IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0738

Filed August 21, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ISAIAH CECIL HAKEEM DUFFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Richard D. Stochl, 

Judge.

Isaiah Duffield appeals his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree 

and the court’s ruling on his motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

After a jury found Isaiah Duffield guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree, 

Duffield moved for a new trial. He argued the verdict was contrary to the weight of 

the evidence. The district court verbally denied his motion during the sentencing 

hearing. Duffield appeals. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction and the district court applied the wrong standard in ruling on his 

motion for a new trial.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The charge against Duffield stems from allegations that he performed a sex 

act on a sixteen-year-old girl against her will. Duffield claims the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree because 

the girl’s testimony was contradicted by her prior statements and by other evidence 

presented at trial.

We review claims of insufficient evidence for correction of errors at law. 

State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). “We will uphold a jury’s verdict 

if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. There is substantial evidence if it 

could convince a rational fact finder of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. We “view the ‘evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including 

legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced 

from the record.’” Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005)).

The marshaling instruction to the jury required the State to prove two 

elements: (1) Duffield performed a sex act with the alleged victim; and (2) the act 

was done by force or against the will of the alleged victim. As Duffield made no 

challenge to that instruction, it became the law of the case for purposes of 
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reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See State v. Schiebout, 944 

N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). Duffield does not challenge the jury’s finding that 

he performed a sex act on the alleged victim. He limits his challenge to the jury’s 

finding that the sex act was done by force or against the girl’s will. In short, Duffield 

claims the sex act was consensual.

We begin by reciting the settled principle that it is the province of the jury to 

evaluate the evidence and determine whether a witness is credible. State v. 

Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa 2022). When reviewing for sufficiency of the 

evidence, it is not the appellate court’s role to decide that a witness’s testimony is 

untruthful. Id. 

From our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence exists to 

support the jury’s determination that Duffield performed a sex act on the girl against 

her will. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, 

reasonable jurors could have found the following facts. The girl arrived at a New 

Year’s Eve party at the home of a friend. Duffield also attended the party. While 

at the party, the girl interacted with Duffield multiple times. At midnight, the two 

kissed. Later that night, a drunk Duffield asked her for help in the bathroom. When 

the party wound down, some partygoers left while others, including the girl and 

Duffield, prepared to spend the night. The girl got settled in the host’s bed. Later, 

Duffield entered the bedroom uninvited and got into the bed with her. Duffield was 

naked when he got into bed. When the girl sat up to get out of bed, Duffield 

grabbed her arms and prevented her from doing so. Duffield got on top of her, 

pulled her pants and underwear off, and covered her mouth when she tried to yell. 

Duffield then forced his penis into her vagina. Duffield eventually stopped 
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penetrating the girl’s vagina, released her, and went to sleep. The girl got up and 

went to the living room, where she spent the rest of the night. She did not tell 

anyone at the party what happened, and the party’s host testified that the girl did 

not seem upset that morning. The girl went home later that morning. Over the 

ensuing few days, her mother noticed that the girl was unusually quiet. Four days 

after returning to school from the winter break, the girl disclosed the sexual abuse 

to her school principal, who testified that the girl was visibly upset as she discussed 

the assault. The ensuing investigation showed that Duffield admitted to a friend

and the police that the sex act occurred.

As noted, Duffield challenges only whether the sex act was consensual. He 

highlights discrepancies in the victim’s testimony and evidence that he contends is 

inconsistent with sexual abuse having occurred. Duffield’s argument is essentially 

that the evidence he highlights would support a different verdict. But our role in 

addressing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is to determine whether the 

evidence supports the finding actually made, not whether it would support an 

alternative finding. State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800–01 (Iowa 2021). Here, 

the evidence supports the guilty verdict. A victim’s testimony alone can be enough 

to prove sexual abuse. State v. Kraii, 969 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 2022) 

(confirming that corroboration of testimony of an alleged victim is not required in 

sexual abuse cases). And, although corroborative evidence is not required, see

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3), there was corroborative evidence here in the form of the 

victim’s changed behavior in the days after the party and her distress when 

reporting the assault to the school principal. While there was evidence that the 

victim’s description of the incident varied in some respects in each account she 
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gave—whether to the forensic interviewer, the police, at deposition, or at trial—the 

jury was aware of those discrepancies. It is up to the factfinder, not us, to decide 

how much weight to give the conflicting evidence. State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 

247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (“It is not our place ‘to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to 

pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, 

or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.’” (quoting State v. Musser, 

721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006))). When viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, Cook, 996 N.W.2d at 708, there is substantial evidence 

supporting the jury’s determination that Duffield performed the sex act against the 

girl’s will.

II. New Trial Based on Weight of the Evidence

Duffield filed a motion for a new trial. Within the motion Duffield asserted

that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See Iowa R. Crim. 

P. 2.24(2)(b)(6) (2023).1 Duffield contends the district court applied the wrong 

standard in ruling on that part of his motion. We review rulings on motions for new 

trial for correction of legal error when there is a claim that the district court applied 

the wrong standard. State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Iowa 2018). 

“A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence only when a greater 

amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.” 

Id. at 570 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). The appropriate standard is “whether a 

greater amount of credible evidence suggests the verdict rendered was a 

miscarriage of justice.” Id. (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In determining whether 

1 This rule is now located at rule 2.24(2)(b)(7). See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7) 

(2024).
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a new trial should be granted because the verdict is contrary to the weight of the 

evidence, the district court must assess the credibility of witnesses and make its

own determination about what weight to give different pieces of evidence. See id.

at 570‒71. 

In deciding Duffield’s motion, the district court said:

In our system of justice it is the jury’s function to determine the 

credibility of a witness; it is for the jury to determine the effect of 

inconsistencies on the credibility of a witness. Discrepancies in 

testimony do not necessarily render a victim’s testimony 

unbelievable. Mr. Duffield had the opportunity to question the child, 

or the victim, and during cross-examination brought up all the 

discrepancies we’re talking about that existed between her testimony 

and the prior statements she may have made. Mr. Duffield also 

testified and told the jury his sexual encounter with the victim was 

consensual. Obviously, this jury assessed Duffield’s testimony, 

compared it to the victim’s, considered her inconsistencies that were 

brought up during cross and argued in closing arguments and 

determined the child’s testimony was reliable and found the 

defendant guilty. This court, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, concludes substantial evidence did support 

the jury’s verdict. I further conclude the State has met its burden of 

proof and that verdict—or judgment is properly entered. The verdict 

is not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Defendant’s motion for 

new trial is denied. 

Defense counsel then sought clarification by asking, “The court also said that the 

court was viewing the standard in the light most favorable to the State. Is the court 

using that standard today, or is the court using the broader weight of the evidence 

standard?” The court replied, “Greater weight of the evidence. Yes, greater weight 

of the evidence.” It explained, “I used light most favorable to the State in your 

argument for directed verdict,” “[b]ut here it’s the greater weight of the evidence.”

The State claims the court’s clarification that it applied the correct standard 

suffices to show the correct standard was applied. We agree.
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The manner used here is not a model of how to address a weight-of-theevidence challenge because the district court didn’t initially make clear when it

switched from assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to independently 

assessing the weight of the evidence to rule on Duffield’s new-trial motion. 

Nevertheless, after discussing standards applicable to a sufficiency-of-theevidence issue, the court did appear to shift focus and address the weight-of-theevidence challenge when it stated “[t]he verdict is not contrary to the weight of the 

evidence.” Although we would be reluctant to conclude that this comment in 

isolation would be enough to show that the court applied the correct standard, the 

court’s response to defense counsel’s question shows that it did differentiate 

between the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard and the weight-of-the-evidence 

standard and applied the correct one. Just as with its initial comments, the court’s 

response was not a model to follow, as the court didn’t explain how it applied the 

correct standard to reach its conclusion. Ideally, the court would provide some 

analysis to demonstrate it was correctly applying the weight-of-the-evidence 

standard. But our cases do not require judges to show their work. See, e.g., State 

v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 192‒93 (Iowa 2008) (reviewing the record to 

determine whether a basis for affirming denial of the motion existed when the 

district court gave no reasons for denying the new-trial motion). Here, enough was 

shown to establish that the court applied the correct standard. 

The court’s lack of analysis or explanation makes this a closer call than it 

needs to be, but we conclude that the court applied the correct weight-of-theevidence standard in ruling on Duffield’s new-trial motion. Consequently, we find 

no error in the court’s ruling on it.
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III. Conclusion

Sufficient evidence supports the guilty verdict, and the court applied the 

correct standard in ruling on Duffield’s claim that the verdict was contrary to the 

weight of the evidence. As a result, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.