NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LARRY JAMES RADY, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0118 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2018-144942-001

The Honorable John R. Hannah, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By David R. Cole

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert W. Doyle

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 1-26-2021
STATE v. RADY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Larry James Rady, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for 

misconduct involving weapons. Because Rady has shown no error, we 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2018, Rady was shot in the leg. While at the 

hospital receiving treatment for his wound, Rady was interviewed by the 

police. Rady told police officers he was shot by an unknown subject while 

smoking a cigarette on his back porch. Officers were dispatched to Rady’s 

residence and, shortly after arrival, they encountered Rady’s roommate, 

Cynthia Flagg. Flagg told the officers Rady shot himself and described 

Rady as her “boyfriend.” Two days after the shooting, Rady contradicted 

his initial statement and told police the shooting occurred when he was 

moving a safe and a gun fell out, hit the floor, and discharged.

¶3 At the time of the shooting, Rady was on probation for a 

prior felony conviction and was prohibited from possessing firearms. The 

state charged Rady with two counts of misconduct involving weapons 

occurring on different dates, both Class 4 felonies (“Count One” and 

“Count Three”); and unlawful discharge of a firearm, a Class 6 felony, 

(“Count Two”). Rady entered a plea agreement, resolving Counts Two 

and Three, but proceeded to trial on Count One. 

¶4 At trial, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt Rady knowingly possessed a deadly weapon while classified as a 

prohibited possessor. A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4). 

¶5 Rady’s probation officer, Kimberly Peterson, testified she 

visited Rady’s home twice between May and June of 2018. When asked by 

the prosecutor which room was Rady’s, Peterson responded she believed 

Rady and Flagg shared a bedroom. The prosecutor then asked Peterson 

whether, based on her observations, she believed Rady and Flagg to be 

boyfriend and girlfriend. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the 
STATE v. RADY

Decision of the Court

3

question called for speculation. The trial court overruled the objection,

and Peterson testified it appeared that Rady and Flagg were in a romantic 

relationship.

¶6 Flagg testified she did not recall telling police that Rady was 

her boyfriend or that he had shot himself. Instead, Flagg denied that Rady 

was her boyfriend and testified that she accidentally shot Rady while 

attempting to remove the gun from a safe in her room. Flagg maintained 

she did not share her bedroom with Rady. 

¶7 The jury found Rady guilty as charged and the trial court 

sentenced him to a presumptive ten-year prison term. Rady timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Rady presents only one issue on appeal, contending the trial 

court committed reversible error by allowing Peterson to testify she 

believed Rady and Flagg shared a bedroom and were romantically 

involved. Rady argues such testimony called for speculation and 

constituted improper opinion testimony. 

¶9 It is well established that decisions regarding the admission 

or exclusion of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court 

and will be reversed on appeal only when they constitute a clear and 

prejudicial abuse of the court’s discretion. State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 387 

(App. 1994). To grant Rady the relief he requests, we must conclude the 

trial court abused its discretion, and that Rady was prejudiced “sufficient 

to create a reasonable doubt about whether the verdict might have been 

different had the error not [occurred].” Id.1

¶10 Relying only on State v. Reimer, 189 Ariz. 239 (App. 1997) to 

support his argument that Peterson’s testimony requires us to overturn 

the conviction, Rady has failed to show how the court abused its 

discretion. In Reimer, this court concluded the trial court abused its 

discretion when it admitted into evidence a police officer’s opinion 

testimony on the truthfulness of another witness’ statements. 189 Ariz. at 

1 The state seemingly concedes Rady’s contention that Peterson’s 

testimony called for speculation. We disagree. State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 242, 

249, ¶ 23 (App. 2014) (appellate court is not bound by the state’s 

concession of error). 
STATE v. RADY

Decision of the Court

4

241 (noting that the Arizona Rules of Evidence do not permit an expert or 

lay witness to opine on the truthfulness of a statement made by another 

witness as it usurps the function of the jury to determine the credibility of 

the witness). Here, while Peterson’s testimony contradicted that of Flagg, 

she did not opine on the truthfulness of the statements made by Flagg. 

Reimer is inapplicable.

¶11 Furthermore, lay witnesses, such a Peterson, may testify to 

relevant evidence and may provide inferences or opinions which are 

rationally based on the perceptions of the witness and helpful in 

understanding the witness’ testimony or determining a fact in issue. Ariz. 

R. Evid. 701; Ayala, 178 Ariz. at 387; see also United States v. Freeman, 619 

F.2d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding witnesses’ testimony about their

“‘impression’ and ‘understanding’ of appellants’ relationship to each 

other” was admissible lay opinion testimony). How much weight to give 

Peterson’s testimony, including whether to accept it as credible, was 

within the province of the jury. See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335, ¶ 39 

(2008) (“Determining veracity and credibility lies within the province of 

the jury . . . .”); see also Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 

283, 287, ¶ 12 (2000) (“The credibility of a witness’ testimony and the

weight it should be given are issues particularly within the province of the

jury.”) (quoting Kuhnke v. Textron, Inc., 140 Ariz. 587, 591 (App. 1984)).

¶12 Because Peterson’s testimony was rationally based upon her 

perceptions and helpful in determining a fact in issue, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. 

CONCLUSION

¶13 Because Rady has shown no error, his conviction and 

sentence are affirmed.