alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Subpart R of Part 405
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subpart R of part 405 appear at 79 FR 55031, Aug. 22, 2014.

§ 405.1829 Scope of authority of contractor hearing officer(s). ( a ) The hearing officer(s) in exercising his authority must comply with all the provisions of title XVIII of the Act and regulations issued thereunder, as well as with CMS Rulings issued under the authority of the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (as described in § 401.108 of this chapter), and with the general instructions issued by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in accordance with the Secretary's agreement with the contractor.
( b ) ( 1 ) If the contractor hearing officer(s) has jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on the specific matters at issue under § 405.1811, and the legal authority to fully resolve the matters in a hearing decision (as described in § 405.1831 of this subpart), the hearing officer(s) must affirm, modify, or reverse the contractor's findings on each specific matter at issue in the contractor or Secretary determination for the cost year under appeal.
( 2 ) The contractor hearing officer(s) also may make additional revisions on specific matters regardless of whether the contractor considered the matters in issuing the contractor determination for the cost year, provided the hearing officer(s) does not consider or decide any specific matter for which it lacks jurisdiction (as described in § 405.1814(b) of this subpart) or which was not timely raised in the provider's hearing request.
( 3 ) The authority of the contractor hearing officer(s) under this paragraph to make the additional revisions is limited to those revisions necessary to fully resolve a specific matter at issue if— ( i ) The hearing officer(s) has jurisdiction to grant a hearing on the specific matter under §§ 405.1811 and 405.1814 of this subpart; and
( ii ) The specific matter was timely raised in an initial request for a contractor hearing filed in accordance with § 405.1811(b) of this subpart or in a timely request to add issues to an appeal submitted in accordance with § 405.1811(c) of this subpart.
[39 FR 34515, Sept. 26, 1974. Redesignated at 42 FR 52826, Sept. 30, 1977, as amended at 73 FR 30247, May 23, 2008]
#### Iva Barksdale CONNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BUSINESS INSURANCE LIFE OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14815.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

April 5, 1982.

*1341Conner, Martinez & Miles by Joseph P. Williams, Jr., Metairie, for defendant-appellant.

Sanders & Castete, Ltd. by Herman A. Castete, Winnfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before PRICE, JASPER E. JONES and NORRIS, JJ.

PRICE, Judge.

Defendant, Business Insurance Life of America, appeals that portion of the trial court judgment which awarded plaintiff statutory penalties in the amount of $6,729.08 pursuant to La.R.S. 22:657. The sole issue to be decided is whether the group hospitalization insurance policy issued by defendant is “health and accident” insurance within the terms of La.R.S. 22:657. We affirm.

Although the levy of statutory penalties under La.R.S. 22:657 was not at issue, the Supreme Court, in *Rudloff v. La. Health Services and Indemnity Co.,*385 So.2d 767 (La.1980) held on rehearing that a policy providing benefits for hospital and medical care is “health and accident” insurance under Louisiana law. This decision specifically overruled *Tabb v. La. Health Services and Indemnity, Co.,*361 So.2d 862 (La.1978) which had previously found that such a hospitalization policy was not “health and accident” insurance.

In *Lucito v. La. Hospital Service, Inc.,*392 So.2d 700 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980), the court was faced with the issue of whether the insurer was liable for penalties and attorney fees under La.R.S. 22:657 for failure to pay benefits under a group hospitalization insurance policy. Although penalties and attorney fees were not awarded, the court found that La.R.S. 22:657 was the appropriate statute to apply.

*Peters v. Life General Security Insurance Co.,*400 So.2d 1103 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied 403 So.2d 70, presented the exact issue raised here. There the defendant insurer argued that La.R.S. 22:658, rather than La.R.S. 22:657, was the appropriate statute to apply to an award of penalties for arbitrary failure to pay on a group hospitalization plan. The court rejected this approach, finding that a hospitalization insurance policy was “health and accident” insurance within the meaning of La.R.S. 22:657.

In line with the above cited jurisprudence, we find that the group hospitalization insurance policy issued by defendant is “health and accident” insurance within the contemplation of La.R.S. 22:657. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its assessment of penalties. See also *Ray N. Boyle, Jr., et ux v. Fringe Facts, Inc., et al,*414 So.2d 1333 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1982), a decision rendered this day where the court has decided the same issue.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed at defendant’s costs.
§ 566.203 Exempt transactions. Sanctions will not be imposed under § 566.201 with respect to: ( a ) Any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.
( b ) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United States, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, or the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or any other United States international agreement.
[84 FR 35310, July 23, 2019]
#### Marcia WELCH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WILDWOOD GOLF CLUB and Board of Directors of Stone Lodge, Inc., individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 90-1154.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Sept. 5, 1995.

*442Deborah L. Iwanyshyn, Pittsburgh, PA, Bruce Bagin, Pittsburgh, PA, J.W. Hernandez-Cuebas, Delmar, NY, for plaintiffs.

Laura A. Candris, Pittsburgh, PA, Richard F. Rinaldo, Pittsburgh, PA, for defendants.

ORDER OF COURT

LEE, District Judge.

AND NOW this 5th day of September, 1995, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

On August 31, 1995, Plaintiffs filed their “Objection to Appointment of Special Master” (Document No. 366) requesting that any action by the Special Master be stayed pending a determination of Plaintiffs’ appeal of the Court’s order of August 10, 1995.

Plaintiffs’ request that the Special Master shall not conduct hearings related to the Court’s award of counsel fees until the appeal of this matter is heard by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is DENIED as the Court believes there is a jurisdictional defect in the filing of the appeal as the Court’s August 10, 1995 order is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). *See Pennsylvania v. Flaherty,*983 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir.1993); and *Becton Dickinson and Co. v. District 65, United Auto.,*799 F.2d 57 (3d Cir.1986).
#### Haughton BARRETT, Appellant, v. Annette BARRETT, Appellee.

No. 74-288.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 31, 1974.

*261Wallace, Kreutzer & Breslow, Miami, for appellant.

Sue R. G. Samuels, N. Miami Béách, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., HAVER-FIELD, J., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.) Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was the respondent in an action for dissolution of marriage. In her petition, the wife prayed that the marital residence be awarded to her as lump sum alimony. In a judgment dissolving the marriage, the court so ordered. The correctness of the latter ruling is challenged by the respondent-appellant. We hold no error has been shown.

The court designated the award of the property to the wife as rehabilitative alimony. That allowance was within the power and discretion of the court under § 61.08(1) & (2), Fla.Stat.F.S.A. The record shows reasonable and adequate basis therefor. Previously, the wife had substantial earning capacity as a private nurse. Prior to the action, her husband had shot her, leaving four bullets lodged in her body. Her resultant disability substantially reduced her earning capacity, and she was on welfare. The wife presented evidence of need for support and the husband, although afforded opportunity to reveal his financial status, refused to do so. The appropriateness of the alimony as awarded is indicated by an unrefuted statement of the petitioner’s attorney, made to the court, as follows:

> * * * * * *

> “She wants to go back to work. She wants to get off of welfare, and I feel that she must have this house in order to secure herself a decent place to live. She has been damaged, and it seems to me that this Court has recognized in the past that where the breakdown of the marriage is caused by the husband and the damages to the parties have been caused by the Defendant, that alimony should be awarded.

> “And in this case the man has a limited means in which to pay alimony; one income that we are certain that the woman could use to rehabilitate herself would be her house.”

> ******

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6599

In Re: THOMAS CARVER STEPHENS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-98-83)

Submitted: June 15, 2000 Decided: June 26, 2000

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas Carver Stephens, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Carver Stephens petitions this court for a writ of

mandamus and requests that we stay district court proceedings in

his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000) action. The district

court has entered a final order denying relief on Stephens’ § 2255

motion. Accordingly, while we grant leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, we dismiss the mandamus petition as moot. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DISMISSED
Editorial Note on Part 411
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 411 appear at 71 FR 9471, Feb. 24, 2006

§ 411.165 Basis for conditional Medicare payments. ( a ) *General rule.* Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the Medicare intermediary or carrier may make a conditional payment if— ( 1 ) The beneficiary, the provider, or the supplier that has accepted assignment files a proper claim under the group health plan and the plan denies the claim in whole or in part; or
( 2 ) The beneficiary, because of physical or mental incapacity, fails to file a proper claim.
( b ) *Exception.* Medicare does not make conditional primary payments under either of the following circumstances: ( 1 ) The claim is denied for one of the following reasons: ( i ) It is alleged that the group health plan is secondary to Medicare.
( ii ) The group health plan limits its payments when the individual is entitled to Medicare.
( iii ) Failure to file a proper claim if that failure is for any reason other than the physical or mental incapacity of the beneficiary.
( 2 ) The group health plan fails to furnish information requested by CMS and necessary to determine whether the employer plan is primary to Medicare.
[57 FR 36015, Aug. 12, 1992. Redesignated and amended at 60 FR 45362, 45370, Aug. 31, 1995; 60 FR 53877, Oct. 18, 1995]
Exhibit 21


Registrant  owns all of the issued and outstanding capital stock of Harleysville
National Bank and Trust Company, a National banking association headquartered at
483 Main Street, Harleysville, PA 19438, the Citizens National Bank of Lansford,
a  national  banking  association  headquartered  at  13-15  West  Ridge Street,
Lansford,  PA  18232,  Security  National  Bank,  a national banking association
headquartered  at  One  Security  Plaza,  Pottstown,  PA  19464,  HNC  Financial
Company,  a  Delaware  Corporation headquartered at 2751 Centerville Road, Suite
3164,  Wilmington,  Delaware  19808  and  of HNC Reinsurance Company, an Arizona
Corporation  headquartered  at  101  North  First  Avenue,  Suite 2460, Phoenix,
Arizona  85003.
40877.

#### CULLENS v. STERLING DISCOUNT CORPORATION.

Eberhardt, Judge.

1. Where A entered into a contract with a financial institution guaranteeing to it all obligations thereafter incurred by B to it arising from credit extended to B and/or Old South Motor Company, either directly or indirectly, and whether as principal debtor, endorser, guarantor, or otherwise, not exceeding a liability of $15,000, and B then executed notes to the financial institution signing them “B, individually and d/b/a Old South Motor Company,” it is not a good ground of defense to an action against A on the contract that after it was executed B had taken his wife in as a partner with him in Old South Motor Company. Whether it would have amounted to an increase in the risk of A, thus relieving him, had the obligation been that of the partnership rather than of B individually, need not be decided since the notes specifically obligated B in his individual capacity. It would appear that the addition of Old South Motor Company as an obligor on the notes afforded greater security, if anything, to the principal debt and this should not relieve a surety or guarantor of his liability.

2. For the reason stated above there was no error in admitting in evidence the notes executed by B, individually and d/b/a Old South Motor Company.

3. Notice was given to B and his wife for the purpose of binding them for the payment of attorney’s fees as provided in the notes in compliance with *Code Ann.*§ 20-506, as amended, and a notice was given to A in compliance with the provision in the guaranty agreement calling for payment by him of the guaranteed obligations three days after receipt of notice requesting payment in which his attention was called to the provision in the notes obligating B to pay attorney’s fees. These notices were properly admitted in evidence. Compliance with *Code Ann.*§ 20-506 as to B bound him for the *373payment of the 15 percent attorney’s fees as provided in the note as a part of the original obligation and the fees were thus a portion of the obligation for which A, became liable under the guaranty agreement. Proof of compliance with the Code section in binding B and of compliance with the agreement in binding A was a proper part of the plaintiff’s case.

Decided September 24, 1964.

*Claude Hambrick,*for plaintiff in error.

*Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, James K. Rankin, Robert R. Harlin,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Deputy Secretary McKeon’s Meeting with World Health Organization Director-General Ghebreyesus

# 									Deputy Secretary McKeon’s Meeting with World Health Organization Director-General Ghebreyesus							

Readout

Office of the Spokesperson

April 8, 2022

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brain P. McKeon met with World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to discuss WHO sustainable financing and reform priorities. Deputy Secretary McKeon also expressed commitment to the pandemic instrument process, the continued efforts on amendments to the International Health Regulations, ongoing studies of COVID-19 origins, and Taiwan’s inclusion as an observer to the World Health Assembly.

Tags

Bureau of International Organization AffairsDeputy Secretary of State for Management and ResourcesInternational OrganizationsOffice of the SpokespersonWorld Health Organization

Back to Top
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 173 (Wednesday, September 9, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 46428]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-21563]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Notice of Proposals to Engage in Permissible Nonbanking 
Activities or to Acquire Companies that are Engaged in Permissible 
Nonbanking Activities

    The companies listed in this notice have given notice under section 
4 of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843) (BHC Act) and 
Regulation Y (12 CFR Part 225) to engage de novo, or to acquire or 
control voting securities or assets of a company, including the 
companies listed below, that engages either directly or through a 
subsidiary or other company, in a nonbanking activity that is listed in 
Sec. [thinsp]225.28 of Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.28) or that the Board 
has determined by Order to be closely related to banking and 
permissible for bank holding companies. Unless otherwise noted, these 
activities will be conducted throughout the United States.
    Each notice is available for inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank 
indicated. The notice also will be available for inspection at the 
offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their 
views in writing on the question whether the proposal complies with the 
standards of section 4 of the BHC Act. Additional information on all 
bank holding companies may be obtained from the National Information 
Center website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding the applications must be 
received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of 
Governors not later than September 22, 2009.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Ivan Hurwitz, Bank 
Applications Officer) 33 Liberty Street, New York, New York 10045-0001:
    1. Banco do Brasil, S.A., Brasilia, Brazil, and Caixa de 
Previdencia dos Funcionarios do Banco do Brasil, Rio De Janiero, 
Brazil; to engage in securities brokerage activities in the United 
States through Banco Votorantim Securities, Inc., Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
pursuant to sections 225.28(b)(6)(ii); (b)(6)(iii); (b)(6)(iv); 
(b)(7)(i); (b)(7)(ii); (b)(7)(iii) and (b)(7)(v) of Regulation Y.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 2, 
2009.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E9-21563 Filed 9-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
#### § 596.312 United States.

The term *United States* means the United States, including its territories and possessions.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 29, 2010 

s0125 

Order 

 

January 29, 2010 

139503 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139503 

 COA: 291102 

Wayne CC: 02-002144-FC 

CORDELL SANJUAN POWELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 1, 2009 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to 

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### § 402.205 Length of exclusion.

The length of exclusion from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and, where applicable, other Federal health care programs, is contingent upon the specific violation of the Medicare statute. A full description of the specific violations identified in the sections of the Act are cross-referenced in the regulatory sections listed in the table in [paragraph (a)](/on/2024-09-17/title-42/section-402.205#p-402.205(a)) of this section.

(a) In no event will the period of exclusion exceed 5 years for violation of the following sections of the Act:

| Social Security Act paragraph | Code of Federal Regulations section |
| --- | --- |
| 1833(h)(5)(D) in repeated cases | § 402.1(c)(1) |
| 1833(q)(2)(B) in repeated cases | § 402.1(c)(3) |
| 1834(a)(11)(A) | § 402.1(c)(4) |
| 1834(a)(18)(B) | § 402.1(c)(5) |
| 1834(b)(5)(C) | § 402.1(c)(6) |
| 1834(c)(4)(C) | § 402.1(c)(7) |
| 1834(h)(3) | § 402.1(c)(8) |
| 1834(j)(4) | § 402.1(c)(10) |
| 1834(k)(6) | § 402.1(c)(31) |
| 1834(l)(6) | § 402.1(c)(32) |
| 1842(b)(18)(B) | § 402.1(c)(11) |
| 1842(k) | § 402.1(c)(12) |
| 1842(l)(3) | § 402.1(c)(13) |
| 1842(m)(3) | § 402.1(c)(14) |
| 1842(n)(3) | § 402.1(c)(15) |
| 1842(p)(3)(B) in repeated cases | § 402.1(c)(16) |
| 1848(g)(1)(B) in repeated cases | § 402.1(c)(17) |
| 1848(g)(3)(B) | § 402.1(c)(18) |
| 1848(g)(4)(B)(ii) in repeated cases | § 402.1(c)(19) |
| 1879(h) | § 402.1(c)(23) |

(b) For violation of the following sections, there is no maximum time limit for the period of exclusion.

| Social Security Act paragraph | Code of Federal Regulations section |
| --- | --- |
| 1834(a)(17)(c) for a pattern of contacts | § 402.1(e)(2)(i) |
| 1834(h)(3) for a pattern of contacts | § 402.1(e)(2)(ii) |
| 1877(g)(5) | § 402.1(c)(22) |
| 1882(a)(2) | § 402.1(c)(24) |
| 1882(p)(8) | § 402.1(c)(25) |
| 1882(p)(9)(C) | § 402.1(c)(26) |
| 1882(q)(5)(C) | § 402.1(c)(27) |
| 1882(r)(6)(A) | § 402.1(c)(28) |
| 1882(s)(4) | § 402.1(c)(29) |
| 1882(t)(2) | § 402.1(c)(30) |

(c) For a person excluded under any of the grounds specified in [paragraph (a)](/on/2024-09-17/title-42/section-402.205#p-402.205(a)) of this section, notwithstanding any other requirements in this section, reinstatement occurs—

(1) At the expiration of the period of exclusion, if the exclusion was imposed for a period of 5 years; or

(2) At the expiration of 5 years from the effective date of the exclusion, if the exclusion was imposed for a period of less than 5 years and the initiating agency did not receive the appropriate written request for reinstatement as specified in [§ 402.300](/on/2024-09-17/title-42/section-402.300).
#### Melvina PHELPS v. DIXIELAND FOOD STORES, d/b/a Piggly Wiggly of Escatawpa, Mississippi.

No. 52680.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 15, 1981.

W. Harvey Barton, Cumbest, Cumbest & Hunter, Pascagoula, for appellant.

John M. Kinard, Megehee, Brown, Williams & Mestayer, Pascagoula, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Clinton E. Lockard, Judge.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and LEE and HAWKINS, JJ.

AFFIRMED.

SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM and BOWLING, JJ., concur.