# United Kingdom - United States Department of State

- Joint Statement by the U.S. Department of State and UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office:  Second U.S.-UK Strategic Sanctions Dialogue Office of the SpokespersonThe following is the text of a joint statement by the U.S. Department of State and UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.Begin text:On Wednesday 8 May 2024, the UK Government hosted a senior U.S. Government delegation for the second U.S.-UK Strategic Sanctions Dialogue.Talks, which took place in London and followed the inaugural Dialogue held in Washington, D.C. in July 2023, delivered on the commitment under the 2023 Atlantic Declaration  for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership to strengthen coordination on sanctions and export controls.  This brought together both countries’ departments and agencies for strategic discussions on priorities across geographic and thematic sanctions and export controls regimes.  The UK delegation was led by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and included senior officials from His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Department of Business and Trade.  The U.S. delegation was led by the State Department and included senior officials from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Department of Commerce.The United States and the United Kingdom reaffirmed that sanctions and export controls are essential tools of national security policy.  The delegations discussed the uses of targeted, coordinated sanctions and export control measures to deter and disrupt malign activity and to defend international norms.In response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, together with our allies and partners, we have imposed unprecedented costs on the Kremlin through sanctions and export controls.  These measures are starving Russia’s military of essential components and technology, along with other items, and constraining Putin’s ability to wage war on Ukraine.  We will continue to work with allies to restrict sources of Russian revenue, including from services and key commodities such as energy and metals that allow Russia to fight.  Beyond Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom reaffirmed our shared commitment to opposing those who threaten peace, security, and stability in the Middle East, reflected in recent coordinated actions targeting Iranian malign actors, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders and financiers, and those enabling Houthi Red Sea attacks.  We are committed to holding to account those responsible for conducting or supporting terrorist and other destabilizing activities in the Middle East.The United States and the United Kingdom continue to intensify our coordination on United Nations and autonomous sanctions regimes, bilaterally and with other partners.  This includes action to promote accountability for human rights violations and abuses, tackle corruption, counter terrorism, and weapons proliferation, and target cyber-criminal networks.Across our programs, we commit to continue to work together and with allies to ensure the effectiveness of our sanctions and export control measures.  We will continue to collaborate to counter circumvention occurring in third country jurisdictions to strengthen our measures in support of shared national security and foreign policy goals.End text.
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meetings in the United Kingdom Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:On May 1, in London, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell held a series of bilateral meetings with Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office counterparts Permanent Under Secretary Sir Philip Barton and the UK AUKUS team, as well as Cabinet Office colleagues National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow and Deputy National Security Advisor Sarah Macintosh.  They discussed challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as next steps to advance the AUKUS security partnership.  They reaffirmed the United States’ and United Kingdom’s continued support for Ukraine, including confronting the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense-industrial base.  They further underscored the need for an immediate release of the hostages held by Hamas and a sustainable ceasefire that allows for a surge of the urgently needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered safely through Gaza.
- Resettlement Diplomacy Network Senior Officials Meeting Office of the SpokespersonFrom April 29 to May 1, 2024, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Julieta Valls Noyes convened the third Senior Officials Meeting of the Resettlement Diplomacy Network (RDN) in Washington, DC.  Under the chairship of the United States, senior government officials from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom, along with representatives of the European Commission, participated in the exchange.The meeting provided an opportunity for participating states to review the impact of the RDN’s work since its inaugural ministerial meeting in September 2023 and to assess priorities for continued collective action on refugee resettlement and complementary pathways that help strengthen the global protection system.Participants discussed the use of the Emergency Coordination Platform established within the RDN (also known as the “Red Phone” mechanism) to facilitate rapid collaboration on situations of shared concern, including continued focus on providing safety to Afghan refugees in need of protection.  In addition, participants reflected on lessons from previous emergency responses to large-scale displacement and discussed opportunities to work together to strengthen the global resettlement and complementary protection pathways system, including by strengthening existing emergency transit infrastructure, using innovative refugee resettlement referral mechanisms, and leveraging community-driven sponsorship models.  Finally, participants discussed the Safe Mobility initiative and further opportunities for coordination on infrastructure to support pathways to resettlement.The United States launched the RDN in September 2022.  Pathways International and the Migration Policy Institute support the U.S. chairship of the RDN as the RDN secretariat.
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Travel to Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and France Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary Kurt M. Campbell will travel to Abuja, Nigeria; London, United Kingdom; and Paris, France April 29-May 3.  In Abuja, the Deputy Secretary will co-chair the sixth U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC) with Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar to discuss partnerships; security cooperation; shared prosperity; democracy, governance and accountability; and the movement of people.  He will also meet with senior Nigerian government officials, business leaders, and civil society representatives.In London, the Deputy Secretary will participate in bilateral meetings on the Indo-Pacific and the AUKUS trilateral security partnership.  He will also meet with UK counterparts to discuss continued support for Ukraine, as well as efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza in conjunction with the release of hostages, and address the dire humanitarian situation.In Paris, the Deputy Secretary will attend the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting (MCM), chaired by Japan, under the theme of “Co-creating the Flow of Change: Leading Global Discussions with Objective and Reliable Approaches Toward Sustainable and Inclusive Growth.”  In addition to his meetings at the OECD, the Deputy Secretary will meet with French counterparts on support for Ukraine, the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, and an Indo-Pacific dialogue.
- Department Press Briefing – April 23, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024																																																					April 23, 2024																																																								1:23 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. As you can see, we have some special guests with us today. I want to introduce Ambassador David Satterfield, our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues and Sonali Korde, Assistant to the Administrator of USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Satterfield will make some comments at the top, and then they’ll be on hand for some questions. And then I will continue on with the normal daily press briefing, so Ambassador Satterfield, over to you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks. Immediately after Hamas launched its attack on October 7th, President Biden stood strongly with the nation of Israel. As the President has said many times, Israel has a right and a duty to defend itself against Hamas.Hamas committed a massacre. They used rape, sexual violence to terrorize Israeli women. They continue to hold hostages – 133 Americans, women, elderly, injured – and they hide in tunnels they purposely built over the last 16 years under civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals.We remain committed to supporting Israel in its fight against Hamas because we cannot expect Israel to accept a situation we would not – no one would – in which their citizens continue to live under active threat.But at the same time, President Biden, starting on his visit to Israel October 18, was clear – he was clear privately and publicly with the prime minister, with the war cabinet, and then in his comments – that Israel must do more to protect civilians, to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to enable its safe and unhindered distribution inside of Gaza. This is both the morally right thing to do, and it is strategically absolutely necessary.Now, the risk of famine throughout Gaza is very high, especially in the north. We’ve been very clear: Israel must do everything possible to facilitate efforts to avert famine in Gaza. Now, the President has made this point clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu during his April 4th call, and he also made clear that U.S. policy with respect to Gaza will be determined by our assessment of Israel’s actions – immediate actions – to protect innocent civilians and ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as to increase the amount of assistance reaching those in need in Gaza.Far too many Palestinian civilians have been killed and injured. As Secretary Blinken has said, even one innocent casualty is one too many. This conflict has been one of the worst in recent memory in terms of how many humanitarian workers – nearly 250 – have been killed since October. Humanitarians should never be a target.Now, since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. has been leading efforts to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza to alleviate the suffering of innocent Palestinians who have nothing to do with – indeed, are victims themselves – of Hamas and its brutal rule. Let’s recall before the President’s engagement, there was no food, no water, no medicine getting into Gaza. We are the largest provider of aid to the Gaza response. This is and will continue to be a top priority for the President, for the Secretary, for the United States.Now, over the six months past, as a result of our efforts, we have secured the opening of multiple land border crossings, and the volume of assistance entering into and, most importantly, distributed within Gaza has increased significantly. But we know much more aid is needed, and that more aid needs to be done, needs to get out to reach the most vulnerable in Gaza, especially in the north.As their military operations continue – give me a moment – Israel must take all steps to minimize civilian casualties. Protecting civilians is not just a moral obligation – it is that – but it’s a strategic imperative. We’re coordinating closely with Jordan, Egypt, the United Nations, and various international partners to ensure that these measures translate into real, sustained long-term relief for the people of Gaza. It is crucial that Israel sees these commitments through, not just today, but every day.Now, to truly address the urgent needs of the civilian population in Gaza and to enable humanitarian partners to safely distribute life-saving aid throughout Gaza at the scale needed, it’s essential to see a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal in Gaza. The path ahead there is straightforward.There could be a six-week ceasefire today, if Hamas would agree to the terms of a deal on the table. It would help bring immediate relief to the people of Gaza. It would also create the conditions needed to enable the urgent humanitarian work that must be done. Hamas, and Hamas alone, is responsible for the failure to return hostages and implement a ceasefire.Now, we’re going to continue to work, as we have, to pursue peace, to ensure assistance reaches the most vulnerable, and to make sure that humanitarians delivering assistance are protected from harm. Israelis and Palestinians, like all people, deserve to live in peace. They deserve to experience “the quiet miracle of a normal life,” which this and previous U.S. administrations have spoken of as our goal. We’ll do all we can to be part of the work to make that possible.But I know for all of you the question exists. We have commitments. The President has spoken. The prime minister has offered assurances. But where are we? What is, in fact, being done on the ground. As I noted, the volume of assistance has increased dramatically over the course of the last several months. Over 200 trucks of assistance per day average – and the numbers on individual days have topped 400 – have entered into Gaza.Now, those numbers are important, but even more important than the number of trucks dropping their loads inside Rafah or Kerem Shalom into Gaza is the ability of the humanitarian community, primarily the UN, to distribute assistance within Gaza, to pick it up, take it from warehouses, take it from storage yards, and get it to people in need throughout south, central, and northern Gaza. There, too, the numbers have increased significantly to an average of 200 or 200-plus trucks a day in south and central Gaza, where the bulk of the population – 1.8, 1.9 million people – live.More must be done though to ensure that assistance is effectively and efficiently moved, not just in the south and the center, but in the north. The population in the north is in particular threat of malnutrition, wasting, famine. And there all too little aid had come in, until the last several weeks. Aid has been moving now to the north through land corridors from outside Gaza in and from within Gaza north. Nearly 100 trucks a day have been moving to the north over the course of the last several weeks.It is essential that the needs of the people living there be addressed, be assessed accurately. That process will be taking place later this week by the UN, and so we can move beyond counting trucks to focusing – and Sonali can comment on this in detail – on what specific kinds of assistance – specialized feeding, the treatments needed to deal with wasting, to deal with infant, newborn mortality and morbidity, that those can be provided to people in need. Our first priority was, because it had to be, adverting famine. But we now need to move on beyond that goal to addressing the true needs – sanitization, availability of medicine, availability of potable water, the specialized care required for these vulnerable populations. That has to be the ongoing focus.Now, Israel has taken significant steps in these last two, two and a half, weeks. Erez and an additional northern crossing are in the process of being made accessible for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. That was at our request. The so-called gate 96 crossing into the center of Gaza has been open now for several weeks and is being utilized by the UN to move assistance into Gaza. The Jordan channel as we refer to it – Jordanian trucks carrying assistance from the humanitarian hub near Amman directly into Gaza – has also been flowing, for now, through Kerem Shalom into Gaza but in the near future directly from Jordan across the river, in via Israel to northern crossings and into Gaza for distribution.The JLOTS, the U.S. maritime corridor, which Sonali has been working on so hard over these last few weeks – that will also begin operation in early May. We have a significant volume today of assistance moving in by land. We’re going to have an increased volume within the predictable next few weeks moving in from land and sea.And that flooding, that additional assistance has brought with it its own logistical challenges. The problem is not getting assistance into Gaza; it’s getting it distributed within Gaza. And there the logistical constraints are the lack of sufficient trucks in possession of the UN, something that the UN and we have been working on assiduously over these last weeks, to enable a greater logistical capacity to distribute, pick up aid, and move it.And secondly, there are two crossing points, two checkpoints, to and from north Gaza. Those two checkpoints – one on the coastal road, one on an inland road called Salah al-Din &#8212; are now heavily congested with truck movements. That wasn’t a problem before. It’s a problem now, and it needs to be sorted out so assistance can be moved safely and efficiently up, empty trucks brought south, so the cycle can begin again. We’re in close touch with the Government of Israel, with Israeli authorities on how best to expediate, along with the UN, these movements.So, these challenges still exist. There is still considerable work to be done, but progress has been made.And a final note on something that all of you have heard us speak to and you have asked about – deconfliction and coordination. Too many humanitarian workers have been killed. Too many humanitarian movements have not been able to move effectively and efficiently to their destinations. And so we have worked intensively – and the President discussed this with the prime minister – on setting up a mechanism that works in real time between humanitarian actors on the ground, between IDF personnel at checkpoints, at contact points on the ground, and appropriate levels within the IDF structure to enable that efficient, effective, and safe movement of humanitarians, their staff, and the convoys containing assistance. Progress is being made, but more progress still needs to be done to assure that this is in train. To make it work, humanitarian actors need effective communications. They need to be able to talk – talk to the IDF on the ground, talk to command levels of the IDF and vice versa. We’re pleased that progress has been made on availability of appropriate communications systems for humanitarian workers.Lost in the things that need to be done – because those needs are significant – is the fact that we have seen meaningful progress. That progress needs to be sustained, needs to be continued, but the situation has improved, particularly in these last two to three weeks, from where we would be were I briefing at beginning of April or in the latter part of March. But more needs; more has to be done to meet those needs; it has to be sustained.And I’ll leave here with one final comment, which is, if you will, editorial. I have been working Arab-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli issues for over 40 years. For the past 30 years, since September 13th, 1993, the Oslo Agreement, Hamas has had a choice. The choice is to accept what we refer to as the Oslo principles, then the Quartet principles; to eschew the use of violence; to accept a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the Palestinian-Israel issue. Hamas has made a choice, but it was not one in favor of a peaceful resolution. Hamas, for its own ideological and political reasons, has chosen in favor of violence, threat, to pursue its ambitions. The greatest victims of this have been Palestinians themselves, not just the Israelis who were massacred on October 7th in that paroxysm of bestial violence.Hamas still has a choice. The fighting in Gaza, the suffering of the Palestinian people, could end tonight if Hamas chose to accept the deal for release of hostages and the establishment of a ceasefire, and that ceasefire could with further releases be sustained. But as in the past, Hamas has taken a different course. Let us not lose sight in our correct focus on the requirements incumbent upon Israel to assure all of those humanitarian steps I’ve just spoken to that the fundamental actor responsible for the suffering here is a terrorist group, Hamas. Thank you.MR PATEL: Ellen, you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. I don’t really get a sense exactly of the precise details about how close Israel’s compliance has come to the level that President Biden said he wanted to see when he said policy would be shaped by it allowing humanitarian aid. You talk about 200 trucks a day, but aid groups have said the minimum is 500 trucks a day. And there’s – you mentioned communication systems to help with deconfliction. I mean, there was communication systems, if you’re talking about actual – the comms. Those were &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Is there a question?QUESTION: Yeah. Those were there with the World Central Kitchen. And you talked about negotiations on the comms – those are two crucial themes. How – it sounds like there’s actually – it’s actually pretty far from meeting the level that’s needed, and how long is Israel going to have until – to meet that standard?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Ellen, we work closely with Israel on the commitments made by the prime minister to the President. I have outlined many of the steps that have contributed to progress, meaningful progress that has been made. The volume of assistance moving into Gaza is significantly greater over these last weeks than the volume in the months that preceded. The volume of assistance on a daily basis being distributed within Gaza, which is the more important number – that is also, on an average, at a higher level than in the previous months. More needs to be done.The north has seen for the first time in all of these six months significant levels of assistance moving in on a daily basis. Is it enough? No, it is not enough, but it is progress. Northern crossings have been opened and are being prepared for opening, in the case of Erez and another northern crossing. Ashdod Port – the President said we need to see Ashdod Port open for humanitarian goods, not just flour. Ashdod Port has been opened. That step has been taken.We’ll get now into important but, if you will, secondary details. Comms equipment – World Central Kitchen did not have the types of communications systems that could have provided redundancy during that terrible event. It is essential those redundant systems with different technical operating parameters be provided. That is what Israel has now approved. So, there is a change that’s been made there.Water – President said water has got to be turned back on. There are three Mekorot national carrier pipelines into Gaza. The southernmost one has been operating. The second one has been intermittently operating; it has been under active repair. Because the network from delivery into Gaza through Gaza has been disrupted, the repairs are ongoing. The northern pipeline, which was turned off since October 7th, has been repaired and is functioning now.All of this reflects progress. Northern crossings, Ashdod Port open, the Jordan channel – it is essential for us that Jordan be able to deliver trucks on a daily basis directly into Gaza. Right now, they are doing so through Kerem Shalom as an interim measure. When the northern crossings are repaired and functional, which we expect will be in the next very few weeks, possibly shorter in the case of Erez, Jordanian trucks will be able to enter there. But they’re already moving. And the JLOTS is in final stages of preparation.All of this represents progress. Is there more to do? Yes. But this is a very different picture I am presenting to you than the one we would have had just three weeks ago on the eve of the President’s call to Netanyahu.MR PATEL: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for being here. Just to put a fine point on my colleagues’ questions, three weeks later, are you – can you say you’re satisfied with the steps that Israel has taken so far? Has the deconfliction mechanism that you talked about, you said there is progress – is that in place now and is working?And the final thing is about the pier. We’re being told U.S. will rely on Israel for security. Can you elaborate on that? Is it going to be security of U.S. troops provided by Israel? Who will distribute the aid inside Gaza? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll take your last part and turn to Sonali for that, but I am not going to give you – and I’ll spare the rest of your colleagues – I’m not going to give you a grade. “Did they get an A+, an A, or a B?” We are in the constant process of monitoring, assessing, facilitating, supporting progress towards the goals the President set. This is not a “gotcha” test. “At 2:00 p.m. on the 7th of May, will Israel pass or not?” This is a set of requirements to help the people of Gaza and the humanitarian workers whose role is vital in facilitating assistance. Progress is being made, but I am not going to stand here and give you a grade on that. More needs to be done.Sonali, do you want to talk about JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So just on your question on JLOTS, we’re working – from USAID working very closely with CENTCOM to put together the JLOTS and the pier. We’re working very closely with the UN to handle the distribution mechanism into Gaza. I’ll also say that we are taking a lot of care to respect the UN’s neutrality and independence in terms of distribution.Just on your question on security, I think that’s best placed to DOD, but suffice it to say that IDF is providing some security and force protection measures to U.S. assets that will be offshore. And I’ll have you ask my DOD colleagues further questions on that. Over.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks, Sonali.MR PATEL: Gillian, go ahead.QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, can you talk a little bit more broadly about how you see – since October 7th in particular – the – Israel’s – the Israeli Government’s conduct of humanitarian affairs versus Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs, broadly speaking?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Excuse me? Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs? What do you mean?QUESTION: Well, for an example, yesterday the State Department released the annual Human Rights Report, and featured Israel alongside Hamas in the first page.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to comment on the Human Rights Report or any aspect &#8212;QUESTION: Right, so that’s why I’m asking you about the humanitarian conduct of those governments &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hamas has &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; as they were presented side by side.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah, I’ll comment on Hamas. Hamas has spent 17 years in expending every resource provided for the people of Gaza for its own purposes in constructing a network of military facilities, tunnels, embedded in, under, around humanitarian facilities as a deliberate act of preservation and advancement of their interests. Hamas has sacrificed those thousands of innocent Gazans who had been lost after their brutal massacre on October 7th. Again, inconvenient truth – I’m going to keep reminding of that – something happened on the 7th of October which precipitated all of this.Hamas’s humanitarian policy is the opposite of humanitarian. It is to use innocent civilians as shields, as presumed protection for their own facilities, for their own terrorist military forces, and for the plotting and planning which first and foremost victimizes Palestinians and their future. And how there can be any other consideration of Hamas other than as a terrorist group who has proclaimed – I’ll remind – they’ll do it again and again and again, if given the opportunity. That’s Hamas. That’s why they’re an FTO.Now, with respect to Israel, we require from Israel – because it is the right and moral thing to do – a very different standard of conduct. And as I noted in my remarks, the President made clear on his visit to Israel, shortly after October 7th, it’s not just strategically important for you to do this. It’s the morally right thing to do. It is the reflection of what Israel is – a democracy with values. Does more need to be done? Yes. Could more have been done sooner? Yes, of course. But the point is, over time, progress has been made. With all of the distance that remains to fully meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Gaza – those needs are considerable – progress has been made.QUESTION: Are you – may I follow up with that real quickly?MR PATEL: We’re going to try and get through as many questions as we can. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Anne Flaherty with ABC News. Can we – can you first of all clarify that you have not put a timeline on Israel to take certain steps forward when you talked about potable water, more UN trucks? It sounds like it’s more of just a constant discussion that you’re having with Israel. Also, has Israel provided assurances that JLOTS will not be in lieu of these land corridors, that they will both remain open?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll start with your last one first. We have made clear, and Israel has affirmed to us that the JLOTS, the maritime corridor, whoever operates it – military or, ultimately, anyone else – is an adjunct to, it’s additive to, supplemental to land corridors. There is no question that the most efficient and effective way to deliver assistance is via as many land corridors as possible, which is why the increase in the operation in Kerem Shalom; the opening of the gate 96 corridor into the center of Gaza; the preparation for opening of the two new northern crossings; Ashdod Port, which is a perfectly functional port with immediate access directly into Gaza – all of those are critical. So yes, it’s additive to, it is not a replacement for in any sense of the word.With respect to timing, I think you all know the President must make a determination by May 8th on the NSM-20 issue. I’m not going to get into that question here. But I will say our work is focused every day, every hour, on seeing continuous progress made. We are not doing this because there’s a deadline on May 8th or any other date certain. We’re doing it because every day there are people in need. Every day those needs need to be met.MR PATEL: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Good to see you again, Mr. Ambassador.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hi, Said.QUESTION: I have two quick questions. Would you say that famine that was looming a couple of weeks ago, three weeks ago, has now been averted? That’s one. And second, I mean, this insistence on the six-week ceasefire – why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Because the implicit message for the Palestinians is that after six weeks Israel can resume its bombing of Gaza and bombing civilian targets and so on. So why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to get into the details, Said. I hope you will understand – of the hostage deal which is presented and not accepted by Hamas, the terms of that deal. This administration has always insisted that a ceasefire is conditioned upon, part and parcel of not just a hostage release, but hostage releases. Hamas has it in its hands not just to effect a first-phase release, but further releases which would extend the ceasefire beyond that point. Beyond that, I’m not going to comment on famine. I’ll turn to Sonali.QUESTION: All right, thank you.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Hi, thanks for that question. So, we don’t know. Assessments on famine are based on a very rigorous methodology that is undertaken by the IPC, the Integrated Phase Classification, which is the expert body that both collects and reviews data. So, we will wait for their determination. What I will say is that in order to address this, we not only need to get trucks in, but we need to get nutritional therapies, we need to reach the moms and kids that are most at risk, especially in northern Gaza. We need to get them clean water. We need to get them health care.I will say that with 29 percent of children under two showing signs of acute malnutrition in northern Gaza – this is what was reported in the IPC – it takes time to reverse that trend. It takes at least six weeks to get a child who is suffering the effects of malnutrition back on track. So, I don’t know that we’ve averted it. We’re certainly trying, but we’ll wait for the data and the experts to tell us what they see.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: John Hendren with Al Jazeera English. To what extent will an operation in Rafah affect your ability to get this aid in there? Will it not certainly push back that effort and make things more difficult?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: John, you know the position which the White House, State have expressed; Secretary Austin as well. We could not support a Rafah ground operation without an appropriate, credible, executable humanitarian plan precisely because of the complications for delivery of assistance; and then on top of that, the consequences of displacement of the hundreds of thousands of Rafahns already multiply displaced. Where do they go? How will their needs be met: shelter, medicine, water, sanitation?Rafah itself today poses significant challenges in all of these areas. The compression of population, whatever the number may today be – 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 million – poses enormous challenges: shelter, sanitation, water. To move them again under kinetic circumstances would complicate that enormously. It’s for all of these reasons that we have been as clear as we have been with the Government of Israel. And that’s not just a past-tense discussion; it is a current tense. We continue discussions with Israel on what we believe are alternate ways of addressing a challenge which we recognize, which is Hamas military present in Rafah. We get it, we understand it, but we think there are other ways to deal with this. And if there is not a credible, executable humanitarian plan, then we cannot support a ground operation.QUESTION: But fair to say that Israel views that differently up till now?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: That’s our position.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Elizabeth, and then these guys have got to wrap.QUESTION: I want to follow up on the pier. How will the U.S. ensure the safety of aid workers who are concerned over the Israeli military’s presence in the area and role securing it given the past failures in deconfliction? And also, will Israel’s so-called dual-use restrictions be applied to goods entering the pier?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So, what I can say is that there are conversations happening every single day between our humanitarian assistance team, the DART, in Jerusalem, CENTCOM on the ground, and our UN partners on the ground. The safety and security of our humanitarian partners is the most important thing; it’s absolutely vital. They need to feel safe and secure.I’m not going to get into specific security measures on what’s being discussed for obvious reasons, but just to say that those are happening, and we’re very cognizant, again, as I said earlier, that the UN needs to maintain its principles of neutrality and independence and access throughout Gaza. So, we are trying to abide by those principles and make sure that everyone involved has the safety and security that they need.QUESTION: And the dual-use goods?MR PATEL: (Off-mike.)ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’ll defer to Ambassador Satterfield on dual use. Oh, I can take dual use. So again, we – so the goods will be inspected in Cyprus by Israelis, but also by a team which will include the UN, our colleagues in Cyprus. The dual-use concerns are being discussed. There should be a consistency on what goes in, so we’re not trying to create, like, an exception for Cyprus – just to say that we continue to have conversations with our Israeli colleagues to streamline the process for inspecting and approving goods that are sensitive or on the dual-use list.MR PATEL: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Mr. Ambassador, I have two questions. First, did the U.S. ask Qatar to expel Hamas leaders from there? Second, are you preparing for humanitarian emergencies in case a full war – a full-scale war breaks between Hizballah and Israel?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Easiest ones yet. First answer is no. The second is, in the great tradition of those standing at this podium, I don’t comment on hypotheticals.MR PATEL: Laura, you had your hand up in the back. Yes, you, Laura Rozen.QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: Did you not have your hand up?QUESTION: No.MR PATEL: Oh, okay. All right. Go ahead, Doc.QUESTION: Okay, yeah. I wanted to know about Egypt’s role in – about giving relief for the Gazans to be able to go into Egypt. Is Egypt open to taking a lot of the people – to – Gaza to go out through that into a safe area, so that Israel can deal with the Hamas battalions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll comment first, and this is longstanding commentary: We believe the future of the Palestinian people of Gaza lies in Gaza, not anywhere else. Egypt has made very clear – preceding October 7th – that they also believe the future for Palestinians lies in Gaza, not in Egypt. We understand that point; we respect it. So does the Government of Israel.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Are you in touch with the organization – the Palestinian organizations like the Red Crescent as far as with these updated comms? And – because we’ve seen medics, for example, attacked as well by the Israelis. So &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: There’s a humanitarian hub at al-Arish in which UN, UN agencies are represented, and of course the Egyptian Red Crescent runs that hub in close coordination for delivery of bilateral assistance, non-UN assistance, through the PRCS. And so, with respect to our focus on comms, that has been directed primarily at the UN, the UN family of agencies, rather than at Palestine Red Crescent Society.But Sonali, any further comment on that?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: No, I think you’ve got it.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah.QUESTION: And one more question. We haven’t seen too many briefings with you. Should we expect more opportunities to ask you some questions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: You haven’t seen them because I have been all but about 25 days of the last six and a half months in the region working the actual issues. So, I can’t promise for the future, but thank you.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR PATEL: Final question, go ahead.QUESTION: Regarding the maritime corridor from the Republic of Cyprus, do you have any updates about any possible logistical challenges or how we move forward with that plan?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’m sorry, I think I lost that second word – about any logistics?QUESTION: The maritime corridor from Cyprus, or the Republic of Cyprus, to Gaza to provide humanitarian aid.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Yeah, so the update that I can give you is that we are proceeding apace and on schedule, working very closely with CENTCOM. We have colleagues in Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus. We have a coalition of partners working around this: the EU, the UK. And then we’re also working with CENTCOM and Israeli colleagues to set up the assistance and the beach landing spot in Gaza, and critically, we’re working with UN partners to handle the distribution of assistance going into Gaza. Again, this is a humanitarian initiative. We’re keeping it in line with humanitarian principles, and we hope to have more updates for you on this soon.QUESTION: Can I ask one question about JLOTS? We haven’t had a chance to ask anything in the – previously.MR PATEL: If you want to ask one more question about JLOTS, then these guys have got to go.QUESTION: Sure, thank you, thank you. Can you – can you tell me, is – are things still in discussion or is there an agreement that the WFP will actually handle the distribution part of it? Is there an agreement on the rules of engagement with the IDF? And is there – is the deconfliction aspect handled to your satisfaction so that you’re confident that the aid workers will actually be protected as they work with the people with JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: So – so yes. We have an agreement with the UN and WFP to work on the logistics. As I said, this is – we’re working out a lot of details on how this is going to work. The partners are working on the security aspects of it. As you mentioned, again, I don’t want to comment on that here just for very obvious reasons, to protect their security.So, all of these issues are being worked through. Again, I’ll re-emphasize that the key principle for the UN’s engagement here is to protect their independence and neutrality and ability to access vulnerable populations throughout Gaza. We are working to make sure that they feel comfortable in upholding those principles. I think the conversations are going ahead really well.Just again, on specific issues around deconfliction and protection, I will ask that you defer those conversations for our DOD colleagues. Deconfliction is an issue for all humanitarian workers working in Gaza. It’s not just a JLOTS issue. As Ambassador Satterfield said, some steps have been made to improve the system, which obviously had some failures given the World Central Kitchen attack, but also we have lost over 200 humanitarian workers through the course of this war. We need to see those steps be implemented and the humanitarian community and IDF continue to talk and engage and iterate and improve the system, so that everyone feels safe and secure in this very difficult operating environment.QUESTION: Okay, thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks, everybody.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks so much. Ambassador Satterfield, Administrator Korde, thank you so much for joining us today.QUESTION: We can do Zoom press conferences if you’re out in the region. (Laughter.) This was very helpful. Thanks.MR PATEL: All right, okay. Give me two seconds, guys. All right. Well, that was – I’m very glad we were able to have them join us today. Ellen, you want to kick us back off?QUESTION: What to ask?MR PATEL: We can also stop. If that was – (laughter). If that really – if that quenched your thirst, I’m happy to go &#8212;QUESTION: No, if I could.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: I guess the – as you – obviously, there’s been lots of anticipation about the Leahy Law decisions that are expected. Can – there’s been reporting that there were recommendations for some IDF units to be identified as in violation of the Leahy Amendments, but that the Secretary opted not to take staff’s recommendation for several of the units. Can you – can you comment on that?MR PATEL: So, I think I’m going to echo what you saw Matt and the Secretary address as it relates to this question beginning in Capri on Friday, which is I’m just not going to get ahead of this process. What I will say is that we take the Leahy Law incredibly seriously. It is also the standards of it we apply consistently across the board with all countries in which we have security relationships with. That should be no surprise to anybody. But I am not going to get ahead of the process, and I am sure we’ll have more to say in the time forthcoming.Humeyra.QUESTION: Yesterday I think Matt said on UNRWA you guys haven’t had a chance to review it, you were still reviewing it. Do you have, like, an assessment on the Colonna report’s findings?MR PATEL: So, as it relates to the report that foreign – former French Foreign Minister Colonna took the – led on, we first – to take a step back, we welcome and strongly support the recommendations of the independent review of UNRWA mechanisms and procedures related to neutrality. This was released yesterday.We continue to look closely at the report and are assessing how we can continue to work with partners in the region, host authorities in the Government of Israel, to implement some of these recommendations. We, of course, continue to support UNRWA’s important work. It must continue. But at the same time, we continue to advocate for reforms. And we welcome what the former French foreign minister laid out.QUESTION: So, given the language the – the language in the supplemental that’s about to pass and how it prohibits the resumption of U.S. funding, is it fair to say until at least, like, 2025 there is no chance that U.S. would be able to resume funding for UNRWA?MR PATEL: You’ve heard me say this before. We assume this supplemental passes when the – when it passes the Senate. We will be an administration that complies with the law, and the law is very clearly laid out in that national security supplemental as it relates to what kind of relationship the United States can have with UNRWA. We’re continuing to engage with partners in the region, with UN agencies, and other humanitarian organizations about the important work when it comes to humanitarian aid. It’s also really important to note that there is a significant amount of monies for humanitarian aid in the supplemental, including humanitarian aid into Gaza. And so we’ll continue to pursue those lines of effort.QUESTION: And the report also found that Israel was yet to present any evidence for the accusation that hundreds of UNRWA staff were members of terrorist groups. Is the U.S. going to be encouraging Israel to provide that evidence? Are you going to do anything towards that end?MR PATEL: So, the – our understanding is that the United Nations is continuing to pursue an investigation as it relates to &#8212;QUESTION: Separate one.MR PATEL: That’s separate – that relates to the individuals alleged to have participated in the October 7th terrorist attacks. And so, I will – I’m not going to get ahead of that process.QUESTION: Okay. And the final thing is you must have seen the reports about mass graves containing hundreds of bodies around al-Shifa. UN chief said he was horrified by these reports. I’m wondering if U.S. has a comment on this and whether you guys have raised this with the Israeli Government.MR PATEL: We have seen the – those reports, and the reports are incredibly troubling. And we’re inquiring on this with Government of Israel. I don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Specifically on the &#8212;MR PATEL: Correct. I don’t have any specific information to offer – insight into what this is or isn’t. I don’t have a sense of that from up here, but we are inquiring about this with the Government of Israel.QUESTION: Do you know who reached out to who? Is it the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to speak to the specifics, but it should be no surprise to you that we engage with the Government of Israel at all levels often many times, multiple times a day, at all hours.Anne, go ahead.QUESTION: So, Ambassador Satterfield seemed pretty pleased with how Israel is progressing. Has the U.S. shared with Israel what would happen, if Israel takes its foot off the pedal with regards to humanitarian aid? And then also a question on Ukraine. UK has already beat – beaten us to the punch – biggest military package ever. Can you characterize if the U.S. package to Ukraine is going to look to be – is it shaping up to be the biggest ever?MR PATEL: Let me take that in two parts. First, I’m not sure pleased is the appropriate adjective that I would use. I think Ambassador Satterfield was pretty clear that there have been – there’s been some clear metrics for progress that have been over the past number of weeks. Those are welcome steps, and they are things that we are very happy to see. However, he was also explicitly clear that there continue to be areas – specifically, distribution of aid within Gaza, some of the telecommunication measures that he mentioned, sanitation and others areas, deconfliction – those are areas that we want to and need to continue to see sustained progress, including the sustained progress on the steps that have been made in the right direction. And as it relates to a deadline or anything like that, you &#8212;QUESTION: But is there a consequence?MR PATEL: The Secretary and the President were incredibly clear that these are kinds of steps that we absolutely need to see, or it will have a determining factor as it relates to the kinds of policy we pursue as it relates to Gaza. There has not been a change in that assessment. We expect that these kinds of efforts to be continued and sustained. This situation is still dire. Both things can be true, which is something that we’ve kind of been pretty clear about for quite some time now. We can see steps being taken that we think are beneficial to the overall humanitarian aid ecosystem – stuff like the Ashdod Port opening, some of these northern crossings being opened. These are all good, welcome, positive steps in the right direction. Simultaneously, there continues to be a lot of work that needs to be done. On Ukraine, look, first let me just say as it relates to our partners in the United Kingdom, we welcome any country taking additional steps to support our Ukrainian partners and bolster the transatlantic Alliance. My understanding is that this was an announcement not just about support for Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom committing to contribute 2.5 percent of their GDP towards the defense space by 2030 – again, a step that we think is in line with NATO commitments but also, again, something that bolsters the transatlantic Alliance. So very – very glad and happy to see that news.When it comes to the United States, we have not been shy about the fact that one of the key reasons we need this national security supplemental passed is because we need to continue to support our Ukrainian partners. We are going to wait for, I’m sure, final passage before previewing or talking about any additional next steps when it comes to how we might be supporting our Ukrainian partners.Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to Humeyra’s question, just to follow up &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; on that, now it seems that more than 300 bodies have been found. The United Nations is asking or calling for an independent investigation. Would you support such an independent investigation for this matter?MR PATEL: Right now, Said, we are asking for more information.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: That is where – that is squarely where we are leaving the conversation.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: I don’t have any details to match, confirm, or offer as it relates to that. We’re aware of those reports, and we have asked the Government of Israel for additional clarity and information. And that’s where I’m at for today.QUESTION: I understand. If the – if Secretary-General Guterres asked for your support in this effort, would the United States support him in the pursuit of &#8212;MR PATEL: You are asking to – you’re asking about a hypothetical, Said &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: &#8212; which, again, I’m not going to get ahead of until we have greater fidelity on information as to what this is. And we’re hoping to get that from the Government of Israel as soon as possible.QUESTION: All right. Now on – Israel is said to be expanding the so-called safe zone in Gaza as it prepares to invade Rafah. I wonder if you’ve seen the report, and if you have any comment on that.MR PATEL: I’ve not – I’ve not seen that report, Said. But look, any kind of action that would be inconsistent with what we’d consider the forced relocation or the forced movement or eviction of Palestinians from their homes in Gaza is something that is inconsistent with the principles that Secretary Blinken laid out in Tokyo last December, and a key tenet of that continues to be that there can be no forced relocation.Ellen, you had your hand up? That &#8212;QUESTION: No, I was just going to say on the issue of investigating or finding out the truth of the allegations of the mass grave, your – the State Department’s Human Rights Report yesterday said along the lines that it knew of no instances where Israeli officials had brought accountability basically for crimes alleged in Gaza. In those circumstances, I mean, with that kind of determination by the State Department itself, is waiting for Israel to investigate it the appropriate course of action?MR PATEL: So that’s not a – first, I think we should clarify what the Human Rights Report is and isn’t. It isn’t a determination or an assessment by the State Department. What it is, is a compilation of submitted violations of human rights all around the world that are done in close coordination with our embassies and consulates in all the places that we have them, with civil society organizations, with media organizations. That’s how that report is compiled. I will also note that it is not an exhaustive or a list of every single human rights violation in the world. It is a compilation.But you saw the Secretary speak to this a little bit yesterday. First, as it relates to our own system when it comes to violations of human rights, there are processes and protocols and procedures in place for the United States to assess what is happening on the ground. These are thorough, deliberate, detail-oriented processes that can take time. Those processes are ongoing, and we’ll continue that work, as we continue that work in any conflict zone around the world.Simultaneously, I am sure our partners in Israel can speak to any procedures and parameters they have in place in their own system as it relates to things that would be viewed as violations. And I will let them speak to that.Alex, on the region, or something else?QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Please come back.MR PATEL: Let me stay a little bit on the region; I’ll come back to you.Michel, you had your hand up.QUESTION: On Iran. Al-Jarida newspaper, a Kuwaiti newspaper, has quoted a high-level source in the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, saying that Iran received an American letter offering to resume negotiations to resume the nuclear agreement after reaching security understandings. And the source added that the offer includes promises to cancel a large portion of economic and non-economic sanctions if Tehran cooperates in restricting its atomic activity and regional pacification. Can you confirm this report?MR PATEL: So, Michel, I’m not going to comment on our ways of communicating with Iran except to say we are not in direct talks with Iran on the JCPOA, either in New York or anywhere else.QUESTION: Indirect talks?MR PATEL: What’s that?QUESTION: Are you in indirect talks with Iran?MR PATEL: I just said that we are not in direct talks with Iran.QUESTION: Indirect, indirect – not direct.MR PATEL: I am not going to speak to any of our communicating – ways of communicating with Iran.QUESTION: And one on Israel-Lebanon. War is escalating between Hizballah and Israel on the border. Do you expect a full-scale war between the two sides? And what can you say about the U.S. efforts to find a diplomatic solution for this crisis?MR PATEL: We are continuing to engage in direct conversations with our partners in Israel and other regional partners to avoid any kind of massive, dire escalation. As we know, Israel is – has this challenge of defeating Hamas in Gaza, but simultaneously is dealing with the threat from Hizballah in the north, and Israel of course has every right to defend itself and right to its security, but we have been clear with everyone that we possibly can that it – from the United States point of view, we’re not interested in seeing this escalate. But I don’t have any other thing to offer on the process there.On the Middle East, or anything &#8212;QUESTION: On the region, on Iran. (Inaudible.)MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: So yesterday the special report about human rights indicated that the Iranian regime had terrorist activities and also put pressure on Iran International journalists, my colleagues. So, in one occasion, they had to move their office from London to Washington, D.C. So, do you have any comment on that? Because this is a serious attack on journalists who are working in the United States and also in the UK.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: And – they are my colleagues, and they are concerned about it.MR PATEL: So first let me just say I’m not going to comment on any particular report or any particular anecdote laid out in the Human Rights Report. But it should be no surprise to anybody that Iran continues to be one of the largest exporters of terrorism and has been so since 1979. Simultaneously, it is also a regime that has showed blatant disregard to a free and open press and media environment. I mean, you have seen over the course of the past three years alone a serious crackdown within Iran on civil society, on media organizations, on human rights. We will continue to take steps to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its human rights violations, for other malign activities, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And one – sorry, one follow-up, sir.MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room. I’m going to work the room. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: According to Jewish Press and Middle East Forum reports, the U.S. State Department has announced that it will take legal steps against the Israeli army’s unit known as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion based on reports that the U.S. gets from Dawn, which is a &#8212;MR PATEL: We have spoken to this pretty regularly since Friday, and your colleague just asked about it at the beginning of the press briefing, so I would ask you pay attention. But I will just reiterate what I said, which is that we’re not going to get ahead of our determinative or deliberative processes here. We take our role and responsibility as it relates to implementation of the Leahy Law quite seriously. It is – its standards are applied consistently to all countries who we have security relationships with, but I don’t have any announcement to make.QUESTION: But this is a follow-up to this. According to U.S. State Department website report, the U.S. has declared that it will “take action against those who undermine peace, security, and stability in the West Bank, which undermine the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution.” So does that mean that the U.S. will take action against Arabs who raise millions to support any Arab who murders a Jew, or take action against the Palestinian Authority for the pay for slay – for the pay a salary for life to any Arab who murders a Jew, and finally take action against the Palestinian ministry of education, whose new curriculum indoctrinates Palestinian Arabs to destroy Israel?MR PATEL: So, I see you’re trying to connect a couple different threads there. First, the sentence that you quote from, you’re talking about actions that the United States took in response to violence, extremism that we are seeing in the West Bank, and yes, that absolutely is a detractor from peace and stability in the region. It’s a detractor from Israel’s own security, takes us further away from a two-state solution, and as you saw, we won’t hesitate to take appropriate actions to actors who partake in that kind of activity.Simultaneously, when it comes to the PA, which is what I think you’re referring to, issues like the so-called martyr payments are something that we have raised regularly in our engagements with the PA. It is a tenet of the kinds of reform that we are continuing to insist the Palestinian Authority undertake, and we’ll continue to have those kinds of conversations.In the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: So, on the reforms, today the new Palestinian prime minister announced a new package of reforms designed to strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and it seems like largely these were – these reforms were the same as promised by the previous prime minister. Have they – has the United States, has the State Department been in touch with the Palestinian Authority in – about these reforms that were announced &#8212;MR PATEL: We have conversations with appropriate members of the PA regularly. I don’t have any conversations to read out, but broadly, reform is something that we have stressed and made clear to them as part of the broader conversations we continue to have for peace and stability in the region. But I’m happy to check if we have had any more specific engagements on this news.QUESTION: You – are you familiar with the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’ve seen the reports. I’ve not – I think it broke right before I came out, so I haven’t had an opportunity to look into it, but we’re happy to check with the team.Go ahead. Yes, you.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Regarding the recent sanctions by United States on Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to see if there’s anything else on the Middle East before we come to any other topics.QUESTION: Okay. So, regarding the recent diplomatic push by the United States towards Saudi Arabia and Israel about normalizing ties – so do you think – so with the ongoing circumstances, what is the line of action you have, as Netanyahu is not even bothering United States regarding the aid, (inaudible) regarding the ceasefire, regarding the hostages, even. Meanwhile, you have many Israeli politicians you hosted here just for another attempt just to – a possible house change in the Israeli Knesset. So, what is the line of action you have?MR PATEL: We’ve been pretty clear that we think further integration of Israel into the Middle East region is in better – it’s in better interest of Israel’s security, it’s in better interest for the United States, and it is a further way for us to push back against Iran’s malign and destabilizing behavior. Of course, there is important work that still needs to be done as it relates to that integration, including, of course, ensuring that we can get to a place for a negotiated two-state solution, and those conversations continue to be ongoing.Anything else on the Middle East before I close out?QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Let me – I’ll come – Gaza. I’ll come to you after. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Yesterday Secretary Blinken released the Human Rights Reports, and he said in his speech that, in quote, “We repeatedly have pressed concerns about Palestinian civilians’ access to humanitarian assistance, displacements of the majority of the population in Gaza, and unprecedented number of journalists killed,” end quote. So, actually, one of the journalists killed in Gaza was one of our colleagues, working for Anadolu Agency of Türkiye. His name is Mustafa Alkharouf, and I want to ask a journalist – I mean, what would be your message to Israeli Government, Israeli military to protect the journalists working in Gaza?MR PATEL: Our message to the Government of Israel is the same message it is to any government on the face of this planet, which is that journalists need to be protected. They do important work; they do especially important work in conflict zones, where they shed light on what is happening on the ground, often in circumstances where it is not easy for public to get their information or get a sense of what is happening. And somewhere like Gaza, they do critical, critical work of informing people about what’s going on. And so, our message everywhere is journalists, media organizations, absolutely need to be protected.You had your hand up in the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: I did. Thanks, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I just wanted to circle back to what one of our colleagues asked, which was in relation to the mass graves story, my colleague referred to calls for an independent investigation, and you said that you were asking for more information from the Government of Israel, and that is squarely where we’re leaving the conversation. Why is there resistance to support an independent investigation into how 300 people ended up in a mass grave?MR PATEL: It’s not about resistance to this particular situation. It is me not wanting to speak in detail about something which Said posed as a hypothetical question, when from the United States perspective, I don&#8217;t have any additional information on this – aside from the public reporting that Humeyra and Said and others have asked about, which is a fair question. But what I am saying, from the United States perspective, is that we’ve seen those reports, and we are asking the Government of Israel for more details and more information.QUESTION: And do you believe that the Government of Israel is a credible source in enlightening you in that regards?MR PATEL: We do. We do. We do.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. Regarding the Human Rights Report from yesterday, particularly the chapter of Colombia, Section 4, corruption in government – you made references specifically to an episode or an issue and is the investigations from the attorney’s office in Colombia towards President Gustavo Petro’s son and his brother because of irregular payments that allegedly entered his presidential campaign. Why did you make reference or relate to corruption this issue that hasn’t been solved yet by the Colombian authorities, and taking into account that it’s so sensitive because it targets directly Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: So again, I – in the context of the Middle East, I will apply the same context here. I’m not going to speak to specific entries in the Human Rights Report. I will just say, again, that this is a compilation of various human rights violations that we’ve seen that are input by our embassies and consulates, that are input by civil society and nonprofit organizations and media organizations.QUESTION: Yes.MR PATEL: And I will just leave it at that. And I’m happy to check more on the specifics of this, but I don&#8217;t have anything more –QUESTION: Just to follow up, but do you have any credible – I don&#8217;t know – reasons to believe that there are irregular payments that enter into the Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: What I can say about the entries of the Human Rights Report is that we find them to be credible, which is why we have included them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: United States imposes sanctions on suppliers to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. What was the real reason for these sanctions?MR PATEL: The sanctions were made because these were entities that were proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. These were entities based in the PRC, in Belarus, and that we have witnessed to have supplied equipment and other applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. They are following our October 23rd designation of other – three PRC entities who’ve worked to supply Pakistan’s missile program. We’re going to continue to disrupt and take actions against proliferation networks and concerning weapons of mass destruction procurement activities wherever they may occur.QUESTION: Sir, Iranian president was in Pakistan and during his visit, Pakistan and Iran signed eight MOUs and also agreed to push bilateral trade to $10 billion. A Pakistani Government spokesperson also said that it does not need a waiver from U.S. sanctions to build its portion of a Pak-Iran gas pipeline. How does United States view these agreements and statements?MR PATEL: So first, just let me say broadly we advise anyone considering business deals with Iran to be aware of the potential risk of sanctions. But ultimately, the Government of Pakistan can speak to their own foreign policy pursuits.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: But do you have &#8212;QUESTION: Does the State Department &#8212;QUESTION: On Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a little bit. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much. If you could – quick answer for me. Let me get your reaction to today’s Moscow court hearing on Evan Gershkovich, where he’s appeal has been rejected. Do you have anything to say?MR PATEL: We, of course, are incredibly disappointed that Evan has been in pretrial detention for over a year without any clear justification from Russian authorities. Members of the embassy team in Moscow attended Evan’s appeal hearing today. Candidly though, Alex, Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips. Evan and Paul should be released immediately.QUESTION: Thank you. On Georgia, I wonder if you’re able to keep your eyes on the ball, given the recent developments – three of the nine states – of the protests. We also see that ruling party has announced its own counterprotest, and they also arrested a protestor from last week. They are flirting with a pro-Russian CPAC kind of group. Do you see any happy ending there?MR PATEL: So look, Alex, as it relates to protests, we certainly support what in the United States would be an expression of the people’s rights under the First Amendment to peacefully protest and demonstrate. Our call and our push, of course, continues to be that they be peaceful and certainly would condemn any steps that are taken for these kinds of protests to become violent.But Alex, I think this goes back to the draft law that you and I have been speaking about for a number of weeks now. We continue to find that this kind of legislative activity to be deeply problematic and inconsistent with – what would one would think – EU aspirations. You have to remember we’re talking about something that cracks down on media organizations, civil society organizations, and other things.And I see so many people leaving the room. I’m going to go ahead and call it, today. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 2:23 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Belarus																								China																								Colombia																								Cyprus																								Egypt																								Georgia																								Iran																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								United Kingdom
- Digital Press Briefing with Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International SecurityAsia Pacific Media HubMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.  Under Secretary Jenkins will provide an update on the Australia-UK-U.S., or AUKUS, security partnership, including recent announcements, its role in regional security, opportunities for innovation, and our commitments to advancing the initiative.And with that, let’s get started.  Under Secretary Jenkins, thank you so much for being with us today.  I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Great, thank you so much for inviting me.  It’s really a great opportunity to speak about AUKUS and the great work that we’re trying to – as we are working to implement this amazing initiative.So U.S., Australia, and UK are longstanding allies and partners committed to working together to actualize AUKUS and deepen our partnership.  These new authorities will allow for unparalleled levels of security cooperation between our governments and industries.  An endeavor of this size and scale will have challenges, but we will work trilaterally to overcome them together.  AUKUS is an example of demonstrating our firm commitment to our international partners and is a key line of effort in our Indo-Pacific strategies.The initiative remains committed to the highest nuclear nonproliferation standard, and AUKUS maintains strong bilateral and multilateral support in all three countries.  We are committed to getting this done right.  We understand the importance of enhancing security standards to protect our sensitive technology as you break new frontiers on developing emerging technologies together.  And we collectively want to have a robust consultation with industry that’s important to complete before exemptions can take effect to maximize its potential and use.We look forward to robust engagement in the weeks ahead with industry stakeholders after the trilateral partners have a chance to publish draft regulations for collaboration.  We see public input as vital and we will publish draft regulations for the exemptions soon.So with that, I’ll turn it back over and I am open and ready for questions.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Under Secretary.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Kym Bergmann at the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter in Canberra, Australia.  Kym asks:  “I&#8217;m after a bit more fidelity on the U.S. $3 billion that Australia will transfer to the U.S. submarine industrial base.  Can you indicate how that figure was arrived at?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Great, thank you for that question.  So the AUKUS security partnership collectively boosts each partner’s defense industrial bases and it strengthens submarine supply chains.  So the 3 billion in U.S.-dollar Australian contribution will uplift the U.S. submarine industrial base and provide enduring benefits to U.S. Virginia-class submarine construction and maintenance efforts.  So the contribution by Australia to the U.S. submarine industrial base will build on existing and planned U.S. efforts that will improve industrial base capability, will increase capacity, will – it’ll grow workforce and advance new manufacturing technologies.So the important Australian contribution will directly support the necessary growth for our Virginia-class submarine production that will meet U.S. national needs as well as AUKUS requirements.  I hope that answers the question.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question goes to Jinmyung Kim at the Chosun Ilbo in Seoul, Republic of Korea, who asks:  “About two weeks ago the AUKUS defense ministers said they would consider bringing Japan into Pillar II.  Also, the AUKUS partners are reportedly considering to add some more partners to Pillar II, including the ROK, Canada, and New Zealand.  What are the most important elements to be considered?  Where are we in terms of the expansion of AUKUS?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Great, thanks for that question.  I know there’s a lot of interest in Pillar II of AUKUS.  And I just want to make a few points early on, because I know there&#8217;s a lot of interest.  So since the beginning of AUKUS, the President and trilateral leaders have been very clear in our intent to engage others in Pillar II advanced capability projects as we progress.So to be very clear about this, we are not planning to expand cooperation of Pillar I, of course, which is focused on assisting Australia with the acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines.  But the parties have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement in Pillar II projects.  And we will undertake consultations this year with potential partners regarding areas where they can contribute to and benefit from the work that we&#8217;re doing in Pillar II.So we announced that Japan will be the first to be consulted, and we recognize Japan&#8217;s strength and the close bilateral defense partnerships with AUKUS countries, AUKUS partners, our continuing cooperation with Japan, and Pillar II advanced capability projects.  But we don’t have a timeline for Japan or any other country with which we are consulting about additional partnerships.  It is critical that we conduct a very deliberate process.  So these are discussions that we&#8217;re having, we&#8217;re going to be having with countries based on things that we think are important in terms of what additional partners can bring.So we have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement.  We&#8217;ve identified collaboration opportunities and we will take into account factors such as technological Innovation, financing, industrial capacity, ability to adequately protect sensitive data and information, and impact on promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.So those are some of the things I just wanted to note early on and just to re-emphasize that having partners in Pillar II is always something that we – that was considered by the leaders of all three countries – not for Pillar I but for Pillar II – and we are – we have some criteria that we&#8217;re looking at and we will be engaging countries.  We don’t have a timeframe in which we’re going to do it necessarily, but we hope to be able to make some advancements this year.  So I hope that’s helpful.MODERATOR:  Great.  Our next question comes to us via the Q&amp;A tab from Gordon Arthur at Defense News, who&#8217;s based in Christchurch, New Zealand.  Gordon asks:  “Apart from nuclear-powered submarines, can you provide some concrete examples of AUKUS Pillar II projects that are actually making concrete progress?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Well, we are in – I mean, one of the things I want to highlight is we have a number of trilateral groups that are looking at all of the different technologies.  But I think most of you know the technologies include cyber and undersea and electronic warfare and artificial intelligence and quantum computing.  And we&#8217;re looking at all of those, and we have – we&#8217;ve done a – at a meeting that we had in April last year, we did some work on some UAVs and I think we did – there was another event that we did in Australia that we can get more information to you on.  And so we are actually having conversations and working together on some of these demonstrations that we can show that we are actually making some progress.I should also note, of course, that a lot of this is in development when you talk about emerging technologies, as we have three countries working together.  One of the things we do want to do is find out where we have similarities, where there’s gaps in what we&#8217;re trying to do.So these are things that we&#8217;re working on.  I should also point out that regarding Pillar II and even Pillar I for that matter, part of it’s going to be education; part of it&#8217;s going to be training individuals from all three countries going to different schools.  We&#8217;ve already started having conversations amongst universities of the three countries.  We&#8217;ve been able to train some of submarine individuals from Australia in U.S. schools.So there&#8217;s a lot that&#8217;s happening in all of AUKUS in terms of the steps we&#8217;re making, in terms of implementing both Pillar I and Pillar II.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you.  Our next question goes to Paul Starick of The Advertiser in Adelaide, Australia.  Paul asked:  “Why is it in the United States’ strategic and industrial interest to have AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines built in Adelaide?  Is it because of capacity issues in the U.S. shipyards?  And what benefits will Adelaide nuclear-powered submarines bring to this industrial base?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Thanks for that question.  And in terms of the location, that really is a – where the submarines are is really built on sovereign decisions that remain in Australia.  So I would have to refer that specific question to the Australian Government because that&#8217;s really a decision that was made by them in terms of where the best location would be for that.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Christine Rovoi of the Pacific Media Network based in Auckland, New Zealand.  Christine asks:  “Pacific leaders have warned against AUKUS and regional partners Australia and New Zealand joining AUKUS because the region says it wants a nuclear-free Pacific, and this trilateral agreement between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. goes against the Blue Pacific narrative.  AUKUS has not been discussed in the Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting since it was signed in 2021.  Why hasn&#8217;t the U.S. fronted the Pacific leaders about AUKUS?  How can Washington – what can Washington do to quell the fears from the Pacific?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Yes, we – thanks for the question.  And we – ever since we launched the AUKUS, we&#8217;ve been having conversations with many countries about the goal of AUKUS, what AUKUS is, what we&#8217;re trying to do with AUKUS.  I know I can say that I&#8217;ve had many conversations personally with a number of countries in the region, outside the region, on AUKUS and what the goal of AUKUS is.So we want to keep doing that.  We want to keep having these conversations.  But I can certainly say that we have been – and not just the U.S. but also Australia has also been doing a lot of engagements within the region to explain what AUKUS is: the goals, the rationale, what we hope to achieve, and just regular updates on AUKUS.We’ve also done it in terms of engagements with – in Pillar I and the IAEA.  Director General Grossi has come out with at least two reports on AUKUS and the relationships and the good conversations that he&#8217;s having with the trilateral partners.  So there’s been a lot of engagement on AUKUS and we are very open and we want to be very transparent about the goals of AUKUS for both Pillar I and Pillar II, and hopefully, If folks aren&#8217;t really seeing that, they will see that in the near future because we recognize the importance of transparency and making sure we get the correct information out there about what we&#8217;re trying to accomplish with this very important initiative.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question goes to Rosie Lewis from The Australian based in Canberra, who asks:  “There&#8217;s been recent congressional reports suggesting the Virginia-class submarine production has been delayed by several years.  What does that mean for delivering Virginias to Australia in the early 2030s?  Is that still feasible?  Is there concern in Washington that giving those subs to Australia will undermine American security?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  What I can say is we are very – still very committed to the implementation of AUKUS to make sure that we are able to provide Australia with the nuclear-powered submarines.  That has not wavered.  Of course there&#8217;s been, as usual, concerns raised on the Hill about different aspects of AUKUS, though I can say that there&#8217;s strong bilateral bipartisan support for AUKUS overall, which is really good.  I mean, I testified in Congress at the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February and when there was a strong takeaway by me in terms of the bipartisan support.So what I can certainly say is that we remain committed to AUKUS.  We remain committed to providing a nuclear-powered submarine to AUKUS.  We recognize that there’s things that we have to address here in the United States domestically in terms of concerns raised by the Hill, but we are very committed to fulfilling our obligations under the AUKUS agreement.MODERATOR:  Next we have a question from the live queue.  We have Brandon How at InnovationAus in Canberra.  Brandon, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thanks very much for giving me time for the question, and thanks very much for taking time to update us on AUKUS.  I just wanted to follow up on the questions about additional partners for AUKUS Pillar II.  I was just wondering, will the United States be – in order to additional partners to participate, will there need to be additional exemptions under the export administrations regulation, or ITAR, and do you expect similar reforms or exemptions would need to be made in Australia and the UK to enable additional AUKUS Pillar II partners?  Thanks.UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Thanks for the question.  Right now we are working very closely with the UK and Australia.  All three countries are working very closely to ensure that we all have comparable export control regulations that will help to ensure the security of information and technology that will be shared amongst all three countries.  I can say that it&#8217;s been a lot of hard work that&#8217;s gone into this so far.  Ever since we had our NDAA passed late last year in the U.S., both Australia and the UK have been working very hard in terms of their own legislation that has to be adapted for AUKUS.  And we are very close to that point right now.  So that is going very well and we&#8217;re very happy with that process.  And we feel – we think that we&#8217;ll be able to get everything done in a – the next timeframe that is required in the next 120 days.As for other partners, it’s hard; I can&#8217;t predict right now and I don&#8217;t want to get ahead of the process in terms of what might be required for other partners.  Of course this will be one of the things that will be looked at as we consider new partners, part of it in addition to things that I had listed early on that we’ll have to look at, issues like ITAR and what would need to happen to have successful new partners join AUKUS.So what I can say is that it’s something that we will certainly be looking at, but I don’t have anything that I can really say at this point in terms of that because I don’t want to get ahead of the process.MODERATOR:  Okay, we have another live question from Lewis Jackson with Reuters.  Lewis, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Oh, fantastic.  Thanks.  So a couple of quick ones.  So first, there&#8217;s been a lot of concerns raised in the U.S., in Australia, even in Japan about sort of the level of their sophistication when it comes to cyber security and how that could be a barrier to being involved in Pillar II.  I mean, is this something you&#8217;re thinking about?  Is this something being discussed?  Do you expect it to be a topic of discussion when those talks begin later this year?And then just to, I suppose, reiterate a point you made just earlier, but do you see any chance that there could be a further delay after this 120-day timeline regarding the State Department trade exemptions?UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Great, thanks for the question.  Kind of what I was saying before, when we look at additional partners and which partners may come on board, we will be looking at a total panoply of issues.  It includes the things that I had already mentioned in terms of what we’re going to be looking at with specific countries and what they can bring to the table, what gaps they can fill, what are their areas of expertise.  But we’ve also been looking at what I said about how does it – what do we need to do in terms of potential exemptions, levels of sophistication.  These are all like – as you had said, these are all things we’re going to be looking at.  And so as I said, it’s going to be an issue that all three countries will be discussing.  We’ll be discussing that with the potential country that can come on board.  So these are all things that we’ll look at, and thanks for that because that is one of the things we will be looking at as well.As far as the next 120 days, what I can say is, I mean, it’s hard to put in words how much we’ve gotten done.  I mean, a process that normally takes six to 12 months we’ve been able to get done – get a lot done in the first 120 days.  And that includes new legislation in the U.S., new legislation in the UK, new legislation in Australia.  There were weekly meetings.  There were –flying between London and Canberra and D.C.  There’s been working groups.  It’s been a lot of work and we’ve been able to get a lot done, and I do appreciate all that the UK and Australia have done in terms of actually putting forth legislation and getting – and working toward to get the legislation approved and implemented as we’re doing in the U.S.So it’s hard to explain how much work has happened, but the fact that we were able to get so much done in the first 120 days and we’re hoping to get something out to our industries so that they can look at that, because we need to have industry input on any changes of legislation, because if it’s going to be successful we need to hear from them – that’s the next step.  But I don’t want to say I guarantee, but I can say we feel pretty good based on what we’ve accomplished already that we can probably make the next 120 days.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes from Chan Thul Prak at Kiripost in Cambodia, who asks:  “How do you respond to past remarks by Cambodian leaders that AUKUS is a threat to the region, that it is a dangerous arms race?  This has been a concern by Cambodia, which is a close ally with China.  Cambodia objected to the coming of nuclear-powered submarines to the region.”  Over.UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Well, a couple things.  As we’ve said several times, we are focused on safety and freedom of navigation and those things in the Indo-Pacific, and those are a fundamental reason why we are engaged on these issues and doing this trilateral.  As I said, one of the things we want to do is be very transparent and talking with countries in the region to hear their concerns, to be – and for us – and I say here again I thank Australia because they’ve been very good at this – explaining to countries in the region about why we’re doing this.  And it&#8217;s not at all to create a problem.  We’re trying to help to – help the safety and security of the region and countries, and that Australia is not going to develop a nuclear weapon; as I said, they’re going to have a nuclear-powered submarine, which is allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.So we’re not creating new nuclear weapons.  We’re not creating new nuclear states by doing this.  And so I just want to just be – just want to make that very clear, and this is something that we’re going to keep talking to countries in the region because we know there’s also some incorrect information out there about the purpose of AUKUS and what we’re trying to do.  And it’s very important that countries understand that this is not to create a race, to create any kind of arms races.  As I said, nuclear-powered submarines are allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Australia is not going to become a nuclear weapons state and they’re not going to be able to use the nuclear-powered submarines to develop a nuclear weapon either because if they tried to do that, the whole submarine would not work anymore.So these are things that we want to make very clear to countries.  And lastly, I just want to highlight, as I said earlier, the great work that we’re doing with the International Atomic Energy Agency to make sure that we are doing everything to have the highest nonproliferation standards in what we’re trying to do.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we have questions from Dileepa Fonseka at BusinessDesk in New Zealand, who asks:  “Is AUKUS Pillar II considered to be a military alliance?  And what benefits will AUKUS Pillar II potentially deliver members beyond what they might already get from Five Eyes membership?”UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Well, I think the thing about it is these are emerging technologies in Pillar II.  I mean, these are things that are developing, so that it’s a very exciting prospect to think the three countries and other countries who might be involved will be developing new technologies together that could be interoperable and connected.  And so it’s not only having the three countries who can use their knowledge and experience from the military and also from academia and from industry, who are all going to be part of this, working together to develop new technologies that can be interoperable.And so of course there’s the military side of it, but there’s also academia.  As I said, we’re going to be – we have universities amongst the three countries who are already starting to work together.  We’re talking to our young people about it because AUKUS is going to be a 70-, 80-year process, so the next two generations working on it.  So it’s really going to be government, industry, academia, military all working together on these new technologies.So yeah, you can see part of it’s military, but part of it is also a lot more in terms of what we’re going to be able to do in terms of students who are in STEM who can get involved in this kind of work.  So, and then of course we can bring in more countries that can also benefit from that.  They can also share in that and they can also be part of this interoperability that we have.  And so it will build on whatever existing relationships that are out there amongst the countries who are part of it.MODERATOR:  Okay, I think we have time for one more question.  We have Colin Clark from Breaking Defense in Sydney, Australia, in the live queue.  Colin, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Hopefully that worked.MODERATOR:  We can hear you.UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Yes.QUESTION:  Excellent.  So there was three point something billion in the House supplemental that just passed for submarine industrial base.  And my question is:  Is this effectively moving the Australian money into U.S. coffers, or is this new money for the U.S. submarine industrial base?UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Yeah, I believe – and I will check, but I believe that’s new money.  I don’t – I think that’s new money that’s going into the industrial base.  I can check on that and get back to you, but I think it’s new money.  That’s my understanding.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you.  And now, Under Secretary Jenkins, if you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back to you.UNDER SECRETARY JENKINS:  Well, first of all, just thank you for hosting this.  Thank you for everyone who’s asking questions or just listening.  I know a bulk of the questions at this point are really about new partners, which is actually a very exciting part of where we are now.I guess there’s just a couple points.  One is that – I said this already – all the work that’s already gone into this, I mean, it’s hard to say – as I said already, to say in here how much has been done by all three countries.  And that’s one of the innovative things about AUKUS, is that we have been able to move in the direction that over 80 percent of technology and everything that we can now share amongst all three countries that we – much more than we could before, once everything is done.  And that’s exciting in terms of what we’re able to do.I think we still have to, of course, do a few more things, but I think we’re feeling pretty good that we’ll be able to get this done in the 240 days, which, as I said, is so much faster than we could normally do anything like this, and the amount of openness in terms of technology that we have between the three countries is important.Second of all, we want to continue to be transparent.  We want to continue to talk to countries about this.  I know there’s still concerns from different aspects of AUKUS that people have and countries have.  But the best way to get through some of that is to have these kind of conversations and to continue to talk through it and answer questions about it and to be as transparent as we can be, both in this kind of forum but also in forums like the International Atomic Energy Agency, where we are working very closely with them.So just thank you very much for taking part in this, and that we look forward to having more conversations with anyone who wants to know more about what AUKUS is doing and where we’re heading in the future.  So thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Under Secretary Jenkins.  That brings us to the end of our time today.  I’m sorry we couldn’t get to all questions.  Thank you so much to everyone who asked questions, and huge thanks to Under Secretary Jenkins for joining us.We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation, and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.  Take care.
- Continued Progress on AUKUS Defense Trade Integration HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Continued Progress on AUKUS Defense Trade Integration				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Continued Progress on AUKUS Defense Trade Integration																																		Media Note																														April 19, 2024																																							AUKUS partners are making significant strides toward creating an innovative ecosystem that supports our shared interests and deepens our defense and security cooperation. Trilateral partners are increasing engagement with industry, including through forums like the Sea-Air-Space global maritime exposition, individual consultations, and more. Yesterday, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an “interim final rule significantly reducing licensing requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) to foster defense trade and technological innovation.” The partners welcomed the passage of the FY24 U.S National Defense Authorization Act, and legislation passed in the Australian and UK parliaments. All three AUKUS partners remain committed to implementation of novel trade critical to the success of AUKUS.Exemptions in our export control systems, within a framework of shared standards with Australia and the UK, are key to harnessing and maximizing the innovative power residing in our defense industrial bases. Industry, research communities, and academic institutions should take full advantage of this innovation spurring ecosystem. All three nations are committed to working with our private sectors and research communities – those who will use these exemptions – to ensure the exemptions, taken together, support the goals of all three governments and our shared interests. We look forward to robust engagement and consultation with stakeholders soon, after trilateral partners publish their reciprocal arrangements for public comment.The strength of the AUKUS partnership is rooted in the strength of our historic ties. We applaud the significant progress made to date on defense trade cooperation across our respective countries in such a short time. We fully expect to finalize the new trade exemptions – based on stakeholder input – over the course of the next 120 days.						Tags																					Australia																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																																														Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																															Office of the Spokesperson																								United Kingdom
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Steadfast Support for Ukraine Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, strongly condemn Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. We reaffirm our unwavering determination to support democratic Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, within its internationally recognized borders.  We pay tribute to the bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people, fighting for their freedom and democratic future.Ten years on since Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea and its setting up of unrecognized proxy regimes in parts of the Donbas and into the third year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we demand that the Russian Federation immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraws all of its military forces and equipment from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. Russia can end this war today.We call on all countries to uphold international law and in no way to validate or condone Russia’s attempts to acquire territory by force, in violation of the basic tenets of the UN Charter. We will never recognize the legitimacy of so-called “referenda” or “elections”, past or future, held by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, nor their results. Illegally holding Russian Presidential elections in Ukraine’s sovereign territories was an outrageous violation of international law.We will continue to support Ukraine’s right of self-defense and reiterate our commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security. Based on the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine we endorsed in Vilnius in July 2023, we are fully engaged on finalizing and implementing specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements with Ukraine, which several G7 countries and other partners have already signed. We are stepping up our defense and security assistance to Ukraine and are increasing our production and delivery capabilities to assist the country. We also support efforts to assist Ukraine building a future force capable of self-defense and deterrence against all aggression.We express our resolve in particular to bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities to save lives and protect critical infrastructure. We will also work with partners towards this end. In this context we appreciate the Immediate Action for Air Defense Initiative (IAAD) proposed by Germany.Together with international partners, we are determined to continue to provide military, financial, political, humanitarian, economic, and development support to Ukraine and its people. We welcome the EU’s adoption of the Ukraine facility of EUR 50 billion, the EU “Ukraine Assistance Fund” of EUR 5 billion. We also welcome additional support G7 countries have approved, as well as the swift delivery of budget support in the first quarter of 2024 by Canada and Japan. We urge the approval of further support from other international partners.We will continue to help Ukraine repair and restore its critical energy and environmental infrastructure and we re-emphasize our strong support for Ukraine’s energy security, including through the G7+ Ukraine Energy Coordination Group. We express our deepest concern about the reported use of chemical agents by Russia, as a method of warfare.Russia must pay for the damage and devastation it is causing. We condemn Russia’s recent missile and drone strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and cities across Ukraine. We are determined to ensure full accountability and we support Ukraine in obtaining compensation for the loss, injury and damage resulting from Russia’s aggression. We welcome the launch of the Register of Damage caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Russia’s sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia ceases its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused.We welcome the adoption by the EU of the legal acts concerning extraordinary revenues held by private entities stemming directly from Russia’s immobilized sovereign assets also in view to exploring ways to maximize the benefit for Ukraine that can be obtained from these revenues.We will continue to explore all possible avenues to aid Ukraine in obtaining compensation from Russia, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law. As requested by Leaders, we will continue our work and advise ahead of the Apulia Summit on all possible avenues and feasible options by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law.Ukraine’s reconstruction, starting with early recovery measures and addressing the current energy emergency, remains key priorities. We will continue to work with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform and by leveraging private investments. We welcome the Steering Committee of the enlarged MDCP which took place for the first time in Kyiv on 10 April. We highlight the importance of gender-responsive recovery and the need to address the different needs of women, children and disabled persons as well as other population groups who have been disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression. The reintegration of disabled combatants and civilians remains a priority. Further to the successful Japan-Ukraine Conference for the Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction, we look forward to the Ukraine Recovery Conferences, to be hosted in Berlin in 2024 and in Rome in 2025.We welcome the European Council’s decision in December 2023 to open negotiations for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. We praise Ukraine’s progress in its reform efforts, especially to reinforce the justice system and the rule of law and to fight corruption. These endeavors are in line with the Euro-Atlantic path Ukraine has embraced. We will continue to support Ukraine as it works to implement further reforms to strengthen its democracy.We reiterate our support for Ukraine’s efforts to promote a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, consistent with international law, including the UN Charter, with respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will continue to work to achieve the widest possible international support for the key principles and objectives of Ukraine’s Peace Formula, also in view of the high-level international conference planned in Switzerland in mid-June. Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and its posture of strategic intimidation, including its announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus are unacceptable. We reaffirm that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences. In this context, threats by Russia of nuclear weapons use, let alone any use of nuclear weapons by Russia, in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine are inadmissible.We condemn Russia’s seizure and continued control and militarization of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which poses severe risks for nuclear safety and security, with implications for the broader international community. We support the International Atomic Energy Agency’s efforts directed at mitigating such risks, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts and its focus on ensuring nuclear safety and security at the site.Despite Russia’s attempts to undermine global food security, Ukraine’s success in securing a corridor through the Black Sea has significantly expanded food exports and continues to help feed the world. We pledge our enduring support to those efforts, including through the EU solidarity lanes and other appropriate mechanisms.We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia and adopting new measures as necessary. We will continue to counter, in close cooperation with third countries, any attempts to evade and circumvent our sanctions and export restrictions. We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting Russia’s defense industrial base and we will take appropriate steps, consistent with our legal systems, to disrupt and deter this behavior. We will impose additional sanctions on companies and individuals in third countries who help Russia acquire tools and other equipment that aid Russian weapons production or military-industrial development.We will continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other sectors. We call on all countries to reduce their imports from Russia which are supporting its war. We will continue to take steps to tighten compliance and enforcement of the oil price cap. While working to maintain supply stability, we will respond to price cap violations, including by imposing additional sanctions measures on those engaged in deceptive practices while transporting Russian oil and against the networks Russia has developed to extract additional revenue from price cap violations. We will continue taking steps to limit Russia’s future energy revenues. We will continue to impede Russia’s development of future energy projects and disrupt its development of alternatives for energy shipping and other services. We also welcome the steps taken by the UK and U.S. to stop the trade of new Russian base metals on their global metal exchanges. We will continue efforts to reduce Russia’s revenues from metals.We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s unlawful export of arms to Russia and for use in Ukraine. In particular, we condemn North Korea’s exports and Russia’s procurement of North Korea’s ballistic missiles in direct violation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and call upon them to immediately cease such activities.We call upon Iran to stop assisting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. Any steps by Iran to transfer ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia, would represent a substantive, material escalation, and t we would respond swiftly and in a coordinated manner, including with new and significant measures against Iran. We call on all countries to prevent the supply of components or other items to Iran’s UAV programmes, which support Russia’s war effort.We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from businesses in the People’s Republic of China of dual-use materials and weapons components that Russia is using to advance its military production. This is enabling Russia to reconstitute and revitalize its defense industrial base, posing a threat both to Ukraine and to international peace and security. China should ensure that this support stops, as it will only prolong this illegal war of aggression in violation of the UN Charter and increase the threat that Russia poses to its neighbors.We reiterate our condemnation of the Belarusian regime’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine. We express our continued concern over the regime’s continuing repression of independent media, civil society, and of opposition and citizens that peacefully express their views. We also condemn the ill-treatment of political prisoners and ask for their immediate and unconditional release.There can be no impunity for war crimes such as attacks against civilians and critical civilian infrastructure, humanitarian workers, deportation of Ukrainians, including forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, or grave and serious violations of children’s rights and conflict-related sexual violence. Those responsible for crimes, which are of concern to the international community, will be held to account consistent with international law. We welcome initiatives to address Russia’s   unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children.We firmly reject the Russian authorities’ baseless attempts to blame Ukraine for the tragic terrorist attack near Moscow on March 22, which was claimed by ISIS. We call on Russia to stop using this tragedy in its disinformation efforts against Ukraine. We remain steadfast in our fight against terrorism, as illustrated by several G7 countries continuing to share information with Russia on this issue.We will not relent from holding those responsible for Alexei Navalny’s death accountable, including by continuing to impose restrictive measures and other appropriate actions in response to human rights violations and abuses in Russia. We condemn the Kremlin’s systematic repression of dissenting voices, and we call on Russia to release all political prisoners.
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the Middle East Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union. Iran We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, condemn in the strongest terms Iran’s direct and unprecedented attack against Israel of April 13-14, which Israel defeated with the help of its partners. This was a dangerous escalation, as Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones.We also condemn the Iranian boarding and seizure, in breach of international law, of the Portuguese flagged merchant vessel MSC Aries by armed personnel, which occurred while the merchant vessel was sailing near the Strait of Hormuz. We call for the immediate release of the vessel, its crews and cargo.Israel and its people have our full solidarity and support and we reaffirm our commitment towards Israel’s security. Iran’s actions mark an unacceptable step towards the destabilization of the region and a further escalation, which must be avoided. In light of reports of strikes on April 19th, we urge all parties to work to prevent further escalation. The G7 will continue to work to this end.We call on all parties, both in the region and beyond, to offer their positive contribution to this collective effort.We call on Iran to refrain from providing support to Hamas and taking further actions that destabilize the Middle East, including support for Lebanese Hezbollah and other non-state actors.  Iran’s continued provision of arms and related materiel to the Houthis in violation of UNSCR 2216 and to other non-state actors in the region are dangerously increasing tensions. We call on all countries to prevent the supply of components or other items to Iran’s UAV and missile programmes.We demand that Iran and its affiliated groups cease their attacks. We will hold the Iranian government accountable for its malicious and destabilizing actions and we stand ready to adopt further sanctions or take other measures, now and in response to further destabilizing initiatives.We reiterate our determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We urge Iran to cease and reverse nuclear escalations and to stop the continuing uranium enrichment activities reported by IAEA in the framework provided by UNSCR 2231 that have no credible civil justification and pose significant proliferative risks. Tehran must reverse this trend and engage in serious dialogue, returning to full cooperation with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. We support IAEA’s monitoring and verification role regarding Iran’s nuclear-related obligation and commitments and express strong concern about Iran’s current lack of cooperation with the Agency.We are extremely concerned by reports that Iran is considering transferring ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.  We call on Iran not to do so, as it would represent a substantive material escalation in its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Were Iran to proceed with providing ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia, we are prepared to respond in a swift and coordinated manner, including with new and significant measures against Iran.We reiterate our deep concern over Iran’s human rights violations and abuses, especially against women, girls and minority groups, and in light of the first report issued on March 8 by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council, which said that certain violations against “Women, Life, Freedom” protestors amounted to crimes against humanity.We strongly reject Iran’s targeting and arbitrary arrest of dual and foreign citizens and call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions. We condemn Iran’s harassment, intimidation and plots to kill perceived dissidents and opponents of the regime overseas, including journalists and religious figures, as well as the targeting of Jewish individuals and institutions.Conflict in Gaza We condemn in the strongest terms the brutal terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas and other terrorist groups against Israel that began on October 7, 2023. In exerting its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian law. Hamas must release all hostages immediately and unconditionally. We continue to press for the full investigation of the horrific reports of sexual violence committed by Hamas and other terrorist groups and for perpetrators to be held accountable.We deplore all losses of civilian lives and note with great concern the unacceptable number of civilians, including thousands of women, children and persons in vulnerable situations who have been killed in Gaza. We call for urgent action to address the devastating and growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, particularly the plight of civilians throughout the territory. We reiterate our opposition to a full scale military operation in Rafah that would have catastrophic consequences on the civilian population. We reiterate our call for a credible and actionable plan to protect the civilian population there and address their humanitarian needs. We are deeply concerned by the internal displacement within Gaza and the risk of forcible displacement from Gaza. Israel must act in compliance with its obligations under international law and treat individuals humanely and with dignity, and should thoroughly and transparently investigate credible allegations of wrongdoing and ensure accountability for any abuses or violations.We underscore the urgent need for specific, concrete, and measurable steps to significantly increase the flow of aid into Gaza in light of imminent risk of famine for a majority of Gaza’s population.  We urge the rapid implementation of steps announced by the Government of Israel including the commitment to expand flow of aid through existing land crossings, opening new land crossings, and facilitating aid to northern Gaza where humanitarian needs are most acute, including by opening more routes into Gaza.  We welcome efforts to establish a maritime corridor to further increase the flow of much-needed humanitarian assistance into Gaza, in coordination with the United Nations. We reiterate that such corridors must complement and not be a substitute to expanded and sustained assistance flows by land.Securing full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access in all its forms remains an absolute priority. We call on Israel to do more to ensure protection of international and local humanitarian aid workers, journalists, and Palestinian civilians, to improve humanitarian deconfliction, including communications, and to pursue full accountability, as appropriate, for incidents of harm against aid workers and civilians.  We call on all parties to allow the unimpeded delivery of aid, including food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel, shelter, as well as facilitate the restoration of basic services and ensure access for humanitarian workers. All parties must protect civilians, especially those most vulnerable, particularly women, children, and people with disabilities, consistent with international humanitarian law.Since the onset of the crisis, the G7 has been among the largest providers of assistance to the affected population in Gaza. We reiterate our intention to continue doing so and we call on all our partners to strengthen their efforts. We welcome the initiative “Food for Gaza” launched by Italy together with FAO, WFP and IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society), aimed at better meeting the urgent demand for food security and primary health of the population.We recognize the crucial role played by UN agencies and other humanitarian actors in delivering assistance. UNRWA has a vital role in the Gaza humanitarian response. We welcome the swift decision by the UN Secretary General to initiate an immediate investigation on UNRWA to provide full transparency on the serious allegations against its staff and to appoint an independent review group also in view of the implementation of the needed reforms. We agreed it is critical that UNRWA and other UN organizations and agencies’ distribution networks be fully able to deliver aid to those who need it most, fulfilling their mandate effectively.We call for an immediate release of hostages and a sustainable ceasefire that allows for a surge of the urgently needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered safely throughout Gaza. In this context, we strongly support the ongoing mediation efforts undertaken by the United States and regional partners to that aim, respected by all parties, leading to a sustainable cessation of hostilities, in order to facilitate the immediate return of all hostages, a surge of assistance and for the urgent implementation of UNSC resolutions 2712, 2720, and 2728. Hamas’ refusal to release hostages is only prolonging the conflict and the suffering of civilians.We welcome the new Palestinian Authority cabinet and remain ready to support the Palestinian Authority as it undertakes the reforms that are indispensable to enable it to take up its responsibilities in the aftermath of the conflict, in both Gaza and the West Bank.We are also working, including by imposing sanctions and other measures, to deny Hamas the ability to raise funds to carry out further atrocities. Likewise, we will also continue our work to fight against the dissemination of terrorist content online.All parties must refrain from unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution. We are concerned by rising levels of settlers’ violence. Extremist settlers responsible for violent acts against Palestinian communities must be brought to account.A viable solution to the conflict can only be the result of a coordinated regional effort. We remain committed to a lasting and sustainable peace based on a two-State solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel and the Palestinians. We call for upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem. We concur that the final territory of a Palestinian state should be defined through negotiations based on 1967-lines. We note that the recognition of a Palestinian state, at the appropriate time, would be a crucial component of that political process.We are working intensively – along with partners in the region – to prevent the conflict from escalating further. We are particularly concerned by the situation along the Blue Line. We recognize the essential stabilizing role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in mitigating that risk. We urge all involved to exercise restraint and to work toward de-escalation.We oppose all discrimination and violence based on religion or belief and we call for effective protection of all members of religious minority groups. We strongly reject all forms of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred.Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea We condemn the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the navy ships protecting them. We are greatly concerned by the deaths of three innocent mariners aboard the True Confidence and the sinking of the Rubymar, which created a navigational hazard and a serious environmental threat. We call for the immediate release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader and its crew, seized on 19th November 2023. In line with UNSCR 2722, we reiterate our support for countries that exercise the right to defend their vessels from attacks, in accordance with international law. We also call for continued international involvement in close cooperation with the United Nations and coastal states, as well as with regional and sub-regional organizations to prevent further escalation with possible multidimensional consequences.We welcome the continued efforts of the EU maritime operation “Aspides” and of the U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian” along with UK and 10 other countries to protect these crucial shipping lanes.We are concerned by the hindrance to the transit of energy supplies, raw materials and other commodities through the Red Sea. The countries most negatively affected by the Houthis’ attacks include those in the region. Maritime security and navigational rights and freedoms are critical to ensuring free movement of essential commodities to destinations and populations all over the world. This includes delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to more than half the population of Yemen and to Sudan and Ethiopia.Yemen We express great concern for the situation in Yemen, notably for the humanitarian conditions of the Yemeni civilian population. Yemeni parties must allow safe, rapid, and unimpeded access to all those in need, halt requirements that restrict women’s freedom of movement and impede delivery of humanitarian aid, and remove obstacles to the delivery of assistance, notably to the most vulnerable. All parties must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.We reiterate our strong support to the United Nations and to UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg for his efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen.We welcome the understanding reached in December 2023 between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthis that included a commitment on a set of measures to implement a nation-wide ceasefire and to improve living conditions in the country. We urge all involved parties and in particular the Houthis to engage in good faith in preparations for an inclusive political process in consultation with civil society and under UN auspices.We call for accountability for human rights violations, including grave violations of children’s rights, and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.Syria   We remain committed to a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, and we fully support the mandate of the UN Special Envoy, Geir O. Pedersen. We call on the Syrian regime to engage meaningfully with the UN-facilitated political process to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis and national reconciliation. Normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions would only be considered in the framework of a credible inclusive and enduring political process consistent with UNSC resolution 2254. Stability and peace in Syria cannot be achieved without the enduring defeat of Daesh. As members of the Global Coalition against Daesh we are committed to ending Daesh’s presence in Syria.We remain committed to advancing justice for victims and accountability for all actors responsible for violations of international law in Syria, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We reiterate our condemnation of the use that the Syrian régime has made of chemical weapons in Syria. We continue to urge the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention and to eliminate its chemical weapons programme completely and verifiably.We continue to call for the immediate release of all civilians arbitrarily detained and to clarify the fate of those forcibly disappeared. We support the work of organizations such as the Commission of Inquiry and the International Independent and Impartial Mechanism, which document the crimes perpetrated in Syria. We stand ready to support the newly established UN Independent Institution for Missing Persons in Syria.We will continue to support the Syrian people through humanitarian assistance to meet their needs, including early recovery assistance and measures fostering resilience, and demand that the regime facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians, including through UN cross-border humanitarian assistance, for which there is no alternative. We remain grateful to regional countries for continuing to host Syrian refugees, and we call upon the Syrian regime to create the conditions for voluntary, safe, and dignified refugee returns.The upcoming Eighth Brussels Conference on the Future of Syria and the Region is important in maintaining a high level of engagement and mobilisation of the international community in this regard.
- United Kingdom HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;United Kingdom				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Kingdom																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the United Kingdom during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: crimes, violence, or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings. The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) investigated the most serious and sensitive incidents and allegations involving the police. It considered whether police shootings were justifiable, investigated serious injury or death in police custody, and allegations of excessive force. If appropriate, it passed cases to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to pursue prosecution. In September the CPS announced the police officer who fatally shot an unarmed Black man, Chris Kaba, in South London in 2022 would be charged with murder.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, and there were no credible reports that government officials employed them.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention center were overcrowded, with limited purposeful activities for detainees, low quality healthcare, and minimal rehabilitation opportunities. Violence among inmates occurred.Abusive Physical Conditions: Overcrowding, prolonged confinement of prisoners in cells without an opportunity for movement or exercise, and lack of purposeful activities for detainees were significant problems. On October 13, the prison population reached its highest ever reported level of over 88,000 prisoners, leaving the system 560 spaces away from full capacity. To free up more space, the government announced on October 16 it would pursue justice reforms aimed at addressing overcrowding, including jailing fewer low-level offenders and removing more foreign prisoners.In his annual report published in July, the chief inspector of prisons stated that in many of the facilities visited, prisoners were locked up without activity for long periods of time. The inspector found there were low quality and limited purposeful activities for detainees in all but one prison inspected. He reported poor treatment of women in prison suffering from extreme mental health difficulties and noted violence remained a significant issue for youth in custody.On October 17, the chief inspector of prisons published a report into His Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Bristol, which he described as “categorically failing.” He also condemned the “appalling state” of the prison, and said it was “one of the most unsafe in the country.” The prison’s normal capacity was 408, but it held more than 540 inmates at the time it was inspected in July with prisoners locked in cells 22 hours a day. Eight prisoners took their lives since the jail was inspected in 2019, and one since the prison was inspected in July. One prisoner was charged with murdering his cell mate.In July an Irish judge blocked the extradition of Richard Sharples, a man wanted over firearm offenses alleged to have taken place in Glasgow in 2021, because Sharples would face a “real and substantial risk of inhumane or degrading treatment” in the Scottish prison system. The Irish judge noted that due to overcrowding at the two facilities Sharples would be placed – HMP Barlinnie or HMP Low Moss – he would likely be kept in a cell for 22 hours per day with limited space for movement. In August the governor of HMP Barlinnie warned in a BBC Scotland interview that the facility was so overcrowded and outdated that it could suffer a “catastrophic failure” at any time.As of mid-December, the reinspection report had not yet been published.Administration: Authorities conducted investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring: In England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the 14 British Overseas Territories, the government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers. Every prison, immigration removal center, and some short-term holding facilities at airports had an independent monitoring board. Each board’s members were required to monitor day-to-day activity in the facility and ensured proper standards of care and decency. Members had unrestricted access to the facility at any time and could talk to any prisoner or detainee they wished, out of sight and hearing of staff, if necessary.Scotland operated the Independent Prison Monitoring system. The HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland had overall responsibility for monitoring Scottish prisons. The government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers in Scotland.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements.Police in England and Wales had powers to stop and search anyone if they had “reasonable grounds” to suspect the individual could be in possession of drugs, weapons, stolen property, or any item that could be used to commit a crime. In Scotland guidelines allowed police to stop and search persons only when police had “reasonable grounds,” a refinement after criticism that stop-and-search was being used to target specific racial groups.In Northern Ireland, the law permitted police officers to stop and search members of the public. In most circumstances a police officer needed grounds to search an individual. Some stop-and-search powers allowed individuals to be searched without grounds. By law persons living in the 14 overseas territories, including Bermuda, were generally ensured the same rights and protections against arbitrary arrest and detentions, with slight variations in each of the jurisdictions.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Police nationally were required to have a warrant issued by a magistrate or a judge to arrest a person unless there was reasonable suspicion a person had just committed or was about to commit a crime. In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, a senior police official could authorize detention without charges for more than 24 hours, and a magistrate could authorize detention for more than 36 hours up to a maximum of 96 hours. Police could detain terrorism suspects without charge for up to 14 days. Police were required to inform detainees promptly of charges against them. The court could extend pretrial detention in exceptional cases. Authorities respected these rights.In Scotland police could detain a suspect for no more than 24 hours. After an initial detention period of 12 hours, a police custody officer could authorize further detention for an additional 12 hours without authorization from the court if the officer believed it was necessary. Only a judge could issue a warrant for arrest if they believed there was sufficient evidence against a suspect. A suspect was required to be informed immediately of allegations against him or her and be advised promptly of the charges if there was sufficient evidence to proceed. Authorities respected this right. Depending on the nature of the crime, a suspect could be released from custody if they were deemed not to present a risk.There was a functioning bail system throughout the United Kingdom and the 14 overseas territories but defendants could be denied bail if they were judged to be flight risks, likely to commit another offense, were suspected terrorists, or for other limited reasons.If questioned at a police station, all suspects in the country had the right to legal representation, including counsel provided by the government if they were indigent. Police could not question suspects who requested legal advice until a lawyer was present. In Gibraltar the Duty Legal Representative Scheme provided free legal representation to anyone in Gibraltar police custody earning less than £14,000 ($17,080) per year, the minimum wage. All law firms in Gibraltar with five or more lawyers were required to register as part of the scheme.In Bermuda a court was required to issue a warrant for an arrest to proceed. The law permitted arrests without warrant only in certain conditions. When a police officer had reasonable grounds for suspecting that any offense that was not an arrestable offense had been or was being committed or attempted, they could arrest the relevant person if it appeared that service of a summons was impracticable. No arrests or detentions could be made arbitrarily or secretly, and the detainee was required to be told the reason for the arrest immediately. Individuals could be detained initially for six hours, and for two further periods of up to nine hours each, subject to review and justification. Authorities respected this right.There was a functioning bail system in Bermuda. House arrest and wearing an electronic monitoring device could be a condition of bail. A detainee had an immediate right of access to a lawyer, either through a personal meeting or by telephone. Free legal advice was provided for detainees. Police were required to inform the arrestee of their rights to communication with a friend, family member, or other person identified by the detainee. The police superintendent could authorize incommunicado detention for serious crimes such as terrorism.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, and the government respected judicial independence and impartiality.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair, timely, and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Under the Official Secrets Act a judge could order the court closed, but sentencing was required to be public.In Bermuda the law required defendants to declare to the prosecutor and the court within 28 days of their arraignment whether they intended to give evidence at their trial. Failure to do so permitted the court to direct the jury to draw inferences from the defendant’s refusal to testify.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government had laws and mechanisms in place, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups reported that the government made significant progress on resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens.The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in July 2020, can be found on the Department’s website at:  https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress/.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members.Freedom of Expression: The law prohibited expressions of hatred toward persons because of their color, race, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion, or sexual orientation as well as any communication that was deemed threatening or abusive and was intended to harass, alarm, or distress a person. The penalties for such expressions included fines, imprisonment, or both.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The law’s restrictions on expressions of hatred applied to the print and broadcast media.Libel/Slander Laws: In the British Virgin Islands, the law criminalized “sending offensive messages through a computer” with imprisonment for up to 14 years and a fine. The law applied to a message that was “grossly offensive” or had “menacing character” or that was sent “for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience.” Media freedom NGOs strongly criticized the law.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there were no credible reports that the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. The country had no blanket laws covering internet blocking, but the courts issued blocking injunctions against various categories of content such as depictions of child sexual abuse, promotion of violent extremism and terrorism, and materials infringing on copyrights.By law the electronic surveillance powers of the country’s intelligence community and police allowed authorities to check internet communications records as part of an investigation without a warrant.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government respected these rights.In-country Movement: The home secretary could impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs) based on a “balance of probabilities.” TPIMs were a form of house arrest applied for up to two years to those believed to pose a terrorist threat but who could not be prosecuted or deported. The 14 measures included electronic tagging, reporting regularly to police, and facing “tightly defined exclusion from particular places and the prevention of travel overseas.” A suspect was required to live at home and remain there overnight, potentially for up to 10 hours daily. Authorities could send suspects to live up to 200 miles from their normal residence. The suspect could apply to the courts to stay elsewhere. The suspect could use a mobile phone and the internet to work and study, subject to conditions.Exile: The law permitted the home secretary to impose temporary exclusion orders (TEOs) on returning United Kingdom (UK) citizens or legal residents if the home secretary reasonably suspected the individual in question was involved in terrorism-related activity and considered the exclusion necessary to protect individuals in the UK from a risk of terrorism. TEOs imposed certain obligations on the repatriates, such as periodic reporting to police. The measure required a court order and was subject to judicial oversight and appeal.Citizenship: The law allowed the home secretary to deprive an individual of citizenship if officials were satisfied it was “conducive to the public good,” but not if doing so would render a citizen stateless. A woman who left the UK for Syria as a teenager to join the Islamic State group challenged the UK government’s decision to remove her British citizenship. Shamima Begum was stripped of her citizenship in 2019. In 2020 a tribunal upheld the decision as lawful, and in 2021 the country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, ruled Begum could not return to the country to appeal the decision. In February Begum lost the appeal against the removal of her British citizenship. In October, however, Begum’s lawyers returned to the court of appeal, arguing it was unlawful to deprive her of British citizenship because the Home Office failed to consider that she was a victim of grooming and human trafficking. A legal decision was pending as of mid-December.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refuges, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: In England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees. Asylum was a matter reserved for the national government and was handled centrally by the Home Office, including for most overseas territories. Bermuda’s constitution and laws did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government did not have an established system for providing protection to refugees.On May 26, in its published comprehensive audit of the country’s asylum intake, registration, and screening procedures, UNHCR stated that the UK’s “flawed and inefficient screening procedures” were undermining the country’s asylum capacity, placing vulnerable persons at risk and adding to the pressure on public resources.UNHCR reiterated its “longstanding and well-known concerns” over the government’s plan to transfer asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda, which it previously stated did not comply with the UK’s obligations. In June the Court of Appeal ruled that the government’s plan to transfer asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful, reversing a December 2022 High Court decision. On November 15, the UK Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the government’s plan to have asylum seekers sent to Rwanda was unlawful. The court found that there were substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda would face a risk of ill-treatment because of refoulement. Following the judgment, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stated the government would pursue a new treaty with Rwanda and emergency legislation to “stop the government’s policy from being repeatedly blocked.” As of year’s end, no persons had been sent to Rwanda amid ongoing legal challenges.On July 20, the Illegal Migration Bill received royal assent and became law. The government asserted the law would help prevent illegal migration by removing the incentive to make dangerous small boat crossings from France via the English Channel; would speed up removals; and would prevent individuals who traveled to the UK through illegal and dangerous methods from misusing safeguards intended to combat human trafficking to block their removal from the country.Civil society and media criticized the government’s handling of asylum seekers. NGOs and the Office for Statistics Regulation asserted the government had not provided evidence of “abuse” of the system and needed to ensure that the country supported those in genuine need by committing to resettle a specific number of the most vulnerable refugees in the country each year. UNHCR criticized the new migration law for being “at variance” with the country’s human rights and refugee obligations and asserted it would have “profound consequences for people in need of international protection.” UNHCR stated the law “extinguishes access to asylum in the UK for anyone who arrives irregularly, having passed through a country – however briefly – where they did not face persecution,” and noted that it also created sweeping new detention powers, with limited judicial oversight. Experts asserted the new law put victims of trafficking at risk of deportation and exclusion from protection or support.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to approximately 950 individuals who would likely not have qualified as refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										There were an estimated 5,500 stateless persons who resided in the country. The government provided a route to legal residence for up to five years for stateless persons resident in the country. After the initial five-year period, stateless persons could apply for “settled status” or further extension of their residency. The government did not publish data on the number of habitual residents who were legally stateless. The law allowed for the acquisition of citizenship for persons who were stateless.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: UK general parliamentary elections were held in 2019. Bermuda held elections to the House of Assembly in 2020. Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly were held in May 2022. National elections were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities in all jurisdictions. Independent observers reported no abuses or irregularities in any of the elections.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government implemented the law effectively. There were no reports of government corruption.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were often cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Government Human Rights Bodies: Parliament had a Joint Committee on Human Rights composed of 12 members selected from the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The committee investigated human rights matters in the country and scrutinized legislation affecting human rights. It could call for testimony from government officials, who routinely complied.The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) operated as an independent, nondepartmental public body that promoted and monitored human rights and protected, enforced, and promoted equality across nine “protected” grounds: age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, sexual orientation, and gender reassignment. The sponsoring department was the Government Equalities Office. The commission was considered effective.In Scotland the Scottish Human Rights Commission, which was accountable to the Scottish Parliament, monitored and protected human rights. The commission was considered effective.The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, sponsored by the Northern Ireland Office, and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, sponsored by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, monitored human rights in that province. Both entities were considered effective.The Bermuda Human Rights Commission was an independent body that effectively administered human rights law through the investigation and resolution of complaints lodged with it and provided services to resolve individual complaints involving human rights, sexual harassment, and disability, promoted knowledge of human rights in Bermuda, and helped to reduce barriers to equality in employment and access to service.Other British Overseas Territories, including the Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos, also had independent commissions aimed at promoting, protecting, and preserving human rights.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal and domestic or intimate partner rape and other forms of domestic and sexual violence including so-called corrective rape of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. The maximum legal penalty for rape was life imprisonment. The law also provided for injunctive relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion orders (similar to restraining orders) for survivors of gender-based violence. The government enforced the law effectively in reported cases. Courts in some cases imposed the maximum punishment for rape. The government provided shelters, counseling, and other assistance for survivors of rape or violence. NGOs asserted police and CPS raised the bar for evidence needed, causing survivors to drop out of the justice process. The CPS was in the fourth year of a five-year plan for the prosecution of rape and serious sexual offenses (RASSO) to help reduce the gap between reported cases and prosecutions, improve cooperation between police and prosecutors, fully resource RASSO units, and provide training to improve communication with victims. In July the CPS launched a new national operating model in England and Wales that established a standardized approach for how all adult rape cases were handled. The new approach included offering early advice to police in each rape or serious sexual assault case within 21 days, increased scrutiny of CPS and police decision making, and dedicated victim liaison officers as a single point of contact for survivors.According to data published by the Scottish government, in Scotland, juries returned verdicts of acquittal at a significantly higher rate for sexual offenses than for other crimes, with conviction rate data for the past 10 years showing that the average rate of conviction for attempted rape was 46 percent versus 88 percent for all offenses.The law criminalized domestic violence. Those who abused spouses, partners, or family members faced tougher punishment than those who committed similar offenses in a nondomestic context.In January the Home Office committed up to £18 million ($22 million) per year over two years to the Domestic Abuse Perpetrator Intervention Fund, bringing the total fund to £36 million ($43.9 million). The fund allowed police forces to intervene early and work with perpetrators to change their behavior and reduce the risk they pose to victims. On July 25, the government granted up to £8.3 million ($10.1 million) to 55 organizations supporting victims of abuse, for counseling, training, and community outreach. On July 7, a coalition of 11 women’s sector organizations launched a petition and called for additional funding for community-based domestic services. The petition noted that financial pressure meant frontline service providers were finding it harder to meet the rising demand for support.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law prohibited FGM/C and required health and social care professionals and teachers to report to police cases of FGM/C on girls younger than age 18. It was illegal to take a British national or permanent resident abroad for FGM/C or to help someone trying to do so. The penalty was up to 14 years in prison. An FGM/C protection order, a civil measure that could be applied for through a family court, offered the means of protecting survivors or at-risk women and girls from FGM/C under the civil law. Breach of an FGM/C protection order was a criminal offense and carried a sentence of up to five years in prison.FGM/C was illegally practiced in the country, particularly within some diaspora communities from countries where FGM/C was prevalent.The government took nonjudicial steps to address FGM/C, including awareness-raising efforts, a hotline, and requiring medical professionals to report FGM/C observed on patients. In October a British woman was found guilty of assisting another person, in Kenya, carry out FGM on a British minor in 2006.Discrimination: The law provided the same legal status and rights for women and men including under family, religious, personal status, and nationality laws as well as laws related to labor, property, inheritance, employment, access to credit, and owning or managing businesses or property. The government enforced the law effectively.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence. Emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis were available as part of the clinical management of rape. Health policy was devolved to constituent parts of the country.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited racial and ethnic discrimination, but travelers, Roma, and persons of African, Afro-Caribbean, South Asian, and Middle Eastern origin reported mistreatment on racial or ethnic grounds. The government effectively enforced the law.Ethnic minorities were significantly overrepresented in prisons. Nearly one-third of the prison population identified as an ethnic minority.In Scotland racial or other discriminatory motivation could be considered an “aggravating factor” in crimes. Race-based hate crime slightly increased from the previous year and was the most reported type of hate crime committed in Scotland.“Right to Rent” laws required all landlords in England to check that all tenants who occupied their properties had legal status to live in the UK. Tenancies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were not subject to right to rent checks. Landlords could be fined or face a prison term for noncompliance. Activists claimed “Right to Rent” laws were a form of discrimination and asserted they caused homelessness.																																				Children										Child Abuse: There were laws against child abuse, and the government enforced them effectively. The abuse of children was punishable by up to a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. Social service departments in each local authority in the country maintained confidential child protection registers containing details of children at risk of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect. The registers also included child protection plans for each child.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal age for marriage was 16. In England, Northern Ireland, and Wales, persons younger than 18 required the written consent of parents or guardians, and the underage person was required to present a birth certificate. The legal minimum age for marriage in Scotland was 16 and did not require parental consent. The legal minimum age for marriage was effectively enforced by the government.Forcing someone to marry against their will was a criminal offense throughout the country with a maximum prison sentence of seven years. Forcing a UK citizen into marriage anywhere in the world was a criminal offense in England and Wales. The government operated a public helpline to provide advice and support to victims of forced marriage. The government offered lifelong anonymity for victims of forced marriage to encourage more to come forward.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. The penalties for sexual offenses against children and the commercial sexual exploitation of children ranged up to life imprisonment. The law prohibited child pornography and other forms of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Authorities enforced the law. The minimum age of consensual sex was 16.																																				Antisemitism										The 2021 census recorded the Jewish population at approximately 271,000. There were credible reports of crimes, violence, and threats of violence motivated by antisemitism.Between the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and November 22, the NGO Community Security Trust (CST) recorded at least 1,563 antisemitic incidents across the UK. The CST compared this figure with the same period in 2022, when 242 incidents were recorded, an increase of 546 percent. The 1,563 incidents reported included 70 assaults and 130 direct threats.On December 7, a Jewish woman was assaulted and robbed by two young women in North London. The attackers reportedly kicked the unconscious victim in the head and laughed that she was “dead,” according to the Stamford Hill Shomrim neighborhood watch group. On December 10, police arrested two teenage girls on suspicion of robbery, but later released them while the case remained under investigation. Police reported “The victim is from the orthodox Jewish community. It would have been obvious from her appearance that she was Jewish and there has been significant concern that she was targeted for that reason.” As of December 14, the investigation remained ongoing.On December 5, an emeritus professor of the University of Bristol and the University of the West of England retweeted a post about the Jewish Labour Movement’s (JLM) national One Day Conference, commenting that somebody should “blow up” the venue. Following the post, the JLM wrote to the University of Bristol urging the institution to “send a powerful message about the lack of tolerance the faculty has for such hateful, highly dangerous, and inflammatory behavior.” On December 8, the University of Bristol said it was “deeply dismayed” by the comment and withdrew the professor’s honorary emeritus title with immediate effect. The professor subsequently apologized and said her remark was “made as a joke.” Avon and Somerset Police said they were investigating the post as “an incident of malicious communication.” As of December 14, the investigation was ongoing.For further information on incidents of antisemitism in the country, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: Laws in the UK did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors. Facially neutral laws, such as laws on immorality or loitering, were not disproportionally applied to LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment: Crimes involving violence or threats targeting LGBTQI+ persons were a significant human rights concern. Police and other government agents did not incite, perpetrate, condone, or tolerate violence against LGBTQI+ individuals. LGBTQI+ NGO Galop reported that demand for hate crime support services increased during the year by 65 percent. Home Office official figures reported a 6 percent drop in sexual orientation hate crimes, but an 11 percent increase in transgender hate crimes. NGOs asserted this increase coincided with a decrease in government support and the growth of divisive and demonizing rhetoric about trans persons in society. LGBTQI+ NGOs reported most victims did not report violence against them to the police.On February 11, Brianna Ghey, an age 16 British transgender girl, was found dead with multiple stab wounds in a park in Culceth, Warrington. Police arrested two teenage suspects on February 15, and charged them with murder. Both suspects were denied bail and placed in youth detention pending resolution of their trial, which began on November 27.On August 13, two men were stabbed outside an LGBTQI+ nightclub in South London. On September 7, the police arrested a youth age 19 on suspicion of two counts of grievous bodily harm. Mayor of London Sadiq Khan called the double stabbing “abhorrent” and voiced his support for the LGBTQI+ community. As of December 14, the case remained pending.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics and recognized LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families. The government generally enforced such laws, although there were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity against LGBTQI+ persons. Observers reported individuals identifying as LGBTQI+ were more likely to experience worse health outcomes than the general population, found it harder to access services, and had poorer experiences of using services when they were able to access them.In October, 246 NGOs submitted a letter to the prime minister criticizing Home Secretary Suella Braverman for singling out LGBTQI+ persons in her September 26 speech, in which she implied that “simply being gay, or a woman, and fearful of discrimination in your country of origin” was not sufficient to qualify for protection.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: By law, persons could change their legally recognized sex by obtaining a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) that entitled the holder to be treated for legal purposes in line with their acquired sex. Obtaining a GRC required a person to have lived in their acquired gender for at least two years and to have the intention of doing so for the rest of their life. The Scottish government legally challenged a UK government block on legislation passed in December 2022 by the Scottish Parliament, which proposed reducing this time to three months for those age at least 18, and six months for persons ages 16 and 17. On December 8, Scotland’s Supreme Civil Court rule that the UK government acted lawfully in blocking the legislation. As of December 14, the Scottish government had not stated whether it would appeal the ruling.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: In April 2022, the government announced plans to ban so-called conversion therapy practices for lesbian, gay and bisexual persons in England and Wales. As of December, however, the government had not yet introduced legislation to outlaw such practices, which prompted criticism from NGOs throughout the year. According to a survey of LGBTQI+ persons commissioned by the NGO Galop, 18 percent of respondents reported being subjected to someone trying to “change, cure, or suppress their sexual orientation or gender identity.”There were no reports of surgeries performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons. The government and medical associations made efforts to limit these practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no restrictions on freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly for those speaking out about or covering LGBTQI+ topics in the media or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities. The Equality Act 2010 required changes or “reasonable adjustments” to be made to ensure disabled persons could access education, employment, health services, housing, and “goods and services” including shops, banks, cinemas, public buildings, transportation, and it placed a legal duty on persons and organizations. If a person or body refused, a discrimination claim could be made under the Equality Act. Some persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment and occupation. The number of reported hate crimes against individuals with disabilities remained consistent with the previous year.Bermudian law protected the rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace. The law did not include any protection from discrimination on mental health grounds.In August the EHRC submitted a report to the United Nations warning that many disabled persons faced discrimination in the country and that their situation was worsening due to cost-of-living pressures. According to the report, the government had made little or no progress to address 11 policy recommendations identified by the United Nations in 2016 on issues including but not limited to access to justice and accessible communication. The commission reported that disabled persons continued to be at disproportionately high risk of poverty and low income, and had poor access to public services.Children with disabilities attended school through secondary education at similar rates to children without disabilities. The law required all publicly funded preschools, nurseries, state schools, and local authorities to try to identify, help assess, and provide reasonable accommodation to children with “special educational needs or disabilities.”The EHRC provided legal advice and support to individuals with disabilities and a hotline. It conducted formal investigations, required persons or organizations to adopt action plans to ensure compliance with the law, and applied for injunctions to prevent acts of unlawful discrimination.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Hate speech, notably against Muslims, in some traditional media, particularly tabloid newspapers, was a problem, with dissemination of biased or ill-founded information. Online hate speech also was a problem. There were instances of societal violence against Muslims and attacks on mosques. After the October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel, Islamophobic offenses increased, and London police recorded a 140 per cent increase in Islamophobic offenses compared with the same month in 2022.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers to form and join independent trade unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law did not cover workers in the armed forces, public-sector security services, police forces, and freelance or temporary work. In July the Strikes (Minimum Service Level) Act 2023 became law. Under the new law, trade unions were compelled to provide minimum service levels in the health, fire and rescue, education, transport, nuclear decommissioning, and border security sectors. The government held public consultations about the new law throughout the year.The government effectively enforced laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right of workers to engage in a strike or other industrial action. Employers generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Most trade union rights applied only to recognized, independent trade unions. A trade union could be certified as independent if it was not employer-linked. The trade union was recognized by the employer if there was a recognition agreement between trade union and employer for collective bargaining purposes. Workers were entitled to have a trade union recognized where most of the workers concerned supported the union, as evidenced by a ballot showing a majority of workers voted and at least 40 percent of those eligible to vote supported recognition. There was a statutory procedure for trade union recognition (and derecognition) applicable to companies with more than 21 workers. A statutory recognition agreement limited negotiations to pay (not including pensions), hours of work, and holidays.The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and protected employees from unfair dismissal while striking for up to 12 weeks, provided the union complied with the legal requirements governing such industrial action. Under the law, employers were not allowed to dismiss an employee for being or wanting to be a trade union member.The law required a supportive ballot before industrial action by a trade union. A ballot was regarded as supportive if at least 50 percent of those who were entitled to vote did so, and if the majority of those votes were in favor of industrial action. For workers in “important public services,” defined as health services, education for those younger than 17, fire services, transport services, nuclear decommissioning and the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, and border security, a ballot was deemed supportive only if at least 40 percent of eligible voters voted in favor of industrial action. After securing a supportive ballot, the trade union was required to provide the employer with 14-days’ notice before strike action was taken. The members’ agreement to a union’s proposed industrial action automatically expired six months after the date of the ballot. If nonunion members conducted a strike, they were protected from dismissal and had the same rights as union members, if the industrial action were lawful.Industrial action, including strike action organized by a trade union, was legal provided conditions were met. According to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the ability to strike in the country was “limited” due to prohibitions against political and solidarity strikes, lengthy procedures for calling strikes, loopholes that allowed employers to use recruitment agencies to replace strikers, and the ability of employers to seek injunctions against unions before a strike had begun if the union did not observe all legal steps in organizing the strike. In addition, the ITUC noted the six-month mandate that arose from a union vote to strike, whether negotiations had concluded or not, placed undue burdens on unions and their members.Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the ability to strike were commensurate with those for analogous crimes such as civil rights violations, and were regularly applied against violators. Inspection was sufficient to enforce compliance. Remedies were limited in situations where workers faced reprisal for trade union activity. Workers could make a claim to an independent employment tribunal in instances of unfair dismissal, discrimination at work, breach of contract, or unauthorized pay deductions. Workers claiming unfair dismissal for trade union activities, acting as a workers’ representative, and whistleblowing were able to continue paid employment (known as interim relief) until the case was decided by the employment tribunal.The Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service (ACAS), primarily funded by the Department for Business and Trade, worked to help employees and employers better adhere to collective bargaining and other workplace laws and to improve workplace relationships. It provided free advice to employers, employees, and their representatives, as well as dispute resolution services. If ACAS was not able to settle a dispute, a claim could be made at an employment tribunal and, in some cases, be eligible for interim relief.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all the worst forms of child labor. The law prohibited the employment of children younger than 13 with exceptions for sports, modeling, and paid performances, which could require a child performance license, depending on local bylaws. Children younger than 18 were prohibited from working in hazardous environments or after 7 p.m. The law prohibited those younger than 16 from working in an industrial enterprise, including transportation or street trading. Children’s work hours were strictly limited and could not interfere with school attendance. Different legislation governed the employment of persons younger than 16 and, while some laws were common across the UK, local bylaws varied. Some local bylaws required children between the ages of 13 and 16 to obtain a work permit from local authorities. The local authority’s education and welfare services had primary responsibility for oversight and enforcement of the permits.The Department for Education had primary regulatory responsibility for child labor, although local authorities generally handled enforcement. Penalties were commensurate with those for equally severe crimes. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.In Bermuda children younger than 13 could perform light work of an agricultural, horticultural, or domestic character if a parent or guardian was the employer. Schoolchildren could not work during school hours or more than two hours on school days. No child younger than 15 could work in any industrial undertaking, other than light work, or on any vessel, other than a vessel where only family members worked. Children younger than 16 could not work at night; children aged 16 to 18 were allowed to work until midnight under certain conditions; and employers were required to arrange for safe transport home for girls aged 16 to 18 working until midnight. Penalties were commensurate with those for similar crimes, and inspection was sufficient to enforce compliance. The government effectively enforced the law. The Bermuda Police Service reported no cases of child labor or exploitation of children during the year.There were no confirmed reports during 2022 of the worst forms of child labor in the British Overseas Territories, but gaps in the law made children vulnerable. The British Overseas Territories of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), Montserrat, and Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha did not have functioning labor inspectorates to enforce labor laws. There were legislative gaps in the prohibition of trafficking in children for labor exploitation in Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha. While criminal laws prohibited trafficking in children for sexual exploitation, they did not address trafficking in children for labor exploitation. Laws did not exist in Monserrat or the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) regarding the use of children in drug trafficking and other illicit activities.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a National Living Wage for workers aged 23 and over and a National Minimum Wage for workers of at least school-leaving age until age 22. Both wages were above the poverty level.The law limited the workweek to an average of 48 hours, normally averaged over a 17-week period. The law did not prohibit compulsory overtime, but it limited overtime to the 48-hour workweek restriction. The 48-hour-workweek regulations did not apply to senior managers and others who could exercise control over their own work hours. There were also exceptions for the armed forces, emergency services, police, domestic workers, sea and air transportation workers, and fishermen. The law allowed workers to choose to work more than a 48-hour week; this was called an “opt out” of the 48-hour limit. An individual could “opt out” for a certain period or indefinitely; the “opt out” was required to be voluntary, and an employee could not be fired or treated unfairly for refusing. The employee could cancel an “opt out” agreement at any time, by giving seven days’ notice. There were exceptions for airline staff, delivery drivers, security guards, and workers on ships or boats.Bermuda implemented its first minimum wage on June 1 with an hourly wage of 16.40 Bermuda Dollars ($16.4). The Employment Minimum Hourly Wage Order was tabled on March 2 by the Minister of Economy and Labour. The order set the minimum hourly wage and provided a hybrid payment structure for employees who received gratuities, commissions, and service charges. If basic wages did not equal the minimum hourly rate for employees who received these forms of compensation, the employer would be liable for the difference.The Bermuda Department of Labour enforced any contractually agreed wage and hour and standards.Occupational Safety and Health: The government set appropriate occupational safety and health (OSH) standards. The law stipulated employers could not place the health and safety of employees at risk. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was responsible for identifying unsafe situations, not the worker, and inspectors had the authority to conduct unannounced inspections, levy fines, and initiate criminal proceedings. The government proactively identified unsafe conditions. By law, workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, and authorities effectively protected employees in this situation. Alleged violations of OSH standards were common in the construction, manufacturing, and agricultural, forestry, and fishing sectors.The Bermuda Department of Labour and Training enforced OSH standards. Regulations enforced by the department extensively covered the safety of the work environment, occupational safety, and health standards and were appropriate for the main industries.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government effectively enforced minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) enforced wage payments. The HSE enforced maximum working hours. The number of labor inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance. The HMRC and the HSE could make unannounced inspections and initiate criminal proceedings. Inspections were sufficient to enforce compliance.Penalties for violations were generally commensurate with those for similar crimes such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. Although criminal enforcement was available, most minimum wage noncompliance was pursued via civil enforcement through the courts. The HSE reported violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were common in the agriculture, chemicals, construction, fairgrounds and theme parks, film and theater, logistics and transport, manufacturing, mining, energy, sports and leisure, utilities, and waste and recycling sectors.The HSE effectively enforced occupational health and safety laws in all sectors including the informal economy. Fines for violations were commensurate with those for similar laws. HSE inspectors also advised employers on how to comply with the law. Employers could be ordered to make improvements, either through an improvement notice, which allowed time for the recipient to comply, or a prohibition notice, which prohibited an activity until remedial action was taken. The HSE issued notices to companies and individuals for breaches of health and safety law. The notice could involve one or more instances when the recipient failed to comply with health and safety law, each of which was called a “breach.” The HSE prosecuted recipients for noncompliance with a notice while the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service prosecuted similar cases in Scotland. According to a government report published in June, 9 percent of the UK adult population participated in the informal sector in 2022.In Bermuda penalties enforced by the Department of Labour and Training were commensurate with those for similar violations and were regularly applied against violators.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								United Kingdom