UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

VINCENT N. LOUNCHI, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, 

United States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 21-9534 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Petitioner Vincent Nkameni Lounchi is a native and citizen of the Republic of 

Cameroon. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) after 

finding his testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

dismissed his appeal, finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 28, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Petitioner seeks review of the BIA’s order. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252, we deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings, 

alleging Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an applicant 

for admission without valid entry and travel documents. He admitted the factual 

allegations and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief on the ground 

that he fled Cameroon to escape persecution based on his political opinion. 

1. Testimony and Documents 

Petitioner testified he joined the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), a 

political party that advocates for the independence of southern Cameroon, in 2015, and 

that he fled Cameroon after being detained in harsh conditions, threatened, and beaten by 

gendarmes because of his of his anti-government and separatist political opinion. 

Petitioner testified he participated in a protest march organized by the SCNC in 

2016 during which police surrounded the protesters and arrested many of them, but he 

escaped. He testified further that during a 2017 protest march, an officer who had 

arrested Petitioner for refusing to pay money at a checkpoint recognized him and told 

other officers to arrest him, but he eluded them. Soon thereafter, he moved to another 

city because he feared being arrested. 

Petitioner also described an incident where, one morning at about 5:30 when he 

was preparing to go to a 6:00 church service, he responded to a knock at the door, 

thinking it was his friend he was staying with. He opened the door to two officers and 

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tried to run back inside. The officers apprehended and arrested him. He testified that 

they were in the house for only a few minutes. They took him to a gendarme camp 

where they detained him in a crowded cell for eight days. Guards beat and interrogated 

him twice daily, and doused him with dirty water before each beating. He sustained 

wounds on his face, knees, legs, and laps. On the eighth day, while being transported to a 

maximum-security prison, Petitioner escaped during a restroom break. 

Petitioner returned to the city where he spent nights in different places to avoid 

being identified and arrested. A family friend who was a police commissioner told him 

to leave the country and gave him a copy of a warrant that had been issued for his arrest. 

Petitioner claimed that, while he was en route to the United States, gunmen in 

Colombia robbed the group he was travelling with, taking his passport and some of his 

money. They did not take the other identification documents and the almost $300 in cash 

he had when he arrived in the United States. He testified the robbers rummaged through 

his bag and that he did not have all of his money in the bag. 

Petitioner also submitted documentary evidence, including an official criminal 

history document, his friend’s affidavit, and a photograph that he testified depicted his 

arrest. He said an unknown neighbor took the picture and gave it to the friend who then 

gave it to Petitioner’s wife. The friend’s affidavit said the neighbor showed him the 

picture, but it did not say the neighbor gave him the picture or that he gave it to 

Petitioner’s wife. The picture showed Petitioner with his hands handcuffed in front of 

him. Petitioner testified the officers handcuffed him in front because he was struggling 

and resisting arrest. 

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It was daylight in the picture. After counsel for DHS pointed out that the sun did 

not rise until 6:22 that morning so it would have been dark at 5:30, Petitioner insisted it 

was light out when he was arrested and said the arrest occurred during the “dry season” 

when “the sun comes out earlier.” R. at 329. He also said that it was about 5:30 when 

the officers arrived and that some time passed by the time they dragged him outside 

where the neighbor took the picture. When reminded of his earlier testimony that the 

officers were inside for only a few minutes, he said he “wasn’t paying attention to the 

clock . . . but it took a while.” R. at 364. And when questioned about his earlier 

testimony that he was getting ready for a 6:00 church service when the officers arrived, 

Petitioner insisted that it was typically light out when he walked to church. Counsel for 

DHS asked the IJ to take administrative notice of the time of the sunrise the day of 

Petitioner’s arrest as reflected in a printout from the internet. Petitioner’s counsel did not 

object. The IJ granted the request, noting that the time of sunrise was a “scientific fact” 

appropriate for administrative notice. R. at 365. 

Petitioner also submitted what he said was the April 2017 arrest warrant he said 

his police commissioner friend had given him and a June 2017 criminal history 

document. When asked why the criminal history document showed no arrest warrants 

against him, he said it was the result of the Cameroonian government’s dysfunction and 

faulty record keeping. 

2. The IJ’s Decision 

The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for relief after finding him not credible 

because he “provided inconsistent testimony, many of his claims were implausible, he 

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submitted documents that were not genuine, and his demeanor changed noticeably during 

portions of cross-examination” when challenged about inconsistencies in his evidence. 

R. at 84. In support of that determination, the IJ found the photo was “staged” and that 

Petitioner’s testimony about it was “untruthful[].” Id. The IJ explained that (1) the photo 

supposedly depicted Petitioner being dragged away, but it was “clear that the subjects in 

the picture [were] not moving” and that the officers “posed to create a look that they” 

were dragging him; (2) he did not convincingly explain why it was daylight in the picture 

given his testimony regarding the time of his arrest; (3) contrary to his claim that he was 

handcuffed with his arms in front because he was resisting arrest, he was likely 

handcuffed with his arms in front because if his arms had been behind him “as would be 

expected, he would have been dragged with his face towards the ground, which would 

not have served [his] purposes in having his face appear in the picture”; and (4) his “story 

about the photo’s origin [was] implausible” because it was unlikely an unknown neighbor 

would be outside the friend’s house at 5:30 a.m. and take one “perfectly centered and 

nearly perfectly timed” picture. R. at 85. 

The IJ identified other aspects of Petitioner’s evidence that undermined his 

credibility, including that it was “unclear who [he] actually is,” because he failed to prove 

his identity, and his claim that robbers stole his passport but not his money and other 

identification documents was implausible. R. at 85. The IJ also noted discrepancies 

between what Petitioner told the asylum officer and what he said in his 2014 visa 

application about his marital status, and the IJ did not believe his statement to the asylum 

officer that he had forgotten his wife’s name and referred to her by the wrong name 

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because their relationship “had been so bad.” R. at 86. Further, the IJ found the arrest 

warrant was “not legitimate” because the official criminal history document showed there 

were no outstanding warrants for him, and the body of the warrant was in French, not in 

English and French, as a Cameroonian warrant would be. R. at 86 & n.5. 

Finally, the IJ found Petitioner’s demeanor during cross-examination 

demonstrated a lack of credibility. In contrast to his “calm” demeanor on direct 

examination, Petitioner became defensive and animated when cross-examined about 

inconsistencies in his story. The IJ also noted that Petitioner was “often evasive in 

answering direct questions,” “went off on a tangent,” or referred to documents he had 

with him “instead of just answering questions based on his recollection.” R. at 87. 

3. The BIA’s Decision 

The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination was “based on specific and cogent reasons” and was not clearly erroneous. 

R. at 3. The BIA acknowledged Petitioner’s arguments challenging each of the IJ’s 

findings, but found they did not “adequately reconcile[] the credibility issues” the IJ 

identified. R. at 5. In particular, the BIA upheld the IJ’s findings that the arrest warrant 

was not legitimate and that Petitioner’s testimony about the circumstances 

surrounding his arrest and the photo was not credible. The IJ also upheld the IJ’s 

finding that it was implausible that robbers would take Petitioner’s passport but not all of 

his money, explaining that it was not “illogical or without support in inferences that may 

be drawn from the evidence.” R. at 5. In so holding, the BIA noted that it might have 

reached a different conclusion if it were the factfinder but recognized that it was not at 

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liberty to “substitute its own view of the evidence” for the IJ’s. R. at 8. Finally, the BIA 

found no clear error in the IJ’s demeanor finding. And, having concluded that the IJ’s 

adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous, the BIA held that the IJ 

properly denied Petitioner’s applications because without credible testimony, he could 

not establish his eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. 

DISCUSSION 

Where, as here, a single BIA member issues a brief order deciding the merits of an 

appeal, we review the BIA’s order and consult the IJ’s decision when necessary to 

understand the grounds for the BIA’s decision. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 

1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). 

The BIA reviews an IJ’s credibility findings “for clear error, and only clear error.” 

Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008). It may not substitute its 

judgment for the IJ’s because when “there are two permissible views of the evidence . . . 

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). When the BIA’s application of the clear error standard amounts to a 

factual determination, we review its decision under the deferential substantial-evidence 

standard. Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1244. 

Under that standard, “our duty is to guarantee that factual determinations are 

supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a 

whole.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004). We ensure that the IJ 

gives “specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving [the alien’s] testimony,” Elzour v. 

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 

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does not base an implausibility finding on “speculation, conjecture, or unsupported 

personal opinion,” id. at 1153. But we do not reweigh the evidence or “question 

credibility findings that are substantially reasonable.” Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 

1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency’s factual 

findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, if the evidence and 

reasonable inferences support conflicting versions of events, we may not disturb the 

BIA’s choice between them. To reverse its decision “we must find that the evidence not 

only supports [Petitioner’s] conclusion, but compels it.” I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). 

Petitioner contends the BIA erred by (1) upholding the IJ’s administrative notice 

decision; (2) finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination; and 

(3) failing to consider evidence apart from the adverse credibility determination. 

1. Administrative Notice 

Petitioner takes issue with the administrative notice decision because counsel for 

DHS did not explain why the website was a credible and authoritative source. He also 

contends the IJ did not evaluate “the reliability and scholarship of the information,” and 

should have “substantiate[d] [the information DHS provided] with [the opinion of] an 

expert witness.” Pet. Br. at 18-19.1

 

1

 We note that, because Petitioner did not object to DHS’s administrative 

notice request when given an opportunity to do so at the hearing, the BIA could have 

declined to address the issue on waiver grounds. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 

483 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2007). 

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An agency may take administrative notice of a fact that is “not subject to 

reasonable dispute” because it is “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” de la Llana-Castellon v. 

I.N.S., 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scientific 

facts such as when the sun rose or set on a particular day are among “the kinds of things 

about which courts ordinarily” take notice. Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 

(11th Cir. 1997); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 12 (1929) 

(taking judicial notice of the time of sunrise and light conditions). And it is not 

uncommon for courts to take notice of “factual information found on the world wide 

web.” O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007). 

The BIA rejected Petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s decision because he failed to 

“present any evidence or otherwise sufficiently demonstrate on appeal how the 

administratively noticed fact is subject to reasonable dispute.” R. at 4. We agree—the 

time of sunrise the day of Petitioner’s arrest is easily verifiable, and he presented no 

evidence establishing either that the time shown on the printout was inaccurate or that the 

website was an unreliable source.2

 

2. Adverse Credibility Determination 

Petitioner next contends the BIA erred in concluding the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination was not clearly erroneous. Specifically, he claims the record does not 

2

 Petitioner’s citation to cases discrediting Wikipedia articles is unhelpful 

because the website at issue here is not Wikipedia. 

 

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support the IJ’s findings that the arrest photo was staged and that his story about the theft 

of his passport was implausible.3

 But he concedes “the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination is supported by permissible views of the evidence.” Pet. Br. at 27. While 

he argues there is record support for a contrary finding, this argument is insufficient to 

show the agency decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. at 481 n.1. 

Considering the record as a whole, we conclude the BIA’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence. The IJ gave specific, cogent reasons for finding Petitioner not 

credible and properly based that determination on inconsistencies in his testimony, 

inconsistencies between his testimony and his documentary evidence, inconsistencies in 

his documents, concerns about his demeanor, and the conclusion that key aspects of his 

story were implausible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that an IJ “may 

base a credibility determination on the [applicant’s] demeanor, candor, or 

responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, 

“without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim”); Elzour, 

378 F.3d at 1152. The BIA correctly rejected Petitioner’s assertion that the IJ was 

required to credit his explanations. See Matter of D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 455 (B.I.A. 

2011) (an IJ “is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if plausible, where 

there are other permissible views of the evidence based on the record.”). And while 

3

 Petitioner does not challenge and has therefore waived any arguments he 

might have made regarding other aspects of the BIA’s review of the IJ’s adverse 

credibility determination. See Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1248 (arguments not raised or 

inadequately briefed are waived). 

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reasonable minds could differ about the plausibility of Petitioner’s testimony regarding 

his arrest, the photo, and the passport theft, substantial evidence—including the 

administratively noticed fact of the time of sunrise the day of his arrest and the IJ’s 

unchallenged demeanor finding—supports the BIA’s determination. See Chaib v. 

Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that an incredibility 

determination may be based on inherent inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony, the 

implausibility of his story, and testimonial demeanor). 

3. Other Evidence 

We also reject Petitioner’s contention that the BIA erred by denying his 

applications for relief based solely on the adverse credibility determination. 

An applicant’s testimony, if credible, may be enough to satisfy his burden of 

establishing entitlement to relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (asylum); id.

§ 1231(b)(3)(C) (withholding) (incorporating asylum standards); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(2) (CAT relief). Conversely, if the agency determines that his testimony is 

not credible, it may deny relief on that basis alone. See id.

The record indicates that the IJ considered Petitioner’s other evidence and found it 

insufficient to support his applications absent credible testimony from him. We presume 

the BIA reviewed the complete record as well. See Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246, 

1252 (10th Cir. 2004). The BIA mentioned some of Petitioner’s other evidence in 

outlining the factual background and his testimony, and the fact that it did not expressly 

discuss each piece of evidence or explain why the other evidence was insufficient to 

overcome the adverse credibility determination does not mean it failed to consider his 

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evidence. See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 648 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). Its 

decision appropriately focused on Petitioner’s credibility, and we find no error in its 

conclusion that his lack of credible testimony prevented him from establishing his 

entitlement to relief. See Matter of M-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 125, 129 (B.I.A. 1995) (“A 

persecution claim which lacks veracity cannot satisfy the burdens of proof and persuasion 

necessary to establish eligibility for asylum and withholding relief.”).4

 

Finally, Petitioner argues the BIA “failed to comply with its own regulations and 

erred in failing to submit this case to a three-member panel for decision.” Pet. Br. at 2. 

But he does not develop this argument beyond this one-sentence assertion, and he does 

not even acknowledge the criteria for assigning a three-judge panel, see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(e)(6), much less argue those criteria were satisfied here. Accordingly, we 

decline to address it. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). 

CONCLUSION 

We deny the petition for review. 

Entered for the Court 

Joel M. Carson III 

Circuit Judge 

4

 We are not persuaded otherwise by Petitioner’s citation to out-of-circuit 

authority holding that an IJ may not deny relief on the basis of incredible testimony 

alone if other objective evidence supports the applicant’s claim for relief. Those 

cases are inapposite here because the other evidence Petitioner submitted in support 

of his persecution claim was either not individualized (the country conditions 

evidence) or not objective (his friends’ and family members’ affidavits and letters). 

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