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40–503 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–487 

HOST COMMUNITIES: ANALYZING THE ROLE AND 

NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES THAT TAKE IN DISASTER EVACUEES IN THE WAKE OF MAJOR 

DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 3, 2007 

FIELD HEARING IN BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANNA 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

DONNY WILLIAMS, Staff Director 

APRILLE RAABE, Minority Staff Director 

AMANDA FOX, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2007 

Melvin ‘‘Kip’’ Holden, Mayor President, East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana .. 4 

Randy Roach, Mayor, Lake Charles, Louisiana .................................................... 6 

Mayson H. Foster, Mayor, City of Hammond, Louisiana ..................................... 8 

Mary Hawkins-Butler, Mayor, City of Madison, Mississippi ............................... 10 

Sid Hebert, Sheriff, Iberia Parish, Louisiana ........................................................ 20 

Robert A. Eckles, Former County Judge, Harris County, Texas ......................... 22 

Raymond A. Jetson, Chief Executive Officer, Louisiana Family Recovery 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 27 

Kim Boyle, Chairman, Louisiana Recovery Authority Health Care Committee 30 

Greg Davis, Commissioner, Cajundome, and Chairman, IAAM Shelter Task 

Force ...................................................................................................................... 33 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Boyle, Kim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 86 

Davis, Greg: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 100 

Eckles, Robert A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Foster, Mayson H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Hawkins-Butler, Mary: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

Hebert, Sid: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67 

Holden, Melvin ‘‘Kip’’: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Jetson, Raymond A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77 

Roach, Randy: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 46 

(1) 

HOST COMMUNITIES: ANALYZING THE ROLE 

AND NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES THAT TAKE 

IN DISASTER EVACUEES IN THE WAKE OF 

MAJOR DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHES 

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2007 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Baton Rouge, Louisianna 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in the Old 

State Capitol Building, 100 North Boulevard, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Hon. Mary Landrieu, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

During Hurricane Katrina, first responders took Kemberly Samuels and her husband to Interstate 610, a highway overpass in 

downtown New Orleans where they had been evacuating local residents. Local authorities had identified only one official drop-off 

point, at an intersection of Interstate 10 and the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway known as the Cloverleaf, about 2 miles away. 

It was also the only rescue point where they had positioned food, 

water, and medicine. This is how Ms. Samuels explained her experience: ‘‘There were people lined up as far as I could see. I saw one 

9-year-old boy try to drag his grandmother up the interstate on a 

blanket. She was too weak to make it on her own. I tried to get 

them help, but none of the officials would help them. It was so hot 

you wouldn’t believe. We went for a while without water, and when 

it finally did get there they just started throwing it at the crowd. 

People were fighting over it, and I did not want to get in the middle of that. They did the same thing with the MREs [Meals Ready 

to Eat].’’ 

Another story of one of our constituents is Bobbie Moreau. Bobbie Moreau was a legal secretary in Plaquemines Parish who was 

evacuated during Hurricane Katrina to West Jefferson Hospital. 

‘‘Barefoot, no purse, no money, no shoes,’’ Moreau recalled. ‘‘My 

daughter went in with the baby. I sat on the curb and just cried.’’ 

Soon, they were moved to a shelter. ‘‘There were over 100 people 

in one room. The heat was incredible, could not go outside with the 

baby because of the mosquitoes. We fanned her all night.’’ Moreau 

2 

asked the National Guard if she could leave with her family, but 

they warned that they couldn’t leave. She said that they thought 

the baby would die, so they just walked out to get help. 

They went on to live at a friend’s house. They broke into the 

house, cooled the baby off; they took a shower, ate food, and then 

siphoned gas out of his boat 2 gallons at a time to put it in the 

truck. ‘‘I left him a letter with my nephew’s phone number in Arkansas. The only clothes he had that would fit us were boxer shorts 

and a T-shirt, so that is what we left in. We went across the Sunshine Bridge [across the Mississippi River], got to Prairieville, and 

my nephew picked us up. We have had a hard time since then, but 

we made it.’’ 

These are just two of thousands of stories that we have heard not 

just in this State but around the Nation about what happened in 

the aftermaths of the two storms and the devastation that followed 

in the history of the Nation. We are aware of thousands of others 

who found shelter and welcoming arms and open arms as well, 

which these mayors will testify to. But there has not been a displacement of people this large since the Civil War, and this Subcommittee and many other committees of the Congress are struggling with ways that we can be better prepared in the future. 

So I have convened this Subcommittee to underscore one of the 

most significant challenges during and after any disaster: The role 

and needs of communities that take in these disaster evacuees— 

just like Kemberly Samuels, just like the story of Bobbie Moreau, 

and thousands and thousands of others like them. 

This is the seventh public hearing of this Subcommittee, as I 

have said. These hearings are intended to look into the laws and 

policies that govern our response to all disasters. Many of these 

hearings in the past have focused on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

because they highlighted the deficiencies in our response planning. 

These stories are just the beginning of a longer, arduous process 

to rebuild the lives of these disaster victims and others. In the 

aftermath of the 2005 storms, citizens of the Gulf Coast were 

shipped, literally—by rail, by bus, by air—all over the country. 

More than 200,000 found immediate refuge right here in Baton 

Rouge, our capital city, and evacuees almost doubled the population of Baton Rouge at the time, and we will hear from Mayor 

Holden about the impact that caused to this community. 

More than 304,000 people, according to FEMA estimates, were 

evacuated to Houston, Texas; more than 80,000 to Jackson, Mississippi; and these other mayors can tell the numbers from their 

cities. 

In addition to the failure at many levels of different government 

responses, it became clear that the Stafford Act was unsuited to 

deal with the massive migration of individuals away from their 

homes, communities, jobs, hospitals, schools, and neighborhoods for 

an extended period of time. It became clear to many of us that the 

government had never really asked this question: What do we do 

with a million people who cannot return home and will be away 

from their homes for an extended period of time? Over a million 

people. That question evidently had never been asked before. That 

is the question that is being asked today. What can we do? How 

can we make that work better? 

3 

‘‘Host Communities’’ like Baton Rouge, Houston, Lake Charles, 

Hammond, and Madison, Mississippi, were called upon when the 

Federal Government failed to provide the resources. In some instances, the Federal Government worked as a good partner; in others, they left gaping holes that these mayors had to step up and 

fill. They set up systems to feed and clothe and help evacuees find 

lost family members. They provided health services to evacuees, 

many of whom lacked documentation or even proper identification. 

The challenge for host communities is to provide services to people who are at the apex of distress and to help orient them after 

a tremendously disorienting experience, to say the least. Host communities are charged with providing a sense of calm to individuals 

who are frustrated, confused, traumatized, and displaced, and in 

many instances injured and unemployed. They must also decide 

where to place individuals, how to provide educational opportunities to uprooted children, how to integrate new citizens into the 

workforce and communities, how to relieve new strains on transportation and transit systems, and how to navigate the sometimes 

mind-numbing Federal processes in their efforts to get this done. 

Host communities must also have the resources to identify those 

that have evacuated to their communities but did not report to 

shelters. They must be able to account for evacuees like Bobbie 

Moreau, who fled to a friend’s house rather than a shelter. 

Section 403 of the Stafford Act, which authorizes most of the 

Federal Government disaster assistance programs, offers aid to regions and residents in a designated, presidentially declared disaster area. Individuals and households who flee the disaster area 

remain eligible for assistance, but communities that take in evacuees are left without adequate resources to provide for those evacuees. The Stafford Act does not appropriately account for their critical role, and hopefully this hearing will begin to build the basis 

to fix this glaring inequity in our law. 

While the law accounts for the immediate needs of host communities, including shelter, food, and other needs, it does not account 

for a situation where evacuees cannot return home for an extended 

period of time. 

Just as so many American cities in the southern part of the 

United States have absorbed large numbers of evacuees from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, so too would areas of West Virginia and 

Pennsylvania in the event of a dirty bomb attack on our Nation’s 

capital or the Northeastern States in the wake of a WMD attack 

on New York City. We must be prepared, and we are currently not. 

Mass migration is an inevitable consequence of a catastrophe, be 

it natural or manmade, and our Nation’s Government must broaden its thinking about this policy area as we work to reform our approach toward emergency management and disaster recovery. 

I am committed, as these mayors know, to increasing awareness 

of the impact of catastrophes on their communities and hundreds 

like them around the country that have generously stepped forward 

to help. We want to hear their stories. We want to understand 

their questions. We want to take their suggestions and turn it into 

a law that works better for them, for the evacuees, and as a greater 

testament to our great Nation. 

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Holden appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I have heard 

their stories personally many times, and I thought it only appropriate to actually have a formal hearing to take their testimony so 

it could become part of the Congressional Record as we rewrite the 

parts of the Stafford Act that have been shown to be wholly inadequate to the experience that we experienced 21⁄2 years ago, but in 

large measure are continuing to struggle with today. 

So with that, let me ask Mayor Kip Holden of Baton Rouge if he 

would give his opening statement. Please keep it to 5 minutes, as 

pre-arranged, and then we will move down the panel from there. 

TESTIMONY OF MELVIN ‘‘KIP’’ HOLDEN,1 MAYOR-PRESIDENT, 

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, LOUISIANA 

Mr. HOLDEN. Thank you. Good afternoon. I am Kip Holden, 

Mayor-President of East Baton Rouge Parish, and I would like to 

welcome the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery to Baton 

Rouge for this hearing. I would especially like to take this opportunity to thank my good friend Senator Mary Landrieu for convening this field hearing to listen to the unique perspectives of cities that hosted those whose lives were devastated by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. 

While the impact on our communities was not the devastation 

our neighbors to the south suffered, our own resources were, nevertheless, strained and our lives impacted in ways that had never 

been experienced before in history. On behalf of the citizens of 

Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish, I would like to thank 

you for hearing from us and for sharing this information with the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. It is our hope that our government will take measures to assure us all that we never again experience the response we saw 

from the Federal Government in the aftermath of the hurricanes 

that hit South Louisiana in 2005. 

If you will permit me to take you back for a minute to that time, 

I will attempt to relate to you the impact of these storms and these 

events on East Baton Rouge Parish. 

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, an estimated 250,000 

people sought shelter in our city of Baton Rouge. The results were 

a tremendous strain on housing, traffic, schools, hospitals, and 

service providers. 

From the standpoint of our Administration, we balanced the 

needs of a vibrant capital city with aggressive plans for development and revitalization of our downtown and riverfront, with the 

need to be compassionate neighbors to a quarter of a million traumatized and displaced citizens. 

One option we have pursued in Baton Rouge to put more affordable housing stock into the market has been to work with nonprofit 

developers and the faith-based community to provide grants and 

low-interest housing loans. More funding through HUD should be 

made available through CDBG dollars. Under the formula used by 

the State, Baton Rouge received a very small percentage of allocated dollars. The formula used by the State and approved by HUD 

basically deprived the local developers of providing affordable housVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5 

ing and mixed-income housing. The same held through for getting 

housing tax credits through the Louisiana Housing Finance Authority. It was a formula derived as if no residents from New Orleans or surrounding parishes were living in Baton Rouge. 

Our experience was that the community development block 

grants are the most efficient manner of providing assistance to the 

cities dealing with the aftermath of a major disaster. Our parish 

has a consolidated plan in place for using these funds; however, 

Federal dollars could be more effective if provided with greater 

flexibility on how those dollars are spent. 

You have already mentioned one situation, Senator, and I will repeat it again. I am sure it will come as no surprise to you that 

those of us who served on the frontline of disaster response following Hurricane Katrina believe the Stafford Act should be updated in light of the government response. 

My experience is that the Stafford Act is too restrictive in limiting funding to areas that have suffered physical damage. Our city 

was significantly affected by a tremendous population shift, with 

our service providers strained to serve human needs. Yet we are 

faced with fighting for funds because we have for the most part recovered from the physical damage but still face serious problems 

caused by the aftermath. 

In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Baton 

Rouge area experienced traffic growth we had not projected for 25 

years. For a capital city that was already experiencing severe traffic congestion, the influx of a displaced population resulted in traffic counts that showed a 35- to 40-percent increase in traffic, with 

frequent gridlock on our surface streets. 

With our interstate system serving as a major evacuation route, 

traffic around Baton Rouge quite literally ground to a halt. 

We have not waited for the Federal Government to solve our 

problems. Only 2 months after Hurricane Katrina, the voters of 

East Baton Rouge Parish passed our first bond election in 40 years 

to fund a ‘‘Green Light Program’’ of street improvements that address short-term and long-term solutions. 

In May of this year, we kicked off a regional effort—and we are 

glad that you are a partner in this regional effort—to build the 

Baton Rouge Loop, a traffic loop supported by the parish leadership 

of five surrounding parishes that is being designed to relieve traffic 

congestion. Through new financing options and legislation that will 

allow public-private partnerships and tolls for financing alternatives, we are taking an exciting new regional approach to transportation planning. 

While the volunteer medical response to victims of Hurricane 

Katrina was unprecedented in Red Cross history, it was severely 

hindered by inadequate communications, limited resources, and red 

tape. 

Prepositioned Federal assets critical to the operations of our area 

hospitals were never received. Resources from the Strategic National Stockpile, despite our requests, were never locally deployed 

and were derailed due to paperwork issues. 

Area hospitals were faced with serious reimbursement needs for 

depleted resources. Many of the patients treated at our area hospitals were uninsured and underinsured, so the impact on our hosVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Roach with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

46. 

pitals was tremendous, and even today the waiting time in an 

emergency room has gone from 1 to 2 hours to 6 to 8 hours. 

Our recommendations for improving the level of emergency response following a major catastrophic event: Address the shortcomings of the Stafford Act to provide greater flexibility in providing support to host cities that are impacted by the influx of 

evacuees from a major disaster; Provide a single point of entry for 

those who are homeless to streamline access to food, shelter, job 

services, and access to health care; and safe havens for those who 

are in need of substance abuse treatment or mental health services; and Help us build healthy communities where public transportation meets the needs of the community and smart growth strategies are utilized to provide mixed-income housing options with 

health care and recreational opportunities located nearby; and 

where we can encourage public-private partnerships to rehabilitate 

old properties to bring them back online. 

To all those who found shelter in Baton Rouge, our message was 

simple: Our hearts went out to them; our homes opened to them; 

our businesses served them; our city cared for them. 

This is the legacy of the Baton Rouge community and East Baton 

Rouge Parish. But our city was impacted. Today, as we look at disasters that could occur, it may be a hurricane, it may be flooding, 

it may be tornadoes, it may be earthquakes. But we stand united 

that we speak with one voice, regardless of our locations, regardless of the States, and say that we need help. And we thank you 

for your help and thank the Members of the Subcommittee. Together let us move forward. Thank you and God bless you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Mayor Roach from 

Lake Charles, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF RANDY ROACH,1 MAYOR, LAKE CHARLES, 

LOUISIANA 

Mr. ROACH. Senator Landrieu, thank you very much for the opportunity to make this presentation this afternoon. We appreciate 

very much the leadership that you have shown in the last 2 years 

in working with communities all across the coast as we look at not 

only disaster recovery but also we look at the problems that are 

facing us as we look forward to the seasons ahead. So we appreciate very much your interest in this area. 

I am tempted at this point simply to say ‘‘Ditto’’ to what my good 

friend Mayor Kip Holden has said. But I am going to share with 

you, I think, a little bit different perspective, a little different aspect of what communities go through when we talk about hurricane evacuation and disaster response. 

Hurricane evacuations are nothing new to Southwest Louisiana. 

We have been in the sheltering business since 1957 when Hurricane Audrey struck Cameron Parish, our neighbor to the south, 

and killed over 500 people. The number may not sound as significant as some of the numbers we have heard when we talk about 

Hurricane Katrina, but that was almost 10 percent of the population of that parish. The residents of Cameron who lived through 

7 

that tragedy rarely have to be told to evacuate. Even in the approach of a tropical storm, they evacuate. They know what can 

happen, and they know what they need to do. 

The Red Cross has been an indispensable ally for our community 

in handling the sheltering operations. Without their help and assistance we would not be able to do what we do for the people who 

need our help. 

Shelters are very public operations. Most of the people who use 

shelters cannot afford a place to stay or cannot afford to find a 

place to stay. They are from the very young to the very old, those 

who are able-bodied and those who are not. They need food, water, 

medical care, and other essential services. 

Our evacuation experience in connection with Hurricane Katrina 

began like most other events. We had sheltered around 900 people 

from New Orleans at our Civic Center 2 years before in response 

to Hurricane Ivan. That operation went very well, and we were 

more than happy to be able to help once again. Normally, a sheltering operation lasts for around a maximum of 3 days. Although 

we do our best to provide a comfortable shelter, there is very little 

privacy. People sleep on the bedding that they bring or whatever 

we can provide in an open area. There are no private rooms. Most 

families stay together in a spot that they find for themselves. And 

most people are more than ready to leave once the all-clear is 

given. 

Although our Hurricane Katrina sheltering operation began normally, it dramatically changed on day two when we realized what 

was happening in the city of New Orleans. Our Civic Center operation quickly grew from around 900 people to over 2,000 people. It 

eventually exceeded 3,000. We did not want to turn anybody away. 

But before it was all over, our newspaper described the community 

response to the effort as one of our city’s finest hours. 

Evacuee immediate needs include not only shelter but food, bedding, clothing, bathrooms and facilities for personal hygiene, laundry facilities, and accommodations for pets. When it was apparent 

that Hurricane Katrina evacuees were going to stay longer than 3 

days, we had to address several issues: Security, because a shelter 

of more than a few hundred people quickly becomes a community 

in and of itself; entertainment; medicine, medical and counseling 

services; communications for ways to contact families; money, because many evacuees cannot even access their bank accounts; 

transportation for a variety of services; legal assistance; access to 

government agencies; and babies—babies did not wait to be born, 

and babies had to come, and we had to find a place for Mama and 

the baby. 

Many evacuees did not have identification or birth certificates or 

documents to validate their applications for assistance. Schools for 

students with books and supplies and uniforms; had to help people 

find jobs, had to arrange for mail delivery. But from the community, we had an overwhelming response: Amounts of food and clothing—local relief agencies donated a thousand mattresses. The city 

set up computer terminals so evacuees could apply for assistance. 

Local industries and businesses provided volunteers with help in 

food preparation and service. Churches provided transportation 

service. The chamber provided job assistance. Local officials asVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Foster appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

sisted with FEMA applications. Families volunteered to take care 

of people they did not know. A task force was made up of local 

agencies and officials from across the area. They established their 

own website, and the United Way and the American Press established a community fund with donations to help support the effort. 

There are several challenges when you face a sheltering operation of the magnitude that we had to deal with. When you care 

for people, you take on an awesome responsibility. It is like having 

people come to stay in your house only you do not get to do the 

inviting and you do not know what they are going to need when 

they get there and you do not know how long they are going to 

stay. The capacity of our local service organizations was stretched 

to the limit. The 211 volunteer agency number could not handle the 

influx of calls. 

But in spite of all of that, I can tell you that if we had to do it 

all over again, we would do it all over again. But the assistance we 

need from the Federal Government is assistance in the form of 

being able to provide the services, boots on the ground. And what 

needs to happen is that those Federal agencies that are charged 

with the responsibility of providing assistance need to be able to respond quickly to our requests for assistance. They need to be able 

to anticipate that need and respond when asked. 

So we would ask that the Federal Government consider what it 

can do to assist us in covering the awesome cost of providing the 

services that need to be provided to people in these types of situations. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Now we will hear 

from Mayor Foster from Hammond. 

TESTIMONY OF MAYSON H. FOSTER,1 MAYOR, CITY OF 

HAMMOND, LOUISIANA 

Mr. FOSTER. It is an extreme honor for me to be here, Senator. 

I thank you for the invitation to come, and may I say, ‘‘Ditto, ditto.’’ 

There has been much that has been written about what actually 

happened during Hurricane Katrina and immediately after. There 

are so many stories about nonprofit organizations and individuals 

that stepped forward to provide services. But I think today our goal 

is to look forward, not look back. 

Please understand that I am making this presentation—and you 

alluded to this, Senator—on behalf of hundreds, if not thousands 

of small communities across the Nation that have experienced 

what we have under some other circumstances. I feel also that I 

represent the Northshore of Lake Pontchartrain because we have 

seen unprecedented growth. Our area has changed overnight. We 

expected growth over time, but we experienced 20 years of movement in just a few weeks. 

Today, we have been asked to present three challenges that we 

are facing, and to me, without a doubt, those three challenges are 

transportation, housing, and the ability to deal with Federal agencies. 

Anyone that has come to the Northshore has seen firsthand the 

traffic congestion because of roads that were not planned for this 

9 

influx of people. Senator, you have been in our area. You have seen 

the traffic tie-ups. If anyone goes from this area to New Orleans 

or to the Gulf Coast, I invite them to go by the way of Interstate 

12 through Hammond, past Covington, and on to Slidell. And if you 

really feel adventuresome, you can get off on Highway 190 in Covington where sometimes traffic is backed up for as long as 2 hours. 

In Tangipahoa Parish and on the Northshore, we have no public 

transportation system, and many of those that were sent here for 

emergency living came with nothing except the shirts on their 

backs. In cases of disaster, our country must be ready to give peripheral areas immediate funding for infrastructure and to meet 

those transportation needs. 

Housing. Our city has determined that to continue to attract 

business and industry as well as to meet the needs of those moving 

to our area require housing. Mayor Holden alluded to this, but we 

have a little different take on things. The city of Hammond has 

completed a housing study that can be viewed on our website, 

www.hammond.org, and in the city of Hammond, our whole goal is 

to provide housing needs to our citizens utilizing homeownership, 

particularly workforce housing for middle-class Americans, not just 

affordable housing. 

Today, the Federal Government makes available to developers 

significant tax credits to provide affordable housing, but these tax 

credits are offered only for the purpose of constructing lease units. 

If this Subcommittee takes nothing else away from my testimony, 

I would ask you to please, please, please consider authorizing a 

portion of those tax credits for developers who desire to make properties available for purchase for homeowners. These tax credits 

could be acquired either by the homeowner, the developer of the 

property, or by grants to governmental units who had entered into 

cooperative endeavor agreements with nonprofit organizations. 

This would enhance the quality of life for all, including the evacuees to our area. 

Governmental liaison. Last, it is imperative, as Mayor Roach 

said, that the Federal Government develop standards for action 

within Federal agencies when a disaster occurs. As our Parish 

President Gordon Burgess has said, host communities should be 

given more consideration to Federal resources, especially in terms 

of equipment and facilities, because we, the smaller communities, 

assume the roles, responsibilities, and liabilities of larger communities by accommodating their displaced residents, with no followup resources. 

We have made much of the shortcomings of FEMA, and we are 

not here today to knock that agency. But, FEMA has a pretty good 

guidebook on the disaster declaration process. The challenge that 

they had was that they did not follow their own guidebook. We had 

extreme difficulty when every ‘‘I’’ was not dotted or every ‘‘T’’ was 

not crossed. Local authorities should be allowed to use alternative 

solutions if they are found to be more efficient and at less expense 

than indicated in Federal policy guidelines. 

The city of Hammond had 90 percent of our debris removed within 30 days at a cost of about one-third of what the Corps of Engineers were charging. Given the ability to act, local government can 

be much more efficient. 

10 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Hawkins-Butler appears in the Appendix on page 62. 

I thank the Subcommittee for coming to Baton Rouge today to 

hear our challenges. I encourage you to review our written submittals that contain much more detail than the time allotted today. It 

is a beautiful day in Baton Rouge, and it is a beautiful day in 

Hammond, Louisiana. The best is yet to come, but just like our 

LSU Tigers, we will meet the challenge. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mayor Foster, and I really appreciate the specifics of your remarks. 

Mayor Butler, we welcome you from Mississippi, and you are 

mayor of a small town of how many? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. Around 14,000. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Around 14,000. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF MARY HAWKINS-BUTLER,1 MAYOR, CITY OF 

MADISON, MISSISSIPPI 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. Well, thank you, Senator, and I thank you 

for the opportunity to share with you some of the experiences that 

we had as a small town as a host community for Hurricane Katrina 

evacuees. 

There was no doubt that our resources were limited, but there 

was a call, and we as a community and a team pulled together to 

answer that call and to get the job done. We have always prided 

ourselves in a community that plans and to try to prepare ourselves for whatever we face, whether it is in providing services to 

our community or in a disaster. We also know that the most critical element in an emergency, natural or manmade, is to have that 

plan. 

The use of the Unified Incident Command System is very important to a smooth and uninterrupted flow of government services. 

Proper training of all city personnel, including elected officials, allows the department heads to concentrate on operational issues in 

a timely manner while the city leaders deal with the terms of policy nature. It is important that plans are in place to accept and 

provide for the arrival of evacuees seeking shelter from harm’s 

way. As leaders, we must plan for the services and protection of 

our citizenry, and it is imperative that emergency planning is part 

of the process. 

It is vital to be ahead of the curve, to have emergency declarations in place that will allow the implementation of emergency 

measures to keep law and order, and to allow actions that can expedite resources to meet the needs of the community and evacuees. 

In August 2005, the city of Madison’s plan kicked in. Forty-eight 

hours before the landfall of Katrina, our forces were meeting to 

ready the city for the worst-case scenario. The rest is history. 

When assessing our Nation’s worst natural disaster and the role 

our community played, one of the greatest challenges was providing safe and sufficient shelters for the masses. Every aspect of 

the evacuees’ needs must be considered, such as sleeping accommodations, food, water, immediate medical needs, long-term medical needs, health and hygiene, communication needs—yes, right 

down to the washing of your clothes. 

11 

Social service, such as counseling, was provided to cope with the 

trauma. The details of accurate records were a must so families 

separated could be reunited. The complex, logistical needs to mount 

such an exercise became even more challenging, and sustainability 

of these efforts grew into weeks instead of days. 

As the relocation time of the evacuees increased, support such as 

housing beyond a shelter, school for displaced children, employment, and vehicle issues became mind-boggling. For example, the 

simple task of renewing auto insurance during a time of extended 

shelter living can create questions that no one can answer. 

The ability for people displaced to quickly establish a new address in order to receive mail and information is critical. The need 

for a new address is important in the direct deposits of funds, such 

as retirement and benefit payments. It is understandable that the 

focus of one’s attention has been on the large-scale movement of 

evacuees to larger cities. However, it must be remembered and recognized that smaller communities such as Madison and Natchez, 

Hattiesburg, and Purvis, Mississippi, also became homes for our 

displaced coastal residents. 

We hope that lessons learned from these hearings may filter 

down and be used to assist smaller communities in preparing and 

caring for those in need. We hope the tools will be provided at the 

local level so we can get our job done. The local level is where you 

reach out and touch and make a difference, and we need those resources to make that difference. We learned from experience, and 

we have seen that experience and experienced that experience, and 

together we build. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much. 

I do have a number of questions, and please feel free in the time 

we have to answer them. But was there ever a time that any of 

you were designated officially as a host community? Do you remember when that designation took place or how it took place? Any of 

you can comment about that. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Well, FEMA came in, and first they had this twotier area where you had parishes that received most of the damage. 

That was seven. They expanded that number, which then brought 

Baton Rouge in as one of the cities that should have been eligible 

for help. But the expansion basically was on paper with no action 

behind it. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And when did that expansion take place? Do 

you remember? 

Mr. HOLDEN. This took place, frankly, around maybe 4 months, 

5 months after the storm. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So it took until 5 months after the storm for 

basically you, as a mayor, to even believe that you had any recognition from the Federal Government as a host city. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Correct, other than some reimbursement costs that 

we got, and anybody in any of our agencies can tell you the paperwork that you have to go through for reimbursement costs was 

really unbelievable. Other than those costs, that was it for what we 

got, and even those were not timely coming back to local governments. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Roach, do you remember when they 

first let you know that you were actually a host community and 

12 

that some additional resources might be brought to bear for that 

purpose? 

Mr. ROACH. It was several weeks after the event. I don’t remember exactly when that was. I think it was when everybody realized 

that this was going to be a long-term process, the evacuation process. Of course, our situation was a little bit different. We hosted 

the hurricane evacuees from Hurricane Katrina for about 3 weeks, 

and then we had our own situation to deal with. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And then you all had to evacuate all 3,000 

plus your constituents for Hurricane Rita. 

Mr. ROACH. Correct. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And so you served temporarily as a host community, but then you actually were part of the catastrophe yourself 

because you were in the eye, generally in the eye of Hurricane 

Rita. 

Mr. ROACH. Right. But we never really stopped sheltering. We 

continued a sheltering operation all the way through, and actually 

I think we were one of the last cities in the State to actually close 

the sheltering operation. It was several weeks after both storms 

passed that we actually closed our final sheltering location. 

Senator LANDRIEU. This is an interesting notion that I am not 

sure anybody has really understood, that in this case you could be 

both a disaster site and a host community at one and the same 

time, which is basically Lake Charles and some of the communities 

served first as hosts, but because of really just the coincidence, 

very unfortunate coincidence of another storm hitting, they became 

a disaster location themselves. 

Mayor Foster, do you remember any specific time where you 

were notified that you, in fact, were a host community and additional help—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, ma’am. We were never notified that we were 

a host city. There is a big difference between entitlement cities and 

non-entitlement cities, and this was one of the things that I 

brought out in my written testimony, that cities between 5,000 and 

25,000, which we are, which Madison is, are oftentimes sort of left 

out of information. I can tell you that we are the largest city in 

Tangipahoa Parish. We were not notified as being a host city. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Were you, Mayor Butler? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. No, Senator, we were not. We basically 

took it upon ourselves to open our doors by establishing a mobile 

command post at the interstate, putting up signs, and created an 

information center for the metro area. So we were basically designated as the point of information for evacuees. 

Senator LANDRIEU. How did you ascertain from the very earliest 

hours or days the actual number of people that were moving into 

your area? Did you have confidence that the system that you were 

either trained with or was delivered to you to use was accurate so 

when people would ask you, Mayor, how many people are in Baton 

Rouge tonight, did you feel confident that you could tell them? 

Mr. HOLDEN. Not really, because, I mean, even today we are asking for a real census count, and they want to do this mathematical 

extrapolation in order to come up with a formula. Some have used 

and talked about using the number of people who filed their income 

tax returns. The post office uses a separate system. 

13 

So what we did have, I guess, our hands on was the fact of we 

basically logged in every center that housed evacuees, and so 

through our emergency preparedness unit, we were able to do that. 

But at the same time, FEMA had a number of people housed at 

local hotels. So we could then extrapolate that information to go 

along with what we have, but still, there was a count that was not 

there because easily people will tell you they took in 10 and 15 people into their homes, and a lot of those individuals, some have 

stayed there even until today. 

So there are still a number out there, LSU students, Southern 

students, Baton Rouge Community College students, the number of 

people actually brought in and treated at LSU for triage, at the 

PMAC Center. I mean, there are tons of people out there, but there 

has to be, I believe, some kind of general way to start compiling 

this information with a lot more accuracy. We, of course, started 

using traffic data and some other information to supplement it, 

but, still, that was not exactly scientific. 

Senator LANDRIEU. You described a process that you ultimately 

resorted to when no real system stood up, but the expense of putting that together fell to you all to do? Or did the Federal Government offer to pay for that? 

Mr. HOLDEN. No, we paid for the whole system, and let me tell 

you what: Without the faith-based community—and, again, here is 

something that needs to be noted. Faith-based communities went 

out without—they had guidelines that they changed probably 20 

times, meaning FEMA. The faith-based community went out, and 

they did not wait for guidelines. If there was a washer that needed 

to be put in a church, a dryer, or any other stuff, or purchasing 

food supplies, many of those faith-based organizations went out 

and then they put it out. Now, remember, afterwards, that is when 

the President said, well, we will start reimbursing the faith-based 

organizations. 

Well, then, here is where the technicality came in. They really 

did not have anything in place. So they asked, OK, can you then 

submit all of your reimbursements to the city or parish government? And then we had to actually take them in as a unit of our 

government. 

And so we said, well, wait a minute. Suppose there is a liability 

issue here. You are now asking us to take in all of the faith-based 

organizations, put them under our government. Would you sign a 

waiver that says, ‘‘Baton Rouge, you will not have any liability’’? 

They said, ‘‘No, we would not.’’ Would you sign a waiver that says, 

‘‘OK, if we do not reimburse all of the expenses that you are sending in, the city of Baton Rouge will not be held accountable’’? ‘‘No, 

we would not.’’ 

And so the faith-based piece needs a lot more work because a lot 

of those churches, frankly, I think probably some of them just got 

their money this year. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So what you are testifying to is while the 

faith-based community was—and we know this—very generous, in 

many ways when the Federal Government went to reimburse them, 

they wanted the city or parish government to try to organize that 

reimbursement process for them so that the Federal Government 

14 

would not have to account for every item submitted by each church 

individually? 

Mr. HOLDEN. That is correct. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And what you are saying is that was very 

complicated—— 

Mr. HOLDEN. That is correct. And we did not have the personnel. 

But, again, what they did, they took our Office of Emergency Preparedness, and they found themselves in the paperwork business 

because they knew a lot of the churches. But, again, a lot of those 

churches will tell you that they did not get 100 percent reimbursement. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Roach. 

Mr. ROACH. Senator, one of the things that I think perhaps needs 

to be at least mentioned in this process is that when we talked to 

FEMA before Hurricane Rita, and I asked FEMA, I said, ‘‘OK, 

where is your blue book? Where is the plan for catastrophic disaster on a regional scale?’’ There is no plan for that. The policies 

are based upon the assumption that we are going to have—we 

treat a disaster—whether a hurricane affects three square blocks 

in the city, it doesn’t matter if it is three square blocks or 300 

square miles, both disasters are treated the same. And those disasters obviously are different. The demands are different. The requirements are different. And so I think the whole process needs 

to be studied and needs to be evaluated, and there needs to be a 

blue book, because this can happen anywhere in this country. We 

can have a situation in California with an earthquake. We can 

have a series of tornadoes in the Midwest. We can have other problems on the East Coast. It can happen, as you mentioned earlier, 

with terrorist activities. There needs to be a blue book to handle 

the regional implications of a large-scale disaster, regardless of the 

cause, because it is going to result in the mass dislocation of people 

and the services that have to go along to cover that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. For an extended period of time. 

Mr. HOLDEN. And if I can add one other thing. From the moment 

the storm occurred, we asked FEMA, could you have somebody at 

our OEP who could be the designated person in order to make the 

calls, because we are serving this region. And at the same time, a 

lot of the calls that would normally go to the State ended up in our 

office. But there needs to be somebody who can make a decision on 

the ground, and those individuals were not there. 

The second thing, they need to have stability in regards to their 

employees because one week you are talking to one person and that 

person is telling you something; a week or two later, that person 

may be shipped to Siberia or somewhere, and there is no continuity 

at that point on. You go back, and regardless of what that individual told you, that is no good anymore, because when that new 

person comes in, you have to start all over again. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So you were not designated officially as a 

host community. You did not have a consistency of personnel. And 

you were asked to take on responsibilities like coordinating the reimbursements for nonprofits within your jurisdiction that you did 

not have the resources or the time or the ability to actually coordinate. 

15 

Mr. HOLDEN. That is correct. They had two gentlemen from 

FEMA who sat down with our office with Jim Barnhart and some 

others, and they said, Here is what we are going to do, for example, 

for Renaissance Park, and you will have nice cul-de-sacs and you 

will have tree lines, boulevards, and all of these things. And Renaissance Village did not get that. 

But here you have two people that came to us and said we are 

willing to work with you all, let us know anything that you need— 

from FEMA. And those two guys were transferred out within the 

next 2 weeks to a month. They were gone. 

Mr. FOSTER. I think every municipality had that same experience. Every one of them. I know that we did. I know that 

Tangipahoa Parish did. I heard that St. Tammany Parish did as 

well. 

Again, I do not think that our business here today is to knock 

FEMA, but what Mayor Holden is saying is absolutely accurate. 

And, Senator, when you ask about the number of people that are 

coming in, I think we probably have some differentiation about the 

number of people that came in immediately after the storm and the 

number of people that are still there. And I think what we have 

to prepare for is the number of people that are going to be there 

immediately after the catastrophe. 

I will give you some numbers, and these are in my written testimony. In the Hammond Northshore Regional Airport, we hosted almost 6,000 troops that came through Hammond Northshore Regional Airport. We had 15,000 take-offs and landings from our airport, including the Vice President that came in. We had nonprofit 

organizations that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been reimbursed a dime. One church group provided 10,000 meals a day 

for almost 3 weeks to provide food for anyone that needed it. 

So there is a tremendous need there, and the preparation is absolutely necessary. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Butler, do you have any idea how 

many people were in your town, the first night and then a week 

out and then a month out? Did you have any records that you 

thought you could count on to try to make the decisions? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. We had three shelters that were supported by faith-based organizations. We had 300-plus evacuees that 

stayed for over a month. 

Senator LANDRIEU. In your shelters? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. Yes. 

Senator LANDRIEU. How about housed in private homes? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. We do not know how many were in private homes, but residents did open their homes to the evacuees. 

Mr. FOSTER. Senator, anybody that says that they know how 

many people were there, they are just picking numbers out of the 

air, in my opinion. 

Senator LANDRIEU. After asking this question to everybody I can, 

that is what I think, too. It is a real guess, which makes it very 

difficult, as you can imagine, to plan effectively if you are not sure 

you are planning for 5,000, 25,000, or 50,000. And think about this. 

Now, you have rough estimates and you have anecdotal information, but there has got to be a better system of trying to get a handle on the actual numbers you are dealing with. It is important beVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
16 

cause it tells you how many trailers you might want to order instead of the ones we have rotting in a field in Arkansas. How many 

do we have up there? We have 10,000 trailers rotting in a field. It 

would tell you how many hotel rooms you might need to make 

available, approximately, how many mental health services you 

might need in a community or how many slots in schools you might 

need to have, etc. 

So I think numbers are important because it gives you some idea 

of what you are dealing with. And I am understanding that we virtually have a system that is not very accurate in that, and it makes 

your jobs even harder. 

Mayor Holden. 

Mr. HOLDEN. But the other thing it does, there are Federal funding formulas based upon population. This State has funding formulas based upon population. So without us getting that accurate 

account, the revenue stream is not flowing. And because the revenue stream is not flowing, then we are left to our own coffers in 

order to take care of those basic needs that we are seeing. 

And let me just add one other point, because I do not think we 

can leave without noting that we had a case whereby a young child 

in elementary school went to a school here with full-blown tuberculosis, but nobody knew. And so we have to go back and say, well, 

where are we now in getting medical records so these hospitals or 

the school-based health clinics or other providers can actually know 

what they are dealing with. 

And I do not know where we are, but somebody is going to have 

to pay fast attention to a situation whereby when you have people 

who have been walking out in these streets for 2 years and we are 

seeing them, basically mental health patients, and still nobody 

knows exactly what all has happened in regards to their treatment 

regimen, then there has to be some effective strategies on the 

health care side to cover a lot of those situations. And let me not 

leave out the elderly and those who are disabled. All of those have 

to have services provided. 

Senator LANDRIEU. That brings up an interesting point, and I 

have thought about this, but I would like to pursue this line for a 

minute. We had thousands of children that were displaced, I think 

at least 300,000 displaced from schools in Orleans, Jefferson, St. 

Tammany, and Cameron Parishes, etc, that had to go to school 

somewhere else and did so for up to 18 months. Some children are 

still not back in their regular school. There were many waivers, 

and we passed a new law to help that, but it reminded me of this 

when you said about the case of tuberculosis. 

Were you all involved in the waiver of requirements when children came to school in your areas about medical records? Because 

children cannot enroll without their immunization records. Normally, you have to have immunization records to enroll. Do you remember what was done in your communities? Were those just 

waived? 

Mr. HOLDEN. No. That would have to come through the school 

board itself in regards to whether or not there was a waiver because they are a separate entity. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Do any of you have instances of sick children 

showing up? 

17 

Mr. ROACH. I know that we did take children and enrolled them 

in school and continued to do that even after Hurricane Rita. But 

as far as the process and any waivers that were done, I have no 

knowledge of that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Foster. 

Mr. FOSTER. Based on the speed that we were enrolling children, 

my guess is that we received no records. But I do not know that 

for a fact. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Butler. 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. That is determined by the school board. 

Senator LANDRIEU. One more thing, you all mentioned the entitlement of cities. I think you are probably referring to some cities 

that get direct community development block grant funding based 

on size, and that is usually the larger cities, and the smaller cities 

do not. Would you all think that at least the community development block grant structure might be a good way to get additional 

unrestricted flexible aid to host cities after a storm? Would that be 

something that you would want to recommend, or is there another 

way that you think the Federal Government should be responsive 

in identifying you as a host community, allowing you to know what 

you are entitled to, and then providing funding? Would you think 

that the community development block grant might be a way? Or 

would you suggest something else? 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. I think it would be important that host 

cities be named and designated and that those cities are known 

and it is communicated to the public who they are, and that the 

funding be put in place for those cities to get the job done, whether 

it is under a special appropriations or line item. But I think it is 

most important that we know who the host cities are and that they 

are prepared, whatever is needed is put in place for long-term 

housing or medical facilities. 

One of the things I would like to say and just in closing, what 

we experienced was really a problem when we had people from 

other States coming through our community to go to the coast or 

come to Louisiana to help. They were not prepared. They did not 

have fuel. It was chaos. So that is something that needs to be addressed, too, when individuals come from other States to address 

an area that has been devastated. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mayor Foster. 

Mr. FOSTER. In the city of Hammond, we established a reserve, 

a disaster reserve. We put $1 million into a fund that in case this 

ever happens again, our city council does not have to say to itself 

where are we going to get this money. We do have a reserve. Hopefully it will be less than that. 

I think that it would be very appropriate if the Federal Government could do the same thing, have some reserve money in case 

of a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, with some characteristics 

of what the disaster would be. Of course, we have disasters every 

day across the country. I realize that. 

In terms of whether or not it should be CDBG, in my opinion it 

would be dependent upon how the rules for disbursement were established. Again, if it is just for entitlement cities, that leaves out 

smaller communities, less than 25,000 population. We again would 

18 

have to go fight for those monies. We would have to fight the larger 

cities for the dollars. 

So if there is some type of method of distribution recognizing, 

say, municipalities that were set up as host cities or host parishes 

that would be able to acquire some of that funding quickly, then 

CDBG would be appropriate. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Please let me say I meant a model of community development block grants, but that would go to all the cities, 

not just limited to the larger. Those reimbursements can get complicated, and even though it is touted as a flexible Federal program, I find the Federal Government overuses that word. It is not 

usually as flexible as the Federal Government sometimes claims it 

is. But I understand—— 

Mr. FOSTER. It is never flexible. 

Senator LANDRIEU. It is never flexible enough. Mr. Roach. 

Mr. ROACH. That might be an oxymoron to say it is flexible. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROACH. But I would caution you on utilizing CDBG money. 

It took me a while, after I got elected, to be able to say ‘‘CDBG’’ 

real fast, but I can say it fast now. And I know we are big on acronyms sometimes, but I just penned one out here called ‘‘CDRF’’ 

money, community development response fund. It can be structured similar to CDBG, but it has to have a different focus and a 

different purpose, and it has to have its own set of rules and regulations, because I know we have to have rules and regulations. But 

those rules and regulations need to be specifically tailored to what 

those monies are going to be used for. 

And I think we have a tendency sometimes—especially in this 

situation, I certainly can understand it—to want to use an existing 

funding source, an existing vehicle to provide that money because 

we need it now. But if we are looking at it long term, what we are 

going to do in the future, what can we do from a lessons learned 

approach, I think we need to recognize that disasters are unique 

and different. Each one is going to be different, and there needs to 

be methodology that we could use in order to fund those communities that are involved in that disaster recovery effort—whatever 

that disaster is. It might not be a hurricane next time. There might 

not be any flooding involved at all. It might be totally wind-driven. 

But we need to have an ability to funnel funds to those communities quickly so we can meet the need. 

Senator LANDRIEU. That is an excellent suggestion. Mayor 

Holden. 

Mr. HOLDEN. I agree with him. Again, this funding formula that 

they came up with is patently unfair to a lot of areas, including 

Baton Rouge. So I just want my friend, Mayor Foster, to know that 

there were equal opportunity challenges there, but there are other 

parties that, when you look at the funding. 

The last point I will make is also FEMA should not start programs that they end at a certain period of time and leave the local 

governments having to pick up the burden. And that came true especially with the Paratransit program that they started, and now 

those costs are being absorbed by us. And we are subsidizing transit now almost to the tune of $3 million, and it is a quasi-public 

agency, but they are looking for the city government to bail them 

19 

out each time they run a deficit, especially, again, this program 

was started by FEMA, and then they gave them a certain cutoff 

date and said that is it. And then the only people left as the bad 

guys are the transportation system, Capital Area Transit, and our 

government, and we look like the Grinches who stole Christmas 

from them. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And this transportation system is helping 

people that are temporarily living in Baton Rouge, getting to worksites in—— 

Mr. HOLDEN. Doctor’s offices, grocery stores. I mean, there are a 

myriad of things that Paratransit provides. But, we are having to 

have some cutbacks, and some people are not getting the service. 

But we are left now having to provide those dollars and cutting 

routes because of the lack of funding. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Well, thank you all very much. That 

wraps up my questions, and we may submit more questions to you 

in writing. But I think this testimony has given us a great basis 

to proceed. 

Let’s take a 5-minute break, and the other panel can come forward. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROACH. Thank you. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Ms. HAWKINS-BUTLER. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me welcome our second panel. I know 

that some of you are here to hear the remarks of our distinguished 

mayors who represented several of our host communities, and the 

second panel represents other elected officials and community leaders who are on the front lines of serving this host community. This 

graph will call your attention to a pictorial of where people fled. 

And it is very telling because you can see your dark spots, whether 

it is Houston, Lafayette, Lake Charles, Jackson, or Picayune. But 

then you can see how far dispersed this diaspora was. 

I would be hard pressed to think of another disaster in our country’s history truly where people would be so far flung away from 

their regular homes and places of work, which is why this is important for us to get lessons learned down and to correct it for the 

next time. We are still living through the shortcomings of the last 

disaster, and I say ‘‘disaster’’—two storms, multiple levee breaks, 

but talking as one. There is little we can do to go back other than 

just continue to take steps forward, but there is a lot we can do 

to prepare this country for the next time this happens. And I want 

to restate again that the primary concern of this Subcommittee is 

to build a better mousetrap, and we intend to do it. What we have 

is just wholly inadequate. 

What I would like to do, because time is short, I would like just 

to introduce the whole panel at once and then ask the sheriff to 

begin. Our first witness will be Sheriff Sid Hebert, who served as 

Chairman of the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and 

Criminal Justice and as Past President of the Louisiana Sheriffs 

Association. I think, Sheriff, you were the President of the association during the storm. So he brings a unique perspective from law 

enforcement’s commission. 

20 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Hebert appears in the Appendix on page 67. 

Next we will hear from Judge Robert Eckels of Harris County, 

Texas. Judge Eckels oversaw the Harris County Office of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness during the 2005 hurricane 

and the evacuation and sheltering operations associated with them. 

I understand, Judge, you worked very closely with Mayor White. 

You all worked as a team. For us in Louisiana, don’t be put off or 

on by the word ‘‘judge.’’ He is actually a county commissioner. He 

is not the ‘‘judge’’ in our sense of the word. He is the executive. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge ECKELS. Senator, I can still do mental health commitments. [Laughter.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. That is what they call their folks in Houston. 

Then we will hear from a great leader in our State, Raymond 

Jetson, who is CEO of Louisiana Family Recovery Corps. Mr. 

Jetson was charged with providing leadership in the coordination 

of local, State, and national efforts to connect people and families 

with the resources needed to return and resume their lives. He is 

formerly a State representative and has quite a story to tell. 

Our fourth witness will be Mrs. Kim Boyle, also an outstanding 

leader, a partner in the employment law group at Phelps Dunbar. 

She is a member of the Louisiana Recovery Authority and is Chairman of the Health Care Committee, so she has seen firsthand the 

challenges of our communities and our people of trying to continue 

basic health care, including mental health services, which is really 

one of our acute challenges today. 

Greg Davis, Executive Director of the Cajundome, was in the 

front line there. He has served as a board member for CABL, 

Council for A Better Louisiana, and he along with Council President Joe Durrell led the effort in Lafayette, and we so appreciate 

you being here. 

So why don’t we start with 5 minutes each, and then we will 

have a round of questions. 

TESTIMONY OF SID HEBERT,1 SHERIFF, IBERIA PARISH, 

LOUISIANA 

Mr. HEBERT. Senator, thank you very much for having myself 

and certainly my associate members here on the panel to address 

you, and hopefully your Subcommittee will establish a record, a 

permanent record, for what your contemporaries will at some point 

sit down and have to digest when it comes to examining Federal 

policy on catastrophic events nationwide. 

Senator, I have given this a lot of thought, not only during the 

event itself but certainly the last 2-plus years after. The only thing 

I can come up with would be the devastation to Pompeii in the 

major volcanic era. And I can think of nothing through history to 

determine how large a population was displaced, to echo your 

words. I think you were extremely accurate when it came to that. 

As being the only law enforcement person per se on the Subcommittee to address the group, it gives me a very unique opportunity to not necessarily repeat but to echo in some sense the 

voices that the mayors gave to you. 

21 

Interestingly enough, of all of the groups that will come to the 

Federal table to ask for assistance, temporary as well as long term, 

law enforcement would be the easiest to satisfy because we look for 

no new money. And the difference between us and long-term recovery would be is our needs are more immediate, would be literally 

within weeks, months. And in this catastrophic event, now we are 

2-plus years into it, and we are still being affected very dramatically. 

But to have you understand the interesting problems that we 

dealt with, initially a host city—I still wonder what that term 

means, Senator. I am not quite sure. But, really, in our eyes there 

was no such thing. It was a matter of setting up for an unknown 

amount of people with unknown names and unknown ability to 

identify themselves, with unknown clothes and unknown anything 

to get there and establish their identification, more than just lay 

on the floor. 

In my presentation, as I hope you will read, and certainly your 

other Senate Subcommittee Members will as well, within the first 

couple days, interesting problems started to present themselves 

right after Hurricane Katrina as my staff members, along with volunteers, Red Cross, school members, and the members of the 

church, as my mayor put it so eloquently, came to the rescue of 

many thousands of people throughout the State of Louisiana. The 

problem started to rear its ugly head quickly when it comes to security, offering the most immediate services to the evacuees. You 

think you will get 200 to 300. You end up with 3,000. This really 

is not, as I perceive this, a Federal problem immediately. But when 

it comes to a bit longer term—and I mean that meaning days—the 

assessment, on-ground assessment from a Federal military unit or 

a Federal Department of Justice or Federal FEMA group that could 

come in and do a very quick assessment of what that impacted 

area’s needs would be quickly, such as sanitary conditions, quick 

military response—as our National Guard was able to do so to 

some degree. But it was overwhelmed by the nature of the geographical vastness of the problem. 

What I noticed in Hurricane Katrina, as I was displaced as a 

sheriff, uniquely enough, as my representation statewide took me 

out of my local parish where I was housing 3,000 people, I was in 

the Gonzales area where we staged up and then spent most of my 

time in Greater New Orleans area, to be pushed again when Hurricane Rita came, and then ultimately things changed. But we started dealing with, after about the tenth day, mental instability with 

workers, volunteers. Stress was a dramatic problem that they dealt 

with. There was nothing for them to rely on when it came to mental assistance, medical evaluations, the people that were there. And 

for those Senators that hopefully will understand the dramatic 

problem that we dealt with in these communities, these new developed tent and housing communities, we displaced some 650 sexual 

predators from the Greater Orleans area into our communities. 

And we struggled with the FEMA restriction that did not allow us 

to identify the people that were there. 

In two cases here in Louisiana, sheriffs had to sue the Federal 

Government to try to gain access to identities in FEMA trailer 

courts. It is a very unique problem, and we certainly understand 

22 

1The prepared statement of Judge Eckels appears in the Appendix on page 70. 

the right to privacy. But, on the other hand, you have people who 

are in violation of their probation and prior judged issuances. 

I guess in a way it needs to be addressed and certainly looked 

at. But if I can quickly, so I don’t burn to much time, a quick assessment by the military officials to determine needs and mobilize 

in quick time. The military, whether it be States and/or Federal, 

could be a dramatic assistance to cities from a public works standpoint as well as law enforcement assistance if properly coordinated. 

Establish nation—here is one that may be overlooked. Establish a 

nationwide website for the Department of Justice that evacuees 

could quickly register their whereabouts through a connectivity, as 

simply as a website location, and we could offer them to do nothing 

more than download their information. 

As you see in Third World countries when people put their pictures up on those walls, on big boards, that is what we resorted 

to. A nationwide news agency helped us with that, developed that. 

We tied into it and certainly were able to find missing people and 

location people who they thought were missing and/or deceased. 

Very easy to do, not terribly expensive. 

Stafford Act, you talked about it. Senator, you, if I can only tell 

this group of people here today, and certainly your friends in 

Washington, you were a monumental help, along with the Senators 

from Mississippi, to re-evaluate money away from the Stafford Act 

for immediate distribution to the areas that literally could not function as public service responsibilities. We would hope that Stafford 

would be revisited long term, adjustments made, and a quicker— 

instead of having to go there literally and throw ourselves in front 

of the train, a way that it could be addressed for the immediacy 

of the public service providers. 

An infusion of medical services to include mental health professionals, I am not even sure if you have that authority, but I would 

offer that as a thought. And then certainly long term, if possible, 

if FEMA is listening, please give us the identities of the people in 

those communities so we can address that accordingly. 

And here is one that I would want it to be a bipartisan issue. 

Identify social issues within each community in this State as real. 

I do believe in international terrorism, and I do believe there are 

domestic terrorists. But in the last 7 years, to have a grant writer 

working for a local law enforcement agency is useless because there 

are no grants to compete for. You cannot even begin to try to be 

diverse in the way you address the issues in your locale, because 

there is no longer money other than the things that we can use to 

stop terrorism. It in a way, it needs to be re-addressed, Senator. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you so much, Sheriff. Judge Eckles. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. ECKELS,1 FORMER COUNTY 

JUDGE, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

Judge ECKELS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am honored to 

be here. I am Robert Eckels. I want to make sure the Subcommittee and, Madam Chairman, you understand that I am here 

in my capacity as the former judge of Harris County. I am a partner at Fulbright and Jaworski, and I appreciate the firm’s being 

23 

very supportive of my continued work on this. I left about 6 months 

ago. I think Hurricane Katrina wore me out, Sheriff. 

After Hurricane Katrina, I did represent about 4 million people 

in Harris County. The region is about 5 million and was able to accommodate approximately a quarter million people, we think, that 

came into the Houston area. Originally, it was planned to be 2,500 

people. It grew to 23,750 to be the evacuees from the Superdome, 

and it turned into about a quarter million; 65,000 actually came 

through the Astrodome itself. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Can you repeat that? Sixty-five thousand—— 

Judge ECKELS. Sixty-five thousand actually processed through 

the Dome. We had a maximum population at any given time of 

about 25,000, maybe 27,000 in the Superdome complex, between 

the Astrodome, the Reliant Center, the convention facilities next 

door, and the Astro Arena convention facilities on the pad, but we 

triaged about 65,000 that came through. The first day, about 8,000 

actually processed straight through and never even stayed but arrived. We operated the New Orleans Housing Authority. The Director of the Housing Authority was one of the evacuees on a bus coming in and actually partnered with us very well. 

I will quickly go through the prepared statement and touch on 

a few things, as you mentioned, the issues between host communities and impact communities. Like much of New Orleans, we 

were a host community for a period of time, about 3 weeks, and 

then Hurricane Rita came. We tried to take the things we learned 

and ensure that as those people that we shipped off to—the last 

group, I believe, went to Fort Smith, Arkansas—that we had a good 

manifest so they knew what to expect. Our biggest challenge as 

people came in was the lack of information. I do not think that the 

folks here—I cannot fault the people here because they did not 

have the information. It was a mass exodus. It was not an organized evacuation from Louisiana, as the folks loaded in buses and 

cars, and the folks came to Houston. 

The main issue that we had was the reimbursement question 

coming in for actual expenses. The congressional action, the laws 

we operated under are designed for—and the way FEMA operates 

is it follows those laws—is designed for an impact zone, an area 

that is hit, where our people will do straight time and work for the 

folks in the community, much as we did in Tropical Storm Allison 

where we had another quarter of a million people who were out of 

their homes. In that case, the county officers and the Houston Police Department and our social service workers all take care of our 

people, as we always do. 

After Hurricane Katrina, however, we had a quarter million people that came from outside into our community, and if I had hired 

private security guards in the Astrodome, I would have been reimbursed. But the sheriff’s deputies and my county employees, my social service employees, all of the straight-time folks are not eligible 

for reimbursement. And if there was anything I would look at in 

a change in the Federal rules, I would change that. And I do not 

think you can, as earlier witnesses testified, designate a host community in advance because host communities come where people 

show up. But you can put in place a process that people can follow 

and be reimbursed for their expenses. 

24 

The incentives that we were given in Houston told us next time 

to say, ‘‘I am sorry. The air conditioning is not working in the Superdome. Go to San Antonio. Let them worry about it.’’ We would 

not do that. I do not think the people of Houston would not take 

care of the people that show up from New Orleans or Dallas or San 

Antonio, or wherever they come from. But the incentives are there 

not to do that, and I cannot tell you that is not a problem in another setting. And it is an issue. And New Orleans may be the host 

city next time for somebody coming from Mobile. Or it may be that 

Baltimore is the host city for Washington, DC, after a disaster. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So let me just say, you would have been reimbursed if you hired private security guards, but not if you used 

your own personnel for straight time. 

Judge ECKELS. Correct. We were reimbursed for all of the contract expenses in the Astrodome. 

Senator LANDRIEU. But not your personal—— 

Judge ECKELS. Not of our personal—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. And then you were not reimbursed for the air 

condition usage or the—— 

Judge ECKELS. No. We were reimbursed for the use of the facility. We were not reimbursed for lost events. What immediately 

happens is the other cities that do not give up their convention 

space jump on and cannibalize the functions. It is not a big deal 

for the 1 year because FEMA did pay us our rack rate for the Astrodome and for the Convention Center. What happens, though, is 

when you relocate a major convention from New Orleans or from 

Houston and they go to San Antonio, the next year they go back 

to San Antonio and the next year they go back to San Antonio, and 

so you lose that business over a long period of time. And so that 

is a common problem for every city that has to give up their convention space. There is no real way to reimburse long term, and 

there have been those kinds of problems. 

So the short answer is that reimbursement needs to recognize a 

different set of issues in host communities. As we evacuated from 

Hurricane Rita, as was discussed earlier on small towns, Polk 

County, Brenham, Livingston, all the little tech towns through 

East Texas and Central Texas became host communities for people 

from Houston that were evacuating, that were stranded on the 

road, they went into their schools and community centers. In many 

ways, it was more difficult for them than us because they are a 

small town, and you take a small town and drop 2,000 people in 

there, that is a pretty big impact to try to—and they did a yeoman’s job taking care of people from Houston, and we really thank 

them for that. But that is a big issue for small communities, and 

they need to know that they won’t be expected to absorb those costs 

over the long term. 

Mayor White and I convened daily meetings, and the county was 

able to absorb—we have got a $2 million budget. We can absorb 

some costs of our operations. The city has a similar size budget. 

The mayor advanced $10 million for housing vouchers assuming 

that FEMA would come through and pay them. They did. But they 

just did it based on—betting on the come, if you will, that it would 

be there. 

25 

We did not have the reimbursement issues that we saw in Louisiana because we had good relationships with our State Emergency Management Agency. I remember one of the sheriffs complaining about challenges on getting money from FEMA, and I 

wanted to call him and say FEMA does not send the money, the 

State sends the money. I had already received $7 million from our 

Texas Division of Emergency Management and Governor Perry’s office because we followed the paperwork and the process. And I 

think there is a lot of education that goes on with that. The ultimate issue was some of it is time for reimbursement and some of 

it is actual dollars you are eligible for. We are still waiting 2 years 

later for reimbursement on some of our expenses. 

We had a real issue with special-needs evacuees. Most of the 

evacuees from New Orleans were special-needs. We did not know 

who they were. There needs to be—and it is multiple issues on special needs that is addressed in my written testimony, but it is identifying them in advance, identifying them in transit, and then having the shelters prepared. The State of Texas—and I would encourage you and anyone who wants to look at a planning process to ID 

those people, provide wrist bands, and not only the people but the 

wheelchairs and their equipment to travel with them, to be able to 

handle that special-needs population as they move forward, and 

use a lot of the private sector that is able to provide some of the 

technology to help as you involved the special-needs population. 

I mentioned the private sector because there was a prime example in the Astrodome with the debit cards, and I will tell you that 

I think the debt cards is a great program, but—and it is a compassionate program. It puts cash in people’s hands when it needs to 

be there, and it helps Congress and FEMA and the service providers track expenses and what people are using the money for 

when they come back later and say they need more cash. But if instead of having a bunch of bureaucrats come in that can do 50 or 

100 debit cards an hour, you would say Chase Bank, who issued 

the cards to begin with, you have got 1,000 branches, issue cards, 

which you do, you would have 1,000 locations. You would have 

bank accounts. You could transfer the money immediately for those 

folks, and it would provide tracking of the funds and tracking of 

expenditures, like you use the Visa or MasterCard type of card to 

limit it so they cannot buy lap dances and alcohol, as some of them 

did with the cards that they got. It set up FEMA for criticism from 

Congress that people used the money for things that they should 

not have used it for. The fact is most people desperately needed the 

money and used it for what they needed. Overall, it is the kind of 

program and a great example of where the private sector could 

come in and provide a lot of help. 

The final thing I would close out with is, as you are looking at 

solutions, look for regional and State solutions. It is very difficult 

to come in on a national plan with a Federal prescription of how 

you are going to work in a local community. Our classic that was 

touched on earlier was the shelters. The faith-based community 

came forward. I now am on the board of Interfaith Ministries, and 

between them and Second Baptist, they were part of that daily 

meeting with the mayor. We had thousands of churches that 

popped up as ad hoc shelters. To come back later for reimburseVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
26 

ment, we set up eventually a per diem system, which was very 

much resisted by FEMA. But FEMA was cooperative and helpful 

to us at a local level. They agreed to it. But after the bean counters 

took over and wanted an audit, they asked these churches to give 

positive ID of every shelter victim that was there, and some kind 

of driver’s license or Social Security number, the number of people, 

the number of nights. And when you are underwater—this is the 

old analogy of when you are in the swamp with alligators, are you 

trying to drain the swamp? You cannot come back later and ask 

a small organization that has not got the technical expertise or the 

training, that is really just trying to help people to cross the T’s 

and dot the I’s and fix the paperwork in order to qualify for reimbursement. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, we need a Good Samaritan statute and 

something that is clear and easy to follow for people that step up, 

and we will follow that. 

One question, and let me move then to Mr. Jetson. But when you 

said that you took in most special-needs people, was it most special-needs was the majority of people going to Houston or just to 

the Astrodome? 

Judge ECKELS. Everyone who came in through a bus or transit, 

or many others who just showed up at the Superdome because it 

is easy to find and they knew where it was as they drove from Louisiana, was triaged through our medical facilities, eventually set up 

as a triage—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. But the people that drove their own automobiles that never went to the Astrodome, do you think they were 

special-needs or—— 

Judge ECKELS. Some of them were. What we have done in Texas, 

the State DEM, the Emergency Management Division, has redefined special needs as anyone who cannot get out on their own. 

There are some who have physical needs, some who have mental 

problems, some who have—are just transit dependent and cannot 

get—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. And you all have an accurate count of that 

between the doctors who showed up who just went right to work 

in the hospitals as opposed to people who showed up and were in 

wheelchairs? 

Judge ECKELS. We have within our facilities at the Astrodome 

where we handled the people who came through the Dome complex 

through the city’s Exposition and Convention Center, they operated 

in—Harris County Hospital operated one. The University of Texas 

Health Science Center operated one that served people outside of 

the shelters that came in. We can identify those people who came 

to our shelters. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Can you identify people who did not come to 

your shelters? 

Judge ECKELS. No, we cannot. We can do a survey, but we have 

not. The people that came to the shelters—the challenge of New 

Orleans was that the people that were left were the people who 

couldn’t get out. They either had no friends, they had no family, 

they were medically dependent, they were compromised or transit 

dependent, they were compromised to begin with, many of them. So 

they were just loaded on buses. They spent 7 or 8 hours coming to 

27 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jetson appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

Houston where, if they weren’t physically stressed before they got 

there, they were after a long bus ride with little food or water and 

maybe no bathroom break. If they had medical problems, mental 

problems, they were off their meds. We had the tuberculosis cases 

that were talked about with poor medical care underlying the system in Louisiana, and I cannot tell you that is not happening all 

over the country. But many people came in, received medical care 

for the first time in their lives, comprehensive medical care 

through the Harris County Hospital. 

I appreciate you having us out, and I am happy to answer more 

questions. I know we are short on time today. I would commend 

to you all of the written testimony previously submitted. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Jetson. 

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND A. JETSON,1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, LOUISIANA FAMILY RECOVERY CORPS 

Mr. JETSON. Thank you very much, Senator. On behalf of the 

parents, children, grandparents, aunts, uncles, college students, executives, bus drivers, nurses, doctors, construction workers, case 

managers, first responders, and the nonprofits and faith-based organizations who served them, I say thank you for your continued 

commitment to support recovery along the coast and the strengthening of our people. I want to get right into the challenges, innovations, and recommendations for improvement. 

The first challenge at the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps, a 

nonprofit created after Hurricane Katrina to serve people who were 

impacted both by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and have served 

more than 30,000 families in our existence, the first challenge that 

we found, Senator, was that there was no adequate plan to address 

a response to human recovery. I respect greatly the challenges of 

the municipalities. I respect greatly the challenges of those who 

would seek to provide security and those who would do sheltering 

and all of the other things. The missing ingredient in most of this 

was certainly things that spoke to the needs of the people themselves who were impacted by the disasters. Their loss was initially 

and accurately attributed to a physical phenomenon, but the loss 

of community and support networks and control of their own destiny was actually destroyed by the hands of those who were 

charged with executing on their behalf. 

There was a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities and 

a lack of collaboration and planning that caused well-intentioned 

solutions to have profoundly adverse impacts. There was no cohesive plan for human recover, no lead agency that was recognized 

by the stakeholders as the one having the plan. This caused confusion amongst providers. In addition, there was no clarity as to who 

would be responsible for what. There was a total absence of common goals, outcomes, and strategies. There was a lack of partnership and the absence of a master strategy. 

The activities undertaken by stakeholders exceeded greatly their 

traditional roles and expertise. As you heard from the mayors and 

others who were involved, the absence of collaboration from content 

experts produced short-term solutions to attempt to address very 

28 

complex issues. The downside of that is the short-term nature of 

those solutions produced long-term negative outcomes, a prime example being the aforementioned transitional trailer communities 

that FEMA put in place. Their decision to locate these communities 

without social services and being dislocated from the very resources 

that people would need to recovery led to the situation that we face 

now. The only services that people received in these communities 

were because of the initiative of faith-based communities and local 

quasi-governmental institutions who would go in to serve these 

people. And so that is an example of the absence of an overall 

strategy and the lack of collaboration and planning leading to longterm problems and consequences. 

The second challenge that we faced was the service capacity to 

address the needs was destroyed and overburdened. You heard example after example from the government and from local municipalities. I would suggest to you that churches and community centers and nonprofit organizations, such service organizations are the 

cornerstones or the safety nets that have served people. The storms 

destroyed most that would serve the people who were historically 

served, and the people who were displaced ended up in communities where the safety nets existed in those communities were not 

equipped, did not have the resources, were already challenged to 

serve the people in their existing communities, now had a brandnew population to serve with no additional staff, no additional resources, and a huge pile of paperwork if they wanted to seek Federal reimbursement. 

The reduced service capacity meant that service providers took 

on responsibilities outside of their expertise. This quickly became 

overburdened, and likewise, specialized services such as substance 

abuse and mental health services became non-existent in terms of 

access for people who had been displaced, as well as many of the 

residents who were in the communities already. The disaster-related needs that manifested themselves extended far beyond the 

traditional service offerings of most of the faith-based and community-based organizations. 

The third challenge that we saw, Senator, was that the financing 

for human recovery was totally inadequate and overly restrictive. 

There was not funding for the recovery of people and families, and 

I would suggest to you that is the most daunting aspect of the recovery we faced. We know how to build bridges. We know how to 

build levees. We know how to build homes. We are not clear on 

what it takes to restore families. People did not simply lose their 

homes. They lost their neighbors. They lost their support networks. 

They lost the structure that gave them a sense of belonging. And 

the patchwork financing from Federal funding streams was not designed to provide disaster funding. In most instances, the money 

was tied to traditional government programs, which limited the 

people that could be served and the types of services that could be 

provided for those that we could serve under those restrictions. For 

example, the TANF supplemental grant, we are very thankful for 

it, but it certainly designates the people that you can serve and 

what you can do with those individuals. Likewise with the social 

services block grant funding and other dollars. And so those are 

three challenges that we found. 

29 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Boyle appears in the Appendix on page 86. 

In terms of innovations, the Family Recovery Corps has evolved 

and learned that there has to be the creation of a needs-based service model to address individualized issues in recovery. The Recovery Corps and its practices in serving the needs of people and families has evolved to service approaches that offer a combined menu 

of services and access points for people and families. There is not 

a one size fits all, nor is there a one place that fits all. 

In addition, we have learned that it is important to become responsive to the needs of people and families as soon as they become 

apparent. People and families cannot wait for us and our bureaucracies to navigate their needs. We also are focused on a centralized 

and personal access to information and services. Despite the variety and increase in toll-free numbers, there was not a single number where people could access the information that was critical to 

their needs and their recovery. This was particularly important for 

people who were located out of State whose access to information 

was limited to the local news venues, the local media venues where 

they were. The Louisiana Family Recovery Corps created NOLA 

Bound, which was a call center that we staffed with social service 

professionals that people could call and get real-time information 

about their neighborhoods, employment, schools, child care, and 

housing. And we also learned that a localized approach to service 

delivery creates trust and credibility. The closer you get to people 

and families, the closer you get to their needs. 

And I would suggest to you very quickly, Senator, three changes. 

There has to be funding sources that are designated specifically to 

human recovery that are not tied to government programs for the 

reasons that I alluded to earlier. 

Second, there has to be clearly defined expectations of FEMA in 

its planning, development, implementation, and management of 

disaster responsibilities. There has to be clear responsibilities for 

other stakeholders to participate in the planning of the recovery, 

the development of that recovery, and the implementation of that 

recovery that impacts their life, their communities, and their 

neighborhoods. 

Additionally, and finally, there has to be a more appropriate 

mechanism to address the emotional well-being of people who are 

impacted by disaster. The existing approaches are not designed as 

interventions for people who have truly been impacted by disasters. 

They are not designed to help people rebuild their support networks, integrate into new communities, and learn techniques to 

successfully manage the stressors. And so there has to be a different approach to address the emotional well-being of people who 

are impacted by disaster. Thank you very much. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Jetson. Ms. Boyle. 

TESTIMONY OF KIM BOYLE,1 CHAIRMAN, LOUISIANA 

RECOVERY AUTHORITY HEALTH CARE COMMITTEE 

Ms. BOYLE. Senator Landrieu, thank you for having us here 

today. On behalf of all of the citizens of Louisiana, as well as the 

Louisiana Recovery Authority, I would like to personally thank you 

for continuing to pursue solutions to problems that have plagued 

30 

evacuees, as well as the cities that took them in, over the past 21⁄2

years. I would also like to thank the people and communities across 

America that welcomed us, the evacuees, into their towns, their 

schools, their hospitals, and into their lives. 

I would also like to personally thank Judge Eckels and Mayor 

White because I did evacuate to Houston, and I can say with full 

confidence and I can say clearly that the citizens of Houston welcomed us with open arms and went out of their way to try to ensure that we were taken care of during that time that we were 

there. 

Mayor Holden referred to the work of the faith-based communities, and while this is more appropriate to Reverend Jetson, I 

would like to also commend those communities because I saw the 

work of the faith-based communities firsthand, and these communities worked very hard with evacuees in Houston, never looking 

for what the method of reimbursement was going to be. And I 

think it is critical that their work is recognized publicly. 

Being forced to evacuate, Senator Landrieu, I saw people struggle not just to find a secure place to land, but to retain their physical and, more importantly, their mental health, which you have 

talked about this afternoon. There is no doubt that catastrophes 

such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will continue to occur. But it 

is clear that we owe the citizens of America a better response when 

those catastrophes do occur. 

I was very lucky. My situation is very different than many of the 

people who had to evacuate. As stated, I went to Houston, where 

I had family members. I went to Houston, where I had a support 

mechanism through my work situation, and my parents were able 

to travel with me. So my situation was different than many of 

those people that Judge Eckels referred to in his testimony, i.e., 

people who had to go to the Superdome, people who had special 

needs. 

My parents were lucky. When they left New Orleans, they were 

prepared. They had their list of medications with them. They had 

a supply of medicine actually with them. They were able to access 

their medications through a national drug store, and they had recommendations from doctors in Houston where they could get seamless care. Many people did not have that same luxury, and they 

were not so blessed. And it is important that we address the needs 

of those citizens. 

As chairman of Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission of the Health Care Committee—and this was formed right 

after the storm, as you are aware, Senator Landrieu—I have given 

a great deal of thought to the manner in which we addressed some 

of the human needs after the storms. Some of them we were able 

to employ in this particular catastrophe, but many others occurred 

too late. I would like to talk briefly about some of the areas of success. 

First, Louisiana did act quickly to develop a free, secure online 

service to allow doctors and pharmacists to access information 

about evacuees’ prescriptions. I think this is critical, particularly 

when you are talking about the elderly, particularly when you are 

talking about the disabled community. If you cannot get to your 

medicine, you have a serious problem wherever you land. 

31 

Louisiana also worked with national pharmaceutical retailers to 

get free prescriptions for evacuees who had limited financial 

means. Louisiana activated a hotline to recruit displaced nurses, 

physicians, and health care providers. It facilitated access to children’s records. It recruited and deployed volunteer medical professionals. And it waived licensing requirements for out-of-State medical professionals to provide emergency services. 

Louisiana, most importantly, created the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps shortly after the storms, which is run by Reverend 

Jetson, and I think that is critical as it relates to addressing the 

human service needs. 

You just heard Mr. Jetson talk about the ways that his agency 

has excellently served thousands of families who otherwise would 

have fallen through the cracks. He did a great job of describing the 

social services impacted. However, what we learned from this experience and what my committee with the Bring New Orleans Back 

Commission learned is that the best place for evacuee families to 

be placed is in existing housing within communities and given access to aggressive case management services. 

To the extent and only to the extent such housing is not available and families must be placed in trailer villages, these wraparound case management services are critical and should not be an 

afterthought, as Mr. Jetson just stated. Judge Eckels talked about 

the special needs of a number of evacuees. This is critical to address those special needs. 

Over the past 2 years, as you are aware, Senator, there has been 

progress toward the creation of an electronic health information exchange. We talked about this on the local level, in New Orleans 

after the storm, and the LRA has continued to talk about this. 

This, again, is critical. People have to have the ability to access 

their medical records. As stated, my parents had their information 

very organized. But, bluntly, they were probably in the minority. 

We have to have that ability, particularly for our elderly communities. 

What we learned after the storm, bluntly, was that our Nation 

was ill prepared to handle a health crisis in a catastrophe of this 

magnitude. I am going to briefly outline some of the specific waivers and law changes that we would alleviate issues that Louisiana 

still faces in its health care recovery and issues that other States 

would no doubt have to confront in any type of similar catastrophe. 

As many of the panelists stated during the first panel, many of 

the problems relate to the Stafford Act. No matter how you slice 

it, the Stafford Act was not created to address a catastrophe of this 

magnitude. As you are aware, Senator Landrieu, the LRA is asking 

Congress for an all-out reform of this law. We believe it should be 

amended to create what is called a ‘‘catastrophic annex.’’ This catastrophic annex would trigger certain immediate actions in the 

aftermath of a catastrophe, and this type of reform would have a 

profound impact on the health care response in future catastrophes. We believe these minimal actions should be: 

One, automatic 100 percent cost share for Medicaid for evacuees 

displaced because of a catastrophe. Senator Landrieu, that this was 

critical, and without this waiver, Louisiana Medicaid would have 

been placed in dire financial circumstances. 

32 

Two, the creation of an uncompensated care program with clear 

eligibility guidelines for providers of health care services to uninsured victims of the catastrophe. You spoke just a minute ago, Senator Landrieu, about a Good Samaritan statute. Judge Eckels referred to that. It is critical that many providers acted as Good Samaritans out of the kindness of their hearts because they wanted 

to help people, but they did so in the absence of clear guidelines 

as to whether they would be reimbursed and the manner in which 

they would be reimbursed. And notwithstanding people’s good nature and good heart, people cannot continue to provide services for 

which they are normally compensated at no compensation whatsoever. So that is critical. 

Third—and you have talked about this on numerous occasions, 

Senator, and I know you are very focused on this—a clear provision 

allowing for the delivery of mental health treatment services in addition to basic counseling. Mr. Jetson talked about this. I think 

every panelist on the first panel talked about this. Basic mental 

health services must be expanded to allow for the diagnosis and 

treatment of mental disorders that may surface as a result of preexisting medical conditions but, bluntly, from prolonged exposure 

to the current circumstances. Everyone who evacuated or was impacted by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita has some form of 

a mental problem right now, and I do not mean mental problem 

in a negative fashion. I know I do. It has been very stressful. It 

has been very difficult over the past 2 years. And I was in a better 

situation than most. This is clear that those issues have to be addressed. 

We recommend that provisions within the Stafford Act allow for 

the identification of a disaster incident as catastrophic, that it trigger provisions for formal outpatient treatment of conditions clearly 

related to exposure. In this case, the length of the family services 

crisis counseling program grant must be extended to a 3-year cycle. 

In addition to these Stafford Act changes, services for the severely 

mentally ill could be enhanced statewide if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services grant the State a waiver allowing it to 

more quickly expand beds for psychiatric services in host communities as well as in disaster areas. 

I do not want to exceed my time, Senator, but it is important to 

talk about briefly flexibility and using the disproportionate share 

hospital funds, as you refer to it as the ‘‘DSH funds,’’ because that 

places a unique strain on the State’s graduate medical education 

programs. And as outlined in my written testimony, we have talked 

about the strain on the GME, the graduate medical education programs in the State of Louisiana. 

In conclusion, we know—this is not theory; this is not hypothetical. We know that the victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

were fortunate to have these host communities who provided physical, emotional, and even spiritual sustenance. However, we need 

to ensure that when such a catastrophe occurs again—and we 

know, unfortunately, one will—these host communities have the resources that they need to adequately address the human toll without placing undue strain on their own populations. And we need to 

ensure that the people most directly impacted by these catasVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the Appendix on page 100. 

trophes are able to access the appropriate human mental and physical health care services. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Ms. Boyle. That was excellent. 

And I understand we have a special guest, Mr. Davis? Your 

mother is with us, I understand. 

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Would you recognize her? 

Mr. DAVIS. Stand up, Mom. [Laughter.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. Welcome. We are glad you are here. 

[Applause.] 

TESTIMONY OF GREG DAVIS,1 COMMISSIONER, CAJUNDOME, 

AND CHAIRMAN, IAAM SHELTER TASK FORCE 

Mr. DAVIS. Thanks for the invitation to appear before your Subcommittee, Senator. 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, many of America’s 

arenas, stadiums, and convention centers were asked to convert 

their operations to mega-shelters to accommodate thousands of 

evacuees who were in desperate need of basic living necessities and 

medical services. Facility managers around the country responded 

to this call without hesitation, focusing with great passion on the 

needs of many senior citizens, children, and families who were trying to survive a terrible disaster. 

Public assembly facilities were converted to mass care facilities 

for extended periods. There was no precedence for such operations. 

This new territory of facility management required the resourcefulness and skill of the professional facility manager and staff to respond adequately to the needs of evacuees. They demonstrated an 

ability to perform under extreme circumstances. 

Before Hurricane Katrina, most shelters consisted of schools, 

churches, and recreation centers. They were small, accommodating 

up to a thousand people on average. For the first time in our Nation’s history, in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, arenas, 

convention centers, and stadiums were used to accommodate tens 

of thousands of evacuees over several weeks. These facilities provided sleeping arrangements, showers, clothing, medical services, 

social services, postal services, mental health counseling, classrooms, recreation centers, religious services, laundry services, pet 

and animal control, security, and three meals a day. Some facilities 

even required isolation rooms to house evacuees with contagious 

diseases. 

The Cajundome, which was used as a mega-shelter in Lafayette, 

Louisiana, accommodated 18,500 evacuees over 58 days. It provided 409,000 meals to evacuees and first responders. Houston’s 

Reliant Park sheltered 27,100 evacuees over 37 days. They processed another 65,000 evacuees located throughout Houston as a 

processing center for the State. 

Shelters in Dallas, including the Dallas Convention Center and 

the Reunion Arena, provided shelter for 25,000, processed another 

27,000 for American Red Cross benefits over 39 days and served 

114,000-plus meals. 

34 

The first difficulty that confronted the facility manager was the 

fear that was generated in communities from the depiction of evacuees as looters, rapists, and thugs. Television news created a false 

image of the evacuee. They were not looters, they were not rapists, 

and they were not thugs. They were senior citizens, children, mothers, and families desperately trying to survive a devastating disaster. 

When evacuees arrived by the busloads for the help that was 

available at public assembly facilities, they found professionals who 

were ready to deliver compassionate care in spite of the televised 

sensationalism at the Superdome and the Morial Convention Center. 

Hurricane Katrina exposed several weaknesses in our Nation’s 

ability to respond to major disasters involving the displacement of 

hundreds of thousands of people in a major metropolitan area enduring almost total devastation. One of those weaknesses involved 

the sheltering of evacuees before, during, and after Hurricane 

Katrina. For the first time in our Nation’s history, the term ‘‘megashelter’’ was used to describe public assembly facilities. The Hurricane Katrina disaster exposed a vital need for nationally recognized mega-shelter standards. 

Managers who operate public assembly facilities relied on their 

association, the International Association of Assembly Managers, to 

respond to the need for best practice guidelines for mega-shelter 

operations. Soon after the storms of 2005, the IAAM reached out 

to facility managers affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

IAAM quickly discovered the need for an industry task force to establish nationally recognized guidelines for public assembly facilities that are converted to mega-shelters. The IAAM also reached 

out to its industry partners, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and the American Red Cross and the faith-based community. 

In the summer of 2006, it released comprehensive best practice 

guidelines for mega-shelter operations. This booklet was shipped to 

arenas, convention centers, and stadiums on the Gulf Coast and 

the Atlantic Seaboard. If called into service, facility managers will 

now have critical sheltering guidelines that will help them face the 

extreme challenges of sheltering thousands of evacuees from a 

major disaster. 

In October of this year, we saw thousands of people in San Diego 

fleeing their homes to the safety of Qualcomm Stadium. This facility converted to mega-shelter operations quickly and effectively. 

The lessons learned from the 2005 storms are helping responders 

do better in servicing disaster victims. 

To convert to mega-shelter operations, public assembly facilities 

must stop their normal business operations and in many cases cancel events. Most do not have a tax base to sustain operations and 

are unable to generate revenues to make payroll and to pay the expenses of operating the shelter. 

In secondary and tertiary markets, this is especially problematic 

due to the inability of local government to fund a mega-shelter operation. Cleaning and custodial costs, for example, can cost several 

thousand dollars per day when hospital sanitation standards are 

required to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. In many 

35 

cases, cash reserves are not sufficient to sustain the shelter operation over the long term. 

Through its partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security and the American Red Cross, the IAAM hopes we can agree 

on nationally recognized reimbursement guidelines that will require FEMA to pay usage fees and to reimburse the hard cost of 

sheltering operations and recovery. 

Most public assembly facilities self-generate their operating revenues. Most do not have a tax base to sustain their operations once 

normal operations are stopped and events are canceled. Federal 

Disaster Assistance Guidelines must include the payment of usage 

fees, sheltering costs, and recovery costs. 

Public assembly facilities are now integral to disaster response. 

These valuable public assets are now available for the public good 

as they have never been before. The IAAM and the public assembly 

industry it serves stand ready to assist citizens across America 

when disasters require them to take shelter in arenas, stadiums, 

or convention centers. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much, and I know our time 

is pressing, but I do have a couple of questions. And if you do not 

mind, Mr. Davis, I would like to start with you because I am very 

interested—I had read in your testimony and reviewed this megashelter best practices national task force. Who initiated the creation of that task force? And can you just say a few more things 

about how it was formed, how often you all met, and what the 

hopes are for an outcome? I think you have described that in what 

you just said, but how was this task force established, and by 

whom? 

Mr. DAVIS. It was established by the International Association of 

Assembly Managers, which is the association that facility managers like myself belong to. I was the chairman of that task force, 

and it included people from the Reliant Arena, from the Dallas 

Convention Center, major facilities around the country that became 

a mega-shelter. And we worked very closely with the American Red 

Cross and the Department of Homeland Security, met several 

times in Washington, DC, and other parts of the country, and eventually within a 7-month period came out with the first draft of the 

mega-shelter best practice guidelines in anticipation of the hurricane season that was coming upon us in 2006. 

Senator LANDRIEU. All right. I am going to include your report 

in my information, and I have just instructed the staff to do so. 

Have you all briefed the National Governors Association on your 

findings or had any relationship with the National Governors or 

the U.S. Conference of Mayors formally? 

Mr. DAVIS. Not to my knowledge, Senator. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Because I think that would be a very good action for you all to take, and I would like to help you expedite that. 

We can just do that informally, find out some kind of way, because 

I do think that if we have—and we will; it is just a matter of 

when—another massive evacuation, the shelter component of this 

is a very important component. But it is not the only component, 

as people will say. Many people went to shelters, but not everybody 

went to shelters. We have got to come up with a plan that can 

reach everyone, whether they are housed in private homes, whethVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
36 

er they are in shelters, or whether they find shelter somewhere 

else in some sort of group home facility or hotel, etc. 

But since your group came together so well with this shelter 

piece, I think the lessons learned would be very helpful to communicate to those particular organizations. 

Mr. Jetson, you have talked to me many times about this, and 

I am well aware of the excellent work that you all have done 

through the Family Corps, but again remind me: How was that created? Was it created on executive order by our governor? Is it modeled after anything or was it created by us in response to this 

storm? 

Mr. JETSON. It was created by folks within the State of Louisiana 

in the aftermath of the storm, and it was created within the context of input from those who were actually involved in international disasters. It is in partnership with the International Rescue Committee. Many of the components of the Family Recovery 

Corps and its initial approaches to serving people and families 

were in many ways the result of partnerships and consultations 

with the International Rescue Committee and others who were involved in large-scale international incidents because the domestic 

response mechanism had certainly not been faced with anything of 

this magnitude. The Recovery Corps was created as Section 

501(c)(3). It is a private, not-for-profit. 

I would share with you additionally that the Recovery Corps has 

been embraced by the Louisiana Legislature with the passage of an 

act which recognized the capacity of the Recovery Corps to partner 

with the State in its response to future disasters, and so it has 

been in some way codified in statute or memorialized in statute as 

a valuable resource for the State. 

I will share with you just very quickly, on a comment that you 

made about the need to communicate with people both in shelters 

and out of shelters, that the need for a centralized area, a central 

area to call for information that is consistent across sectors, regardless of where you are, is critical to doing that. That is one of the 

experiences that we have found from NOLA Bound for individuals 

who are out of State. One of the things that we hear consistently 

is, ‘‘Thank you for giving us a way to call and find out what is really happening and what is really important.’’ And so an entity that 

has a centralized call center that is staffed not simply by typical 

call center staff but trained social service professionals is critical 

in being able—and having that information shared broadly with 

people who are impacted by disaster allows you to have that funnel 

into all of the services that are available to them. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I am somewhat familiar on this 211 system 

that the country is trying to establish, 911 being for immediate 

emergencies. We all know what that is, but can someone discuss 

the detils of 211? 

Mr. JETSON. I will be very brief. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK, go ahead. 

Mr. JETSON. I actually met today, Senator, with the executives 

of the United Ways from across the State to discuss 211, which is 

an information and referral system for social services for people, 

and it is a centralized entry point into not only those services that 

are provided by government agencies, but for local nonprofits and 

37 

other faith-based organizations who provide services in communities. 

The Department of Social Services in this State under its current 

leadership has invested in the 211 system, and certainly likewise 

has the United Ways across the State. But I think that the potential is there for a statewide system that would provide access to information for people not only during times of disaster but yearround. 

Judge ECKELS. Senator, we made extensive use of 211 during 

Hurricane Katrina, and it is today our registration system, our primary registration system for special-needs people who want services to be evacuated. The challenge is getting them to keep their 

information current. They register today. Next year at hurricane 

season, they have to call in again. But it is a valuable resource. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I am not sure I know the origins of 211. I actually have a piece of legislation trying to help them now. But it 

seems to me that might be a model that you could have established 

211 just to operate regularly. People always need more coordination at a center point. But when there is a mega-disaster, have 211 

step up to be able to fill that role of a coordinating entity. That is 

is something we should probably pursue. 

Mr. JETSON. I would just suggest to you, Senator, that to view 

them as a coordinating agency is a risky proposition. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Not coordinating. A clearinghouse? 

Mr. JETSON. Yes, sharing of information and pointing people—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. A clearinghouse of shared information. 

Mr. JETSON. And I think that as you would in the advent of a 

disaster utilize them as an access point for certain things, should 

that be the decision, I think as it relates to the needs of people in 

families, that information has to be fed to someone who would assume responsibility for coordinating a response to the needs that 

are identified. And I certainly, with no disrespect to 211, would 

suggest to you that they are not the appropriate entities to do that. 

And I certainly don’t want to sound self-serving. And so if it is in 

Louisiana not the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps, then it would 

need to be someone else. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, let me drill down here, then, because 

this is a very important component. Try to explain in your view 

what is the role of a model like Louisiana Recovery Corps—which 

I think I understand—and how it would work with a model like 

211, if that were put together. 

Mr. JETSON. We have, first of all, recognized the value of 211 in 

that we have invested resources in it for the last 2 years to increase their capacity and increase their staff. 

In a statewide model that our 211 system is still evolving to, in 

a statewide model where people can simply press 211 and have access to information about social services in the time of a disaster, 

they can access—people can call, whether they are in shelters, 

whether they are wherever, and where there are needs, Senator, 

information can be gleaned and then shared with the appropriate 

entities—the data or contact information. They certainly can be an 

access point for information and information gathering. But there 

has to be a partnership with somebody who accepts responsibility 

for the response to those needs. And as they relate to the needs of 

38 

people and the recovery of human beings, I am going to suggest in 

Louisiana, self-serving though it may be, that the Louisiana Family 

Recovery Corps is the appropriate entity to do that. 

Judge ECKELS. Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Go ahead, Judge, and then I have a question 

for Mr. Hebert. 

Judge ECKELS. To follow up on that 211 question, too, if you will 

look at 211 as inherently a local operation—and it needs to be— 

one of the things the Federal Government could do is help with the 

technology to share information. So when somebody in Houston 

calls 211 and asks about programs in Louisiana, they can get an 

answer. 

Then the other comment I would make on the mass shelters that 

211 could help with is a national registration database through the 

technology so that we would know where people were. If you can 

imagine you and I and Raymond in the Superdome on a Saints 

game and say we could find each other, that is what the Astrodome 

was like. And you do not find each other. Even people in the same 

facility, much less when they are loaded on buses and do not know 

where they are going and Mom is in Houston and Dad is in Dallas 

and the kids are in Baton Rouge, it takes a long time to match 

those families up, and a common national registry would be a big 

help. That is a system that could do it. And if you are looking for 

a role for the Federal Government in 211, it is supplying the technology and the base to link those systems so that the local social 

service needs that we—in Houston, what we do—we do not know 

what is going on with Louisiana Recovery—we may today, but that 

is not what we do in 211. We deal with our local and State programs. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I am pleased to say that with my support and others, the Center for Missing and Exploited Children was 

able to receive some emergency money to set up and they are in 

the process of setting up sort of a national family reunification 

model. That may or may not be the model that we use for the future, but at least I know that there is at least one developing. But 

within shelters, there need to be communications of coordinating 

where people are. 

Sheriff, you said that the Federal Government was resistant and 

nonresponsive allowing criminal backgrounds to be shared with 

law enforcement. Is that still the case, or was that ever corrected? 

Mr. HEBERT. Senator, I must tell you, perhaps out of my most 

recent ignorance, I am not quite sure if it has changed. I do know 

that there were several court challenges here in Louisiana specifically aimed at FEMA. 

I would like to show the distinction this way. When evacuees 

came to our shelters, as they were describing on the mass level, 

they came in. To the best of your ability, you identified them based 

on what they would tell you, and in many cases there were no supporting documents. It is when they went out into the local communities, as they were to be placed from an interim standpoint by 

FEMA and other Federal agencies, is where we lost contact and 

control of what was happening in our own environment. Particularly, as I described, into your first year, when you have these new 

residents, the face of crime changes. The face of the actual dynamVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 11, 2008 Jkt 040503 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40503.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
39 

ics of your community interactively, violence on the street, murders, armed robberies, things like that, takes on an entirely new 

face. 

So we were stressed to try to figure out exactly who we were 

dealing with, and as time went on, through crime and statistics, we 

were able to identify and earmark to some degree the long-term 

residents in the area and then start to be able to do intelligence 

gathering, things like that. 

We even resorted to—from a social standpoint, I sent out officers, 

community resource officers, to knock on doors in areas that we 

knew FEMA had contracted housing, what we considered to be 

longer term, and do visits, site visits. And hopefully they would tell 

you the truth as to who they were, and then you—there is that element of privacy, we certainly do understand. But we struggled with 

trying to thread that needle between a local, State, and then ultimately through the Federal agencies that had known identities to 

their ability of the residents they were housing. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I think I have covered all my questions. 

Is there anything that anybody else feels compelled to add to the 

record? All of your testimony has been submitted in writing, and 

that will be part of the record. We filmed the whole hearing today. 

That will be part of the record. 

This is the seventh in a series of probably 15 hearings that I am 

conducting in the Nation’s capital and around the country on this 

subject, and we will be introducing a major piece of legislation 

based on this work, probably in the middle of the spring. So please 

know that your information is going to be very helpful to the 

crafting of that piece of legislation, and there are many Members 

of Congress extremely interested in this subject, as you can imagine, for many reasons. And I think several Presidential candidates, 

if not all of them, are going to be interested in the recommendations that come from this Subcommittee. 

So thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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