i ed t o t he f o rme r o wner a t t he t i m e o f t he f o recl o sur e and t h u s n ot a “ bo n a f

i de t e n a n t ” pr ot e c t e d b y t h e PT FA

. unlawful de tainer a ction ag ainst her i n state cour t without g iv in g 9 0 d ay s n o ti c e to v a c ate th e f o r e c lo s e d p r o p e rty

as required b y t h e Ac t. Although we disag ree with the district court’s a bstention from exerc ising jurisdiction over L og an’s injunctive relief claim under Y ou nge r v . H

arris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971), we never

theless af firm dismissal of the complaint beca use the Ac t does not cr ea t e a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion
a llo wi ngL og an to e nf

or c e its re qu ir e me nts

. B ACKG ROUND
L og an cla ims that she wa s the tenant of the former owner of a pr operty

located in Westlake Vi l l age, California. US 1 Ba nk took ti t l e to t he prope rty at fore closure in June 2009. Acc ordingto L og an, US Ba n k s erve d her w ith a three -day notice of te rmination and t h en i mmediately initiated an
un lawf ul d e ta ine r a c tio n in

L os Ang e le s Su

pe ri or Cou rt

. L og an alleg es that these a ctions contraven ed the PTFA, which re quired US B ank to serve a 90-d ay notice of termination prior to evic tion.
After the unlawful detainer action was initiated i n J une 2009, L og an filed a

demurre r ra ising the PTFA issue, but the de mur re r w a s o ve rr

ule d. L og an tw ic e a tte mpt e d, a lbe it
un su c c e ssf

ull y , to re mov e the un lawf ul d e ta in er act ion

to fe de ra l c ourt

.L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 5

L og an filed her action in f eder al court in D ece mber 2009, seeking“tempora

ry , p relim inary , and per

manent injunctive
re lie f c omp e lli ngob e dia

nc e [sic ] to the F e de ra l L aw, ” a s w e ll
a s d ama g e s. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d th e c omplai nt, c on c lud ingthat Y

ou nge r v . H

arris require d it to abstain from exercisingjurisdiction b ec au s e L og an soug ht to enjoin an action that was pending in state court at t he ti me s he filed he r case in f eder al court. The district c ourt further rea soned that it did no t hav e su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r L og an’ s c la im fo r d ama g e s un de r the PTF A be c a us e the Ac t do e s n ot c re a te a private rig ht of ac tion.

A N A L Y SIS
I. M O O TN ESS
As a threshold matter, we addre ss whether L og an’s a ppeal is moot g iven US Ba

nk’s voluntary

dismiss al of the unla

wful detainer action in Fe bruar y 2010, just two mont hs befor e she filed t his appea l. Article I I Iof the Constituti on limit s fede ral courts to t he adjudication of actua l, ongoingcase s or c on tr ov e rs ie s b e tw e e n li tig ants . I f a “ li ve” c on tr ov e rs y cea ses to exis t beca

use of c hang ed cir cumstance s after the complaint is f

iled, the claim is moot and no long er justiciable. Am. Civil Liberti es Union of Nev. v. Lomax , 471 F.3d 1010, 10 16 (9 th Cir

. 20 06 ). Ho we ve r, wh e n th e ba sis fo r m oo tne ss is defen d ant’s voluntary conduct, a

fede ral c ourt is not “depr ive[d] . . . of its power to de termi ne the leg ality of the pr a c tic e ,” le avin g the de fe nd ant “ fr e e to r e turn to [i ts] o ld way s.” F

r iends of the Earth, Inc. v . Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) ( internal quotation marks a nd cit at ions omit ted). Rather , the def endant must “be ar[] t he formidable bur den of showingthat it i s ab s olutely clea r the alleg edly wrongful be havior c ould not reasona bly beL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

6 expected to re cur.” Id. at1 9 0 (c i t i n g Un i t ed States v. Concentrated P h o s

phate Export Ass’n. , 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968))

. US B an k h a s n o t m e t th i s f o r m i d a b l e b ur d e n

. I ts voluntary dismiss al of t h e unlawful de tainer a ction without prejudice does not make it “a bsolutely clea r” that the alleg ed
wr on g fu l e vic tio n “ c ou ld no t re a so na bly be e xpe c te d to
rec ur.” Id. The bank has off ere d no evidenc e or r eassur ance that it either could not or would not re initiate the unl aw ful detainer action ag ainst L og an a t an o ther time, should she
re ma in i n p os se ssi on

of th e pr op e rt

y . A dd iti on a lly , e ve n if the re quest for injunctive relief wer e moot, L og an’s pur suit of monetary relief ensure s that the ca se “r emains def inite and
concr ete, touchingthe leg al relations of parties having adver se leg al intere sts.” Have ns Realty Co r p

. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982) (inter nal quot ation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal of the state unlawful de t ainer pr oc e e din g s d id n ot m oo t L og an’ s c la im.

II. Y O U N G ER A B S T E NT I ON
As a g e ne ra l r

ule , a fe der a l c ourt

ha s a “ vir tua lly
un fl a g g ingob lig atio n” to ad jud ic ate c on tr ov e rs ie s p ro pe rl y befor e it. Deak

ins v. Monaghan , 484 U.S. 19 3 , 203 (1988) (inter n al q uotation marks and c itation omit ted). In car rying out this dut y , fede ral c ourts “may well aff ect, or for pr actica l purp os e s pre -e mpt ” a

pe nd ingstate c ourt

a c tio n, but “ the re is
n o d o ct ri n e th at

. . . th e p en d en cy o f s t at e j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs e xc lu d e s th e f

e d e r a l c o urts .” New Orleans Pub. Serv. I nc. (“ NOPSI ”) v. Council of N

ew Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 373 (1 98 9) . T o th e c on tr a

ry , a pe nd inga c tio n in stat e c ourt is g ener ally “no bar to pr ocee dings conce rningthe same matter in the Fe dera l court havingjurisdiction.” Colo. River W aterL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 7

Conservation Dist. v. United States , 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (q u o t i n g McClellan v. Carland , 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). Ag ainst this backdrop, the Supre me Court has ca rved out an “‘ extraordinary

and nar ro w ex ception.’” Colo. River W ater Conservation , 424 U.S. at 813 (quotin g C n t y. of Allegheny

v. Frank M

ashuda Co. , 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)) . In Y

oung er v. H

arris , the Supreme Court he ld that a fe dera l court may

not interfe re with a pendingstate cr iminal pr os e c uti on

a bs e nt e xtra or dinary

c ir c ums tanc e s. 40 1 U .S. 43–54. This principle has a lso been e x tended to limited classes of civil proce eding s. See NOPSI , 491 U.S. at 367–68. Fo r example, in M

id d le s e x Co u n ty E th ic

s Co m m it te e v. Garden Stat e Bar Associati on , 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), the Supreme Court applied Y ou nge r abstention to s t ate attorney dis c ipl ina ry pr oc e e din g s, bu t was c are fu l to lim it i ts application in the non-criminal context t o those ca ses wher e (1 ) t he re is a n o ng oin g state pr oc e e di ng, (2) the state proce edingimplicates important state intere sts , and (3) the state pr oc e e din gpr ov ide s an a de qu ate op po rt un ity to r a ise fede ral que stions. I nterpre ting the Supre me Court’s d ir ective, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized an other c riterion: (4) that the fe dera l action would enj o i n the state proc eedingor have the prac tical eff

ect of doing so. S

a n Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of CommercePolitical Action Comm. v. City of San J os e , 5 46 F .3 d 1 08 7, 10 92 (9 th C ir . 2 00 8) . All fo ur e le me nts must be satisfied to w arr ant abstention. Amerisource Bergen Corp. v. Roden , 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 ( 9th Cir. 2007).
US Ba nk’s unlawf

ul detainer

action mee ts three o f t he four r equire ments

. T o beg in, there w as an ong oing proce edingin state cour

t when L og an filed the fede ral a ction in D e c e mbe r 2 00 9. Al tho ug h U S B ank late r v olu

nta ri ly dismiss ed the state action without prejudice in Febr uary 2010,L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

8
the re levant date for e valuatingabst en tion is t he date the fede ral action is filed. Gilbertson v. Albright , 381 F.3d 965, 96 9 n .4 (9 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ); Kitchens v. Bowen , 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1987) (“ [T] he cr itical question is not whether the state p ro ceeding s are still ong oing, but whether the state proc eeding s were underw ay befor e initiation of the feder al proc eeding s.”) ( internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Seco n d , L og an had the op po rt un ity to l iti g ate he r f

e de ra l ques tio n in

state c ourt

. Although sh e was unsuccessful, the pe rtinent inquiry in the
a bs te nti on c onte xt i s wh e the r p la int if fs ’ f e de ra l c la ims “ c ou ld have be en raised in the pendingstate proc eeding s.” Moore v

. Sims , 442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979). L og an also meets t he third pr on g : T he purp os e of

he r federal act ion

is e ith e r t o e njo in the state proc eedingdirec tly or to have the prac tical ef fec t of do ingso by

lim iti ngUS B ank ’s a

bil ity to pu rsue i ts s tate court a ction.

De sp ite satis fy

ingthe se thr e e re qu ir e me nts , a bs te nti on is not warr anted beca

use the state unla

wful deta iner a ction does
no t impli c a te “ imp or

tant s tate int e re sts .” No tw ith sta nd ingits
a pp are nt b re a dth , th at ta g lin e is n ot a n in vi tation t o a

bs ta in simply beca use a suit i mplicates a state law, eve n one involving a tr aditional state conc ern. Whi l e re cog nizi ng imp or tant s tate int e re sts in a

numbe r o f c ivi l pr oc e e din g s, “neither we nor

the Supreme Court ha s held Y ounger to a pp ly g ener ally to or dinary civil liti g ation.” Po tre ro Hi lls Lan dfi ll, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano , 6 5 7 F

. 3 d 8 7 6 , 8 8 2 ( 9 thC i r

. 2 0 1 1 )

. In Middlesex , th e Sup re me Court of fe re d thre e ty

pe s of c ivi l proce eding s in which a state mig ht have a vital interest: nonc ri min a l pr oc e e din g s th at “ be ar a c los e re lationship to proce eding s criminal in nature ,” “[p]rocee dings nece ssary for the vindication of important state policies,” a nd

“ [p]r oc e e din g s n e c e ssa

ry

. . . f or the f un c tio nin g of

the stateL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 9

See , e

. g. , O hi o C i vi l R igh ts Co m m ’ n v. D ayt on C hri s t i an Schs.
, I nc. , 2 4 7 7 U .S . 6 1 9 (1 9 8 6 ) (p e n d ing a d m inistra tive p ro c e e d ing in w h ic h the sta te ci v i l r i g h t s c ommi s s i on w as e n f or ci n g i t s e mpl oy men t a n t i

- di s cr i mi n at i on la w s) ; M i dd l es ex , 457 U

. S. 423 ( pendi ng di s ci pl i nar y procee di ng i n w hi ch t he l ocal coun t y et hi cs comm i t t ee was mai nt ai ni ng t he prof es s i onal
c o n d u c t o f t h e a tto rn e ys it lice n se s) ; Mo o r e v

. S i ms , 442 U

. S. 415 ( 1979) ( pendi ng s t at e pr oceedi ng i n whi ch t he T exa s D epar t ment of H uman R e so u rc e s w a s e n fo r c in g it s c h ild a b u se law s) ; Tr ai no r v. H er na nd ez , 431 U

. S. 434 ( 1977) ( pen di n g s u i t i n w h i ch t h e I l l i no i s D epa r t men t of P u b lic A id s o u g h t t h e re tur n o f we lfar e p a ym e n ts a lleg e d ly wr o n g fully
re c e ive d ); H uf

f m an v

. Pur s ue, Lt d. , 4 2 0 U .S

. 5 9 2 ( 1 9 7 5 ) (p e n d ing sta te nui sance pro ceed i ng i nst i t ut ed by s heri f f and pro secut i ng at t o rney ).

See , e

. g. , P e n n zo il C o. v. Texaco, I nc. , 481 U

. S. 1, 13

– 1 4 (1987) 3 (holdi ng t hat a fed eral co urt m ay no t enjoin executi o n of a st at e co urt judgm ent pe nd i ng ap p eal of t hat jud gm ent t o a s t at e ap p el l at e co urt ); J u id ic e v . V

a il , 430 U

. S. 327, 335 ( 1977) ( hol di ng t hat a f eder al cour t may not en j oi n t he s t at e’ s cont emp t proces s becau s e “ [ t ] he cont emp t power l i es at t he co re of

t he ad m i ni st rat i o n of a Stat e’ s judici al s y st em ”). jud ic ia l s y s te m. ” 4 5 7 U

. S. at 4 3 2

. T h e f ir s t t w o c a te g o ries implicate the state’ s executive interest a nd encompa ss case s in which the state or

an ag ent of the state i s a par ty “in an enfor ceme nt posture,” Potre ro Hi lls Lan dfi ll , 657 F.3d at 883. The third categ ory en compasses c ases—including 2 those betwe en private par ties—where the oper ation of the state judicial sy stem is its elf at issue. 3

An un lawf ul d e ta ine r a c tio n d oe s n ot f a ll int o a ny of the se c a te g or ie s. Ob vio us ly

it d oe s n ot b e ar a

c los e re latio ns hip to pr oc e e din g s th at are c ri min a l in natur e , nor do e s it imp lic a te the fu nct io nin gof

the state jud ic ia l sy ste m. T he on ly quest i o n for discussion i s whether the suit vindicates imp ortant state inter ests or policies. B ut the eviction ac tion do e s n ot f it i n th at c ate g or

y e ith e r be c a

us e it is ga

rd e n v ari e ty c ivi l li tig a tio n b e tw e e n p ri vate p art ie s, no t a state enfor ceme nt action.L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

10

T h i s c a s e i s di s t i n c t f r om G o l d i e’s B o o ksto re, In c. v. S u p erio r C o u rt 4

o f S ta te o f C a lif o rn ia , 739 F. 2d 466 , 467 –6 8 (9t h Ci r

. 198 4), wh er e a su b le sse e b ro u g h t a n a c tio n a g a ins t a C a lif o rn ia S u p e rio r C o u rt, a c o u n ty
s h er i f f , a c o unt y ma r s h al , a n d ot h er s , s ee k i n g a pr el i mi n ar y i n j u n ct i on a g a ins t en fo rc e m e n t o f a sta te u n la w ful d e ta ine r ju d g m e n t. T h e re w e he ld tha t C a lif

o rn ia d id no t ha v e a n im p o rta n t i n te re st in e n fo r c in g a sta te d e ta ine r j u d g m e n t f

o r p u rp o se s o f You ng er a b ste n tio n

. I d. at 470. G o l d i e’s B o o ksto re was l at er cal l ed int o q uest i o n a f t er t he Sup rem e C o urt d eci d ed i n P e n n zo iltha t a sta te ha s a n im p o rta n t i n te re st in e x e c u ting sta te
c o u rt ju d g m e n ts. See L eb b o s v. Ju d g es o f th e S u p erio r C o u rt

, S a n t a C l a ra C nt y. , 88 3 F.2d 81 0 , 81 5 n.6 (9th C i r. 19 8 9 ) ( “O ur conclus i o n i n [ G o l d i e’s B o o ksto re ] th a t t h e p ro c e e d ing s d id no t i m p lica te im p o rta n t state inte re sts
a p p e a rs to ha v e b e e n su b s ta n tially un d e rm ine d b y the S u p re m e C o u rt’s ho l d i ng i n P e n n zo il

. ”) ( i nt er nal ci t at i on om i t t ed ). W e do not t ake a I t is no t e n o u g hth at t

h e s tate c o urt a c ti o nc o n c e r n s r e al proper ty transfe rs, lease hold e states, and tena nt rig hts, all of wh ic h a re his tor ic a lly

the do ma in o f state re g ulatio n. “ [I ]t is not the bare subject matter of the under lying state law that . . . deter mine[s] whether

the st at e proc eedingimplicates an ‘important state intere st’ for Y ounger purposes.” Po tr e ro Hi lls Lan dfi ll , 6 57 F .3 d at 88 4. Ins te a d, “ the c on te nt o f s tate laws bec omes ‘important’ f or Y ounger purposes only

when
cou pled with the state e x ecutive’ s interest in enfor cingsuch laws” or the state judiciar

y ’s intere st in the o p er ation of the judicial sy stem. Id. a t8 8 4

– 86 ; see also Cate v. O ldham , 707 F.2d 1176, 1183 ( 11th Cir. 1 9 8 3 ) (“Application of the Y ounger doctrine to ong oing state civil pr ocee dings ha s been limit ed to t hose civil ac tions in aid of criminal jurisdiction or involving enf

orce m ent-ty

pe proc eeding s in which vital interests of the state qua state are inv olv ed. ”). B y c on tr a st, the un law ful de ta ine r a c tio n h e re is s imp ly a pr ivate dis pute b e tw e e ntw o p r i v at e p art i e s o v e r p o s s e s s i o no f

a p r o p e rty. The state ha s not stepped in as a pa rty to e nforc e its tenanc y laws, and no c ore a spect of the administration o f t he state’ s judicial sy stem is a t i ssue. Th is i s n ot t o s ay tha t th e state 4L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 11

p o sitio n o n w h e the r U S B a n k ’s un la w ful d e ta ine r ac tio n w o u ld im p lica te
a n im p o rta n t sta te i n te re st if U S B a n k ha d a lre a d y o b ta ine d a fav o ra b le j udgment and Logan s ough t t o enj oi n i t s enf orce ment , as was t he f

act ual scenari o i n G o l d i e’s B o o ksto re
. Suf f i ce i t t o say t hat t here i s no s t at e co urt judgm ent at i ss ue here, and no co ncern ab o ut i n te rf eri ng wi t h t he
ex ec uti o n o f

st ate c o urt jud gm en t s. do e s n ot have a signif

ic ant i nte re st i n p ro te c tin g te na nts , o nly that such intere st does not warr ant abstention. Although the district court c i t ed to severa l district court de c isi on s h old ingtha

t “ un lawf ul d e ta ine r a c tio ns re pr e se nt a su ff ic ie nt s tate int e re st t o w arr ant Y ounger abstenti o n ,” we
are not persuade d. Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n , N o. CV 09-08950, 2010 WL1444878, at *3 (C.D. Cal. April 12, 20 10 ); see, e .g. , McG lothin v. Santos , No. 1:08cv1290, 20 08 WL51 35 99 6, at *6 (E .D . C al. De c . 8 , 2 00 8) ; Hicks v

. Su pe rio r Co ur t of

Cal
., Cnt

y . o f Ke rn , No. 08- cv-0207, 20 08 WL 63 85 44 , at *5 (E .D . Ca l. M arc h 5 , 2 00 8) . T ho se de c isi on s, lik e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on he re , f a ll p re y to the log ic that th e state ha s a signif ic ant c on c e rn

sim ply beca use prope rty

law, includingevi cti on, has longbeen a state c on c e rn . T he dif

fi c ulty wi th t his a ssumpt ion

is that it
wo uld re qu ir e fe de ra l c ourt s to a bs ta in f ro m st a te lit ig a tio n in virtually ever y are a of state law—fr om co nsumer prote ction to r e a l e s tate

— e v e n w h e r e th e d is p u te is p ur e ly p r iv a te

. We ag ree with the Third Circuit that the re g u l at i o n of evic tion pr oc e e din g s “ do e s n ot i mpl ic ate an impo rt ant s tate int e re st” under Y ounger
. Ay e rs v. Phila. Hous. Auth. , 908 F.2d 1184, 1195 n.21 (3d Cir. 1990) (holdingthat an e v i ct i on action broug ht by

Philadelphia’s city

housing a

uthority did n ot implicate an important state inter est).L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

12
III. No P R I V A TE RIGH T O F A CT I ON U N D ER T HE P ROT E CT I NG T ENA N TS A T F OR ECLO SUR E A CT Although L og an’s claims are neither moot nor pr eclude d b y Y ounger , th e y

fa il b ecause s he ha s n o c og niza ble c la im under the PTFA. The Supreme Court has repe atedly held that private r ights of a ction, like substantive federa l law itself, must be cr ea t ed by

Congr ess. See, e .g. , Alexande r v. Sandoval , 53 2 U.S. 275 , 2 86 (2 00 1) . O ur c ha lle ng e is t o deter min e whether the PTF A, either expli citly

or by imp lic a tio n, e vin c e s a c on g re ssi on a l inte nt to cr e a te a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion. To u c h e R o s s &Co

. v

. R e ding ton , 4 42 U. S. 56 0, 56 8 ( 19 79 ). With out c le ar e vid e nc e of su c h inte nt, courts may

n o t cr ea t e a c ause of

action “no matter how desirable . . . as a policy

matter, or how

compatible with the statute.” Sandoval , 5 32 U. S. at 286–8 7. Th is i ssu e is a quest io n o f f

ir s t im p r e s s io n f

o r th is c o urt, b u t a nu mb e r of district co u rt s within this circ uit have held that ther e is no such rig ht. See, e .g. , W

ells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen , No. C11- 01932, 2011 WL2194117, at *1 (N.D . Cal. J une 6, 2011) (c on c lud ingtha

t “ th e P TFA

on ly pr ov ide s te na

nts wi th fede ral de fense s to eviction but doe s n o t cre ate a fede ral
e je c tme nt c la im o r a

ny pr ivate r ight of

a c tio n” ); Nativi v. DeutscheBank N

at’l Trust Co. , N o

. 0 9

- 0 6 0 9 6 , 2 0 1 0 WL 2179885, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (holdingthat the PTFA doe s not pr ovide for an implied pr ivate rig ht of ac tion). We c on c lud e that th e statut e ne ith e r e xplic itl y no r i mpl ie dly
cre ates a private r ight of

action allowingL og an to enf orce the PTFA.
Se c tio n 7 02 (a ) o f t

he PTF A p ro vid e s:
In the ca se of a

ny fore closure on a fede rally -re lated mortgage loan or on a nyL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 13

dwelling or re sidential rea l property afte r the date of e na c tme nt of thi s tit le , any imm e diate succe ssor in inter est in such prope rty pursuant to t he fo re c los ur e sh a ll a ssume su c h inte re st subject to— (1 ) t he pr ov isi on , by

su c h s uc c e sso r i n inte re st of a notice to va cate to a

ny bona fide tena

nt at least 90 day s befor e the eff ective date of such notice; and (2) the rig hts of any bona fide tena nt, as of the date of such notice of

fore closure— (A ) u nd e r a ny bo na fi de le a se e nte re d into befor e the notice of for eclosure to occupy the pre mi s es until the end of the
re ma ini ngte rm

of the le a se , exce pt that a su c c e sso r i n inte re st m ay

te rm inate a

le a se e ff e c tiv e on the date of s a le of

the un it t o a purc ha se r who wi ll o c c up y the un it as a primary residenc e, subj ect to the rece ipt by th e te n an t o f

th e 9 0 d ay

n o ti c e under para g raph ( 1); or ( B ) w i th o u ta

l e a s e o r

w i tha l e a se terminable at will unde r state law, subjec t to the rec eipt by

the tenant of

the 90 day notice under

subsection (1). PTFA § 702(a ).
The p arti e s a c kn o w le d g e th at th e s tatute d o e s not e xplic itl y c re a te a pr ivate c a

us e of a c tio n be c a

us e no thi nginL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

14 the text of § 702(a) re fer ence s the avai l ab i l i t y of any action to enforc e the statute’ s provisions, describes a forum in which an enf orce ment suit may

be brought, or ident ifies a plaintiff fo r who m su c h a fo rum is ava ila ble

. Ac c or din g ly , a

ny pr ivate rig ht o f a c ti o n w it

h in § 7 0 2 ( a ) mu s t b e im p li e d f r o m the
s t a tu t e ’ s l an g u a g e , s tr

u c tur e , c o n t e x t , an d l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y. See O pera Plaza Residential Parce l Homeowners Ass’n v

. Hoang , 376 F.3d 831, 836 ( 9th Cir. 2004).

In Cor t v . A sh , the Supreme Court identified f our fa ctors that are re le va

nt fo r de te rm ini ng wh e the r a pr ivate re me dy is implicit i n a statute not expressly providing one: (1) whe ther the plaintiff is “ one of the class for whose espec ial benef it the statute was e nacte d”; (2) wh et her the re is “a ny indication of leg islative intent, ex plicit or i m p licit, either to cre ate suc h a
re me dy or to d e ny on e ” ; ( 3) wh e the r a

n im pli e d p ri va

te c a us e of ac tion for the pl aint iff is “c onsistent with the underlying purposes of the leg islative scheme” ; an d (4) whe ther the
cause of ac tion is “one traditionally rele g ated to st ate law

. . . so that it would be inappropriate to infer a ca u s e of a ction based solely

on fede ra l l aw .” 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (interna l quotation marks and cita t i o n s omitt ed). The Cor t test repla ced the understandingof private rig hts of action that had p r e v io u s ly

h e ld s w ay

—th at “ ‘ it

[w a s ] th e d

u ty o f the
c ourt s to be a le rt

to p ro vid e su c h re me die s a s are ne c e ssa ry to m ak e e f f e c t i v e th e c o n g r e s s i o n a l p ur p o s e ’ e x p r e s s e d

b y a statute.” Sandoval , 5 3 2 U. S

. at2 8 7 (qu o t i n g J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 3 7 7 U

. S. 4 2 6 , 4 3 3 ( 1 9 64)). Cort repr esente d a

“ re tr e a t[] fr om [the Sup re me Court ’s ] pr e vio us wi lli ng ne ss t o imply a cause of action wher e Congr ess ha[d] not p ro v i d ed one.” Corr. Serv. C o r

p

. v. Male

sko , 534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001).L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 15

W e al so p o i nt o ut that the val i d i t y of t he f o urt h C o rtf

act or— whe t her 5 t he cau s e of

a c t i on i s on e t r a di t i on a l l y r e l e g a t e d t o s t a t e l a w

— h a s been
c a lled into q u e stio n

. F i r s t P ac. B an cor p, I nc. v. H el

f er , 224 F. 3d 1117, 1 1 2 7 (9t h C i r. 20 0 0 ). R egard l ess , c o nsi d eri ng i t wo ul d not al t er our co ncl usi o n. T radit i o nal l y , l eases and evi ct i o n pro ceed i ngs are uni q u e ly
s t at e l aw ma t t er s s u ch t h at “ i t w ou l d be i n appr opr i at e t o i n f er a c au s e of act i on bas ed s ol el y on f eder al l aw. ” C o rt , 422 U

. S. a t 78. In later case s, the Supreme Court esse ntially collapsed the Cor t test into a single f

ocus: “[t] he ce ntral inquiry rema ins whether Congr ess intended to create, either e x pressly or by implication, a private c ause of action.” Tou c heRoss , 442 U .S. a t 57 5; se e als o Cal. v. Sierra Club , 4 5 1 U

. S. 287, 29 3 (1 98 1) (“ [T]he ult imate iss ue is wh e ther Cong re ss int e nd e d to c re ate a

pr ivate ri g ht o f a c tio n. ” ); Thompson v. Thompson , 4 8 4 U. S

. 1 7 4 , 1 8 9 (1 9 8 8 ) (S ca l i a, J

. , co n cu rr i n g) (“[W] e effe ct ively

overr uled the Cor t v . A sh ana ly sis in [ Tou c heRo ss ] . . . converting one of i t s fo u r factors (congressional intent) into th e d e te rm in a ti v e fa ctor . . . .”) (empha sis in original). Nonetheless, our court ha s found the fou r fa c tor

te st h e lpf

ul, and ha s c on tin

ue d to e mpl oy

it t o “guide [the] centr al projec t of discerningCongr ess’s intent.” Orkin v. Taylor , 487 F.3d 734, 739 ( 9th Cir. 2007).

Be cause the Supreme Court ha s elevated in tent into a supreme f actor , we star

t there a nd do not fee l constrained by the Cor t framework. As with any ca se involving 5
c on g re ssi on a l inte nt, we pr e sume that Cong re ss expr e sse d it s intent throug h the statutory languag e it chose. Conn. Nat’l Bank v . G e rm ain , 5 03 U. S. 2 49 , 2 53 –5 4 ( 19 92 ). We b e g in
our sea rch f or congressional intent with t h e l an g uag e and structure of the st at u t e, and the n look to legislative history only if the languag e is unclea

r, Alarcon v. Keller Indus., I nc. , 27 F .3 d 3 86 , 3 89 (9 th C ir . 1 99 4), or if the re is a c le arl y express ed co ntrary

intention in the legislative history thatL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

16

may overc ome the strongpresum p t i on that the statutory languag e re prese nts c ong ressional intent, Flores-Arellano v. I.N.S. , 5 F.3d 360, 362 ( 9th Cir. 1993).

No thi ngin t

he langua g e and str

uc tur e of § 7 02 (a ) r e fl e c ts a cle ar a nd unambig uou s i n t ent to cre ate a private r ight of action. See Gonzaga Univ. v. D oe , 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (“ [C]le ar a

nd un ambi g uo us te rm s” are “ re qu ir e d f or Con g re ss to c re a te ne w r ig hts e nf

or c eabl e un de r a

n im pli e d p ri vate ri ght o f act io n. ”). T he dif fi cul ty for L ogan i s t hatth e P TFA foc u s es on the “immediate suc cessor in interest” in the proper ty —in other words, the re g ulated par ty . Section 702(a) is frame d in terms of the obli g ations imposed on the regulated pa rt y (“ any imm e diate su c c e sso r in int e re st .

. . sh a ll a ssume su c h inte re st sub

je c t to

. . .” ), wh ile the “ bo na fi de te na nt” is ref ere nced only

as an obje ct of that oblig ation. Statutes containi n g gener al proscr iptions of activities or focusingon the re g ulated par

ty rathe r than the c las s of bene ficiar ies wh os e we lf

are Con g re ss i nte nd e d to fu rt he r “ do [] n ot i nd ic a te an intent to provide for

private r ights of a ction.” Sierra Club , 45 1 U .S. a t 29 4; see also Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 289.

No r do es th e PTF A p la c e L og an into a c la ss f or wh os e “espe cial” be nefit the statute wa s en ac ted. An “ espec ial ” benef iciary is not “simply

[one] who would benef

it from the Act”—othe rwise, the vic tim of any crime w ould be an espec ial benef

iciary of the c riminal statute’s proscr iption. Sierra Club , 4 51 U. S. at 29 3– 94 (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . It is tr ue that te na

nts wo uld be ne fi t f ro m th e Ac t’ s r e qu ir e me nts to p ro vid e 90 da

y s’ no tic e to v a c ate and

to a llo w t enan ts t o continue occ upying the premises until the end of the
rema ining lea se term, but t h e co n fer ral of be nefits is not enoug h. Id. a t 29 4 ( “ Th e qu est ion is no t si mpl y wh o w ou ld benef it from the Act, but whether Congr ess i ntended to conf erL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 17

fede ral rig hts upon those benef iciarie s

. ”) (citation omitted). Section 702’s fo cu s on the par ties regulated rather than the ind ivi du a ls ulti mate ly be ne fi te d by the statut e we ig hs a g a ins t implication of a private rig ht of ac tion.

L og an ar g u es that the title of the statute—“Prote cting Tena nts at Fore clos ure A ct of 2009” —evince s sufficient cong ressional intent to cre ate a fede ral rig ht in fav o r of tenan ts o f f

o r e c lo s e d p r o p e r

ti e s

. B u t, h e r e , th e ti tl e d oes no work in divining intent. Thoug h a statute’s title “ can be used to resolve[] ambig uity ,” it “ca nnot control t he plain mea ning of a statute.” Or e

go n Pub . Util . Co mm ’n v . I .C. C. , 979 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1992).

L ooking to the over all statutory scheme , we discove r that PTF A i s p art

of a larg e r f ra mework in wh ic h Co ng re ss d id provide a private cause of action for a differ ent specifie d claim. The PTFA was e nacte d as par t of the He lping Families Save The ir Homes Ac t of 2009 (“the Homes Ac t”). Pub. L

. No. 111-22, § 1(a) , 123 Stat. 1632, 163 2 (2009) ( D i v i s i o nA , un d e r

w h i c hth e P T F A a

p p e ar s a s T i t l e V II, §§ 701–04, “may b e ci ted as the ‘ HelpingFamilies S ave Their Home s Act of 2009.’ ”). Sec tion 404( a) o f t he Homes Ac t a dd e d a

no tic e re qu ir e me nt t o th e Tr uth in L e nd ingAc t, 15 U.S.C. § 1641, under which a ne w cr editor must notify the borrowe r in writing o f ce rt ain information no later than 30 day s after

a mortg ag e loan is transf err ed or a ssi gned. § 4 04(a ), 12 3 St at. a

t 16 58 . Se c tio n 4 04 (b ) t he n e xplic itl y ame nd e d th e pr ivate ri g ht of a c tio n pro vis ion of the Tr uth in L e nd ingAc t, 1 5 U .S. C. § 16 40 (a ), a llo wi ng “ any pe rs on ” to sue a c r e d it o r w h o f

a il s to c o mp ly w it

h th e n e w ly

enac ted notice re quirement or othe r re quirements under the Act f or damag es. § 404(b) , 123 Stat. at 1658.L OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

18
No s uch languag e ac companies § 702. Where a statutory scheme contains a pa

rticular express reme dy

or re medies, “a court must be cha

ry of re ading others into it.” Transamerica Mo rtg. A dv iso rs, In c . v. Le wis , 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). B e c a us e Con g re ss i nc lud e d a

n e xpre ss p ro vis ion

fo r p ri vate e nf or c e me nt u

nd e r on e se c tio n of the Ho me s Ac t, it is “ highly improbable that Cong ress a bsentmindedly forg ot to mention an intended pr iv ate action” in the PTFAsection. Id. at 20 (i nte rn a l quot a tio n mar

ks and c itatio n o mitte d) ; se e als o I n r e Digimarc Corp. DerivativeLiti g. , 5 49 F .3 d 1 22 3, 12 32 (9 th Cir. 2008) (“Wher e ana logous pr ovisions ex pressly provide fo r a pr ivate ri g ht o f a c tio n, we mus t in fe r t hat Co ngre ss d id not intend to cr ea te a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion in the statutory section at issue.” ) (inter nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The leg islative history of § 702(a) reinfor ces our dec ision not to impl y

a private rig ht of ac tion. L ike t he statutory la ng uag e itself, the leg islative history emphasizes compliance by landlords and f

orec losing lende rs. Then -S en ator John Ker ry , the bill’s primary

draf ter, pro claimed: “Alandlord should not be allowed to c ome in, c hang e the locks, and for ce out tenants who we re the re c om p l et ely leg itimately , with an
e xpe c t a t i o nth atth e y

w e r e c o m i n g h o m e t o th e i r s am e old home.” 155 Cong. Rec . S5111 (daily ed. May 5, 2009). After passag e of the l egislation, Senator Ke rry praised the Fe dera l Reserve and the De p ar t m ent of Housing and Urban De velopment for quic kly

issuing notifications outl ining “ how
r e g u l a t e d i n s t i tu t i o n s ar e e xp e c t e d

t o c o mp l y

w i thth e t e rm s of the a ct.” 155 Cong. Rec. S 8978 (daily ed. Aug . 6, 2009). Although the leg islative history undersc ores that the statute’s ultimate purpose is to benefi t tenants, s ee, e .g. , 155 Cong. Rec

. S 5 0 9 7 (daily ed. May 5, 2009) (“ IamL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK 19

of fe r i n g th i s am e n dm e n tt o a d dr e s s th e n e e d s o f r e n t e r s in pro p e rti e s th a t h av e b e e nf o r e c lo s e d

. ” ) ( s tate me n t o f Se n. JohnKe rr y ), it i s si le nt as to a

ny ri g ht o r r e me dy

fo r t e na nts

. Where the statutory

languag e and structure do not indicate a cong ressional intent to cre ate a private rig ht of ac tion, “silent leg islative history

prec ludes furthe r inquiry .” Helfer , 2 2 4 F. 3 d at1 1 2 5 (c i t i n g Te

x as In du s. , I

nc . v . R ad

c lif f Materials, Inc. , 451 U.S . 630 , 6 39 (19 81 )). W hen th e P TFA
wa s ame nd e d in July 20 10 to c lari fy the statut e and

e xten d it s a p p li c a ti o n , o n c e a g a in

Co n g r e s s w a s s il e n t—

b o th in th e te xt and in leg islative history

—with reg ard to any private right of action. Dodd- Fr ank Wall Street Ref o rm and Consumer Protection Act, P ub. L

. 111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010). B y

the time of the a

mendment, seve ral c ourts had deter mined that no private r emedy ex isted under the PTF A. See, e .g. , Cla re mo nt 1s t Stre e t In v esto rs v. Es pin oz a , No. CV10-3532, 2010 WL 2486804 (C.D. Cal. J un e 1 5 , 2010) (c on c lud ing t hat the re is n o p ri vate ri g ht o f a c tio n) ; Nativi , 20 10 WL21 79 88 5 ( same ); Bank of Ame rica, N.A. v. Owens , 90 3 N

. Y

. S. 2 d

6 6 7 ( Ro c h e s te r

Ci ty Ct

. 2 0 1 0 ) ( s ame )

. We
mus t pr e sume that Co ng re ss a c te d w ithawa re ness of th e se judicial decisions. See U nited S tates v. Alvare

z-Hernande

z , 478 F.3d 1060, 1065 ( 9th Cir. 2007).
Finall y , w e n o te th at t

h e PT F A ’ s n a ti o n w id e f e d e r al policy and re quirements ar e not re ndere d unenf o rc eable by the abse nce of

a fe dera l private rig ht of ac tion. S ee He l fer , 22 4 F. 3 d at 1126 (e x plaining that where Congr ess or a n administr ative ag ency

provided no e x plicit enforc ement mecha nism, “it is appropriate to infe r that Cong ress d i d not int e nd to e na c t un e nf

or c e a ble r e qu ir e me nts ” ). Th e PTF A i s framed in terms of “prote ctions” for tena nts, sugg esting that it was intended to provide a defe nse in state evic tion proce eding s rather

than a ba sis for offe nsive suits i n fede ralL OGAN V

. U. S. B ANK

20

court. Notice require ments are ty pically elements of unla

wful de t a i n e r a c t i o n s th at

c anb e e mp l o y e d

t o c h a l l e n g e a

s t a te eviction proc eedingby

showing that the notice r equire ment was not met. See, e .g. , Cal. Code Civ. P roc. § 1161 (r e qu ir ingthr e e da

y s’ no tic e to b e se rv e d o n th e te na nt i n wr iti ngc on ta ini ngsp e c if ie d in fo rm atio n) ; N e v. Re v. Stat. § 40.2516 (re quiring five da y s’ notice to be se rved on the te na nt in wri tin g ). Am ic i argue that de fe ns e of a state e vic tio n a c tio n w ou ld b e ina de qu ate to e nf or c e the P TF A i n states t hat allow the pur chase r at a fore closure sa le to remove a tena nt without judi cial proc ess. While we ar e troubled by
su c h a po ssi bil ity , w e have no t be e n p re se nte d w ithc on c re te fac ts in thi s case that allow us to evaluate that scena rio. Nor
can th is p o li cy

consideration override c ong ressional intent not to incorporate a pr ivate right of a ction. The intent of Congr ess rema ins the “ultimate issue.” Thompson , 4 84 U. S.
a t 17 9. B e c a

us e we c ann ot i nf

e r a c on g ressi on a l in te nt t o cre ate a private r ight of

action fr om t h e l anguag e of the statute, the statutory

structure , or any

o t h er s ource , “the
e sse nti a l pr e dic a te fo r imp lic atio n of a pr ivate re me dy

sim ply does not exist .” Id . (interna l quota t i on marks and c itation omitted). The district cour t’s dismiss al of L og an’s c omplaint is AF F IRMED.