# Brunei - United States Department of State

- Brunei HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Brunei				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brunei																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Brunei Darussalam during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: degrading treatment or punishment by government authorities; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including censorship; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious restrictions on political participation; trafficking in persons; the extensive practice of Type 4 female genital mutilation/cutting that constituted serious gender-based violence; and the existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although the law was not enforced.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law did not prohibit torture. Caning could be ordered for certain offenses under both secular law and sharia, and it was mandatory for some offenses. The country’s Sharia Penal Code (SPC) included offenses punishable by corporal and capital punishments, including stoning to death, amputation of hands or feet, and caning. Neither stoning nor amputation were imposed or carried out during the year.The SPC prohibited caning persons younger than 15. Secular law prohibited caning for women, girls, boys younger than eight, men older than 50, and those a doctor ruled unfit for caning. Juvenile boys older than eight could be caned with a “light rattan” stick. Canings were conducted in the presence of a doctor, who could interrupt the punishment for medical reasons. The government generally applied laws carrying a sentence of caning impartially; the government sometimes deported foreigners in lieu of caning. The sharia court did not hand down any sentences imposing other corporal or capital punishments.There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						The government reported prison overcrowding.Abusive Physical Conditions: In 2021, the last year for which information was provided, Ministry of Home Affairs reported 841 prison inmates, exceeding the maximum prison capacity of 585.Administration: A government-appointed committee composed of retired government officials monitored prison conditions and investigated complaints concerning prison and detention center conditions.The prison system had an ombudsman’s office through which judicial officials, Legislative Council members, community leaders, and representatives of public institutions visited inmates monthly. A prisoner could complain to a visiting judge, the superintendent, the officer in charge, or, in the case of women prisoners, the matron in charge.“Spiritual rehabilitation” programs were compulsory for Muslim inmates.Sharia convicts were held in the same prison facilities but separated from inmates convicted in the secular courts. Sharia convicts were subject to the same regulations as secular convicts.Independent Monitoring: There were no reports of independent domestic or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) monitoring prison conditions.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons arrested for secular (not sharia) offenses to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements but could supersede them by invoking emergency powers.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						A magistrate had to endorse a warrant for arrest, except when police were unable to obtain an endorsement in time to prevent the flight of a suspect or when a suspect was apprehended in the act of committing a crime. After an arrest, police could detain a suspect for a maximum of 48 hours for investigation before bringing the suspect before a magistrate or sharia judge. Secular law and sharia enforcement agencies respected and upheld this right. Police stations maintained a policy of no access to detained individuals during the 48-hour investigative period, including by attorneys. Authorities could hold detainees beyond the initial 48 hours with the approval of a magistrate or sharia judge.Authorities reportedly informed detainees promptly of the charges against them. Authorities made information on detainees public after the 48-hour investigative period. Subject to court order, police could deny visitor access after the 48-hour investigative period in exceptional cases, such as when probable cause to suspect witness tampering existed.The law allowed for bail at the discretion of the judge overseeing the case. There was no provision for providing pro bono legal counsel to poor defendants, except in capital offenses. In noncapital cases, indigent defendants could have to act as their own lawyers. Some NGOs provided pro bono legal service to indigent defendants in noncapital cases before secular courts. There were no reports of suspects being held incommunicado or without access to an attorney after the initial 48-hour investigative period, except in Internal Security Act cases.Authorities could detain persons without a hearing in cases of detention or arrest under the Internal Security Act, which permitted the government to detain suspects without trial for renewable two-year periods. In these cases, the government convened an independent advisory board consisting of senior security and judicial officials to review individual detentions and report to the minister of home affairs. The minister was required to notify detainees in writing of the grounds for their detention and of relevant allegations of fact. The advisory board had to review individual detentions annually.The Sharia Penal Code operated in parallel with the country’s common law courts. In cases involving offenses covered by both the SPC and secular law – such as murder, rape, and theft – an “assessment committee” including a secular law prosecutor, a sharia prosecutor, a regular police officer, and a religious enforcement officer determined whether the secular or sharia court system would try the case. The committee’s deliberations and the grounds for its decisions were not made public. If a dispute arose, the attorney general acted as final arbiter.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law did not provide specifically for an independent judiciary, and both the secular and sharia courts fell administratively under the Prime Minister’s Office, run by the sultan as prime minister and the crown prince as senior minister. The government generally respected judicial independence, however, and there were no known instances of government interference with the judiciary. In both judicial systems, the sultan appointed all higher-court judges, who served at his pleasure.																Trial Procedures						Secular law provided for the right to a fair, timely, and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. The Internal Security Act, which was part of secular law, allowed for preventative detention in cases of subversion and organized violence. Sharia procedures did not specifically provide for the right to a fair trial.In general, defendants in sharia proceedings had the same rights as defendants in criminal cases under secular law.While sharia courts long had jurisdiction in certain civil matters when at least one party was Muslim, many SPC elements applied to all persons in the country, regardless of nationality or religion; some sections of the law had specific applicability to Muslims. Sharia courts prosecuted criminal, divorce, and probate cases; unlike in secular courts, sharia court cases were not reported in the local media, although sharia court hearings were open to the public.The Internal Security Act established significant exceptions to the rights granted in secular law. Individuals detained under the act were not presumed innocent and generally did not have the right to legal counsel. Those detained were entitled to make representation against a detention order to an advisory board, either personally or through an advocate or attorney.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law permitted government intrusion into the privacy of individuals, families, and homes. The government reportedly monitored private email, mobile telephone messaging, and internet chat-room exchanges suspected of being subversive. An informant system was part of the government’s internal security apparatus for monitoring suspected dissidents, religious and ethnic minorities, and those accused of crimes. Persons who published comments on social media critical of government policy, both on public blogs and on personal sites such as Facebook, reported that authorities monitored their comments. In some cases, persons were told by friends or colleagues in the government they were being monitored; in other cases, it appeared critical comments were brought to the attention of authorities by private complainants.The Kadis act, which governs aspects of personal law for Muslims, and the SPC permitted enforcement of khalwat, a prohibition on the close proximity of a Muslim and a member of the opposite sex other than a spouse or close relative. Non-Muslims could be arrested for violating khalwat if the other accused party was Muslim. Not all suspects accused of violating khalwat were formally arrested; some individuals received informal warnings.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Under the law and emergency powers, the government restricted freedom of expression, including for media.Freedom of Expression: There was no provision for freedom of speech in the constitution or law. Members of the Legislative Council could “speak their opinions freely” on behalf of citizens, but were prohibited from using language or exhibiting behavior deemed “irresponsible, derogatory, scandalous, or injurious.” Under the law it was an offense to challenge the royal family’s authority. The law also made it an offense to challenge “the standing or prominence of the national philosophy, the Malay Islamic Monarchy concept.” This philosophy identified the Shafi’i School of Sunni Islam as the state religion and monarchical rule as the sole form of government to uphold the rights and privileges of the Brunei Malay ethnic community. The law also criminalized any act, matter, or word intended to promote “feelings of ill will or hostility” between classes of persons or to “wound religious feelings.”The SPC included provisions barring contempt for or insult of the sultan, the administration of sharia, or any law related to Islam. SPC sections provided, in certain circumstances, for death sentences for apostasy from Islam, deriding Islamic scriptures, and declaring oneself as God, among other offenses. There were no known cases of persons charged under these sections, but criticism of the law was largely self-censored, and online newspapers did not permit comments or stories on these subjects.The government interpreted the SPC as prohibiting public celebration of religions other than Islam, including publicly displaying Christmas decorations. Some establishments, however, openly sold Christmas decorations or advertised Christmas-themed events. Christmas remained an official national holiday.The SPC prohibited the publication or import of publications giving instruction about Islam contrary to sharia. It also barred the distribution to Muslims or to persons with no religion of publications related to religions other than Islam. The SPC barred the publication, broadcast, or public expression of a list of words generally associated with Islam (such as Quran) in a non-Islamic context. The SPC also prohibited religious teaching without written approval. There were no reports of charges under these regulations.Government authorities had to approve public lectures, academic conferences, and visiting scholars. Two academics reported government scrutiny of proposed research papers on what the government perceived as sensitive topics. An academic who published overseas reported government surveillance after returning to the country. Nearly all academics reported practicing self-censorship.The government restricted cultural events; Chinese New Year lion dance performances, for example, were restricted to Chinese temples or other community facilities or residences. All public musical or theatrical performances required prior approval by a censorship board; public entertainment was generally barred on and around specified Islamic holidays. Although the censorship board rarely required changes to performances, delays associated with the censorship process posed logistical hurdles for performing arts organizations. Some movies were censored or not permitted to be shown in cinemas, often because of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) content.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The law allowed the government to close a newspaper without prior notice or showing cause. The law required local newspapers to obtain operating licenses and prior government approval for hiring foreign editorial staff, journalists, and printers. The law also gave the government the right to bar distribution of foreign publications and required distributors of foreign publications to obtain a government permit.The government owned the only local television station, although three Malaysian television channels and two satellite television services were also available. Some programs were subject to censorship based on theme or content, including religious content, but such censorship was not consistent.The law provided for the prosecution of newspaper publishers, proprietors, or editors who published anything the government deemed as having seditious intent. Punishments included suspension of publication for a maximum of one year; a prohibition on publishers, printers, or editors from publishing, writing for, or editing any other newspaper; and the seizure of printing equipment. Government-owned media outlets were unable to interview anyone (including witnesses to a traffic accident) without prior clearance. Moreover, all media were censored from reporting on domestic incidents until police had issued a press release.Reportedly, local media were not permitted to report directly on foreign or domestic subjects deemed sensitive, and instead had to rely on wire stories from international media. In an August 24 interview with the nonresident Ambassador of Ukraine, Kateryna Zelenko, the Borneo Bulletin censored all mention of Russia’s war on Ukraine.Persons convicted for violation of media laws or regulations faced a significant fine and a maximum prison term of three years. Journalists deemed to have published or written “false and malicious” reports could be subject to fines or prison sentences.Observers reported prohibitions against covering a variety of topics, such as aggression by the People’s Republic of China in the South China Sea and reporting on topics such as crime until the relevant government agency issued an official press release on the topic.Journalists commonly reported practicing self-censorship because of social pressure, reports of government interference and pressure, and legal and professional concerns.Libel/Slander Laws: The law prohibited bringing into hatred or contempt, or exciting disaffection against, the sultan or the government. Persons convicted under the law faced a significant fine, a maximum of three years in prison, or both. There were no reports of such cases.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted access to the internet, censored online content, and had the unrestricted legal right and capability to monitor private online communications. The government monitored private email and internet chatroom exchanges it believed to be propagating subversive views, including those of religious minorities, or material on topics deemed immoral. The Ministry of Transport and Infocommunications and the Prime Minister’s Office enforced the law requiring internet service providers and internet cafe operators to register with the director of broadcasting in the Prime Minister’s Office. The Attorney General’s Chambers and the Authority for the Infocommunications Technology Industry advised internet service and content providers to monitor items posted on their sites for content contrary to the public interest, national harmony, and social morals. Members of the LQBTQI+ community reported the government-linked telecommunications provider limited the use of the dating app Grindr to chat functionality only.Internet companies self-censored content and reserved the right to cut off internet access without prior notice. The government continued awareness campaigns warning citizens about the misuse of and social ills associated with social media, including the use of social media to criticize Islam, sharia, or the monarchy. The government maintained a hotline for reporting fake or malicious information circulated on social media that involved public or national interests.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The government’s emergency powers restricted the right to assembly. Public gatherings of 10 or more persons required a government permit, and police could disband an unofficial assembly of five or more persons deemed likely to cause a disturbance of the peace. Permits required the approval of the minister of home affairs. The government routinely issued permits for annual events but in recent years occasionally used its authority to disrupt gatherings deemed politically or otherwise sensitive. Civil society leaders reported challenges in advancing social causes in the country’s heavily censored and insular society. A transgender advocate explained that, while the LGBTQI+ community was generally safe so long as individuals did not assemble openly or speak out, these conditions made it difficult to reach out to youth who might be struggling to find support. Organizers of events on sensitive topics tended to hold meetings in private rather than apply for permits, or practiced self-censorship at public events.						Freedom of Association						The law did not provide for freedom of association. The law required formal groups, including religious, social, business, labor, and cultural organizations, to register with the Registrar of Societies and provide regular reports on membership and finances. Applicants were subject to background checks, and proposed organizations were subject to naming requirements, including, for example, a prohibition on names or symbols linked to triad societies (Chinese organized crime networks). The government reported it accepted most applications to form associations. The government could suspend the activities of a registered organization if it deemed doing so was in the public interest.Organizations seeking to raise funds or donations from the public were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and each individual fundraising activity required a separate permit. Approved organizations dealt with matters such as pollution, wildlife preservation, the arts, entrepreneurship, and women in business.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The government generally respected the right to freedom of internal movement and the right to emigrate but imposed restrictions on foreign travel and repatriation.Foreign Travel: Government employees and government contractors had to apply for exit permits to travel abroad. Government guidelines stated no government official could travel alone, and unrelated male and female officers could not travel together; the government enforced these policies inconsistently and usually only towards women. The country’s tourist passports stated the bearer could not travel to Israel.Exile: By law the sultan could forcibly exile, permanently or temporarily, any person deemed a threat to the safety, peace, or welfare of the country. There were no cases of banishment since the country became fully independent.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government did not cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, or other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had no system for providing protection to refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										There were no recent, reliable statistics on the number of stateless persons in the country, but observers estimated there were tens of thousands, most of whom had permanent resident status. One academic reported the stateless population was approximately 20,000, which tallied with government reporting from 2011. Most stateless residents were native-born, of Chinese heritage, and from families resident in the country for generations. Other stateless residents included members of Indigenous tribes, whose lands spanned Brunei and the neighboring Malaysian state of Sarawak, and the foreign wives of Malay Muslim men. Most stateless persons held a certificate of identity, which functioned as a passport. Certificate holders had some rights like those of citizens, including to subsidized health care and education. They were, however, unable to apply for certain government jobs or join the military. Stateless business owners approaching the mandatory retirement age of 60 described discriminatory laws preventing them from transferring the business to their children. There was no reliable data on stateless persons who held no form of residency or certificate of identity.Stateless persons could apply for citizenship if they were adults born in the country and resident for 12 of the prior 15 years, provided they passed a test demonstrating sufficient knowledge of Malay culture and language. Women married to citizens and the minor children of citizens who did not obtain citizenship at birth – such as children of citizen mothers and permanent resident fathers – could also apply. Members of the stateless community who passed the Malay culture and language test reported a de facto suspension of citizenship approvals for stateless adult residents, with many reporting that although five to 10 years had elapsed since they passed their test, they had not been granted citizenship. In March, 662 persons, an increase of approximately 50 percent from the previous year, were awarded citizenship; most were wives of Malay Muslim men. One Indigenous recipient reported he had waited 13 years since passing his citizenship test and still had not received citizenship.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Citizens did not have the ability to choose their government. The sultan ruled through hereditary birthright. While the country was nominally a constitutional sultanate, in 1962 the then ruler invoked an article of the constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers. The sultan renewed the emergency powers every two years.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: There were no national or local elections in the country above the village level. The Legislative Council, composed primarily of appointed members, provided a forum for limited public discussion of proposed government programs, budgets, and administrative deficiencies. It convened once per year in March for approximately two weeks. Council members served five-year terms at the pleasure of the sultan. All persons aged 18 and older could vote by secret ballot in village consultative council elections. Candidates, however, had to be Malay Muslim men, approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and have been a citizen or permanent resident for more than 15 years.Political Parties and Political Participation: The National Development Party was the only registered political party. The party pledged to support the sultan and the government and did not criticize the government. A de facto ban existed on establishing political parties. The government had to authorize the establishment and operation of a party; there were no known requests to form a political party in recent memory.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: The constitution required all ministers be of Malay ethnicity and Muslim except as permitted by the sultan. The cabinet included an ethnic Chinese minister. Non-Malay Indigenous communities lacked representation at all levels of government.In 2022 the sultan appointed the country’s first woman cabinet minister as minister of education; the sultan also appointed the first woman deputy minister to the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Women faced barriers to political participation, including limited opportunity for political participation for all citizens, and gender discrimination under sharia. Women were restricted from holding elected village chief positions.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were isolated reports of government corruption.Corruption: Although corruption was not pervasive, the sultan and senior government minsters warned officials in the government and government-linked companies against engaging in corruption. Government officials were prosecuted throughout the year for corruption. In September a former deputy permanent secretary at the Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism was charged with abusing public trust and misconduct for accepting bribes. The case continued as of November.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Neither domestic nor international human rights groups could operate freely due to government restrictions. No registered civil society organizations dealt directly with human rights, mostly due to self-censorship. A few domestic organizations worked on humanitarian issues, such as assistance for victims of domestic violence or provision of free legal counsel for indigent defendants. They generally operated with government support, and the government was somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views, although they reported practicing self-censorship and avoided sensitive issues. Regional and other international human rights organizations occasionally operated in the country but faced the same restrictions as all unregistered organizations.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Secular law stipulated imprisonment from eight to 30 years plus caning with a minimum of 12 strokes as punishment for rape. The SPC provided stoning to death as the maximum punishment for rape. The punishment of stoning was not imposed.The law did not criminalize rape against men or spousal rape and explicitly stated that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife was not rape if she was not younger than 14 (or 15 if ethnic Chinese). There was no specific domestic violence law, but authorities arrested individuals in domestic violence cases under the law on protection of women and girls. The criminal penalty under the law was one to two weeks in jail and a fine for a minor assault; an assault resulting in serious injury was punishable by caning and a prison sentence of up to five years. Islamic family law provided protections against spousal abuse and for the granting of protection orders, and was interpreted to cover sexual assault. The penalty for violating a protection order was a significant fine, maximum imprisonment of six months, or both. In August a man was sentenced to 30 years and four months’ imprisonment and 20 strokes of the cane after he pleaded guilty to two charges of raping a girl, age 10, in 2021.The government reported rape cases, but there were no data available on the prevalence of the crime. All rape cases were tried under the secular criminal law. A special police unit staffed by women officers investigated domestic abuse and child abuse complaints. Police investigated domestic violence only in response to a report by a survivor but reportedly did respond effectively in such cases.The Department of Community Development in the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports provided domestic violence and abuse counseling for women and their spouses. Some women and girl survivors of domestic violence and rape were placed in protective custody at a government-sponsored shelter while waiting for their cases to be scheduled in court. Sharia courts staffed by male and female officials offered counseling to married couples in domestic violence cases. Both secular and sharia courts recognized assault as grounds for divorce.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): No law criminalized FGM/C for women and girls of any age. There were no statistics on the prevalence of FGM/C, but international media and others reported that in general Type 4 FGM/C was done within 40 days of birth based on religious belief and custom, and that the practice was widespread. Observers also reported the procedure was sometimes performed outside of a medical setting. The Ministry of Religious Affairs declared “circumcision” for Muslim girls (sunat) to be an obligatory religious rite and described it as the removal of the hood of the clitoris although some characterized the procedure as a minor incision of the hood of the clitoris (Type 4 per World Health Organization classification), or as touching the clitoris with the flat side of the knife blade.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibited sexual harassment and stated that whoever uttered any word, made any sound or gesture, or exhibited any object intending to insult the modesty of a woman would be punished by up to three years in prison and a fine. The law also stipulated that whoever assaulted or used criminal force, intending thereby to outrage, or knowing the act was likely to outrage the modesty of a person, would be punished by caning and imprisonment of up to five years. During the 2021 Legislative Council sessions, members reported a government study showed 55 percent of women civil servants faced sexual harassment in the workplace, 75 percent of those who encountered sexual harassment did not report the incident, and 85 percent were unaware there were laws to protect them. In 2022 a government human resources officer reported many survivors of sexual harassment did not report the abuse out of fear of social consequences, including ostracization by colleagues or the abuser. The government’s executive training program for middle managers introduced several initiatives to increase public awareness of sexual harassment in the workplace, including discussion and outreach to members of the government and private sectors as well as NGOs.Women reported negative experiences while attending mandatory religious school, including physical menstruation checks by male teachers and forced hair cutting.Discrimination: In accordance with the government’s interpretation of the Quran and sharia, Muslim women and men were accorded different rights. Secular civil law permitted women citizens to own property and other assets, including business properties. Noncitizen husbands of citizens could not apply for permanent resident status until they resided in the country for a minimum of seven years, whereas noncitizen wives could do so after two years of marriage and residence in the country. Although citizenship was automatically inherited from citizen fathers, citizen mothers could only pass their nationality to their children through a process in which children were first issued a certificate of identity (and considered stateless); the process normally resulted in approval. Women who converted to Islam cited pressure to change their names, removing a piece of their cultural and family identity.The law restricted women from serving in certain military combat roles, such as infantry. Women were prohibited from working in certain jobs, at night, or on offshore oil platforms.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.While neither law nor policy limited access to contraception, sociocultural and religious pressures affected some women’s access to contraception or health care for sexually transmitted infections. Unmarried Muslim women had difficulty obtaining contraception from government clinics, turning to private clinics or reproductive services abroad instead. Women seeking medical assistance for complications arising from illegal abortions were reported to police after being given care. Unenforced provisions of the law set imprisonment or fines as punishments for abortion. In July a woman was jailed for six months for inducing a miscarriage after learning at a healthcare center that she was pregnant. The abortion was identified during a follow up visit to the health center, which reported her to police the following day.The government provided access to health services, including emergency contraception for sexual violence survivors. Postexposure prophylaxis was available, based on a doctor’s review of the patient.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										There were no specific laws protecting members of racial or ethnic minority groups. Under the Nationality Act, which favored ethnic Malays, full legal rights were accorded only to citizens; some members of ethnic minority groups were awarded citizenship and enjoyed rights like those of the Malay majority.The government favored ethnic Malays in society through the national Malay Islamic Monarchy philosophy.There were no reports of governmental or societal violence against members of ethnic minority groups, but discriminatory government policies were in effect in many areas. Racial and ethnic minority groups faced discrimination in education, where the curriculum was delivered only in Malay and English. There were pro-Malay policies on land ownership, employment, and service in the armed forces. Opaque nationality laws and pro-Malay policies denied most minority populations adequate representation in government and society and rendered them largely voiceless in public affairs.Reflecting government policy, most public and many private employers showed hiring biases against foreign workers, particularly in key sectors such as oil and gas. In some sectors, foreign workers’ wages could be established based on national origin, with those from certain foreign countries receiving lower wages than others.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Some Indigenous persons were stateless. Indigenous lands were not specifically demarcated, and there were no designated representatives for Indigenous groups in the Legislative Council or other government entities. Indigenous persons generally had a minimal role in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and traditions or in the exploitation of energy, minerals, timber, or other natural resources on and under Indigenous lands.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Stateless parents had to apply for a special pass for a child born in the country. Failure to register a birth was against the law and made it difficult to enroll the child in school.Child Abuse: Child abuse was a crime and was prosecuted but did not appear prevalent. In May a woman was sentenced to 16 months in jail after she pleaded guilty to physically abusing her nephew. The Royal Brunei Police Force included a specialized Woman and Child Abuse Crime Investigation Unit, and the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports provided shelter and care to survivors.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage was 14 years and seven months with parental and participant consent, unless otherwise stipulated by religion or custom under the law, which generally set a higher minimum age. The Islamic Family Act set the minimum marriageable age at 16 for Muslim girls and 18 for Muslim men and made it an offense to use force, threat, or deception to compel persons to marry against their will. Ethnic Chinese had to be 15 or older to marry, according to the Chinese Marriage Act, which also stipulated sexual intercourse with an ethnic Chinese girl younger than 15 was considered rape even if with her spouse. Observers reported that, although permitted by the law, marriages involving children were rare and generally prohibited by social custom.Sexual Exploitation of Children: By law sexual intercourse with a girl younger than 14 (15 if ethnically Chinese) constituted rape and was punishable by imprisonment of from eight to 30 years plus a minimum of 12 strokes of the cane. The law provided for protection of women, girls, and boys from commercial sexual exploitation and “other immoral purposes,” including pornography. The government applied the law against “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” to prosecute rape of boys. The minimum age for consensual sex outside of marriage was 16. The government enforced the law against commercial sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.																																				Antisemitism										There was no known Jewish community in the country. Comments disparaging Jewish persons collectively were occasionally posted online and on social media.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The government did not support the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. Common law criminalized “carnal knowledge against the order of nature,” understood to mean sex between men. The minimum prison sentence for such acts was 20 years. The SPC banned anal intercourse between men or between a man and a woman who was not his wife, with a maximum penalty of death by stoning. The SPC also criminalized same-sex sexual conduct between women, with punishment of up to 10 years’ imprisonment or caning. The SPC additionally prohibited men from dressing as women or women dressing as men “without reasonable excuse” or “for immoral purposes.” The above prohibitions were rarely enforced.Violence and Harassment: There were no known incidents of violence by police or other government agents or by nonstate actors against LGBTQI+ persons.Discrimination: Local LGBTQI+ community members continued to report familial pressure toward heterosexual marriage and childbearing in addition to societal discrimination in public and private employment, housing, recreation, and obtaining public services including education.LGBTQI+ individuals said the absence of online or in-person support injured their mental health but that they were reluctant to seek counseling at government health centers for fear of social opprobrium. LGBTQI+ community members often depended on personal referrals to health care providers known to be sympathetic to the LGBTQI+ community. In addition to finding support among older members of local LGBTQI+ communities, some sought support from similar communities and NGOs in other countries.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The government did not allow an individual to change their name or the sex at birth on any official documents. There was no mechanism for legal gender recognition and gender affirmation surgery was not allowed.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: The government did not ban involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices targeting LGBTQI+ individuals (“conversion therapy”) and such practices were available and advertised.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Some LGBTQI+ individuals reported the government monitored their activities and communications. Like all events in the country, events on LGBTQI+ topics were subject to restrictions on assembly and expression and LGBTQI+ persons reported that the government would not issue permits for events on LGBTQI+ topics. LGBTQI+ individuals self-censored their gender expression or sexual orientation due to strong cultural norms against violating conservation social and political mores.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law did not prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities or mandate accessibility or the provision of most public services. Access to public buildings, government information and communication on disability concerns, and transportation for persons with disabilities was inconsistent. The law did not specifically address the right of persons with disabilities to seek legal remedies for rights violations. All persons regardless of disability, however, had the same legal rights and access to health care.The government provided inclusive educational services for children with disabilities who attended both government and religious schools alongside peers without disabilities. There were limited provisions for accommodations enabling persons with disabilities to vote.The law required newly constructed government office buildings to meet access standards for persons with disabilities. The Department for Community Development continued outreach programs promoting awareness of the needs of persons with disabilities. In a September speech, the Minister of Development said projects under the country’s National Development Plan had to include designs that comply with the country’s Different Abilities Design Guideline.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										HIV and HIV-related discrimination continued to occur. By law, foreigners with HIV were not permitted to enter or stay in the country, although no medical testing was required for short-term visitors.The Brunei Darussalam AIDS Council, a government-linked NGO, provided free HIV testing and anonymous counseling for all men to encourage those at risk to seek resources and assistance without fear of scrutiny into the cause or source of infection.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										Although the law provided for the right of workers to form and join unions, there were no unions or worker organizations in the country. The law did not provide for collective bargaining and prohibited strikes. The law prohibited employers from discriminating against workers for union activities, but it did not provide for reinstatement for dismissal related to union activity.Given the absence of unions or worker organizations, there were no reports of government enforcement of laws respecting their establishment or operation. Some NGOs were involved in labor issues, such as wages, contracts, and working conditions. These NGOs largely operated openly in cooperation with relevant government agencies, but they avoided confrontation with the government and engaged in self-censorship.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law did not prohibit all the worst forms of child labor. The law on procuring or offering children younger than 18 for commercial sexual exploitation or illicit intercourse referred only to girls and not to boys. Law prohibited the employment of children younger than 16. Parental consent and approval by the Labor Commission were required for those between ages 16 and 18 to work. Girls younger than 18 could not work at night or on offshore oil platforms.The Department of Labor, part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, effectively enforced child labor laws. Penalties for child labor violations included a fine, imprisonment, or both, and were commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping. There were no confirmed reports of the worst forms of child labor. There was no list of hazardous occupations prohibited for children, or types of light work activities legal for children ages 14 to 16.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: There was no national legal minimum wage. In July the government implemented a new minimum wage for workers in the banking, finance, and information and communications and technology sectors, with scheduled implementation of a minimum wage in remaining sectors by July 2024. Wages in all sectors were above the poverty level. The law required overtime after 40 hours per week. The law also stipulated that weekly maximum hours of work shall not exceed 56 hours. Work hours and overtime violations were more prevalent among domestic staff and shop workers.Occupational Safety and Health: Government regulations established appropriate occupational safety and health (OSH) standards for the principal industries/sectors. The law clarified that the responsibility for identifying unsafe conditions lay with OSH experts and employers, not workers. OSH experts actively identified unsafe conditions, in addition to responding to workers’ OSH complaints. Individuals were encouraged to report violations of health and safety standards, but the law did not explicitly protect the right to remove oneself from a hazardous workplace.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce working hours or OSH laws. The commissioner of the Department of Labor was responsible for enforcing labor laws. The Department of Labor inspected working conditions on a routine basis and in response to complaints. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. The number of labor inspectors was adequate to conduct mandated inspections. The Department of Labor reportedly inspected migrant workers’ housing; when it found the housing unsuitable, it instructed employers to rehouse workers adequately. The department could terminate the licenses of abusive employers and revoke their foreign labor quotas; it did so rarely. The government levied fines on employers found to have violated the terms of employment of workers.Employers who violated laws regarding conditions of service – including payment of wages, working hours, leave, and holidays – could initially be fined and, for further offenses, be fined, imprisoned, or both. Penalties for violations of wage, hour, and health and safety standards were not commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence and penalties were rarely applied against violators.Foreign laborers (predominantly Filipinos, Indonesians, and Bangladeshis) dominated most low-wage professions, such as domestic service, construction, maintenance, retail, and food service, in which violations of wage, overtime, and health and safety regulations most frequently occurred.Government enforcement in sectors employing low-skilled labor in small-scale construction or maintenance projects was inadequate. This was especially true for foreign laborers at construction sites, where complaints of wage arrears, inadequate safety, and poor, unsafe living conditions were reported.The informal sector was negligible, as the government strictly enforced work visa requirements for all workers entering the country.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. 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Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Brunei																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Bruneian Foreign Minister II Dato Erywan Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Bruneian Foreign Minister II Dato Erywan Yusof today in Washington, DC during the fifth U.S.-Brunei Senior Officials’ Dialogue.Deputy Secretary Campbell and Foreign Minister II Dato Erywan celebrated 40 years of robust diplomatic relations between the United States and Brunei and reaffirmed a shared commitment to strengthening bilateral security ties. The two parties announced plans to elevate the relationship to a Strategic Partnership to further cooperation on cyber and technology, economic and commercial, and other issues. The Deputy Secretary and Foreign Minister II also emphasized the value of increased cooperation on regional issues and raised partnership opportunities for delivering urgent humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink’s Travel to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink will travel to Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, February 23-March 4 to underscore the United States’ strong and enduring commitment to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia.In Singapore, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue alongside Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua.  They will discuss the wide-ranging U.S.-Singapore partnership, including defense and security ties, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.In Phnom Penh, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Cambodian officials to advance our shared vision of a free, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.  The Assistant Secretary will also underscore U.S. commitment to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a democratic and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the 9th U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue alongside Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi.  He will also co-lead the Second Strategic and Defense Dialogue alongside Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Royal.  During these two dialogues, under the auspices of the U.S.-Thai Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will work to advance bilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.In Hanoi, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Vietnamese officials and participate in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue.  Building on the recent upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will seek to further deepen U.S.-Vietnam relations and advance our shared vision of a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful Indo-Pacific Region.In Bandar Seri Begawan, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei relations.  He will also meet with senior Bruneian officials to discuss key issues in the bilateral relationship, including economic and security initiatives, efforts to tackle climate change, and regional cooperation.
- Brunei National Day HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Brunei National Day				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Brunei National Day																																		Press Statement																														February 22, 2024																																							On behalf of the people of the United States, congratulations to the people of Brunei Darussalam as you mark your 40th National Day on February 23.The United States and Brunei have enjoyed a long-lasting and prosperous friendship since 1850 when we signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. In the coming year, I look forward to broadening cooperation by promoting prosperity through economic diversification, supporting Brunei’s regional leadership on climate change, deepening our robust military partnership, and growing our strong people-to-people ties through our professional and educational exchanges.I wish all the people of Brunei Darussalam joyful and peaceful celebrations as you come together to honor your national holiday.						Tags																					Brunei																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State
- The U.S. APEC 2023 Host Year Elevated Stakeholder Voices Matt Murray, U.S. Senior Official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsOn November 17, the United States successfully concluded its 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host year.  Starting in Honolulu late last year, we visited Palm Springs, California, a crossroads of the Americas and Asia, in February to advance resilient and sustainable growth.  We then moved on to Detroit in May, where we saw the Motor City being revitalized as a center of innovative and worker-centered transportation and auto industries, and in August we gathered in Seattle, a global gateway of trade, investment, and innovation for the Pacific Northwest.  We completed our fruitful journey in San Francisco last month.   So, what did we accomplish during our host year?  For starters, the United States proudly hosted 400 technical meetings, 10 ministerial meetings, and over 5,000 delegates from the public and private sectors across the Asia-Pacific region.  APEC 2023 outcomes included announcements of $200 billion of investments from companies in the Asia Pacific into the United States and $50 billion of U.S. private sector investments into APEC economies.  We also directly engaged with more than 12,000 stakeholders and nearly 2,500 press members, and most importantly, APEC Economic Leaders endorsed the Golden Gate Declaration to advance the 21 APEC economies’ important work on sustainability, resilience, and economic inclusion.  Our success this year would not be possible without the engagement of each of our stakeholders and many Americans across the country who showed incredible support for APEC 2023.   Spirit of APEC Connect in the Leaders’ DeclarationAt the beginning of our host year, we took domestic outreach efforts to the next level by launching “APEC Connect,” a nation-wide campaign explaining our U.S. APEC 2023 host year to the American public.  Through this program, we engaged stakeholders from diverse sectors, from trade associations and chambers of commerce to labor groups, Indigenous communities, and diaspora communities across nearly all corners of the country. APEC Connect generated public awareness and broad support for our host year and cultivated partnerships to ensure all Americans can play a part in the APEC process.  The program further helped ensure that APEC’s work on sustainability, resiliency, and economic inclusion benefits people across the Asia-Pacific region. Traveling across the United States beyond U.S. APEC host cities – including to Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Rockville, and Chicago – we learned about economic opportunities and policy outcomes Americans would like to see from APEC to improve their personal and their community’s livelihoods.  It strengthened our stakeholder relations and inclusive approach to make better and more informed decisions about our host year policy priorities.  Much of this was captured in the Golden Gate Declaration, which stated, “Our stakeholders and business communities bring creativity, dynamism, and energy and remain vital partners in our work.  We look forward to further strengthening multi-stakeholder engagement.”  APEC Connect Efforts Enhanced in San Francisco Private Sector and Stakeholder Engagements during the 2023 U.S. APEC Economic Leaders&#8217; Week in San Francisco. &nbsp;In San Francisco, our last destination, the voices we gathered from across the United States through APEC Connect were incorporated into our final efforts to build a better tomorrow in the Asia-Pacific region.  During APEC Economic Leaders&#8217; Week (AELW), civic organizations and San Francisco APEC Host Committees hosted nearly 30 public and stakeholder engagement initiatives, conferences, and events to highlight San Francisco and California as the perfect AELW host and discuss how APEC can help people across the region thrive.  They included the APEC Meets California and Silicon Valley series, The Future Starts in California Conference, and more.  Over 3,000 domestic and international participants joined them.  As APEC Connect ‘friends’ advised, we continued to prioritize women’s economic empowerment and a just transition to Net Zero carbon economies through the inaugural APEC Multistakeholder Forum.  We also met with experts from academia at the APEC University Leaders’ Forum and the APEC Study Centers Conference, and engaged with a range of dynamic youth groups.AELW also featured the extensive public-private collaboration of nearly 2,000 participants at the APEC CEO Summit, the inaugural APEC Sustainable Future Forum, the APEC Business Advisory Council&#8217;s Dialogue with APEC Leaders, and other conversations.  This formal role for public-private cooperation – unique to APEC – is the “secret sauce” which helps us continue to deliver important outcomes for our workers, families, and businesses. Importantly, we also engaged with Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in San Francisco and from other parts of the United States.  It was amazing to see that SMEs from different cities and states – Nevada, Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Texas – that ‘APEC Connect’ed together earlier in the year were reunited in San Francisco as an integral part of AELW.  The City of San Francisco empowered other important stakeholders and members of communities and dramatically expanded APEC’s public outreach.  They recruited 1,200 multilingual volunteers and more than 300 leaders and elected officials from the city and the State of California.  They also engaged around 400 local groups, including members of the Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander community, who account for more than 30% of the city’s population and serve as connectors between San Francisco and the Asia-Pacific region.  They supported the successful execution of AELW, promoted AELW, provided opportunities for San Francisco and APEC delegates to interact, and distributed 40,000 copies of the city’s APEC flyer to neighborhoods.  The San Francisco media team reached more than 30,000 people via newsletters, their 600 advertisements received over 320,000 impressions, and their website attracted almost half a million visitors. Throughout the year, ‘APEC Connect’ed true champions of regional economic engagement to each other, to the U.S. host team, and to the Asia-Pacific.  The champions are all 12,000 stakeholders APEC 2023 engaged directly with – and more importantly, American workers, families, and businesses.  They all played a pivotal role in ‘Creating a Sustainable and Resilient Future for All’ and building an interconnected, innovative, and inclusive APEC region which benefits all our communities.  
- Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos																																		Media Note																														November 29, 2023																																							Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs William Russo will travel to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos from November 29 to December 8, 2023.&nbsp; His trip will prioritize working with U.S. embassies on policy and messaging priorities and engaging with partners in the information space.&nbsp; Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with government officials, local and international media outlets, students, journalists, non-governmental organizations, and U.S. embassy staff.&nbsp;In Belgium, Assistant Secretary Russo will be the Head of Delegation for the United States to the 2023 NATO Senior Communicators Conference.&nbsp; This conference will focus on the challenge of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and discuss Alliance communications efforts and messaging related to the NATO Washington Summit to be held in July 2024. &nbsp;While there, he will meet with several counterparts among our NATO Allies, in addition to engaging with tri-mission staff.&nbsp;&nbsp;In Brunei, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Bruneian officials, including the Minster of Primary Resources and Tourism. &nbsp;He will also speak with alumni of U.S. exchange programs and Bruneian journalists as we prepare to commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei diplomatic relations in 2024.&nbsp;In Thailand, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Thai government officials, visit the Asia Pacific Media Hub, and meet with embassy staff. &nbsp;He will also speak with&nbsp;journalists and media partners to discuss modern communications and the media environment. &nbsp;&nbsp;In Laos, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Lao PDR officials and visit the embassy. &nbsp;He will also engage with journalists and media contacts to discuss the Lao PDR government’s plans and media preparations and support for the 2024 ASEAN Chair Year, as well as modern strategic communications and countering disinformation.&nbsp;Follow along on Twitter/X at @GPA_AS for more updates from the trip.&nbsp;						Tags																					Belgium																								Brunei																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of Global Public Affairs																																Disinformation																																							Embassies and Consulates																															Laos																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Thailand
- Digital Press Briefing with David M. Turk, U.S. Department of Energy David M. Turk, Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of EnergyMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with David M. Turk, the Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of Energy.  Deputy Secretary Turk will provide an overview of his ongoing visit to Bali, Indonesia, and Manila, Philippines, for the third ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting and the United States Exchange and East Asia Summit Energy Ministerial Meetings. With that, let’s get started.  Deputy Secretary Turk, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much, Natalie, and it’s a pleasure to be with you all.  Thanks to all our reporter colleagues who are joining this call.  Just a few thoughts of framing and then happy to take any and all questions as well. As Natalie mentioned, I’m here in Bali for a meeting we just concluded with our ASEAN minister colleagues, between ASEAN and the U.S., and sitting down here in a few minutes with a number of the ministers for bilateral discussions as well, and of course meeting with our Indonesian host, Minister Tasrif, earlier today also.  And then this comes on the – just after a visit to the Philippines earlier this week as well, and really exploring additional bilateral opportunities of cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines also. In addition, I had a chance not too long ago to visit Thailand and Vietnam and Indonesia again as well, and the reason we are spending – I am spending, we are spending so much time and effort on the region is because as we really step up and implement historic legislation in the U.S. on our clean energy transition – the Inflation Reduction Act, the bipartisan infrastructure legislation, truly groundbreaking efforts in the U.S. to walk the talk and get our own house in order – we also view a core, core part of our overall efforts to engage in partnership with key organizations like ASEAN, and I think ASEAN is an incredibly impactful organization that we are eager to support and to do what we can to help those countries and the ASEAN region more generally achieve its objectives; but also to make sure that if there are things we can be doing internationally, bilaterally, multilaterally, that we do that.  And we have a number of ongoing areas of collaboration with particular countries in the region but also with ASEAN as a group as well.  I’m happy to get into any particulars as there’s interest.  As the U.S. Government, we of course are working on JETP with Indonesia, with Vietnam.  We have our own flagship partnership at the Department of Energy called Net Zero World, where we try to bring terrific, independent, gold-standard technical expertise from our national laboratories – 10 of our national laboratories – to help Indonesia, to help Thailand, to help Singapore, and to help other countries as there’s interest as well, a variety of technical conversations working in particular technology areas; but also trying to help inform policymaking and decision-making as we make progress in the U.S., learn from others, and share examples from our end as well.  And we’re having incredibly fruitful and real-world conversations on that front, and we really try to strive to be a true partner for countries around the world and certainly in ASEAN, of course with our private sector partners as well helping to lead the way. We’re also having a range of conversations on clean energy supply chains and really trying to work with countries so that they benefit not only from the mining of their particular minerals and resources, but try to move up the value chain so that they get more economic benefit from those resources that they’ve been given.  We view that as a win for those countries and those people, assuming the mining and the manufacturing is done responsibly, but also a win for diversification of supply chains and making sure that we all can benefit from these technologies going forward.   So happy to get into any and all of that, and to certainly answer questions.  Back over to you, Natalie, to moderate.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Deputy Secretary Turk.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  So our first question is from Diep Nguyen Thi Ngoc from BizLIVE in Hanoi, Vietnam.  “What are the obstacles that some Southeast Asian countries face on the way to net zero by 2050?  And what are the deputy secretary&#8217;s recommendations and key points for Southeast Asian countries to achieve the net-zero target?”  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much for the question.  And I think the biggest obstacle in terms of not only Southeast Asian countries but all our countries to get to net zero by 2050 and to have a pathway towards decarbonization that’s in line with what science is telling us we need to to avoid even worse consequences of climate change, and it’s clear that all our countries are already experiencing horrific consequences of climate change – just look at what happened in Hawaii not too long ago, but we’ve got droughts, we’ve got extended heat spells, all sorts of more violent typhoons and hurricanes, et cetera, et cetera.  And the biggest obstacle is just the scale and pace of what we need to do: transforming our economies, not just electricity but transportation, manufacturing, building, across the board to truly net zero within just a few decades, a couple decades’ period of time.  It’s already 2023, and not too far from 2024.  So you think of transforming our entire economy to net zero is a huge, huge undertaking, and we’re all part of this transition.   We all need to support each other, we all need to push each other, and we all need to of course have guiderails and incentives for the private sector to really take off and help get us there. So it’s just the scale and pace of what we need to do, and then there’s particular obstacles of course underneath that.   And then to the second part of the question – recommendations for Southeast Asian countries to achieve net-zero targets.  Our approach is to work with countries to try to support their own objectives.  Governments – especially democratically elected governments – represent the people, and it is not our job to question what their duly-elected leaders want for their country.  What we’re doing is, especially for those countries who have ambitious targets, is:  Are there things that we can do to help support the cause along the way?  Whether it’s leveraging our phenomenal national lab expertise in the U.S. that’s helping us on our own transition, but there’s expertise there and sharing back and forth that’s useful, as we support the objectives to all get us to where we need to go. So we’ve certainly heard some phenomenal opportunities and potential for different technologies.  In the Philippines we had some really good conversations on offshore wind – 170 gigawatts of offshore wind potential has been estimated just in the Philippines itself, and there’s huge offshore wind potential in Vietnam and other countries in the region.  Geothermal, solar, including floating solar.  Working on the grids and building out transmission is a shared challenge.  We’ve got that in the U.S. and other countries do as well.   So we’re all trying to move and help support each other along the way.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  The next question goes to Aditya Hadi from The Jakarta Post in Jakarta, and I see your hand is raised.  If you would like to unmute and ask, please go ahead.  Okay.  Yes, go ahead.  Go ahead, Aditya.   QUESTION:  Right, thank you.  Yeah, I just want to raise a question because recently the (inaudible) secretary in Indonesia said that there’s no money left for the – especially for early retirement in all (inaudible) plans, and Indonesia may not hit the target if there is no money or financing available for the country.  I just want to ask how the U.S. and IPG support for the 10 billion pledge in JETP, and is there any punishment for – from you, from the U.S. for the recent proposal of JETP from Indonesia?   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, Aditya, for the question.  And the JETP, which stands for Just Energy Transition Partnership for those who aren’t tracking this closely, is a really innovative way to help support countries like Indonesia, but there are a few other countries around the world as well, in a comprehensive fashion – not just from the U.S. Government side of things, but other key partners around the world as well.  And it’s really trying to join in a true partnership to think, to see what we can bring to the table to help countries like Indonesia to achieve their own objectives in line with what the science tells us we all need to do. I think it’s important to underscore that this is a partnership and there’s a lot of discussion back and forth.  It’s also a long-term partnership.  So there are opportunities and needs in the near term, but this is also trying to think through comprehensively in terms of a comprehensive investment and policy plan and having that back and forth to make sure that we’re doing what’s necessary.   I think important to really underscore the “Just” part of Just Energy Transition Partnership:  This is meant to be a way to support Indonesia and the other countries who are working in the JETP partnership to not only decarbonize, but to do it in a way that has a just transition taking care of communities, taking care of affordability, taking care of energy security, and doing it in a real-world kind of way.   So it’s a very ambitious partnership.  There will be challenges along the way, as there are in any kind of ambitious partnership, and that’s what’s being worked through right now.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And we’ll go to a question from Maki Iwasaki from the Jiji Press news agency in Tokyo, Japan.  “How do you see the role of Japan and other Asian countries in driving the growth of the hydrogen energy industry in the United States?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, well, thanks for the question.  And I don’t think there’s an international meeting that I’ve gone to recently in which the subject of hydrogen and clean hydrogen in particular didn’t come up.  And there’s an awful lot of work being done in a variety of countries around the world.  Certainly want to give a shout-out to Japan, who has been a leader in hydrogen for many, many years.  And we’re certainly trying to do our part to help move along a clean hydrogen economy, not only for the benefit of the U.S. but the benefit of countries around the world to take advantage of this very versatile fuel carrier.  In the U.S. we have a very robust set of incentives to try to move our clean hydrogen economy along.  One of our most generous tax incentives through the Inflation Reduction Act – up to $3 per kilogram for hydrogen production, a production tax credit – is in place and we’re putting together the final rules of that particular tax credit, helping to support Treasury, the U.S. Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service, IRS.   We also have – in the Department of Energy, the department I work for, helps coordinate this directly – is $8 billion, U.S. dollars, in hydrogen hubs to take advantage of existing hydrogen but not clean hydrogen, and industrial clusters to try to build out the hydrogen economy in a very cost-effective kind of way.   So I think there’s a role for the U.S. and U.S. Government and U.S. companies to help support Japanese and other goals on hydrogen, certainly within the ASEAN countries but the region as a whole, and vice versa as well.  And we need to have some standards; we need to have some interoperability.  There’s a great interest in international trade in clean hydrogen, and we have many partnerships to try to move that along as well.  So I think there’s a role in all of us trying to help move this along, of course with key private sector leaders really stepping up to the plate.  But this is a moment for hydrogen, but it’s beyond a moment – it’s really a shared momentum going forward, especially for hydrogen being able to help us decarbonize harder-to-decarbonize so-called sectors, like industry, a variety of industries, heavy-duty freight, et cetera.  Hydrogen holds some real potential in those areas in particular. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question was submitted by Rong Wei Neo from S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  “With the recent affirmation for nuclear power between the U.S. and the Philippines, would promoting nuclear as a viable renewable energy source in Southeast Asia be in the cards during your visit?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, thanks for the question.  And we in the U.S. and other countries around the world have had extensive experience with nuclear power for quite a few years.  Twenty percent of our own U.S. electricity production is from nuclear right now, and it ends up being a very significant part of our overall generation of decarbonized electricity in our country.  What we’re finding is, not only in the Philippines but other countries in the region and countries around the world, is because these climate objectives that we all have put on the table – net zero by mid-century – are so ambitious, there’s a real need to explore a variety of different technologies, and not only the traditional nuclear people think about – the big, huge nuclear power plants – but there’s a real interest, including in the Philippines, for what’s called small modular reactors.   So these are smaller, safer reactors.  There’s a number of really interesting models, companies in the U.S. and elsewhere who are putting together some different technologies.  And there’s an awful lot of interest in it, including because this is base power, baseload power that can help complement increasing number of renewables, whether solar or wind, as part of an overall decarbonized electricity generation mix.  So I think the interest is only going to grow and there’s some real opportunities for governments, societies to take advantage.  We are very much, as I said before, in the mode of true partner in helping to support countries.  And some countries are interested in exploring nuclear, including small modular reactors, going forward, and other countries are not interested.  For those countries who are, we’re certainly sharing our expertise and having some good conversations and seeing what we can do to support their ambitions. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question comes from Nhu Nguyen, OEC, from Da Nang, Vietnam.  “Recently Vietnamese electric vehicle maker VinFast has joined NASDAQ.  What is your comment on the prospect of more Vietnamese companies like VinFast who will invest in the green economy in the U.S.?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks for the question, and there’s no doubt that there’s a huge market opportunity and business opportunity for a variety of companies than what’s going on in the U.S. with the various tax incentives and all that we’re doing to really accelerate our clean energy transition.   The point I’d like to underscore is we think this a win-win situation for companies, including whether Vietnamese companies or other companies from the region.  They can help shore up their own bottom line – they can make money – as part of our clean energy transition in the U.S.  But that makes them stronger companies, more financially sound companies, reduces their prices that they need to charge for their products because they’re able to do things at scale in the U.S. that will help them make money and help the decarbonization process in Vietnam and other countries in the region as well.  So we really view this as a win-win situation, public and private partnerships in countries around the world, and certainly between the U.S. and ASEAN countries.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Deputy Secretary, we’re going to go back to a question also submitted by S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  And you kind of touched upon this a little bit, but it’s a slightly different question:  “How do you think your visit to Indonesia may put pressure on them for the Just Energy Transition Partnership, seeing how the monetary injection has failed to shift the needle thus far?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, as I was mentioning earlier, the partnership – the JETP partnership with Indonesia, and we’ve got a few others around the region and around the world as well – really is a partnership.  And I think there’s a recognition that it’s very much a mutually beneficial partnership.  And we’re able to have very candid conversations back and forth and make sure that we’re all doing our parts in order for – in the Indonesia JETP context – for Indonesia to be successful, to the benefit first and foremost of the people in Indonesia, but for Indonesia to also be a responsible global player as well.   So I think it’s less pressure from my vantage point and more just having candid, real-world true partner conversations to all do our part in a partnership to Indonesia achieve the objective that it’s laid out.  So that’s the spirit, and I think that’s the modality of the conversations.  And I had a very constructive conversation with the minister of energy, Minister Tasrif, here in Indonesia just a few hours ago, including on JETP – all in that kind of spirit of true partnership.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And now, Deputy Secretary Turk, that’s it for the questions and answers.  If you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you.  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, again, Natalie, for moderating, and thanks to everyone who’s joined and had such terrific questions.  And we look forward to engaging with you all further.  As I mentioned at the outset, working hand-in-hand with countries in this region – ASEAN countries but other countries in this region – is a top, top priority from our end.  I hope you’ve heard that clearly from the President, the Vice President, others in the administration as well.   And so any number of us will be back in the region, available to talk further, and again trying to work in this true partnership mode to support the governments but support the people in the region to get the benefits from the clean energy transition and to all move along as quickly, as robustly as we need to from a climate perspective but also very much with an eye towards affordability and an eye towards resilience and reliability and making sure that we all have the energy sources, the energy supply chains that we need to be successful going forward.  So the U.S. – all of us in the U.S., not just the U.S. Department of Energy, all of us in the U.S. look forward to continuing to engage with you all, answering your questions but also working with public and private partners in the region for the long haul.  Thanks, everybody.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And that is all we have time for today.  Thank you for your questions, participants, and thank you to Deputy Secretary Turk for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists and all of those who are RSVP’d as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon. # # # 
- Brunei HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Brunei				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Brunei																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment 																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment 																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews 																																																																											Business Facilitation 																																																																											Outward Investment 																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties  																															3. Legal Regime 																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System 																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations 																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence 																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment 																																																																											Business Registration 																																																																											Competition and Antitrust Laws 																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation 																																																																											Dispute Settlement 																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention 																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement 																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts 																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations 																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies 																																																									Investment Incentives 																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation 																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements  																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights 																																																									Real Property 																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights 																																																																																	6. Financial Sector 																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment 																																																																											Money and Banking System 																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances 																																																																			Foreign Exchange 																																																								Remittance Policies 																																																								Sovereign Wealth Funds 																																																																																																																								7. State-Owned Enterprises 																																																									Privatization Program 																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct 																																																									Additional Resources  																																																																											Climate Issues 																																																																																	9. Corruption 																																																									Resources to Report Corruption 																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment 																															11. Labor Policies and Practices 																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs 																															13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 																															14. Contact for More Information 																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Brunei is a small, energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population, excellent infrastructure, and a government intent on attracting foreign investment and projects. In parallel with Brunei’s efforts to attract foreign investment and create an open and transparent investment regime, the country has taken steps to streamline the process for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses and has improved its protections for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).Despite ambitions to diversify, Brunei’s economy remains dependent on the income derived from sales of oil and gas, contributing about 50 percent to the country’s GDP. Substantial revenue from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. These two revenue streams provide a comfortable quality of life for Bruneians by regional standards. Citizens are not required to pay taxes and have access to free education through the university level, free medical care, and subsidized housing and car fuel.Brunei has a stable political climate and is generally sheltered from natural disasters. Its central location in Southeast Asia, with good telecommunications and airline connections, business tax credits in specified sectors, and no income, sales, or export taxes, offers a welcoming climate for potential investors. Sectors offering U.S. business opportunities in Brunei include aerospace and defense, agribusiness, construction, petrochemicals, energy and mining, environmental technologies, food processing and packaging, franchising, health technologies, information and communication, digital finance, and services. Brunei has ambitious climate change goals, aspiring to lower greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 percent and increase its share of renewable energy to 30 percent of total capacity by 2035.Although Brunei has benefited from the higher global oil and gas prices due to the war in Ukraine, geopolitical unrest has caused a surge in shipping costs due to supply chain disruptions. Inflation has also risen to an all-time high.In 2014, Brunei began implementing sections of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC) that expanded preexisting restrictions on activities such as alcohol consumption, eating in public during the fasting hours in the month of Ramadan, and indecent behavior, with possible punishments including fines and imprisonment. The SPC functions in parallel with Brunei’s common law-based civil penal code. The government commenced full implementation of the SPC in 2019, introducing the possibility of corporal and capital punishments including, under certain evidentiary circumstances, amputation for theft and death by stoning for offenses including sodomy, adultery, and blasphemy. Government officials emphasize that sentencing to the most severe punishments is highly improbable due to the very high standard of proof required for conviction under the SPC. While the SPC does not specifically address business-related matters, potential investors should be aware that the SPC generated global controversy when it was implemented due to its draconian punishments and inherent discrimination toward LGBT communities. The sultan declared a moratorium on the death penalty for sharia crimes in response to the outcry and there have been no recorded incidents of U.S. citizens or U.S. investments directly affected by sharia law.Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings MeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index202035 of 175http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewGlobal Innovation Index202292 of 132https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicatorU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2021USD 10.0 millionhttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheetWorld Bank GNI per capita2021USD 30,320http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment 										Brunei has an open economy favorable to foreign trade and FDI as the government continues its economic diversification efforts to limit its long reliance on oil and gas exports.FDI is important to Brunei as it plays a key role in the country’s economic and technological development. Brunei encourages FDI in the domestic economy through various investment incentives offered by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The Brunei Economic Development Board, under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, is the government’s frontline agency that promotes and facilitates foreign investment into Brunei. BEDB is responsible for evaluating investment proposals, liaising with government agencies, and obtaining project approval from the government’s Foreign Direct Investment and Downstream Industry Committee.Brunei amended its laws to make it easier and quicker for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses. The Business License Act (Amendment) of 2016 exempts several business activities (eateries, boarding and lodging houses or other places of public resort; street vendors and stalls; motor vehicle dealers; petrol stations, including places for storing petrol and inflammable material; timber store and furniture factories; and retail shops and workshops) from needing to obtain a business license. The Miscellaneous License Act (Amendment) of 2015 reduced the wait times for new business registrants to start operations, with low-risk businesses like eateries and shops able to start operations immediately.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment 										There is no restriction on foreign ownership of companies incorporated in Brunei. The Companies Act requires locally incorporated companies to have at least one of the two directors—or if more than two directors, at least two of them—to be residents of Brunei, but companies may request exceptions. The corporate income tax rate is the same whether the company is locally or foreign owned and managed.All businesses in Brunei must be registered with the Registry of Companies and Business Names at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Foreign investors can fully own incorporated companies, foreign company branches, or representative offices, but not sole proprietorships or partnerships. Brunei does maintain its right to screen investment to ensure that foreign investments do not contradict and cause negative impact to the overall National Development Plan and to the national interest.More information on incorporation of companies can be found on the Ministry of Finance and Economy  website .																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews 										The World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat prepared a  Trade Policy Review of Brunei  in December 2014 and a revision in February 2015.																																				Business Facilitation 										Darussalam Enterprise (DARe) is the government statutory body established to facilitate a conducive business environment. DARe provides business support services and advice on starting up or growing a business, which includes how toobtain permits, approvals, and licenses. Guidelines and information on government services for businesses can be found at this  website .Business registration can be done online at the  Registry of Companies Business Names (ROCBN)  website.																																				Outward Investment 										A major share of outward investment is made by the government through its sovereign wealth funds, which are managed by the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. No data is available on the total investment amount due to a strict policy of secrecy. It is believed that the majority of sovereign wealth funds are invested in foreign portfolio investments and real estate. Despite the limited availability of public information regarding the amount, the funds are generally viewed positively and managed well by BIA.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties  						    																						Brunei is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Australia, New Zealand, China, India, and South Korea, and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan.Brunei currently has Bilateral Investment Treaties with Bahrain, China, Germany, India, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Oman, and Ukraine. Brunei does not currently have a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.Brunei served as the ASEAN Coordinator in negotiations for the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), which was signed February 2009 in Thailand and entered into force January 2010. Brunei is the current country coordinator for ASEAN-New Zealand dialogue relations and ASEAN-United Kingdom dialogue relations from 2021-2024.Brunei is also a negotiating party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a signatory to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).Brunei is among the 13 partners participating in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity launched in May 2022 by the United States.Brunei does not have a Bilateral Taxation Treaty with the United States. Brunei has signed Tax Information Exchange Agreements with Canada, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Greenland, Sweden, Australia, and Denmark and the Faroe Islands. Information on Brunei’s tax exchange agreements and treaties can be found on the Ministry of Finance and Economy  website.  In 2017, Brunei became a signatory to the OECD multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and is also a member of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.																																		3. Legal Regime 						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System 										Brunei’s regulatory system has limited transparency, particularly in lawmaking processes and impact assessments. Each ministry is responsible for coordinating with the Attorney General’s Chambers to draft proposed legislation. Legislation does not receive broad review and little input is provided from outside of the originating ministry. The sultan has final authority to approve proposed legislation. Laws and regulations are readily accessible on the Attorney General’s Chambers  website .Brunei encourages environment, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure but does not mandate it.																																				International Regulatory Considerations 										Brunei is an active member of ASEAN, through which it has concluded FTAs with Australia &amp; New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea. Brunei became a WTO member in 1995 and a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993.																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence 										Brunei’s constitution does not specifically provide for judicial independence, but in practice the court system operates without government interference. Brunei’s legal system includes two parallel systems: one based on common law and the other based on Islamic law. The common law judicial system is presided over by the Supreme Court, which comprises the Court of Appeal and the High Court.Recognizing the importance of protecting investors’ rights and contract enforcement, Brunei established a Commercial Court in 2016.In 2014, Brunei implemented the first phase of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC), which expanded existing restrictions on minor offenses—such as eating during Ramadan—that are punishable by fines or imprisonment. On April 3, 2019, Brunei commenced full implementation of the SPC, introducing the possibility of harsher punishments such as stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran. However, these forms of punishment require higher standards of proof than the common-law-based penal code (for example, four pious men must personally witness an act of fornication to support a sharia-based harsh sentence), placing them under a de facto moratorium. The sultan confirmed the moratorium in a 2019 public statement.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment 										.The basic legislation on investment includes the Investment Incentive Order 2001 and the Income Tax (As Amended) Order 2001. Investment Order 2001 supports economic development in strategically important industrial and economic enterprises and, through the Ministry of Finance and Economy, offers investment incentives through a favorable tax regime. Although Brunei does not have a stock exchange, the government is reportedly planning to establish a securities market.Foreign ownership of companies is not restricted, although under the Companies Act, at least one of two directors of a locally incorporated company must be a resident of Brunei, unless granted an exemption from the appropriate authorities.																																				Business Registration 										All businesses in Brunei must be registered with the Registry of Companies and Business Names at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Except for sole proprietorships and partnerships, foreign investors can fully own incorporated companies, foreign company branches, or representative offices. Foreign direct investments by multinational corporations do not require local partnership in setting up a subsidiary of their parent company in Brunei. However, at least one company director must be a Brunei citizen or permanent resident of Brunei. Brunei’s “one-stop-shop” website for investments and business start-ups can be found  here .The Business License Act (Amendment) of 2016 exempts several business activities (eateries, boarding and lodging houses or other places of public resort; street vendors and stalls; motor vehicle dealers; petrol stations including places for storing petrol and inflammable materials; timber stores and furniture factories; and retail shops and workshops) from needing to obtain a business license.																																				Competition and Antitrust Laws 										Brunei’s Competition Order, published in 2015 to promote and maintain fair and healthy competition to enhance market efficiency and consumer welfare, entered into force on January 1, 2020. The sultan also announced the establishment of the Competition Commission in 2017 to oversee and act on competition issues that include adjudicating anti-competitive cases and imposing penalties on companies that violate the Competition Order.																																				Expropriation and Compensation 										Brunei is a signatory to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. There is no history of expropriation of foreign owned property in Brunei, but there have been cases of domestically owned private property being expropriated for infrastructure development. The government provided compensation in such cases and claimants were afforded due process.																																				Dispute Settlement 																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention 						Brunei is a member state to the convention on the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) and a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). Legislation related to dispute settlement is covered under Brunei’s Arbitration Order 2009.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement 						In 2016, Brunei’s Supreme Court announced the establishment of a commercial court to deal with business-related cases. More information about Brunei’s judiciary system is available through the  judiciary website. 						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts 						In May 2016, Brunei’s Attorney General’s Chambers announced the establishment of the Brunei Darussalam Arbitration Center (BDAC). BDAC delivers services and administration for arbitration and mediation to fulfill the needs of domestic and international users in relation to commercial disputes as a resolution alternative to court proceedings.The International Arbitration Order (IAO), which regulates international and domestic arbitrations, came into effect in February 2010. More information about Brunei’s Attorney General’s Chambers is available on its  website .																										Bankruptcy Regulations 										In 2012, amendments to Brunei’s Bankruptcy Act increased the minimum threshold for a creditor to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor from BND 500 to BND 10,000 (USD 350 to USD 7,060) and enabled an appointed bankruptcy trustee to direct the Controller of Immigration to impound and retain the debtor’s passport, certificate of identity, or travel document to prevent the debtor from leaving the country. The amendment also requires the debtor to deliver all property under the debtor’s possession to the trustee. Information about Brunei’s bankruptcy laws is available on the judiciary’s  website .																																												4. Industrial Policies 						    																																																Investment Incentives 										Companies involved in the exportation of agriculture, forestry, and fishery products can apply for tax relief on export profits. Tax exemption may be available for pioneer industry companies. For non-pioneer enterprises, the tax relief period is eight years and up to 11 years for pioneer enterprises.In 2015, the government reduced the corporate income tax rate in Brunei from 20 percent to 18.5 percent.Sole proprietorships and partnerships are not subject to tax. Individuals do not pay any capital gains tax, and profits arising from the sale of capital assets are not taxable. Brunei has double-taxation agreements with the United Kingdom, Indonesia, China, Singapore, Vietnam, Bahrain, Oman, Japan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Laos, Kuwait, Tajikistan, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. Under the Income Tax (Petroleum) Act, a company is subject to taxes of up to 55 percent for any petroleum operation pursuant to production sharing agreements.Darussalam Assets is a private limited company established in December 2012 under the purview of the Ministry of Finance and Economy to spur the growth of government-linked companies (GLC) through active ownership and management of its GLC portfolio based on commercial principles, in line with Brunei’s 2035 development vision. More info on Darussalam Assets may be found at their  website .																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation 										In 2017, Brunei announced the creation of its first Free Trade Zone, Terunjing Industrial Park, a 235-acre site located between two main highways near Brunei International Airport and Muara Port.Darussalam Enterprise (DARe), under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, works closely with other relevant government agencies to facilitate the implementation of investors’ projects. DARe oversees and manages 26 industrial parks across Brunei.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements  										The government of Brunei seeks to increase the number of Bruneians working in the private sector. Brunei’s Local Business Development Framework seeks to increase the use of local goods and services, train a domestic workforce, and develop Bruneian businesses by placing requirements on all companies operating in the oil and gas industry in Brunei to meet local hiring and contracting targets. These requirements also apply to information and communication technology firms that work on government projects. The Framework sets local content targets based on the difficulty of the project and the value of the contract, with more flexible local content requirements for projects requiring highly specialized technologies or with a high contract value.  In 2019, senior officials stated an intent to extend local hiring targets to additional sectors of the economy.Expatriate employment is controlled by a labor quota system administered by the Labor Department and the issuance of employment passes by the Immigration Department. Brunei allows new companies to apply for special approval to expedite the recruitment of expatriate workers in select positions. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the special approval is only available to new companies for up to six months and covers businesses such as restaurants and retail stores. The special approval cuts the waiting time for a quota from 21 days to seven.Brunei has not announced any specific legislation pertaining to data storage and data localization requirements.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights 						    																																																Real Property 										Mortgages are recognized and enforced in Brunei; however, only Bruneian citizens can own land property in Brunei indefinitely. Foreigners and permanent residents can only own properties for up to 99 years. Brunei’s Department of Economic Planning and Development does not publish FDI data for real estate. Each transfer of ownership in Brunei requires the approval of “His Majesty in Council” which is a council of officials representing the Sultan. This process can be lengthy and opaque.Brunei is considering amending the Land Code are being considered to ban past practices of proxy land sales to foreigners and permanent residents using power of attorney and trust deeds. The amendments to the Land Code have eliminated the recognition of powers of attorney and trust deeds as mechanisms in land transactions involving non-citizens. The government may grant temporary occupation permits over state land to applicants for licenses to occupy land for agricultural, commercial, housing or industrial purposes. These licenses are granted for renewable annual terms.																																				Intellectual Property Rights 										Brunei’s intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement regime is still in development but is increasingly strong and effective. The country was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 report in 2013 in recognition of its improving IPR protections, increasing enforcement, and efforts to educate the public about the importance of IPR.Brunei finalized and adopted the Copyright (Amendment) Order 2013 in December 2013, a development long requested by the U.S. government. The amendment enhanced enforcement provisions for copyright infringement by increasing the penalties for IP offenses; adding new offenses; strengthening the enforcement powers of the Royal Brunei Police Force and the Ministry of Finance and Economy’s Customs and Excise Department; and allowing for sanctioned private prosecution. The amendments are designed to deter copyright infringements with fines of BND 10,000 (USD 7,400) to BND 20,000 (USD 14,800) per infringing copy, imprisonment for a term up to five years, or both. Enforcement agencies are authorized to enter premises and arrest without warrant; to stop, search, and board vehicles; and to access computerized and digitized data. The amendments further allow for admissibility of evidence obtained covertly and protect the identity of informants.  Statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods are unavailable.Brunei established the Brunei Intellectual Property Office (BruIPO) in 2013 under the Attorney General’s Chambers. The establishment of BruIPO expanded the country’s Patents Registry Office’s (PRO) ability to accept applications for trademarks registration in addition to patents and industrial designs.In September 2013, Brunei acceded to the Geneva (1999) Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs to protect IP from industrial designs, making it the second ASEAN Member country, following Singapore, to accede. The accession emphasized Brunei’s commitment under the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 2011 – 2015. Brunei has also publicly committed to acceding to other World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) treaties including the Madrid Protocol for the International Registration of Marks, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty(WPPT), and the UPOV Convention 1991 for the protection of New Varieties of Plants (PV).For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at:  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 																																												6. Financial Sector 						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment 										In March 2021, the Minister of Finance and Economy II renewed the ministry’s annual budget of USD 292 million to fund infrastructure, technology, and socio-economic studies related to the implementation of Brunei’s own stock exchange, which is expected to launch in the next few years.In 2013, Brunei signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SecuritiesCommission Malaysia (SCM) designed to strengthen collaboration in the development of fair and efficient capital markets in the two countries. It also provided a framework to facilitate greater cross-border capital market activities and cooperation in the areas of regulation as well as capacity building and human capital development, particularly in Islamic capital markets.The capital market industry in Brunei is primarily governed by the Securities Markets Order, 2013 and the Securities Markets Regulations, 2015 which are both administered by Brunei Darussalam Central Bank. In addition, securities with any Shariah or Islamic component would be additionally governed by the Syariah Financial Supervisory Board Order, 2006.Brunei has accepted the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions and multiple currency practices.																																				Money and Banking System 										Brunei has a small banking sector which includes both conventional and Islamic banking. The Brunei Darussalam Central Bank (BDCB) is the sole central authority for the banking sector, in addition to its role as the country’s central bank. Banks have high levels of liquidity, good capital adequacy ratios, and well-managed levels of non-performing loans. Several foreign banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of China (Hong Kong) have established operations in Brunei. In March 2018, HSBC officially ended its operations in Brunei after announcing its planned departure from Brunei in late 2016. All banks fall under the supervision of BDCB, which has also established a credit bureau that centralizes information on applicants’ credit worthiness.The Brunei dollar (BND) is pegged to the Singapore dollar, and each currency is accepted in both countries.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances 																										Foreign Exchange 						In June 2013, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) announced that Brunei would no longer be subject to FATF’s monitoring process under its global Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance process. Brunei’s Mutual Evaluation Report cited Brunei’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and noted that Brunei had established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its Action Plan regarding strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2011.						Remittance Policies 						Any person or company providing services for the transmission of money must be licensed by the Brunei government. Only Brunei citizens may hold remittance licenses. Local financial institutions such as Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam (BIBD), Baiduri Bank and Standard Chartered Bank provide remittance services. Remittance companies require the customer’s full name, identification number, address, and purpose of the remittance. They are also required to file suspicious transaction reports with BDCB.						Sovereign Wealth Funds 						The Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) manages Brunei&#8217;s General Reserve Fund and their external assets. Established in 1983, BIA’s assets are estimated to be USD 60-75 billion. BIA’s activities are not publicly disclosed and are ranked the lowest in transparency ratings by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.																																		7. State-Owned Enterprises 						    																						Brunei’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), managed by Darussalam Assets under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, lead key sectors of the economy including oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, and energy generation and distribution. These enterprises also receive preferential treatment when responding to government tenders.  Some of the largest SOEs include the following:The telecommunications industry is dominated by government-linked companies. The service providers are Datastream Digital, Imagine, and Progresif. In 2019, the government consolidated the infrastructure of all three companies under a state-owned wholesale network operator called Unified National Networks (UNN).Royal Brunei Technical Services (RBTS), established in 1988 as a government owned corporation, is responsible for managing the acquisition of a wide range of systems and equipment for the armed forces and security agencies.Brunei Energy Services and Trading (BEST) is the national oil company owned by the Brunei government. The company was granted all mineral rights in eight prime onshore and offshore petroleum blocks totaling 20,552 sq. km. BEST manages contracts with Shell and Petronas, which are exploring Brunei’s onshore and deep-water offshore blocks. The government continues to modify BEST’s role in the oil and gas industry. In 2019, the government established Petroleum Authority as the oil and gas sector’s regulatory body, a function which had been filled by BEST.Royal Brunei Airlines started operations in 1974 and is the country’s national carrier. The airline flies a combination of Boeing and Airbus aircraft.																										Privatization Program 										Brunei’s Ministry of Transportation and Info-Communication has made corporatization and privatization part of its strategic plan, which calls for the Ministry to shift its role from a service provider to a regulatory body with policy-setting responsibilities. The Ministry is studying initiatives to privatize a few state-owned agencies, including the Postal Services Department and public transportation services. These services are not yet completely privatized and there is no timeline for privatization. Guidelines regarding the role of foreign investors and the bidding process are not yet available.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct 						    																						Responsible business conduct is a relatively new concept in Brunei, and there are no specific government programs encouraging foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles. However, there is broad awareness of CSR among producers and consumers, and individual private and public sector organizations have formalized CSR programs and policies. There are no reporting requirements and no independent NGOs in Brunei that promote or monitor CSR.																										Additional Resources  										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOFAC Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ )																																				Climate Issues 										Brunei recognizes its extreme dependence on finite fossil fuels is a vulnerability in the long-term. The sultanate has committed to ambitious economic diversification and climate change goals with solar power, electric vehicles, and industrial emissions reduction as key pillars. Despite challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Brunei is slow to build momentum on these fronts. Ultimately, the greatest test of Brunei’s clean energy policies will be whether they successfully foster a culture shift away from the oil and gas industry which fueled the country’s rise.The Brunei National Climate Change Policy 2020 ( BNCCP ) outlines ten country strategies to combat climate change focusing on reducing industrial emissions, forest cover, electric vehicles, renewable energy, power management, carbon pricing, waste management, climate resilience and adaptation, carbon inventory and awareness and education. The climate change policy was developed after Brunei recorded the highest number of forest fires in 10 years and rising temperature. The policy aims to reduce Brunei’s greenhouse gas emissions to more than 50 percent by 2035.Solar Power: The sultanate aspires to increase its share of renewable energy (RE) to 30 percent of total capacity for power generation by 2035. Though it will continue to explore different RE options, Brunei plans to rely heavily on solar photovoltaics in the near term to meet this objective. The Ministry of Energy (MoE) pledged to build large-scale photovoltaic solar plants with 100 megawatts of capacity by 2025.Electric Vehicles: Brunei stood up an Electric Vehicles Joint Task Force (EVJTF) in early 2020 that aims to increase electric vehicle sales to 60 percent of total annual sales by 2035. The Bruneian government recognizes the need to facilitate the shift from heavily subsidized gasoline cars to EVs, and plans to offer duty exceptions, special license plates, lanes, and parking spaces as incentives; however, its pilot project has made little progress.Reducing Industrial Emissions: Fugitive emissions from oil and gas production account for 18.1 percent of the sultanate’s GHG emissions. The BNCCP seeks to reduce emissions to zero routine flaring and “As Low as Reasonably Practicable” standards. An Industrial Emissions Committee ensures key emitters from the oil and gas sector set targets that align with Brunei’s national goals. In 2021, Brunei introduced a mandatory carbon reporting requirement for “all facilities and agents that emit and absorb greenhouse gases.”																																												9. Corruption 						    																						Since 1982, Brunei has enforced the Emergency (Prevention of Corruption) Act. In 1984, the Act was renamed the  Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131) . The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was established in 1982 for the purpose of enforcing the Act. The Prevention of Corruption Act provides specific powers to the ACB for the purpose of investigating accusations of corruption. The Act authorizes ACB to investigate certain offences under other written laws, provided such offences were disclosed during the course of ACB investigation. Corrupt practices are punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which also applies to Brunei citizens abroad. Brunei is a member of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities.In 2019, Brunei was ranked 35th of 180 countries worldwide in Transparency International’s corruption perception index. U.S. companies do not generally identify corruption as an obstacle to conducting business in Brunei. The level and extent of reported corruption in Brunei is generally low. In January 2020, however, the government convicted two former judges with embezzling large sums from the court system. The sultan has repeatedly stated in public addresses that corruption is unacceptable.Apart from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, there are no international, regional, local, or nongovernmental organizations operating in Brunei that monitor corruption.Brunei has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention.																										Resources to Report Corruption 										Government Point of Contact:Name: Hjh Anifa Rafiza Hj Abdul GhaniTitle: DirectorOrganization: Anti-Corruption Bureau Brunei DarussalamAddress: Old Airport Berakas, BB 3510 Brunei DarussalamTel: +673 238-3575Fax: +673 238-3193Mobile: +673 8721002 / +673 8130002Email:  info.bmr@acb.gov.bn 																																												10. Political and Security Environment 						    																						Brunei is an absolute monarchy and has no recent history of political violence. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is an experienced and popular monarch who rules the country as Prime Minister while also retaining the titles of Minister of Finance and Economy, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country experienced an uprising in 1962 when it was a British protectorate, which ended through the intervention of British troops. The country has been ruled peacefully under emergency law ever since. Brunei has managed to avoid demands for political reform by making use of its hydrocarbon revenues to provide its citizens with generous welfare benefits and subsidies.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices 						    																						Brunei relies heavily on foreign labor in lower-skill and lower-paying positions, with approximately 25 percent of the labor force coming from abroad to fulfill specific contracts. The largest percentage of foreign employees work is in construction, followed by wholesale and retail trade, with the balance serving in professional, technical, administrative and support roles. Most unskilled laborers in Brunei are from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and enter the country on renewable two-year contracts.The skilled labor pool includes both foreign workers on short-term visas and Bruneian citizens and permanent residents, who often are well-educated but who generally prefer to work for the government due to generous benefits such as bonuses, education allowances, interest-free loans, and housing allowances. In 2019, the Labor Force Survey stated that approximately 33.8 percent of the labor force was employed in the public sector. In 2016, the Department of Labor under the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced an improved Foreign Workers License process with stricter policies to create more employment opportunities for Brunei citizens.While the law permits the formation of trade union federations, it forbids affiliation with international labor organizations unless there is consent from the Minister of Home Affairs and the Department of Labor. Under the Trade Unions Act of 1961, unions must be registered with the government. The government prohibits strikes, and the law makes no explicit provision for the right to collective bargaining. The law prohibits employers from discriminating against workers in connection with union activities, but it does not provide for reinstatement for dismissal related to union activity.All workers, including civil servants other than those serving in the military and those working as prison guards or police officers, may form and join trade unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements. The only active union in the country, which is composed of Brunei Shell Petroleum workers, appears to have had minimal activity in recent years. There are no other active unions or worker organizations.Various domestic laws prohibit the employment of children under the age of 16. Parental consent and approval by the Labor Commission are required for those under the age of 18. Female workers under 18 years of age may not work at night or on offshore oil platforms. The Department of Labor enforces laws related to the employment of children. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws.The law does not set a minimum wage. The public sector pay scale covers all workers in government jobs. Wages for employed foreign residents are wide ranging. Some foreign embassies set minimum wage requirements for their nationals working in the country.Government data indicated approximately 94,200 foreigners live in Brunei, although government officials have publicly stated the number exceeds 100,000. Foreign workers receive a mandatory brief on labor rights from the Department of Labor when they sign their contract. The government also inspects workplaces and maintains a telephone hotline for worker complaints. Immigration law allows prison sentences and caning for workers who overstay their work permits and for workers who fall into irregular status due to their employers’ negligence.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs 						    																						There are no DFC or other investment insurance programs in Brunei.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2021$14.26 million2021$14.01 millionwww.worldbank.org/en/countryForeign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2021$19.32 million2021$10 millionBEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/AN/AN/AData not available.Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP2021$7.3 billion202152.1%UNCTAD data available athttps://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report* Source for Host Country Data:  Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Economy Brunei Darussalam Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIDirect Investment from/in Counterpart Economy DataFrom Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)Inward Direct InvestmentOutward Direct InvestmentTotal Inward$7,302100%Total OutwardAmount100% China,P.R, Hong Kong$2,57035.2%Data not availableUnited Kingdom$2,34632.1%The Netherlands$74110.1%Japan$3144.3%Singapore$2843.9%&#8220;0&#8221; reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.																																		14. Contact for More Information 						    																						U.S. Embassy Commercial SectionSimpang 336-52-16-9Jalan Duta BC 4115(+673) 238-4616+637 238-4616 ext. 2232 BSBCommercial@state.gov 																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											The Bahamas											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											Gabon											The Gambia											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment 																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment 																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews 																																																						Business Facilitation 																																																						Outward Investment 																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties  																3. Legal Regime 																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System 																																																						International Regulatory Considerations 																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence 																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment 																																																						Business Registration 																																																						Competition and Antitrust Laws 																																																						Expropriation and Compensation 																																																						Dispute Settlement 																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention 																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement 																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts 																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations 																																																			4. Industrial Policies 																																							Investment Incentives 																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation 																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements  																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights 																																							Real Property 																																																						Intellectual Property Rights 																																																			6. Financial Sector 																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment 																																																						Money and Banking System 																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances 																																																				Foreign Exchange 																																												Remittance Policies 																																												Sovereign Wealth Funds 																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises 																																							Privatization Program 																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct 																																							Additional Resources  																																																						Climate Issues 																																																			9. Corruption 																																							Resources to Report Corruption 																																																			10. Political and Security Environment 																11. Labor Policies and Practices 																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs 																13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 																14. Contact for More Information 																						Tags																					Brunei																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
- Brunei HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Brunei				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Brunei																																					Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons																																																																																																				 In this section										/																							BRUNEI (Tier 2 Watch List)																																													BRUNEI (Tier 2 Watch List)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								BRUNEI (Tier 2 Watch List)				The Government of Brunei does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government made key achievements during the reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Brunei was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included referring two alleged labor traffickers for prosecution, including one Bruneian national; identifying 14 labor trafficking victims and providing them with special passes to find alternate employment in Brunei, which facilitated their participation in the prosecution of the alleged traffickers; opening two shelters for trafficking victims; passing regulations limiting worker-paid recruitment fees for domestic workers; and signing a bilateral MOU with the Government of Bangladesh on the recruitment of migrant workers. Despite these achievements, the government did not effectively screen for trafficking among foreign nationals in commercial sex and migrant workers who had left their employers. As a result, the government handled some potential trafficking cases administratively, if at all, and due to a lack of effective identification procedures, authorities likely inappropriately detained, prosecuted, and deported potential unidentified sex and labor trafficking victims. Additionally, for the sixth consecutive year, the government did not convict any traffickers under its anti-trafficking law, and other laws that could be used to prosecute traffickers did not provide sufficiently stringent sentences. The government did not take steps to eliminate worker-paid recruitment fees for non-domestic workers – the majority of migrant workers in Brunei.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, and seek adequate penalties of significant prison terms for both sex and labor traffickers, including complicit government officials.Disseminate and train officials on SOPs for victim identification, particularly their application to individuals in commercial sex, domestic workers, LGBTQIA+ individuals, and migrant workers.Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.Train investigators and prosecutors on building trafficking cases, including collecting evidence to corroborate victim testimony and to identify elements of trafficking among labor and immigration violations.Train judges on accurate and effective implementation of trafficking laws, including through understanding the many ways traffickers coerce victims.Increase protective services to provide incentives for victims to participate in investigations and prosecutions, including by allowing at-will communication with people outside shelter facilities and issuing work permits to all victims.Establish a formal communication mechanism to regularly collaborate and learn from foreign government embassies about suspected trafficking crimes.Allocate resources and develop the capacity to proactively screen for trafficking at People’s Republic of China (PRC) worksites and on fishing vessels in Brunei’s exclusive economic zone.Ensure migrant workers receive and can retain copies of their work contracts and information on their rights and obligations under Brunei law in their primary languages.Issue guidelines on the prohibition of recruitment agencies charging or receiving worker-funded fees and eliminate worker-paid recruitment fees.Utilize the victims’ fund to provide compensation to trafficking victims.Offer foreign victims long-term alternatives to removal from the country.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. The 2019 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Order criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines of between 10,000 and 1 million Brunei dollars (BND) ($7,462 and $746,268), which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious offenses, such as rape. The penal code also criminalized travel outside the country for commercial sex with children, prescribing a punishment of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. The government may have also utilized Chapter 120 Section 5 of the Women and Girls Prosecution Act, which addresses “living on or trading in prostitution,” to prosecute potential sex trafficking crimes. The act prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $20,000 BND ($14,925), which were significantly lower than those available under the trafficking law.Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF), labor, and immigration officers referred 121 suspected trafficking cases (five sex trafficking cases, 109 labor trafficking, and seven unknown) to the human trafficking unit (HTU) for review and potential investigation, compared with 134 cases referred in 2021. Although HTU could review case reports from other RBPF units and identify trafficking cases, its review and decision to investigate for trafficking relied upon the quality of the referring officer’s questioning and notes, and many non-HTU RBPF officers lacked training on trafficking. HTU and an interagency committee, which met monthly, concluded nine of the 121 cases contained elements of trafficking – a decrease from further investigating 14 cases (four sex trafficking and 10 labor trafficking) the previous year. The attorney general’s chambers (AGC) continued one prosecution initiated in the previous reporting period and initiated one new prosecution, each with one alleged labor trafficker. The AGC consolidated the two cases, and the single case with two defendants – one Bangladeshi national and one Bruneian national – awaited trial for charges under the anti-trafficking law at the close of the reporting period. For the sixth consecutive year, courts did not convict any traffickers under the trafficking statute.In practice, investigators required proof of physical force, fraud, or physical coercion for a trafficking crime. As a result, and inconsistent with the 2019 law, officials did not investigate or prosecute – as trafficking cases – the cases in which the alleged traffickers used non-physical forms of coercion. Observers indicated an overreliance on victim testimony and lack of special investigative measures to corroborate evidence led to most cases being investigated and prosecuted under non-trafficking statutes. Government officials ascribed poor prosecutorial efforts to high evidentiary standards, including the definition of exploitation under the anti-trafficking law, despite the law’s consistency with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. Observers reported a fundamental lack of understanding about the pervasiveness of trafficking in Brunei and an institutional lack of understanding of labor trafficking indicators, including passport retention and nonpayment of wages, among government officials that hindered anti-trafficking efforts. In addition, observers reported authorities did not investigate all alleged potential trafficking crimes and generally focused their efforts on crimes committed by foreign perpetrators rather than Bruneians.The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. The government continued the 2019 prosecution of one Department of Labor and Immigration (DOL) officer for visa fraud related to foreign workers’ visa applications. Observers reported many Bruneian officials owned construction companies employing migrant workers; foreign construction workers constituted a large portion of trafficking victims in Brunei. Law enforcement cooperated with some foreign governments on trafficking cases; other foreign governments reported challenges in working with Bruneian officials. One foreign government reported the Government of Brunei did not respond for two years to its requests to either criminally investigate its national for alleged trafficking crimes in Brunei or deport the national to face criminal justice in his home country.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government increased efforts to identify and protect victims. The government identified 14 labor trafficking victims, an increase from not identifying any victims in the two previous reporting periods. The government had SOPs for victim identification, referral, and protection and reportedly used the SOPs to screen potential trafficking cases. The SOPs did not function adequately in cases involving adults in commercial sex, LGBTQIA+ individuals, or workers who had left their employers, with the media reporting government efforts as operations to catch criminals rather than protect potential victims. The government completed and opened two shelters, one for male and one for female trafficking victims. The shelters could reportedly house 17 victims each and accommodate victims with physical disabilities; victims could leave the shelters at will. HTU would conduct a threat assessment for trafficking victims and stated that if they ascertained a threat, they would require those victims to stay in the government shelter. At the new shelters, the government could also provide medical care, counseling, psychological assessment, clothing, meals, and access to vocational training programs and recreational activities. Several foreign embassies had shelters that often assisted their nationals who were trafficking victims. Prior to the opening of the government shelters, the government offered shelter, mental health services, and psycho-social support to 14 labor trafficking victims, who elected to find their own accommodations.Multiple male labor trafficking victims participated in investigations against traffickers. Brunei’s anti-trafficking law permitted male victims to provide testimony by video, and it required female and minor victims who testified to do so by video. The government had a $100,000 BND ($74,626) Anti-Trafficking in Persons Fund that could be used to pay compensation to trafficking victims; the government has never reported disbursing these funds. DOL granted special employment passes to 14 foreign trafficking victims participating in a prosecution against their alleged traffickers. The passes enabled the individuals to remain in Brunei and work during the investigation and prosecution, and DOL helped each worker find alternate employment. The government operated a labor and trafficking hotline, and DOL had an online mechanism for workers to submit complaints; DOL reported receiving complaints of nonpayment of wages, but it did not report the number of complaints and how it handled them. The government did not have legal alternatives to removal for victims who may face hardship or retribution upon returning to their home countries.Due to insufficient screening for trafficking, especially among vulnerable migrant workers, the government likely continued to inappropriately arrest, penalize, and deport trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Although the RPBF Vice Unit reportedly referred to HTU for screening all women identified in commercial sex law enforcement actions, HTU often screened only once and in the immediate aftermath of the law enforcement actions. The government arrested at least five foreign women for “offering sexual services;” officials prosecuted and deported the women. Foreign officials continued to report Bruneian authorities deported several of their citizens after their Bruneian employers had withheld wages or medical care, changed workers’ contracts, or withheld passports – indicators of labor trafficking – and then reported to immigration officials the migrant workers had run away. The government placed announcements in newspapers seeking public assistance to trace at least 25 Indonesian, Bangladeshi, and PRC-national “runaway” workers, and it convicted at least three Bangladeshi and Indonesian workers for overstaying their visas or work permits and sentenced them to between three and six months’ imprisonment and caning. Officials did not report screening for trafficking among these populations. Observers reported the practice of detention and deportation perpetuated victims’ fear of communicating with law enforcement officers, exacerbating significant identification and service provision gaps. Observers noted a need for foreign government embassies and the government to develop a formal communication mechanism to increase collaboration in response to suspected trafficking crimes.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The government’s interagency anti-trafficking committee, chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office’s Permanent Secretary of Security and Law, met quarterly, and its working group, which focused on cases, met monthly. The government continued implementation of its NAP, developed in November 2020. Authorities continued to raise awareness of trafficking and foreign workers’ rights, including through social media, national press, and public roadshows.Brunei’s 2004 Employment Agencies Order (EAO) mandated licensing and regulation of recruitment agents. The EAO prohibited agencies from charging or receiving any form of fees, remuneration, profit, or compensation unless government regulation provided otherwise; in January 2023, the government passed a regulation permitting agencies to charge up to a $2,000 BND ($1,492) recruitment fee for domestic workers and, to enforce the cap, required all employment agencies to re-register their licenses. The government did not have regulations limiting or prohibiting recruitment fees in other sectors. DOL required foreign workers to sign their contracts in the presence of a labor officer to prevent forgery, ensure compliance with the law, and enable the labor official to provide information to the worker on their rights and obligations. The government provided sample migrant worker contracts and employment rights pamphlets in the primary languages of regional labor-sending countries; however, all contracts were written the same and did not provide position descriptions or specific details based on the workers’ employment. The government did not provide labor officials with legal guidance to determine the fairness of the contracts, and officials did not ensure that workers retained a copy of their contract. The government continued to oppose foreign governments’ proposals to establish a minimum wage and require that each worker have a position description. Brunei did not have a minimum wage; salary payments were negotiated in individual contracts. Foreign governments alleged the Bruneian government over-issued work visas, which permitted employers to bring in more migrant workers than jobs and left workers vulnerable to exploitation or deportation after having paid substantial recruitment fees. The 2009 Employment Order did not require employers to provide a written record of contract terms to employees not covered under the order, such as domestic workers and fishing crews.Although Bruneian law prohibited employers from withholding wages for more than seven days or retaining employees’ passports, foreign embassies continued to report their citizens commonly experienced both practices; for the second year, the government did not report taking criminal or administrative action against any employers for passport retention, nonpayment of wages, or illegal recruitment fees. When labor officials inspected worksites, they were often announced in advance and only required migrant workers to show a copy of their passport and visa. The government fined four retail outlets for failing to grant workers leave on public holidays and copies of their work contracts; the government did not report screening for trafficking in these cases. The government required one employer to relocate workers because the accommodations were uninhabitable, the same as in the previous reporting period; the government did not report screening for trafficking. DOL investigated two employers for failure to give workers a mandatory day off, failure to grant sick leave, and failure to provide a written service contract; the government did not report investigating for trafficking. One foreign government reported an increase in its nationals working in Brunei dying from strokes and developing kidney diseases consistent with their complaints that employers did not provide them with water and deducted pay when they used the restroom; the foreign government reported the Government of Brunei did not investigate the employers.In October 2022, the government signed an MOU with the Government of Bangladesh that required the Government of Brunei to recruit workers from a singular Bangladeshi recruitment agency, inform the Bangladeshi embassy in Brunei of any arrests of Bangladeshi migrant workers, and work with the Government of Bangladesh to develop a mechanism to settle labor disputes. The government did not finalize a worker protection MOU with a second foreign government, which has been pending since 2013. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by publicizing the arrest of customers. The government provided anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Brunei. There are more than 65,000 registered foreign workers in Brunei, mainly from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and the PRC; and thousands of unregistered migrant workers. Men and women migrate to Brunei primarily for domestic service, retail, and construction work. Many migrant workers from Bangladesh and Indonesia incur large debts from recruiters in Brunei and their home countries, making them vulnerable to exploitative employers. Additionally, some recruiters demand thousands of dollars in recruitment fees but, upon workers’ arrival in Brunei, fail to find them jobs; these workers, most of whom have thousands of dollars in recruitment debt, are vulnerable to traffickers and often resort to “freelancing,” which is illegal in Brunei. Individuals from the PRC and Bangladesh may have been forced to work in Brunei at projects run by PRC-based companies. The Government of Brunei increasingly issued contracts to PRC construction companies, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, and commercial fishing vessels that employed tens of thousands of migrant workers; the government lacked visibility into the workers’ living and working conditions and expressed concern about labor abuses and sex trafficking. Upon arrival, traffickers exploit some migrant workers through involuntary servitude, debt-based coercion, contract switching, nonpayment of wages, passport confiscation, physical abuse, or confinement. Although it is illegal for employers to withhold the wages from their employees for more than seven days, some employers withhold wages to recoup labor broker or recruitment fees or to compel the continued service of workers. Some employers reportedly “sell” to other contractors migrant workers whose visas have not yet expired. Retention of migrant workers’ travel documents by employers or agencies remains a widespread practice, although the law prohibits it. There were reports of Kenyan women in forced labor in Brunei. Traffickers may force some female migrants who arrive in Brunei on tourist visas into sex trafficking. Anti-LGBTQIA+ laws place some LGBTQIA+ individuals at higher risk of extortion and psychological coercion, while already being disproportionately vulnerable to trafficking. Some traffickers who exploit migrants in Malaysia or Indonesia for sex or labor trafficking use Brunei to transit victims. Trafficking experts in Brunei receive threats from traffickers for their advocacy and involvement in anti-trafficking efforts.																																				    							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