1

Filed 8/28/24 Northcoast Environmental Center v. County of Humboldt CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

NORTHCOAST ENVIRONMENTAL 

CENTER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents,

ROLLING MEADOW RANCH, LLC,

et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest and 

Respondents.

 

 A167278

 (Humboldt County

 Super. Ct. No. CV2100518)

Northcoast Environmental Center, Redwood Region Audubon Society, 

Citizens for a Sustainable Humboldt, and Mary Gaterud (collectively 

plaintiffs) appeal a trial court judgment denying their petition for writ of 

mandate alleging violations of the California Environmental Quality Act

(CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.)

1 and Planning and Zoning Law

(Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.). Plaintiffs seek to overturn the decision of 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Public 

Resources Code.
2

defendants County of Humboldt and its board of supervisors (collectively 

County) to adopt a mitigated negative declaration and approve conditional 

use permits allowing Rolling Meadow Ranch, LLC and Rolling Meadow 

Ranch, Inc. (collectively Rolling Meadow) to operate a cannabis cultivation 

and processing project (project). Plaintiffs contend that the County should 

have required preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) and that 

the project is inconsistent with the Humboldt County General Plan (General 

Plan) and the County’s State Responsibility Area Fire Safe Regulations

(Humboldt County Code, § 3111-1 et seq.)

2 (SRA Regulations). We disagree 

and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Rolling Meadow proposes to develop a cannabis cultivation and 

processing operation on 8.5 acres of its 7,110-acre ranch. The ranch—

historically used for ranching and timber operations—is located on the Eel 

River and is comprised of agricultural and timber land. The project will

include 16 greenhouses—divided among four separate areas—and five 

processing buildings. The project will be attended by a maximum of 30

employees each day. 

Rolling Meadow first applied for conditional use permits in 2016. The 

first initial study was prepared in 2017 and, following multiple rounds of 

feedback from the County and project revisions by Rolling Meadow, the 

County circulated for public review and comment a July 2020 initial study

and draft mitigated negative declaration. Rolling Meadow thereafter revised 

the project based on comments received. Rolling Meadow submitted a revised 

2 Further references to County Code are to the Humboldt County Code.
3

initial study and mitigated negative declaration (MND) in November 2020.

3 

The County provided notice of its intent to adopt the MND and circulated it

for a 30-day public review and comment period. After the review period 

closed, the County’s planning commission (Planning Commission) held a 

public hearing on the project. The Planning Commission adopted the MND, 

found that the project complied with the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance, 

and approved the conditional use permits. Three individuals (administrative 

appellants) appealed the Planning Commission’s decision.4

After holding a public hearing on the appeal, the board of supervisors

(the Board) adopted CEQA findings, including finding that a mitigated 

negative declaration was appropriate because there was substantial evidence 

that the project may have a significant effect on the environment, but project 

revisions would avoid or mitigate the effects, and that certain other 

impacts—including hydrology and water quality, utilities, and wildfire—were 

less than significant and did not require mitigation. The Board also found 

the project conformed to the General Plan. The Board adopted the findings 

set forth in its resolution, adopted the MND, denied the appeal, approved the 

six conditional use permits, adopted conditions of approval, and adopted a

mitigation monitoring and report program. 

In July 2021, plaintiffs filed the operative first amended petition for 

writ of mandate (petition), which alleged causes of action for violations of 

3 While the document was titled “initial study and environmental 

checklist,” the County clarified that it was an initial study and mitigated 

negative declaration. (Boldface, italics, and capitalization omitted.) Further 

reference to “MND” refers to the initial study and mitigated negative 

declaration. 

4 The administrative appellants are not plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 
4

CEQA and the Planning and Zoning Law.5 After briefing and oral argument, 

the trial court denied the petition. In a written order, the court determined

plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing there was substantial evidence 

of a fair argument that the project may have a significant effect on the 

environment, and it rejected plaintiffs’ arguments related to consistency with 

the General Plan. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. CEQA 

Plaintiffs contend the project has not been properly analyzed for 

significant environmental effects related to its reliance on on-site wells for 

water, the unstudied use of lignin oil for dust suppression, power 

infrastructure, and wildfire risks. They argue that the County should have 

required preparation of an EIR.

1. CEQA Principles and Standard of Review

“CEQA reflects the California state policy that ‘the long-term protection 

of the environment, consistent with the provision of a decent home and 

suitable living environment for every Californian, shall be the guiding 

criterion in public decisions.’ (§ 21001, subd. (d).) ‘[T]o implement this 

policy,’ CEQA and the Guidelines[6]‘have established a three-tiered process to 

ensure that public agencies inform their decisions with environmental 

considerations.’ [Citation.] A public agency must ‘conduct a preliminary 

5 Plaintiffs alleged a fifth cause of action for declaratory relief, which 

they subsequently dismissed. 

6 All references to “Guideline” or “Guidelines” are to the Guidelines 

codified in the California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq.

They are guidelines for the implementation of CEQA, developed by the 

Governor’s Office of Planning and Research and adopted by the Secretary of 

the Resources Agency. (§ 21083.)
5

review in order to determine whether CEQA applies to a proposed activity.’ 

[Citation.] At this stage, the agency must determine whether any of CEQA’s 

statutory exemptions apply. [Citation.] If the project is in an exempt 

category for which there is no exception, ‘ “no further environmental review is 

necessary.” ’ [Citations.]

“If the project is not exempt from CEQA, the next step is to conduct an 

initial study. [Citation.] The initial study determines whether there is 

‘ “substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the 

environment.” ’ [Citation.] If there is no such evidence, ‘ “CEQA excuses the 

preparation of an EIR and allows the use of a negative declaration . . . .” ’

[Citation.] If there is such evidence, ‘ “but revisions in the project plans 

‘would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no 

significant effect on the environment would occur’ and there is no substantial 

evidence that the project as revised may have a significant effect on the 

environment, [an MND] may be used.” ’ [Citation.]

“If neither type of negative declaration is appropriate, the final step is 

to prepare an EIR. [Citation.] Given that ‘the EIR is the “heart of CEQA,” ’

doubts about whether an EIR is required are resolved in favor of preparing 

one. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶]

“The lead agency must prepare an EIR ‘whenever substantial evidence 

supports a fair argument that a proposed project “may have a significant 

effect on the environment.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The fair argument standard is a 

“low threshold” test for requiring the preparation of an EIR.’ [Citation.] 

‘[F]acts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion 

supported by facts’ all constitute ‘[s]ubstantial evidence’ of a significant effect 

on the environment, and ‘[a]rgument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or 

narrative, or evidence that is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or evidence that 
6

is not credible’ do not.” (Parker Shattuck Neighbors v. Berkeley City Council

(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 768, 776–777 (Parker Shattuck).) “ ‘ “ ‘Significant 

effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially substantial, 

adverse change in the environment.” ’ ” (Pocket Protectors v. City of 

Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903, 927.) “As long as there is 

substantial evidence of a potential significant environmental effect, ‘contrary 

evidence is not adequate to support a decision to dispense with an EIR.’ ” 

(Parker Shattuck, at p. 777.) 

The standard of review in a CEQA case is prejudicial abuse of 

discretion, which is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner 

required by law, or the determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011)

52 Cal.4th 155, 171.) The “appellate court’s review ‘is the same as the trial 

court’s: [It] reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that 

sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.’ ” (Protecting Our 

Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th

479, 495.)

When reviewing an agency’s determination to adopt a mitigated 

negative declaration, and thus dispose of an EIR, “we must determine 

whether the record contains substantial evidence supporting a ‘fair argument’

that the project[] will have a significant impact on the environment.” 

(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51, 87.) “ ‘ “[T]he 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a fair argument” ’ is a question of law. 

[Citation.] When determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a 

fair argument, ‘deference to the agency’s determination is not appropriate 

and its decision not to require an EIR can be upheld only when there is no 
7

credible evidence to the contrary.’ ” (Parker Shattuck, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 777–778.) 

Plaintiffs have “the burden of proof ‘to demonstrate by citation to the 

record the existence of substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of 

significant environmental impact.’ [Citation.] ‘Unless the administrative 

record contains this evidence, and [plaintiffs] cite[ ] to it, no “fair argument”

that an EIR is necessary can be made.’ ” (Parker Shattuck, supra, 

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 778.) If plaintiffs demonstrate that substantial 

evidence of an unmitigated impact exists, then we must conclude the County

abused its discretion by not preparing an EIR. (McCann v. City of San Diego, 

supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 87.)

“Reviewing courts also examine whether the agency’s decision to adopt 

a negative declaration is based on a factual analysis of the project’s potential 

impacts.” (2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental 

Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2024) § 6.75.) “The agency’s decision can be 

invalidated if it appears the agency did not actually evaluate the question 

whether significant effects might result.” (Ibid.) When the agency has failed 

to study a potential environmental impact, “a fair argument may be based on 

the limited facts in the record. Deficiencies in the record may actually 

enlarge the scope of fair argument by lending a logical plausibility to a wider 

range of inferences.” (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 

202 Cal.App.3d 296, 311 (Sundstrom).) While an “ ‘agency [will] not be 

allowed to hide behind its own failure to gather relevant data,’ ” the ultimate 

issue is “the validity of the lead agency’s adoption of a negative declaration.” 

(Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1378–1379 (Gentry).)

It “ ‘remains the appellant’s burden to demonstrate by citation to the record 

the existence of substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of 
8

significant environmental impact.’ [Citation.] ‘An absence of evidence in the 

record on a particular issue does not automatically invalidate a negative 

declaration. “The lack of study is hardly evidence that there will be a 

significant impact.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1379.) 

2. Hydrology and Water Quality

Plaintiffs contend the project has not been properly analyzed for 

significant environmental impacts related to hydrology/water quality. They

argue that the County failed to proceed in a manner required by law, and

that there is a fair argument that the project’s water demands may have a 

significant effect on the environment. 

The project is located on the bank of the Eel River and there are 

multiple streams within the project vicinity. The MND explained that all 

“water used in cultivation, processing, and employee needs will be sourced 

on-site from wells.” In June 2019, Rolling Meadow had three wells drilled 

and tested for yield. The MND concluded that based on the project’s water 

needs, the wells would provide “more than sufficient water supply” for the 

project. In addition to the wells, the project will collect storm water, which 

will be used for landscaping, fire protection, and supplemental water for dust 

mitigation. In going through the checklist

7 for hydrology and water quality 

impacts, the MND concluded the project would not substantially decrease 

groundwater supplies or interfere substantially with groundwater recharge. 

The MND explained the wells are not hydrologically connected to any surface 

7 “The checklist promulgated in the Guidelines asks the lead agency to 

characterize each factor as potentially significant, less than significant with 

mitigation incorporated, less than significant, or having no impact. 

(Guidelines, appen. G.)” (Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Assn. v. City 

of Santa Cruz (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1005 (Ocean Street).)
9

water or any part of a larger shallow homogeneous aquifer. The wells do not

draw from a contiguous shallow aquifer as they are spread over miles of hilly 

terrain at different elevations. 

a. Inconsistency in Documentation Regarding Wells

Plaintiffs contend the County failed to proceed in the manner required 

by law because its conclusions that there are no substantial impacts related 

to hydrology or water quality were based on conclusions which relied on 

contradictory facts. The well completion reports submitted by the well 

driller, David Fisch, located one of the wells on one parcel, 140 feet from 

Beatty Creek, while other maps included in the MND located that well on a 

different parcel, farther away from a watercourse. Based on this, plaintiffs

argue the conclusions are unsupported and the analysis incomplete.8

The County and Rolling Meadow argue plaintiffs may not raise this 

argument based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies and forfeiture 

for not raising this issue before the trial court.9 We reject their claim of 

failure to exhaust. As plaintiffs demonstrate, a letter from Pacific Watershed 

Associates (PWA)—retained by the administrative appellants—raised this 

issue during the administrative process and fairly apprised the County of the 

concern. (See Save the Agoura Cornell Knoll v. City of Agoura Hills (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 665, 677 (Agoura); Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104–1105.)

8 The purposes of an initial study include to provide documentation of 

the factual basis for the finding in a negative declaration that a project will 

not have a significant effect on the environment. (Guidelines, § 15063, 

subd. (c)(5).)

9 The County and Rolling Meadow filed a joint opposition brief. 
10

We agree, however, with the County and Rolling Meadow’s contention 

that plaintiffs forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time on 

appeal. (See Ocean Street, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–1009 [plaintiff

forfeited argument by failing to raise it in the trial court].) Plaintiffs did not 

argue this issue about well location in their trial court briefing on the merits 

of the petition. Plaintiffs do not point to their trial court briefs or oral 

argument. Instead, they only point to the petition itself. In their petition, 

they alleged the project description was legally inadequate because it failed 

to accurately and consistently describe and define project characteristics in 

sufficient detail to enable impact analysis. They alleged the water supply 

analysis was inadequate because it presented conflicting information 

regarding groundwater use and the use of captured rainwater, undermining 

its ability to accurately disclose, analyze, or mitigate water supply impacts. 

They alleged there was not proper analysis of the hydrologic connectivity 

between the well groundwater and surface waters, but plaintiffs point to 

nothing in their petition that addresses the argument they now make. In any 

event, even if it had been alleged in the petition, it was not raised to the trial 

court on the merits. Plaintiffs cite no authority that asserting an allegation

in a petition is the equivalent of raising that issue to the trial court in 

deciding the merits. Therefore, we will not address this argument.

b. Reasonably Foreseeable Future Activities

Plaintiffs contend the County failed to proceed in the manner required 

by law because it did not analyze reasonably foreseeable groundwater 
11

impacts.

10 They contend it is reasonably foreseeable that the wells will be 

insufficient to supply project water needs, but the MND did not address this.

In 2019, Fisch drilled the three on-site wells. In June 2019, he

measured the water levels and yields of the wells based on a four-hour test. 

For each well he provided the estimated yield, remarking that it “[m]ay not 

be representative of a well’s long term yield.” The project will use 

approximately 4,628,200 gallons of water annually for year-round operations

(12,680 gallons per day). Relying on the well yield tests, the MND stated, 

“Assuming year-round flow rates as tested, the project could produce a 

combined average of 63 gpm [gallons per minute]; 63 gpm would result in 

90,720 gallons in 24[ hours] and a more than sufficient water supply for the 

projected project needs.”

Plaintiffs contend that this assumption of year-round flow rates as 

tested by Fisch was impermissible speculative analysis, relying on Vineyard 

Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 412 (Vineyard). There, in addressing whether an EIR provided 

adequate information for the long-term provision of water to a development 

project, the Supreme Court explained that “CEQA’s informational purposes 

are not satisfied by an EIR that simply ignores or assumes a solution to the 

problem of supplying water to a proposed land use project.” (Id. at pp. 430–

431.) The “future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a 

likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic 

allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under 

CEQA.” (Id. at p. 432.) The “EIR’s discussion must include a reasoned 

10 Preparing a negative declaration “involves some degree of 

forecasting. While foreseeing the unforeseeable is not possible, an agency 

must use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can.” 

(Guidelines, § 15144.)
12

analysis of the circumstances affecting the likelihood of the water’s 

availability.” (Ibid.)

Unlike in Vineyard—which involved a challenge to an EIR, not an 

initial study and negative declaration11—here the record demonstrates that 

the conclusion about water supply is not speculative. In its report to the 

Planning Commission, in response to concerns regarding well production 

tests not being performed during the dry season, staff replied that it did not 

preclude well production information from being utilized for review. Staff 

explained that the wells tested at a combined total of 63 gallons per minute 

which, if operated at that level, would provide all the water needed for the 

project in 51 days. If the wells were only operated for 12 hours a day and

yielded half the tested flow, the total water demand could still be provided in 

204 days. Staff concluded there “is not a doubt that there is sufficient water 

to accommodate this use.” Plaintiffs do not point to any record evidence that 

it is reasonably foreseeable that the wells will be unable to supply the 

project’s water needs. (See Rominger v. County of Colusa (2014) 

229 Cal.App.4th 690, 712 (Rominger) [plaintiffs did not point to any evidence 

in the record that certain uses were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 

the project].)

Plaintiffs next take issue with the conditions of approval regarding 

water use. Staff stated, “Conditions of approval require the applicant to 

meter water use to demonstrate that the well meets the water demand and 

provide evidence of metering at the time of annual inspection. Should the 

wells not provide sufficient water for the operation, the applicant is required 

11 “An initial study is only a ‘preliminary analysis’ [citation] and the 

regulatory requirements regarding its contents are not as demanding as 

those imposed upon an EIR.” (Lighthouse Field Beach Rescue v. City of Santa 

Cruz (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1192.) 
13

to modify this permit and propose a different non-divisionary [sic] source of 

water, such as rain catchment and/or reduce the size of the cultivation area 

to be consistent with water availability. As conditioned, the project therefore 

conforms to the performance standards for water.”

Plaintiffs contend this language was not actually adopted as a condition 

of approval, and they argue that the conditions which were adopted do not 

require Rolling Meadow to modify the permit should there be insufficient 

water. The County and Rolling Meadow argue plaintiffs forfeited this 

argument because they did not raise it to the trial court, and that plaintiffs

waived this argument by not citing to legal authority or the record. We agree

with the County and Rolling Meadow. Plaintiffs cite only one page of their 

trial brief, where they argued that the MND assumed sufficient groundwater 

for the project in perpetuity, which was an inadequate analysis. Plaintiffs

urged that the analysis should have identified alternative sources of water

and analyzed the environmental impacts caused by using those sources.

What plaintiffs do not show, however, is that they made an argument to the 

trial court which they make here—arguing that language in the staff reports 

was not included in the adopted conditions of approval and challenging the 

approved conditions. (See Ocean Street, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–

1009.) Additionally, in challenging the conditions of approval, plaintiffs do 

not cite the record or legal authority,

12 and the heading for this section in 

12 We observe that throughout the discussion section of their opening 

brief, plaintiffs cite little legal authority or, more frequently, none. They 

merely provide “supra” references to a previous section on the standards of 

review. “We are not required to develop appellants’ arguments for them. 

[Citation.] ‘We may and do “disregard conclusory arguments that are not 

supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by 

which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.” ’ ” (Los 
14

their opening brief, titled “[the County and Rolling Meadow] did not address 

the reasonably foreseeable insufficiency of wells to supply project needs,” does 

not mention conditions. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) We conclude 

plaintiffs have forfeited and waived any challenge to the conditions of 

approval. (See Los Angeles Unified, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498 

[plaintiffs must provide cogent argument supported by legal analysis and 

citation to the record]; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of 

Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310 [“ ‘Failure to provide proper 

headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly 

identified by a heading.’ ”].)

Finally, to the extent plaintiffs argue the County improperly deferred 

the issue of water supply for future analysis, we are not persuaded. This 

argument is not fully developed by plaintiffs. (See Los Angeles Unified, 

supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498 [we are not required to develop 

plaintiffs’ arguments for them].) Plaintiffs again rely on Vineyard, supra, 

40 Cal.4th at page 431, where the Supreme Court stated, “[T]he future water 

sources for a large land use project and the impacts of exploiting those 

sources are not the type of information that can be deferred for future 

analysis.” Here, there is no demonstration that the County deferred analysis. 

Sufficient long term water supply did not need to be demonstrated “with 

certainty”; it just needed to “show a likelihood water would be available, over 

the long term, for this project.” (Id. at p. 441.)

Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 

57 Cal.App.5th 480, 497–498 (Los Angeles Unified); see also Cinema West, 

LLC v. Baker (2017)13 Cal.App.5th 194, 219 (Cinema West) [“ ‘appellant must 

present argument and authorities on each point to which error is asserted, or 

else the issue is waived’ ”]; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 

37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [an issue raised but unsupported with 

reasoned argument, citations to authority, and record citations is waived].)
15

c. Fair Argument of Significant Effect on the Environment

Plaintiffs contend substantial evidence exists to support a fair 

argument that the project’s water demands may have a significant effect on 

hydrology or water quality. We disagree.

The MND assessed potential hydrology and water quality impacts by 

going through the checklist and it found each impact was less than 

significant or nonexistent. It concluded, among other things, that the project 

would not substantially decrease groundwater supplies or interfere 

substantially with groundwater recharge. The MND also concluded the 

project would have sufficient water supplies to serve the project, including 

during dry years.13

The MND explained the project will use approximately 4,628,200 

gallons of water per year, with daily water use of 12,680 gallons. In testing, 

the three wells yielded 13 gallons per minute, 20 gallons per minute, and 30

gallons per minute. As explained above, the MND concluded the wells would 

provide a more than sufficient supply of water for the project’s needs. 

Additionally, storm water will be collected and stored near each greenhouse. 

In commenting on the MND regarding well productivity, PWA

challenged the well yield tests being conducted in June instead of during the 

dry season of August through September. County staff replied that this did 

not preclude the well production information from being utilized for review. 

Staff explained that the wells tested at a combined total of 63 gallons per 

minute which, if operated at that level, would provide all the water needed 

for the project in 51 days. If the wells were only operated for 12 hours a day 

and at half the tested yield, the total water demand could still be provided in 

13 This conclusion was part of the assessment of utilities and service 

systems impacts. 
16

204 days. Staff replied there “is not a doubt that there is sufficient water to 

accommodate this use.” 

Regarding hydrologic connectivity, the MND cited to Fisch, the well 

driller, who had stated, “ ‘The wells were completed in the Franciscan 

Sandstone. The wells are drilled into perched bedrock with no hydraulic 

connection to any surface water or any part of a larger shallow homogeneous 

aquifer. Considering the depth of the well, it appears to fall in line with the 

guidelines of a non-jurisdictional well of similar depth in the surrounding 

area.’ ” The MND explained that the project wells do not draw from a 

contiguous shallow aquifer as they are spread over miles of hilly terrain at 

different elevations.

A staff report to the Planning Commission explained that an 

examination of Fisch’s well logs indicated that the depth and screening 

intervals are such that “the wells are not connected to any surface water 

features, and as such do not require water rights for diversion and use.” Staff 

responded to public comments received on the MND. Staff explained that the 

Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) had raised concerns that the wells 

may be hydrologically connected to surface water, and, by extension, the 

large amount of proposed water use could have an adverse impact on aquatic 

resources. Staff responded that the wells are deep groundwater wells that 

have screening intervals which strongly indicate they are not connected to 

the underflow of any surface water features, which indicates no direct 

impacts to aquatic resources. “This analysis was performed by staff and is 

also supported by the opinion of the well driller, Dave Fisch, who has 

extensive expertise of installing and working with wells in” the County. 

In reply to the administrative appellants’ claim that the depth at which 

the wells were drawing water indicated they were connected to surface water 
17

features, staff replied that their conclusory statement was not supported by 

factual data to support their contention. Instead, the depth and location of 

the wells relative to surface water features indicated they were not 

hydrologically connected to surface water features. 

The conditions of approval imposed by the County require Rolling

Meadow to “install and utilize a water meter to demonstrate that there is 

sufficient water supply to meet the demands of the project. The water use for 

cultivation is limited to the use of the well and amount of water available in 

storage tanks and shall be provided annually prior to or during the annual 

inspection.” 

Plaintiffs rely on the following evidence to contend there is a fair 

argument the project may have a significant environmental impact.

CDFW commented on the use of the wells, explaining that the 

“scientific and engineering community universally accepts the connectivity of 

surface water and groundwater systems and that groundwater discharge to 

streams constitutes a sizeable and important fraction of streamflow.” CDFW 

commented that the MND had relied on Fisch, a well contractor. It stated,

“In light of the Project’s geologic setting, mapped springs, wetlands, and 

other surface water features . . . , and based on the potential total volume of 

groundwater extraction from the three new wells, CDFW recommends the 

applicant retain a qualified professional (e.g. geologist or engineer with 

hydrogeology background)” to evaluate the potential impacts to local surface 

water flows and provide recommendations that ensure the project will not 

substantially affect aquatic resources. 

PWA submitted a letter written by geologists discussing the hydrologic 

connectivity of the wells. It discussed the locations of the three wells, 

including its observation that well 1 is 140 feet from a tributary stream to 
18

Beatty Creek, and wells 2 and 3 were 300 feet and 400 feet from a wetland 

habitat. PWA stated that significant pumping of groundwater from the wells

“could have potential adverse impacts to the watershed from reduced 

groundwater storage and/or a lowering of the local water table.” When 

groundwater levels are reduced, the location where groundwater intersects 

with the land surface can lower, causing springs and seeps to dry up. PWA 

remarked that geologic investigations to quantify the hydraulic properties of 

aquifers at the site had not been conducted. Due to the proximity of the wells 

to surface waters, PWA remarked that the cone of depression from 

continuous well water withdrawal may intersect and affect nearby stream 

and wetland resources. PWA recommended that additional hydrogeologic 

investigations should be conducted to better identify and describe potentially 

significant impacts to the wetlands and watercourses. 

PWA also discussed the wells’ productivity. PWA remarked that 

pursuant to the County’s standards, water production tests must be 

conducted during the dry season—August through September—and be 

representative of the lowest annual water production anticipated from the 

source. Because Fisch conducted testing in June, PWA recommended 

additional testing be completed. PWA continued, stating that the wells are in 

the rocks of the Yager terrane. Regarding the four-hour well productivity 

tests, PWA stated it was “possible that short-term testing of wells in sheared 

mudstone rocks of the Yager terrane is misrepresentative of sustained well 

yield,” which “may be much lower than is recognized.” PWA recommended 

“more prolonged well pump testing.” 

PWA’s comments do not constitute substantial evidence of a fair 

argument that the project may have a significant environmental effect. PWA 

did not opine that the groundwater which will be drawn from the wells is
19

hydrologically connected, or is likely connected, to surface water. PWA

discussed the wells’ proximity to streams and wetlands habitats, but it did 

not opine that such proximity means they are connected. In essence, PWA 

merely recommended additional investigation. Regarding well productivity, 

PWA’s comments again just recommended more testing. 

Plaintiffs challenge Fisch’s qualifications to opine on hydrologic 

connectivity. During early review of the project—before the wells were 

drilled—in advising Rolling Meadow that a prior initial study was deficient, 

County staff stated that consultation with an engineering geologist was 

needed to document the groundwater supply. It explained Rolling Meadow

needed to demonstrate that the wells were not hydrologically connected to 

the water flow of the river.

Plaintiffs cite documents referenced in the MND. This includes a 

Department of Water Resources bulletin regarding the state’s groundwater. 

While focusing on groundwater resources, the Department of Water 

Resources recognized that, “[I]n reality groundwater and surface water are 

inextricably linked in the hydrologic cycle. As an example, groundwater may 

be recharged by spring runoff in streams, but later in the year the base flow 

of a stream may be provided by groundwater. So, although the land surface 

is a convenient division for categorizing water resources, it is a somewhat 

arbitrary one. It is essential that water managers recognize and account for 

the relationship between groundwater and surface water in their planning 

and operations.” Plaintiffs also point to documents referenced by CDFW in

commenting on the MND. A 2012 U.S. Geological Survey publication

regarding streamflow depletion by wells noted that a common misconception 

is that pumping groundwater exclusively below a confining layer will 

eliminate the possibility of depletion of surface water connected to the 
20

overlying groundwater system. These materials do not demonstrate a fair 

argument of a significant environmental effect because they contain general 

information and are unrelated to the project area.

In February 2019—before the wells were drilled—Rolling Meadow’s 

president wrote to the County identifying the steps Rolling Meadow had 

taken to obtain permit approval. He explained Rolling Meadow’s proposal 

that water for the greenhouses would be supplied by wells, and he stated

there was an “abundance of water on the property. The head waters of 

Beatty Creek and Camron [sic] Creek are on the property that produce large 

quantity of water year-round.” He stated Fisch had assured they would have 

an abundance of available water to meet their demands. Once Rolling 

Meadow obtained approval, they would “drill the wells to guarantee there is 

adequate water at strata that does not adversely affect the Eel River.” The 

president is not an expert on hydrology and his statements cannot be 

construed as substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of hydrologic

connectivity. A review of his full letter demonstrates his belief that once the 

wells were drilled it would be shown that the wells would provide sufficient 

water which did not affect the Eel River. His observations about 

watercourses on his property do not constitute substantial evidence that 

those watercourses are connected to the well groundwater.

Finally, plaintiffs assert that the public commented on potentially 

significant impacts, relying on their personal experience with the Eel River 

and associated waterways, as well as literature. Plaintiffs just list, without 

discussing, a long string of record citations. Their “failure to explain the 

significance of” these public comments “is by itself sufficient to defeat their 

arguments,” because “it is not for us to construct a sufficient argument for 

them.” (Rominger, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.) In any event, the 
21

comments from the public—mainly local residents—do not constitute 

substantial evidence. The commenters provided their personal experience 

and observations, including that the area has a dire water situation, with the 

creeks barely flowing in the summer and the river being bare, so they think it 

“mind blowing” to take water from the aquifer for the project. They 

expressed their concerns over the project taking water from the dwindling 

watersheds. One commenter stated the “wells are absolutely ‘connected’ to 

the Eel River,” however they provided no support for that contention. One 

commenter stated that basic concepts of hydrology show that groundwater is 

the source of many springs and creeks, especially in the dry months, so 

unlimited groundwater pumping would impact all downstream water users. 

While area residents may provide their experience and observations

regarding drought conditions and the creeks and river being dry during 

summer, they do not have expertise to opine on whether the groundwater 

wells are hydrologically connected to surface waters. (See Ocean View 

Estates Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Montecito Water Dist. (2004) 116 

Cal.App.4th 396, 402 [personal observations on “nontechnical issues” may 

constitute substantial evidence]; Newtown Preservation Society v. County of 

El Dorado (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 771, 789 [lay opinion based on technical 

information which requires expertise does not constitute substantial 

evidence].)

For the reasons explained above, and taking together plaintiffs’ cited

evidence, the evidence does not support a fair argument that the project’s 

water demands may have a significant effect on the environment, either 

related to hydrologic connectivity or well productivity.

The evidence does not support a fair argument that the wells may be 

hydrologically connected to local surface water, such that use of the wells 
22

may have a substantial impact on hydrology or water quality. Plaintiffs’ 

arguments are really an attack on the County’s reliance on the information 

provided by Fisch, including his well logs and explanation that the wells are 

not hydrologically connected. The cited evidence attacks Fisch’s

qualifications and recommends further testing. (See Parker Shattuck, supra, 

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 786 [“a suggestion to investigate further is not 

evidence, much less substantial evidence, of an adverse impact”].) The

evidence does not, however, support a fair argument that the project’s wells 

may be hydrologically connected to surface flows and, thus, impact local 

surface water flows and groundwater supplies. “In other words, the thrust of 

[plaintiffs’] criticism was apparently to attack the evidentiary basis for the 

[C]ounty’s conclusion that the project would not have a significant impact on 

groundwater supplies, rather than identifying or providing evidence to 

support a fair argument to the contrary.” (Rominger, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 730.)

Nor does the evidence support a fair argument that the wells may not 

be able to supply the project’s water needs. Again, plaintiffs attack the 

results of Fisch’s well yield tests and recommend further testing be conducted

during the dry season. But they have failed to cite evidence demonstrating 

the wells will not, or may not, be sufficiently productive. Even if we assume 

there is substantial evidence demonstrating that the wells may be less

productive than identified in the yield tests, plaintiffs have not demonstrated 

how that may affect the environment. For example, if the wells cannot 

supply sufficient water for project operations, there is no evidence that 

Rolling Meadow would then divert water from a nearby watercourse.
23

In sum, plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that 

substantial evidence supports a fair argument that the project’s water 

demands may have a significant effect on the environment.

3. Lignin Oil

Plaintiffs argue the County failed to proceed in the manner required by 

law because it did not analyze the impacts of the use of lignin oil for dust 

suppression on biological resources, hydrology/water quality, hazards and

hazardous materials, or wildfires. We disagree.

A prior initial study—prepared in 2018—assessed air quality impacts

and discussed dust generated during the construction phase of the project

and the methods to control it. This included spraying the road with water 

and it also stated that the dirt roads would be rocked and oiled with lignin 

sulfonate compound to further reduce airborne particulate. In subsequent

correspondence with the County, Rolling Meadow explained that regarding 

dust being produced on the roads, dust was not reflective of the project

operations as the predominant use in the ranch’s roads would be by the guard 

shuttling employees in the electric bus. Rolling Meadow explained the road 

would “be rocked and, in any event, if any dust was generated, we would have 

the road sealed with lignin oil. Lignin oil is a chemically derived 

biodegradable oil that is completely harmless to fish and wildlife.” In

response, the County remarked that the chemical makeup of lignin oil and 

the quantity and frequency of use had not been described. The County 

explained that the initial study’s analyses of impacts to air quality, biological 

resources, and hydrology did not “discuss the effect [of lignin oil] on biological 

resources, run-off potential and impacts to watercourses.” Rolling Meadow

subsequently advised the County that it had removed lignin oil from the 

proposal because it was unnecessary. Rolling Meadow explained that clean 
24

gravel, a conservative speed limit, and reduced traffic (bus only and not 

individual trips) would be adequate for dust control. 

Because Rolling Meadow eliminated the use of lignin oil as a dust 

suppressant, the MND did not address it. In discussing air quality impacts, 

the MND discussed dust emissions during both the construction of the project 

and its operation. It concluded any impact was less than significant by 

complying with the North Coast Unified Air Quality Management District’s 

rule 104. In compliance with rule 104, during construction, the project would 

use water trucks to spray surfaces to control fugitive dust. Additionally, the 

roads would be rocked with clean road rock. During project operations, 

project roads are either rocked or will only be used during the wet season, 

eliminating the prospect of fugitive dust. Additionally, the project applied 

U.S. Department of Transportation strategies to mitigate unpaved road dust, 

including a 15 miles per hour speed limit, limiting the number of vehicles on 

the road—employees would be transported from the parking area via electric 

bus—and rocking the ranch roads. 

After the Planning Commission approved the project, and before the 

Board hearing, Rolling Meadow proposed project revisions in response to 

concerns raised by neighbors. It proposed to have employees park at the park 

and ride lot near the highway and be shuttled to the ranch to cut down on 

individual car trips on McCann Road, and “[i]f necessary, the project will 

periodically treat the dirt portion of McCann Road in front of residences with 

Lignin Oil or [a] similar product to control dust.” In addressing these 

proposals, County staff stated in their report to the Board that these changes 

had been added to the proposed findings and conditions of approval, and they 

would “not cause any new environmental effects.”
25

At the Board hearing, counsel for the administrative appellants

brought up the reintroduction of lignin oil and remarked that the County had

previously advised Rolling Meadow that it had a concern about lignin oil not 

being properly addressed. In approving the project, the Board adopted

conditions of approval which included, as relevant here, a mandate that 

Rolling Meadow monitor the dirt portion of McCann Road in front of 

residences and “shall treat the road surface with Lignin Oil or [a] similar 

product to control dust.”

Plaintiffs challenge the County’s conclusion that lignin oil poses no 

potentially significant impact, contending it is unsupported by

documentation. Demonstrating that the County approved the project with a 

condition requiring that Rolling Meadow monitor the dirt portion of McCann 

Road in front of residences and treat the road “with Lignin Oil or [a] similar 

product to control dust”—even though lignin oil had not been analyzed in the 

MND—does not, by itself, demonstrate a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 

Staff’s report to the Board on Rolling Meadow’s proposed changes which 

occurred post-Planning Commission approval was brief. Staff merely 

reported that the proposed changes, including the use of lignin oil, had been 

added to the findings and conditions of approval and would “not cause any 

new environmental effects.” While there appears to be no comprehensive

analysis, such shortcomings merely relate to the determination of whether 

there is substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project’s 

potential use of lignin oil may have a significant effect on the environment. 

Plaintiffs cite no authority supporting their proposition that failure to 

analyze a potential impact and lack of documentation regarding a component 

of a project constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion. In fact, in the 
26

sections of their briefs addressing lignin oil, plaintiffs cite no authority at all. 

(See Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.)

It remains plaintiffs’ burden to cite record evidence supporting a fair 

argument of significant environmental impact. (Gentry, supra,

36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1378–1379.) Lack of study does not constitute evidence 

that there will be a significant impact. (Id. at p. 1379.) When a potential 

environmental impact has not been studied, “a fair argument may be based 

on the limited facts in the record. Deficiencies in the record may actually 

enlarge the scope of fair argument by lending a logical plausibility to a wider 

range of inferences.” (Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 311.) 

Plaintiffs make no argument that applying lignin oil on the roads for dust 

suppression may have a significant environmental impact. As plaintiffs

reference, in reviewing a prior initial study, County staff had advised Rolling 

Meadow that the study had not addressed the chemical makeup of lignin oil, 

its frequency of use, or the potential for environmental impacts. But these

comments do not constitute substantial evidence of a fair argument that 

lignin oil may have a significant environmental effect. They just called for 

additional information. 

Further, as the County and Rolling Meadow point out, there is evidence 

in the record regarding lignin. The County’s approval was under the 

provisions of the 2016 Commercial Medical Marijuana Land Use Ordinance

(CMMLUO). In enacting the CMMLUO, the County had adopted a mitigated 

negative declaration, with mitigation measures, finding that all potential 

impacts associated with implementation of the ordinance had been reduced to 

a less than significant level. The CMMLUO MND explained that the 

ordinance’s requirements worked “to mitigate both project-specific and 

cumulative watershed-level impacts through implementation of ‘standard 
27

conditions’ and ‘best management practices.’ ” One of the best management 

practices for site maintenance and operations stated, “Road surfacing, 

especially within a segment leading to a watercourse, is critical to prevent 

and minimize sediment delivery to a watercourse and maintain road integrity 

for expected uses. Road surfacing can include pavement, chip-seal, lignin, 

rock, or other material appropriate for timing and nature of use.” (Italics 

added.) While a lack of study may enlarge the scope of fair argument, here 

the record does not permit a reasonable inference that use of lignin oil may 

have a significant environmental impact. (Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 311.)14

4. Infrastructure

Plaintiffs contend the project has not been properly analyzed for 

significant environmental impacts related to power infrastructure. They 

argue that the County failed to proceed in a manner required by law, and 

that there is a fair argument that the project’s power needs may have a 

significant effect on the environment. 

The MND explained Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) will

supply the project’s electricity. There is existing PG&E infrastructure in 

above-ground poles located on the south side of the property near the Eel 

River. New electrical lines will be run underground from the existing section 

to the greenhouses and processing buildings. Power will be supplied by the 

local utility Redwood Coast Energy Authority (RCEA) Community Choice 

14 We note that even if lignin oil were used for dust suppression on the 

dirt portion of McCann Road in front of residences—as stated in the 

conditions of approval—such use would be minimal as the predominant use of 

the road would be by the electric shuttle bus to transport employees from the 

parking lot to the work site. Thus, there is no demonstration that any 

potential environmental impacts would rise to any significant levels.
28

Energy, Repower Plus Program, which allows the project to purchase on-grid 

power with 100 percent renewable energy resources. The project will have 

four emergency propane generators and water pumps. The MND stated the 

generators will be utilized in case of a power failure during a fire. They will

only be used to run water pumps for fire suppression, and they “will not be 

used to power grow lights.” To maintain readiness, the generators will run 

an exercise cycle for five minutes every two weeks, consuming 1.5 gallons of 

propane a year. If no fires occur, generators will not run apart from the 

exercise cycle. 

The MND concluded the generators would not have potentially 

significant air quality impacts or noise impacts to wildlife and neighbors. It 

also concluded the project’s energy requirements would have no impact on 

energy resources, would not conflict with a renewable energy plan, and would 

not have significant greenhouse gas emissions. 

The Board resolution adopting the MND found that the project’s power 

would be provided by PG&E. The conditions of approval require Rolling 

Meadow to record a development plan approved by the County’s planning 

department (Planning Department) that the electric service developed for the 

project is only to be used for the cannabis cultivation areas and associated 

structures that support the cannabis operation. The conditions of approval 

also require Rolling Meadow to construct noise containment structures for 

the generators, and the ongoing requirements and development restrictions

require that the “noise produced by a generator used on an emergency-only 

basis for cannabis drying, curing, and processing shall not be audible” by 

neighbors. 
29

a. Documentation to Support Findings

Plaintiffs contend the MND’s conclusions of no potentially significant 

impacts related to air quality, noise, energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and 

utilities and service systems are based on assumptions that (1) PG&E can 

provide the necessary infrastructure, (2) RCEA can provide 100 percent 

renewable energy resources, and (3) generator usage will be limited to 

exercise cycles and operation of water pumps during fire emergencies. They 

argue no documentation supports these assumptions and, therefore, the 

County failed to proceed in the manner required by law. 

Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the record does not establish that 

PG&E can or will install underground power lines and can or will meet the 

energy requirements for the project, and the conditions of approval do not 

include a requirement that PG&E provide a “ ‘will serve’ letter” before project 

operation; the conditions of approval and mitigation monitoring program do 

not include a requirement that PG&E conduct a site-specific review and 

create a site-specific construction plan; the conditions of approval and 

mitigation monitoring program do not include a requirement that RCEA

confirm that it can provide 100 percent renewable energy for the project; and 

the conditions of approval and mitigation monitoring program do not limit

generator use for fire suppression purposes during an emergency. 

To the extent plaintiffs contend that the County’s conclusions of no 

significant environmental impacts caused by the project’s power 

infrastructure are “unsupported by any evidence,” we observe that plaintiffs

cite no authority in the sections of their opening brief (section V.C.1.a) or 

reply brief (section II.E.1) on this topic showing that unsupported conclusions 

in an initial study and negative declaration constitute a prejudicial abuse of 

discretion. This is justification to disregard plaintiffs’ contention. (See Los 
30

Angeles Unified, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498; Cinema West, supra, 

13 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) In any event, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs. 

The findings of no significant impacts as related to the project’s power 

infrastructure are supported by evidence. The record demonstrates that if 

PG&E cannot supply power to the site, then the project will not operate. 

Regarding renewable energy, the MND stated the “project operator has 

secured a letter from the RCEA that confirms availability for the project’s 

power demand.” And the record shows that Rolling Meadow will not use 

generators during power outages other than for fire suppression. 

To the extent plaintiffs are challenging the conditions of approval or

the mitigation monitoring and report program, the County and Rolling 

Meadow argue, and we agree, that plaintiffs forfeited these arguments by 

raising them for the first time on appeal. In the trial court, plaintiffs did not 

argue, as they do here, that any claimed lack of documentation to support the 

conclusions was addressed “through reference to mitigation conditions that 

were not made enforceable.” In their trial court merits briefing, in 

attempting to demonstrate a fair argument that the project may have 

significant energy impacts, plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the 

power extension was unverified despite requests from PG&E and RCEA to 

verify the infrastructure and service. And without power, prolonged reliance 

on generators was likely and would cause various environmental impacts

which were not analyzed. They continued to assert that the adopted findings 

and conditions did not restrict generator use. But plaintiffs advanced these 

arguments to support their contention that there was a fair argument of 

environmental impacts associated with satisfying the project’s energy 

requirements. They were not a separate argument challenging the conditions 

of approval or mitigation monitoring and report program, like here. This is 
31

clear from plaintiffs’ trial brief where they claimed, the “lack of necessary and 

specifically requested information concerning the Project’s energy needs and 

infrastructure, together with the absence of any conditions restricting 

generator use, expands the fair argument concerning impacts associated with 

satisfying the Project’s energy requirements.” Because plaintiffs did not

advance these arguments to the trial court, we will not address them. (See 

Ocean Street, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–1009.)

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the conclusions of no significant 

environmental effects related to the project’s power sources constitute a 

prejudicial abuse of discretion. 

b. Reasonably Foreseeable Future Activities

Plaintiffs argue the County failed to proceed in the manner required by 

law by not analyzing impacts from reasonably foreseeable future activities.

They contend it is reasonably foreseeable that PG&E may not provide the 

proposed infrastructure, may not provide it before the project is operational,

and may not have the capacity to meet the project’s needs. They further 

argue that RCEA may not be able to provide 100 percent renewable energy 

sources. They also assert it is reasonably foreseeable that generators will be 

used for purposes beyond emergency fire suppression. Therefore, plaintiffs

contend the County was required to, but did not, address the environmental 

impacts of these circumstances. 

We agree with the County and Rolling Meadow that plaintiffs waived 

this argument. This three-paragraph section in plaintiffs’ opening brief

(section V.C.1.b) does not cite any legal authority or record evidence. 

Plaintiffs have failed, therefore, to support their claimed foreseeable 

circumstances. (See Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [an issue

raised but unsupported with reasoned argument, citations to authority, and 
32

record citations is waived]; Stolman v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 

114 Cal.App.4th 916, 926–927 [cursory arguments unsupported by record 

citations are disregarded].) Therefore, we do not address this issue.

c. Fair Argument of Significant Effect on the Environment

Plaintiffs contend substantial evidence exists to support a fair 

argument that the power needs of the project may have a significant effect on 

the environment. We disagree.

The MND explained that electricity for the project will be supplied by

PG&E through installation of new underground electrical lines run from the 

existing section of infrastructure. The local utility, RCEA, will supply the 

project’s power through the purchase of 100 percent renewable sources. The 

MND stated, the “project operator has secured a letter from the RCEA that 

confirms availability for the project’s power demand.” The MND stated that,

“PG&E will conduct a site-specific review of the project and create a site 

specific construction plan. The project will comply with PG&E’s site-specific 

safety and installation requirements.” 

Staff responded to public comments which questioned PG&E’s ability to 

adequately supply power needs for the project. Staff explained that PG&E 

was the only authorized power source for the project. “The applicant is 

required to demonstrate that PG&E is installed as described by the project 

description prior to use of any power use for the proposed project.” At the 

Board hearing, regarding a “will serve letter” from PG&E, the County’s 

planning director (Planning Director) explained that obtaining such letter is

normally done with water and sewer service. He explained that if the 

applicants could not get PG&E on the site, they are not authorized to run on 

a generator so, “the site would not be able to operate until PG&E is on-site.” 

Regarding generator use, County staff reiterated that “the [MND] is very 
33

clear. The project does not use generators to provide backup power in the 

case of PG&E outages. The generators are there specifically to support the 

fire safety mechanisms. They’re for no other use. So if the power goes out 

from PG&E, the project [will be] without power, but the generators are there 

to support the fire safety equipment. That’s the only reason their [sic] there, 

and the [MND] is very clear on that purpose.” 

The conditions of approval and requirements and restrictions which 

must be satisfied for the life of the project include a mandate that all 

components of the project must be developed, operated, and maintained in 

conformance with the project description, the approved site plan, the plan of 

operations, and the conditions of approval. The project description in the 

MND stated, in relevant part, that the electricity would be supplied by PG&E 

and power would be 100 percent renewable supplied by RCEA. The project 

description also explained that generators could only be used in case of a 

power failure during a fire to run water pumps, and during their exercise 

cycles. 

Plaintiffs argue the record contains substantial evidence demonstrating

that PG&E will either not be able to provide power to the project or will not 

be able to meet the needs of the project’s operation, which would result in 

generator usage above that analyzed in the MND. Thus, plaintiffs argue that 

more generator usage may have environmental impacts on air quality, 

biological resources, energy, greenhouse emissions, and utilities and service 

systems. 

Plaintiffs cite to record evidence from 2017 and 2018 related to a prior 

initial study, which the County deemed inadequate for failing to analyze 

impacts from generator usage, identifying concern over generator usage, as 

the area “would not be a priority for PG&E to restore power during winter 
34

events.” This evidence is irrelevant. It is based on a prior version of the 

project which proposed to use generators for backup power. As discussed 

above, the project as approved does not include such generator usage. 

Plaintiffs cite to record evidence demonstrating that in 2018, the 

County’s peer review consultant recommended Rolling Meadow obtain a 

letter from PG&E describing how PG&E planned to provide power to the site 

and obtain a letter from RCEA confirming it could provide the renewable 

energy source for the project. According to plaintiffs, no such letters were 

obtained. 

Plaintiffs cite to area residents’ comments about long lasting winter 

power outages. They questioned whether PG&E could supply year-round 

power in the rural area and explained that PG&E did not have enough power 

for current farm owners to obtain industrial power drops. One commenter 

stated PG&E was unable to meet the demand of recent cannabis farms 

because its infrastructure was not designed for that level of industry. 

Commenters suggested that during power outages the project would use 

generators for backup power, which could have fire safety and ecological

impacts. While area residents may comment on their experiences with power 

outages and the inability to obtain power (see Ocean View Estates 

Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Montecito Water Dist., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 402), comments regarding the project’s claimed generator usage and any 

alleged resulting impacts are speculative and inaccurate given the record and 

do not constitute substantial evidence (see Parker Shattuck, supra, 

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 777).

Taking the evidence together, plaintiffs did not identify substantial 

evidence in the record of a fair argument that there may be a significant 

environmental effect. Even if we assume the record demonstrates that the 
35

project may not be able to obtain power, it does not demonstrate that the 

project may have a substantial effect on the environment. If Rolling Meadow

cannot obtain power, the project will not operate. Even if plaintiffs’ 

assertions that PG&E will not be able to provide power to the project or that 

there may be long periods without power, the next step of their premise is 

unsupported. Their arguments are all based on the premise that if there is 

no power to the project site, then generators will be used to power operations. 

For the reasons explained above, this claim is speculative and contrary to the 

record. 

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that substantial 

evidence supports a fair argument that the project’s power demands may 

have a significant effect on the environment.

5. Fire Risk and Safety

Plaintiffs contend that the conclusions on fire risk and safety are 

unsupported by documentation, and that substantial evidence supports a fair 

argument that the fire risks associated with the project may have a 

significant effect on the environment. We disagree.

The project site is accessed by two routes. During the dry season, when 

the low water bridge over the Eel River is available, primary access is 

McCann Road via Dyerville Loop Road. McCann Road is a countymaintained road between its connection with Dyerville Loop Road and the 

ranch’s property line. During winter, when the bridge is not available, access 

will be via Alderpoint Road. The project will be attended by a maximum of 

30 employees a day. While Rolling Meadow initially proposed that employees 

would park on the ranch and then ride an electric bus to the cultivation 

locations, the project as approved will have the employees park at the park 

and ride lot near the highway and be picked up by a project bus.
36

As explained in the MND, the project is in a State Responsibility Area 

(SRA) and is designated by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

(Cal Fire) as a very high fire hazard severity area. In the MND’s checklist on 

wildfire impacts, the checklist asks, if located in a SRA or classified as a very 

high fire hazard severity zone, whether the project would substantially 

impair an adopted emergency response or evacuation plan, would exacerbate 

wildfire risks thereby exposing occupants to wildfire pollutants or the 

uncontrolled spread of a wildfire, would require the installation or 

maintenance of associated infrastructure, such as roads or emergency water 

sources, which may exacerbate fire risk or that may result in impacts to the 

environment, and would expose people or structures to significant risks 

resulting from runoff, post-fire slope instability, or drainage changes. The 

MND concluded these impacts were less than significant or nonexistent. 

In assessing the impact of whether the project would exacerbate 

wildfire risks thereby exposing occupants to wildfire pollutants or the 

uncontrolled spread of a wildfire, the MND explained that the project had the 

potential to significantly exacerbate wildfire risk. It explained that because 

the project design included rainwater storage and emergency generators, and 

because it will improve internal roads to meet the SRA Regulations, the 

project would improve evacuation success, and the impact was reduced to less 

than significant. 

In assessing the impact of whether the project would require the 

installation or maintenance of associated infrastructure, such as roads, 

emergency water sources, or power lines, which may exacerbate fire risk or 

result in impacts to the environment, the MND concluded the impact was less 

than significant. The MND explained the project would expand electric 

power into the project area with underground PG&E power lines. PG&E 
37

would conduct a site-specific review of the project and create a construction 

plan. The project would comply with PG&E’s site-specific safety and 

installation requirements and thereby it reduced the potential of the project 

to exacerbate fire risk and associated environmental impacts to less than 

significant. The MND concluded the associated fire risk from power line 

installation was less than significant. 

In assessing hazards impacts, the MND concluded the project would

not impair implementation of or physically interfere with an adopted 

emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan. The MND explained

that this is because of the isolated location. If there was a wildfire, the 

project would use the electric bus to evacuate the employees, so there was no 

potential for employee traffic to interfere with emergency evacuation. 

Regarding response time, the MND explained that Cal Fire provides 

emergency response to fire, and the nearest Cal Fire station is in Weott, 12 

miles away. It stated it would take firefighters 35 minutes to reach the 

project site. 

The MND relied on an access assessment of McCann Road prepared by 

Northpoint Consulting in 2020. The MND stated Northpoint Consulting 

concluded McCann Road meets the category 2 road standard and is the 

functional equivalent of a category 4 road15 with implementation of 

recommendations the consultant made and due to extremely low traffic 

volumes. Record evidence demonstrates that the County’s department of 

public works (Department of Public Works) also investigated the width of

McCann Road and conducted multi-day traffic counts. The deputy director

15 Per the SRA Regulations, for emergency access, roads must meet a 

minimum category 4 road standard, which requires two 10-foot-wide traffic 

lanes capable of providing for two-way traffic to support emergency vehicle 

and civilian egress. (County Code, § 3112-3.) 
38

stated that while McCann Road was not developed to category 4 road 

standards, it was “developed to an adequate functional classification for the 

proposed project.” The Department of Public Works reviewed Northpoint 

Consulting’s access assessment and found its conclusions to be consistent 

with the Department’s findings. 

In approving the project, the conditions of approval include 

requirements that a minimum of 50 percent of the stored rainwater must be 

reserved for fire suppression purposes, that Rolling Meadow must store 

sufficient water at each structure for firefighting purposes, which amount

“shall be approved” by the Planning Director in consultation with either 

Cal Fire or the Fruitland Ridge Fire District, and that Rolling Meadow must 

purchase a tanker truck to have onsite in the event of a fire.

a. Unsupported Conclusions

Plaintiffs contend the County’s conclusion that there were no 

potentially significant environmental impacts based on wildfire conditions is 

not supported by documentation, constituting a prejudicial abuse of 

discretion. Preliminarily, we observe, again, that plaintiffs cite no legal 

authority in this section of their opening brief (section V.D.2) or reply brief 

(section II.F.5). (See Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.)

Plaintiffs assert there is “no documentation establishing that McCann 

Road can handle emergency wildland fire equipment and civilian evacuation 

(see supra, section V.D.1).” On this topic, that is the entirety of their claim 

related to emergency access and evacuation. Section V.D.1 of plaintiffs’ 

opening brief addresses their contention that the project conflicts with the 

General Plan and SRA Regulations. It is not a CEQA argument. Because 

plaintiffs make no substantive argument demonstrating how this issue was a 

prejudicial abuse of discretion under CEQA and do not cite the record or legal
39

authority, we will not address their one-sentence argument. (See Los Angeles 

Unified, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498; Cinema West, supra, 

13 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) 

Plaintiffs also contend “there is a lack of substantiation regarding the 

ability of rainwater storage to address wildfire emergencies.” Plaintiffs point 

to the MND, which stated that the project will store up to 320,000 gallons of

rainwater, which will be used for landscaping, fire protection, and

supplemental water for dust mitigation and irrigation. In concluding the 

project would have a less than significant impact on exacerbating wildfire 

risks, the MND pointed to rainwater storage as one reason the impact had 

been reduced to less than significant. In approving the project, the County 

imposed a condition of approval that a “minimum of 50% of the stored water 

shall be reserved for fire suppression purposes. The applicants shall install 

meters at all storage tanks and make the logs available to [C]ounty staff 

upon inspection.” Plaintiffs argue “there is no documentation supporting the 

conclusion that 50% of the stored water will be available during the entirety

of the fire season or that 50% of the stored water would be sufficient to 

address a wildfire.” 

The County and Rolling Meadow argue plaintiffs forfeited this 

argument for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We disagree. The 

issue was raised during the administrative process. (See Agoura, supra, 

46 Cal.App.5th at p. 677.) For example, in remarking on wildfire risk, a 

member of the public commented that the “new water use plan put forth by 

the applicant at the last minute . . . shows that stored water of 320,000 

gallons will be ‘depleted in August and September.’ . . . There is no additional 

proposed water storage and the new plan shows that stored water will be 

depleted in August, September and October—when it would be most needed 
40

for fire season.” The commenter requested the County “[r]equire that there 

will either be additional storage or that water for fire suppression is not 

depleted at any time.” At the appeal hearing, counsel for the administrative 

appellants argued that various conditions of approval should be adopted, 

including that rainwater must be reserved for firefighting during fire season. 

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how their contention that no 

documentation supports the conclusion regarding rainwater being used for 

fire suppression constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. On this topic, 

plaintiffs spend one paragraph merely summarizing parts of the record. They 

do not cite legal authority or provide a substantive analysis to demonstrate 

how their argument—if accurate—constitutes a CEQA violation. 

Finally, plaintiffs contend the County’s conclusions regarding wildfire 

conditions “also relied on PG&E being able to run new electric lines 

underneath the existing road structure. As addressed supra, section V.C.1, 

there is no documentation supporting this.” In section V.C.1 of their opening 

brief, plaintiffs argued that the findings regarding the project’s power sources 

were conclusions unsupported by any documentation. We need not address 

this argument further.

b. Fair Argument of Significant Effect on the Environment

Plaintiffs argue substantial evidence in the record supports a fair 

argument that the fire risks associated with the project may have a 

significant effect on the environment. We disagree.

Plaintiffs focus on access issues and response times for emergency 

services. The County and Rolling Meadow argue plaintiffs forfeited their

contention regarding emergency response times by not raising it before the 

trial court. In response, plaintiffs point to one sentence in their trial brief

where they asserted that the MND downplayed “the site access challenges 
41

that would be encountered by police, fire, and other emergency services.” 

They also point to a brief remark at the trial court hearing where plaintiffs

argued that the project posed a significant risk of environmental impact if 

there is a wildfire “and fire protection services, fire suppression services, 

cannot get there safely and timely.” The trial brief, despite the sentence 

plaintiffs point to, did not make any arguments based on record evidence 

discussing long emergency response times to the project area. Plaintiffs

forfeited any argument attempting to demonstrate a significant effect on the 

environment based on response times. (See Ocean Street, supra, 

73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–1009.) Even assuming plaintiffs did not forfeit

this argument, they did not meet their burden of citing record evidence 

supporting a fair argument that the project may have a significant effect on 

the environment. Plaintiffs rely on the following evidence.

In 2017—before any MND was circulated for review—Cal Fire advised 

the County that “many hazards” confronted “fire protection agencies in most 

subdivisions on SRA lands. Steep terrain and heavy wildland fuels 

contribute to fire intensity and spread. The distances from fire stations and 

road grades encountered usually create an excessive response time for 

effective structure fire suppression purposes.” Cal Fire advised that in SRA 

areas, it “does not support development in areas where there is no local 

agency fire service for structure fires and emergency medical response.” 

In January 2018, County staff wrote to Rolling Meadow after reviewing 

the 2017 initial study. Staff identified various deficiencies in that initial 

study, including on the topic of fire protection in the public services impact 

analysis. Staff expressed concerns regarding the response time to access the 

site during a fire, and stated that the initial study must respond to this 

potential impact resulting from high risk response times. 
42

The Fruitland Ridge Volunteer Fire Protection District (district)—first 

responders for the project site—commented on the MND. The district

explained that it took 22 minutes to reach the McCann bridge, with 

additional time added for any location, like the project, on the east side of the 

Eel River. The farthest location of the project is over five miles from the 

bridge. Depending on road conditions, it could take an emergency vehicle

between 20 and 60 minutes to navigate the incident, for a total response time 

between 42 minutes to 1 hour, 22 minutes. The district also expressed

concern about access, stating the roads to the area are category 2 roads made 

of gravel and dirt, with steep slopes and hairpin turns. The private roads 

across the river are narrow and dangerous for emergency vehicles. 

Additionally, the district commented on the project’s water storage in 

the event of a wildfire. It stated the approximately 300,000 gallons of stored 

water were inadequate, explaining that the turnaround time for a water 

tender was at least 45 minutes, and the water tender would use its 2,500 

gallons of water in 20 minutes. The district recommended the project be 

required to store one million gallons of water. 

The administrative appellants retained Steve Salzman, a licensed civil 

engineer, to conduct an evaluation of McCann Road. Salzman performed a 

survey of McCann Road from Dyerville Loop Road to the gate of Rolling 

Meadow’s property. He determined whether the road meets the standards of 

a category 4 (or equivalent) road pursuant to the County “Standards for 

Roadway Categories.”

Salzman observed the following road conditions from McCann Road’s

intersection with Dyerville Loop Road, across the river, and east to the 

property gate: The bridge over the river is 11 feet wide and if a vehicle broke 

down on the bridge access would be blocked. The segment of the road 
43

heading east from the bridge is a 12-foot wide gravel causeway, next to about 

800 feet of gravel bar. Moving east, the road varies between 12 and 16 feet 

wide with no consistent shoulders and a number of pinch points where the 

road is too narrow for two vehicles to pass, some with adequate turnouts and 

others without. The remainder of the road to the property gate is gravel or 

dirt with short segments of old asphalt, with widths that vary between 12 

and 14 feet. This area has no consistent shoulders and a number of pinch 

points where the road is too narrow for two vehicles to pass, some have 

turnouts to allow passing while others do not. He described it as a one-lane 

dirt road. Salzman concluded that none of the segments of McCann Road 

from the bridge to the property meet category 4 requirements. He explained 

that the County’s director of Public Works has the authority to declare the 

road a category 4 equivalent, based on evaluation of the road conditions and 

its uses. He opined, though, that McCann Road does not meet the 

requirements for a category 4, or equivalent, road. 

Plaintiffs also cite to public comments, claiming the public “commented 

about the increased fire risk posed by the Project, and based upon personal 

knowledge, they addressed drought conditions, road hazards, emergency 

response time, and more.” But plaintiffs merely provide a lengthy string of 

record cites “without making an attempt to explain what is contained in those 

pages or why it is relevant,” which “is by itself sufficient to defeat their 

arguments.” (Rominger, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.)

Plaintiffs’ evidence does not support a fair argument that the project 

may have a significant effect on the environment related to wildfire risks. 

Plaintiffs focus on evidence regarding response times in the event of an 

emergency, but they do not explain how lengthy response times constitute an 

impact on the environment caused by the project. (See § 21068 [“ ‘Significant 
44

effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially substantial, 

adverse change in the environment.”]; § 21060.5 [“ ‘Environment’ means the 

physical conditions which exist within the area which will be affected by a 

proposed project, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, or 

objects of historic or aesthetic significance.”].) Any difficulty for first 

responders to access the project site, and the surrounding area, exists 

without the project. Plaintiffs fail to explain how any issues related to 

access—emergency vehicle ingress and civilian egress—may impact the 

environment. “The question is not whether substantial evidence supports a 

fair argument that the proposed project will have significant impacts on 

resident safety and emergency evacuation. . . . [T]he question is whether the 

project may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Newtown 

Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 788, 

italics omitted.) Here, the environment affects access, not the project. (See 

ibid. [analysis does not extend to situations where the environment has an 

effect on a project]; see also City of Hayward v. Trustees of California State 

University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 843 [“The need for additional fire 

protection services is not an environmental impact that CEQA requires a 

project proponent to mitigate.” (italics omitted)].) 

This shortcoming is further emphasized in plaintiffs’ reply brief. In 

claiming to support their fair argument contention, plaintiffs contend that 

the “record demonstrates that the location of the Project is such that wildfire 

risks are exacerbated, and should a fire start, its uncontrolled spread is 

likely. This is so because the Project’s location and roadways prevent quick 

access by emergency services.” This claim does not satisfy plaintiffs’ burden 

to demonstrate a fair argument of a significant effect on the environment.
45

Plaintiffs also assert, “Credible, substantial evidence exists that the 

Project is associated with an increased risk of wildfire, and the County has 

not properly mitigated for this impact. Specifically, the County’s reliance on 

rainwater catchment tanks is not a sufficient mitigation measure to address 

the increased risk of wildfire associated with the Project.” To the extent 

plaintiffs are arguing the project’s use of rainwater catchment tanks may 

have a significant effect on the environment, they do not provide any 

substantive argument of how so. (See Cinema West, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 219; Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)

In sum, plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that 

substantial evidence supports a fair argument that the project may have a 

significant effect on the environment related to fire and safety risks.

B. Planning and Zoning Law

In discussing fire risks and safety, plaintiffs argue the project conflicts 

with the General Plan and SRA Regulations. 

1. Additional Background

As summarized above, based on Northpoint Consulting’s access 

assessment and the Department of Public Works’ evaluation, the County

determined that McCann Road meets category 4 functional equivalency. At 

the Board hearing, the deputy director of the Department of Public Works

explained that not all roads need to meet or exceed category 4 standards to 

have adequate functional capacity; if a road is less than category 4, it may be 

shown that it is functionally equivalent to meet Cal Fire requirements. 

Roads not constructed to category 4 standards must be analyzed by an 

engineer to ensure the road has adequate functional capacity which, here, 

was documented in the access assessment for the project. County staff

explained that the concept of functional capacity stems from the SRA 
46

Regulations and considers the volume of the road related to its capacity. A 

road with adequate functional capacity can accommodate the demands of the 

road and emergency response vehicles. Based on the access assessment and 

Department of Public Works’ evaluation, the Planning Department 

determined McCann Road can accommodate the traffic associated with the 

project. 

In approving the project, the County found the project was consistent 

with the General Plan. The County’s consistency findings discussed fire risk, 

explaining that Cal Fire’s comments had recommended compliance with the 

SRA Regulations, which establish development standards for minimizing 

wildfire danger in SRAs. The findings explained that Cal Fire had been sent 

referrals for the project. The County found the project to be consistent with 

the fire protection policies of the General Plan’s Safety Element. 

The County also found the project would be required to comply with all 

County regulations for fire risk, explaining that the “project is required to 

adhere to all Cal[ ]Fire regulations and standards regarding fire safety. 

County [Department of] Public Works states that McCann Road is developed 

to an adequate functional classification for the project.” The County found 

the “project conforms to the General Plan policies related to access roads in 

areas of fire risk, including Safety Element . . . policies.” It explained that

Northpoint Consulting’s access assessment “concluded that the project 

conforms to County Code Fire Safe Regulations with recommended 

improvements, which are incorporated into the project.” A condition of 

approval requires Rolling Meadow to complete all recommended 

improvements to McCann Road as specified in the Northpoint Consulting 

report. Another condition of approval requires Rolling Meadow to submit a 
47

transportation management plan detailing how employees will park at the 

park and ride lot off the highway and be picked up by a project bus. 

2. Legal Principles & Standard of Review

The Planning and Zoning Law provides every county must adopt a 

“comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the 

county.” (Gov. Code, § 65300.) A general plan is essentially the 

“ ‘constitution for all future developments’ ” within a city or county. (Citizens 

of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 570.) 

“ ‘[A] governing body’s conclusion that a particular project is consistent 

with the relevant general plan carries a strong presumption of regularity that 

can be overcome only by a showing of abuse of discretion.’ [Citations.] ‘An 

abuse of discretion is established only if the city council has not proceeded in 

a manner required by law, its decision is not supported by findings, or the 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Friends of Lagoon 

Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) “A project need 

not conform perfectly to every general plan policy to be consistent with the

general plan. [Citation.] The rule of general plan consistency is that the 

project ‘must be “compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses, 

and programs specified in” ’ the general plan.” (Golden Door Properties, LLC 

v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 501 (Golden Door).) In 

determining whether a project conflicts with a general plan, “ ‘the nature of 

the policy and the nature of the inconsistency are critical factors to consider.’ 

[Citation.] A project is inconsistent with a general plan ‘if it conflicts with a 

general plan policy that is fundamental, mandatory, and clear.’ ” (Spring 

Valley Lake Assn. v. City of Victorville (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 91, 100.)

“ ‘[C]ourts accord great deference to a local governmental agency’s 

determination of consistency with its own general plan, recognizing that “the 
48

body which adopted the general plan policies in its legislative capacity has 

unique competence to interpret those policies when applying them in its 

adjudicatory capacity. [Citations.] Because policies in a general plan reflect 

a range of competing interests, the governmental agency must be allowed to 

weigh and balance the plan’s policies when applying them, and it has broad 

discretion to construe its policies in light of the plan’s purposes.” ’ ” (Golden 

Door, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 501.)

“It is, emphatically, not the role of the courts to micromanage these 

development decisions. Our function is simply to decide whether the city 

officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the 

proposed project conforms with those policies, whether the city officials made 

appropriate findings on this issue, and whether those findings are supported 

by substantial evidence.” (Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of 

Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 719–720.) Courts may not substitute 

their view for the view of the county officials, nor reweigh conflicting 

evidence. (Id. at p. 717.) As stated by our Supreme Court, “Reviewing courts 

must defer to a procedurally proper consistency finding unless no reasonable 

person could have reached the same conclusion.” (Orange Citizens for Parks 

& Recreation v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 141, 155.) The burden is on 

plaintiffs to demonstrate, based on the evidence in the record, that a general 

plan consistency determination was unreasonable. (Pfeiffer v. City of 

Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1563.)

A county’s “interpretation of its own ordinance is ‘ “entitled to 

deference” in our independent review of the meaning or application of the 

law.’ ” (Harrington v. City of Davis (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 420, 434.) 

Turning to the General Plan, the Safety Element includes policies SP19 and S-S9, both of which state that development “shall conform to” the 
49

SRA Regulations. Implementation measure S-IM5 states that the County 

“shall maintain efficient and timely procedures for processing SRA Exception 

Requests to CAL FIRE.” 

The SRA Regulations “constitute the basic wildland fire protection 

standards of the County for lands within” SRAs. (County Code, § 3111-1.) 

The SRA Regulations were adopted to establish “minimum wildlife protection 

standards in conjunction with building, construction and development in 

SRA.” (Id., § 3111-2.) They require that the “future design and construction 

of structures, subdivisions and developments in SRA shall provide for basic 

emergency access.” (Ibid.) 

Chapter 2 of the SRA Regulations dictates emergency access, requiring 

that non-exempt roads provide “safe access for emergency wildland fire 

equipment and civilian evacuation concurrently.” (County Code, § 3112-1.) 

For width, roads must meet a minimum category 4 road standard, which 

requires two 10-foot-wide traffic lanes capable of providing for two-way traffic 

to support emergency vehicle and civilian egress. (Id., § 3112-3.) Roadways 

must support at least 75,000 pounds for a fire vehicle. (Id., § 3112-4.) 

An exception to the requirement to meet a category 4 road standard 

may be granted. (County Code, § 3112-3.) The exception must provide “the 

same overall practical effect as these regulations towards providing 

defensible space.” (Id., § 3111-8.) The exception provisions of the SRA 

Regulations require an applicant to apply for an exception, which are dealt 

with by the local inspection authority together with Cal Fire. (Id., §§ 3111-7, 

3111-9.) When an exception to the access standards is requested, the County 

must request Cal Fire to review the exception request. (Id., § 3111-9.) If Cal 

Fire does not respond within 30 days, the Planning Director shall assume Cal 

Fire supports the exception. (Ibid.) 
50

3. Analysis

Plaintiffs focus on emergency access via McCann Road and the General 

Plan’s mandate to coordinate with Cal Fire. 

As to access, plaintiffs contend the project does not conform to the SRA 

Regulations regarding road standards and, therefore, is inconsistent with the 

General Plan. General Plan policies S-P19 and S-S9 require that

development “shall conform to” the SRA Regulations. The SRA Regulations, 

in turn, require roads to meet a minimum category 4 road standard—two 10-

foot-wide lanes. (County Code, § 3112-3.) McCann Road does not meet a 

category 4 minimum width. However, the purpose of the category 4 width 

standard is to allow “for two-way traffic flow to support emergency vehicle 

and civilian egress.” (Ibid.) The exception provisions authorizing a lower 

road category demonstrate that the goal is to protect the intent of the SRA 

Regulations without imposing undue hardship due to conditions peculiar to 

the County. (Id., § 3111-7.) An exception may be allowed where it “provides 

the same overall practical effect as” the SRA Regulations. (Id., § 3111-8.) 

Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that McCann Road 

allows for a traffic flow which supports emergency vehicle access and civilian 

evacuation and, thus, has the same overall practical effect that the SRA 

Regulations require. As already discussed, the Department of Public Works 

independently evaluated McCann Road and reviewed Northpoint 

Consulting’s access assessment, and it concluded the road was “developed to 

an adequate functional classification for the proposed project.” The County 

made findings on General Plan consistency and relied on this information.

Plaintiffs argue that no reasonable person could conclude that McCann Road 

is functionally equivalent to a category 4 road. We disagree. Plaintiffs failed 
51

to meet their burden of demonstrating that the project is inconsistent with 

the General Plan’s requirements to conform with the SRA Regulations.

Plaintiffs also contend the County failed to properly coordinate with 

Cal Fire, in violation of General Plan policy S-P17 and implementation 

measure S-IM5, and in violation of SRA Regulations sections 3111-4, 3111-9,

and 3112-3.

16 Implementation measure S-IM5 states the County “shall 

maintain efficient and timely procedures for processing SRA Exception 

Requests to CAL FIRE.” The SRA Regulations’ exception provisions require 

the County to ask Cal Fire to review an exception request. (County Code,

§ 3111-9.) 

The County and Rolling Meadow claim the County did consult with Cal

Fire. In 2017, Cal Fire submitted a comment letter on Rolling Meadow’s

permit applications. For projects in SRAs, Cal Fire submitted its 

recommendations for development, including that the development must 

meet minimum fire safe standards in conformance with the County 

regulations, including specific standards for roads providing ingress and 

egress. Cal Fire stated that if it developed any additional comments on the 

project, it would submit an additional response letter. There is no showing 

that Cal Fire commented further. Based on Cal Fire’s letter, the County’s 

staff report included a chart showing to which referral agencies the project

had been referred to for review and comment, and it marked that Cal Fire 

had responded and provided conditional approval. The Board’s resolution 

16 The County and Rolling Meadow argue plaintiffs are barred from 

raising arguments based on General Plan policy S-P17 and County Code, 

section 3111-4 because they were not raised during the administrative 

process. Plaintiffs concede that neither policy S-P17 nor section 3111-4 were 

raised during the administrative process so, therefore, we do not consider 

their arguments based on these authorities. (See Agoura, supra, 

46 Cal.App.5th at p. 677.)
52

approving the project stated Cal Fire had been sent referrals for the project. 

The record demonstrates that the County sent Rolling Meadow’s permit 

applications to Cal Fire and received a reply.

It is unclear whether the material provided to Cal Fire in 2017 included 

information about road standards or emergency access. But even if the 

County did not request Cal Fire to specifically review a determination that

McCann Road is the functional equivalent of a category 4 road, plaintiffs fail 

to demonstrate how this constitutes an abuse of discretion. Substantial 

evidence summarized above demonstrates that the County considered the 

General Plan and SRA Regulations, evaluated McCann Road, and found it 

functionally equivalent to meet the SRA Regulations’ access standards. 

Plaintiffs have not explained how noncompliance with the requirement to 

have Cal Fire review a road standard exception request mandates that we 

find an abuse of discretion. (See Golden Door, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 501 [a project need not conform perfectly to every general plan policy].)

In sum, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing an abuse of 

discretion.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The County and Rolling Meadow are 

awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
53

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, ACTING P. J.

SIGGINS, J.*

A167278

Northcoast Environmental Center v. County of Humboldt

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.