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38–716 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–367

IRAQ BENCHMARKS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 7 AND 11, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

A REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S ASSESSMENT OF 18 

IRAQ BENCHMARKS

SEPTEMBER 7, 2007

Page

Walker, Hon. David M., Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 10

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN

MEETING BENCHMARKS

SEPTEMBER 11, 2007

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq ............ 166

Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., United States Ambassador to Iraq .................... 192

(III) 

(1)

A REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S ASSESSMENT OF 18 IRAQ 

BENCHMARKS 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, 

Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, 

Thune, and Corker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and John 

H. Quirk V, security clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Peter 

K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff 

member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Benjamin L. Rubin. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk and Colleen J. Shogan, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, 

assistant to Senator Reed; Bonnie Berge and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Monica Thurmond, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. 

Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator 

Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. 

Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to 

Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; 

Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Greg Gross and Lindsey Neas, assistants to Senator 

Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart C. 

Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee welcomes this morning David Walker, the Comptroller General of the 

United States, to testify on the Government Accountability Office’s 

(GAO) assessment of 18 Iraqi benchmarks for political security and 

economic progress. Again, we thank Senator Warner for his leadership and I think Senator Byrd was also involved in getting this 

language in the bill, which resulted in this assessment. 

Senator WARNER. Chairman, I’d like to also credit Senator 

Snowe. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. She was very active, I believe, with Senator 

Bayh, in getting this provision in. 

Chairman LEVIN. We appreciate the reference to them and we 

would surely add them. 

We’ve all been interested in the benchmarks, and those Senators 

have taken a leadership role, although they’re obviously not alone 

in this interest. The question of benchmarks has been a question 

which just about every Senator has become involved in. I will have 

more to say about what benchmarks we’re talking about in a moment. 

The Comptroller General’s assessment is one of two independent 

reports that Congress required in approving emergency funding for 

operations in Iraq. The committee received the other congressionally-mandated report yesterday, hearing from retired General Jim 

Jones, and other members of the Independent Commission on the 

Security Forces of Iraq. One of that Commission’s findings was 

that, ‘‘Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence 

in Iraq.’’ Then they said, ‘‘The single-most important event that 

could immediately and favorably affect Iraq’s direction and security, is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence 

and hatred.’’ They ended that paragraph by saying, ‘‘Sustained 

progress within the Iraqi security forces depends on such a political 

agreement.’’ 

The Jones Commission report provided a independent assessment of the Iraqi Army and police capability. The GAO’s report, 

which is the subject of today’s hearing, provides an independent assessment of whether the Iraqi Government has met the 18 benchmarks which it, the Iraqi Government, specifically committed to. 

Fifteen of which, according to the GAO report, were part of the 

international compact with Iraq and three of which were commitments made directly to President Bush. 

These assessments of the situation in Iraq, along with the testimony that we will receive next week from General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker, and the President’s report which is due on 

September 15, are critical to Congress’s understanding. 

So, the 18 benchmarks, reviewed by the GAO, were not created 

by Congress. Those commitments were made by the Iraqi Government as far back as June 2006. In fact, as confirmed by Secretary 

Rice in correspondence with me, 7 of the 18 benchmarks—those 

comprising the political, security, and economic benchmarks that 

are the most important for political reconciliation, had timelines for 

their completion, between September of 2006 and March of 2007. 

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Now, there’s two important facts that I want to single out from 

that statement. Number one, sometimes Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime 

Minister of Iraq, says that he’s not going to be bound by timelines 

which the U.S. Congress imposes on him or outsiders impose on 

him. That is not accurate. The timelines we’re talking about were 

adopted formally by the Government of Iraq. They were approved 

by the Iraqi Prime Minister and Iraq’s Policy Committee on National Security in September 2006. They were reaffirmed by the 

Iraqi Presidency Council, consisting of the President and two Deputy Prime Ministers, on October 16, 2006. That specific timeline, 

relative to the seven benchmarks, was a timeline adopted formally 

by the Iraqi Government and attached to Secretary Rice’s letter to 

me. 

Now, when President Bush announced his new strategy for Iraq 

in January of this year, he stated that the purpose of the so-called 

surge was to provide Iraq’s leaders breathing space to make the political compromises necessary for progress. Again, those were compromises that they had committed to make. 

In July, the administration provided its initial assessment of 

whether Iraq was making satisfactory progress toward meeting its 

political, security, and economic benchmarks, as required by Congress. The administration’s July assessment claimed that Iraq was 

making satisfactory progress on 8 of the benchmarks, mixed 

progress on 2 others, unsatisfactory progress on 6 benchmarks, and 

they didn’t even provide a rating on 2 of the 18 benchmarks. 

The unsatisfactory benchmarks included failing to enact and implement legislation on de-Baathification, failing to enact and implement legislation to ensure an equitable distribution of hydrocarbon 

resources, failing to allow the Baghdad Security Plan to be implemented without political interference, failing to ensure that Iraqi 

security forces provide even-handed enforcement of the law, failing 

to increase the number of Iraqi security force units capable of operating independently, and failing to ensure that Iraq’s political authorities are not making false accusations against leaders of the 

Iraqi security forces. 

Now, that the administration’s own assessment of progress in 

Iraq. There were no consequences arising from the Iraqi Government’s failure to meet its commitments. Instead, the President said 

he’d wait until September to judge what to do next. Now, the 

GAO’s Report, which we’ll hear today, paints even a more negative 

picture than the administration’s July report. In carrying out its 

task, the GAO talked to numerous military and civilian officials, 

and gathered information from a broad range of agencies and organizations, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Treasury, Multinational 

Forces Iraq, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Council, and the United 

Nations. GAO personnel made multiple trips to Iraq during 2006 

and 2007. 

By the way, while we’re on the subject of the GAO personnel, we 

want to thank you, particularly, Mr. Walker, and your staff for not 

only the work that they do, which is thorough and comprehensive, 

but for the risks that they take when they make those multiple 

trips to Iraq. 

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The GAO report concludes that the Iraqi Government has met 

only 3 of the 18 benchmarks. Four others have been partly met. 

Nearly 8 months into the new strategy, 11 of the 18 bencharks remain unmet. The Iraqi Government has met only one of eight legislative benchmarks, and partly met one other, according to the GAO 

report. Key revisions to Iraq’s constitution have not been made, 

laws have not been enacted on de-Baathification, oil revenue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and disarming militias. As a 

matter of fact, the GAO notes that 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi 

Cabinet have withdrawn from the Cabinet. 

Of the nine security benchmarks, the GAO finds that only two 

have been met. It finds that two additional benchmarks have been 

partly met, that leaves five of the security benchmarks, the majority, unmet. 

The time is long overdue to make it clear to Iraq’s leadership 

that there will be consequences to their failure to live up to their 

commitments. Failing to hold Iraq to its commitments is the definition of an open-ended commitment on our part. 

One of the reasons to begin to reduce U.S. forces, is to put in 

place an action-forcing mechanism, to get the Iraqi Government to 

meet its own benchmarks and to take responsibility for the future 

of their country. 

I thank our witness for coming before the committee today. We 

look forward to his testimony. Again, special thanks to his intrepid 

staff for the great work that they do, not only under some risk in 

Iraq for this report, but also for the work that they do in so many 

other parts of our Government and for this Congress. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll ask to place my 

statement into the record, given that we’re about to have a vote in 

less than an hour. 

Mr. Walker, I want to commend you, as does the chairman, for 

your work and that of your colleagues. There are risks to all of us 

who take these trips over there. But, those trips are essential. 

I’ve read through your report. I think it’s a constructive, well 

thought-through contribution to the significant group of factual information that is being put before Congress and equally, if not 

more important, before the American people. 

While the President, as Commander in Chief, has to make these 

tough decisions, it’s helpful to have the American people get a 

broad understanding of the complexities of this situation. I think 

your report does that quite fairly. So, I commend you. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we should just get underway. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Mr. Walker. 

This Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and this hearing is part of 

a series of very important reports and hearings that will help shape the setting for 

the President, as well as Congress and the American people, as we evaluate the 

complex situation in Iraq at this historic time. 

Yesterday we received testimony from General Jim Jones and his respected team 

on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Next week, Ambassador Crocker and 

General Petraeus will testify before committees in both bodies of Congress and the 

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administration will submit their second report on Iraqi progress to meet congressionally-mandated benchmarks. These reports are essential for Congress and the 

American people to conduct a full and informed appraisal of the situation in Iraq. 

Eleven months ago, I returned from my 9th trip, and said things were ‘‘drifting 

sideways.’’ In January, when the President announced his new way forward in Iraq, 

I was not fully supportive of all aspects of that surge. In May, I had a hand in 

crafting the benchmark legislation which was intended to set a common starting 

point and schedule for the upcoming debate. 

This report fulfills a requirement that is contained in legislation that I had a 

hand in crafting. The requirement for an independent assessment of benchmarks by 

the GAO was originally introduced by Senators Snowe and Bayh, and eventually included in the bill that the President signed into law in May. 

Public Law 110–28 requires the GAO to provide an assessment of the ‘‘status of 

achievement of the benchmarks.’’ By contrast, the administration reports whether 

or not satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the 18 benchmarks. As 

a result, the GAO assessment, in some cases, differs from the administration report 

because of different standards of evaluation. If Congress determines to continue this 

benchmark reporting, then we should ensure to reconcile this difference in standards. 

Nonetheless, it is a very important contribution to this historic debate, if for no 

other reason than it comes from the GAO, always regarded as the voice of independence and integrity. 

Mr Walker, again, welcome back before this committee and I wish to thank you 

and all of those involved in the preparation of this report on Iraq’s benchmarks. We 

also recognize the personal risks associated with travel in Iraq by those involved 

in the preparation of this report. 

Yesterday, General Jones and his team provided a very thoughtful alternative 

strategy that involved what they called a ‘‘strategic shift.’’ The ‘‘strategic shift’’ 

would re-task the Iraqis to take more responsibility for daily combat operations 

while coalition forces would transition to ‘‘strategic overwatch’’ and the active defense of the border and critical infrastructure. In addition, I believe the Jones Commission report made a very forceful argument that all provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control immediately. I will be very interested in your thoughts on 

both of those concepts. 

We always appreciate the benefit of the GAO analysis and look forward to your 

testimony and the discussions it will generate. 


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Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Walker? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, 

other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to present GAO’s report on 

the status of the 18 benchmarks relating to the Iraqi Government’s 

commitments, and related issues. 

This is the fourth hearing I’ve held this week on this topic, and 

I really appreciate being able to end with the Senate Armed Services Committee, a very well-respected committee. I know you try to 

work as much as you can on a bipartisan basis. 

As has been mentioned, we did this work because we were required to do this work. There was a legislative mandate. That legislative mandate required GAO to report by September 1, 2007, as 

to whether or not the Iraqi Government had met or had not met 

the 18 benchmarks. 

These 18 benchmarks, as you properly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, were not created by Congress, they were the result of other 

commitments that the Iraqi Government had made in various 

forms over a period of time. I think it’s important to keep in mind 

that the administration’s report in June 2007, used a fundamentally different basis to evaluate these 18 benchmarks. They used 

whether or not satisfactory progress was being made. That’s difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

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ferent than whether or not the benchmark has been met, or not 

met, or partially met. It’s also inherently somewhat more subjective. But nonetheless, it’s important information you need to consider, and compare with the report that’s coming up. 

In this work, we received an extensive amount of documents, 

both classified and unclassified, and we had a team of analysts go 

to Iraq again in late July, early August. We interviewed numerous 

officials from DOD, DOS, Multinational Forces Iraq, various intelligence agencies, et cetera. These officials included General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. 

Importantly, we have issued over a hundred reports and testimonies on Iraq since May 2003. Our staff have made numerous 

trips to Iraq. I, myself, have been to Iraq twice. Therefore, in addition to the work that we did for these 18 benchmarks, our work 

and any questions that I might answer are informed by these 100-

plus reports and testimonies, as well as my personal interaction 

with my colleagues in Iraq and the Middle East; as well as my 

former colleagues who are graduates of Capstone, for Flag Officers, 

from which I was also fortunate to be able to graduate. 

I think it’s important to note that our report does—in no way, 

shape, or form—serve to diminish the courageous efforts and the 

accomplishments of our military and those of our coalition partners. We’re reporting on whether or not the Iraqi Government has 

met their commitments and to what extent that’s been the case. 

In performing our work we used our independent professional 

judgment to also use a partially met criteria. I think this is very 

important. Because when we looked at the facts and when we 

looked at how best to present where things stood, we felt that there 

was a number of these benchmarks that we ought to consider a 

partially met criteria and, in fact, we did for most of them. On four 

of them, we gave a partially met rating because we think it 

wouldn’t have been fair to say not met, given the substantial 

progress that had been made, even though clearly you couldn’t say 

that it had been fully met. 

We’ve laid out, in our report, clearly-defined, consistently applied, well-documented, and transparent criteria as to how we 

reached our judgments. We think that’s important. Reasonable people can—and will—differ, but it’s important that you be able to 

make your own judgment based upon what we’ve done. 

So now, if I can, let me summarize the report and I will refer 

to the pages of my testimony where these boards with charts appear. 

On page 4 of my testimony, this chart shows the origin of the 18 

benchmarks that I’m referring to here today. I won’t spend much 

time on it, but they go back to 2006 and they’ve been reaffirmed 

at various points in time since then. 

Next graphic, please. The next one shows, which is on my left 

over here, shows the result of our evaluation. As a result of this, 

you will see that in the legislative area, one of the eight benchmarks was met, one was partially met, and six were not met. In 

the security area, two were met, two were partially met, and five 

were not met. In the economic sector, none were met, one was partially met, and that’s all there was, it was the only one in that 

area. 

12

I think it’s important to note that we did use partially met ratings, in order to provide a fair and balanced view. We also added 

commentary on the status and in our report, to provide further contextual sophistication with regard to where things stand. 

Next one over here on my right represents the status of the legislative benchmarks. Obviously yourselves being Members of the 

United States Senate, you understand that the legislative process 

has a number of different stages that you have to go through in 

order to be able to get a bill to be a law. This basically demonstrates where things stand, with regard to the key pieces of legislation that have yet to be enacted. Some have made more 

progress than others and hopefully more will be forthcoming. 

The next one shows the level of violence, specifically the average 

number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against the Coalition, 

Iraqi security forces, and civilians, from May 2003 to July 2007. 

This is important. We used average daily because every month 

doesn’t have the same number of days, and so we want to try to 

be fair in that regard. We also broke it down between civilians, 

Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces so you can see the differences in those trends. These represent the total. This does not 

separate between sectarian and non-sectarian violence. There is a 

significant difference of opinion on the sectarian issue. The primary 

difference between us and the military is whether and to what extent violence has been reduced with regard to sectarian violence. 

There is one party that maintains that data. That’s Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I), General Petraeus’ group. They’re the 

only ones that maintain that data. We’re aware of that data. That 

data does show a decline in sectarian violence. Just as you can see 

here, there was a decline in total violence in July. We haven’t seen 

the final August numbers yet, but you’ll get that, presumably next 

week, from General Petraeus. 

There was an increase up until July, but a decrease in July. 

You’ll hear next week what the results are in August. We could not 

get comfortable with MNF–I’s methodology for determining what’s 

sectarian versus nonsectarian violence. It’s extremely difficult to 

know who did it, what their intent was, and therefore, we feel more 

comfortable looking at total violence, and breaking it down by civilians versus other segments. But you’ll have to make up your own 

mind, based upon the information that you receive. 

Next, please. Now, this represents a comparison of GAO’s most 

recent assessment, the one that I’m conveying to you today, and 

the administration’s July assessment. As has been mentioned, they 

looked at whether or not satisfactory progress was being made, 

rather than whether or not the benchmark had been met or not 

met, if you will, so that’s a different standard. 

But if you look at that, you’ll see that in the first one, there was 

significant difference of opinion. The rest of them, either we agreed 

or we had a one difference in rating. Namely, of the three possible 

ratings, there was a rating difference of one. 

Now, next week you’re going to hear an updated report. I would 

hope that their ratings might be better. We’ll see, but I think it’s 

important to keep in mind we’re rating based on a different standard than they are. You need to consider both. You need to use your 

13

1GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks 

(GAO–07–1195) (Washington, DC: Sept. 4, 2007). 2Section 1314 of P.L. 110–28. 

judgment and you need to consider both, as well as the Jones Commission Report, et cetera. 

In conclusion, as of August 30, 2007, based upon our extensive 

work, which included receiving information from the Pentagon 

right up until the day that we finalized the report, the Iraqi Government had met 3, partially met 4, and had not met 11 of the legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. Importantly, in late 

August, Iraqi senior Shia, Sunni, Arab, and Kurdish political leaders signed the Unity Accord, signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on deBaathification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held 

without charges. Time will tell whether or not this Unification Accord results in progress on the political front, which—as has been 

mentioned—is deemed to be key by many parties with regard to 

national reconciliation. 

As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, in our view we 

believe it’s important to consider not just our report, but also the 

reports from General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and the Jones 

Commission, among others. 

You have an opportunity to receive input from a variety of parties, to compare and contrast what they’re saying, and then to 

make up your own judgment as to what you feel is appropriate. 

We also think that it’s important to consider, not just the benchmarks, but also military progress and various homeland security, 

foreign policy, and other goals of the United States, including regional goals, national goals, and economic status, which is not here, 

what’s going on with regard to economics in the lives of Iraqis on 

a day-to-day basis. Those are important factors, we think, as well. 

We made three recommendations in our report about what we 

thought would be more helpful to Congress going forward, for the 

administration to provide a more timely, detailed, and useful information to you. The administration agreed with those recommendations and we, along with yourselves, look forward to receiving that 

information. 

Finally, I too, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, would like to 

thank our team. We have incredibly capable staff at GAO. They’re 

highly educated, very dedicated, courageous—although they don’t 

wear a uniform—and they do a heck of a job for Congress and the 

country, and they’ve done a heck of a job here. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAVID M. WALKER

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to appear today to 

discuss our report 1 on whether or not the Government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, 

and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 2 (the Act). The Act requires 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report on the status of the achievement 

of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO’s core values and our desire to be fair 

and balanced, we also considered and used a ‘‘partially met’’ rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the act requires the administration to report on whether satVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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isfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks 

cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, 

improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. 

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the 

Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the MNF–I. We made 

multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 

1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and 

testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

SUMMARY

In summary, we found: 

The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi 

government in June 2006. 

The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it 

is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction 

funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and 

progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. 

The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The government has not 

enacted legislation on de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, 

amnesty, and militia disarmament. 

It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security 

benchmark—since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators’ intents were 

sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing 

trends. 

As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement 

of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security 

goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. 

ORIGINS OF THE BENCHMARKS

The benchmarks contained in the act were derived from commitments articulated 

by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed in subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and January 2007 (see fig. 1). 

Iraq’s commitments to these benchmarks were most recently stated in the May 2007 

International Compact for Iraq. 

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GAO ASSESSMENT OF THE 18 BENCHMARKS

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not 

meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence 

remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion 

in reconstruction funds. 


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MOST LEGISLATIVE BENCHMARKS HAVE YET TO BE ENACTED AND IMPLEMENTED

The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The government also partially met one benchmark—to enact and implement legislation on the formation of 

regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until 

April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq’s constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Baathification, oil 

revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The administration’s report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. 

We provide that information below. 


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MIXED RESULTS IN ACHIEVING SECURITY BENCHMARKS

Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq’s government 

has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five 

other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia 

control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, and ensured that political authorities made no false accusations 

against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security benchmark—since it is difficult to measure perpetrators’ intents, and various other measures of population security from different sources show 

differing trends. As displayed in figure 4, average daily attacks against civilians 

have remained unchanged from February to July 2007. 


907ful9.eps
18

3GAO provided this report to Congress on September 4, 2007, the first business day following 

September 1, 2007. 

COMPARISON OF GAO AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH ASSESSMENTS

Public Law 110–28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007,3

on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the 

act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The Act requires the 

administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory 

progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. As stated previously, we 

considered and used a ‘‘partially met’’ rating in several circumstances. Figure 5 compares the two assessments. 


907ful10.eps
19

CONCLUSIONS

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and had not 

met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. The Iraqi government 

has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote national reconciliation among 

Iraq’s warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress on deBaathification legislation that could promote greater Sunni participation in the National government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute 

Iraq’s vast oil wealth. In late August, Iraq’s senior Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish 

political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national 

reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de-Baathification reform and 

provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni 

detainees being held without charges. However, the polarization of Iraq’s major 

sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Sh’ia factions further diminishes the 

stability of Iraq’s governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed 

for sectarian reconciliation. 

Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the Baghdad 

security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it is unclear whether violence has been reduced. Measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetrators’ intents are not clearly known. Other measures, such as the number of enemyinitiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through July 2007. 

As Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement 

of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and homeland security, foreign 

policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reports on the 

benchmarks would be more useful to Congress if they clearly depicted the status 

of each legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

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4GAO–07–1223C. 

formation on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance 

and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition operations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency on 

progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that:

1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi legislation; 

2. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate agencies 

provide information to the President on trends in sectarian violence with 

appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security; and 

3. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate agencies 

provide additional information on the operational readiness of Iraqi security 

forces supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly information on 

their loyalty and willingness to help secure Baghdad.

We provided drafts of the report accompanying this testimony to the relevant U.S. 

agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as appropriate. We received written comments from the Departments of State and Defense and technical 

comments from the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council, 

which are included in the report. State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our assessment of certain benchmarks. Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for 

Iraq, the testimony and report only contain unclassified information, as of August 

30, 2007. We issued a classified report to supplement the information discussed in 

our report.4

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact me 

at (202) 512–5500 or Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, 

at (202) 512–8979. Key contributors to this testimony include Stephen Lord, David 

Bruno, Howard Cott, Timothy Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian 

Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Kathleen 

Monahan. 

In addition, Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie Burke-Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Debbie Chung, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Aniruddha Dasgupta, 

Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, 

Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary Moutsos, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, 

Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Walker, very much for a very 

succinct, direct report and testimony. Let’s try a 7-minute round, 

the first round here for our questions this morning. 

Looking at the origin of Iraqi benchmarks, that particular chart. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The second column, you say, is Prime Minister 

Maliki’s benchmarks, those are the ones that I made reference to 

before that were attached to Secretary Rice’s letter. You got a footnote A, relative to that. I just want you, if you would, to read that 

footnote, if you have it handy. Let me read it to you. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, because I don’t have it. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘Iraq’s Policy Committee on National Security 

agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks 

and an associated timeline in September 2006. They were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006.’’ I want 

to make it clear that the title, with that A after it, makes it clear 

that those weren’t just Maliki’s benchmarks, they were, according 

21

to their own footnote, and as Secretary Rice said, they were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council. Is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s my understanding, Mr. Chairman. That’s 

right. 

Chairman LEVIN. The timeline that was attached to those benchmarks was the following: that they would agree on an investment 

law by September 2006; they’d approve provincial elections law and 

set a date for provincial elections by October 2006; they’d approve 

a hydrocarbon by October 2006; they’d approve a de-Baathification 

law by November 2006; they’d approve a provincial council authorities law by November 2006; they would address the question of amnesty, militias, and other armed forces in the Council of Representatives by December 2006; they’d approve those laws by December 

2006; the Constitutional Review Committee would complete its 

work by January 2007; and they’d have referendum on Constitutional amendments by March 2007. Have any of those commitments been kept, the ones I just identified? 

Mr. WALKER. We’ve noted that those have not been met, based 

upon our evaluation, and that there clearly has been a significant 

delay in the Iraqi Government being able to meet its milestones. 

That’s the area of greatest disappointment, namely, the lack of political progress. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of those specific self-adopted, self-imposed, not just benchmarks, but timelines. 

Mr. WALKER. The milestones. 

Chairman LEVIN. The milestones that they set out for themselves, they have not been met, is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, that when Prime Minister Maliki rails 

against others for trying to impose benchmarks and milestones on 

Iraq, is it not accurate to say that they, in fact, have adopted their 

own benchmarks, which is part of the compact commitment that 

you make reference to in your last column? They also have adopted 

timelines, which have not been met? 

Mr. WALKER. What I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, is whether or 

not they’ve modified those timelines, but not published it. But 

you’re correct, they did not meet those, the timelines that you refer 

to. 

Chairman LEVIN. As far as you know, did they ever modify those 

timelines? 

Mr. WALKER. We’re not aware of any formal modification to those 

timelines. 

Chairman LEVIN. How about informal modifications? 

Mr. WALKER. We’re not aware of any such modification, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Yesterday we were given a report by 

the Jones Commission in which the Commission concluded that the 

Iraqi Armed Forces are, ‘‘capable of assuming greater responsibility 

for the internal security of Iraq.’’ What that was based on, was a 

finding that they made—and that has been made by others—that 

a majority of the Iraqi Army units, not police units, Army units—

are able either to act independently, which is so-called category 1, 

what you were asked to look at, but also category 2 units, which 

22

are characterized as being able to act in the lead with the support 

of the coalition. 

Those are categories which we use, in our own operational readiness assessments, we look at four categories. The first category is 

the ability to act independently, the second one is to take the lead, 

in essence, with the support of coalition forces. 

Now, I believe that you looked only at the category 1 units, the 

ability to act independently. Is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. For benchmark number 15, you’re correct, but we 

are aware of the other data that you’re referring to. 

Chairman LEVIN. You are, okay. 

Mr. WALKER. We are. 

Chairman LEVIN. Relative to the combined number of category 1 

and 2—because that’s the unclassified number, that’s the number 

which our folks are currently using: that number, according to our 

statistics, which are given to us by DOD, and are given to us in 

accordance with section 9010 of the Defense Appropriations Act, 

those figures impact 89 of 159 units that are at either fully independent or can take the lead, essentially, are category 1 or category 

2. Is that similar to the information you have? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s consistent with the information that we 

have for category 1 and category 2, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, let me first give you my impression. It’s 

my impression—and I believe from the testimony yesterday, that 

the Independent Commission would agree with this—that while 

over half of the Iraqi units are capable of either acting independently—which there are relatively few—but also of taking the lead 

in operations with the support of coalition forces, that many fewer 

are actually either acting independently or taking the lead with coalition support and that there’s a significant number of units that 

are not taking the lead, although they have the capability of doing 

so with coalition support. Did you make any finding or do you have 

any—— 

Mr. WALKER. We did not, but the data would seem to support 

that position. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have any finding as to why that is true, 

assuming it’s true? 

Mr. WALKER. I think one of the things that people need to keep 

in mind is how much support you need for category 2. It could be 

considerable support, especially logistical support, air support, et 

cetera. Second, it’s not just the issue of readiness, it’s also the issue 

of reliability. By reliability I mean, they may have the capability 

to do it, but will they do it and will they act in a non-sectarian 

fashion? 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that particularly a problem with the police? 

Mr. WALKER. It is clearly a much greater problem with the police 

and much less of a problem with the Army. But we would note, 

that we had recommended to the Defense Department some 

months ago, that in addition to considering traditional readiness 

factors, they also consider reliability factors. They now, in fact, are 

doing that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, on the Unity Accord, to which you referred. Senator Warner and I were in President Talibani’s house, 

23

actually having dinner with General Petraeus and our Ambassador 

when presented to the——

Senator WARNER. General Petraeus was not there. 

Chairman LEVIN. I apologize. You’re correct. Senator Warner is 

correct. Ambassador Crocker was there, but General Petraeus was 

not at that dinner. Presented to President Talibani were these initialed agreements, it was a so-called initialed by, perhaps, the second-level person in each of those factions. Then, later on, a couple 

weeks later, last week or early this week there was this meeting 

where the five top folks came together in this so-called Unity Accord, and I guess signed what was previously initialed. 

Senator WARNER. Not all of them. 

Chairman LEVIN. One or more of the items, Senator Warner, I 

think is probably correct on that, even though it maybe that just 

one of them was going to be immediately presented to the Assembly and the other two were signed, but not going to be immediately 

presented. 

But whatever the precise accuracy of that—it’s obviously important—but my point is this: Would you agree that the ability of the 

government to achieve the goals laid out in that Unity Accord is 

severely undermined by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the 

Cabinet? 

Mr. WALKER. It clearly shows that there is significant strife and 

significant differences that exist within the elected government of 

Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have an assessment on the likelihood 

of the Iraqi legislature to enact that legislation? 

Mr. WALKER. No, we don’t, Mr. Chairman. That was really beyond the scope of what we were asked to do. I wouldn’t want to 

speculate on that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you agree that it’s not a done deal by 

any stretch of the imagination, given the history of that assembly? 

Mr. WALKER. Given the history of any assembly, I would say it’s 

probably not a done deal. 

Chairman LEVIN. Because that is a parliament where majority 

rules? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, I understand. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, but I think the other thing, Mr. Chairman, 

as you undoubtedly know, part of the issue is not whether or not 

they have the votes, but when do they want to take the vote, because of the potential implications of that vote. I can’t get into that. 

I don’t know where they stand there. 

But I think only time will tell whether or not this national Unity 

Accord will, in fact, result in real legislation being enacted, which 

is necessary for reconciliation and for people to have confidence 

that it’s not a temporary thing, but that it has a more lasting significance. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, one of my members has a commitment, so I’m going to yield to Senator Inhofe. But I would think 

it important that we place in the record, at an appropriate place, 

perhaps directly following my opening testimony, and quote the 

24

law as written and perhaps that will help clarify the different procedures by which you proceeded. 

I note that, having had a hand in writing the basic law, the provision relating to your organization was in the form of an amendment. I think if I and others had been a little more alert we would 

have seen if we couldn’t have had a parallelism as to the requirements. But nevertheless, I think both reports do basically reach 

much of the same conclusions. 

Mr. WALKER. Senator Warner, I’d also like to mention that 

should you desire us to do further work in this area, we would like 

to work with this committee for possible refinements on what we 

might be able to do to improve the usefulness to this committee 

and Congress as a whole. 

Senator WARNER. We will take that offer. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Warner. That’s kind of my 

thought too. Mr. Walker, you’ve done a great job in coming up with 

the report that you’ve come up with. I question if it really tells me 

what I know about the progress that’s being made there. What I’m 

saying, and I’m not being critical at all, but from my understanding, you were charged with reporting on the various benchmarks as they have been met. I’m not disagreeing with your conclusions. You’ve done exactly what you were charted to do. 

But I am questioning that if this report provides us with something beyond just a snapshot of where we are today as opposed to 

what kind of progress that we’ve been able to make. Focusing on 

a black and white, yes or no report on benchmarks seems to be a 

little myopic in its attempt to oversimplify an extremely complex 

and dynamic situation. 

Actual progress has not been considered under these standards. 

Representative Jimmy Saxton (New Jersey, 3rd District) yesterday 

said, ‘‘By solely examining whether each benchmark has achieved 

without considering the actual progress being made under each 

area, it appears that this hearing has been set up with a goal of 

providing a negative picture by failing to accurately reflect the current activities on the ground in Iraq.’’ Mr. Walker, you stated Tuesday, I guess it was and I agree with this, you said, ‘‘Progress is a 

highly subjective issue and by definition, one would expect that 

there would be a better rating that would be achieved if one solely 

focused on progress.’’ I agree with that and that’s what I focus on. 

I’ve had occasion to be, not always in Iraq, but in the Iraqi area 

of responsibility, 15 times now. Last week was the last time. So as 

I go through and I see some of the great progress that’s being 

made, I don’t see that this report reflects that progress. 

I think the Iraqi Government, while not agreeing on legislative 

language, has put into an accumulation of practices, many of the 

benchmarks. The Iraqi Government is sharing oil revenues, is taking steps towards the de-Baathification, it is giving conditional immunity to the Baath Party members. There’s been a 75-percent reduction in religious and ethnic killings in the capitol between December and August 7. 

Along this line, one of the great progresses that I see, and it was 

reflected from our intel going to the various mosques and their 

weekly meetings and coming back with the idea that there’s been 

a total abrupt change since this surge took place, in terms of the 

25

programs that are given by the clerics and Imans in the mosques. 

Moreover, prior to January, 85 percent of the services were antiAmerican, by nature, but since April there hasn’t been anything 

anti-American. I think that accounts for some of the success that 

we’ve had. 

We’ve doubled the seizure of insurgent’s weapons caches between 

January and August. A rise in the number of al Qaeda killings and 

captures, Anbar incidents of attacks are down from 40 per day 

down to 10 per day at the present time. As far as economic 

growth—I’ll talk about that in just a minute—but the markets are 

open, crowded, and stacked. I know that. I’ve been in the markets. 

I’ve also been in the same markets several years, probably each 3 

or 4 months. So, it’s easy to see the progress when you’re looking 

at that. 

The large hospital projects in the Sunni triangle are back on 

track. Three of the provinces were transferred to Iraqi control on 

May 30. The Iraqi police are in control inside the city of Kirkuk. 

In Mosul, a mixed population of Sunni and Shia have been turned 

over to Iraqi control. Only a small U.S. presence remains in that 

area. Additionally, the Iraqi Army continues to perform very well. 

Although we tend to look at things by our standards, and sometimes that’s rather difficult to do. 

In visiting last week with General Petraeus on the overall picture, he says less than half of the al Qaeda leaders that were in 

Baghdad when the surge began are still in the city. Half of them 

are still in the city, less than half. They fled and are being killed 

and captured. Seventy-five percent reductions in religious and ethnic killings. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) decreased by 

the use of advanced IEDs. In fact, he said the IEDs, really, are 

dead now, it’s the advanced IEDs that we’re having a problem 

with. 

Ambassador Crocker, when we talked about the markets and 

about the economy, about the large hospital projects and this type 

of thing. Well, up in the Multinational Division North, Major General Benjamin R. Mixon’s, USA, area of responsibility, progress is 

being made. It’s in the right direction up there. The only problem 

is the city of Diyala is where most of the problems are. I think 

what’s happened is that as the successes in Anbar have taken 

place, it’s kind of squeezed it up into that area, and now it’s confined to Diyala at the present time. At least that’s my conclusion 

after being up there. 

Patrol Base Murray, the same thing there. I’ve had a chance to 

meet with former Iraqi Army Brigadier General Mustafa Kamel 

Hamad Shabib al-Jabouri (better known simply as General 

Mustafa), founder of Concerned Citizens, Iraq now three times, you 

probably did when you were over there, too. He’s the one who talks 

about the Concerned Citizen’s groups and how successful they have 

been. Your report also shows the success in the joint security stations, 32 of the 34, that benchmark, I think, is pretty healthy. That 

reflects a lot of progress. Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno 

talking about the progress in Iraq called it, ‘‘Baghdad, back to normalcy.’’ 

All these things are happening. I would also reflect that even 

earlier—this is about a month or 5 weeks ago—I observed progress, 

26

and I think a lot of it is due to the, not the political, but the religious leaders. I’ve kind of come to the conclusion that they’re more 

important than the political leaders. I remember in a hearing in 

this committee about a little over a year ago, it was predicted that 

Ramadi was going to be the terrorist capitol of the world. Well, now 

it’s under control and so is Fallujah. 

I’d say, the only question I’d have, and you can answer for the 

record, since I’ve gone over my time, can you tell us better ways 

that you suggest to measure this benchmark, and how a snapshot 

in time can accurately reflect a constantly evolving situation? In 

other words, provide more depth to the assignment that was given 

to you. 

Mr. WALKER. Sure. Let me briefly respond. First, we did what we 

were asked to do. 

Senator INHOFE. I said that already. 

Mr. WALKER. However, we did use ‘‘partially met’’ in an attempt 

to be fair and balanced and we provided more commentary, because 

even a ‘‘not met’’ doesn’t mean no progress, okay? So, you need to 

understand that. 

My personal view and professional opinion as Comptroller General of the United States is, that these 18 benchmarks need to be 

considered, but there are things beyond these 18 benchmarks that 

you ought to consider. Furthermore, ideally in evaluating any type 

of progress, including this type of progress, it’s good to look at 

where you stand as of a point in time, what progress you are making, and how does it relate to the commitments that have been 

made? 

I think having all of that information is relevant in order to be 

able to make the fully-informed view. That would be a suggestion 

that I would make for your consideration, to the extent that you 

want to continue to have GAO do something going forward. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s an excellent statement. Thank you so 

much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Reed is next, but he has agreed—as he 

is always so generous—to switch places in the order with Senator 

McCaskill. 

So, Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to tell you that I appreciate the atmosphere in 

which this report is released, is highly politically charged. I’m not 

sure that it could be more politically charged than this particular 

topic at this particular time with our Government and with our 

elected leaders. 

In that environment, I want to compliment what you’ve done because, as always, what the GAO has done, is you’ve been a fact 

gatherer and a fact reporter. I would challenge anyone in the administration, in DOD, in the military, in this committee, or in Congress to find a factual piece of information that you report here 

that is a mistake. I know that there has been a little controversy 

over your report in the House, when you testified I think they 

roughed you up a little bit. Let me tell you from my perspective, 

being called an auditor is the highest compliment that anyone 

could ever give you. I appreciate the fact that some of our colVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
27

leagues in the House called you an auditor, as if it was a derogatory term. 

I have read the facts and I want to state the obvious here. I have 

a great respect for General Petraeus too, but I think everyone 

needs to understand the differences in your positions. Who do you 

work for? Who do you work for, Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WALKER. I work for the Congress of the United States. I’m 

sorry. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s no doubt in my mind about that. 

Mr. WALKER. Believe me, I know. I just didn’t know it was a 

question. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It was a question. Who, in fact, does General Petraeus work for? Who is his boss? 

Mr. WALKER. The President of the United States is Commander 

in Chief. 

Senator MCCASKILL. His job is much different than yours. I appreciate that he’s going to have additional perspective that you 

could never bring to this discussion. 

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely. He’s management, he’s responsible for 

helping to define and execute the strategy. He’s on the ground, he’s 

extremely capable. You ought to seriously listen to what he has to 

say. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. I have looked at the nine benchmarks, I have honed in on the nine benchmarks that President 

Bush laid out in his speech to the American people in January, ‘‘A 

new way forward.’’ This was the President’s decision to lay out 

these nine benchmarks. It was his attempt to convince the American people that we were going to provide accountability. If we 

were going to put more lives on the line and go even deeper in debt 

in order to finance this effort, we were going to require certain 

commitments of the Iraqi Government. This was not anything Congress foisted upon him. These were his nine he laid out in his 

speech. 

I’ve looked at your analysis of those nine benchmarks. You say 

they have not been met in six instances. You give him partial credit, partially met for three of those. Six no, three partial. The President, in July, said four of those there had been satisfactory 

progress, four he admitted no, unsatisfactory progress. So, by his 

own report in July, four yes, four no, and then he said one partial. 

So, I tried to go in and look at one of those benchmarks in detail, 

the one where you say partial and he says it’s satisfactory, which 

concerns the spending of the $10 billion of Iraqi money. 

Now, there are several reasons I honed in on this. One, I think 

it will satisfy people because as one House member called you a 

bean-counter, this is about the finances, this is about the ability of 

the Iraqi Government to spend their money. 

Now, when I was in Iraq in June, I asked some of the Missouri 

soldiers on the ground what was their biggest challenge in one of 

these Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They said to me, ‘‘electricity.’’ They said that these people are getting 1 hour of electricity 

a day on average in Baghdad. Now, how in the world do we ever 

get to a point that they have any confidence whatsoever in their 

government if they can’t get electricity. Spending this money on infrastructure and capital projects, this $10 billion, a very modest 

28

amount—I hate to count the billions and billions we’ve spent—

ought to be something that we feel confident that they’re moving 

towards doing. It shouldn’t be that hard to spend money. We manage to do it around here without blinking an eye. 

I looked to see what, exactly, factually you found and what the 

President reported. As of the middle of the year, they had spent, 

according to the U.S. Embassy, $1.5 billion of the $10 billion—24 

percent—leaving 76 percent that had not yet been spent. But if you 

look behind that number, you find the Ministry of Oil’s money, you 

all determined, based on the Special Inspector General’s report, 

that of the $1.5 billion that they’re getting credit for spending, 

$500 million of that, they’re not confident that all has been spent. 

That’s because it was just transferred to the Marketing Division. 

There wasn’t really any evidence that it had actually been spent. 

If you look at the money that’s been given to the provinces, there 

is no confidence that that money is going to be spent. They haven’t 

even spent last year’s money yet, much less this year’s money, 

which in this instance, they’re not going to be allowed to carry forward. 

I read every word about that benchmark. Now, the interesting 

thing is, the President said it was satisfactory progress. Now, I 

would like you to speak about that benchmark, if you would, and 

talk about the factual basis for the difference between your findings. You said partially met, which by the way, I thought was wildly generous, because you’re saying because they’ve allocated it. For 

gosh sakes, allocating money is not spending money. If you would 

address that particular benchmark and the difference between the 

President and GAO. I’m trying to figure out where the spin is here 

and I got to tell you, with this benchmark, I don’t think there’s 

much spin on your side. I think you are being wildly generous and 

I think there’s a whole lot of spin going on, on the other side. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Obviously you’ve done a thorough job, again, in reading this report. I appreciate that. 

First, I’m proud to be a Certified Public Accountant, to be an 

auditor, among other things. 

What we did here, is we looked at the language. ‘‘Allocating and 

spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, 

including delivering of essential services on an equitable basis.’’ 

Now, they have allocated $10 billion. They have transferred some 

of the money, but clearly not most of the money. They’ve obligated 

even less and we have a concern as to whether or not this amount 

is ultimately going to be spent and whether or not it’s going to be 

spent in a manner that will result in delivering essential services 

on a equitable basis. 

The best we could get to was partial. We wanted to give them 

credit for the fact that they had allocated the money, they’ve transferred some of the money, they’ve spent some of the money. 

However, our opinion there has also been formed by work that 

we’ve done in many other areas in Iraq, where frankly they haven’t 

spent, historically, a lot of the money that’s been allocated. We 

think that, as I said, we based the work on these 18 benchmarks, 

not just on what we did in the last couple of months, but what 

29

we’ve done over several years and the track record that has been 

established there. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But I want to make it clear that the facts 

indicate, that of the $1.5 billion or 24 percent of the $10 billion, 

that the U.S. Embassy is saying has been spent, there is not even 

concrete factual evidence that we could rely on as auditors, that all 

of that money has actually even been expended, even though it was 

only 24 percent of the total. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, $1.5 billion, of course, would be 15 percent, so 

there’s other money in there, but they’ve transferred a certain 

amount, they’ve obligated a certain amount, they’ve spent a certain 

amount, but a significant majority of the funds don’t meet any of 

those criteria. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. I’m going to defer down to Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walker, I want to talk further with you about benchmark 15, 

which is a very important benchmark because it’s an evaluation of 

whether the Iraqi security forces can operate independently. 

Obviously, the scale and the success of the Iraqi security forces 

directly affects when our troops will be able to come home. Your 

assessment that this benchmark of increasing the number of Iraqi 

security forces units capable of operating independently, is that it 

was not met. It’s not one where you said there was limited progress 

or partially met. You say it was not met, and you even say that 

the number of capable forces has actually declined. 

This seems at odds with the testimony that we had yesterday 

from the Jones Commission. I have a great deal of respect for both 

the GAO and the Jones Commission. I am surprised that the conclusions seem to be so at odds on such a vital issue. I’d like to have 

you comment further on why GAO reached such a different assessment. 

Mr. WALKER. First Senator Collins, thank you very much for the 

question. Because in reality, the reason that we reached a different 

conclusion is because we had a different metric that we had to 

evaluate. 

As Chairman Levin mentioned earlier, if you look at categories 

one and two of the four readiness categories, you get a different 

number with regard to how many people, how many units might 

be able to operate either fully independently or lead. Our requirement was just to look at those who could operate fully independently. So in other words, category 1, the highest category. We’ve 

issued a classified report, which I would commend to you and every 

member of this committee, that clearly demonstrates why we put 

this benchmark in the not met category. Basically, we are looking 

only at category 1, because operating independently is category 1. 

They either went up, or they went down, or they stayed the same, 

and that’s in our classified report. 

Senator COLLINS. Sounds like we need to review the classified information, as well. 

30

This is an area that Senator Warner has been the leader on getting this assessment. I hope that the Jones Commission and GAO 

can come together on this issue because this is so vital to the ability of our troops to be able to turn over responsibility to the Iraqi 

security forces, and ultimately to their ability to be able to come 

home. 

There’s a broader issue that I want to raise with you to make 

sure that this committee fully understands what you mean by each 

of your assessments. Of the 18 benchmarks that were graded by 

the GAO, your report states that only 7 received a grade of met or 

partially met. So, of the other 11 benchmarks, are you implying 

that there’s been no progress at all? That the Iraqi Government is 

no further along on those benchmarks than they were a year ago? 

I’m trying to understand the difference between not met—which 

can be read as no progress at all, which I don’t think is really what 

you’re saying—versus partially met. 

Mr. WALKER. Again, thank you for this question because it helps 

add contextual sophistication. 

The biggest problem is in the legislative area. One of the exhibits 

that we had, which is on page eight of my testimony, illustrates the 

progress that has been made. So, on these, the ones that been met 

and not met. So, the fact that they’re not met doesn’t mean that 

nothing has been done, but it means that not nearly enough has 

been done in order to justify a partially met rating. As I mentioned 

earlier, my professional opinion is, the most meaningful information for Congress would be, not just to know where things stand 

as of a point in time, but also what type of progress is being made. 

It’s my understanding that Congress may have intended—and I 

don’t know this for sure, Senator Warner and Senator Levin 

would—that it was contemplated that this might end up being a 

baseline that could then provide a basis to compare. Even if that 

was the case, my personal view is you need to look at where do 

things stand and what progress is being made. You need to look 

at both in order to be able to consider that. That’s not what we 

were asked to do. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. If I could interject, Mr. Chairman. What 

amount of time and effort would it take for you to try and reconcile 

your data and put it into a format that comports with what we 

tasked the President to do, by way of the benchmark assessment? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, you asked the President to talk about 

progress rather than status. First thing we’d have to do is define, 

we’d have to come up with a definition of what’s satisfactory. 

Senator WARNER. Instead of taking up time getting into detail, 

do you think that you could take the criteria we laid down for the 

executive branch and apply your own metrics and come up with 

conclusions? 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I’d want to consult with my very capable staff on what were those metrics, are we comfortable with 

those metrics, and what do we think it would take. We will do that 

expeditiously. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Mr. WALKER. Get back to you later. 

31

Chairman LEVIN. Whether those metrics are available to you? 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to say aloha to Mr. Walker and welcome to you to this 

committee. 

I would like to first congratulate you and your staff for the excellent work you’ve done on reporting the Iraqi Government’s legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. I believe that the GAO 

conducted an excellent assessment of the Iraq benchmarks and I 

want to convey my appreciation, again, to you and your staff. 

The inability of the Iraqi Government to meet its benchmarks is 

one of the main issues in the overall debate regarding whether to 

begin redeployment of our troops. This report will provide us with 

valuable information in our deliberations on any future involvement of the U.S. military forces in Iraq. 

I do have few questions to you, Mr. Walker. The GAO’s report 

states that the Iraqi Government has provided $10 billion in its 

current budget for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, but that it is unlikely to be 

spent by the end of this year. As of July 31, the Iraqi Government 

had only about $1.5 billion of the allocated funds. 

Now, my question to you is can you tell us what is the underlying cause of the Iraqi’s failure to use their budgeted resources to 

rebuild critical infrastructure? In addition to that, could you describe some of the key projects that will likely not be accomplished 

if the Iraqi Government continues at this current pace? 

Mr. WALKER. First, whether or not the money will be spent depends, in great part, on their willingness and ability to spend that 

money. We have seen, historically, that amounts have been allocated, but not transferred. Of the amounts that have transferred 

have not necessarily been spent, in the past. Some of the reasons 

for that are that Iraq does not have a well-established capacity, as 

it relates to acquisition and contracting. They have a serious problem with regard to having an adequate number of people with the 

knowledge, the right type of systems and controls to get things 

done. 

Some people are concerned about moving too quickly because of 

the possibility of being accused of corruption or other types of activities if they don’t dot all the Is and cross all the Ts. So, I can’t 

comment on their willingness to spend it. I can comment on the 

fact that historically they have not had a good track record and 

some of that is because of the lack of enough people and enough 

infrastructure to be able to make it happen in a timely manner. I’ll 

be happy to provide, for the record, some examples of things that 

might not get done. 

[The information referred to follows:]

As we recently reported, the energy sector is critical for Iraq’s economy and for 

rebuilding the country. Experts estimate that over the next few years, $27 billion 

will be needed for the electricity sector to keep up with needed demand and $20 

to $30 billion will be needed for the oil sector to reach production goals. Since most 

U.S. reconstruction funds have been obligated, the Iraqi Government will need to 

assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq’s electricity and oil sectors. Major 

challenges to these efforts include continued security concerns, lack of expertise to 

32

plan for and maintain the infrastructure, and lack of a legislative framework that 

would encourage international investment.

Mr. WALKER. But as Senator McCaskill said before, they include 

reliable electricity and adequate, safe water, and appropriate levels 

of oil production. These are basic things that I think are important 

that they be measured. From a professional standpoint, I believe 

it’s important they be measured and reported on. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, GAO credits the Iraqi Government 

with meeting benchmark 16, ‘‘Ensuring that the rights of minority 

political parties in the Iraqi Legislature are protected.’’ However, 

the report then states that because of the security situation, Iraqi 

legislators interviewed by GAO insisted that the situation in their 

communities has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature, 

their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their 

ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. 

If I understand the report correctly, the Iraqis have met this 

benchmark because their constitution has provisions guaranteeing 

minority party rights. However, in practice, this benchmark is not 

actually being met because minority rights are still being violated. 

Is my understanding correct? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding, Senator Akaka, is the reason 

we showed this as met is because, in fact, they have enacted a constitution that provides for minority rights. There are issues, you 

talked about two. One, security—whether or not there’s adequate 

security for people to be able to get to the parliament to be able 

to exercise their rights. Second, there are significant sectarian 

issues. I mean, there are significant sectarian issues between the 

Shia, the Sunni, the Kurd, there are also significant issues within 

those segments, especially the Sunni segment. So, we assessed it, 

based upon the fact that they’ve done what they have to do, as a 

matter of law. But, let me come back to an issue I’ve mentioned 

before. 

One of the issues that they have to think about is how do they 

execute? The Shia have 60 percent of the population, the Kurds 

have 20 percent of the population, and the Sunnis have 20. Well, 

the Sunnis are used to running things on a totalitarian basis for 

awhile, but now they have only 20 percent in the democracy. On 

a vote basis, they’re not there. I think that’s one of the issues that 

you ought to try to find out more about, as to whether and to what 

extent that’s had a practical problem in being able to move forward 

in some areas where, otherwise, people might want to, and may 

even have the votes. 

Senator AKAKA. I’d like to ask about the impact the surge has 

had. If we have not improved the protection of minority rights of 

legislators, then it suggests that a fundamental tenant of the surge 

is not being met. Is there any evidence that the surge has improved 

the protection of the rights of minority members of the legislature? 

Mr. WALKER. We didn’t look to that level of detail, Senator 

Akaka. I think that one can say is the surge has had an impact 

in at least two areas. 

First, Anbar Province, and the efforts that we’re taking there to 

combat al Qaeda. Second, in the efforts of U.S. and Iraqi forces to 

try to be able to provide additional security, in major portions of 

Baghdad, including these joint security stations and related activiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
33

ties there. Those are the areas where I think the surge has had the 

most impact so far. 

But, keep in mind that one of the reasons for the surge was to 

provide, one of the Senators mentioned, ‘‘breathing room,’’ to make 

political progress. So far, that political progress has not been made. 

Hopefully, it can be and it will be, but so far, it has not. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker, for your responses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Chambliss? 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be brief so 

others can have a chance to make comments or ask questions before the vote. 

Mr. Walker, first all let me thank you for doing a great job. Your 

staff, too. Most everybody on this committee—not all, but most of 

us—have been in theater, we know the difficulties that you encounter there, and your staff is to be commended for taking the time, 

making the efforts, and really getting down to the core of some of 

the issues that need to be called to our attention, and addressed. 

It’s information like this that, I think, does provide us with the 

background to be able to make the decisions that we’re going to 

make, relative to the situation in Iraq. 

That being said, you have highlighted something that has concerned me from day one over there, and the more I’m in Iraq, the 

more I talk with people who are in theater, and I frankly agree 

with you about the issue of the lack of movement by the government. That’s the weakest aspect of what’s going on over there. 

I was pleased to hear you say that ‘‘not met’’ in your chart, 

doesn’t mean that there’s been no progress, because actually, I 

could probably argue with you, but it’s immaterial as to whether 

or not the ‘‘not met’’ is correct on a number of these. But, the fact 

is, I think you have fairly stated what’s going on over there, from 

the standpoint of the government not moving forward. 

By the same token, if you had assessed the commitments made 

by the current majority back in December, and done an assessment 

at the end of 6 months, I daresay it wouldn’t have looked very positive. It’s not just the current majority, you could take the previous 

majority in any Congress, and assess the activity of Congress, and 

I don’t think we would have scored very well on a points chart, like 

you’ve been tasked to do. 

So, I think you’ve done a good job in making the point that they 

have failed to achieve some of these benchmarks. But, it does appear from your report that they are moving forward. 

The one chart that you had up there, relative to the level of violence, brings to mind a charge that we saw yesterday from General 

Jones, that’s probably the most significant I’ve seen relative to the 

conflict in Iraq. It was a chart which, unlike yours which simply 

shows the number of incidents of violence, and whether it had gone 

up or down, and that could be a suicide bomber walking in and 

blowing up 100 people, or it could be a few rifle shots, on incidents 

of violence. 

What General Jones’ chart showed was the decrease in violent 

activity in the City of Baghdad. He took it over a timeframe of several months. What that diagram showed, that the incidences of violence are shrinking. The area where the incidents of violence are 

34

occurring, is shrinking. That bears out exactly what I expect to 

hear from General Petraeus next week, and what I have personally 

seen on the ground in Iraq when I’ve been there, and that is that 

we are making great strides from a military perspective, and that 

our men and women wearing the uniform are doing a terrific job. 

General Petraeus is also, I think, going to validate what you 

have reported to us, that the government has a long way to go. 

In summary, I just want to say, I think you’ve done a good job 

of coming forward with facts, with telling us, you’re giving us a report of your investigation of the benchmarks that we have tasked 

you to address. I look forward to seeing additional reports like this, 

Mr. Chairman, as we move forward, under whatever scenario we 

undertake, after General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker’s report. 

Mr. Walker, thanks to you and your folks. We commend you for 

a job well done. 

Mr. WALKER. Senator Chambliss, so I can mention quickly, for 

your benefit and the benefit of the other members of the committee—this graphic is just total activity, it’s not lethality—there’s 

a difference as to what type of casualties might cover. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Yes. 

Mr. WALKER. In our classified report, we do have information on 

Baghdad, versus overall. I would commend our classified report—

as well as a classified report from the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to you to look at. I think, though, they’re both important. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Yes, I agree. I think that’s much more 

meaningful than just a diagram showing spikes up and down. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

General, let me thank you—not only for your work, and for your 

staff’s work, but your staff is not unaccustomed to dealing with 

these issues. In fact, not only their expertise individually, but their 

experience over the last 4 or 5 years, with this topic in particular, 

is outstanding. 

This is not a drive-by evaluation. These are people, I presume, 

who are deeply, on a daily basis, involved. They have a perspective, 

as well as the expertise to look at these issues, and I thank you 

for that. 

I think one of the critical issues that we’re going to have to address is the issue of these numbers, the accuracy of numbers. You 

point out, there’s a difference in methodology, that you differ with 

General Petraeus’ command. In that line, there was an article yesterday in the Washington Post that pointed out that DOD, in their 

releasing death counts, dramatically shifted the results from last 

year to this year. They had a report released in March which 

showed a peak in December 2006 of approximately 1,200 and then 

they had a June report that showed that to increase. General 

Petraeus is using that as his baseline, the increased numbers. Can 

you comment, at all, about the General’s methodology, or the issue 

of whether these numbers are accurate? 

35

Mr. WALKER. We’re generally comfortable with the approach 

that’s taken on Figure 4 which is on page 10. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. I would commend to you, Senator, and the other 

members of this committee, our classified report, that supplements 

this non-classified report, because there’s information in it that’s 

directly relevant to our concerns with regard to data on sectarian 

violence. There’s a lot of emphasis on that, and I think you need 

to look at that. 

Senator REED. I appreciate that very much, and certainly we 

don’t want to intrude publicly here, today. But, we’re going to have 

a very public debate. General Petraeus will make public statements 

about the decrease in violence, about the level, et cetera, and if 

there are details in that classified report that we can’t divulge, 

then we, frankly, are disadvantaged. 

I just wonder, from your perspective, without broaching the security which we all recognize, do you have a comment on the accuracy? The methodology? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, let me give you a comment that would be 

non-classified. First, his (General Petraeus’) data will show that 

sectarian violence is going down, in recent months. He will show 

that. Second, we are not comfortable with the methodology that’s 

used to determine, of total violence, which is sectarian-related, and 

which is non-sectarian-related. It’s extremely difficult to do that, 

since people don’t necessarily leave calling cards when certain 

things happen. Even if there is some type of attempt to leave information, you don’t know the accuracy or reliability of it. 

So, we’ve said that his data will show it’s gone down. We’re not 

comfortable with the methodology, and please read the classified 

report, because it’s not just our view. 

Senator REED. I will do that, but let me ask you another question, which I think is appropriate. Your data, as I look at your 

chart, suggests a decrease in violence over the last month or so, is 

that fair? 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. It showed an increase in violence, overall, 

up until June——

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. The surge reached its full level in mid-June. It 

shows a decrease since June, and the level at the end of July of 

total violence is roughly the same as it was in February 2007. 

Senator REED. General Petraeus’ methodology shows a much 

steeper decrease, is that fair? 

Mr. WALKER. His sectarian data, I think, shows a more dramatic 

decline. I don’t have it in front of me, and I can’t get much more 

specific than that. 

Senator REED. If this dramatic decline is urged upon us, at least 

from a methodological basis, you have questions about that? 

Mr. WALKER. We have questions about it. The other thing you 

have to look at is, is it sustainable? You’ll have to ask the General 

that and you’ll also have to look at what’s going on—this is in our 

classified report, too, which you need to look at. You need to look 

at what migration has been taking place. If you look at what Baghdad looks like today, versus 4 years ago, with regard to which portions of the city are mixed, and which portions of the city are preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
36

dominantly Sunni or Shia, you’ll see there’s been considerable migration, and you’ll also know that there is more difficulty in movement between one area to another. 

Senator REED. You’ve anticipated my next line of questioning, 

which is ethnic cleansing. One of the consequences is perhaps because they succeeded in pushing people out of these neighborhoods, 

that the intimidation, the violence, the killing has gone down a bit 

that’s not a good sign, that’s just a consequence of the facts on the 

ground, is that the case? 

Mr. WALKER. Our classified report has more information on it. 

Senator REED. Can I ask you, this might seem like a dumb question, but why is this classified? I mean, who are we trying to keep 

this information from, the American people? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, we’re not the ones that decide whether or not 

it’s classified, and we’ve expressed concerns in the past as to 

whether or not there’s over-classification. 

Senator REED. The only people who are not getting this information, frankly, are the American people, and Congress, in an open 

session, where we can honestly and fairly debate these issues with 

people who have access to this information, and can choose to divulge what they want, or not. 

Mr. WALKER. I would respectfully request, Senator Reed, you 

ought to ask the administration witnesses that. Because the administration is the one that decides whether or not to classify 

data—whichever administration it is, that’s not new, it’s been that 

way for a long time. 

Senator REED. Your point about ethnic cleansing was one that I 

wanted to address, and that is—this might be peripheral to the 

benchmarks you’ve looked at. But, I presume from what you’ve 

said, your conclusion is that there’s been a significant ethnic displacement within Baghdad. 

Mr. WALKER. There’s been significant migration within Baghdad, 

correct. 

Senator REED. Also, migration out of the country, internal displacement, unrelated to Baghdad, all over the country? 

Mr. WALKER. Correct, and we have data on that, and others have 

data on that. Again, I think our classified report, and the NIE classified report are two things, for sure, you need to read. 

Senator REED. I guess the final point, and it’s more of a comment 

than a question, is that, we’ve had, I think, a very important debate about, one, why should it be classified, and two, what’s the difference between the different methodologies. My presumption 

would be that, for the Iraqi citizen, this is all very immaterial. 

They’re living in a very violent atmosphere which undermines their 

trust in their government, and undermines the ability of the government to function, and not much has changed in that regard, 

even as we debate the nuances of sectarian versus non-sectarian. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, in my professional opinion, I think one of the 

things that Congress needs to consider is whether or not the relevant benchmark should be sectarian violence or total violence. It’s 

difficult to be able to determine the difference, and to some people, 

a casualty, is a casualty, is a casualty. 

Senator REED. Final point—and this might go more for anecdotal 

responses. My impression is that many of these sectarian, ideologVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
37

ical groups, also engage deliberately in criminal activity, and so 

that the same person could be taking you out, because he wants 

your money, and an hour later, taking you out, because he doesn’t 

like your religion, or your politics, or your clothes. Is that, sort of, 

fair? 

Mr. WALKER. There’s significant criminal activity, there’s significant corruption that exists, as well, in Iraq. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Walker, you said, just to clarify one point 

of Senator Reed’s that you don’t do the classification? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who did the classification of Benchmark 13? 

Mr. WALKER. DOD. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think that that was the specific 

benchmark that you were referring to. 

Mr. WALKER. I think so, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. What we will be doing is making an urgent request to the Secretary of Defense to reconsider the classification of 

that benchmark, and any other benchmark, or part of that document which any member of this committee wants to add to the request. So, we’re not just limiting the request to one benchmark. 

So, if by 3:00 this afternoon, any member of the committee wants 

to seek reconsideration of any part of the classified part of the GAO 

report, kindly let our staff director, Rick DeBobes, know and we 

will include that in an urgent request, that over the weekend there 

be reconsideration of this classification. I briefly looked at this, and 

I don’t quite understand the reason for the classification. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, you’re correct, it is number 13. Also, 

I would point out for 13, there are two levels there, first the level 

of sectarian violence, and second, eliminating militia control of local 

security—both the administration and we are in agreement, there 

has not been elimination of militia control of local security, and 

we’ve already talked about the sectarian violence issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, now, Senator Warner, again, you 

would be next. 

Senator WARNER. I’m going to defer to Senator Thune. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune, let me ask you—have you 

voted? 

Senator THUNE. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t mean to intrude on your privacy, here. 

The vote, I think, only is for a few more minutes. I’m happy to recognize you if you want to stay here, but that’s a risk that you 

carry. If not, would you—when you’re finished—just simply recess 

for the call of the chair. 

Senator THUNE [presiding]. I will be happy to recess it, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, and your 

staff for an excellent work product, and for the very thorough and 

detailed way in which you go about this. 

The one distinction you made that I think is a very relevant one, 

when you said that you’re tasked with determining status as opposed to progress. I think that standard is a little bit different for 

our benefit and use. I think it would be very helpful if you can 

38

have apples-to-apples comparisons with this report, and some of 

the other reports that are being made, and just so that there is 

some, I guess, standard threshold that we’re all using when we 

evaluate whether or not we are making headway and making 

progress. 

There’s one in particular that I would like to question, I’d like 

to draw to your attention, with regard to that issue, and that is, 

yesterday the committee received testimony from the Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF) Assessment Commission, the Jones Commission, that 

the ISF was made up of two parts—the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi 

police. Benchmark 11 in your report, does that apply to both the 

Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police force? I guess my question is, in 

assessing the benchmark, how did you define Iraqi security forces? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is it’s both forces. Consistent 

with what you heard from the Jones Commission yesterday, there’s 

a much greater problem with the police forces than with the Army. 

Senator THUNE. In writing your assessment of this benchmark, 

you said you lumped them together? You put them together? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct. 

Senator THUNE. In other words, you did not differentiate or distinguish between the two, and clearly, I think, in terms of at least 

their testimony yesterday, there is a very clear difference between 

the progress that’s being made, and the work that’s being done by 

the Iraqi Army, versus the Iraqi police force? 

Mr. WALKER. Senator, I think one of the things that we would 

like to have the opportunity to work with this committee on, if you 

want us to do additional work, going forward, is how these benchmarks might be refined, and how they might be able to be enhanced, and coming back to where you started—the best type of information that you would have from my professional opinion, would 

be where do things stand on relevant benchmarks, and what 

progress is being made? You could require all parties to do the 

same, and then you have an apples-to-apples comparison that you 

can deal with and reach your own judgment. 

Senator THUNE. That would be very useful, and I know, even 

with regard to the, the violence numbers, the casualty numbers, 

and there are sort of different metrics that are being used, but I 

think it would be extremely helpful if there was some way in which 

these metrics could be applied in the, essentially, same way. 

Mr. WALKER. I think they can be, they should be, we can help 

you if you want to do that. But again, we did what we were asked 

to do, but we did provide more information, in order to help you 

get a sense as to whether, and to what extent, progress has been 

made, both in the areas that we assessed as not met, as well as 

those areas where we assessed as partially met. 

Senator THUNE. I guess one of the reasons I say that is, at least 

the way this is being interpreted out there by the media and the 

public and others, are this report is very much at odds with the 

other reports. I’m not sure there is as much difference there as is 

being reported, but it’s primarily, in my view, because you were 

tasked differently than some of these other Commissions have 

been. 

Mr. WALKER. We’ve tried to make that very clear, right up front, 

at the beginning of the report, on the highlights page, at the beginVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
39

ning of my testimony. We stand behind our report. I think next 

week when General Petraeus comes, and you need to seriously consider what he and Ambassador Crocker have to say. The biggest 

area of disagreement will be on the sectarian violence issue. We’ve 

already talked about that, and our classified report has a lot more 

information you need to look at there, I think. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate that. I have to run and vote, thank 

you again for your good work. 

Mr. WALKER. We’ll be in recess, from what I understand. 

Senator THUNE. I will slam the gavel and put us in recess until 

the chairman is able to return. Thank you. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator. [Recess.] 

Senator WEBB [presiding]. The committee will be in order. We’re 

going to continue the testimony, Senator Graham has another engagement. He’s asked to give his questions now, so we’ll begin with 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator Webb, that’s very kind of 

you. I appreciate you letting me do that so I can catch my flight. 

Mr. Walker, I’d just add my high opinion of you to the list of people who said nice things about you. I have to work with you and 

your staff on Social Security. You all really do a good job for us. 

Now, your paycheck, I think, comes from Congress, is that right? 

Mr. WALKER. It comes from the Treasury, but I work for Congress. 

Senator GRAHAM. Work for Congress, and you’ve come to Congress many times, saying things about entitlement reform, I think, 

that Congress needs to hear. So, the fact that you’re employed by 

this body, I’ve never once thought for a second that you would say 

anything other than what, professionally, you’ve arrived at, and I 

hope people believe that about General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Crocker, because I think you all have that in common. You just 

have different universes from which you come. 

But this information you’re giving Congress is important, and I 

think the American people want to know where we’re at in Iraq, 

and what does it look like going forward. 

Now, the political reconciliation part, is the prize. You can have 

a million troops in Iraq, it is not going to change things in a permanent fashion until the government reconciles itself. What is your 

belief regarding a breakthrough in the next 60 days regarding legislation called de-Baathification, or provincial election legislation 

being passed in Baghdad? 

Mr. WALKER. Senator Graham, I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to try to give you odds on that. I will tell you, as I 

noted in my testimony, based on our work, that was part of the National Unity Accord that’s been signed. 

Senator GRAHAM. That was about 2 weeks ago, right? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. How do you evaluate that Unity Accord? Is 

that a significant event for you? 

Mr. WALKER. It is a significant event, but it states intent, and 

as you can see from this graphic here, there are lots of steps you 

have to go through, in the legislative process, in order to make it 

a reality. 

40

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me, that when Congress 

really wants to do something, it will do it, and when it finds reasons not to, it won’t? 

Mr. WALKER. There are lots of reasons not to move things, but 

when there is agreement, broad-based agreement, things can happen quickly. 

Senator GRAHAM. From your visit, did you sense a war-weariness 

among the Iraqi people that you met with, that they were tired of 

the killing and the dying? 

Mr. WALKER. We really were focusing on meeting with officials 

necessary to do this assessment rather than individual Iraqi citizens on the street. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, now when it comes to sectarian violence, 

whether it’s going up or down—I remember very graphically, when 

it was being reported out of Iraq that sectarian violence is spiraling 

out of control, about a year ago. Do you remember that? 

Mr. WALKER. I remember when it was a major concern, in fact, 

as you remember, Senator Graham, undoubtedly that one of the 

primary reasons that the President proposed the surge is to try to 

be able to try to get sectarian violence under control, in order to 

give breathing space for political progress. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. How did we measure sectarian violence 

then? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is, it was MNF–I, as it is now. 

But, it’s in the classified briefing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, no one seemed to argue with the fact that 

the numbers had gone up. I’m just curious as to why somebody 

would question the same methodology if they show a drop? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. WALKER. We’re not saying they’re wrong—we’re just not saying they’re right. It’s very difficult to be able to determine. 

Senator GRAHAM. You could say that about whether or not they’d 

spiked, I guess. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, that’s true. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, right. 

Mr. WALKER. If they’re using the same methodology now that 

they were then, which I can’t say right now then I would have had 

the same concerns. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, right. Yes, but the bottom line is, if it’s 

the same methodology, one could argue that they were wrong when 

the numbers went up, you could argue they’re wrong when they’re 

coming down, but if it’s the same methodology, at least you’re comparing apples to apples. 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, the idea of using the information 

is, obviously, it’s for every Senator to determine how to put this 

puzzle together, and you’re part of the puzzle. General Jones’ testimony, and then we’ll have Ambassador Crocker, and General 

Petraeus and your report, and we’ll have to put this puzzle together. 

One of the questions that drives me the most is—if we decided 

now to withdraw a large number of troops at a date certain, and 

we declared it, that we would reduce our forces by half, say, in 6 

41

months—do you have any idea how that would affect future 

progress? 

Mr. WALKER. Senator, it would be speculation for me to say that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. WALKER. That’s beyond the scope of what we were asked to 

do. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, right. Well, thank you very much for 

your service, and for giving us the information that you’ve provided 

to the committee about a snapshot of where we stand, based on 

some areas. Did you look at the police at all? 

Mr. WALKER. We did look at the police as it relates to the security forces, for example, even-handed enforcement of the law—any 

place where it talked about security forces. Our work, not just with 

regard to this particular report, but past reports, have shown significant differences between challenges associated with the police 

and the Army. 

Senator GRAHAM. I certainly agree with that. I don’t know why 

the police are more sectarian, why they’re so far behind, but they 

certainly are. 

Mr. WALKER. In many cases, Senator Graham, it’s because the 

police are hired at the provincial or local level rather than at the 

national level. 

Senator GRAHAM. That doesn’t bother me, if you have local policeman policing the local area, that’s okay. But the National Ministry of Interior seems to have a bias that is unhealthy. Did you 

look at the judiciary at all? 

Mr. WALKER. No, we did not look at the judiciary. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can I ask, Senator Levin, the next time we do 

a benchmark, that we consider looking at the rule of law from the 

judicial side? The detention policy side? Because, I have seen some 

progress, but I’ll be honest with you, Senator Levin, there are 

many concerns there, and this is an area where I think Congress 

can reinforce some gains we’ve made, and I’ll just put that on the 

table, that maybe we’ll add that to our list next time. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Graham, you’ve made that 

very compelling point for a long time, and I think most of us have, 

hopefully, soaked in what you and a few others on this committee 

have talked about in terms of the lacking infrastructure in the justice area. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course, Senator Warner is also the author 

of the benchmark legislation, but I’m sure the next round it could, 

and should, be added. 

The focus of these benchmarks, though, just to kind of remind 

everyone—is that these are the self-adopted benchmarks by the 

Iraqi government. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, I understand, I understand. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, we were trying to judge them by their own 

standards. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely, absolutely, absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. I agree with you that there are other indications, such as yours, which need to be added. 

42

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you for sharing this information with 

us, and to your staff who made it possible, and went over there to 

Iraq, we appreciate their service, too. Thank you. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walker, I first would like to echo my agreement with something that Senator McCaskill said. There are so many different 

components here that are being brought forward to us in order to 

attempt to make an evaluation of the situation that we face. The 

scope of what you were asked to do, really, is pretty much a result 

of what the administration laid forward as to what they said they 

were going to do. 

I go back, first of all, to the speech that the President made in 

January when he announced the surge. These are things that the 

Iraqis said they were going to do. One of the major components of 

that was—and I’m going to directly quote his speech, that they 

would ‘‘establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take 

responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November.’’ 

Did you see any indication that that actually is going to occur? 

Mr. WALKER. It’s unrealistic to expect that Iraqi Security Forces 

will take total control of every province by November of this year. 

Senator WEBB. Did you get any feeling from the reports that you 

got as to how many of those provinces would be fully controlled by 

the Iraqi? 

Mr. WALKER. No, Senator Webb, that was beyond the scope of 

what we were asked to do. 

Senator WEBB. Okay. 

Mr. WALKER. So, we did not. 

Senator WEBB. One of the other points that I think is important 

here, at any time that we have these sorts of emotional, and politically-driven debates, it’s very important to understand the facts. I 

think we can argue about conclusions all we want, but I think facts 

themselves need to be fully understood before we can proceed to 

the argument beyond them. 

I’m saying that because yesterday, one of the set of facts that 

sort of jumped out at me, when General Jones and his Commission 

were reporting, was they said at least three times in their testimony that the Iraqi casualty rate was higher, significantly higher, 

than the American casualty rate, and they had a chart that showed 

the same kind of chart that you have on the Average Daily EnemyInitiated Attack Incidents. But, when I sat down and added up the 

numbers of Iraqis that they were including, operationally—the 

Iraqi military, the Iraqi police, the territorial forces, et cetera, the 

people under their Ministry of Interior—when you added those up, 

there were 3.6 times as many Iraqis, notionally, at risk as there 

were Americans in Iraq, and if you played that back into the data, 

it showed that the Iraqis were not taking casualties at a rate higher than we were, the American forces, and in fact, I would venture—they didn’t have the data available yesterday—but I would 

venture that if you took the police casualties out of that formula, 

that you would see markedly higher American casualties actually 

out in the operating environment. 

43

I say that as an example of how we need to really look at facts 

before we reach conclusions. Now I have a question with respect to 

the chart, and I know, I watched your opening statement from my 

office before I came down here, and I saw the caveats that you 

were putting in to this chart, but I’m just wondering here—on the 

one hand, what we’re measuring in your chart, Figure 3, as it’s in 

front of me, the Average Number of Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks, 

showing that they went up, and now that, there’s a drop at the 

very end of this chart, that it could be argued that the average 

number of attacks are down, but how does that play out in terms 

of casualties? I’m not seeing casualties? The reason that I ask this 

is—there are two reasons that I ask this, and I think it’s very important, at least from my understanding of where we’re going on 

this. The first is that we’re seeing more sophisticated methods of 

attack. In fact, I think you even mentioned that, the sophistication 

of the IEDs and that sort of thing. I think it was you that had mentioned that——

Mr. WALKER. It wasn’t me, it was a Senator. 

Senator WEBB. —but, with a more highly sophisticated device, 

you’re going to have fewer attacks, but they’re going to be more effective. So, that doesn’t mean that fewer attacks mean fewer casualties. 

The second reason I’m asking this, is because there was an article in the Associated Press (AP) about 10 days ago, that said that 

the average number of civilian deaths in Iraq actually was double 

this year than last year—went from 30 to 62, according to this AP 

article. Would you comment on that with respect to your chart? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, Senator, I would respectfully suggest that you 

should consider several things. First, our chart, which is on page 

10, which talks about the average number of daily enemy-initiated 

attacks against the coalition or Iraqi security forces and civilians. 

As you can see, there’s a significant difference in the incidents of 

attacks on the coalition forces, which includes our forces—primarily 

our forces—versus the Iraqi security forces. There are a lot more 

attacks on coalition forces than there are Iraqi security forces. 

Second, I think you also need to consider lethality. In other 

words, this is the amount of attacks, but there are different natures of attacks. Some are more effective than others, so I think 

you ought to consider that as well, and you ought to break that 

down based on coalition, Iraqi security forces, and civilians. 

Senator WEBB. Exactly. That’s exactly my point. Now, you have 

a chart that indicates—this goes a little bit to the point that Senator Reed was trying to make earlier about how we need to be able 

to articulate actually what’s going on in this debate that we’re 

going to have. We have this chart that shows the number, average 

number of daily attacks, but I don’t see a chart that shows the casualty implications. 

Mr. WALKER. We have some additional data in our classified report, but what I would respectfully suggest, Senator Webb, for you 

and any other member of this committee, if there are things that 

you don’t have in there that you want, let me know, and we’ll see 

what we can do. 

44

Senator WEBB. So, you don’t have any information that would illuminate the AP article about the doubling in the number of average casualties? 

Mr. WALKER. We have some more information in our classified 

report, and candidly, I’m a little bit uncomfortable in recalling 

which of this is classified and nonclassified—that’s why I’d rather 

deal with it offline, if we can. 

Senator WEBB. All right. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb, Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to draw the witness’s attention to a matter that you and I observed on our trip. I’m not sure that in the 

course of your work, Comptroller General, that you examined this. 

But, it’s a question of the foreign military sales problem, which 

Senator Levin and I received a briefing on by the senior ranking 

officers in Iraq. That this system has failed to deliver in a timely 

fashion a great deal of essential military equipment, required both 

by the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police. I think I speak for my 

chairman—both of us were astounded. Because we keep trying to 

push both of these organizations to train and prepare, and to take 

up a greater burden—did you have an opportunity to look into that 

issue? 

Mr. WALKER. Not as part of this engagement, Senator Warner. 

But I will, as soon as I get back to the office, find out if we’re doing 

anything else on it, outside of this engagement and get back to 

both of you and let you know. 

Senator WARNER. Fine. 

You join me in that request? 

Chairman LEVIN. I do. As a matter of fact, our staffs have drafted for us the letter which we will—— 

Senator WARNER. Letter that we’re sending today. 

Mr. WALKER. It sounds like we will be soon doing work there. It’s 

very worthwhile. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will send you a copy of that letter, so that 

you can tell us whether or not you could add to this inquiry, because it is a very serious business. 

Mr. WALKER. Be happy to do that, Senator. We look forward to 

taking a look at it. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Foreign Military Sales. CG commits to provide additional information to the committee regarding any ongoing GAO work. 

The Iraqi Government is making an effort to address longstanding procurement 

and contracting problems by procuring items for its security forces through the U.S. 

foreign military sales program (FMS). To date, the Government of Iraq has committed about $3.3 billion for U.S. military sales. According to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I), these funds are being used lo procure 

a variety of items such as small arms, ammunition, uniforms, body armor, vehicles, 

aircraft, and other items. 

According to U.S. Government officials, the Iraqi Government has expressed concern about the length of time it takes to procure items through the FMS process. 

However. MNSTC–I and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials stated that Iraqi Government officials had unrealistic expectations regarding FMS processing time frames leading to an ‘‘expectations gap.’’ Officials also noted that efforts 

to expedite the current FMS process are hindered by a number of factors, including 

Iraq’s difficulty in defining military requirements, insufficient U.S. and Iraqi staffing, the absence of an Iraqi Government multiyear acquisition strategy to guide future procurement efforts, and competing demands for similar equipment for U.S. 

45

and Iraqi security forces, such as M–16 rifless. To address these issues, the military 

departments, DSCA, MNSTC–I, and others have initiated efforts lo help the Iraqi 

Government better define requirements, increased security assistance office staffing 

and training, and implemented a new tracking system to provide increased visibility 

over FMS procurements for U.S. and Iraqi Governments officials, among other efforts.

Senator WARNER. Also, in the report yesterday by that very distinguished group, headed up by General Jones, they talked about 

the need to have a more rapid transfer of authority, security responsibilities and the like, to the various provincial governments. 

I think 6 of them, now, have been given the authority, 6 out of the 

18. It seems as though the distressing chapters of fact that we have 

received here in the past week or 10 days, indicate less and less 

hope respecting the ability to have reconciliation at the top, again 

to work down, and more the administration and others are putting 

emphasis on the importance of the small, but nevertheless, significant, reconciliation that’s growing up, particularly in the al Anbar 

province and elsewhere, amongst the Sheiks and so forth, now 

working with the coalition forces, and trying to cut down the sectarian violence, and reinforcing our efforts against al Qaeda. 

But, it seems to me, the more we bring upon the Federal system, 

such as it exists, the Maliki Government, to begin to accelerate the 

transfer of authority—they call it the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) 

Program—down to these regional authorities, the faster this, somewhat, interesting growth of bottom-up reconciliation. I tell you the 

public has to be confused about all of these terms. Because we all 

started off on reconciliation at the top on January 10, and if we do 

the surge, and secure the military operations, Maliki will have in 

place a whole framework of achievements on reconciliation down—

well, it’s not happening. 

So, back to the question. Did you address the advisability of the 

PIC Program, and accelerating it to move authority down? 

Mr. WALKER. That was beyond our scope, Senator Warner. I will 

note that, as I said before, there has been progress in al Anbar 

province, in particular with regard to combating al Qaeda. Al 

Anbar province is about 5 percent of the population of Iraq and is 

not a mixed population, it’s overwhelmingly a Sunni population. 

Senator WARNER. Also, did you make reference as sort of a 

benchmark to the important contributions provided by the NIE, 

which is the consensus of 16 of our intelligence organizations, with 

regard to certain, they sort of laid them out as benchmarks? 

Mr. WALKER. We did consider input from the intelligence agencies. We did read, were aware, and did consider that, and we also 

commend to you the classified version of that, which I’m sure 

you’ve probably already read. 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Mr. WALKER. I would encourage other members to read it. 

Senator WARNER. Oh, yes. Well then, just for this record, I wondered if we could ask these questions. If your research and findings 

support the Intelligence Community findings contained in the unclassified key judgments of the NIE on Iraq issued last month. The 

first one, was the Intelligence Community assesses that ‘‘to the extent that coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi security 

46

forces, that Iraq security will continue to improve modestly during 

the next 6 to 12 months.’’ 

Mr. WALKER. We did not, Senator Warner, project where we 

think things were going from here. Because our task was to assess 

where things stood as of a particular point in time. 

Senator WARNER. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. So that’s beyond what we were asked to do. 

Senator WARNER. All right. The next one, ‘‘the Intelligence Community assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next 6 to 12 months.’’ 

Mr. WALKER. Again, we did not attempt to project where we 

think things were going. 

Senator WARNER. All right. 

Mr. WALKER. We felt that was beyond our scope. I will note for 

the record, Senator Warner, that there are a number of aspects of 

the unclassified version of the National Intelligent Estimate on 

Iraq that we do concur with and I’m happy to—— 

Senator WARNER. Well, I tell you what. If you could provide for 

the record those findings of the NIE with which you have concurrence and, more specifically, if there are findings with which you 

have a professional differences of view. 

Mr. WALKER. Within the scope of what we were asked to do? 

Senator WARNER. Within the scope. 

Mr. WALKER. We will do that. 

Senator WARNER. There’s one very important one. The NIE also 

assessed changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily 

counterinsurgency and stabilization role to more of a support role, 

‘‘Would erode security gains achieved thus far.’’ Now, that might 

fall within the parameters of your metrics. 

Mr. WALKER. We’ll take a look at it, Senator, and we will be 

happy to do what we can. 

Senator WARNER. I thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just to clarify that request, however, if it 

doesn’t fall within in your scope, make it clear. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That’s a good point. 

We’ll do that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Government Accountability Office can provide some additional classified information on this issue. However, this briefing will require codeword clearance.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to begin by 

thanking you and, particularly, Senator Warner, for his kind remarks about Senator Snowe and myself. 

Senator WARNER. I remember you came up to me on the floor 

and you felt that this was an important element. Since we’re in a 

posture here in Congress of trying to facilitate the maximum 

amount of information that can be utilized by Congress in making 

its decisions—as well as the general public—and hopefully some of 

these constructive findings by this organization, General Jones, 

and others can contribute to the President’s and synthesis of all 

this information, and his final remarks with regard to such strategy changes as he deems appropriate. 

47

Senator BAYH. Well, that was exactly our intent, and I think that 

is going to be the result of the GAO’s report. But it wouldn’t have 

happened without you, Senator, so I want to thank you and the 

chairman for your support. 

Since the outset of this undertaking with the weapons of mass 

destruction situation, we’ve struggled to get accurate information 

upon which we can base our decisions. Issues of credibility have 

been raised because some of the reports previously have been inaccurate about things. Your report is very helpful, serving as an objective marker against which to measure other assessments and to 

compare other assessments, just as Senator Warner was doing with 

the declassified versions of the NIE. We’re going to hear from General Petraeus, as well, and we heard yesterday from General Jones, 

and so forth. So thank you for helping the American people and 

those of us as policymakers get access to the facts so we can make 

the best decisions possible. 

Mr. Walker, I really enjoyed your interaction with Senator 

McCaskill, one accountant to another—I’m going to ask you to, perhaps, help us, not only ascertain the facts, but perhaps draw some 

lessons from them. It may, at times, go close to going beyond the 

scope of your report, but you’re an intelligent man and I’d appreciate your opinion, whether personal or official. 

The first is the progress—as you noted—has so far just not been 

made on the political front. Everyone agrees that, ultimately, we’ve 

made some security gains, our troops are behaving heroically. If 

success in Iraq was solely up to them, we’d be doing very well. But 

it’s not solely up to them. Ultimately, we can not create a country 

for the Iraqis. They have to do their part and that involves political 

reconciliation, and it just hasn’t been happening. 

I’m wondering if you’ve developed an opinion in the course of 

compiling this report and assessing that the political progress has 

not been adequate, why that has been. I mean, their country is at 

risk of falling apart. They’re dying, we’re dying. Why not the 

progress? Where’s the sense of urgency? What’s holding this up? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first Senator Bayh, I would not express a personal opinion because I don’t think it’s appropriate to separate my 

position as Comptroller General of the United States from my personal opinion. Therefore, to the extent that I comment, it will be 

based upon our work and my personal interaction. 

Senator BAYH. I’m just asking for your assessment to the extent 

you have one. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. I think what I would suggest is, the level of 

complexity in Iraq is much greater than the level of complexity in 

the United States with regard to getting things done, because of 

the sectarian differences, because of the newness of their Republic, 

and a variety issues. 

Senator BAYH. Historic enmities, and the cycle of violence, and 

the neighbors intruding, and the list goes on and on and on. 

Mr. WALKER. We don’t have the type of activity in our streets, 

thank God. 

Senator BAYH. Here’s the direction I’m going with this question. 

Is it possible, in your opinion, that in spite of our best efforts, and 

the heroic sacrifices of our military and others, that since this is 

ultimately up to them and the process of political reconciliation, 

48

given the challenges that they face, it just may ultimately not be 

doable for them. 

Mr. WALKER. I think only time will tell. I think one of the things 

that one has to keep in mind is that with the Sunnis having 20 

percent of population, but accustomed to being in charge, with the 

Kurds having 20 percent, and with the Shia having 60—of which 

that’s not a single block—they may be, and I don’t know this for 

a fact, doing scenario analysis. Each group may be doing scenario 

analysis as to how do we come out based on this course of action 

versus an alternative course of action. I can’t put myself in their 

minds. 

Senator BAYH. It would frankly be reassuring to know that they 

were going through such a rational process. 

Mr. WALKER. I can’t say whether they are or they aren’t, but 

that’s human. 

Senator BAYH. As I mentioned, this is our third hearing. We’re 

going to have one next week. We sit in rooms like this and talk 

about decisions that we make and if we do this what will happen, 

if we do that what will happen. Based upon the information you 

gleaned in the process of putting together this very good report, 

shouldn’t we have a fair amount of modesty when it comes to our 

own assessment of our ability to influence events there? I mean, 

based upon your answer to my previous question. They’re making 

their calculus and their decision based upon a whole lot of factors, 

in addition to what we do. Now, we can affect things, but shouldn’t 

we be a little bit modest in our assessment of our ability to drive 

events in Iraq? 

Mr. WALKER. I’ll say it a little bit differently. We have made a 

difference on the security front, and our military has done everything they’ve been asked to do. We’ve made a difference there. But 

part of the reason that we’ve used our military in that regard, is 

to provide the space for political progress. Only they can decide 

that they want national reconciliation and do what it takes to 

make that happen. 

Senator BAYH. Well, let me ask you about that. 

Mr. WALKER. So far they haven’t. Hopefully they will. 

Senator BAYH. That’s what I’m driving at here. Let me ask you 

if you’ve developed an opinion about what, if anything, we can do 

to expedite the process of reconciliation, to the extent we can, 

which in my own opinion is, we can operate at the margins, but 

ultimately it’s up to them. Let me ask you about the conundrum 

that we’ve wrestled with here. If we stand by them in an attempt 

to build up their security and their confidence in the hope that 

they’ll make tough compromises in the process of reconciliation, a 

sense of urgency seems to dissipate and they back-off, they have 

kind of a comfort zone there. If on the other hand, we set timelines 

and insist upon consequences for their failure to act, well then they 

retreat into their sectarian corners and begin to prepare for the 

aftermath when we leave. Either way, it seems that our action, either staying or threatening to go, doesn’t expedite the process of 

political reconciliation. How would you address that conundrum? 

Mr. WALKER. Let me just say, without getting into details, I 

found that in order to achieve positive results in a sustainable 

fashion, you have to have a framework that deals with three 

49

things. A plan that provides appropriate goals, objectives, metrics 

and milestones, and incentives for people to do the right thing. Second, adequate transparency to provide reasonable assurance that 

people will do the right thing because somebody’s looking. Third, 

appropriate accountability and consequences if people don’t deliver 

on their commitments. I think there’s more that can be done with 

regard to those elements here without getting into a lot of detail. 

Senator BAYH. I think that’s a very important statement. General Jones sitting in the chair that you’re occupying today, yesterday, said in his opinion he thought that deadlines would be counterproductive. I asked him, ‘‘What about consequences, what about 

accountability?’’ He’s a good man, but there wasn’t much of a direct 

answer to that. 

Mr. WALKER. I think there’s a difference between a milestone 

and a deadline. I mean, there is a fundamental difference. When 

you have goals, objectives, metrics, and milestones, if you don’t hit 

the milestones then there should be some explanation and accountability for why you didn’t, and then you’ll have to make a judgment 

as to whether or not things are likely to change. That’s different. 

Senator BAYH. Let me ask you then. We have these benchmarks 

you’ve reported on here. Most of them haven’t been met, correct? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct. 

Senator BAYH. What are the consequences going to be for them 

not having been met? 

Mr. WALKER. Yet to be determined. 

Senator BAYH. I think the honest answer is none. None that I’m 

aware of. So we can talk about deadlines or milestones or however 

we want to split that hair, but ultimately there will have to be 

some kind of consequences, as you say, otherwise behavior doesn’t 

change. So, we’re struggling with what those consequences, if any, 

should be. Some of us have concluded that we’re long past the time 

where there at least need to be some, otherwise they’re not going 

to take us seriously. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, and I think one of the things that this committee needs to consider, as well as Congress, is what should our 

goals be, what should our objectives be, what should the metrics 

and milestones be, what type of reporting and mechanisms will be 

there to try to make sure we’re making progress. But I think one 

of the subsets is, what should the role of our military be? I mean, 

it’s going to be there for a while. What should their role be? Consistent with the goals and the objectives and all these other factors. 

Senator BAYH. Just a final couple things, Mr. Walker. I think 

your last statement there was very important about the three 

things that you mentioned about how to go about influencing behavior there. I hope that we’ll adopt as the policy of this government, but to date we’ve been requesting and suggesting and pleading and they’ve given lip service to that but nothing has happened. 

There has to begin to be some consequence for that. I think your 

statement was very important. 

Two final quick things. General Jones, yesterday, in his testimony indicated the belief that the Iraqi security forces over the 

next—I can’t remember the period—6 to 12 months or 12 to 18 

months, over a period of either 6 months to a year and a half, 

would have improved their capability sufficiently that we could 

50

begin the process of adjusting, redeploying, however you want to 

characterize our presence in Iraq. I asked him about his confidence 

level that they would achieve that sometime next year, that would 

enable us to begin the process of redeploying. His expressed in his 

words ‘‘a high degree of confidence’’ in that judgment. Do you share 

that high degree of confidence? 

Mr. WALKER. Senator, we did not attempt to project forward as 

to what we think is going to happen. That was beyond our scope, 

and I really don’t think it’s appropriate for me to do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator, if I could interrupt on that point. 

At the end of the conversation yesterday with General Jones, he 

made it clear because I asked him to clarify this question. In answering the questions that this could happen, with a high degree 

of confidence, in 6 to 12 months, that was his task, what could 

occur in 6 to 12 months. I point blank asked him, ‘‘Well couldn’t 

that transition occur sooner than that?’’ He said, ‘‘Yes. I’m not trying to imply it can’t occur sooner, but my task was to say what 

could be achieved in 6 to 12 months.’’ It’s a very significant difference. It’s like, if I asked you, ‘‘Could you be back in Indiana in 

6 to 12 months?’’ Your answer would be, ‘‘Sure.’’ That’s what his 

answer was yesterday. But if the question was, ‘‘Does that mean 

you can’t be in Indiana this weekend?’’ The answer is, ‘‘No, I can 

be there this weekend, too.’’ 

Senator BAYH. Perhaps he didn’t understand my question. I read 

from the section of his report, quoting the language expressing his 

beliefs that they would achieve that, and asked him, ‘‘Well, what’s 

your confidence level in that assessment?’’ He said he had a high 

confidence. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s correct, but that does not suggest that 

it can not occur before 6 to 12 months. 

Senator BAYH. Of course. 

Chairman LEVIN. Because of what he was tasked to do, that was 

the way it was phrased. I just commend you on the question, but 

also that you get that Q&A with him, so there’s not a suggestion, 

which the press kind of picked up, I think, erroneously. Well, that 

means that it could not happen before 6 to 12 months. That’s not 

what he was saying. 

Senator BAYH. I understand and I agree. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One last question. Is it possible for you to render an opinion 

about whether the security gains, which our military, our forces 

have secured over the last several months, can persist in the absence of political reconciliation? In other words, some of us are trying to determine whether the progress on the security front that 

apparently has been achieved is transitory or whether it is more 

permanent. Some of us believe that it has set the stage, but without political reconciliation—which according to your report, just 

doesn’t seem to be happening—it will either be transitory, or it 

could only be maintained with an indefinite commitment of our security forces. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, the unclassified NIE makes it pretty clear the 

political process is essential in order to ultimately achieve the current objectives that are outlined by the administration in Iraq. Second, it also shares our concerns with regard to the lack of political 

51

progress. Furthermore, it notes that while the military can make 

a difference, it can’t get the job done. One of the issues that, by 

itself, no matter how great of effort they do and no matter what 

the results are there, and they are performing courageously in getting results. I think one of the questions you have to ask yourself, 

and potentially General Petraeus next week is, what has happened 

so far on the military front. There has been progress, how much 

of that experience is sustainable and how much of it is transferable 

is not yet known. I think both are relevant and I think, obviously, 

he’s on the ground, he’s in the best position to give you an opinion. 

I come back to what I said before. We need to rethink about what 

the goals ought to be, the objectives, what the metrics and milestones should be. We need to have the three elements that I talked 

about. Then when people tell you things, periodically you’ll come 

back and find out what actually happened, and ask them, ‘‘Why 

didn’t it happen?’’ or ‘‘Congratulations that it did happen,’’ or, 

‘‘What’s the reason for the variance?’’ and ‘‘What’s going to change 

in the next 3 months?’’ We need to get on a track here so that you 

can make some more informed, timely, and considered judgments. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Walker. That exhausts my questions. 

I just want to, again, thank the Chairman and, Senator Warner. 

I want to thank you for having performed a real public service. 

Your analytical framework here, the objectivity you’ve brought to 

this can really help clarify the decisions that we need to make. So 

thank you very much. I’m sure it was a real labor for you. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator WARNER. If I could say something. 

You really framed in your last closing remarks, what is so important. You point out the expectations that we had with regard to 

benchmarks, to political reconciliation from the top down. That information is now coming up, corroborated, in many instances, by 

the various panels and sources coming before Congress. It then 

goes to the President. With no disrespect whatsoever to the President—he’s faced with one of the most difficult decisions any President has ever faced—namely, one of them is that the military witnesses have repeatedly said this problem can not be solved by military force, that political reconciliation from the top down is an essential element. I think there’s consensus that top-down political 

reconciliation is no longer a foundation for what strategy we begin 

to pursue in the next months, days, whatever it may be. I just hope 

the President will address this because you used the word accountability. The President has to address that very question. It is at the 

heart of what we’re trying to determine as how America and the 

other coalition forces, what strategy do they follow in the next 6 

to 12 months. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Sessions? 

Let me interrupt if you’re beginning, Senator Sessions. I’m going 

to have to leave. I want to leave with my thanks to you, Mr. Walker. Senator Bayh has to leave, so Senator Warner can take over 

while, from here on in and if he leaves, Senator Sessions, would 

you close it off or turn it over to anyone else. Thank you so much. 

52

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, we’ll do 

that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Walker, for your and GAO’s contribution to this 

national discussion that we’re having now. We had General Jones 

and his crew yesterday. You now are giving your report. We’ll have 

General Petraeus giving his report next week. It’s appropriate and 

fitting that this Nation undertake a national discussion of Iraq, 

honestly, with the best information we can get and make the tough 

decisions we have to make that serve our national interest, serve 

the world’s interest, our allies, and our security and safety of the 

American people. 

I don’t doubt the value of what we’re doing. I totally support it. 

I think all of us need to rise above politics and we need to try to 

do the right thing for our country at this difficult time. Thank you 

for participating in this discussion. 

I would tend to agree with Senator Bayh, who says we should 

be somewhat modest about creating a government in an area of the 

world that’s never had one before, that’s never functioned in a decent way before. It’s very hard, it’s just very hard. 

Let me ask one thing, for the record. You’ve complimented the 

military on a number of occasions and it’s something of which I’m 

proud. They go out every day to execute the policies we ask them 

to execute. They put their lives at risk for us. But would you tell 

us, in the hierarchy of command in Iraq, what agencies of our Government are responsible for negotiating and encouraging and facilitating political reconciliation in Iraq, electricity, water, and that 

kind of thing. 

Mr. WALKER. It depends upon the issue, Senator Sessions. Responsibility in Iraq is generally divided primarily between DOD 

and DOS, depending upon what the particular issues are, if you 

will. That’s why it’s appropriate that you’re going to be hearing, 

next week, from both General Petraeus, who’s our Commander on 

the ground, but also from Ambassador Crocker. 

Senator SESSIONS. But the real truth is that it’s not our military, 

our DOD that is charged with the primary responsibility for working with the Iraqi leaders to assist them in creating a more progressive and effective government. That’s DOS’s responsibility. 

Mr. WALKER. You raise a good point. One of the concerns that 

we’ve expressed, based upon our past work, is an adequate number 

of advisors, both from the U.S., as well hopefully from the international community, to be able to help Iraq help itself be able to 

stand up a fully-functioning government that can deliver reliable 

electricity, enough safe and potable water, safer streets, education, 

health care. This is really important. In many cases what’s happened is the military has been asked to do things that, quite frankly, they’re willing to step up to the plate and do what they can, but 

they don’t necessarily have the expertise. The fact that you have 

somebody in the uniform doing it, even though it’s a non-military 

matter, doesn’t necessarily send the right kind of signal, as well. 

So I think you’ve touched on an important issue that we’ve highlighted in some of our prior work, prior to this 18 benchmark report. 

53

Senator SESSIONS. Well, if you’re looking at it from a management responsibility, I think you would say that the military is 

making progress—at least I would and General Jones did—but the 

areas that are lagging behind are the governmental, which are not 

the military’s primary responsibility. I just kind of want to make 

that point. 

Mr. WALKER. I think our report supports that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Looking at the numbers about violence, we’ve 

had an upward trend, according to your chart on page 11—for some 

time I guess—from January 2006, now to September 2007, a general upward trend in violence. But it does appear that, according 

to your chart, that maybe about June, in both attacks on the coalition and overall attacks, there has been a decline. Your report ends 

in July. Maybe July it begins to drop—June, July area—and it does 

show a rather sharp reduction. How far that will continue, I don’t 

know. You did not evaluate the month of August, as far as violent 

trends, did you? At least this chart does not. 

Mr. WALKER. We asked for data and were briefed on data 

through August 15. We then asked for the data for the month, but 

it is yet to be provided to us. Hopefully it will be provided to you, 

next week, when General Petraeus speaks. As you can see, there 

was a significant decline between June and July, but two important notes there. Number one, it was primarily attributable to attacks on Coalition forces. In other words, that’s where most of it 

was. In the other areas it’s roughly about the same, civilian and 

attacks on Iraqi security forces. Second, the overall level of violence 

in July 2007 was roughly the same as February 2007. 

I think it’s going to be important for you to be able to get what 

the numbers are for August. We also have to keep in mind that 

Ramadan starts this month. Hopefully the past is not prologue 

with regard to Ramadan. In the past, the tendency has been for 

somewhat less violence right before Ramadan and escalating violence during Ramadan. Hopefully that won’t occur this year, but I 

just note that, because it is an important fact that you need to keep 

in mind. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I certainly don’t think these are balanced numbers that we should be celebrating, or assuming are 

going to continue indefinitely, this trend downward. But I do believe that the numbers will probably show that August continued 

a decline, which is certainly better than showing an increase. We 

ought not to disregard that. 

The administration evaluated benchmarks and you evaluated, I 

guess, their evaluation. Was that required by the mandate? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, not really. What they did is, they looked at 

the benchmarks in July, and they evaluated them based upon 

whether or not they felt satisfactory progress was being made. We 

looked at the benchmarks as of August 30, 2007 and consistent 

with the statutory mandate, noted whether or not they had met or 

not met, but used our independent professional judgment to be able 

to also use some partially met ratings. Furthermore, consistent 

with some of the language in our mandate, we provided a lot of 

commentary so you got a sense as to what kind of progress was 

made. Of the ones that were not met, was any progress there or 

not? In many cases there was some, but just not a lot. 

54

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s fine and I think people here are 

concerned about it and we want the best information and multiple 

sources of information, multiple perspectives, and thank you for 

sharing that. I guess it would be fair to say you did not find, in 

their report, their evaluation, things that were plainly false or dishonest in that report? 

Mr. WALKER. We didn’t evaluate theirs. But what we did do is, 

as I have in one of the exhibits—the last exhibit, I believe, that has 

been provided as part of my testimony—we did do a comparative 

analysis of what we found as of August 30, and what the administration asserted as of July. 

Now, presumably they’re going to give you a new one next week. 

I would hope that they’ll give you a new one next week, and we’ll 

see what’s changed on theirs between July and September. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we have a challenge. I think it’s, the administration report was not particularly rosy, either. This is a difficult challenge for America, that’s what I understand. I have no 

doubt of it. It’s not going to be easy. We need to be able to draw 

our troop levels down as soon as we possibly can, but after we’ve 

committed so much, we’ve worked so hard, our soldiers have risked 

so much, we ought not to do it in a way that is unwise, that’s precipitous, that acts based on politics rather than what’s in the longterm national interest of America. So, that’s where I am. I thank 

you for your contribution to that effort, and my time is up. 

Senator BILL NELSON [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. Well, I would say to my distinguished colleague, I have a high degree of confidence that we will not do anything unwise, respecting any withdrawal policy. We owe it to the 

men and women and their families who’ve made enormous sacrifices. I have confidence that the President would not let that happen, and Congress would not let it happen. So, I want to conclude 

on the note that we might have situation which would be characterized as an unwise decision. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say that I think the report yesterday and the report today reflects a good, honest, constructive, bipartisan discussion of a difficult challenge this country faces. 

Senator WARNER. I observe the presence of our distinguished colleague from Florida. The floor is yours if you so like. Senator Levin 

has had to depart. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it looks like I’m the cleanup hitter. 

Senator WARNER. Well, you’ve been known to do that before, and 

very admirably. So, take over. 

I thank you very much, and your staff. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Walker, thank you for your long and 

dedicated public service. Is this a fair statement that political reconciliation in Iraq is a key to reducing the sectarian violence? 

Mr. WALKER. There are a number of authorities that have come 

to that conclusion, to say that that is essential. The work that 

we’ve done doesn’t go forward as to whether or not that’s likely to 

happen, but we’ve noted the importance of that, and we’ve noted 

the lack of progress, to date, in that area. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly that’s what General Jones’ Commission said yesterday. I have certainly thought that it’s the key 

55

to reducing sectarian violence, but I will just give an editorial comment here, that having observed what’s been going on, having been 

there, having talked to the parties, having read a bit of history, in 

that this sectarian violence has been going on for 1,327 years, since 

the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., that, I just think it’s going to 

be very, very hard for political reconciliation. If that is the key to 

stabilizing Iraq, then it seems to me that we have a very difficult 

time ahead of us. 

Now, earlier today, you stated that you think that General 

Petraeus, next week, is going to testify to us that sectarian violence 

is down. 

Mr. WALKER. That’s correct. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Then the question, as you earlier discussed this morning is, what is the definition of sectarian violence? 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As we receive his testimony, how would 

you recommend that we try to determine that? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, I think you need to ask him, how does he define sectarian violence and what methodology does he use in order 

to try to ascertain the rate of sectarian violence and, those are very 

relevant questions. We could not get comfortable with the methodology that is used in determining sectarian violence versus non-sectarian violence. We’re comfortable with overall violence, we’re not 

comfortable with that split. 

As has been mentioned previously in this hearing, that data 

went up, it’s now gone down. We haven’t been confident with how 

you differentiate during any of the time. So, you should ask him. 

Senator WARNER. But could I interrupt to clarify? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly. 

Senator WARNER. Because at some point, you’re talking about 

the methodology that presumably DOD and therefore, General 

Petraeus is going to use. 

Mr. WALKER. It’s my understanding, Senator Warner, that the 

MNF–I, of which General Petraeus is the commander, is the one 

that maintains this data. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

Mr. WALKER. It’s my understanding that’s the basis of whatever 

he might testify to. 

Senator WARNER. But did you have full access to the methodology that they’re using? 

Mr. WALKER. We did, we were briefed on the methodology. We’re 

not comfortable with the methodology and we fully expect that it 

will show a decline. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you a couple more questions 

about the readiness of the Iraqi brigades, specifically with regard 

to the Baghdad operations. You looked at that, and you came to a 

conclusion different from the administration. What were the different standards of readiness that were used? 

Mr. WALKER. Well first, there’s additional information, Senator 

Nelson, that’s in our classified report that I would commend to you 

on that. Second, with regard to number nine, which I presume 

you’re talking about, which is providing three standing-ready brigades to support Baghdad. Is that the one you’re talking about? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, sir. 

56

Mr. WALKER. Okay good. There are three issues there. Number 

one, did they supply the requisite number of troops? The answer 

is yes. The second question is, what was the level of readiness of 

those troops? That is in our classified report. Third, what about the 

reliability of those troops, which in our classified report. Reliability 

meaning things like even though they may have the capability, are 

they willing to execute that capability and are they willing to execute that capability in a non-sectarian way, in other words, sectarian-neutral manner. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Your conclusion there was? 

Mr. WALKER. We had concerns with regard to the last element 

the most, and the second element the next most. So, the troops 

were provided, many of them, in fact, have a high level of readiness 

and that is noted in there. So our concern was really more about 

the reliability issue than it was the readiness issue. 

Senator WARNER. That’s expressed in your classified annex to the 

reports we received? 

Mr. WALKER. Correct, Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Available to all Senators of the committee to 

examine. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, in putting that in other words, your 

conclusion would be that those brigades of the Iraqi Army in and 

around Baghdad would not be capable of operating independent of 

the U.S. support? 

Mr. WALKER. That’s not what we’re saying. In fact, when you 

look at the classified material, you’ll see the level of readiness 

there. Senator Nelson, there are four levels of readiness from level 

1 to 4 and I think it’ll speak loudly. We’re not saying that, no. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well for the public record here, can you 

give an opinion about their ability to operate independently of the 

U.S.? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. The numbers are classified. There are a significant number of those units that are in the top category—can’t 

say that? Okay. I would commend to you our classified report. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Well, then I would just concur with 

the Chairman and Senator Warner that we need to make that classified report public. I understand that the leadership of this committee has so requested that of DOD. 

Senator WARNER. That’s my understanding, that the chairman 

intends to do so—I have read through this, and I think it would 

be beneficial. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now, are you reading from the classified? 

Senator WARNER. I’m not going to read from it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. No, no. But I mean that’s what you’re referring to. 

Senator WARNER. That’s correct. 

Mr. WALKER. It has information that is directly relevant to your 

question, Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. It’s very important for us to know and it’s 

important for the American people to know, because the question 

is, can Iraq do it on their own? 

Mr. WALKER. Senator Nelson, earlier when Senator Levin was 

here he said—and I’m sure the very capable staff of this committee 

has probably already taken it down —that by 3 o’clock today he 

57

wanted to know if there was any additional information that members, such as yourself, wanted to try to seek to have declassified, 

that is in our classified report. Obviously you’re noting at least one 

piece of information you’d like to be in that category. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Senator Warner, are you going to adjourn the meeting or am I? 

Senator WARNER. If I might just ask a question. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly. 

Senator WARNER. Then obviously you can, you have the authority. 

I’ve read so much in the last 48 hours in preparation for Jones’ 

report and this one, that I can’t put my hands on this statement 

in public, that there’s a difference in criteria as to casualties. When 

the authorities in Iraq—be it our military authorities or local or 

whatever, find a deceased person in the street, which is the unfortunate incident that happens daily, unfortunately hundreds of bodies are discovered from time to time—some of the metrics being 

used by certain parts of, I presume whether it’s the Iraqi Government our Government, but I’m going to find out. If the cadaver indicates that loss of life was attributed to a bullet that came into 

the forehead, it is put in the category of, should we say murder, 

wanton murder. If the skull is penetrated from the rear by a bullet, 

then that should be put into the category of sectarian violence because there’s been certain patterns of how sectarian violence has 

been carried out, in terms of rendering death to an individual. 

Have you seen that? 

Mr. WALKER. I have not personally seen it, but some of my staff 

has seen it. You’re talking about some of the issues that are in our 

classified report. We couldn’t get comfortable with the methodology. 

Senator WARNER. This is in open literature. This is open literature. 

Mr. WALKER. I understand. I know what you’re talking about 

now is open, but there are more details in our classified report. 

You’re noting some of the concerns that we have as to how can you 

reliably say that this type of casualty is sectarian and this type of 

casualty isn’t? 

Senator WARNER. I don’t know. I’ve had some experience in the 

past. I used to be a prosecutor and had to go the morgue a number 

of times to accompany those making analysis. I find that a rather 

curious thing that I’m going to try to get to the bottom of. That is 

what you were pointing out. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I hope you will, Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Well, thank you again, very much. As you may 

know, Chuck Bowser occupied your position at one time. He and 

I were in the Navy Secretariat during the war in Vietnam. I may 

have been the Secretary and he the assistant, but I tell you, he was 

a power force and one that was highly respected in this profession. 

You’ve had a very proud lineage of individuals who have taken on 

these important responsibilities of the GAO. I commend you and 

your staff. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator Warner. He’s a friend and obviously my predecessor and I’m pleased to say that as of today, 

Elmer Staats who was his predecessor, is still with us and hopefully will be for a while, but, at 93. 

58

1 GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues, 

GAO–08–231T (Washington, DC: Oct. 30, 2007). 

Senator WARNER. I remember Elmer Staats, worked with him 

many times during those periods in Vietnam. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Senator, and I want to just thank our 

staff for the record. Thank you. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

VARIANCE BETWEEN DOD AND GAO METHODOLOGY

1. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, the media has reported about the dispute between 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

regarding the accuracy of DOD’s claim that the ‘‘surge’’ has successfully resulted in 

a reduction in violence. Can you elaborate on the differences in the methodologies 

used by DOD and GAO to estimate the levels of violence in Iraq? 

Mr. WALKER. According to the administration’s September 2007 report to Congress, MNF–I data showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since the start of the Baghdad security plan. The report concluded that the 

Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had made satisfactory 

progress toward reducing sectarian violence. However, GAO could not reliably determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq had been reduced because measuring such 

violence requires understanding the perpetrator’s intent, which may not be known. 

Instead, it would be useful to consider broader measures of population security 

when assessing levels of violence in Iraq. For example, the number of attacks targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may 

serve as additional indicators. As we reported in our September 2007 benchmark 

report, the average number of daily enemy-initiated attacks against civilians remained high relative to attacks on coalition forces. In addition, as we reported in 

October 2007,1 the decrease in total average daily attacks through September is 

largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. 

Our benchmark report also noted that the violence in Iraq has resulted in a large 

number of Iraqis displaced from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent 

Organization found that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 

in February 2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 million Iraqi citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, 

and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000 to 50,000 people will continue to be 

displaced each month even if the security plan succeeds in solving the displacement 

problem. Currently, the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average of 

80,000 to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent. The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq also stated that population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments 

and some neighboring states. Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities 

find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.

2. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, in your opinion, is the DOD methodology for evaluating the levels of violence in Iraq inadequate for the purpose of identifying trends 

in the level of violence? If not, why not? 

Mr. WALKER. As previously stated, it is inherently difficult to judge trends in sectarian violence because this requires an understanding of the perpetrator’s intent, 

which may not be known. Instead, as discussed in question 1, broader measures of 

population security should be considered when assessing trends in violence in Iraq. 

For example, as we reported in September 28, 2007, MNF–I data on enemy initiated 

attacks provide a reasonably sound depiction of general security trends. However, 

according to the DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not account 

for all violence throughout Iraq, such as incidents of Shi’a militias fighting each 

other or attacks against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq.

59

2GAO–08–231T. 

3. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, General Petraeus indicated in his testimony on 

September 11, 2007, that the current methodology has been used for over a year, 

which implies that the methodology was changed just prior to the surge. Did GAO’s 

auditors find evidence that DOD had revised either its methodology for estimating 

violence or its definitions of the different types of violence? If so, what was DOD’s 

explanation for the revising the methodology? 

Mr. WALKER. The methodology we assessed took effect in August 2006. We did 

not assess the methodology used prior to this time.

4. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, does the change in DOD methodology prevent 

comparisons of the recent data against data from previous years? 

Mr. WALKER. We have no basis for responding to this question as we did not assess the previous methodologies used to assess trends in sectarian violence.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURGE

5. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, as noted in GAO’s report, the purpose of the surge 

was to reduce sectarian violence and provide the Iraqi government with breathing 

room to allow them to address political reconciliation. The benchmarks evaluated in 

this report were identified by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In theory, we 

should have seen the Iraqi government become more effective once the surge started. Instead, it seems that several groups have recently, or are currently, boycotting 

the government. It seems to me that its unclear as to whether they can really accomplish anything right now. Can you tell us how many of the benchmarks that 

have been completed or partially completed were accomplished by the Iraqi government since the arrival of additional troops for the surge in February of this year? 

In other words, did we see any improvement in the government’s performance once 

the surge started? 

Mr. WALKER. As we recently reported,2 the Iraqi government has made limited 

progress in meeting eight legislative benchmarks intended to promote national reconciliation. As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi Government had met one legislative 

benchmark and partially met another. Specifically, the rights of minority political 

parties in the Iraqi legislature were protected through existing provisions in the 

Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives’ by-laws. In addition, the Iraqi 

Government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the 

formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. 

The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not yet been met. 

Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional review process, 

such as expanded powers for the presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such 

as Kirkuk), and power sharing between Federal and regional governments over 

issues such as the distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legistlative 

benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not yet been met.

6. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, would you provide a copy of Figures 1 and 2 from 

the report revised to show the completion dates for each item shown as complete? 

Mr. WALKER. Figure 1 - The electoral commission legislation was passed in January 2007. 

Figure 2 - Committees were established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan 

in February 2007. 

Figure 2 - Joint security stations were established by August 2007.

CHANGE OF DEFINITION OF SUCCESS

7. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, footnote 4 for Benchmark 15, ‘‘Iraqi Security 

Forces Operating Independently’’ states, ‘‘In 2006, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF–

I) changed the definition of a Level 1 unit. Previously, in guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a Level 1 unit was 

said to be fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations. In 2006, MNF–I removed the words ’fully’ and ’independent’ from the definition. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for the change.’’ Although DOD 

could not provide an explanation for the change, did GAO determine the net effect 

on the performance metric? In other words, did the number of Level 1 units go up 

or down as a result of the change? 

60

Mr. WALKER. GAO did not determine how the change in definition affected the 

performance metric. As of September 2007, MNF–I reported that only about 10 of 

140 units of the Iraqi security forces are capable of operating independently.

8. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, when was the change implemented? 

Mr. WALKER. The new definition of a level-1 unit was implemented in April 2006.

IRAQ BUDGET SPENDING

9. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walker, during the hearing, I pointed out that GAO’s report states that the Iraqi government has provided $10 billion in its current budget 

for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an equitable 

basis, but that it is unlikely to be spent by the end of the year. In addition, as of 

July 31, the Iraqi government had only spent about $1.5 billion of the allocated 

funds. One of the questions I asked you during the hearing was if you could you 

describe some of the key projects that will likely not be accomplished if the Iraqi 

government’s spending continues at the current pace. Consistent with your response 

to my question, could you please provide more specific information on the types of 

projects not being accomplished due to the Iraqi government’s inability to spend 

their budgeted resources? 

Mr. WALKER. As we reported in our May 2007 report, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated 

Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors (GAO–07–

677), the energy sector is critical for Iraq’s economy and for rebuilding the country 

and the Ministries of Oil and Electricity have budgeted substantial sums for future 

reconstruction. Experts estimate that over the next few years $27 billion will be 

needed for the electricity sector to keep up with needed demand and S20 to $30 billion will be needed for the oil sector to reach production goals. Although significant 

funds have been allocated to the Ministries of Oil and Electricity for critical infrastructure repair, the ministries have had persistent difficulties spending these funds 

on critical oil and electricity sector projects due to poor procurement and budgeting 

practices, and the ‘‘brain drain’’ resulting from high levels of violence in Iraq. 

[Annex: The report from Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq,’’ follows:]

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[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 


907ful13.eps
(161)

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS 

MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN 

MEETING BENCHMARKS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, 

Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, 

Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, 

and Corker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Brian 

F. Sebold, receptionist. 

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 

staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; 

Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Mark R. Jacobson, 

professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff 

member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional 

staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and 

Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Jessica L. Kingston. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and 

Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and 

James Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey and 

Vance Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Richard Kessler, 

assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew 

Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael Sozan, assistants to 

Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; 

Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra 

162

Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant 

to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants 

to Senator Sessions; Jan Alonso and Mark J. Winter, assistants to 

Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke 

and Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. 

Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to 

Senator Martinez; and Paul B. Palagyi and Bradford T. Sellers, assistants to Senator Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. Today we welcome 

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their update on the 

situation in Iraq. We thank both of you for your service to this 

country, the men and women that you both command and lead. 

You’re doing so under very, very difficult circumstances. We ask 

both of you to pass along to the men and women who you do lead 

in this endeavor, our heartfelt thanks, particularly those who risk 

their lives on a daily basis. 

While people here have different views on the war and will continue to vigorously debate the strategy, tactics, and policies relating to the war—we are united in our admiration and appreciation 

for those who serve there, for their families who love them, and 

who support them. 

There’s much disagreement relative to the facts on the ground in 

Iraq, on the issue of whether or not the surge has produced significant progress in terms of security. Recent public opinion polls in 

Iraq indicate that Iraqi citizens feel even less secure than before 

the surge. 

According to an ABC News analysis, ‘‘The surge broadly is seen 

to have done more harm than good, with 65 to 70 percent of Iraqis 

saying it’s worsened rather than improved security in surge areas, 

security in other areas, conditions for political dialogue, the ability 

of the Iraqi Government to do its work, the pace of reconstruction, 

and the pace of economic development.’’ Is Baghdad, itself, actually 

safer for citizens to go about their normal business? Or are large 

sectors of Baghdad, in electricity and fuel distribution, controlled 

by the Mahdi Army and neighborhood militias as detailed in last 

Sunday’s New York Times? 

While the facts relating to security are debated and are debatable, there seems to be little dispute on three key points that go 

to the heart of the matter. 

First, the stated purpose of the surge, to give Iraqi politicians 

breathing space to work out a political settlement, has not been 

achieved. 

Second, there will be no end to violence until Iraqi’s national 

leaders work out their political differences. As the Commission 

headed by General Jones reported last week, political reconciliation 

is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq. 

Third, the Iraqi politicians haven’t done that. They haven’t kept 

the commitments that they made a year ago, to set the date for 

provincial elections, to approve a hydrocarbon law, to approve a deBaathification law, and to submit constitutional amendments to a 

referendum. 

163

General Petraeus said 3 years ago that Iraqi political leaders 

were, ‘‘Stepping forward, leading their country courageously and 

making progress,’’ in his words. Well, if they were, progress sure 

has stalled politically. 

Ambassador Crocker told Congress yesterday and today that 

Iraqi leaders have the ‘‘will’’ to tackle the nation’s pressing problems and ‘‘approach the task with the deep sense of commitment 

and patriotism,’’ even though those leaders ignore their own benchmarks. The Ambassador inappropriately compares Iraq’s sectarian 

strife and slaughter to this Nation’s Civil Rights movement. 

So the administration’s message to Iraqi leaders continues to be 

that they’re doing just fine. That’s exactly the wrong message to 

send the leaders who dawdle while their nation is torn apart by 

sectarian strife and while their people are killed and forcibly ejected by sectarian militias or killed if they refuse to be ethnically 

cleansed. The Iraqi politicians dawdle while our casualties and our 

expenditures keep climbing. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) told us last week 

that most of the key promises of Iraq’s political leaders, the benchmarks that they set for themselves, with relevant timetables, have 

been ignored by those leaders. 

On January 14 of this year, President Bush said, ‘‘America will 

hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks that it has announced.’’ Those words ring hollow. There have been no consequences for the Iraqi political leaders’ failures to do what President Bush said they must do. Year after year, the President and 

the administration have touted progress in Iraq and called for patience. 

It has been a litany of delusion. Just listen to President Bush’s 

repeated claims of progress. October 2003, he said, ‘‘We’re making 

progress about improving the lives of people there in Iraq.’’ September 2004, the President said, ‘‘We’re making steady progress in 

implementing our five-step plan.’’ In October 2005, the President 

said, ‘‘Iraq has made incredible political progress.’’ In May 2006, 

the President said, ‘‘We’re making progress on all fronts.’’ In March 

of this year, the President said, ‘‘There’s been good progress.’’ On 

July 4, the President said that, ‘‘Victory in this struggle will require more patience.’’ 

Well, there’s been little progress on the political front and the 

American people’s patience with Iraq’s political leaders has run 

out. Success in Iraq depends on Iraqi leaders finally seeing the end 

of the open-ended American commitment. Success depends on 

doing what James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the rest of the Iraq 

Study Group said we should have done a year a ago, that the 

United States ‘‘should not make an open-ended commitment to 

keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. If the 

Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward the 

achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and 

governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, 

or economic support for the Iraqi Government.’’ That was before 

the surge level was increased. 

Success also depends on a transition of missions. According to 

the Iraq Study Group, ‘‘By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all 

164

combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of 

Iraq.’’ At that time, the Iraq Study Group said, ‘‘U.S. combat forces 

in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, 

in rapid reaction and special operations teams, and in training, 

equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.’’ 

Finally, presenting Iraq’s political leaders with a timetable for 

transition of our forces, from mainly combat to mainly support 

roles, as opposed to a timetable for ending the surge—which is a 

fact of life, which is going to happen by necessity anyway—presenting those political leaders with a timetable for transition is the 

only hope that Iraqi leaders will realize that their future is in their 

hands, not in the hands of our brave men and women who proudly 

wear America’s uniform. 

Establishing a timetable for the transition of missions will also 

recognize another fact of life, that the stress on our forces, especially the wear and tear on the Army and Marine Corps, must be 

reduced. Telling the Iraqis that the surge will end by the middle 

of next year, and then we will make a decision as to whether to 

reduce our troop level from the basic pre-surge level of 130,000, 

does not change our course in Iraq. It presents an illusion of 

change to prevent a real change of course from occurring. It is 

aimed at taking the steam out of the engine of change. 

I hope we are not deterred from continuing to press for true 

change and that the momentum for true change of course is not diffused. It must continue until, by our deeds, we get the Iraqi political leaders to understand, that for our security and theirs, the 

American presence in Iraq needs to be significantly reduced after 

41⁄2 years of U.S. sacrifice, and that the future of their country is 

in their own hands. 

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses. All of us are aware that you’ve 

been literally nonstop testifying for the last day and a half, and we 

thank you for your willingness, not only to discuss with Congress, 

but with the American people, this very critical issue. 

With your testimony, a debate of historic proportions begins in 

the United States Congress. The choices that we make now, whether to build on the success of the surge and fight for additional 

gains, or whether to set a date for American surrender in Iraq, will 

affect the security of all our countrymen for decades to come. 

As we all know, the American people are saddened, frustrated, 

and angry over our past failures in Iraq. I, too, have been made 

sick at heart by the terrible price we’ve paid for nearly 4 years of 

mismanaged war. Some of us, from the beginning, warned against 

the Rumsfeld strategy of too few troops, insufficient resources, and 

a plan predicated on hope, rather than on the difficult business of 

stabilization and counterinsurgency. 

We lost years to that strategy and we lost that which is most 

precious to us—the lives of the brave men and women who fight 

on our behalf. 

But the question today is not whether we can recover those 4 

years—we cannot—but whether we end this effort in frustration 

165

and accept thereby the terrible consequences that will ensue. I believe we cannot choose to lose in Iraq and I will do everything in 

my power to see that our commanders in Iraq have the time and 

support they request to win this war. 

The distinguished strategist Ralph Peters summed up the state 

of affairs well in a column today, noting that Congress’s failure to 

support General Petraeus, ‘‘would be a shame, since after nearly 4 

years of getting it miserably wrong in Iraq, we’re finally getting it 

right.’’ 

We’re getting it right, because we finally have in place a strategy 

that can succeed. A counterinsurgency strategy which some of us 

have argued we should have been following from the beginning, 

which makes the most effective use of our strength, and does not 

strengthen the tactics of our enemy. 

We must, as General Petraeus intends, keep this strategy in 

place. It is the only approach that has resulted in real security improvements in Iraq. 

Anyone who has traveled recently to Anbar, or Diyala, or to 

Baghdad can see the improvements that have taken place over the 

past months. As our witnesses will testify, violence is down, commerce is on the rise, and the bottom-up efforts to forge counter-terrorism alliances are bearing tangible fruit. 

There are many challenges remaining, and the road ahead is 

long and tough. The Maliki Government has not seized the opportunity presented by our efforts to move ahead with reconciliation, 

and is not functioning as it must. Violence, having declined significantly, remains high. 

As Ambassador Crocker has noted, no one can be certain of success. We can be sure, however, that should the United States Congress succeed in legislating a date for withdrawal, and thus surrender, then we will fail for certain. 

Make no mistake, the consequences of American defeat in Iraq 

will be terrible and long-lasting. There is, in some corners, a belief 

that we can simply turn the page in Iraq, come home, and move 

onto other things. This is dangerously wrong. 

If we surrender in Iraq, we will be back in Iraq, and elsewhere, 

in many more desperate fights to protect our security, and at even 

greater cost in American lives and treasure. 

Last week, General Jim Jones testified before this committee and 

outlined what he believes to be the consequences of such a course. 

A precipitous departure which results in a failed state in Iraq, he 

said, will have a significant boost in the number of extremist 

jihadists in the world, who will believe that they will have toppled 

a major power on earth, and that all else is possible. I think it will 

only make us less safe, it will make our friends and allies less safe, 

and the struggle will continue. It will simply be done in different, 

and other, areas. 

Some Senators would like to withdraw our troops from Iraq so 

we can get back to fighting what they believe to be the ‘‘real’’ war 

on terror, which is taking place somewhere else. This too is inaccurate. Iraq has become the central front in the global war on terror, and failure there would turn Iraq into a terrorist sanctuary in 

the heart of the Middle East, and a host for jihadists planning attacks on America. The region could easily descend into chaos, wider 

166

war and genocide, and we should have no doubt about who will 

take advantage. 

The Iranian President has stated his intentions bluntly, saying, 

‘‘Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, 

we are prepared to fill the gap.’’ We cannot allow an Iranian-dominated Middle East to take shape in the context of a wider war and 

terrorist safe havens. All of us want our troops to come home, but 

we should want them to return to us with honor—the honor of victory that is due all of those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. 

General Petraeus and his troops ask just two things of us: the 

time to continue this strategy, and the support they need to carry 

out their mission. They must have both, and we should fight to ensure that they do. 

Soon this debate will move from hearing rooms to the Senate 

floor, where we’ll see again attempts to legislate a withdrawal from 

Iraq. Given the enormous human and strategic costs such a defeat 

would impose on Iraq, the region, and Americans for years to come, 

Congress must not choose to lose in Iraq. I will do everything in 

my power to ensure that we do not. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Our welcome to both of you, our thanks to both of you, and to 

your families that provide essential support for you in extraordinarily difficult circumstances in which you both work. 

We’re indebted to you for your appearance here today, and for 

the fact that this is the third of three long hearings for you. 

General Petraeus? 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. May I interrupt you for one moment? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you choose, both of you, or each of you, may 

reduce and summarize, if you so choose, because of the fact that 

your statements have been given in full before the other committees. I’m not asking you to do that, we’ll leave that up to you. 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, I’ve actually cut it down a bit. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. [Laughter.] 

It didn’t take much suggesting, then, to do that. 

General PETRAEUS. But it’s still—— 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s fine—do it as you wish. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you for the opportunity to provide my 

assessment of the security situation in Iraq, and to discuss the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the 

way forward. 

As I stated in testimony to the two House committees yesterday, 

and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning, this 

is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and the 

recommendations in it to my chain of command, I wrote this statement myself, and did not clear it with anyone in the Pentagon, the 

White House, or Congress. 

167

Today, I will provide a summary of the full written testimony to 

each of you, and for the record. As a bottom line, upfront, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies, and the brutal summer 

heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved 

progress in the security arena. 

Though improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall 

number of security incidents has declined in 8 of the past 12 

weeks. During this time, ethno-sectarian violence has also been reduced, and the number of overall civilian deaths has declined, although both are clearly still at troubling levels. 

The progress is a result of many factors—coalition and Iraqi 

forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq, and have disrupted Shiite militia extremists. 

Additionally, in a very significant development, we and our Iraqi 

partners are being assisted by tribes and local citizens who are rejecting extremism, and choosing to help secure Iraq. 

Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow, and to shoulder 

more of the load—albeit slowly—and amid continuing concerns 

about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. 

Based on all of this, and on the further progress we believe we 

can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able 

to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams 

by next summer, withdrawing one-quarter of our combat brigades 

by that time, without jeopardizing the security gains that we have 

fought so hard to achieve. 

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains 

complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible for us to achieve our objectives in Iraq over 

time, though doing so will be neither quick, nor easy. 

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature 

of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe 

the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. 

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition 

among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. 

This competition will take place. The question is whether it is resolved more, or less, violently. 

This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq—foreign and 

home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals 

all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. 

Malign actions by Syria, and especially by Iran, fuel that violence, and lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to the challenges. 

In January 2007, in response to the horrific ethno-sectarian violence that spiraled out of control in 2006, and to an assessment in 

December 2006 that we were failing to achieve our objectives, a 

surge of forces began flowing into Iraq, focusing on protecting the 

population, and reducing sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. 

In so doing, these forces have employed counterinsurgency practices, such as living among the people they are securing. In midJune, with all of the surge brigades in place, we launched a series 

of offensive operations in partnership with Iraqi security forces. 

168

These operations focused on expanding the gains achieved in the 

preceding months in Anbar Province, pursuing al Qaeda in the 

Diyala River Valley and several other areas, clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in 

Anbar Province, and important areas around Baghdad. With coalition and Iraqi forces located among the populations they are securing, we have sought to keep areas clear, and to help Iraqis in rebuilding them. 

All the while, we have engaged in dialogue with insurgent troops 

and tribes, leading to additional elements standing up to oppose al 

Qaeda and other extremists. 

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has—as I noted at the outset—been substantial. While there 

have been setbacks, as well as successes, and tough losses along 

the way, overall our tactical commanders see improvements in the 

security environment. 

We do not, however, just rely on gut feeling or personal observations. To gauge progress and determine trends, we also conduct rigorous and consistent data collection and analysis. In fact, two U.S. 

intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq. 

As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the 

level of security incidents has decreased significantly, since the 

start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 

8 of the past 12 weeks with the level of incidents in the past 2 

weeks the lowest since June 2006. 

Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also 

declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide, since the 

height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the 

top line on this next chart, and the decline by some 70 percent in 

Baghdad is shown in the bottom line. 

Periodic mass casualty attacks—car bombs by al Qaeda—have 

tragically added to the numbers, outside Baghdad, in particular. 

Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian 

deaths is of serious concern. 

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, 

an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has 

also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence 

in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, 

ethno-sectarian deaths have come down by over 55 percent. 

In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, ethno-sectarian deaths 

have declined by some 80 percent since December. This chart also 

displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad 

neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing 

ethno-sectarian violence, and identifies the area where more work 

must be done. 

As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosive caches. 

As this next chart shows, we have so far this year already found 

and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may, in fact, be a factor in the reducVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
169

tion in the overall improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in recent months, which as this next chart shows, has declined sharply, 

by about one-third since June. 

The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of 

course, been particularly dramatic. As this next chart shows, the 

monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined, from some 1,350 in 

October 2006, to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of al 

Qaeda, and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer 

to serve in the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police service. 

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, 

as is shown by this next chart, depicting violence trends in several 

key Iraqi provinces. 

The trend in Ninevah Province in Northern Iraq, for example, 

has been much more up and down until a recent decline, and the 

same is true in Salah ad Din Province, also north of Baghdad, and 

the site of Saddam’s former hometown, though recent trends there 

and in Baghdad have been in the right direction. 

In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq, a steady decline of 

incidents in the past 3 months, is still quite significant. 

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 months. The total from a high of some 

175 in March, as this next chart shows, to about 90 this past 

month. While this trend has been heartening, the number of highprofile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to 

destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks. 

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress 

against al Qaeda-Iraq. As this next chart shows, in the past 8 

months we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda 

enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders, and some 2,500 rank-and-file 

fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated. However, it is off-balance, and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. 

Of note, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the synergy 

of actions by conventional forces, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and special operations elements. A combination of 

these assets is necessary to conduct effective operations against 

terrorist elements. 

In the past 6 months, we have also targeted Shiite militia extremists, killing or capturing over 1,400 senior leaders and fighters. 

It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that 

Iran—through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps 

Quds Force—seeks to turn these Shiite militia extremists into a 

Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests, and fight a proxy war 

against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. 

The most significant development in the past 6 months likely has 

been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting 

al Qaeda and other extremists. The success in Anbar is an example 

of what can happen when local Iraqis decide to oppose al Qaeda 

and reject its Taliban-like ideology. 

While Anbar’s model cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it 

does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible 

with the support and participation of local citizens. 

170

As this next chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the 

actions of those in Anbar, and have volunteered to fight extremists, 

as well. Over 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for 

the Iraqi police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the 

Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq’s security forces. 

As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, 

to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of 

providing security for their country. 

Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics 

and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified 

commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Iraqi units 

are engaged around the country. 

As this next chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, 

national police, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) battalions in 

the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. 

Although their qualitative development have not always kept 

pace with their quantitative growth, all of Iraq’s battalions have 

been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the 

loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. Despite the losses, a number of Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition 

assistance. 

In order to take over the security of their country, the Iraqis are 

rapidly expanding their security forces. In fact, they have some 

445,000 assigned to the Ministries of Interior and Defense now, 

and we believe that they will be close to 480,000 by year’s end. 

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will—as in 2006—spend more on its 

security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the 

United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States’ 

larger foreign military sales (FMS) customers, committing some 

$1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of the year. 

Here, I’d like to say that I appreciate the attention that the 

chairman and other members of this committee have recently given 

to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. 

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and 

Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for 

protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead, however, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward 

achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will 

be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. 

Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead 

in Iraq to the members of my chain of command, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS). The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title, ‘‘Security While Transitioning: From Leading, to 

Partnering, to Overwatch.’’ This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troops and our Iraqi counterparts have 

achieved in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance 

of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces, as quickly as 

possible, but without rushing to failure. 

It includes substantial support for the continuing development of 

Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the 

171

counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with 

Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. It highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. 

Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being 

fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in cyberspace, it also notes 

the need to contest the enemy’s growing use of that important medium to spread extremism. 

The recommendations I’ve provided were informed by operational 

and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that military aspect of the surge have achieved 

progress, and generated momentum. Iraqi security forces have been 

slowly shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq. A mission 

focused on either population security, or transition alone, will not 

be adequate to achieve our objectives. Success against al QaedaIraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces, as well as SOFs, and the security in local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces. 

My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations. That political progress will only take place if 

sufficient security exists. Long-term U.S. ground force viability will 

benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course. 

Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success, 

and Iraqi leaders, understandably, want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, 

they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 

2008, under a new U.S. Security Council resolution, and following 

that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with 

the United States and others. 

Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield 

geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, to ensure that we 

retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, 

I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In 

fact, later this month, the Marine expedition, our first unit deployed as part of the surge, will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my 

recommendations are approved, this will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December, and the further redeployment without replacement of four 

other brigade combat teams, and the two surge Marine battalions 

in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 

15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. 

Force reductions will continue, beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008. In my professional judgment, however, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, 

our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far 

into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading, and even 

hazardous. 

In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission 

adjustments beyond the summer of 2008, until about mid-March of 

next year. We will—no later than that time—consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having 

by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00175 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
172

provements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the 

enemy situation. 

This final chart captures the recommendations I have described, 

showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as 

the surge runs its course, and illustrating the concept of our units 

adjusting their missions, and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis 

as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. 

It also reflects the ‘‘no later than’’ date for recommendations on 

force adjustments beyond next summer, and it provides a possible 

approach we have considered for the future force structure and 

mission set in Iraq over time. 

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note, 

again, that like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will 

require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. Although we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take 

time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have 

devastating consequences. That assessment is supported by the 

findings of a August 16 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report 

on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. 

Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a 

rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong 

centrifugal forces in Iraq, and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security 

forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, al QaedaIraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence, and further ethno-sectarian displacement and 

refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals, and 

exacerbation of already-challenging regional dynamics, especially 

with respect to Iran. 

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment, and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid 

an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people, while targeting terrorist groups 

and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, 

transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. 

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for our 

support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsman with whom I’m honored to serve are the best-equipped, and very likely the most professional force in our Nation’s history. All of us appreciate what 

you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what 

they have needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate 

what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have 

made significant sacrifices in recent years. 

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment, in munitions, in command, control, and communications (C3) systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, in vehicles and counter-IED systems 

and programs, and in manned, and unmanned aircraft, have proven invaluable in Iraq. 

173

Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to 

prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. 

Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention 

programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq. 

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier, again, in 

Iraq, with America’s new greatest generation. Our country’s men 

and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most 

complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans 

should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq 

today. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA 

Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way 

forward. 

At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have 

briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this 

testimony myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress. 

As a bottom line upfront, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition, and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the 

security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall 

number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with 

the numbers of incidents in the last 2 weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 

2006. 

One reason for the decline in incidents is that coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt 

significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq. Though al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain 

dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas. 

We have also disrupted Shiite militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Iraqi Special Groups, along with a senior 

Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq. 

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as 

well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad 

and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels. 

Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, 

albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some 

elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing 

and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas. 

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 

months, the tribal rejection of al Qaeda that started in Anbar province and helped 

produce such significant change there has now spread lo a number of other locations 

as well. 

Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the 

next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge 

level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security 

gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. 

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, 

and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our 

objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. 

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict 

in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way 

ahead in Iraq. 

174

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and 

sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, 

and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more—or less—violently. This chart 

shows the security challenges in Iraq, Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence. 

Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various 

forms of corruption add to Iraq’s challenges. 

THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER 2006 AND THE SURGE

In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past. 

In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated 

in the wake of the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders 

in Iraq at that time—General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad—

concluded that the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. Their review underscored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially 

in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the 

coalition to accomplish these tasks, and those forces began to flow in January. 

In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from al Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported 

militia extremists. We have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore 

the importance of units living among the people they are securing, and accordingly, 

our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases 

manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq. 

In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive operations focused on: expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months 

in Anbar province; dealing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province, and important areas in the so-called ‘‘belts’’ 

around Baghdad; and pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several 

other areas. 

Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups 

and tribes, and this led to additional elements standing up to oppose al Qaeda and 

other extremists. We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi security forces and we employed nonkinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided 

by the conduct of our kinetic operations—aided in this effort by the arrival of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted 

at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes 

and tough losses along the way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations; we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to 

gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and refining data 

from coalition and Iraqi operations centers, using a methodology that has been in 

place for well over a year and that has benefited over the past 7 months from the 

increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people. We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our ability 

to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent on 

collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time. Two U.S. intelligence 

agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and they concluded that the data we 

produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq. 

As I mentioned upfront, and as the chain before you reflects, the level of security 

incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents 

in the past 2 weeks the lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this 

past week the lowest since April 2006. 

Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this chart, and the decline by some 70 

percent in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by 

al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even 

175

without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still 

too high and continues to be of serious concern. 

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the 

height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line 

on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55 percent, and it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In 

Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come 

down by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of 

sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the 

progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging. 

As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, 

and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially 

increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this chart shows, 

we have, so far this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 

more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction 

in the number of overall improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in recent months, 

which as this chart shows, has declined sharply, by about one-third, since June. 

The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. 

This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of al Qaeda and 

the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer lo serve in the Iraqi Army 

and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar actions in other 

locations, as well. 

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by 

this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in 

Ninevah province, for example, has been much more up and down, until a recent 

decline, and the same is (rue in Sala ad Din province, though recent trends there 

and in Baghdad have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory 

in Iraq—a steady decline of incidents in the past 3 months—is still quite significant. 

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the 

past 5 months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 

90 this past month. While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the 

number of high profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to 

destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks. 

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against al Qaeda and 

its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or 

captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al 

Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are pursuing its 

leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq explained, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special operations 

elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to 

prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq. 

In the past 6 months we have also targeted Shiite militia extremists, capturing 

a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, 

arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and 

kidnapped Iraqi Governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians 

in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition 

and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the 

Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a 

proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. 

The most significant development in the past 6 months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as ‘‘lost’’ politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when 

local leaders and citizens decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible 

176

with the support and participation of local citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes 

have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight 

extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the Iraqi Government’s National 

Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens 

who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000 such 

individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi Police, thousands of others are 

being assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more arc vying for a spot in 

Iraq’s security forces. 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their 

capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting 

institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country. 

As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and 

Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of 

taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all 

of Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are among the 

shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not 

take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight 

and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now 

operate with minimal coalition assistance. 

As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the 

ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces. Currently, 

there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense 

Ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of 

Iraq’s security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much 

as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and 

we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces. 

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than 

it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fad, Iraq is becoming 

one of the United States’ larger foreign military sales (FMS) customers, committing 

some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more 

being committed before the end of this year. I appreciate the attention that some 

Members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. 

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are 

slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable 

challenges lie ahead; however, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made 

progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will 

be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the 

members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the 

approach I recommended is captured in its title: ‘‘Security While Transitioning: 

From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.’’ This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard 

to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the 

population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions 

and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes 

substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also 

stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. It highlights the 

importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of 

the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in 

cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy’s growing use of that important medium to spread extremism. 

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that:

• military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum; 

177

• Iraqi security forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq; 

• a mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not 

be adequate to achieve our objectives; 

• success against al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists 

requires conventional forces as well as Special Operations Forces; and 

• the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the 

surge forces.

My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations:

• political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists; • long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as 

the surge runs its course; 

• regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and • Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their 

country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued 

presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security 

Council Resolution and, following that, they want to negotiate a long-term 

security agreement with the United States and other nations.

Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with 

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains 

for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge 

forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed 

as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit’s departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat 

team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without 

replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade 

combat teams by mid-July 2008. 

I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will 

continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by 

mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would he premature to 

make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not 

just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past 6 

months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one 

would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the 

way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers 

in onetime al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya 

in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against al Qaeda. Nor would we 

have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of 

Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, 

on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of 

Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now 

have greater concern. 

In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation 

for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 

2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider 

factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by 

then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did 

in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that 

consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make. 

This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the 

no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer 

and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure 

and mission set in Iraq. 

One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the 

Multinational Forces-Iraq mission from one that emphasizes population security, 

counterterrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on transition and 

counterterrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We 

have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi 

security forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released NIE on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, 

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and I quote, ‘‘We assess that changing the mission of coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for 

Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent al Qaeda-Iraq from establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.’’

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like 

Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There 

are no easy answers or quick solutions. Though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. 

That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence 

Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. 

Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal 

would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and 

produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of 

the Iraqi security forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; al QaedaIraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence 

and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience 

by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran. 

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best 

way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is 

to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, 

transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. 

CLOSING COMMENTS

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our 

men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 

coastguardsmen with whom I’m honored to serve are the best equipped and, very 

likely, the most professional force in our Nation’s history. Impressively, despite all 

that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands 

and volunteer to stay in uniform. With 3 weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, 

the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130 percent of the 

reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115 percent in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure 

that these great troopers have had what they’ve needed lo accomplish their mission, 

just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, 

too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years. 

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment; in munitions;.in command, control, and communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED 

systems and programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently—especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against IEDs—are also of enormous importance. Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the 

counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new 

detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq. 

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America’s new ‘‘Greatest Generation.’’ Our country’s men and women in uniform have 

done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in 

Iraq today. 

Thank you very much. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Ambassador Crocker? 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED 

STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, since I have circulated my 

statement and delivered it in previous hearings, in the interest of 

the committee’s time, if it’s agreeable to you, I’d be prepared to go 

straight to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]


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PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to address the Senate this week. I have considered it a privilege 

and an honor to serve in Iraq at a time when so much is at stake for our country 

and the people of the region—and when so many Americans of the highest caliber 

in our military and civilian services are doing the same. I know that a heavy responsibility weighs on my shoulders to provide the country with my best, most honest assessment of the political, economic, and diplomatic situation in Iraq and the 

implications for the United States. 

Americans, in this chamber and beyond, are looking for more than an update on 

the latest events. They want to know the answers to some key questions. Are our 

objectives realistic? Is it possible that Iraq will become a united, stable country with 

a democratic government operating under the rule of law? What is the trajectory—

is Iraq, on the whole, moving in the right direction? Can we expect more and under 

what time frame? Are there alternative courses of action for our country which are 

superior? 

These are sensible questions to be asked by a nation investing in and sacrificing 

for another country and people. In asking these questions, however, we must not 

lose sight of the vital interests the United States has in a successful outcome in 

Iraq. 

My intention today is to give you an assessment of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. In doing so, I will not minimize the enormity of the 

challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the complexity of the situation. Yet at the same time, 

I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems 

confronting them today. A secure, stable democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors 

is attainable. In my judgment, the cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and 

diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not 

steep. The process will not be quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks as 

well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment. 

There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory; any turning point 

will likely only be recognized in retrospect. 

This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening one. I have found 

it helpful, during my time in Iraq to reflect on our own history. At many points in 

the early years, our survival as a nation was questionable. Our efforts to build the 

institutions of government were not always successful in the first instance. Tough 

issues—such as slavery, universal suffrage, civil rights, and state rights—were resolved only after acrimonious debate and sometimes violence. 

Iraq is experiencing a revolution—not just regime change. It is only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in Iraq and what Iraqis 

have achieved, as well as maintain a sense of realism about the challenges that remain. 

CONTEXT

Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the context of where they 

have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years old—and that is the overwhelming majority 

of the population—would have known nothing but the rule of the Ba’ath party before liberation 41⁄2 years ago. Those 35 years were filled with crimes against humanity on every scale. Saddam Hussein ruled without mercy, not hesitating to use lethal 

force and torture against even those in his inner circle. His genocidal campaign 

against the Kurds and savagery toward southern Shi’a are well known. But he also 

used violence and intimidation as tools in the complete deconstruction of Iraqi society. No organization or institution survived that was not linked in some way to regime protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even family members were afraid to talk to one another. 

This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when Saddam’s statue came 

down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela existed to emerge on the national political scene; anyone with his leadership talents would have not survived. A new Iraq 

had to be built almost literally from scratch, and the builders in most cases were 

themselves reduced to their most basic identity, ethnic, or sectarian. 

Much progress has been made, particularly in building an institutional framework 

where there was none before. But rather than being a period in which old animosities and suspicions were overcome, the past 18 months in particular have further 

strained Iraqi society. The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 had its seeds 

in Saddam’s social deconstruction and it had dire consequences for the people of 

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Iraq as well as its politics. Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian 

killings by al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed away at the already 

frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is—

and will remain for some time to come—a traumatized society. 

NATIONAL POLITICS

It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraq must be seen. Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq—but they 

are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how 

Iraqis will share power and resources among each other. The constitution approved 

in a referendum in 2005 answered some of these questions in theory, but much remains uncertain in both law and practice. 

Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. For instance, 

there is a budding debate about federalism among Iraq’s leaders and, importantly, 

within the Sunni community. Those living in place like al-Anbar and Salahaddin are 

beginning to realize how localities having more of a say in daily decision making 

will empower their communities. No longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as the 

panacea to Iraq’s problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is ultimately critical to 

the evolution of a common vision among all Iraqi leaders. 

Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over the sectarian system 

that was used to divide the spoils of the state in the last few years. Leaders from 

all communities openly acknowledge that a focus on sectarian gains has led to poor 

governance and served Iraqis badly. Many claim to be ready to make the sacrifices 

that will be needed to put government performance ahead of sectarian and ethnic 

concerns. Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their application will be. 

Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first providing a national framework, but instead by tackling immediate problems. One such 

example is how the central government has accepted over 1,700 young men from 

the Abu Ghurayb area west of Baghdad, including former members of insurgent 

groups, to be part of the Iraqi security forces. Another is how the government, without much public fanfare, has contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi 

army, offering them retirement, return to the military, or public sector employment. 

So without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we see amnesty being granted, 

and deba’athification reform in advance of national legislation. In both instances, 

the seeds of reconciliation are being planted. 

We have come to associate progress on national reconciliation as meaning the passage of key pieces of legislation. There is logic to this, as the legislation we are urging the Iraqis to produce does—in one way or another—have to do with the question 

of how to share power and resources among Iraq’s many communities. This legislation also has to do with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenues 

sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply whether Iraqis in 

oil producing areas are willing to share their wealth with other Iraqis. What is difficult about the oil laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward 

a Federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that 

even in the absence of legislation there is practical action as the central government 

shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq’s 

provinces. 

In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq—de-Baathification and 

provincial powers—are akin to those surrounding our civil rights movement or 

struggle over states rights. On de-Baathification, Iraqis are struggling to come to 

terms with a vicious past. They are trying to balance fear that the Baath party 

would one day return to power with the recognition that many former members of 

the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization not to repress others 

but for personal survival. With provincial powers, they are grappling with very serious questions about what the right balance between the center and the periphery 

is for Iraq. Some see the devolution of power to regions and provinces as being the 

best insurance against the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others see 

Iraq, with its complex demographics, as in need of a strong central authority. 

In short, we should not be surprised or dismayed that Iraqis have not fully resolved such issues. Rather, we should ask whether the way in which they are approaching such issues gives us a sense of their seriousness and ultimate capability 

to resolve Iraq’s fundamental problems. Is the collective national leadership of Iraq 

ready to prioritize Iraq over sectarian and community interests? Can and will they 

come to agreement about what sort of Iraq they want? 

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I do believe that Iraq’s leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing problems, although it will take longer than we originally anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the issues before them. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki 

and the other Iraqi leaders face enormous obstacles in their efforts to govern effectively. I believe they approach the task with a deep sense of commitment and patriotism. An important part of my assessment was the effort made by the leaders this 

past summer. After weeks of preparatory work and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq’s five most prominent national leaders from the three major communities 

issued a communique ́ on August 26 that noted agreement on draft legislation dealing with deba’athification and provincial powers. This agreement by no means 

solves all of Iraq’s problems. But the commitment of its leaders to work together 

on hard issues is encouraging. 

Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders together decided to publicly express their joint desire to develop a long term relationship with the United States. 

Despite their many differences in perspectives and experiences, they all agreed on 

language acknowledging the need for a continued presence by the multinational 

forces in Iraq and expressing gratitude for the sacrifices these forces have made for 

Iraqis. 

PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL POLITICS

At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in 

the north and west of Iraq where the security improvements have been in some 

places dramatic. In these areas, there is abundant evidence that the security gains 

have opened the door for meaningful politics. 

In al-Anbar, the progress on the security side has been extraordinary. Six months 

ago, violence was rampant, our forces were under daily attack, and Iraqis were cowering from the intimidation of al Qaeda. But al Qaeda overplayed its hand in alAnbar and Anbaris began to reject its excesses—be they beheading school children 

or cutting off peoples’ fingers as punishment for smoking. Recognizing the coalition 

would help eject al Qaeda, the tribes began to fight with us, not against us, and 

the landscape in al-Anbar is dramatically different as a result. Tribal representatives are on the provincial council, which is now meeting regularly to find ways of 

restoring services, developing the economy, and executing a provincial budget. These 

leaders are looking for help to rebuild their cities and talking of attracting investment. Such scenes are also unfolding in parts of Diyala’ and Ninewa, where Iraqis 

have mobilized with the help of the coalition and Iraqi security forces to evict al 

Qaeda from their communities. The world should note that when al Qaeda began 

implementing its twisted vision of the Caliphate in Iraq, Iraqis, from al-Anbar to 

Baghdad to Diyala’, have overwhelmingly rejected it. 

Shiite extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks by elements of the Iranian backed Jaysh al-Mahdi on worshipers in the holy city of Karbala’ have provoked a backlash and triggered a call by Muqtada as-Sadr for Jaysh al-Mahdi to 

cease attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces. 

A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have 

little ability to generate funds through taxation, making them dependent on the central government for resources. The growing ability of the provinces to design and 

execute budgets and the readiness of the central government to resource them are 

success stories. On September 6, Iraq’s senior Federal leadership traveled to alAnbar where they announced a 70 percent increase in the 2007 provincial capital 

budget as well as $50 million to compensate losses in the fight against al Qaeda. 

The support of the central government is also needed to maintain hard-won security 

in areas like al-Anbar through the rapid expansion of locally-generated police. The 

Government of Iraq has placed some 21,000 Anbaris on police roles. 

ECONOMICS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Iraq is starting to make some gains in the economy. Improving security is stimulating revival of markets, with the active participation of local communities. In some 

places, war damage is being cleared and buildings repaired, roads and sewers built 

and commerce energized. 

The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed 6 percent for 2007. Iraqi 

ministries and provincial councils have made substantial progress this year in utilizing Iraq’s oil revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental budget allocated 

$10 billion (nearly one-third Iraq’s expected oil export revenue) to capital investment. Over $3 billion was allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish Region for 

spending. The latest data show that spending units (national ministries and provincial councils) have proceeded to commit these funds at more than twice the rate of 

196

last year. Doing the best are the provincial authorities, in the process gaining experience with making plans and decisions, and running fair tenders. In so doing, they 

are stimulating local business development and providing employment. Over time 

we expect the experience with more responsive local authorities will change Iraqi 

attitudes towards their elected leaders, and of the provinces towards Baghdad. 

At two conferences in Dubai in the last 2 weeks, hundreds of Iraqi businessmen 

met an equal number of foreign investors newly interested in acquiring shares of 

businesses in Iraq. An auction of cell phone spectrum conducted by Pricewaterhouse 

Coopers netted the Government a better-than-expected sum of $3.75 billion. The 

Minister of Finance plans to use the funds, along with all the country’s oil revenue, 

to apply to its pressing investment and current expenditure needs. 

Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly under potential. 

A lack of security in many parts of the countryside raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and agriculture. Electricity supply has improved in 

many parts of the country, but is woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighborhoods in the city receive 2 hours a day or less from the national grid, although 

power supplies for essential services such as water pumping stations or hospitals 

are much better. The Minister of Electricity said last week that it would take $25 

billion through 2016 to meet demand requirements, but that by investing the $2 billion a year the Ministry is now receiving from the government’s budget, as well as 

private investment in power generation, that goal could be met. 

We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to ordinary Iraqis and 

to support our political objectives. Military units are using Commanders Emergency 

Response (CERP) funds to ensure that residents see a difference when neighborhood 

violence declines. U.S. Assistance for International Development Community Stabilization Funds provide tens of thousands of jobs. With the recent apportionment 

of 2007 supplemental funds, we are putting ‘‘Quick Response Funds’’ in the hands 

of our Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders to build communities and institutions 

in post-kinetic environments. Vocational training and microfinance programs are 

supporting nascent private businesses. In Baghdad, we are increasing our engagement and capacity building efforts with ministries. 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS

On the diplomatic front, there is expanding international and regional engagement with Iraq. In August, the UN Security Council, at Iraq’s invitation, provided 

the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) with an expanded mandate 

through U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1770. The work of the International Compact with Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by Iraq and the U.N. 

Seventy-four countries pledged support for Iraq’s economic reform efforts at a Ministerial Conference in May. The U.N. has reported progress in 75 percent of the 400 

areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this month, the Iraqi Prime Minister and 

the U.N. Secretary General will chair a ministerial-level meeting in New York to 

discuss further progress under the Compact and how UNSCR 1770 can be most effectively implemented. 

Many of Iraq’s neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the outcome of the 

current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. A neighbors’ ministerial in May, also attended by the P–5 and the G–8, has been followed 

by meetings of working groups on security, border issues, and energy. An ambassadorial level meeting just took place in Baghdad, and another neighbors’ ministerial 

will be held in Istanbul in October. 

Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business of being neighbors 

is quietly unfolding. For the first time in years, Iraq is exporting oil through its 

neighbor, Turkey, as well as through the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclusion on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with critically 

needed diesel. Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders’ 

communique ́ and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is planning 

on opening an Embassy in Baghdad—its first since the fall of Saddam. 

Syria’s role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria has hosted a meeting 

of the border security working group and interdicted some foreign terrorists in transit to Iraq. On the other hand, suicide-bombers continue to cross the border from 

Syria to murder Iraqi civilians. 

Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, 

Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of 

the Iraqi state. In doing so, the Iranian government seems to ignore the risks that 

an unstable Iraq carries for its own interests. 

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LOOKING AHEAD

2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms. 2007 has brought some improvements. Enormous 

challenges remain. Iraqis still struggle with fundamental questions about how to 

share power, accept their differences and overcome their past. The changes to our 

strategy last January—the Surge—have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the 

better. Our increased presence made besieged communities feel that they could defeat al Qaeda by working with us. Our population security measures have made it 

much harder for terrorists to conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and 

space to reflect on what sort of country they want. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq 

as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society—it is the balance of power that has yet 

to be sorted out. 

Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately the product of Iraqi decisions. But the involvement and support of the United States will be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome. Our country has given a great deal in blood and 

treasure to stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for a 

united, democratic country governed under the rule of law. Realizing this vision will 

take more time and patience on the part of the United States. 

I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have described, that it is 

attainable. I am certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will 

bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood. An 

Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering—well beyond what has already occurred within Iraq’s borders. It could well invite the intervention of regional states, all of which see their future connected to Iraq’s in some 

fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in this scenario, consolidating its influence over Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The Iranian President has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In such an environment, the gains made against al Qaeda and other extremists groups could easily 

evaporate and they could establish strongholds to be used as safehavens for regional 

and international operations. Our current course is hard. The alternatives are far 

worse. 

Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This is particularly true in 

an environment like Iraq where change is a daily or hourly occurrence. As chief of 

mission in Iraq, I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that 

they are coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of our military. I believe 

that, thanks to the support of Congress, we have an appropriate civilian posture in 

Iraq. Over the coming year, we will continue to increase our civilian efforts outside 

of Baghdad and the international zone. This presence has allowed us to focus on 

capacity building, especially in the provinces. The number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams has grown from 10 to 25 this year. In support of these goals, we will 

be asking Congress for additional economic assistance including additional quick response funds for capacity building. We will also seek support for two significant proposals that hold the prospect of creating permanent jobs for thousands of Iraqis. 

One would be the establishment of an ‘‘Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund,’’ modeled 

on our successful funds in Poland and elsewhere in Central Europe. Such a fund 

could make equity investments in new and revamped firms based in Iraq. The second would be a large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our Highway Trust Fund. On a cost-sharing basis, such a fund would train Iraqis to budget 

for and maintain important public sector infrastructure (power plants, dams, roads). 

Over time, the cost-sharing would phase down and out, leaving behind well-trained 

professionals and instilling the habits of preventative maintenance. 

We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front may come in many forms and 

must ultimately be done by Iraqis themselves. We will seek additional ways to neutralize regional interference and enhance regional and international support. We 

will help Iraqis consolidate the positive developments at local levels and connect 

them with the national government. Finally, I expect we will invest much effort in 

developing the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq, which is 

an investment in the future of both countries. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. That’s your call, Ambassador. 

Thank you. 

General Petraeus, General Jones and his very distinguished 

Commission, and very experienced and independent Commission 

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said that political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq. Do you agree? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The Commission also said that Iraqi armed 

forces, excuse me for interrupting myself here—but I will say that 

we’ll have an 8-minute first round of questions—this is for our colleagues, I’ve talked to Senator McCain about it, we have a huge 

night, I think everyone is probably here today, so we’d all like more 

time, but we’ll limit the first found to 8 minutes. 

General, let me ask you another question, then, about the Independent Commission which was headed by General Jones. They 

also wrote that the Iraqi armed forces are capable of assuming 

greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. Do you agree 

with that? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. I would want to talk about which units, 

but that is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in your testimony and your charts indicate that there are approximately 95 of the Iraqi battalions—Army, 

police, and SOFs battalions that are capable of taking the lead in 

operations, albeit with some coalition support, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I believe from our own statistics given to us by 

the Department of Defense (DOD) under section 9010, that 89 of 

those battalions are in the Iraqi army, does that sound about right? 

General PETRAEUS. That sounds about right, I don’t know if they 

have the Special Operations elements in that—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I think they are. 

General PETRAEUS.—but I think that’s about right. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think they are, that includes Special Operations. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, after talking with soldiers during a recent visit to Iraq, it was my impression that many of the Iraqi 

units that have the capabilities to be in the lead, are not yet in the 

lead. From their testimony last week, I believe that General Jones, 

and Jawr, speaking for that Independent Commission, agree that 

there are many Iraqi units that have that capability of being in the 

lead again, with support from the coalition, that are not yet in the 

lead. Would you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir, I think I would, right. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us, about how many of the 89 

Iraqi units that are capable of taking the lead with the support of 

the coalition are not yet in the lead? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I can not. If I could take that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

As of September 2007, there were two Iraqi Army battalions that had recently 

reached Operational Readiness Assessment Level 2 that had not yet assumed Iraqi 

Army Lead. The status of these two battalions had recently been upgraded and once 

the conditions on the ground and opportunities permit, these battalions will be 

placed in the lead. 

It remains our policy to ensure that units are rated as capable of operating in 

the lead or of conducting their own independent operations before being given responsibility for their own battlespace. Once they are rated as such, we transfer responsibility as soon as conditions allow.

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Chairman LEVIN. It’s a very important point. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Obviously, for those of us who believe that we 

have to begin to reduce our forces, and to turn over responsibility 

to the Iraqis, both politically and militarily, where they have that 

capability that is still not being used. I would appreciate that, if 

you would promptly get us that number for the record. 

General, British troops withdrew from Basra to a position outside of the city. Now, of the 40,000 British troops that were deployed to Iraq after the invasion, only 5,500 remain, and they are, 

again, posted outside of the city of Basra. Prime Minister Gordon 

Brown called the move part of a British strategy to shift from combat to an overwatch role. The role of securing the four provinces 

in the region, then, is left to the Iraqi security forces. Did you agree 

with the British decision to redeploy their troops out of Basra? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I did, and they had already withdrawn 

from Maysan Province, that was transitioned to provincial Iraqi 

control some months ago. The Australian forces are in one of the 

other four provinces, Dhi Qar and Al-Muthanna Province 

transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, actually, last year. So, they 

really are, what it really is, transitioning the security of the palace 

in Basra City to Iraqi elements that were trained and equipped 

and certified for that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you agree with the reduction in British 

troops? 

General PETRAEUS. I did, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, there was a lengthy article in last 

Sunday’s New York Times that assessed the surge, I don’t know if 

you’ve had a chance to read that article? 

General PETRAEUS. I have not, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The article was a result of work of 20 reporters 

who repeatedly visited 20 neighborhoods in Baghdad. They found 

that of the residents had been killed or driven away from their 

homes in Baghdad, more than 35,000 Iraqis had left their homes 

since the surge began, that of nearly all of the Shiite-dominated 

areas of Baghdad, the Mahdi Army has expanded and deepened its 

control of daily life in Sadr City. The residents say the Mahdi militants control neighborhood security, gas stations, water supplies, 

and real estate, and now Baghdad residents say the market is now 

controlled by the Mahdi Army in Sedia—once middle-class and 

mixed, and relatively peaceful—crackdowns in nearby Sunni areas 

led to an influx of hardline Sunni insurgents. Shiites turned to 

their own militias, principally the Mahdi Army. Most residents 

have left, fleeing death squads from both sides. One of the most 

alarming findings of the article is that Sunnis and Shiites fear each 

other at the top levels of the government, and in the sweltering 

neighborhood of Baghdad, hatreds are festering, not healing. 

Do you have any reaction to that summary? It’s a long article, 

but you didn’t mention any specifics about the provinces. I’m just 

wondering if anything I read strikes you as being erroneous? 

General PETRAEUS. No, there are certainly all of those situations 

to be found in Baghdad, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now Ambassador Crocker, in your 

opening statement for the record, you provided a positive judgment 

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on the Iraqi political leaders, including Prime Minister Maliki. Yet, 

according to Joe Klein, in an article in the September 3rd edition 

of Time Magazine, you told him that the fall of the Maliki Government, when it happens, might be a good thing. Were you accurately 

quoted? 

Ambassador CROCKER. What I have said, when I have been 

asked that question—and it’s come up several times—is that in 

Iraq now, with its democratically-elected parliament, questions 

about any government—the Maliki Government or any other, are 

going to be determined by the Iraqi people. There is a mechanism 

for voting ‘‘no confidence’’ in their parliamentary system, there are 

several ways they can do that, and it’s up to them. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think we all agree with that. But that’s not 

my question. My question is, were you accurately quoted when you 

were quoted as saying that it might be a good thing if the Maliki 

Government falls? Is that an accurate quote? 

Ambassador CROCKER. My answer is that when I have been 

asked that question, I respond in the manner that I just laid out 

for you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you saying, then, that you did not say that 

when it happens, it might be a good thing? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I do not recall saying that, no, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Mr. Ambassador, the New York Times reported that Prime Minister Maliki flew to Najaf to meet with 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani on September 5, 2 days after Mr. Maliki 

met with the President in Western Iraq. Mr. Maliki is quoted as 

having stated that, ‘‘I raised before Ayatollah Sistani my viewpoints to form a government of technocrats.’’ Now, did you discuss 

that with Mr. Maliki, that conversation that he had with Ayatollah 

Sistani? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I did not discuss that conversation, because I was on my way back here that night. I have had discussions with the Prime Minister on questions of how the government 

functions, the problems in governmental functioning—there is a lot 

of frustration over that, on our side, of course, and on the part of 

Iraqis, and including the Prime Minister himself. He has previously spoken of one alternative, being the formation of a technocratic government. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, my time is up. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, again, thank you. 

General Petraeus, you have stated that Iraq is now the central 

front in the war on terror, is that a correct quote? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Why is that? 

General PETRAEUS. It is based on my conversations with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Lieutenant 

General McCrystal, the Joint Special Operations Command Commander who has assessed that it is a central front for al Qaeda, 

and they have based that on communications and other things. 

It is possible that the loss of momentum—to some degree—in 

Iraq by al Qaeda may be shifting that, we’ve actually been looking 

at that to see if there are indicators of a reduction in support for 

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al Qaeda-Iraq or not, and there is not something conclusive yet, but 

it is certainly something that we are looking at very hard. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, in my statement I mentioned, and I’m sure you heard the Iranian President stated, ‘‘Soon 

we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are 

prepared to fill the gap.’’ Did you hear that comment? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I did, I did hear that comment, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Your conclusion from that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. At least the President of Iran has one virtue of being honest. Because that is already very apparent to those 

of us in Iraq, as Iran’s intention. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, it’s astonishing the number 

of things that people come up with, one of the latest statements is 

that the surge had nothing to do with Anbar Province, and the 

rather stunning success we’ve had there. How do you respond to 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. The success in Anbar Province, correctly, is 

a political success. But, it is a political success that has been enabled, very much, by our forces, who have been enabled by having 

additional forces in Anbar Province. The tribes, indeed, stood up, 

started outside Ramadi last October or so, Colonel McFarland of 

the Army with some great Marine forces and some Army forces in 

Ramadi made the decision to back him, that began to build some 

momentum, got some Iraqis trained, and all of a sudden by midMarch, they felt that they could go ahead and launch a—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Could it have happened without the surge? 

General PETRAEUS. It would not have happened as quickly without the surge, and I don’t know whether we could have capitalized 

on it in the way that we have without the surge. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, there’s now a lot of conversation about a ‘‘soft partition’’ of Iraq, and that Baghdad is already partitioned, and Kurds are doing things locally—and others. 

What is your response to a proposal to a ‘‘soft partition’’ of Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Iraqis have to figure out what their state 

will look like in the future. One of the promising indicators we’re 

seeing right now is, in fact, a discussion among all Iraqis—including Sunnis—about a decentralized federal system. These will be 

their choices to make. That kind of outcome—which is provided for 

in the constitution, is not soft partition, it’s not partition of any 

form. Partition, in my view, is not a viable outcome for the situation in Iraq. Baghdad—in spite of all of the violence it has seen, 

and all of the population displacements—remains a very mixed 

city. Sunnis and Shiite together. Any notion that that city of over 

5 million can be neatly divided up, or painlessly cleansed of a huge 

number of people, is just incorrect. 

Senator MCCAIN. Some argue that that ethnic cleansing is already taking place? 

Ambassador CROCKER. There clearly has been a substantial displacement of—mainly of Sunnis—but also of Shiite. You know to be 

candid, there is still some of that going on, as the New York Times 

article suggests. That is going to be one of the challenges ahead for 

the Iraqis, and for us in support of them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Why not let it just continue? 

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Ambassador CROCKER. Because this is occurring in its current 

form, pushed by militias and death squads, at a tremendous 

human cost. We’ve brought that down. The surge has brought that 

down, but it hasn’t ended it. To simply say, ‘‘This is a good thing,’’ 

would be, I think, in both practical and moral terms, roughly equivalent to some of the ethnic cleansing we saw in the Balkans. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, we agree that the national 

police have been a colossal failure. What are we going to do about 

it? How many people are we talking about in the context of the 

overall national police force, as it is? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, there’s no question that certain national police elements were hijacked by sectarian interests—particularly during 2006—and became part of the problem instead of 

part of the solution. The Ministry of Interior has recognized that, 

this Minister has taken steps, and we have supported those steps, 

needless to say. But it includes replacement of the overall national 

police commander, both division commanders, all 9 of the brigade 

commanders, and 17 of 27 battalion commanders. 

In addition, there has been a retraining process for them of a 

month-long course, where they’re pulled out of the line, literally, 

and sent to a location Southeast of Baghdad for retraining. With 

some of the units, this has appeared to work, there are some others 

about which we still have continuing concerns. I believe that Prime 

Minister Maliki himself has gotten much greater concern about militia activity in general, and has publicly said now that the militias 

must be dissolved over time. 

I am going to bring in some individuals to take a look at this, 

together with the Ministry of Interior, in fact, shortly after I get 

back. 

Senator MCCAIN. There’s an argument that the success in Anbar 

Province, because it’s strictly Sunni, cannot be replicated throughout Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it can’t be replicated exactly, except of 

course in locations that are exactly Sunni-Arab. Now, actually, 

there are neighborhoods in Baghdad where this has been replicated, in other areas, including Abu Ghraib where some, well over 

1,500 men have been put on hiring orders by the Ministry of Interior, almost all Sunni-Arab, I assume, and some are former insurgents, Jaish al-Islami—the Iraqi Government knows this, they did 

it with their eyes wide open, because they saw that it would be better to have these individuals fighting al Qaeda, instead of part of 

al Qaeda. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, this can be and is being replicated throughout Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. It can be replicated in a number of different 

locations where it’s needed to be replicated. The truth is, in some 

areas you have sufficient security forces now to combat—and it’s 

not just al Qaeda, it’s also, of course, militia extremists. But, if you 

look at the province of Dhi Qar, for example, one of the four provinces for which the British are responsible, in that province, there’s 

a pretty strong Iraqi element, and each time the militia has gotten 

out of hand, that element has been able to deal with it—on some 

occasions with some help with a special forces team, that is in that 

area, and that can provide some close air support, as required. 

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Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Crocker, what is your degree of 

confidence that the Maliki Government can do the things that 

we’ve been asking them to do for a long time? 

Ambassador CROCKER. My level of confidence is under control. 

We saw in the course of the summer a serious effort on the part 

of Prime Minister Maliki and other leaders to try to work out some 

of the national level issues among them, and that led to a 

communique ́ on August 26 in which they announced agreement in 

principle on two pieces of legislation—de-Baathification reform and 

provincial powers—committed themselves to convening regularly to 

deal with issues of strategic significance to the nation, and also announced agreement on issues relating to detainees and armed 

groups. 

These are modest achievements, but I nonetheless find them 

somewhat encouraging as an indication of, certainly, the intention 

of the leaders of the three main communities to work together, and 

their ability to produce some results. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, as others do, for 

your service. 

Ambassador Crocker, you’ve given us a rather ominous prediction, when you say that your level of confidence in terms of the 

political resolution decision, reconciliation is—you used the words 

‘‘under control.’’ We’ve heard from General Petraeus, we’ve heard 

from General Jones, we’ve heard from the President of the United 

States, that military action and political reconciliation have to go 

hand-in-hand—you’d agree with that, would you not? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I would agree that political reconciliation has to be the end state, but I would not, myself, suggest 

that they go hand-in-hand. 

Senator KENNEDY. All right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think the military surge can create the 

conditions under which political reconciliation is possible. 

Senator KENNEDY. All right, well they can create the conditions. 

The real issue and question is, with the surge, are those conditions 

being created? General Petraeus pointed out in his counterinsurgency statement and book published last December, ‘‘the tactical actions that must be linked, not only to strategic and operational military objectives, but also to the host nation’s essential 

political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may 

be wasted for no real gain.’’ Without those connections—military 

and political—lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. 

So, General Petraeus, in looking at the surge, and being mindful 

of the GAO report, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, 

that point out that the most important benchmarks that are essential to achieve national reconciliation, end the violence, have not 

been met, and are not likely to be met any time soon—how do we 

have any real confidence that these political judgments are going 

to be made by the Iraqi political leadership? The Iraqi political 

leadership—they’re the ones that are going to have to make the 

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judgments on political reconciliation. We’ve had the surge now. 

We’ve read the GAO report, we know what President Bush has 

said, that if the benchmarks have not been achieved, he’s going to 

hold the Iraqis accountable—we’ve seen no evidence of that. I’d 

suggest that the Iraqi political leadership is holding hostage American service men and women in Iraq. If they are not going to move, 

if they’re not going to make judgments, if they’re not going to make 

a decision, what I hear from you is that the American commitment 

is going to be open-ended. It’s going to be open-ended into the future. I’m not sure the American people are willing to buy into that. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, what gives me some confidence is 

actions beyond those of the inability to gain agreement on the 

benchmark legislation. An example is the fact that, although there 

has not been agreement on the oil revenue-sharing law, although 

they have actually sent it forward, I believe is the latest status—

they have been, in fact, sharing oil revenue. In fact, giving provinces budgets that are commensurate with what they likely will be 

given if this law were passed. 

Similarly, in terms of—there is no general amnesty law, but 

there is, essentially conditional immunity that Prime Minister 

Maliki—through the National Reconciliation Committee—has fostered in reaching out to these groups that have raised their hand 

to support al Qaeda, and supporting them by putting them through 

training, and on the payroll of the Ministries of Interior and Defense. 

Senator KENNEDY. Just to remind ourselves, the NIE, which I 

think most of us have had the opportunity to read, said the political reconciliation—I think they used the word ‘‘elusive’’—the GAO, 

the establishment of benchmarks which are basically benchmarks 

by the Bush administration have not been effectively achieved and 

accomplished. We hear now that Ambassador Crocker says that he 

has called the idea of political reconciliation, he is keeping ‘‘under 

control’’ his degree of enthusiasm, or interest, or belief that that’s 

going to happen. We have to know why we should believe that the 

Maliki Government or the politicians in Baghdad are going to 

make the tough judgments or decisions that are going to provide 

the national reconciliation and the political stability of that country, which—as you pointed out in your book—says is absolutely essential if we’re going to end violence, and have a country that’s 

going to have some degree of independence. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I described a few minutes ago 

the efforts that Prime Minister Maliki and other members of the 

leadership made in the course of the summer that does give me 

some encouragement, both of their resolve and, to a certain degree, 

their ability to get things done. 

There are other indications—— 

Senator KENNEDY. They’re not in the GAO report. 

My time is just going out—General, if I could ask you, on your 

last chart that you have over here, this is the last chart? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KENNEDY. It shows the gradual reduction of American 

personnel over the period—these are the numbers, the brigades 

that are going down, this has it eventually flattening out to virtually nothing, it’s the chart over here. What is the timeline beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00208 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tween these various bars that we have in this chart that’s on this—

on the chart that you have over here, and that you’ve distributed 

here? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned in my testimony, the 

next decision—per my recommendations, at least, it would be in 

mid-March, which would be to recommend the subsequent drawdown—the pace of the subsequent drawdown beyond that we would 

reach when we had hit the 15 brigade combat teams. We would 

continue to do that as we go along. 

Senator KENNEDY. So, we shouldn’t conclude, we shouldn’t draw 

any conclusions from that chart over there on the phasing down, 

in terms of the American troops, what those bars mean, and when 

the years will come out—do you have any estimate? 

General PETRAEUS. I cannot offer you that. What that does represent is our thinking on conceptually, how we would adjust our 

mission set, and also the numbers of brigade combat teams over 

time. Again, the over time—my best professional military advice is 

that, again, I have to do that as we get closer to each of those 

times. 

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to join all of us in saying that I have felt your appearances—which I’ve followed very carefully, I was in attendance at 

the House yesterday—have been very productive. They’ve been 

forceful statements, they’ve been objective statements, and I think, 

very credible statements, and I commend you for this public service 

that each of you are performing. 

This is a critical time in our contemporary history of this country, and we’re on the threshold of a very important message that 

our President will deliver regarding the forward strategy. He’ll deliver that, presumably, in the coming few days. 

General Petraeus, I’ve followed with great interest your career 

and I’ve gotten to know you quite well. I value our professional association. You wrote a letter to your troops, it says as follows, 

‘‘Many of us had hoped this summer would be a time of tangible, 

political process at the national level, as well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the 

space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions, and agree on 

key pieces of national reconciliation legislation.’’ You concluded 

with this simple sentence: ‘‘It has not worked out as we had 

hoped.’’ 

On what facts did you predicate the hope that you had? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I guess on the projections that were 

made by—in many cases—those who came before us. There were 

plans laid out of when certain pieces of legislation would be dealt 

with and the plain and simple fact is they were not, and I needed 

to level with our troops, and tell them that was the case. 

Senator WARNER. Good. Let me go on, quickly. You value intelligence, as a military man. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

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Senator WARNER. We have, I think, a very fine system of intelligence now. Listen to what they said in January 2007 with the 

NIE, and I quote them, ‘‘Even if violence is diminished, given the 

current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting 

the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard-pressed to achieve 

sustained political reconciliation.’’ Now, in January, there was a 

very positive message to all, including you. 

Now you come to August of this year. The NIE assesses that, 

‘‘Broadly-accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political process and economic development are 

unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security.’’ The NIE went on to say, 

‘‘That the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the 

next 6 to 12 months.’’ 

How has this intelligence report—which I’m sure you respect—— 

General PETRAEUS. I do. 

Senator WARNER. How has this shaped your message to Congress, and your advice you’re now giving the President of the 

United States? 

General PETRAEUS. For one, it has made it realistic, and as I 

have mentioned to the other committees, I am not a pessimist or 

an optimist at this point, I am a realist about Iraq, and Iraq is 

hard. What gives, again, some hope, is the willingness of Prime 

Minister Maliki—although it’s difficult for him to cobble together 

all of the different elements that are required to agree on legislation—but he has given direction, the formation of the National Reconciliation Committee, that works with the engagement cell that 

the Ambassador and I have created—a British two-star and a senior diplomat—to try to embrace and facilitate these local initiatives, 

being connected to the national government. That has been the 

positive—— 

Senator WARNER. General, I have to tell you my own personal 

view is that I think the local activities, of what they call ‘‘bottom 

up’’ reconciliation, are just coming into being, it’s just come into the 

lexicon, the debates that we’ve had, in these 5 years, we’ve never 

seen it before. It’s a little too early, I think, to put much credit on 

it. But let them, let’s think for the future positively. 

We have to have bottom up—I mean, top down, not bottom up, 

reconciliation to meet the maxims that we’ve operated on, and witnesses at that table have said for years, there is no military solution to this, it has to be a political reconciliation to have a unity 

government. 

That brings you up, Mr. Ambassador. Again, you’re giving advice 

to the President. The President’s message is going to take this debate—as it should—from the halls of Congress into every city, village, town, and crossroads in this country, into most of the capitols 

of the worlds, and most particularly, in the Middle East. Credibility 

of the United States is on the line, and we have to help the President—all of us, in my judgment—to get it right. 

I don’t feel that this current status of the Iraqi Government, and 

I’m not going to use all of the adjectives; is dysfunctional. It’s all 

been laid out, very carefully, by each of you over these days. But 

in January, the President, in that January 10 message—and I’ve 

read it, and re-read it many times—it is clear that that reconciliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ation was a concept, it was a building block to justify going forward 

with the surge. 

I do not think that the forward strategy that will be announced 

by the President in a matter of days can once again use the concept 

of top-down reconciliation as a building block for that strategy he 

will announce to our Nation. Do you agree or disagree with that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, as you and others of your colleagues 

have remarked, and as we have said, and national reconciliation, 

political reconciliation is ultimately what success will be all about 

in Iraq, if it’s achieved. So, I think whether it is top-down or bottom up, or—which is actually the case, both, that remains critically 

important. 

I’d make just a couple of quick points—first, as General Petraeus 

said, Iraq is hard, and reconciliation is hard, particularly when 

you’re looking at it against the backdrop of the levels of violence 

the country has experienced over the last year and a half. 

Senator WARNER. Simply, do you think it’s going to be a part of 

the fundamental factual basis of support for the new strategy? 

We’re betting on it happening at some point in time. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think that the essence of success in 

Iraq, for Iraqis, as well as for our own goals, centers around a successful national reconciliation process that is going to have both 

bottom-up and top-down elements. 

Senator WARNER. That’s what’s been said at this table for a long 

time, sir. I respect you, but it hasn’t happened. 

I want to ask one last question to the General. Again, with my 

respect for you, and how I’ve come to know you, you feel very deeply about every single soldier, airman, marine, and sailor that you 

have under your command. I think back about George Marshall in 

World War II, when he was faced with decisions in every respect, 

you face the same tough decisions that he and Eisenhower and others faced in that period. 

He said in his diary, ‘‘I was very careful to send to President 

Roosevelt every few days a statement of our casualties. I tried to 

keep before him, all the time, the casualty results. Because you get 

hardened to these things, and yet you have to be very careful, to 

keep them always in the forefront of your mind.’’ Interesting, fascinating. I’m confident that you do that. You’re advising our President now on a strategy, and we don’t know what it will be. But I 

hope that if—in any way you disagree—that you will so advise him. 

Second, I hope in the recesses of your heart, that you know that 

strategy will continue the casualties, the stress on our forces, the 

stress on military families, the stress on all Americans. Are you 

able to say at this time, if we continue what you have laid before 

Congress here as a strategy, do you feel that that is making America safer? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe that this is, indeed, the best 

course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq. 

Senator WARNER. Does that make America safer? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don’t know actually. I have not sat 

down and sorted out in my own mind. What I have focused on and 

been riveted on, is how to accomplish the mission of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I). I have not stepped back to look at 

the—and you’ve heard with other committees, in fact, I’ve certainly 

208

taken into account the impact on the military, the strain on our 

ground forces in particular, has very much been a factor in my recommendations. 

But I have tried to focus on doing what I think a commander is 

supposed to do, which is to determine the best recommendations to 

achieve the objectives of the policy from which his mission is derived. That is what I have sought to do, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Once the President makes his statement, I 

hope you do consider very carefully—as I know you will. I thank 

you, General. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Senator Byrd. 

Senator BYRD. General, a lot of your testimony is focused on al 

Qaeda in Iraq, even though the underlying problem in Iraq is the 

sectarian conflict that stems back over 1,000 years. 

I don’t think it’s a coincidence that this important hearing is taking place on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. This 

seems to be another attempt to make—in the mind of a confused 

public—the war in Iraq to the attacks perpetrated on us on September 11 by al Qaeda. Is this just a big sales job? Please answer 

this clearly and succinctly, so the American people can understand. 

Is there, and was there, any connection between the attacks of September 11, 2001, and Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Not that I am aware of, Senator. 

Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, it’s getting to be like the change of seasons around here. Every few 

months someone from the administration comes up and says, ‘‘Just 

give us 6 or 12 more months and things will look better.’’ Your argument for the surge back in January was that military success 

would create space for political progress. That didn’t work. Now the 

new buzz-word is ‘‘bottom-up.’’ You talked about military success, 

but by the President’s own reckoning, that success is meaningless 

without political reconciliation. Are 6 months or 12 months really 

going to make a difference on the big questions? Why should we 

keep giving you more and more time? Why? Why should we keep 

giving you more and more time? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think there are a couple of things that 

we have to keep very much in our minds here. First, what are we 

seeing in Iraq on the ground. General Petraeus has talked about 

the developments in the security situation. On the political level, 

we are seeing some signs of encouragement, and at the national 

level, I talked about with the leaders announced in August. 

We’re also seeing something we hadn’t seen before, which is efforts to link bottom-up developments, such as those taking place in 

Anbar, to the central government. 

Just before I came back to Washington, for example, the top 

leaders of the central government in Baghdad, the two Vice Presidents, and the Deputy Prime Minister, that’s a Sunni, a Shiite, and 

a Kurd, went out to Ramadi to announce that the central government was increasing the budget for Anbar Province by $70 million 

for 2007, and was also providing $50 million in compensation for 

losses suffered in Anbar in the fight against al Qaeda. 

In addition to the monetary amounts, I think this was important, 

again, as a signal that the central government is engaged with 

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Anbar, and is working to cement relations with this province, as 

Anbar takes its own steps to deal with al Qaeda and establish security. 

So, the answer I would give is that we are seeing some encouraging signs out there, both at the provincial level, at the Federal 

level, and between the two. I don’t want to overstate what’s going 

on, but I think it is certainly something that is encouraging to me. 

Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, you’ve touted success in Anbar 

Province. Just a few months ago, the tribes in Anbar Province were 

shooting and killing Americans. Recently, they decided they dislike 

the terrorists there more than they dislike Americans, so they’re 

cooperating with us for the time being, while we give them money 

and arms. 

This recalls, in my mind, our policy in the 1980s in Afghanistan 

of arming the Taliban to fight the Soviet Union. We all know how 

that short-term policy hurt our long-term interests. 

What guarantee can you give us that the tribes in Anbar are not 

going to turn around and use the guns that we gave them against 

our troops, once they feel we no longer serve their interests? Isn’t 

that a short-sighted policy? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, we are not arming the 

tribes. We have not provided weapons to them. What we did initially is, basically give a thumbs up when they asked if it would 

be okay if they pointed the weapons they did have—they were already well enough armed—at al Qaeda, because they had come to 

reject the Taliban-like ideology and barbarity of al Qaeda in the 

Euphrates River Valley. 

At this point, their salaries in Anbar Province of the vast majority of these individuals are being paid by the central Iraqi Government, because they’ve been picked up as members that have either 

joined the Army, or have joined local police forces up and down the 

Euphrates River Valley. So, there is a connection to a national 

chain of command, and to a national salary structure that does 

give considerable leverage to the national government over those 

individuals. 

Very significant, again, that they have taken on al Qaeda, because although I have not sought to connect al Qaeda with September 11, al Qaeda is very much part of the sectarian violence. 

They’re really the most barbaric and lethal accelerant on the 

Sunni-Arab side. Within Baghdad, in particular, the element that 

has—had been trying to carry out the displacement of Shiite, and 

kill—in fact our forces have increasingly dealt with and there’s still 

work to be done in those neighborhoods against al Qaeda, and certainly very much against Shiite militia, as well. 

Senator BYRD. Ambassador Crocker, we’re hearing that political 

reconciliation can’t take place without security. But there will be 

no security without political reconciliation. This circular dilemma 

sounds a lot like the dog chasing his tail. A breeder would tell you 

that this is not the puppy to pick. ‘‘Don’t pick that one.’’ 

I’m not looking for an explanation about satisfactory progress. I 

want to know when Iraq will step up to its responsibilities, as have 

so many of our service men and women, and what you’re going to 

convey to the Iraqis that there is an urgency for them to act now. 

When can we expect to see the benchmarks that you were charged 

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to report on? The benchmarks originally proposed by the Iraqis 

themselves? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the benchmark process has been 

deeply frustrating, certainly to us, and frustrating to a lot of Iraqis. 

At the same time, I think we have to maintain a certain flexibility in our approach, and note that in some respects, we’re seeing 

action on the objectives of the benchmarks, without actual national 

legislation. 

We’ve mentioned, for example, revenue-sharing taking place 

without a revenue-sharing law. It’s being done on a reasonably equitable basis to all of Iraq’s provinces—that’s all oil revenue that’s 

being shared. 

De-Baathification reform—there is not yet legislation in place, 

yet the government has reached out to a number of former military 

officers, many of whom were members of the Baath party to offer 

them reinstatement in the service, to offer them pensions, or to 

offer them the choice of other public sector employment. So, that 

is, indeed, progress on reconciliation, without achieving the national benchmark. 

Similarly, on amnesty, as General Petraeus mentioned. The fact 

that the Government of Iraq was prepared to bring 1,700 young 

men from the Abu Ghraib area, just west of Baghdad into the police force—even though some of those individuals had been involved 

with Sunni insurgent groups in the past—is, if not a general amnesty, it’s clearly a conditional immunity. 

So, while I certainly cannot tell you when Iraq will achieve these 

benchmarks, formally, I can tell you that we’re seeing some interesting progress on the objectives behind the benchmarks, which is 

reconciliation. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you, General Petraeus. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, having 

been over and visited with you on the ground over there on a couple of occasions, I have to say here, publicly, that you two are the 

right people at the right time. 

I listened to your testimony, General Petraeus, and I’m not sure 

why I did—I knew, pretty much, what you were going to say when 

you came here, because these are things that we experienced, those 

of us who have been over there—particularly who have been over 

there recently. 

You talked about Ramadi—there’s no question that the successes 

there, no one would have believed a year ago when they declared 

that that very likely was going to be the terrorist capitol of the 

world, and Fallujah, as we all watched with great anxiety, the 

door-to-door Marine operations, and now Fallujah is secure, just 

like Ramadi is. But the interesting thing is, it’s secured by the 

Iraqi security forces, as opposed to ours. 

You talked about Patrol Base Murray, south of Baghdad, where 

they’re doing things, the neighborhood programs that are providing 

for their own security, the volunteers that are there on the ground, 

we watched these programs, with the concerned citizens programs 

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take place in Anbar province, now it’s reaching some of the other 

areas, so that the successes are not confined to Anbar province. 

The citizens who go out and mark the undetonated IEDs—they’re 

taking a risk. This is something that wasn’t happening just a few 

months—well, it wasn’t happening before the surge. 

What’s happening in the mosques is just really remarkable, 

while the Imams, the clerics, and the mosques had been giving 

their anti-American reports—I think we said that 85 percent of the 

messages were anti-American, and we really haven’t had antiAmerican messages since about April. Now, I think that’s having 

a huge effect on the people over there in the region, we’re getting 

so much of the cooperation that we weren’t getting before. 

Joint security stations, even a very critical report said that we 

were almost to the anticipated number of 34, we have 32 now. 

When you talk to the troops, and when you talk to the Iraqi troops 

about the relationships that are being developed, it’s a huge success story. 

Ambassador Crocker, you talked about some of the economic victories that were there, you talked about the markets, about the 

kids in the playgrounds and these things. Some of us have been 

there, and we’ve gone through the markets, so we know that those 

successes are very real. 

I have to say—and to apologize to the two of you for what you’ve 

had to undergo—the moveon.org was bad enough, but I think we 

know who was behind that, but when my old friend, Congressman 

Tom Lantos, came out and said, ‘‘We cannot take any of this administration’s assertions about Iraq seriously anymore, no amount 

of charts and statistics will increase its credibility,’’ I think it’s appropriate for you to repeat something that you’re probably tired of 

repeating. That is, the report that you’ve brought to us and to the 

American people and to Congress that you’ve been able to articulate in the last couple of days. Just one more time, tell us the genesis of that report—who put it together, and who’s responsible for 

it. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I have a brain trust of bright guys, 

they wrote two drafts of it, and I took control of the electrons last 

week, or 2 weeks ago and basically rewrote it, and wrote that myself. Obviously, I shared it back and forth with them, but what I 

delivered here today was very much, by and large, my testimony, 

and it certainly had not been cleared with—nor even shared with 

anyone——

Senator INHOFE. At the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress. 

General PETRAEUS. The White House, the Pentagon, or Congress. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that, very much. 

I say to both of you that the adversaries, those who had been opposed to the war, those who are, generally, opposed to this President, have been very outspoken for a long period of time. But, I 

also noticed that some of the adversaries, once they go over there, 

and they see firsthand what we have seen, change their minds. 

I was really shocked when I saw the article in the paper by Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, in the New York Times on 

the 30th of July. These are two journalists, fine people and all that, 

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with the Brookings Institute, but they’ve been very critical. They 

came back and wrote the article, ‘‘A War We Just Might Win.’’ I 

was in shock to see that. Katie Couric, who has certainly been no 

friend of the President’s, or of this effort, came back from actually 

going over and visiting—Fallujah was one of the deadliest cities in 

this country with terrible fighting. But what happened is, al Qaeda 

came in, the tribal leaders realized they did not want to live under 

a brutal al Qaeda regime, so they enlisted the help of the U.S. soldiers—suddenly, these former enemies had a common enemy, 

worked together, and now Fallujah is relatively calm, reconstruction efforts are underway, and it is really being considered a crowning achievement. 

I can’t help but think, I would suggest that both Senator Kennedy and Senator Byrd go over there, and they may experience the 

same type of conversion. 

Now, when that statement was made, trying to draw a relationship—or trying not to draw a relationship between Iraq and September 11—I think it’s important to bring out the fact that there 

were very major terrorist training camps in Iraq. In place like 

Sarda, Ramadi, Samarra, and Salimin Paq. In Salimin Paq there 

was a training camp where they actually had a fuselage of a 707, 

training terrorists how to hijack airplanes—there’s no evidence 

that those who performed that duty on September 11 were trained 

there, but nonetheless, these were terrorist training camps. Are 

there any left in Iraq now? 

General PETRAEUS. There are certainly areas in which al Qaeda 

still has local sway, if you will. But one of the big efforts during 

the surge has, in fact, been to wrest control from them of many of 

the areas that were formerly sanctuaries, including not—also 

Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jaboor, a number of other neighborhoods 

in Baghdad, and so—— 

Senator INHOFE. The point I want to make and want to get into 

the record, is that there are terrorist training camps that were 

there, most of which are not there anymore. 

There’s been a lot of discussion about the various ‘‘cut and run’’ 

resolutions, and what would happen if we precipitously left. We 

have a lot of people we can quote, but one that has not been in the 

record so far was Iranian President Ahmadinejad, when he said at 

a press conference in Tehran just a matter of a few days ago, he 

said, ‘‘soon,’’—believing that we might pull out, he said, ‘‘soon we 

will see a huge power vacuum in the region, of course, we are prepared to fill that gap.’’ Ambassador Crocker, do you think they’d do 

that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, I think they’ve already shown that 

that is their intention. Iranian involvements in Iraq, support for 

extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, 

provision of munitions that are used against our forces, as well as 

the Iraqis, are all—in my view—a pretty clear demonstration that 

Ahmadinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability. 

Senator INHOFE. I’d appreciate one last question, as my time is 

just about expired. 

General Petraeus, I probably wouldn’t have gone quite as far as 

you went, in terms of what you’re anticipating could be in the troop 

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level in the future, because I think that’s a difficult thing to do, but 

in your assessment, I would like to have you respond as to what 

factors should be used to determine that date and the size of troop 

withdrawal. What kind of factors would we be looking at? Instead 

of using specific withdrawals, and withdrawals and dates. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, certainly the conditions in local areas are 

hugely important, and it’s not just the conditions of the local security forces, it’s also, actually, local political conditions. Because 

when you have a real sea change, as we have had in some of the 

Sunni areas, where they have decided to oppose al Qaeda, needless 

to say, the job just became quite more manageable. That’s a very 

important factor. 

I will continue to factor in the strain on our ground forces, I 

think that’s something in a strategic sense that I do have to take 

into account. It is an area, in fact, in which I’ve looked at what the 

impact of this is on our country? 

To come back to that, if I could—let me be very clear—I believe 

that if we can achieve our objectives in Iraq, that is obviously a 

very good thing for the United States, and would make us safer. 

The converse, I think, is also true, depending on how it turned out. 

To go on further, as I said, the Iraqi security forces become of 

considerable importance in that area, the institutional underpinnings for them at that time become important, and those are 

the key factors that we would look at, as we take this forward. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General and Ambassador. It strikes me, as I watched 

your testimony over the last 2 days that you left the real war in 

Iraq, and came over onto the battlefield of the political war here 

in Washington about Iraq. I would say, on this battlefield, you have 

gained considerable ground over the last 2 days. 

I say so because, too often on this battleground, the forces are 

divided according to partisan loyalties, and there’s a lot of hype 

and spin. You have given testimony that is thoroughly non-partisan, non-political, and realistic. It’s quite obvious just today, this 

afternoon, that all of the answers you have given have not been answers that the administration would have wanted you to give. But, 

you’re straight-shooters, you’re both professionals—a soldier and a 

statesman who have served your country, and are serving it most 

admirably today. I thank you very much for that. 

I also thank you for the encouraging report that you have given, 

and I hope that it effects opinions here on Capitol Hill—I’m confident it will effect the opinions of a lot of people across America, 

because of the credibility that you’ve gained in giving it. You’ve 

said to us, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met, and as a result, the forces can be reduced by 7,500 

troops by the end of this year, and 30,000 by about, less than a 

year—by next summer. ‘‘Without jeopardizing,’’ I’m quoting you, 

General, ‘‘the security gains that we’ve fought so hard to achieve.’’ 

I suppose one of the things that has surprised me most over the 

last 2 days is that every Member of Congress, regardless of our 

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opinion about the way forward in Iraq, hasn’t cheered when you 

said that, thanked you for it. Because, I can tell you that the 

30,000 troops and their families are thrilled to hear that announcement, and I appreciate it very much. In the best of all worlds, I’d 

like to think people around here would take ‘‘yes’’ for an answer, 

and we’d go on and look forward to your next report in the spring. 

It’s probably not going to happen. So, I want to ask you a few 

questions, General, about some of the amendments and proposals 

that we’re likely to have put before us on the floor of the Senate. 

First, some may attempt to take your ‘‘7,500 by the end of the 

year, 30,000 by next summer,’’ and mandate it without regard to 

conditions on the ground, what would you say to that? 

General PETRAEUS. I would be uncomfortable with that. Again, 

I think that we have to have our eyes wide open as we go forward 

with this. We are making projections about what we believe will be 

the case, they’re not hopes, but they are where we think we will 

be, and that is the basis for our decisions. 

In fact, if it can go the other way, we could even make it sooner. 

But, what we should do, again, is the objective about our assessments as we move along and ensure that we do not surrender a 

gain for which we’ve fought very, very hard by being locked into 

a timetable like that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I take it that your answer would be the 

same to a proposal that would accelerate the troop withdrawal, 

mandate a larger troop withdrawal sooner, perhaps switching over 

to a different kind of mission early next year that would be 

counterterrorism, training the Iraqi troops, and protecting our 

troops there? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, to do counterterrorism, as I mentioned very briefly in the statement, requires conventional, as well 

as all types of SOFs and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. We’ve found, in fact, this is very effective. 

We had been banging away in Ramadi with our very high-end, 

SOFs for years, and we did disrupt the enemy in there, we did take 

them down, various times, a few pegs. But it was not until courageous marines and soldiers truly cleared Ramadi in mid-March, 

now augmented by these Iraqi security forces, former tribal members who joined in the fight against al Qaeda in the Euphrates 

River Valley, that we were truly able to take that sanctuary away 

from al Qaeda-Iraq. 

The same has been true in other areas—you do have to clear the 

area, and that is something that is not done just by counter-terrorist forces, per se, those that we normally associate with a 

counter-terrorist mission, but by conventional forces as well. 

In fact, one of the things we’ve worked very hard to do is diffuse 

the intelligence that support all of these different operations, and 

also, to coordinate and to try to achieve a synergy between the effects of these different types of assets. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that answer, which I take to 

be a negative to an earlier accelerated reduction of troops, to switch 

the mission earlier. 

I want to go to Iran—both of you have focused on the very destructive role that Iran is playing through its Quds force in Iraq, 

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by most counts responsible for the murder of hundreds of American 

soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians and soldiers. 

Ambassador Crocker, I know you’ve met twice with the Iranian 

Ambassador to Baghdad. I know that some of my colleagues and 

others have called for a diplomatic surge with Iran, to engage in 

negotiations with them. In your view, based on those two meetings, 

are the Iranians responding to that diplomatic initiative that you 

commenced with them? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, we have seen nothing on the ground 

that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they’re 

doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our 

forces, as well as the Iraqis. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, do you feel that you have all of the 

authorities that you need, from a military point of view, to deter, 

disrupt, and respond to the Iranian attacks on our troops, and 

Iran’s efforts to destabilize Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, Senator. Again, keeping in mind that 

my area of responsibility is limited to Iraq. So, it does not include 

going into Iran. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you about that, because I know 

your military spokespeople in Baghdad have made very clear that 

we have evidence that Iran is taking Iraqi extremists to three 

training camps outside of Tehran, training them in the use of explosive, sophisticated weapons, sending them back into Iraq where 

they are responsible for the murder of American soldiers. Is it time 

to give you authority, in pursuit of your mission in Iraq, to pursue 

those Iranian Quds force operations in Iranian territory in order to 

protect America’s troops in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think that really the MNF–I should 

just focus on Iraq, and that any kinds of operations outside the borders of Iraq would rightly be overseen by Central Command 

(CENTCOM). 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time’s up. 

Thank you both. God bless you in your extraordinary service, and 

we all wish you well and success. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank both 

of you for your service to America, your commitment to executing 

the policies, not only of the President, but of this Congress, as we 

voted, over three-fourths voted to authorize the actions in Iraq. 

I think it’s a healthy discussion, I really do. Last week we had 

General Jones’ Commission, where 20 experienced people came and 

gave their views. We had the GAO give us their evaluation of 

where we are, and today you front-line officers, representing the 

government, are sharing your thoughts with us today, and we 

thank you for that. 

Ultimately, it is Congress’ role to decide whether or not to fund 

this activity. I hope after this discussion, we can reach a bipartisan 

agreement, even though maybe it won’t be a unanimous vote, but 

once an agreement is reached, I hope that we can all work together 

in a way that helps us achieve the decided-upon policy, and does 

not in any way make it any more difficult to achieve the policy that 

this Nation will have decided upon in this democratic fashion. 

216

Bing West has been to Iraq a number of times and written extensively about it—I believe two books—recently said this, General 

Petraeus, and I think you should be complimented, he said, ‘‘The 

new military team has infused the effort with energy and strategic 

clarity, and seize the initiative. In this war, the moral, psychological element outweighs the physical by 20 to 1. On the two primary battlefields—Anbar and Baghdad—I see a common characteristic, U.S. momentum.’’ I think that’s indicated in your comments, and I just wanted to share that, because some things have 

happened there. 

General Petraeus, you have—after having two full tours in Iraq, 

you came back and completed writing the DOD Counterinsurgency 

Manual—I see a copy of the big manual over there someone has. 

Would you tell us some of the tactics and principles you’re applying 

that might have been different from those before, that you think 

can be effective against insurgents? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think one of the most important initiatives has been to ensure that the idea of securing the population 

by living among it, is one of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

that we practice. This manifests itself in the form of the joint security stations that are combinations of Iraqi and coalition forces, 

jointly manning, generally commanding control, and also, typically 

some forces there as well. Locations are in Baghdad, they’re also 

in a number of other cities. 

There are also, however, patrol bases and combat outposts that 

have been established—again, to ensure that our soldiers and Iraqi 

forces are in the neighborhoods, are in the areas. You cannot commute to this fight. You can’t secure a population by driving through 

it a few times in a day. You have to be there 24/7. 

This has, in fact, had positive developments. The intelligence 

that you get from this can actually be overwhelming at a certain 

point when they realize you’re there to stay. It’s worked exceedingly well in Ramadi and Fallujah, and in a number of other cities—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Speaking of intelligence, this is when the local 

people give information of value to the American, or the Iraqi soldiers? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. In fact, that’s a big factor in the 

number of additional weapons caches. The locals are helping us to 

those, we also have more forces on the ground, we also have more 

presence throughout the countryside, throughout cities, and so 

forth. 

Particularly, as the locals sense a degree of momentum, then 

they want to get on board, they’re now happy to have the mortar 

cache in their vegetable garden taken out, as it’s no longer needed. 

So, those are the types of practices that we have sought to employ, and a number of others in terms of this fusion of the intelligence—a lot of these are evolutions. But, I do think that, yes, we 

have made mistakes along the way, we have learned lessons very 

much the hard way, but I think that our institutions—the Army, 

the Marine Corps, the other Services—have made a number of 

changes that have helped ensure that our leaders not only have the 

experience to draw on that many of them have already had in Iraq, 

sometimes one or two tours before—but also have had a preparaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00220 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tion for deployment, the road to deployment, as it’s called—that 

has the DOD Counterinsurgency Manual, or a host of other field 

manuals that have been revised, the detainee operations one is another significant one—and then the education system for our commissioned and NCOs has been completely overhauled. The Combat 

Training Center, mission rehearsal exercises out in the desert in 

Nevada, in Central Louisiana and Germany—all of this. In starting 

off, in fact, with a seminar on counterinsurgency, as they begin the 

road to deployment. 

So, the institutions themselves have already made a lot of 

changes. We have a counterinsurgency center, in fact, in Iraq that 

General Casey started that has a superb element in this as well, 

all leaders, instead of sitting down in Kuwait as our forces come 

through the port, actually are flown up to a base North of Baghdad, where they go through a week at the counterinsurgency center 

there. In fact, I address them. General Odierno and a number of 

others all sit down and talk to them about the latest developments, 

because it does continue to evolve. 

So, there are a lot of these efforts to try to do what we have 

learned is the right thing to do in Iraq. I think that, our leaders 

in particular—commissioned and NCO leaders really do get it, 

about this in a way that perhaps we have not had in the past. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would thank you for those comments, and I 

guess the point of that answer is that you didn’t just take 30,000 

more troops and patrol more in Baghdad. You have a new strategy, 

a complex strategy, that teaches an alteration in their approach to 

the nature of this combat and conflict, is that what I understand? 

General PETRAEUS. We are trying to employ the forces in very 

appropriate ways. The truth is that some cases are doing what you 

might identify as counterterrorism, really. Targeted raids, other 

cases it really is classical counterinsurgency, and in some cases it’s 

almost peace enforcement, in others it’s nation-building—but that 

is what counterinsurgency is today, and that’s what we tried to 

capture, in fact, in the counterinsurgency field manual. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s important. There’s no one area 

of that country that’s exactly like another—— 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS.—and each one has to be treated differently, 

does it not? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. You have that complexity in mind as you develop this strategy—I think it does give us a cause for belief that 

we can make progress. 

General Petraeus, when you came before us in January, before 

you went to Iraq, you had told me previously that no matter what 

happened, you would tell Congress the truth. I asked you that, that 

morning, and you committed to tell the American people the truth 

as you see it. Have you—to the best of your ability—told this Congress the truth about the situation in Iraq today? 

General PETRAEUS. I have, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, in your opinion, is there a 

circumstance in which this effort in Iraq is such that we cannot be 

successful, that we would be putting more effort in a losing cause 

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if we continue it? Or, in your opinion, do we have a realistic chance 

to be successful in this very important endeavor? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe we have a realistic chance of 

achieving our objectives in Iraq. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, when I asked 

General Jones last week, did a single member of his 20-member 

Commission believe that our effort in Iraq was hopeless, and that 

we should withdraw promptly, he indicated not a single one did. 

So, I believe the American people are concerned about that question, and I value your honest answer to it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, have you ever recommended or requested the 

extension of troop tours to 18 months, or the accelerated deployment of National Guard and Reserve Forces? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ve certainly never recommended extension 

beyond 15 months. In fact, General Odierno and I put out a letter 

that said that unless things got completely out of control, that we 

would not even think of extending beyond 15 months. 

Senator REED. Having done that, doesn’t that virtually lock you 

into a recommendation of reducing troops by 30,000, beginning in 

April, and extending to the summer? Regardless of what’s happening on the ground? 

General PETRAEUS. Depending on what can be taken out of the 

Reserves. I don’t know what is available in the National Guard and 

the Reserves. I do know that the Active-Duty Army, in particular, 

that the string does run out for the Army to meet the year-back 

criteria. 

Now, what we have done, of course, as I mentioned, Senator, is 

actually, in fact, to take some elements out short of their 15-month 

mark, because of our assessment of the situation—— 

Senator REED. I understand that, and I think basically, my sense 

is that the overriding constraint you’ve faced is not what’s happening on the ground in Iraq, but the reality—unless you did recommend, request, and succeed—that unless tours were extended, 

30,000 troops are coming out of there beginning in April of next 

year, regardless of the situation on the ground. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, certainly the active brigade combat 

teams were going to come out of there. Again, I’m not aware of 

what is available in terms of battalions, brigades, or what have 

you—— 

Senator REED. My sense is that the Reserve and National Guard 

Forces are not available to—— 

General PETRAEUS. I think that’s the case, but again, I don’t 

know because I have not asked. 

Senator REED. Let me go to an issue which I think is essential 

to, not only where we are, but where we’re going—that’s the reversibility of the progress you’ve reported with respect to the surge. I 

think in that context, I look at the situation in Basra, which the 

Chairman alluded to. 

The British conducted Operation Sinbad for about 6 months, 

goals very similar to the surge—reduce the violence in Basra, the 

second-largest city in Iraq, bring down the level of violence, prepare 

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for redeployment of forces. They’ve begun their redeployment, and 

yet the situation in Basra, I think, has deteriorated significantly. 

Is that accurate? 

General PETRAEUS. Actually, in the last month, the level of violence has come down fairly significantly. In part because as I mentioned, there’s been a four-star general put in place there several 

months ago, changed the police chief, and again, reached some political accommodations among the three parties that are down 

there. Also, did some release of some Jaish al-Mahdi detainees, as 

well, who are not ones—by the way—who are in league with Iran. 

Senator REED. But, the presence there of Iran is quite significant 

in the southern part, particularly in Basra. 

General PETRAEUS. There is a very real concern about Iranian 

activity in the southern provinces, and in Basra, in particular. 

Senator REED. Yet, you’ve agreed—as you said earlier to the 

chairman—that the reduction of British forces was appropriate. In 

that regard, too, do the current British forces have a population 

protection mission? 

General PETRAEUS. They do not. Really, Operation Sinbad was 

very different from our surge, in the sense that it was conducted 

to reach some relatively short-term goals, and actually all along, 

intended to come back to their bases. They did, then, train—for example—the force to secure the palace over the course of the last 

couple of months, it’s certified, took it over, and in fact has done 

an adequate job in maintaining security of that palace there. It has 

been the stand-up of some additional Iraqi forces down there, including Iraqi SOFs. There are additional forces—literally, as we 

speak—that are moving there to strengthen the position of General 

Mohan, the four-star general there. 

Senator REED. If the British forces are operating there with, essentially, a force protection mission, and you’ve described—in your 

terms—progress because of political adjustments, why can’t U.S. 

forces begin to adopt a force protection counterterrorism mission, 

and nonpopulation protection mission? Or, alternatively stated, 

why do certain elements in your command—American units—have 

a population protection mission, and the British don’t? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s largely because that’s a Shiite area, and 

there has not been the kind of sectarian violence, there’s just basically one sect. There is a pocket of Sunnis down there, but there 

has been general co-existence down there, by and large. So you, literally, just don’t have the same—that particular challenge—in 

Basra, or in the other southern provinces. There is intra-Shiite 

fighting that goes on, but that is something that, in general, the 

Iraqis have shown an ability to resolve in a way that they have not 

been able to deal with, the very heightened sectarian violence, in 

particular, that took off in the next areas, in the wake of—— 

Senator REED. But let me return to my initial—you’ve argued 

that lately, at least, that the progress in the south seems to be taking some hold. Principally because of the non-sectarian element. 

Yet, out where you are operating, where you will reduce forces next 

spring, there is a significant sectarian Shiite-Sunni clash. Yet, 

you’re still confident that these gains will stand up? 

General PETRAEUS. There are a number of areas in which we are 

actually doing fine in mixed areas—or, in which, a better more acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00223 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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curate to say, Iraqi security forces are holding their own, are shouldering their share of the burden. Again, not to come back to Anbar, 

but Anbar is one of them, certainly. You see, not only were we 

going to bring the Muhone out of there, and not ask for it to be 

replaced, but we actually moved an Army battalion out of Anbar 

Province, as well, to another area, in fact, where it was needed 

more. But there are other locations like that—Kirkuk, Mosul to a 

degree—other locations where you can thin, because of the additional—in many cases—local volunteers who have seen what has 

happened in Anbar Province, and have sought to have some of that 

in their areas. 

Senator REED. Any strategy has objectives and resources to gain 

those objectives. Included in that is timed troops. So, given the 

present strategy that you’ve adopted, how long, and at what maximum strength, do you anticipate American forces being in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. What I can see so far, with any clarity in 

terms of time, as I said, is to the mid-July figure of 15 brigade combat teams. We have the concepts to take us beyond that, but as I 

mentioned in my testimony, I can’t—with any confidence or clarity—then project beyond that time, other than to say that we will 

draw down. What I cannot say is the pace of the drawdown, beyond 

that 15 brigade combat team structure. 

Senator REED. Ambassador Crocker, to date the nation-building 

effort in Iraq has faulted, dramatically. It seems the emerging 

strategy is one based on tribalism. Do you think that is a long-term 

and appropriate approach to stabilize the country? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, Senator, it’s hard to do nationbuilding or reconciliation in the face of widespread sectarian violence, which has been the situation over the last 18 months. As 

you’ve seen from General Petraeus’ charts, it’s really just been in 

the last few months that we’ve seen a significant reduction in that. 

I think that nation-building, reconciliation in Iraq is going to 

take a lot of forms. In certain areas, the tribal dimension is key. 

If you’re dealing with Anbar, you’re dealing in tribal terms, and 

what is interesting, and somewhat encouraging to me there, is 

those tribal elements that have emerged have shown a considerable 

interest with linking up with the central government in Baghdad. 

About 10 days ago, the leader of the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh 

Sittar, came to Baghdad, I spent some time with him, and his main 

purpose, though, was to meet with the Prime Minister, and establish a relationship, and see what might develop out of that. 

In other parts of the country, it’s going to be a somewhat different story. Diyala, for example, the Baqubah area, you have tribal elements, but given the inner-mixture of Sunni, Shiite, and 

Kurds—unlike Anbar which is all Sunni—you also have a very 

complex sectarian element. So, the dynamic is going to work differently in Diyala. 

Similarly, in the south, there is a tribal dimension there, it has 

a different form and shape than the tribal dimension in the predominantly Sunni areas. But there, too, we’re seeing some signs of 

a desire on the part of Southern Shiite tribes, to connect with us, 

to connect with their own central government in the face of violent 

extremism practiced by elements of Jaish el-Mahdi. 

221

In Baghdad, the tribal dimension is less dominant, although in 

many areas, still present. But, we’re also seeing—as General 

Petraeus has pointed out, in some Sunni Baghdad districts, the 

same kind of backlash against al Qaeda, the same desire to step 

up, and cooperate with our forces, and then to go the next step, for 

these neighborhood watches to link up with their own central government, and come under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. 

So, again, it’s very complex. It’s going to vary from place to place. 

The tribes are part of it, different areas are going to have different 

dynamics. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, I’m going to call on Senator Collins. We are in the middle 

of a roll call vote. There apparently are—how many minutes left, 

10 plus 5 left in the roll call vote. After Senator Collins’ turn, of 

8 minutes, we will automatically stand in recess 20 minutes to give 

our witnesses a break. They haven’t asked for one, but we’re going 

to provide it anyway. [Laughter.] 

So, Senator Collins, then we’ll stand in recess until 20 minutes 

to 5 p.m. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I will say that we’ve had this 

experience before, for those who were on the Governmental Affairs 

and Homeland Security Committee, and I hope the vote really is 

going to go the full amount of time. 

Senator WARNER. I’ll go down and protect you. 

Senator COLLINS. I hope I’ll be protected on that, since I’ve never 

missed a vote. 

General, Ambassador, let me begin by thanking you for your courageous service. 

General, you’ve testified three times now that, ‘‘The fundamental 

source of conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian 

communities for power and resources.’’ As you’ve stated in your 

confirmation hearing—and reaffirmed here today—success in Iraq 

requires a political, as well as a military, component. So, let’s look 

ahead a year from now. 

If a year from now the Iraqi Government has still failed to 

achieve significant political progress, what do we do? How long 

should we continue to commit American troops, American lives, 

American treasure, if the Iraqis fail to make political gains that everyone agrees is necessary to quell the sectarian violence? I’m 

going to ask both you and the Ambassador this question. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, if we arrived at that point a year 

from now, that is something I would have to think very, very, very 

hard about. That is my honest answer to you right now. That 

would be a very, very difficult recommendation to make at that 

point in time. Because, on the one hand, we have very real national 

interests that extend beyond Iraq. They are true American national 

interests. On the other hand, there clearly are limits to the blood 

and treasure that we can expend in an effort. I am keenly aware 

of that, and, as I’ve mentioned a couple of times, that awareness 

did in fact contribute to these recommendations. 

Senator COLLINS. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, what I said in my testimony yesterday and today, is that it is my judgment that cumulative trajecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00225 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is 

upwards, although the slope of that line is not steep. As we move 

forward, I will be constantly reviewing and assessing—with myself, 

my team, General Petraeus and members of his command—how we 

see things developing on the political level. I can’t say what I’ll be 

seeing a year or even 6 months from now, but what I can tell you 

is that I will make the same objective, honest objective, honest assessment that I’ve tried to do for this testimony. 

Again, if I should—at some future point—come to the judgment 

that, instead of a slight upward trend, we have a line moving in 

a downward direction, I’ll be clear about it. 

Senator COLLINS. Ambassador, the first chart that General 

Petraeus showed us listed the major threats to Iraq. It talked 

about foreign fighters coming in from Syria, the possibility of Turkey coming in, and the concern about the Kurdistan Worker’s 

Party. From Iran, we’ve had lethal aid training and funding, there 

are also foreign fighters coming in from Saudi Arabia. 

The Iraq Study Group’s major recommendation—in addition to a 

change of mission—was for a diplomatic surge. To undertake a 

major diplomatic effort, to involve Iraq’s neighbors, and to deal 

with all of these threats. I know that you have met with the Iranians, but there really has not been a consistent, ongoing effort to 

engage all of Iraq’s neighbors. Should we be doing more on the diplomatic front? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great point, Senator, because the reality is that while Iraq’s problems in their own context are extraordinarily difficult, Iraq also exists in a region, and as that slide 

demonstrates, the neighbors can make a hard situation that much 

worse. That has to be part of the overall strategy. 

We’re doing two things on that. One is the neighbors initiative, 

if you will. There was a ministerial meeting in Sharm El Sheikh 

in May that involved all of Iraq’s neighbors, plus the P–5 and the 

G–8. Since then there have been meetings of three working groups, 

among the neighbors, to focus on border security, refugees, and energy. We were observers at those. 

There was a meeting of the neighbors representatives in Baghdad, at the level of Ambassadors, on September 9, and there will 

be another ministerial at the end of October, or the beginning of 

November in Istanbul. 

There is also a proposal out there to establish a permanent secretariat, so that there will be an ongoing, coordinating mechanism for 

some of these difficult issues. So, that’s at one level. 

The other thing we’re doing is—and we coordinate together on 

this—bilateral initiatives—demarches, and capitols, and so forth, 

and we will continue to do that, as well. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

I am going to go run for the vote. Senator Akaka, I believe is 

here, and I think—okay, we’re going to recess until 4:40, I believe. 

Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee will come back to order, and 

Senator Akaka is next. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve been very concerned about placing the responsibility of the 

new Iraqi Government back in the hands of the Iraqi people. In his 

speech on January 10, the President said, ‘‘I’ve made it clear to the 

Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow 

through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American 

people, and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the 

time to act. The Prime Minister must understand this.’’ The President further stated, ‘‘America will hold the Iraqi Government to the 

benchmarks it has announced.’’ 

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, can you explain to 

me why we are not holding the Iraqi Government accountable for 

failure to meet their benchmarks, as the President said we would? 

We’ve heard reports from the Commission and reports from GAO 

pointing this out. But we have not heard about what we’re going 

to do about it. I’m asking the question, why are we not holding the 

Iraqi Government accountable for this? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the benchmark exercise, the failure of the Iraqi Government to fully implement a number of the 

benchmarks has been very frustrating to us, to me personally. It’s 

frustrating to the Iraqis, it’s frustrating in the Iraqi Government. 

These are, in many cases, very complex legislative initiatives that 

are difficult to do, particularly in conditions of significant violence. 

It’s really been in the last few months that we’ve actually seen the 

violence trend down in a substantial way. 

My own view is that while the benchmarks are clearly important—while they are Iraq’s own benchmarks, they are the ones who 

established them—the reality has been that in many cases, it has 

been simply too hard to do as a straight-up, national-level, legislative initiative. That doesn’t mean that they should quit, or that we 

should stop pressing them. Neither is the case. It’s a regular part 

of our discussions with the Iraqi leadership. But I think we have 

to be realistic here. They haven’t been able to do them in the time 

that they and we agreed they should. They have done, as I discussed earlier, some practical things, creating the effect of benchmarks without having a national-level legislation. We see that in 

amnesty and de-Baathification and in revenue-sharing, just to 

mention three. 

So, I guess the final point I would make, sir, is that we have to 

keep in mind that benchmarks themselves are a means to an end. 

That end is reconciliation. If reconciliation is being achieved without full implementation of benchmarks, we should not lose sight of 

that as a measure of progress. 

Senator AKAKA. General? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, let me talk, if I could, about the security-related benchmarks. Frankly, the Iraqis have done better 

there. They did provide the three brigades worth of forces. Yes, 

they’re not all operational readiness assessment (ORA) #1 because 

some of them are short equipment, or short NCOs, or something 

else, but they are in the fight in Baghdad, those forces are there. 

They are involved. In fact, some of them have really gained a good 

bit of respect of our coalition forces. Interestingly, one from Basra 

that is actually operating in the Sunni area. So Shiite, predomiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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nantly Shiite, of course from a Sunni area—in a Sunni area and 

the coalition commander actually wants that force to stay. 

In addition, Prime Minister Maliki has not limited operations 

anywhere in Iraq. There was a time my predecessor, as you may 

recall, was in the press, was directed or asked to remove some 

check points, for example, around Sadr City at one point. We have 

not had restrictions after a couple months after I got there and we 

talked our way through this, and also after Prime Minister Maliki 

came to understand, again, the real challenge that the sectarian—

the Shiite militia extremists, in particular—posed to the new Iraq 

and also the militia threat. It’s something that he became much, 

much more concerned about over time. So again, in that regard, 

there is a more positive level of performance. 

It is mixed in some other areas. One of those, talking about the 

sectarian influence or influence in targeting or things like that. 

Again, Maliki himself has done the right thing in this area. But 

here we have some concerns about others, either in his office or in 

other echelons of command. Therefore, they have not done what we 

had certainly expected that they would do. 

But, on the security side again, I think it’s fair to say—a more 

positive assessment than with respect to the big legislative items. 

Senator AKAKA. We have had faction problems and violence as 

well, General. Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq expert at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, has 

said that, ‘‘In the 6 months the surge has been underway, we have 

lost about 40 percent of the country to Shiite factions.’’ In Basra 

for example, the withdrawal of British troops seems to have led to 

an increase in Shiite on Shiite violence outside government control. 

General, do you agree with this, with his assessment, and if not, 

how much of the country do you believe is now under the control 

of Shiite factions? 

General PETRAEUS. I haven’t sat down and figured out a percentage of the country that might be under Shiite militia control. There 

are certainly large neighborhoods, Sadr City for one, that obviously, in which there is considerable, enormous Shiite militia influence, several others in Baghdad. Again, Prime Minister Maliki has 

actually taken steps to address this in certain locations, in particular, and also in certain ministries. Because sectarian, the Sadr 

movement really hijacked some of the ministries as well. He’s 

taken some fairly courageous steps—detained the Deputy Minister 

of Health, detained the Brigadier General in charge of the Facility 

Protection Security Forces of the Ministry of Health—and replaced 

the Facility Protection Security Forces around Medical City. 

Then I would have to walk down through the Shiite south, there 

has certainly been serious challenges by Shiite militia, including 

the assassination of two governors in southern provinces. But I 

would not say—by and large—that there are entire provinces, by 

any means, that are completely under the sway of the Sadr militia. 

In most of those provinces, Iraqi security forces, by and large, 

have control. Certainly Dewaniya is a bit dicey, but they’ve actually 

rolled back some of that. But others, as you walk your way down—

and then Basra, as I explained earlier, really is in the throes of a, 

both the establishment of a pretty strong security operational command under General Mohan, a four-star general, and a new police 

225

chief, repositioning forces. Really an Iraqi solution down there, a 

Shiite-Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem that right now seems to 

be doing reasonably well. 

But we hosted Tony Cordesman in Iraq, have a great deal of time 

for him and for the piece that he had, this latest one was titled, 

‘‘The Case for Strategic Patience.’’ It poses, it lays out many of the 

challenges that we have described here, but also, as I said, does, 

at the end of the day, make this case for strategic patience, given 

the national interests that are involved. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your response. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me echo the thanks of everybody else here to you gentlemen. 

Number one, for providing the kind of leadership in a very complex 

world at a critical point in the history of the world, the kind of 

leadership that’s really needed right now, and also compliment you 

on what you’ve had to go through for the last 24 hours. 

You’ve been worn down and asked every conceivable question 

that could have been asked about what’s going on in your part of 

the world. But there are a couple of things that I want to get to. 

But first, General Petraeus, we’re very pleased to have you stop 

by Georgia on your way from Baghdad to Washington and to visit 

Fort Benning over the weekend and to see the next generation of 

Petraeus airborne-qualified as he graduated from jump school. I 

know you’re just as proud of Stephen as he is of his Dad, so congratulations to you there. 

One other thing I want to say to you, General. I get a lot of 

emails from soldiers on the ground because of the fact I’ve been 

there so many times, and we have so many soldiers from the 3rd 

Infantry Division at Fort Benning and Fort Stewart that are over 

there. 

I got an email back in January, shortly after you were confirmed 

and went to Baghdad. That e-mail was from a young soldier who 

had been on the ground for several months. He said, ‘‘Senator, I 

just want you to know how refreshing it is to have new leadership 

on the ground in Iraq that is committed to winning this war.’’ He 

sent me a copy of a memo that you had sent out to all of your commanders in the field. He highlighted one phrase in that memo, 

which said, ‘‘Be relentless in your pursuit of the enemy,’’ and he 

said, ‘‘We haven’t heard this before. With General Petraeus here 

now, it has boosted the moral of the soldiers on the ground like I’ve 

never seen.’’ So that’s a great compliment to you and it is the kind 

of leadership that we need if, in fact, we are going to prevail. 

I want to go back to what Senator Lieberman was talking about, 

with this issue regarding Iran. We know that the Iranian influence 

is strong, particularly in the southern part of Iraq. We know that 

there are explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) being manufactured in Iran, or perhaps the parts being shipped from Iran into 

Iraq and manufactured. EFPs are more deadly than the IEDs, so 

we know the Iranians are having a significant influence on American’s lives. 

226

What are we doing, Ambassador Crocker, from the diplomatic 

standpoint, with the fact that you have already said, in response 

to Senator Lieberman, that you didn’t get much in the way of a 

positive reaction on the other side. From a diplomatic standpoint, 

is our discussion with the Iranians dead, are we pursuing it any 

further, or does it even merit pursuing it any further? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I think that it’s an option that 

we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce 

anything. I don’t think that we should either, therefore, be in a big 

hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we’re 

not going to talk anymore. Things have strange ways of developing 

out in that part of the world. It may be, for example, that in the 

wake of the pronouncement by Mokdul Sadr a week or so ago, calling on the Jaish al-Mahdi to stand down in operations against both 

Iraqi and coalition forces, after the negative reaction that Sadr and 

the Jaish al-Mahdi received because of their violence in Karbala 

during a religious festival—it could lead to some recalculations in 

Tehran. I don’t know. 

But I think we want to see how this plays out and see, again, 

whether the Iranians are ready to make another calculation of 

where their interests really lie. Because I would submit that for 

Iran, whose people suffered more than anyone else from Saddam, 

except the Iraqis themselves, that a stable, secure Iraq that doesn’t 

threaten its neighbors is in their long-term interest. 

We’ll see if they get to that calculation. I have absolutely no assurance that they will, or not even very much confidence, but I do 

believe it’s important to keep the option for further discussions on 

the table. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Petraeus, what about from a military standpoint? Obviously, there’s a very long border between Iran 

and Iraq. What action are we moving on to try to make sure that 

we slow down the shipment of arms from the Iranians to the 

Iraqis? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, we have conducted a 

number of operations against individuals connected with the EFP 

shipment process. In fact, we captured the Iraqi head of the 

Shivani Network, as it’s called, that is one of the major arms smuggling networks. 

A number of others along the way, we just picked up a large EFP 

cache in the last 24 or 36 hours. In addition, obviously we’re focusing a good deal of intelligence on this, and we’re working very 

closely with the Iraqi security forces and now, the Georgian Brigade, the country of Georgia—not to be confused with your great 

home State, but the country of Georgia that has just deployed a 

brigade into Iraq—very keen to operate outside the wire. It is going 

to work hard to interdict and disrupt the flow of weapons and other 

assistance from Iran. They’re in a very strategic location in Kut, 

southeast of Baghdad, astride the road that comes up from 

Maysan, and also in from the border crossing that is to the east 

of Kut. That, we believe, can have a positive affect as well, and 

very much thicken and reinforce the actions of the Iraqis in that 

area. 

227

Senator CHAMBLISS. Is there any consideration given to, or being 

given to, establishing a larger military presence, in the form of 

some sort of small base? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, there’s actually a very large base already 

at Kut. It’s a base that had been used by the Multinational Division Center South, and that is, in fact, where the Georgian Brigade 

has deployed. We have a small U.S. headquarters there that works 

with them as well, a Provincial Reconstruction Team standing up 

and then some border transition teams also working out of that location. We may well put a patrol base or a combat outpost just to 

the west of the border crossing in that area as well to assist and 

to get eyes on, really, what is being done at that border entry 

point. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. My time is up, but I thank both of you again 

for being very straightforward and honest in your assessment, as 

well as your presentation over the last 2 days. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, earlier today I asked you 

about Iran. Does Iran support, in your talks with the Ambassador, 

do you get any indication that they support the Shiite government 

in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Their stated policy is to support Iraq’s 

new government and the efforts of that government to build a secure, stable, democratic Iraq. Their actions run pretty much to the 

contrary and that is a fact that the Iraqi Government itself is 

aware of. The Foreign Minister of Iraq, speaking at a gathering of 

Iraq’s neighbors on Sunday, publicly spoke over his concerns on 

intervention by the neighbors, by some of the neighbors in Iraq 

with a negative security impact, and it was clear that he was talking about Iran. So again, you have a stated policy of support that 

simply is not borne out by reality on the ground. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, if I may, earlier in conversation 

that you had with Senator Reed, the question was raised, can you 

sustain 130,000 troops, which you have set as a benchmark at the 

end of next summer. Can you sustain that? You tell me if I’m correct. I understood your answer to be, you would have to be able to 

sustain that, not with the regular Army, but with the Reserves. 

General PETRAEUS. No, sir, I was talking about the surge. Had 

we, if I had requested to extend the surge forces, the Active brigade 

combat teams in the Army could not, with a 15-month tour lane, 

have sustained that beyond, again, the 15 months of those particular deployments. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. It would have taken forces from another component, from either the Reserves or the National Guard. I’m just 

not familiar enough with what the two Services—the Army and the 

Marine Corps—have available in that regard, and I haven’t requested it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As the field commander, do you think that 

if you have a 15-month requirement for soldiers, that there should 

be 15 months off? 

228

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned this morning, what 

I want as a field commander is the maximum possible, but again, 

my job is not to determine the dwell time for the Army or the Marine Corps, it really is to establish the requirements for the 

achievement of the objectives that we are trying to achieve. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly, I would assume that you would 

have an opinion on that, because it would affect morale, rest, and 

recuperation. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, again, if I said the longer the better, I 

mean again, the longer the better, but again, it’s just something 

that’s not on my plate. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, I understand. So, let’s assume that 

Congress enacts a requirement that if you’re going to have 15 

months in-country, you have to have 15 months that you’re not incountry. So now, looking down the road at your goal of 130,000 by 

the end of next summer, can you sustain that? Can you sustain 

that 130,000? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don’t know. I’m not——

Senator BILL NELSON. You don’t know. 

General PETRAEUS.—again, the service chief, I’ve seen discussions of this. My sense is that we could not, but again, I’m not the 

one to ask about that, I’m afraid. That’s really a question for the 

Army Chief of Staff. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We will certainly ask that and there’s no 

mystery that the Reserves and the National Guard had difficulty 

with regard to enlistments. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, could I clarify one point as well? Because 

that is—again, I’m not sitting here saying we’re going to sit at 

130,000 again, what I have said is that we will continue to come 

down. What I don’t know is what recommendation I can make 

about the slope of that line, if you will. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Correct me if I’m wrong, I clearly got the 

impression this morning that you think what we will have is 

130,000 of our U.S. troops over there by the end of next summer. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, what I have said is we will have 15 brigade combat teams and then we’ll have to shape what the rest of 

the force is at that time because we’ve actually had to bring some 

additional forces in above and beyond this because of detainee operations, IED Task Force, and some other things that are there. 

What I want to do is to get as low as we can. I’ve already 

charged the chief of staff of the MNF–I to pull together the teams, 

to start determining where we can achieve savings and combining 

functions of the two headquarters, the logistics, a whole host of 

other areas, wherever we can, we want to send folks home, and not 

keep them over in Iraq. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Can you venture a guess or a wish——

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not——

Senator BILL NELSON.—by the end of the year? Not this year, the 

end of——

General PETRAEUS. I cannot, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON.—after the summer? 

General PETRAEUS. I cannot, sir. Again, what I’ve said is that, 

with any confidence at all, I cannot predict the level of the continued force drawdown beyond that point in mid-July. But that’s what 

229

I’ve pledged to do, is to assess that and make a determination, recommendations no later than mid-March. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Of course, a lot of that would depend on 

whether or not there’s political reconciliation. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s an important factor, both nationally 

and locally, and other factors as well, obviously. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you see any indication, thus far, of political reconciliation? 

General PETRAEUS. What I’ve seen, again, as I mentioned earlier, 

Senator, is the Prime Minister himself, in his office, reaching out 

again, to Sunnis in Anbar Province—we haven’t talked at all about 

what he did in Salah ad Din Province. We actually flew him up to 

Tikrit the other day, he got off, went and met with a number of 

Sheiks up there, and have a similar initiative to what has gone on 

in Anbar Province. Now, it’s going to take a while for that to reach 

critical mass, it’s at the very early stages. But that is an important 

accommodation, if you will, and it is a tangible representation of 

a form of national reconciliation, short of, certainly, the legislative 

items that represent national reconciliation. 

We’ve talked about the fact that there’s no oil revenue-sharing 

law, but there is oil revenue-sharing going on. It’s actually pretty 

decent. In fact, when I left Iraq in 2005, the provinces had no budgets whatsoever. I came back in the early part of this year. They actually had fairly substantial budgets and, in fact, even better, because last year they didn’t spend them. They didn’t spend about 

$10 billion. This year they’re spending them, which—and again, in 

a country that is really a command economy in many respects, certainly there’s some free market areas, but the government spending is just hugely important in Iraq, because that is what does so 

much good for the people in a country with an enormous social 

safety net, but one that has had a lot of holes torn in that safety 

net because of the sectarian violence, sectarian activities, and so 

forth. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Looks like my time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m not so sure 2 

days of this is Geneva Convention-compliant, but we’ll keep going. 

Let’s just put on the table as honestly as we can, what lies ahead 

for the American people and the U.S. military if we continue to 

stay in Iraq. Now, I know you can’t predict with certainty the numbers we’re going to have, but can you agree with this statement, 

General Petraeus? It’s highly likely that a year from now, we’re 

going to have at least 100,000 troops in Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. That is probably the case, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. How many people have we been losing 

a month, on average, since the surge began, in terms of killed in 

action? 

General PETRAEUS. Killed in action is probably in the neighborhood of 60 to 90, probably on average 80 to 90, average, killed in 

action. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. That does not include the American soldiers, 

for example, tragically killed last month in a helicopter accident. 

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Senator GRAHAM. But here’s what lies ahead for the American 

military. If we stay in Iraq and continue to support the surge 

through July, we’re going to lose somewhere in the neighborhood 

of 60 military members, most likely hundreds more. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. We’re spending $9 billion a month to stay in 

Iraq, of U.S. dollars. My question for you, is it worth it to us? 

General PETRAEUS. The national interests that we have in Iraq 

are substantial. An Iraq that is stable and secure, that is not an 

al Qaeda sanctuary, is not in the grips of Iranian-supported Shiite 

militia, that is not a bigger humanitarian disaster, that is connected to the global economy, all of these are very important national interests. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would that be a yes? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Sorry. 

Senator GRAHAM. So you’re saying to Congress that you know 

that at least 60 soldiers, airmen, or marines are likely to be killed 

every month from now to July, that we’re going to spend $9 billion 

a month of American taxpayers’ dollars, and when it’s all said and 

done, we’ll still have 100,000 people there. You believe it’s worth 

it, in terms of our national security interests, to pay that price? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I wouldn’t be here and wouldn’t have 

made the recommendations that I have made if I did not believe 

that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Don’t you think most soldiers who are there 

understand what lies ahead for them, too? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe that’s the case and I have discussed the reenlistment rates there. They know the sacrifice that 

may be required of them during the tour of their next enlistment. 

Senator GRAHAM. Knowing what’s coming their way, how is morale? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I, as a general characterization, let me 

just say that it’s solid. Because, and you’ve heard this before, I believe that morale is an individual thing. Morale is the kind of day 

that you are having. If you lost a buddy that day, if I was the commander, if we have sustained losses that day, it’s not a good day 

and morale’s not great. But that doesn’t mean that you don’t have 

enormous determination and commitment to this very, very important endeavor, one which they all recognize as hugely important to 

our country. I think that one reason that they do reenlist, it’s not 

just these tax-free bonuses, trust me. Those are wonderful, we are 

very grateful to Congress for funding those, but this is about continuing to commit yourself to something that is bigger than self. 

Senator GRAHAM. General, I hear this statement more than any 

other statement from troops. ‘‘The reason I’m here is I don’t want 

my kids to have to come back.’’ Do you hear that? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, sir. I have a kid who, as you heard,——

Senator GRAHAM. Who’s going to go, probably. 

General PETRAEUS.—pin jumplings on and he may well. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. There’s no ‘‘may well.’’ He’ll either be in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. You know that, don’t you? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I do. 

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Senator GRAHAM. The recommendations you’re making make it 

more likely that your own son is going to go to war. You know that, 

don’t you? 

General PETRAEUS. In Iraq. 

Senator GRAHAM. Anywhere. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, in Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s right. 

Senator GRAHAM. Ambassador Crocker, what’s the difference between a dysfunctional government and a failed state? 

Ambassador CROCKER. In a democratic system, governments—or 

in a parliamentary-democratic system, such as Iraq has—there is 

a mechanism for the removal of governments that people get tired 

of. Parliament can simply vote, no confidence. So it’s, I think——

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that Iraq is a dysfunctional government at this moment in time? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Certainly it is a challenged government. 

I would not——

Senator GRAHAM. You called it dysfunctional. 

Ambassador CROCKER. If dysfunctional means it doesn’t——

Senator GRAHAM. You could say we’re dysfunctional and you 

wouldn’t be wrong. The point I’m trying to make, is to anybody 

who’s watched this, this government is in a dysfunctional state. 

The point I’m trying to make, there’s a difference between still trying and not trying. What’s the worst case scenario for the United 

States in Iraq, as you see it? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The worst case scenario would be a failure, either a complete failure on their part, where dysfunctional 

government leads to a failed state. 

Senator GRAHAM. What are the consequences of a failed state, to 

the United States? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Just to finish my thought, that’s one avenue. The other is simply a decision on our own part, that we no 

longer want to sustain our commitment. I think either way, you 

have a failed state in Iraq. 

That, in my view, has the gravest conceivable consequences for 

our own interests. As I mentioned in my statements, and as 

Ahmadinejad has made clear, Iran would seek to fill the void. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is a failed state still possible in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir, it is a possibility. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do the actions we take in Congress, in your 

opinion, affect that outcome one way or the other? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir, they certainly could. 

Senator GRAHAM. General, what’s the worst case scenario militarily for the United States regarding Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, it is the consequences of a failed state, 

of failing to achieve our objectives and really to support the Iraqis 

achieving their objectives. Again, it could include al Qaeda regaining lost ground and its freedom of maneuver. It would certainly be 

a very, very heightened ethno-sectarian level of violence. These alliances of convenience with outside forces, that would certainly flow 

from that, a humanitarian disaster of enormous proportions, for 

which we would share responsibility. Possibly some dislocation in 

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the global economy, depending on what happens, obviously, with 

the flow of oil. 

Senator GRAHAM. Why do you think Bin Laden’s so worried 

about the outcome in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. I think again as I mentioned earlier, it has 

been regarded by al Qaeda Senior Leadership, AQSL, as the central front. They are trying to give us a bloody nose, which would 

be an enormous shot of adrenaline in the arm of international 

jihadists. If they had a sanctuary that close, where they could, 

again, export elsewhere, I don’t know what would happen, in terms 

of the fighters who are there, whether they would then turn to Afghanistan in a bigger way or go to source countries or—again, 

that’s a good question for the intelligence folks. But a lot of these 

scenarios are obviously pretty grim. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me add my appreciation, publicly, to you both for your service. 

Before the surge in Baghdad, do we know what the mix was of 

residents of Sunnis, Shiites, and others, approximately? 

General PETRAEUS. What we have, Senator, is a map that shows 

reasonably where there were predominantly Sunni, predominantly 

Shiite, predominantly mixed, and we have continued to track that. 

Tragically, one of the outcomes of the ethno-sectarian violence has 

been hardening of those certain areas into either more exclusively 

Shiite or Sunni and the diminution of some of the mixed neighborhoods. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In addition, has it resulted in a loss of 

Sunni residents in Baghdad, as well? 

General PETRAEUS. There have been displacements of Sunnis 

from Baghdad, throughout the sectarian violence and of course, 

again, this is why we have focused on that subset that I mentioned, 

of overall deaths, the ethno-sectarian deaths, because that is the 

cancer that just keeps eating at the fabric of Iraqi society and it 

won’t stop if it is not stopped. It’s not going to stop until something 

does, in fact, stop it. In this case, it is coalition and Iraqi forces stabilizing those neighborhoods and then trying to achieve a sustainable situation for the way ahead. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Do we know what the percentage of loss 

of Sunnis is, in the Baghdad area? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don’t have the—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is it a 10 percent, 20 percent loss? 

General PETRAEUS. I could not hazard a guess. There have been 

substantial Sunni-Arab displacement from Baghdad. There has 

also been a tragic displacement of Assyrian Christians from Baghdad. Those two probably most of all. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Out of the south, out of the southern Shiite region as well, it’s my understanding there’s been an exodus of 

Christians from the south. Were you aware of that? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am less aware of that and more aware 

of the challenges to Assyrian Christians in Baghdad and also in 

some of their former areas in northern Iraq. 

233

Senator BEN NELSON. I’ve heard that there have been displaced 

as many as 800,000 Christians in the Shiite regions in southern 

Iraq. Ambassador Crocker, do you know anything about that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. No, sir, I don’t. I’ll certainly check into 

that. We are in regular touch with Christian representatives, and 

I am, myself. Their concerns have been focused on Baghdad and 

the areas to the north. I’ve never heard them raise a problem in 

the south. 

Senator BEN NELSON. It’s my understanding that the problem is 

with the militias, and the ethno-cleansing that’s going on there, as 

well. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think, literally, it may be south Baghdad. There’s one area, in particular, of southeast Baghdad, that 

was, in fact, the Dura area, an Assyrian Christian—or Christian, 

in general—enclave from which there has been tragic displacement. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I think they really had a reference to both, 

so if you would check, that would be very helpful. 

[The information referred to follows:]

There have been a substantial number of Christians displaced from southern Iraq. 

However, given that the total population of Christians in Iraq is estimated at less 

than 1 million, the number cited—800,000—seems high. Many of the Christians who 

have become internally displaced are relocating to northern Iraq, particularly the 

Kurdish region and Ninewa province. Embassy officials and the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Ninewa meet regularly with representatives of these communities, and ensure that their concerns are raised with the appropriate Iraqi local 

and national government officials. Christian communities in need also benefit from 

U.S. Government assistance programs. These include the Iraq Community Action 

Program, which works with underserved communities to form grassroots groups 

that develop community driven projects, and humanitarian aid programs aimed at 

improving the quality of child health services and filling gaps in emergency assistance in Ninewa.

Senator BEN NELSON. You mentioned that when it comes to the 

south there has been a loss of a couple of Governors; former Governors sitting here thought that might be fairly significant, but—— 

General PETRAEUS. It is very significant, sir, and Prime Minister 

Maliki—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. I’m being light-hearted about it. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But it does represent a significant level of 

violence in the south, as well. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, what it represents is really very targeted 

militia activity against Governors who had—in one case, definitely, 

in another case, sort of stood up to the militias. 

Interestingly, it may be another case, as the Ambassador mentioned, of the militia overplaying their hand. Because where there 

was a willingness to have some accommodation in the past between 

the militia—really, the party that the militia represents, and so 

forth, some of the Governors and other political figures, there is 

less willingness for that now. That also is a result of the violence 

in Karbala, which Prime Minister Maliki took very personally. In 

fact, he personally led the column of military vehicles down there 

to sort it out. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Ambassador Crocker, you said when looking at the Government of Iraq in terms of trying to meet the underlying goals of the benchmarks, that we shouldn’t get lost in the 

234

benchmarks, we should try to evaluate whether or not they’re 

achieving success. 

Would you agree that there are three things that you need to 

look for, in connection with that? Is there a commitment to do it? 

Is there effort being made to do it? Because it’s quite possible 

there’s a commitment and there’s effort, but the results become 

more difficult, because as you both have said, Iraq is hard. It’s hard 

for us, and it’s obviously hard for that government. But, can we 

make that analysis, is there commitment to reconciliation? 

I’ve talked to some, and I’ve heard from others that they question 

whether that is the case. It’s ‘‘winner-take-all’’ in many respects. 

Now, you’re suggesting, General, that the Prime Minister’s getting 

outside of Baghdad and going into other areas, I think that’s a very 

positive, positive step. 

But isn’t it the case that in Iraq they’re going to have to have 

a Sunni, a Shiite, or a Kurd somewhere in the top position. While 

they may not believe that they get an honest broker, will they be 

satisfied with an effective broker, that seeks equity among all of 

the groups. Is that fair? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That’s a great point. There has been effort—the trip with the Prime Minister up to Tikrit, Saddam’s old 

hometown, additional budgetary resources for Anbar, and the visit 

of the Shiite Vice President and the Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister to Anbar, illustrate that. 

Then going to your main point there. The question came up earlier as to whether the reports were true that when Prime Minister 

Maliki visited Ayatollah Sistani a few days ago, that he had raised 

the possibility of a technocratic cabinet. The minister’s chosen—not 

because of their sectarian or ethnic identify, but because of their 

ability to do their jobs. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That would be more equitable in dealing 

with the people—would you agree? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely, sir. One thing we have seen 

is a lot of frustration among the Iraqis, and even within the Iraqi 

Government, over where this heavy focus on sectarian and ethnic 

balance in cabinet has taken the country, in terms of effective governance. 

So, if it has brought them to the level of frustration, where the 

key leaders are prepared to say, ‘‘Good governance is more important than strict sectarian and ethnic balance.’’ That I would consider progress. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You used the word ‘‘if’’ several times there, 

so I suspect that it’s hypothetical at the moment, but hope for results in the future. 

Finally, let me say that as we look at the surge, several of us 

didn’t necessarily support the surge going into Baghdad. I think I 

communicated that when we met. No reservations about going into 

al Anbar with the surge. 

What are your thoughts about transitioning the mission out of 

Baghdad, in terms of the troops for over a 6-month period to drawdown—out of Baghdad, not withdrawing or anything of that sort—

but standing up the combat-capable troops that Iraq has, to begin 

to take over that responsibility, so that they can secure themselves, 

235

they can govern themselves. Again, if not, it’s not going to be very 

difficult. 

Then, make the mission stronger in going after the bad guys in 

the north, where we’re having cooperation from the local Sheiks, 

tribal leaders, and others. Also, because as we’ve driven al Qaeda 

and the bad guys out of Baghdad, they’ve gone elsewhere, go after 

them. Then go to the south and work diligently to get the local 

forces there, to work with us in reducing the sectarian violence, 

and the other violence that just comes from Shiite versus Shiite to 

the constant militias. 

What are your thoughts about that suggestion? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned, the title of the recommendations, if you will, ‘‘Security While Transitioning,’’ captures 

the idea that we certainly want to hand off as quickly as we can. 

But, as was stated in the December 2006 assessment that was done 

by Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey, when they determined that the effort at that time was failing to achieve the objectives, the emphasis that it put on was reducing the sectarian violence, in Baghdad in particular—because of that being the center 

of gravity for so much of Iraq. So, what we want to do, certainly, 

is to try to achieve sustainable situations in these neighborhoods, 

and then obviously to hand off over time. 

I don’t think that we need to put U.S. forces in southern provinces, other than, say, some SOF teams or occasionally sending 

something down to help out. But, by and large, in the south what 

we want to do there is to develop these special units, if you will, 

in each province—and every province has them, the special tactics 

unit in Nasiriyah, for example, which is supported by one of our 

SOF teams, although they don’t live with it, but when that unit, 

on occasion, a couple of times in the last, I don’t know, 6 or 7 

months has needed some assistance, and then our team links up 

with it, if it’s close air support or what have you, unmanned vehicle 

or whatever it may be—it provides that enabler, but otherwise that 

force on the ground has been capable of doing what it’s needed to 

do. 

We’re trying to do that in other areas, as well, without increasing 

the conventional combat footprint in those particular areas. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In the process of doing that, it’s quite likely that your force needs will reduce in Iraq. What are your 

thoughts in terms of having a second piece of that phasing-out of 

Baghdad, also establishing the residual force that is going to be 

there for a significant period of time, as in the case of Korea, 

Japan, and Germany—I don’t know that it’s time to establish what 

it is in its entirety—but moving to the borders for border protection, protecting our assets there, both the private assets of the contractors that are rebuilding, protecting the Iraqi Government and 

continuing to support them in the development of their security 

forces—including, perhaps as the Jones Commission report said, 

firing all of their police officers and starting over. It’s a major job, 

but it’s going to be an ongoing job for a long time, and could require a smaller force, ultimately, which I think would enable a reduction in the number that are there, take pressure off the operational tempo, to get to a level where it is sustainable in the future. 

236

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the CENTCOM Headquarters, my boss 

Admiral Fallon—and with, very much, our support from the MNF–

I staff, because we’re frankly where a lot of the expertise, needless 

to say, resides—did a recent look at the request of the Secretary 

of Defense at what a long-term force might look like, literally, that 

down at the lower end there in that stair-step that you saw. 

So, we have looked at that, looked at the force mix, looked at the 

task mix, and so forth—the challenge is getting there from here, 

and trying to do it as expeditiously as we can, but again without 

rushing to failure along the way. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I think we’ll have to leave that there. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Dole. 

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, you’re coming up on 8 

hours of testimony, today alone. I thank you very much for your 

excellent presentations, and I thank you both for your tremendous 

service, and your leadership in our country. 

Let me say at the outset that all of us here, and all Americans, 

want to see our brave young men and women come home as soon 

as possible. My home State of North Carolina, for example, has 

37,000 currently-deployed troops, a total of 151,000 personnel have 

been deployed. Our shared heartfelt concerns in the Senate for our 

troops and for the safety and security of our country should draw 

us toward consensus. But, as we all know, a conspicuous gap exists 

between two policy positions—namely, a long-term military commitment on the one hand, and mandated withdrawal on the other. 

Gentlemen, we must seek common ground based on a set of shared 

principles. 

A growing number of our fellow Americans oppose a long-term 

U.S. military commitment. At the same time, many understand the 

profoundly negative long-term security implications for our country, and for the Middle East of a premature withdrawal, before 

Iraqi security forces are able to independently conduct security operations across their country. 

The difficulty of the current American and Iraqi situation is rooted, in large part, in the Bush administration’s substantial failure 

to understand the full implications of our military invasion, and 

the litany of mistakes made at the outset of the war. 

Regardless, our task must be to see the way forward, to agree 

upon a policy that the majority of Americans will support, and one 

that provides the American and Iraqi people with the greatest opportunity for success. 

I believe that a requisite level of security must be a precondition 

for political reconciliation, and we know that security has improved 

in substantial areas of the country. The continued failure of the 

Maliki Government to achieve reconciliation, and the fact that current U.S. force levels are not sustainable beyond next spring, compels me to support what some have called ‘‘action-forcing measures.’’ 

General Petraeus, I strongly agree with your recommendation to 

begin withdrawal of the equivalent of six brigades between this 

month and next July. I would hope—consistent with your security 

237

assessment—that many units not withdrawn could be reassigned, 

beginning next spring, to conduct border security operations, to reduce the flow of Iranian arms—particularly EFPs and other military supplies—to more effectively deny entry to foreign fighters 

through Syria, to supplement the training of additional Iraqi security forces, to conduct support operations, or to back up Iraqi forces 

that, increasingly, should have the lead in security operations. 

A recent Wall Street Journal article described that the Pentagon 

is preparing to build its first base for U.S. forces near the Iraq-Iran 

border, in a major new effort to curb the flow of advanced Iranian 

weaponry to Shiite militants. Of course, there must be more, which 

has been discussed in the recent questioning. I certainly would like 

to see more secure borders, and more activity along the long border, and of course on the Syrian border, as well, as we move people 

out of the Baghdad region, and more into the border areas. 

But let me ask a question about neighboring Arab countries. 

Why have neighboring Arab countries that have profound vested 

interest in a stable Iraq—Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan, 

Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon—not stepped up to the plate, both diplomatically and economically? Recent diplomatic successes are welcome, but are modest, relative to the need. Could you both discuss 

this matter for me, please? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, ma’am, it’s an important part of an 

overall strategy for success in Iraq. We have been engaged with 

Iraq’s Arab neighbors, and they’ve engaged with each other, and 

with Iraq, that’s the whole point of the neighbors’ exercise—— 

Senator DOLE. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. —the meeting that took place on Sunday, 

the ministerial that will occur in Istanbul. 

We have pressed these states on issues such as debt relief, they 

hold billions of dollars in Iraqi debt from the days of the Saddam 

regime in the Iran-Iraq war. By and large, now, they have agreed 

to afford Paris Club terms to Iraq, which is 80 percent debt forgiveness, we would like to see that move to 100 percent, for example. 

There have been some other steps with the neighbors. Saudi Arabia is planning to re-open its embassy in Baghdad, that will be the 

first step for them since the fall of the Saddam regime, and we 

would hope it would show the way to other Arab neighbors, that 

the time has come to resume an active diplomatic presence in 

Baghdad. 

There is a negotiation that is just about to conclude between Iraq 

and Kuwait that will provide for the supply of Kuwaiti diesel to 

Iraq, and that’s critical for power generation. We’ve also been in direct touch with the Arab neighbors on security-related issues, particularly on foreign fighters. While the flow is through Syria, the 

origins are from other Arab states in the Gulf. We have strongly 

urged steps, for example, for these states to prevent easy travel by, 

say, young men on one-way plane tickets, heading for Damascus 

airports. Indeed, I think one of your recent detainees, a Saudi 

picked up in Iraq, had to get from Saudi Arabia to Syria by bus, 

because he wasn’t allowed to fly out. 

So, we’re going to continue a diplomatic strategy that is focused 

on the neighboring states, and particular the Arab states. They are 

starting to do more, I think they are starting to accept that they 

238

have critical equities on how things turn out in Iraq, and are moving beyond the state they’ve been in for the last several years, of 

just not wanting to engage to accepting that, the outcomes are important to them, and they can affect the outcomes. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, Jordan, first of all, has always been 

really quite supportive, and has worked very hard to limit foreign 

fighter flow to ensure that support for al Qaeda is disrupted as 

much as possible from there. Syria may have taken some steps 

against some of the foreign fighter facilitators in its country—it is 

something that we are literally looking at very hard to see how 

much they have done. But, they do recognize, we believe, that al 

Qaeda poses a very serious threat to them. That, should al Qaeda 

have success in Iraq, the next one you turn on might be that minority government in Damascus. We see signs that they recognize 

that, and have taken some steps, again, to make it more difficult. 

As the Ambassador mentioned, some of the source countries have 

made it more difficult for military-aged males also to travel on a 

one-way plane ticket to Damascus. But again, the more that can 

be done in that regard, or at large, in any way, to limit the flow 

of individuals from source countries through Syria, in particular, 

into Iraq, is something that helps Iraq enormously. Because a number of these end up being the suicide bombers that have created 

such horrific casualties on certain occasions in Iraq. 

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Dole, thank you. 

Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you. I want to express my appreciation for 

your service to our country. 

In a democracy, having a dialogue like this, questioning your recommendations, even your judgment, is entirely appropriate. I don’t 

believe that questioning your integrity is. So I appreciate your candor, and your service, and your presence here today. 

Let me begin—you’ve had to go for 8 hours, this is our fourth 

hearing over the last several days—we heard from the GAO, from 

General Jones, we heard about the NIE, and now we have the benefit of your thinking. 

Let me give you what I have concluded is the collective bottom 

line in all of this, and get your response. The bottom line in all of 

this is, the American people—particularly our service men and 

women, but also our taxpayers—will be required to continue to sacrifice in Iraq for an indefinite period of time to allow Iraqi politicians to get their act together to make the tough decisions that 

only they can make to hopefully begin the process of reconciliation. 

What’s your reaction to that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. There is a process underway that we’ve 

talked about in the course of the afternoon. It’s bottom-up, to some 

degree, it’s top-down to some degree, and it’s linkages between 

them. It’s the beginnings, if you will, of a reconciliation process 

that obviously needs to go much farther, if it is to carry Iraq to a 

position of security and stability over the long run. 

Senator BAYH. Ambassador, there’s a question behind my observation, and you mentioned the process, bottom-up, top-down, so let 

me get to it. 

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For several years now, the progress has not been adequate, I 

think we’d all agree on that. The theory has been, ‘‘Look, insecure 

people don’t make hard decisions. We need to try to increase their 

confidence, their security, so that perhaps they’ll begin to make the 

hard decisions.’’ It just doesn’t seem to have worked that way. They 

dither, they delay, and so we face this dilemma. If we stand by 

them, they tend to take our support for granted, and seem a little 

more comforted by that, and don’t make the hard decisions. Yet, 

your advice as I understand it is timelines would not be helpful. 

So, my direct question to you is—what about accountability for 

taking these hard steps? What about consequences if they don’t? 

Sixty to 70 troops every month, $9 billion to $12 billion every 

month—they’re not doing what they need to do, when do we say, 

enough already? Have some consequences when they don’t? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, it’s important to bear in mind the 

recent past—2006 up through early 2007 was an extremely bad period in Iraq, and not only were things not moving forward, they 

were sliding back, in political terms, economic terms, and above all, 

security terms. Iraq came pretty close, I think, to just unraveling 

in the course of that year that began with the February bombing 

of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra. 

Senator BAYH. There is some history in Iraq before that timeframe you just mentioned, and they weren’t making progress then, 

either. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the challenges are immense, the 

failures are there, too, on the Iraqi side. It is frustrating to me, I’m 

out there. We are pushing them constantly in all sorts of ways. 

But, I have to be honest—this is going to take more time. 

Senator BAYH. I think we all need to be honest with ourselves, 

Ambassador, and I’ve appreciated the General’s comments about 

modesty in making predictions is in order, and overemphasizing 

our ability to control events needs to be guarded against. Isn’t it 

possible, at the end of the day, in spite of all of our efforts, support 

and encouragement—this just may be beyond them, for a variety 

of reasons—outside interference, historic enmities, a lack of leadership, all of those kinds of things. Don’t we constantly need to be 

evaluating their capabilities and whether they can get this done, 

to justify the continuing sacrifices that we’re making? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think, clearly, that’s the case. We’re 

here before you today to give our best assessments in four lines of 

operation, where we see things standing now. 

Senator BAYH. What you’re hearing from a lot of us is, so often 

these last several years, we’ve tried to give their political leadership the benefit of the doubt, and now only doubt remains. So there 

we are. 

General, I hope—but I think you have to be a little skeptical 

about it at this point, too, and that’s why I come down on the side 

of consequences, some accountability, because a gentle encouragement doesn’t seem to have gotten the results that we want, if in 

fact, they can be gotten. 

General, I’d like to turn to you, I thought you had an excellent, 

very candid response to Senator Warner’s questions, and that 

was—he asked you, going forward, the recommendations that 

you’re making, will that make America safer? You said that you 

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could not answer that question because that was beyond the scope 

of your responsibilities. 

General PETRAEUS. I thank you actually, Senator, for an opportunity to address that, frankly. Candidly, I have been so focused on 

Iraq, that drawing all the way out was something that, for a moment there, was a bit of a surprise. But, I think that we have very, 

very clear and very serious national interests in Iraq, achieving 

those interests has very serious implications for our safety—— 

Senator BAYH. Let me ask you about those interests—— 

General PETRAEUS. —and for our security. So I think the answer 

really—to come back to it—is yes. But again, frankly, having focused down and down and down, that was something that really 

on first glance I would let others—— 

Senator BAYH. I judged by your response to Senator Graham that 

you had given that a little additional thought. 

General PETRAEUS. Immediately after, actually. Thank you. 

Senator BAYH. It happens to all of us, including those of us on 

this side of the table, as well. 

Let me ask you about those interests, then. You referred to the 

DIA, and then you referred to things that we picked up about how 

al Qaeda views Iraq, as being the central front in the war on terror, and so forth. 

But, let me refer to some other public statements of our intelligence services, and then ask you this question, about the importance—which we all agree upon—of Iraq not becoming a platform 

from which terrorists can operate against us, or other countries. 

That’s why almost every responsible person thinks we need to keep 

a capability there to deal with that. So, let me tell you what the 

CIA’s experts on radical Islam have indicated in public testimony. 

They have indicated that it is their assessment—on a global, not 

just on an Iraq-specific—basis, our presence in Iraq is generating 

more radicals and terrorists than we are eliminating in Iraq. So, 

on a net basis, we’re actually creating more enemies than we are 

eliminating. 

They’ve also indicated that al Qaeda is reconstituting itself in Afghanistan, and perhaps in the tribal areas in Pakistan, and their 

assessment of the radicals in Iraq, the al Qaeda-Iraq members—I 

asked them this question directly, General, I said, ‘‘Who do they 

hate more? The apostates or the infidels? Once we’ve reduced our 

footprint, and aren’t as obvious a target anymore, where is their 

enmity going to be turned?‘‘ The response was, ‘‘Well, they’ll turn 

on the Shiite. They really hate them more than they hate us.’’ 

So, my question to you, as my time’s going to run out here—isn’t 

it at least possible that looking at this from a global perspective, 

that the strategy we’ve pursued in Iraq, and indeed our presence 

there and the magnitude that we currently are there, is in fact, 

somewhat counterproductive in the global war against terrorism, 

and making America safer? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think again, if al Qaeda was to be 

able to retain a substantial presence in Iraq, particularly a sanctuary in the order of what they had in certain areas, in fact, prior 

to the surge that that would be a very serious threat. I don’t know 

where they would go next. Some have speculated that, in fact, they 

might focus more on Afghanistan, others more in the particular reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00244 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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gion there, to go after some of the other countries in that particular 

region. 

But, I think again, based on their own communications, that the 

CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command commanders assessment—this is their central front on the global war of terror 

that they are carrying out. It has been, at least. Again, it is hard 

to tell whether they will continue to regard it that way because of 

the loss of some momentum there. 

I am not sure that it is true that they are still generating more 

radicals in Iraq. I think, again, one of the big changes, as I’ve reported in the past 6, 8, 12 months if you will, stating all the way 

back, certainly, to October of last year when the first of these tribal 

oppositions to al Qaeda emerged, is that the Sunni-Arabs in al 

Qaeda—and that is the area in which they had been able to find 

sanctuary and so forth—have in large numbers turned against al 

Qaeda. They’ve gotten over the fact that they’re not going to run 

Iraq again, they’ve gotten over the fact that they’re disrespected, 

in their view, dispossessed, whatever it may be—and now want to 

make the Euphrates River Valley a decent place to live, work, and 

raise a family, and maybe even open up the border, and now they 

have a police academy again, and the rest of that, and rebuilt 

Ramadi and some of these other places, and others have seen the 

same. What they really want now is a seat at the table in Baghdad. 

They want adequate representation, they want their share of this 

ethno-sectarian competition for power and resources. They want 

their share of the resources. 

That’s why it is significant—as the Ambassador reported—on the 

Anbar big summit that was held out there the other day, the second of these, where the national government has reached out to 

them in such a substantial way. So, I think how al Qaeda plays out 

in Iraq is of enormous importance to our country, and to the overall 

international jihadist movement. Failing to achieve our objectives 

there would be just an enormous shot of adrenaline to them, I’m 

afraid. 

Senator BAYH. Gentlemen, thank you again, my time is expired. 

I would just conclude by saying, we all want to be successful in 

Iraq. We all hope that these signs you indicate come to fruition, but 

there’s a lot of history here. We have to ask ourselves, ‘‘What if 

they do not?’’ How do we go about securing the national security 

interests of our country if, in fact, that is the course that events 

take. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Mr. Ambassador—you have my respect and admiration, 

and I appreciate your service to our country, particularly in the 

challenging jobs that you have, you are performing now. 

It’s because of my respect and admiration for both of you that I 

was particularly shocked and chagrined when I happened to open 

the New York Times on Sunday to see this ad, purchased by 

moveon.org—I don’t know if I’ve ever witnessed a more reprehensible slander of a public servant and a patriot than as represented 

in this ad. It’s my hope that members of this committee will join 

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me—and, in fact, all Members of the United States Senate—will 

join together, without regard to partisan affiliation, and condemn 

this ad, and restate our confidence in General Petraeus, the same 

confidence that was manifested when he was confirmed by a unanimous vote of the United States Senate this last January. 

It’s a pretty tough environment, I know you’re working in Iraq—

it’s a pretty tough environment here, in Washington, in another 

way. General, when you were confirmed in January, you were announced not only as a new leader there, you announced a new 

strategy in Iraq, something people had been calling for, for a long 

time. People had been asking for some signs of progress in the security situation. You’ve come back here today as the Jones Commission did last week, as did the NIE did in August, and report 

that some security progress being made in Iraq, positive news in 

any other context. 

You’ve announced here today that you would likely recommend 

significant cuts in troops over the next year—something that people in this room and on Capitol Hill have been calling for, for a 

long time. You would, again, think that that would be met with 

some appreciation, some gladness. 

Ambassador, there have been those who have said that we 

weren’t doing enough to talk to the people in the neighborhood, 

Iran, Syria, and others. Indeed, since that time—since January, 

since General Petraeus was confirmed—that’s happened, and 

you’ve reported on that. Here again, something I would think that 

would be met with an appreciation for the progress, or at least the 

effort that entails. 

Then, of course, there were those, General, that announced shortly after the President announced the surge of troops into Iraq, they 

announced it a failure, or predicted a failure at the outset, before 

the surge had even occurred, and I guess it just goes to show that 

it’s a bad bet to bet against the men and women of the United 

States military, because it has demonstrated some significant successes. 

So, I guess this is an unusual case, General and Ambassador, 

where you come bringing what otherwise might be regarded as 

good news, or at least progress, and it’s the first case I’ve seen, I 

guess, of shooting the messenger for bringing good news. It’s a 

strange time we find ourselves in, it’s a strange environment here 

in Washington. 

But my question, what I want to ask you about in particular, are 

the consequences of failure. Because it seems to me there, too 

often, is a debate in the abstract about what’s happening. General, 

you’ve already said that you believe what we’re doing in Iraq is 

making us safer here at home, but I would like to ask, if we embraced the suggestion of some, here on Capitol Hill, that we would 

pull out our troops before the Iraqis are able to govern and defend 

themselves, what the consequences would be? I know we’ve talked 

about providing a failed state, a power vacuum into which al Qaeda 

would fill, you’ve talked about Iran. But, in particular, I’d like to 

get your assessment General, and Ambassador, about the humanitarian crisis that would like occur. Could you speak to that, please? 

General first? 

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General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, there has already been 

a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The estimates run as high as 2 million that have left the country, and perhaps that number that has 

been displaced within the country. So, this is already a tragic situation. 

One of our areas of focus has, as I mentioned, been to try to stabilize and to reduce the ethno-sectarian violence that is really the 

engine of that displacement. Some of that has continued. Some has 

risen to the level of cleansing. But in many areas, again, it has stabilized it, and has kept it from continuing. Because, this is not 

something, again, that just stops of its own accord. It doesn’t reach 

the highway to the airport, let’s say, and say, ‘‘That’s it.’’ It then 

hops over and keeps on going. 

So, that has been a big effort, and we have a lot more work to 

do in that regard, as I mentioned up front, very clearly. We’re not 

at a point that is at all satisfactory, but the trend line, again, is 

good. 

But, the level to which that could go if it got out of hand again, 

and got even worse, obviously could be horrific. 

Senator CORNYN. I believe the figures I recall, off the top of my 

head, about genocide in Darfur, roughly 400,000 people killed 

there. Would this be, would rival or exceed the magnitude of that 

sort of death by ethnic cleansing? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, it’s obviously very difficult to predict. 

My previous experience, for example, in Lebanon in the early 

1980s, I was there at the time of the massacres and the Palestinian 

camps following our withdrawal in 1982. When those massacres 

took place, I knew that some very bad consequences were likely to 

be set in train, but I couldn’t have begun to predict where we’d be 

a year later, for example, with the resurgence of Hezbollah, and the 

bombing of both the embassy and the Marine barracks with horrendous consequences for us. I had a failure of imagination. I don’t 

think in the intervening years, my imagination has gotten any 

more accurate or strong. 

But, I would be very concerned that in a context in which the 

United States was seen to be definitely backing away—and backing 

away in a sense that projected a signal in Iraq and elsewhere that 

we were not coming back, there’s not going to be a second surge, 

it’s over for us—I think the prospects of a truly catastrophic humanitarian disaster would be considerable. 

Senator CORNYN. In the order of hundreds of thousands, or millions? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It could be that, sir. Because it could be 

a situation that would be so, so dramatic, that it would bring in 

neighboring states. Then you would have a failed state. You would 

have, basically, a meltdown inside Iraq, and the ensuing violence 

within Iraq, plus ambitions of some of Iraq’s neighbors, like Iran, 

could bring these states in, and we could be looking at regional conflict, as well as a horrific humanitarian disaster. I can’t say that’s 

going to happen, I can’t predict that’s going to happen, but it certainly is something that could happen. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Cornyn, thank you. 

Senator Clinton. 

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Senator CLINTON. I want to thank both of you, General Petraeus, 

Ambassador Crocker, for your long and distinguished service to our 

Nation. Nobody believes that your jobs or the jobs of the thousands 

of American forces and civilian personnel in Iraq are anything but 

incredibly difficult. 

But today you are testifying about the current status of our policy in Iraq, and the prospects of that policy. It is a policy that you 

have been ordered to implement by the President, and you have 

been made the de facto spokesman for what many of us believe to 

be a failed policy. 

Despite what I view as your rather extraordinary efforts in your 

testimony both yesterday and today, I think that the reports that 

you provide to us really require the willing suspension of disbelief. 

In any of the metrics that have been referenced in your many 

hours of testimony, any fair reading of the advantages and disadvantages accruing post-surge, in my view, end up on the downside. 

I started my morning today at ground zero in New York City, 

where once again, the names of the nearly 3,000 victims of the attack on our country were read solemnly in the rain. We have seen 

Osama bin Laden reappear on our television sets, essentially 

taunting us. We have the most recent reports out of Germany of 

terrorists plotting against American assets who have been trained 

in Pakistan. We get very little comfort from the fact that the mastermind of that mass murder is at large, neither captured nor 

killed, and that the Taliban and al Qaeda are resurging in Afghanistan, and their network is certainly—if not tightly organized, a 

loose confederacy—that has grave consequences for us. 

With respect to Anbar province, a lot has been made of the coalition’s work with the Sheiks, but that was going on before the 

surge. General, in your testimony during your confirmation hearings, you referenced the fact that the Sheiks were coming over, 

that there was already a decision by a lot of the tribal leaders that 

they would no longer tolerate the extraordinary brutality of the al 

Qaeda elements in al Anbar province. 

With respect to violence in Iraq, although the charts tell part of 

the story, I don’t think they tell the whole story. If you look at all 

of the evidence that’s been presented, overall civilian deaths have 

risen. The number of car bombings is higher. May was the deadliest month in 2007 with 1,901 civilian deaths. American military 

casualties are greater in every month in 2007 than in the same 

month in 2006, leaving us with a total thus far, through August, 

of 739 Americans killed. 

The Iraqi reconciliation process is now described as relying on 

bottom’s up efforts, which are anecdotal, which have very little 

hard evidence to support what needs to be accomplished. Senator 

Warner’s very specific questions of what is happening from topdown, certainly lead to the conclusion that not very much is occurring that can give us comfort that the Iraqi leadership is yet ready 

to put aside their sectarian, commercial, and personal interests for 

some kind of greater Iraqi political reconciliation. 

Iraqi public opinion, according to an ABC, BBC, NHK poll released September 10, shows that since the escalation began, Iraqi 

opinion has starkly turned against the occupation, as most Iraqis 

245

see deepening dissatisfaction with conditions in Iraq, lower ratings 

for the national government, growing rejection of the U.S. role 

there. For example, 65 to 70 percent of Iraqis say the escalation 

has worsened, rather than improved, security. Thirty-nine percent 

say their lives are going well, down from 71 percent in November 

2005, and 47 percent now favor immediate withdrawal of U.S. 

forces, a 12 point rise since March. Overwhelming majorities give 

negative ratings to electricity, jobs, and access to health care. 

So, I give you tremendous credit for presenting as positive a view 

of a rather grim reality, and I believe that you and certainly the 

very capable people working with both of you, were dealt a very 

hard hand. It’s a hand that’s unlikely to improve, in my view. 

General, I want to ask you about what appeared to be a contradiction in your testimony. Earlier today you were asked by Senator Biden if, in fact, the circumstances on the ground are exactly 

what they are today in March of next year, will you recommend the 

continuation of somewhere between 130,000 and 160,000 American 

troops being shot at, killed, and maimed every day. Your answer, 

‘‘I would be hard-pressed to recommend that at that point in time.’’ 

In response to Senator Collins, who asked, I thought, a very important question about what if, in a year from now, there has been 

very little progress, your answer was, ‘‘Well, we would have to consider what to do at that time.’’ General, don’t you think the American people deserve a very specific answer about what is expected 

from our country in the face of the failure of the Iraqi Government 

to pursue its own required political agenda, that they have essentially been unwilling or incapable of doing so? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I don’t see quite as big a difference 

in the answer, but I will stand by the answer that I gave earlier, 

which is that I would be very hard-pressed at that time to recommend a continuation. 

This policy is a national policy that results from policies put forward at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue with the advice and consent and resources provided at the other. I would, obviously, provide recommendations to that. Again, I would just say, I would be 

very hard-pressed, at that time—it’s an awfully big hypothetical, 

and it is not something that I would want to try to determine right 

here, right now, about a year from now without having some sense 

of all of the other variables, that I think, understandably, would go 

into a huge recommendation like that. 

Senator CLINTON. Ambassador, it’s not only the Iraqi Government that, in my view, has failed to pursue a coherent strategy, I 

think our own has, as well. You’ve been tasked—as I understand 

it—with carrying the only contact with the Iranians and others in 

the region, and many of us have long-advocated that our government needed to be much more engaged in a robust diplomatic effort. 

Do you believe that if the full force and effect of the American 

government were brought to bear on the region, and more broadly 

on countries that have a stake in the future of Iraq, even beyond 

the region, that there was some process established that could 

begin to try to sort out what was or wasn’t possible, that that 

would be an additional benefit to your efforts, going forward in 

Iraq? 

246

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, engaging the region and the 

international community more broadly in support of Iraq is important. That is ongoing and it’s accelerating. This fall we’ll have at 

least two ministerial-level meetings on Iraq, the one that I mentioned involving the neighbors, plus the P–5 and the G–8 in 

Istanbul, and then in a little less than 2 weeks, in New York, the 

Secretary General of the U.N. and Prime Minister Maliki will jointly chair an international ministerial-level meeting to review 

progress on the international compact with Iraq, and also to focus 

on how the new U.N. mandate for Iraq, the expanded mandate for 

Iraq, can most effectively be implemented. 

So, I think we’re seeing an increase in regional and international 

diplomacy in support of Iraq. We’re also starting to see, I think, 

some change in attitudes. I talked a little bit earlier about some 

positive developments among some of Iraq’s Arab neighbors. I 

think we’re also seeing a new look at Iraq on the part of at least 

some of the European states. 

During a 10-day period, for example, at the end of August, we 

had the visits of Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister of 

France, and then right after that, Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister of 

Sweden—the first time, really, since 2003, we have seen major European states send their foreign ministers into Iraq to assess where 

Iraq is, and how they can, perhaps, more effectively engage for the 

future. 

So, I think we’re seeing that kind of diplomatic initiative now 

gain some further momentum. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your extraordinary service, and thank you for your indulgence in being 

here today. I know both of you, Ambassador and General, are runners. I know, General, you are a marathon runner, and I want you 

to know that when you get to this point at the dais at a hearing, 

you’re like on mile 23 in a marathon, you’re almost there. We appreciate very much your patience. 

I also want to convey our appreciation to the men and women 

who serve under your command. Please let them know how grateful we are for their service. They are the best of the best. 

What I would like to do, General, is Senator Graham asked a 

question about the morale of our troops over there, which you answered—and by the way, your testimony here and report has probably been the most hyped event in this city for a long time. Many 

of us for months now, have been saying that we’re waiting to hear 

this report, and I will have to say that you have not disappointed. 

Your report has been full, it’s been comprehensive, it’s been factual, 

it has been objective and independent, and you’ve not sugar-coated 

things. I think that we appreciate very much your willingness to 

give us an assessment, an honest assessment on where things 

stand. 

I want to hone in on the whole question of the Iraqi troops, in 

general, what is the morale of the Iraqi troops? Are they taking 

ownership of this mission? 

General PETRAEUS. As I mentioned in the testimony, sir, there 

is an unevenness to it. The Iraqi forces range from extremely good 

247

to high-end, Iraqi SOF brigade with a counter-terrorist force commando battalion that is now multiplying. The National Emergency 

Response Unit, the Special Tactics Unit—these forces are absolutely superb, they are in operation just about every night, if not 

more—and every day—and we are now positioning them around 

the country, as well, including some in Basra. 

There are other special forces in just about each of the provinces. 

Again, as I mentioned in many cases, how our own SOF teams 

work with them, and those are viewed very highly, as well. 

The Army, by and large, a professional force, national force, 

again—by and large—and performing credibly and in a number of 

areas, in many cases, literally by themselves already, regardless of 

their ORA. Again, that does not hold up the provincial Iraqi control 

process completely, it is a factor in it, but in many cases those 

forces are doing quite well. 

Then it goes all the way down to—as you heard from General 

Jones’ Commission—concerns about the sectarian tendencies of 

some elements still in the national police. We continue to have concerns about several of the units there. Again, we have raised those 

to the Prime Minister, those are—and the Minister of Interior—

really, who is grappling with this issue, and working their way 

through the change-out of leaders, the retraining of a number of 

the organizations, and now even bringing in the Italian Carabinieri 

to train some of them. At some point, there may be a point at 

which some of those units will have to be disestablished, that is 

certainly not where Iraq wants to go right now, given just the 

sheer need for forces and for boots on the ground in a host of different areas, which is one reason why they’re expanding so rapidly. 

But, so again, it runs the gamut—all the way and there is a substantial effort ongoing to improve the leader development in the 

Iraqi security forces to build the institutional structures that are, 

frankly, very hard to build, the military academies, junior and senior staff colleges, war colleges, and these may not sound all that 

exciting, but they are the types of institutional assets that have 

made our own Army and Marine Corps and other Services the 

truly professional forces that they are, and it takes that level of investment. That is ongoing, but again, it is something that does take 

time. It just doesn’t spring out of the desert floor with infrastructure and structures and all of the support for it. But that is ongoing. 

Senator THUNE. The first time I met with you was in Iraq, I 

think, back in February 2005 when you were leading the training 

mission there. I think you talked about the need to build leadership capacity within the Iraqi security forces. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator THUNE. But that—are they, to me, this doesn’t work 

until that really happens. Is that happening? 

General PETRAEUS. It is happening, but frankly, some of this 

took a step backward—in some cases a substantial step backward—during the height of the sectarian violence. When certain 

units, literally, were taken over by sectarian interests, and became 

part of the problem instead of part of the solution. Retrieving some 

of those units is still ongoing in some cases, and again, of course, 

a big part of that had to be to reduce the level of sectarian violence, 

248

and threats, and so forth, so that these individuals didn’t feel as 

though they had to side with one or the other, but could be truly 

professional, all commissioned and NCOs. 

That is something, again, that Prime Minister Maliki is very 

much concerned about confronting and dealing with. In fact, as I 

mentioned earlier, replacing wholesale, the facility protection security force that guarded the medical city. 

So, there are numerous challenges out there like that, but there 

are also just dozens and dozens of Army battalions and special operations units in particular, that are doing very credible work, and 

are very much going after the enemy. I mentioned the example of 

the unit in Mosul that killed the Emir of Mosul with its own intelligence, in fact, it was actually the intelligence officer who we believe was the one that fired the shot that did kill this individual 

where there was a confrontation. 

Senator THUNE. I know that they’ve prevented some attacks in 

Mosul, they have acted rapidly in restoring security in Karbala, 

they’ve had some successes, and I guess my question is—if and 

when the Iraqi security forces are ready to take responsibility for 

the security of Iraq, if that happens before the political process has 

yielded a political solution, is our job done there? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, let me just—— 

Senator THUNE. Those aren’t on the same tracks. 

General PETRAEUS. Sure, let me just be clear—they have already 

taken over. 

Senator THUNE. In some areas. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, in these provinces that have 

transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, there are no coalition forces 

in Maysan Province, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf and some others. 

Karbala will go to provincial Iraqi control in about a month. Then 

there are some others who are very much, certain areas where we 

still have to be in the lead. 

Again, we can hand off as long as that local situation is sufficiently connected to Baghdad to enable us to do that. That’s what 

we have done, again, in a number of cases, regardless of the fact 

that there may not be the agreement on the laws that we see as 

so important to ultimate national reconciliation. But, the fact is, 

there’s a Ministry of Defense, there’s a Ministry of Interior, there 

are varying degrees of functionality in different areas, and certainly, we’re still having to help a great deal on the logistical 

arena, especially, because that’s just proven very difficult. 

Senator THUNE. I understand that, and I know we’ve made headway, and I know that there are areas that are now totally under 

the control of the Iraqi security forces, and in some cases we’re in 

the lead and they’re supporting, or they’re in the lead and we’re 

supporting. 

But, I guess the bigger question is, is the mission complete when 

they can take over the fight, even if the political component, if we 

haven’t gotten some Western-style democracy imposed in terms of 

a political solution there—are we done? Is that where we can say, 

‘‘mission accomplished’’? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, it depends how far along you are. I 

think we obviously have to have some degree of confidence that it 

wouldn’t unravel. So, again, I think you have to ask where are we? 

249

There is national-level leadership and direction at this point, it 

does exist, Prime Minister Maliki is the commander in chief, he 

does issue orders. 

Another very important case was the celebration of the Seventh 

Imam Commemoration in Baghdad. This is one of the holiest Shiite 

celebrations, it focuses on a shrine in Kadamia, north central Baghdad. That’s the one that you’ll recall—I believe it was 2005—where 

there were nearly 1,000 of the pilgrims that were killed when there 

was a stampede due to either rumor of action, or possibly actually 

enemy action. The other 2 years around that, there have been dozens of Iraqis killed. 

This particular year, the Iraqi Baghdad Operational Command 

oversaw the operation, the Ministry is very much invested in it, it 

involved not just army and police, but also emergency services, 

transportation ministry and a whole host of other ministries that 

all would be involved in this, and to our knowledge there was not 

a death caused by enemy action, which is really a fairly extraordinary accomplishment. 

Senator THUNE. Again, my time is expired, as well, but many of 

us have concerns about some of the national interests that you’ve 

articulated with regards to our efforts there, particularly the possibility of an Iranian-supported Shiite state that would exercise more 

influence, and would obviously put not only that region, but I believe, our country at risk as well. We thank you for the efforts that 

you’re making, and encourage you, there are a lot of us who are 

cheering for you, hope you succeed. But you’ve been exposed to a 

political dimension of the debate that occurs here in Washington 

over the past few days that, on a level that’s regrettable, but notwithstanding that, I think a majority of Americans and a lot of us 

up here want to see you succeed, so thanks again for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to start, if I could, with a question for both of you. That 

is, after 2 days on Capitol Hill, are you two ready to get back to 

Baghdad? [Laughter.] 

Ambassador CROCKER. Baghdad’s never looked so good, Senator. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator PRYOR. No, seriously, I have a couple of questions for 

you, General Petraeus, about the slides that you showed earlier, 

and one is just a real basic question, and that is on slide number 

5, which is the caches found and cleared that you had—I just have 

a quick question in that. 

I remember in the early days of us being in Iraq, we found a lot 

of caches that were former Saddam Hussein caches. I look at January to September 2007, some big numbers there—are these weapons old Saddam weapons, or are they new weapons? 

General PETRAEUS. They’re a mix, Senator, and now they often 

include something called HME, which means Home Made Explosives, which is a mix of fertilizer and nitric acid that is mixed up 

and often put sometimes in 5-gallon or even as much as 55-gallon 

drums. 

But, again, it runs the gamut. It includes, in some cases, weapons that clearly are traced back to Iran in terms of certain rockets, 

250

the EFPs, and some mortars, to items that certainly may have 

come from the Saddam weapons storage sites, or have come in from 

other countries over time. 

Senator PRYOR. I assume you’re seeing a fairly healthy mix of 

Iranian weapons caches? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, there are certain ones that are signature weapons, without question—the EFPs. The rockets, mortars, 

the rest is, it’s just hard to tell where it came from. 

Senator PRYOR. I understand, okay. 

Let me ask about the second graph I wanted to ask about and 

that’s your Iraqi security forces capabilities, and that’s number 12. 

Down at the bottom this, in most cases, the shortest part of the bar 

graph where they’re fully-independent forces, and then you see this 

yellow band on top. I assume one of the fundamentals that you’re 

talking about here in your report this week in Washington, is 

you’re trying to have a yellow to green policy, you’re trying to turn 

this yellow area into green areas, is that fair to say? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, and candidly, it is proving very difficult, 

because the requirements to be green in terms—they can get the 

strength up, that is not really an issue now. They’re starting to—

I think, strength for most Iraqi Army units is really quite good and 

it is climbing. 

The challenge is the fill of NCOs and commissioned officers. As 

the number of units grows, as they take casualties and tough combat, they’re very challenged to find those experienced soldiers who 

can step into those positions, they just don’t have a large pool of 

that, and that’s a limiting factor. Also, the equipment, again, when 

they take losses, they do not have a good resupply, and that’s fairly 

absolute. So, if you don’t have a certain mix of equipment, you’re 

just not going to be ORA–1. The truth is, it doesn’t mean that you 

may not be conducting independent operations—this is very important, because it’s something we work to. Obviously, we want to get 

them the right mix of equipment, we want to help them develop 

the leaders, the strength, again, and so forth, and to fix their 

logistical systems. But, the fact that they’re not ORA–1 does not 

mean that they may not be operating independently. Again, there 

are places where that actually happens. 

Senator PRYOR. That’s one of the things that concerns me, is 

really, there isn’t a clear trend that the green is going up and the 

yellow is going away. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s a tough standard to meet. Especially 

when you’re in combat, and losing soldiers, equipment, and leaders. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have sense—— 

General PETRAEUS. Don’t have a great logistical support structure. 

Candidly, this is something that Senator Levin and Senator Warner are helping us with. They have put a lot of stock in FMS, and 

we have to come through for them. We talked to Senator Levin 

about that, and to Senator Warner when he was chairman—we 

really have to take this on. This cannot be a peacetime approach 

to FMS. I mentioned, they’ve put about, I think it’s $1.6 billion already into it, it could be that much and a bit more by the end of 

the year. But we have to come through for them, and it can’t be 

business-as-usual. It has to be, really, moved very quickly. 

251

Senator PRYOR. I guess it’s hard to say how long it will take you 

to go from yellow to green, but you’re trying to get there as quickly—— 

General PETRAEUS. We are trying to get there. You can see they 

took steps backward, because, again, the hard fighting that took 

place to get this, to deal with the sectarian violence, and then to 

get it down. That’s the unknown, unfortunately, is just what kind 

of losses will they take, what kind of equipment will they lose. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me change the question, here, if I can, General Petraeus, and let me just see if you agree with this. First, I’d 

say our military efforts in Iraq are very important, and our men 

and women in uniform in Iraq are doing an outstanding job in 

some very difficult circumstances, would you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. Certainly, yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Our military efforts are only part of the solution 

there. We must work very hard on four broad fronts—diplomatic, 

economic, military, and political. Would you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, those are the Lines of Operation 

(LOOs) in our Joint Campaign Plan. There is an MNF–I Embassy 

Joint Campaign Plan, and those are, in fact, the LOOs in it. 

Senator PRYOR. Ambassador Crocker, do you agree with that, as 

well, that we need a broad effort—not just on military—but also on 

diplomatic, economic, and political? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely. 

Senator PRYOR. My fundamental concern with the surge strategy, 

is that if we don’t have the diplomatic, the economic, the political 

efforts, and progress in place, then the surge, I’m afraid, won’t 

make a long-term difference in Iraq. So, that’s a concern I have. 

In August, all of us went home to our home States, and I spent 

all month in Arkansas, and my sense of the Arkansas’ general public their view of Iraq would be this: First, they’re very patriotic. 

Second, they want to support—they’re going to support the war 

fighter, regardless, no questions asked. Third, I’d say, they want 

for the United States to leave Iraq in a better condition than what 

we found it. They also need some assurance that the sacrifice we’re 

making, that this country’s making, is worth it. They need that assurance from the President, first and foremost, and from Congress, 

and from you all. But, I’ll say this, too—there’s a sense with people 

I talked to back home is that the goal posts keep moving in Iraq. 

I do have a concern about the report, and the stuff that we’re hearing today, is that the goal posts have moved again. We talked 

about the surge, initially, being maybe 6 months, and now it looks 

like it may be a year-plus before we get back down to the pre-surge 

numbers, so I think people want to support what we’re doing there, 

but they need some assurance on it, and they also desperately want 

to make sure that when we leave Iraq, we leave it in a better condition than what we found it. 

Last thing I have, Mr. Chairman, is a number of us, 15 of us in 

the Senate have been working on a bill to try to implement the 

Iraq Study Group recommendations. I just want to leave a copy of 

this bill with you all, it’s an effort in working with the Iraq Study 

Group and bipartisan group of Senators, 15 of us—I believe it’s 8 

Democrats, 7 Republicans. From my standpoint, it’s really the only 

truly broadbased, bipartisan bill in Congress, in the House or SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00255 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ate. I know we talk about needing political consensus in Baghdad, 

which we do, but we also need it in Washington, DC, you all have 

had a taste of that this week. So, I’m going to leave this with you, 

and I’d love to get your comments, either from you or your staffs, 

at some point in the very near future. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


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As the Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I) and a professional military officer, I do not comment on current legislation or draft legislation; I execute 

the policy and missions that are assigned to MNF–I to execute. I cannot, therefore, 

comment on the draft Iraq Study Group (ISG) legislation that you have referenced, 

but I can provide you with our assessment of the ISG’s recommendations and a comparison of these recommendations with our Joint Campaign Plan. 

The ISG recommended changing the coalition strategy, specifically drawing down 

coalition combat power (although it noted that a temporary increase was an option) 


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while placing greater emphasis on: (1) training, advising, and equipping the Iraqi 

security forces; and (2) conducting counterterrorism operations. Early this year, the 

President’s New Way Forward established a different strategy, placing priority on 

protection of the Iraqi population to establish the security conditions that would enable economic and political progress and gradual transition of security responsibilities. This strategy required a temporary increase of coalition combat power—the 

surge of forces that deployed to Iraq this past spring. 

Despite the difference in prioritization outlined above, we have still implemented 

many of the ISG’s recommendations. Of the 79 ISG recommendations, 40 are within 

the purview of MNF–I and United States Mission-Iraq either to implement or to influence the Government of Iraq to implement, and 36 of those 40 recommendations 

are effectively being implemented. More detailed information on the status of those 

36 recommendations is as follows:

a. Diplomatic. Recommendations 1–12 focus on a comprehensive Diplomatic 

Offensive and an Iraq International Support Group. No such support group has 

been formed, but the elements of the diplomatic offensive are being pursued in 

multilateral, bilateral, and international (to include the U.N.) frameworks. Particularly important are the Neighbors Working Groups on Borders and Security, 

Refugees, and Energy and Fuel. Membership of these groups includes Iraq’s 

neighboring states and other regional Arab partners as well as the five permanent members of the U.N. 

b. Political. The coalition’s current campaign plan establishes the primacy of 

the Political Line of Operation and effectively implements the ISG’s recommendations regarding political action.

i. Recommendations 19–31 deal with legislative initiatives, including constitutional review, de-baathification reform, oil revenue sharing, provincial 

elections, amnesty/reconciliation, and the status of Kirkuk. Joint Campaign 

Plan 07 outlines the aforementioned initiatives as priority political goals. 

Recommendation 24 states that these milestones should be complete no 

later than first quarter of 2007. While we did not meet that target date, 

the coalition continues to assist the Government of Iraq in working to 

achieve resolution of these difficult legislative issues. 

ii. Recommendations 35–36 and 38–39 deal with engaging Iraqis of all 

sects and supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation. Similarly, Joint Campaign Plan 07 emphasizes engagement, transition, and reintegration of militias.

c. Economics. Recommendations 62–63, 65, and 68 deal with improving Iraq’s 

oil industry and improving coalition reconstruction programs. Through mechanisms such as the Energy Fusion Cell and by assisting in the creation of Iraqi 

Army Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, MNF–I is effectively implementing 

the recommendations relevant to the oil industry. The coalition is also implementing recommendations in reconstruction through negotiations focused on 

more foreign investment and involvement and by making full use of the newly 

developed Quick Reaction Fund (QRF). 

d. Security. Recommendation 45 suggests leaving excess equipment behind as 

coalition forces depart and encouraging acceleration of Iraqi use of the Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) program. Although only limited deliveries have occurred 

thus far, Iraq has invested significantly in FMS. Also, as forces depart, MNF–

I will continue to study the feasibility of leaving equipment behind. We are 

working closely with the Department of the Army and Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to transfer 8,500 M1114 Up-armored HMMWVs to the Iraqi security 

forces under a FMS-like case with greatly reduced costs per vehicle. These 8,500 

HMMWVs become excess when the MRAP vehicles flow into country and are 

put into the fight with American units. 

e. Rule of Law. Recommendations 52–55 and 57–61 cover expanding Iraqi police capability to control crime, transforming the Ministry of Interior, controlling 

the Facilities Protection Service, and training the National and Border Police. 

Through the efforts of the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law section, the Law and 

Order Task Force, and the Coalition Police Assistance Transition Team, the coalition is effectively implementing these recommendations. Recommendations 57, 

60, and 61 all assume the Department of Justice will take the lead for Iraqi 

Police training, as recommended in Recommendation 56 (which is beyond MNF–

I/USM–I purview). While these recommendations are being implemented by a 

mix of civilian and military trainers, they are not being done so under a Department of Justice lead.

Four recommendations of the ISG Report are not being implemented at this time. 

More detailed information is as follows:

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a. Recommendations 50 and 51 deal with the transfer of the National Police 

and Border Police from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense. This 

concept continues to be evaluated as part of the long-term evolution of the interior forces, and the ultimate decision will eventually be made by the Government of Iraq. 

b. Recommendation 42 requires the United States to complete Iraqi security 

force training and equipping by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. As the Government of Iraq continues to define its requirements, ISF development will likely not be complete by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. 

c. Recommendation 43 discusses changing the coalition priorities to focus on 

counterterrorism and ISF development. While both activities are important, the 

current coalition strategy assigns different priorities. Counterterrorism is a coalition priority, but its effective execution requires significant conventional combat forces for intelligence collection and complementary conventional operations, 

not just options normally associated with counterterrorist elements. In fact, the 

success of the current counterterrorism program would be impossible without 

broad conventional support. Also, although population protection has a higher 

priority within the current MNF–I strategy, we are also working with the Iraqis 

to improve the capability of the Iraqi security forces, through training and 

equipping programs and robust partnering and advisory efforts. Notably, the 

partnering effort would not have been as effective with the reduced coalition 

presence recommended by the ISG.

The remaining 39 ISG recommendations are directed toward the U.S. Government 

and, as such, are beyond the scope of either MNF–I or USM–I. Of the recommendations that are out of the purview of MNF–I or USM–I, recommendations 13–18 focus 

on the Arab-Israeli conflict; recommendation 37 focuses on ensuring U.S. executive 

and legislative branch actions do not undercut Iraqi amnesty proposals; recommendations 40–41, 44 focus on national policy statements and DOD personnel assignments; recommendations 46–49 focus on resetting the force; recommendation 56 

assigns Department of Justice lead for Iraqi police training; recommendations 64, 

66–67, 69–71 deal with U.S. national economic policy decisions; and recommendations 72–79 focus on U.S. national budgetary, personnel, and intelligence policy.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I appreciate your hosting me 

in Baghdad a few days ago. I got an advance, I think, of what we 

have seen in your report, and I want to tell you that between what 

I’ve heard from you, and also what I was able to perceive by visiting several places, and seeing and talking to our troops, that I 

have a very positive view of your report. I am astonished that some 

may be so invested in failure that they cannot see the very positive 

signs that you’re bringing to us. 

I had the privilege of visiting Patrol Base Murray, south of Baghdad, and I saw there, myself, this is the last brigade of the surge. 

They’ve been there since late-May or early-June. They’ve been in 

the fight in a very tough neighborhood south of Baghdad, and they 

have been rooting out al Qaeda. I talked to Iraqis there, who are 

so thankful that our troops were there, that are working with them 

in partnership, and the enthusiasm that I saw from our men and 

women in uniform, there performing admirably, sustaining some 

difficult losses of their own troops, is what leads me to think that 

this strategy is succeeding in the neighborhoods where it matters, 

and turning the situation around. So while I understand the difficulties ahead, and the difficulties that we’ve had in the past, I 

must say that I am encouraged by what I saw there, and by what 

you report to us here, as well. 

I know we’ve been talking about this for a long, long time, but 

I wonder if you would, General, define for me who it is that our 

enemy is in Iraq? Who are we fighting? 

273

General PETRAEUS. At the outset, actually if I could just point 

out first, you’ll be heartened to hear that the al Qaeda in the area 

of Arab Jabour was killed in the last several days as well, and 

that’s in the Arab Jaboor area there, and that was in an area that 

was a sanctuary for al Qaeda, southeast of Baghdad, in an area in 

which operations are planned, set up and then run into Baghdad. 

So, it is a significant accomplishment by those at Patrol Base Murray. 

Senator MARTINEZ. It’s like the conduit to Baghdad, isn’t it? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Sir, I use the term that the enemy, 

the wolf closest to the sled, is al Qaeda-Iraq because it is the 

enemy that has, in the past, ignited the enormous escalation in 

ethno-sectarian violence by some of its actions. The bombing in 

February 2006 of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra are foremost among those, the enemy that causes the most horrific casualties, the most sensational attacks, and again has an effect at times, 

or tries to have an effect of pouring gas on burning embers, wherever they can find them. 

They’re the ones responsible for the bombings of the four Yazidi 

villages several weeks back, of some Turkomen villages prior to 

that, south of Kurkuk, in trying all the time, again, to conduct 

more of those types of attacks. 

Beyond that, certainly the militia extremists supported by Iran 

are very much a growing concern. I mentioned earlier, we’ve 

learned a great deal about them after capturing the head of the 

special groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah operative who was supporting them, with Iran and a number of others over time, quite 

a few brigade commanders, in that particular structure. Again, the 

impact that they have is very significant because it can eat at 

neighborhoods. In many respects, it is the militia extremists at this 

point in Baghdad that are the cause of the ethno-sectarian violence, more so than are al Qaeda or any other Sunni extremist affiliates. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Slide number 10, in my view, gives a great 

graphic portrayal of the success that you’ve had against al QaedaIraq and we can add to this chart, now, the Amir that you just 

mentioned from my old friends at Patrol Base Murray, God bless 

them. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, and again, that is significant success 

against al Qaeda. They’re off balance, we’re in the pursuit mode 

against them, certainly in many, many more places than we were 

before and had to take some tough casualties to go into areas that 

they had controlled before, Baqubah, and a variety of Baghdad 

neighborhood, Arab Jaboor, and other locations. 

Beyond that, I think the other enemies are less kinetic, but more 

just the challenges of institutions, again, that just aren’t fully functioning. Certainly, residual sectarian influences, and even the degree of corruption that is still in certain elements in Iraq, those 

present big challenges, as do a variety of these different issues that 

we have to deal with in trying to stand up the security forces, in 

getting their logistical systems working, getting the institutional 

structures established, getting the sectarian activities out, and so 

forth. 

274

But that lays out, I think, the major challenges—the two big 

ones, again, being al Qaeda and its affiliates. There are still, certainly, Sunni insurgents out there, loosely affiliated, or not in some 

cases, and then the Shiite militia extremists who have caused such 

challenges in recent months. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir. 

On your chart 13, as you talk about the stepping, you also are 

talking about mission shift. First of all, what would the shift be? 

You mention at the bottom, leading to partner to overwatch. Would 

you define those terms, and then also, is there any way to forecast 

when the shifting mission might also kick in? Because I presume 

that would have some impact of the level of casualties that our own 

forces sustain. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, it already has. As I’ve mentioned, 

we certainly have a number of places where brigades, or the majority of brigades, are in the lead, but there are other phases where 

we are very much in partnering or have already moved to some 

form of tactical or operational overwatch, where we’re not located 

with that unit, we’re away from it. What we provide is quick reaction force, perhaps some other combat enablers, as required in a 

pinch. 

The way this will happen is, there will actually be, an entire brigade I don’t think will go from, say leading to partnering and then 

partnering to tactical overwatch, because the brigades are fairly 

disbursed. There will be units within a brigade that may actually 

already be at a partnering or a tactical overwatch situation, where 

others may still be not as far along, depending on again, the units 

with which they are working. So, it is something we want to move 

as rapidly as we can, but again, we don’t want to rush to failure. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Ambassador Crocker, I just wanted to comment that I think that political communique ́ is an important consideration and may be a foretelling; I know how we legislate here 

sometimes, sometimes it takes people getting in a room, agreeing 

on something, and then ultimately you see it become a bill and 

passed. 

If you could just quickly, my time is up, but I would like to hear 

from you, Ambassador, as to—we talked a lot about the grim realities of a precipitous withdrawal—what is the upside, what is the 

potential if we were to just succeed in Iraq in the way that I think 

is envisioned and possible. What could be the upside potential for 

Iraq and the region, if you could do it just briefly, because my 

time’s expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Please be brief, because we have three more 

questioners and we’re going to have votes, I think at 7 o’clock. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. It would be a fundamental 

change in the region because Iraq, for decades, has been a source 

of instability and threat in the region and beyond, to Iran, to the 

Gulf States, and to Syria. So this would be almost an unprecedented situation, certainly for the last 3-plus decades, something 

we hadn’t seen. I guess I just leave you with that. I wouldn’t try 

to go beyond that. Again, my weak imagination fails me, but it 

would be a situation we have not seen. An Iraq that is a source 

of stability rather than instability and threat. Literally something 

we haven’t seen since 1967. 

275

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentleman, welcome to mile 25. I’ve been with you all the way, 

but you’ve been running a lot harder than I have. 

I would like to make just two comments about some of the testimony that preceded me and then try to get quickly to two questions. 

The first, to echo something that Senator Clinton said, as a result of a question that was posed by Senator McCain. I think it’s 

important to point out for the historical record, that the situation 

in al Anbar did turn around before the surge began. I mentioned 

this in the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I think it’s important to mention it here. Also, it’s a matter of, on the one hand, I 

think, personal loyalty. My son is an infantry Marine, he was in 

the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, and through that period at the last 

4 months of last year, in particular, they were knocking back 

Ramadi block by block and street by street. I think, number one, 

they deserve credit, and number two, you don’t want your staff to 

have to throw hands with the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, if somebody were trying to take credit for what they did. 

The second is, when we talk about consequences of failure, Ambassador, I sadly point out, that so many of these consequences 

were what people, such as myself, General Zinni, and General 

Scowcroft were trying to point out as the predictable consequences 

of an invasion. We have basically scrambled the egg here and we’re 

all struggling to try to find a way to bring the United States out 

of this in a way that will bring further stability to the region, but 

I think it’s fair to point that out. 

I want to renew, briefly, General Petraeus, my comments that I 

began at the end of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing about this dwell-time situation. You can see how divided we 

still are here in trying to come to grips with the policy. As we continue this debate, I just very strongly believe that we need to put 

some sort of a safety net under our troops. The one inarguable result of this policy has been the disruption of the rotational cycles 

of deployment, when we accelerated the deployment cycles. Its policy has resulted in extended tours, 15-month deployments, and also 

an acceleration of other situations like stop-loss and, on the Marine 

Corps side, the going into the pool of the Individual Ready Reserve 

in a way that they had not done in previous years. 

On a personal note, my number two daughter’s long-time boyfriend of 7 years, when I was an embedded journalist in Afghanistan in 2004, I was able to get up to where his unit was, one of 

the nine stops that I made. He did 4 years in the Marine Corps, 

infantry corps, pulled two tours in Afghanistan, out a year and a 

half, finally got a good job, and then last Friday he gets the news 

he’s been recalled, he’s going back to Iraq. 

This is the kind of situation that people up here really aren’t seeing because of the bifurcation that began back in Vietnam between 

the people who are making policy and the people who are carrying 

it out, quite frankly. I’m really glad to see so many members of this 

committee have been able to go on congressional delegations and 

276

come over and, even if it’s just a brief period of time, see what the 

United States military looks like, even see what a combat environment looks like. But we need some advocates up here for a situation that is really having a dramatic impact on the men and 

women who are having to go through these repeated cycles. 

I was out of the room when Senator Nelson of Florida asked 

about this. I am told, General, your response to him was that this 

is more a matter for a Chief of Staff of the Army, in terms of dwelltime. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I, again, am very concerned about 

the strain on, and sacrifice of, our soldiers. Obviously, what a commander in the field wants, is soldiers who have had maximum time 

between deployments. They’ll obviously perform better, they’ll have 

had more time to prepare, presumably, and be rejuvenated in a 

way that they would not if it has been a shorter dwell-time. So 

again, I very much want that and I stated that, I believe at that 

time, I certainly did earlier today. 

What I meant by that is, again, I’m just not any, have been away 

from the Army sufficiently, that I just don’t have a feel for what 

that kind of policy would mean to the Army. It has a responsibility, 

as a force provider, and I again, don’t know what that would do in 

that sense to the Army. That’s why I say that it’s just one I think 

I have to defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Having said that, 

I’d love to, again, have some experience in this myself, in the past 

6 years, I think it’s coming up on 4 of those 6. So, I am all for maximum dwell-time. 

Senator WEBB. Right. I think, I related to you a conversation 

that I’d had with the Chief of Staff of the Army, when the tours 

went to 15 months, where his comment to me was that he is feeding the strategy. So, somewhere in here, we need to find a balance, 

and that’s the reason that I introduced the amendment that I did. 

There are times, perhaps, when Congress needs to weigh in and 

kind of be a referee. 

The other question I wanted to be able to ask you, Ambassador, 

it’s something that I’ve thought a lot about and I would like to get 

your perceptions on—I was a journalist in Beirut in the 1980s, you 

spent a long time there, I spent some time there, not in any way 

the sort that you did, but I see a lot of similarities in the situation, 

from Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq today. Although, Iraq is sort 

of macrocosmic, but with the notion of a weak central government 

that can’t get its feet on the ground and very strong armed militias 

around them that are not going to obey the edicts that come out 

of them. We had a very bad situation there. We did leave. What 

do you draw from this, in terms of how we’re trying to fix the situation in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great question, Senator, and certainly something that’s preoccupied my mind. I spent a total of 6 

years in Lebanon, two different tours, and neither of them at really 

great times, given levels of violence. 

You don’t want to overstate the similarities, or at least I certainly don’t. Iraq is a vastly bigger country, substantially greater 

strategic importance, I would argue. There are some other important differences too, just in terms of internal conditions, that Lebanon was, without question, an all out civil war in the late 1970s, 

277

early 1980s. The Army, as you recall, split and disintegrated. With 

all of the problems in Iraq, we’re not seeing something to that 

level. In fact, it’s kind of the opposite, security forces actually expanding and improving, even as they’re engaged in a fight, and 

many aspects of that fight against other Iraqis, but they’re hanging 

together. 

One element of similarity that we have to keep in mind, because 

our adversaries most certainly are, and that is the roles of Iran and 

Syria. Iran and Syria came together, as you recall, to engage in 

Lebanon in the early 1980s. They worked together to create 

Hezbollah in 1982, for example, and they’re still working together 

in Lebanon. Damascus airport, just as it channels foreign fighters 

into Iraq, also serves as a main supply hub for supplies going to 

Hezbollah from Iran. So, we need to look at it in those terms, because certainly, in Tehran and Damascus, the coordination and the 

cooperation that they have brought to bear in Lebanon, in somewhat different ways, they’re also bringing to bear in Iraq. 

Senator WEBB. My time is up in 30 seconds—one event that 

sticks in my mind, and I was there when it happened, was when 

the United States picked a side, even though it was the Lebanese 

Army, when we supported the Lebanese Army in the Battle of Sug 

el Ghard with naval guns, then all of the other factions decided 

that we were fair game and that, could be argued, led to the destruction of the building at the airport and the deaths of 241 marines. It’s very difficult when you get involved in a five-sided argument. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

both. I know we began together 91⁄2 hours ago in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I want to thank you for your tone, 

your directness, and certainly again, for your service and I certainly have appreciated the meetings we’ve had in Iraq, itself. 

Earlier last week General Jones testified about some border 

issues. Four, 5, 6 months ago, General McCaffrey had been in here 

talking about equipment issues and getting the Iraqis with the 

type of equipment they need to carry out their functions. One of the 

things that was discussed was the lack of equipment at the border 

itself, where Iraqis checking vehicles that are coming and going are 

going through those by hand. They don’t have forklifts, they don’t 

have the basic equipment, if you will, to really leverage our efforts, 

to make sure that munitions and other types of destructive gear 

would be coming into our country. General Petraeus, I wonder if 

you might comment on that or anything that may be happening in 

that regard, to alter that. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, it’s a great question because what 

we want to do is to focus on the ports of entry and to improve the 

equipment at those locations and to, for example, ensure that everyone has a back scatter X-ray that can look at these kinds of cargos, without having to unload all of them. Biometric devices, the 

Pisces system and some others also have transition teams out there 

overseeing them and making sure that, in fact, we’re helping the 

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Iraqis to do the right thing, if you will, at those border points of 

entry. 

It is hugely important on the Syrian border, again, to try to cut 

down on the flow of foreign fighters. Sometimes some of them undoubtedly just drive in and that’s something that we have to try 

to interdict, obviously, at those ports of entry. Then, on the Iranian 

side, what we want to do is similar, and also to have some additional backstop to that on some of the key routes that lead to Baghdad, so that again, we can interdict more of the arms and ammunition that come in from Iran. 

Senator CORKER. That’s something that’s urgently being pursued? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, indeed. Yes, sir. In fact, if it’s important 

to the military, there’s a set of slides and they have stoplights and 

we have that for the ports of entry, in particular. 

Senator CORKER. I want to thank you for the exemplary model 

you all set up. I think you all have a common wall between your 

offices and work together on a daily basis, both diplomatically and 

militarily to achieve our goals here. I know it seems to be an evolving thing we focus on. We focused on diplomacy a great deal 3 or 

4 months ago, it was upgrading of troops and obviously, and for 

good reason, it’s been the lack of the central government’s progress 

politically, certainly at this point in time. 

Ambassador Crocker, talk to us about the nature of the conversations that you have privately, if you will, with the Prime Minister, 

the President, and the Deputy President, just about the fact that 

those things are not happening that need to happen, certainly, to 

create the top-down reconciliation that Senator Warner was referring to. 

Ambassador CROCKER. In the course of the last couple of months, 

we’ve had an extensive and intensive series of discussions with all 

of the Iraqi leadership as part of the effort they were making to 

come together and to work on both specific substantive issues and 

to work on processes. That’s what led to the communique ́ at the 

end of August, in which they announced agreements on several 

areas, among the five principle leaders of Iraq. 

What may be more important in the long run are the substantive 

achievements on de-Baathification reform, provincial powers, detainee issues, and how to handle armed groups that no longer want 

to fight against the coalition or the central government. What may 

be even more important than that was the announcements that the 

five made, that they would continue to work together, both at their 

level, through a mechanism involving the President, the two Vice 

Presidents, and the Prime Minister, but also at a preparatory level, 

where their deputies would continue to meet as they did for a number of weeks during the summer, to wrestle with the hard issues 

of reconciliation and try to hammer out issues to the point where 

the leadership could effectively deal with them. Again, that involved multiple meetings on the part of me and my staff with, 

again, all of Iraq’s leaders, as they moved toward this. 

One other outcome, incidentally, of that meeting, was a statement, declaration, by the five that they wanted to reach an agreement with the United States on a long-term strategic partnership. 

I find that noteworthy, again, particularly in light of the reports 

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that Iraqis want us out, that these five individuals, who all have 

constituencies and whose constituencies are the main communities 

of Iraq, Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd, all wanted that in the 

communique ́. 

So, these are the kinds of things we’re engaged in, on a daily 

basis. We worked very closely, again, with the combined leadership 

to ensure that the Anbar Development Forum that we talked about 

a little bit earlier, that took place on September 5, that the central 

government came forward with the kinds of financial support and 

with the presence in Anbar of its Shiite and Kurdish, as well as 

Sunni, leadership, that they followed through on that commitment. 

Because that too, is an important part of reconciliation. 

So, it’s no exaggeration, sir, to say that in the course of the week 

I will be engaged—if not on a daily basis, something close to it—

again with all of Iraq’s principle leaders. 

One of the good things is, I don’t have to do it by myself. I have 

this gentleman here, General Petraeus, who’s very much a part of 

that. When there are meetings with the Prime Minister, we normally go together and depending on the issues, we’ll even adjust 

our seating. I’ll go through an agenda and then move over and 

General Petraeus will take forward his. 

Senator CORKER. I don’t know if Senator McCaskill is coming 

back. My guess is she is. 

Senator WARNER [presiding]. She is to come and then we’re going 

to conclude the hearing. 

Senator CORKER. Let me just end my day with you on the note 

I guess we started with and that is, in both of your estimations, 

do you believe that Iraqis want to be Iraqis? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I definitely do, Senator. I think the interesting reflection of that was when the Iraqi soccer team won the 

Asian Cup Championship. Even though, horrifically and tragically, 

when they won the semifinal, a suicide vest bomber had caused 

casualties in one of the celebrations, there was nothing keeping 

them off the streets for that. It was Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd. Everyone was proud to be an Iraqi that day. There is an Iraqi identity 

and I think it’s really quite, quite a strong one. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would agree with that, Senator. The 

Iraqi identity is deeply-felt and there is a strong sense that it’s 

something that they’ve literally had to fight for over the years. The 

8-year war with Iran, I think, really intensified that sense of Iraqi 

identity among both Sunnis and Shiites. 

With respect to the Kurds, it’s significant to me and encouraging, 

how Kurdish political leaders have clearly indicated their interest 

in Iraq, as a whole. The Iraqi President is Kurdish, as is Iraq’s Foreign Minister. They have been very effective, the Foreign Minister’s 

been a very effective spokesman for Iraq, in dealing with the international community. The President is a very constructive force in 

trying to bring about elements of reconciliation within the country, 

as is the Deputy Prime Minister, who oversees economic affairs and 

who was out in Anbar with us, on September 5. So, for all of the 

strains, violence, tension, and history, I think there is a strong 

sense of Iraqi identity. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. 

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Senator CORKER. I know my time is up. I want to say to both 

of you, I have a deep respect for the service you provide and I want 

to thank you for that, and also for your time and patience and directness today. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, you have an extraordinary performance, not only in the context of your testimony, but your endurance throughout this day. Senator Levin will be back momentarily to conclude the hearing. He’s asked that I cover a few points 

here, which we feel should be put into the record. If Senator 

McCaskill returns, she’ll have her time and that will conclude the 

hearing. 

So, if you’ll bear with me a minute. We just got started, Carl. 

That last comment of yours, Mr. Ambassador, indicating the 

group of five; would that agreement of the U.S. forces be a status 

of forces-type agreement? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is obviously still to be determined, but 

yes, it could be that. 

Senator WARNER. I think it’s important that we do it. That’s a 

well recognized instrument between the nations in this situation. 

Second, I did a little research, which I think is quite interesting. 

Almost 5 years ago, three other Senators and I, there were four of 

us who worked on Public Law 107–243, October 16, 2002, titled; 

‘‘Use of Military Force Against Iraqi Resolutions.’’ In it, in section 

2, it makes a number of references to one of the reasons that we 

went in on this invasion, and that is ‘‘the Congress of the United 

States supports the effort by the President to strictly enforce the 

United Nations Security Council relevant resolutions. The President is authorized to use armed forces that he determines to be 

necessary in order to: (1) defend the national security of the United 

States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce 

all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding 

Iraq.’’ It’s an interesting piece of history. It brings me to the question, what role do you foresee the United Nations playing in the 

future, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s an excellent question, particularly in 

light of the new Security Council resolution, Resolution 1770, that 

establishes a significantly expanded mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). New mandates for 

UNAMI include facilitating national dialogue and political—— 

Senator WARNER. Let me interrupt you to say, you can finish 

your answer for the record on this question, but I judge that you’re 

somewhat optimistic that they will take a stronger role, particularly as it may be with the bordering countries to get their involvement in a positive way. Would that be correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct. That is the clear intention 

of the Secretary General. 

Senator WARNER. Then amplify that in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

We have been working with the Iraqi Government, Iraq’s neighbors, and the 

broader international community in an effort to increase international support for 

Iraq. The U.N. has demonstrable experience in areas such as humanitarian assistance, rule of law, and conflict resolution, and we believe it is well-positioned and 

ready to take a larger role in helping to stabilize Iraq. The U.N. Security Council 

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renewed and expanded the mandate for the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI) 

in resolution 1770 (August 10), and the mandate now encourages U.N. engagement 

with Iraq on political reconciliation, economic and electoral reform, humanitarian 

assistance, and regional dialogue. 

We are pleased that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed clear interest 

in increasing U.N. involvement in Iraq by cohosting with Prime Minister Maliki a 

September 22 U.N. High Level Meeting on Iraq. This international gathering was 

a notable success. The Secretary General endorsed efforts to provide additional staff 

to implement the expanded UNAMI mandate and including the establishment of a 

support mechanism for the neighbors process. Furthermore, the Secretary General 

appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq, Staffan 

de Mistura, who will launch his efforts by attending the November Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul. In an effort to encourage regional support for Iraq, de 

Mistura will then embark on a consultative tour of neighboring countries thereafter. 

The road to stabilizing Iraq will likely continue to be a difficult and sometimes 

uncertain one. However, we believe that we are on the right course as we work with 

the international community, under the auspices of the U.N., to help build a more 

secure, stable, and prosperous Iraq.

Senator WARNER. The next question I have is, the Jones Commission report, I thought was a very satisfactory contribution. Do 

you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, I do. 

Senator WARNER. One provision in there, page 129, ‘‘Circumstances of the moment may continue to present the opportunity 

for considering a shift in the disposition in deployment of our 

forces. This could be characterized as a transition to a ‘strategic 

over-watch’ posture. Such a strategy would include placing increasing responsibilities for internal security on the Iraqi forces, especially in urban areas. Coalition forces could be retasked to better 

ensure the territorial defense’’—that’s the border—‘‘of Iraq, and increasingly concentrating on the Eastern and Western borders and 

the active defense of the critical infrastructures essential to Iraq,’’ 

namely their water, their power, their electricity, and so forth. 

Now I judged in your comments and testimony you took a reference to that, but I judged from what you said, that there could 

be a point in time when that type of transition might well be employed by the forces under your command. Is that correct, General? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it certainly is possible. We want to get 

to an overwatch situation. Now where the forces deploy to or, 

whether they go home or take on those other mission, I think, is 

something that we need to look at very hard. 

Senator WARNER. Lastly, General, there’s been a good deal of 

comment in the press—I can’t ascribe the accuracy—that various 

segments of the chain of command, the President, Security Council, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Fallon, yourself, as to different viewpoints. I was privileged to have many years of experience in the Pentagon and here on this committee, I think that’s 

healthy that the different views were assessed and will eventually 

be presented to the President. But I assume that you feel, and I 

think you’ve said this for the record, that you did work within the 

chain of the command, that you did listen to your colleagues and 

the Chairman of the JCS, member of the JCS, and others, as well 

as Admiral Fallon, and all of it was brought to bear on the testimony that you’ve given us today. 

282

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that’s correct. Actually Secretary Gates 

really, I think, sheparded quite a process that took place with a 

number of different briefings to the Chairman, to the Secretary of 

the Joint Chiefs, and eventually to the President. I have been told 

that there is support for what I have recommended. Certainly Admiral Fallon has assured me of that, as well as the Chairman and 

the Secretary. 

Senator WARNER. Right, and that will be brought to the President as he prepares to state the—— 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. In fact, the JCS had a 

session separately with him the day after I briefed him, I believe 

was the chronology. 

Senator WARNER. You had a session when he visited your home? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, we also had that session. I gave my recommendations, actually, several days prior to that and then there 

was the additional session in Anbar province as well. 

Senator WARNER. Did this trip back provide any opportunity for 

further work in that area? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not talked to the President at all 

since I have been back. My conversation with the Secretary merely 

was, ‘‘Good luck.’’ I have talked to Admiral Fallon on several occasions and basically, and he just assured me that he supports the 

recommendations that I have put forward. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, General. 

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. It’s a much quieter and smaller 

room than when we began. I’d like to point out what is obvious 

about me being the last questioner. That is how I got here. 

I ran against an incumbent in the United States Senate, who 

was 100 percent supportive of the President’s policies in Iraq, had 

never really asked a tough question during his time on this committee of any of the men and women who sat at that table, justifying why we were going and what was happening when we were 

there. 

So, as our democracy works, the people of my State made a decision whether or not they wanted to send him back to Washington 

to continue to support the policy, or whether they wanted someone 

different. 

I’m blessed, they decided they wanted someone different and I’m 

here. So, I too want to echo everyone’s comments about our respect 

for you and the work you do. But I also feel a mandate from my 

election to disagree, to challenge, and to ask the kind of questions 

that I think most Americans want asked right now. 

The benchmarks came to this discussion by virtue of the commander in chief. It was the commander in chief that gave the 

speech in January, that said ‘‘We will judge the success of this 

strategy by the benchmarks.’’ We’ve had a lot of discussion today 

about the benchmarks and bottom-up, top-down, and I don’t want 

to repeat anything that’s been done. But I went back and read the 

testimony, General Petraeus, when you were confirmed. You had 

an exchange of questions and answers with Senator Levin about 

those benchmarks and about the leverage we could use. There was 

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discussion about what could we use as leverage and there was discussion about, from you, that we could withhold things, we could 

withhold our support, we could provide support. 

I guess my first question to you, and if you could answer it very 

briefly, I would appreciate it, what leverage do we have? Because 

clearly, it does not appear to be working. Why is it not obvious to 

the American people that we’re exercising any of the leverage that 

we have? This just appears that we have to take on faith, that this 

last date is not 2030, or 2025, or 2040. That’s where I think my 

frustration lies, is I see no effective use of leverage to force the 

Iraqis to come back from vacation. Either of you? Leverage that we 

can use? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, we clearly do have leverage and 

we use it. At the same time, national reconciliation, I think by definition, is not something that can be forced from outside. It, just by, 

again, definition, means people in conflict agreeing to work through 

differences and to come together. 

So, we can facilitate, we can pressure to some degree, but ultimately, national reconciliation has to be an Iraqi process. I have 

expressed my view that, to state to the Iraqis that if they don’t do 

A, B, and C, for example, on reconciliation, that we are then going 

to withdraw forces, has a very high risk of being counterproductive, 

that it will cause them to be less likely to compromise, rather than 

more. So I think we have to be very careful about that. 

I wish there were simple answers. I wish there were clear-cut 

things that we could do to get them to do the things that result 

in national reconciliation. But there aren’t. In my experience and 

I’ve been there about 6 months now, it is a long, slow, hard grind 

that may now become easier because of the effects of the surge in 

reducing violence. It’s because, I am convinced that it is only when 

violence comes down and shows every indication of staying down, 

that you create the climate in which hard compromises, if not becoming easy, at least become possible. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I mentioned earlier, I don’t know if 

you were here, but at one time, in an earlier assignment, I did actually withhold support for an element in the Major Crimes Unit 

in the Ministry of Interior after they were found to have been mistreating detainees. We have looked at some of that type of action. 

We have actually discussed this. At one point we actually even prepared a letter with respect to something like that. At this point, we 

just haven’t reached the point, literally, where we think that that 

would be more productive than less productive. 

On the other hand, there are some carrots, as well, that can be 

used. For example, right now, the Major General who oversees our 

Detainee Operations is working closely with the Sunni-Arab Vice 

President to try to facilitate the release of those Sunni-Arabs who 

have been in the system, have been prepared for release, guarantor 

pledges by individuals who we view as responsible and a judge is 

participating in this, and to try to accelerate that process. That is 

one of their big concerns in the Sunni-Arab community. That has 

actually generated some positive responses, in terms of engagement 

with the national process. 

So, there are areas like that where we cannot just use stick but 

occasionally use carrot as well. That’s just one example of that, alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00287 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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though obviously, we have to find some more examples to get them 

to come to grips with the really big issues. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I don’t want to belabor the difference of the 

opinion of the Armed Forces. I think they’re doing a magnificent 

job, but I noticed Senator Martinez talked about talking to the 

troops. When I was there in June, I had an opportunity to talk to 

a number of Missourians and I got all different opinions. Some of 

them stuck in my mind, but one I’ll never forget, and that was a 

young man who was telling me about the biggest problem they 

face. That was 1 hour a day of electricity and what a terrible, difficult situation that was, to get the confidence and the participation 

of the Iraqi people, because of 1 hour a day of electricity. 

I said to him, ‘‘But what if we pulled out, if we began to pull out 

in a meaningful way, wouldn’t it be chaos?’’ He looked me right in 

the eye, and he said, ‘‘Ma’am, this is chaos.’’ So, that stuck with 

me and it probably always will. 

I would like to close today on a subject matter we haven’t talked 

about today, but it’s one that’s near and dear to my heart, and 

that’s the money. I spent most of my time in Iraq in June looking 

at contracting. My background is an auditor. I have yet to sense 

a feeling of urgency among the Active military, among the folks at 

DOD, about the way money has been spent in this conflict, particularly as we have dealt with privatization at a level we’ve never had 

privatization before, in a contingent operation. We have privatized 

much more than we ever have, in terms of not just reconstruction, 

but obviously in troop support and logistics. 

I would certainly appreciate, briefly, if the Chairman will indulge 

me at this point, your sense about that. I think that all of this is 

about choices and none of them are easy, but I do think people 

need to understand that the price tag for 1 month pays for health 

insurance for 800,000 American children. That is a startling reality 

of what we’re doing. The President’s going to ask us for another 

$50 billion of debt, and now we have borrowed most of the money 

for this conflict. The strength of our military not only relies on the 

incredible leadership that we develop within our military and the 

brave and courageous acts of our military men and women, but it 

depends on the economic status of our Nation and the strength and 

security of our economy. I would like, briefly, from both of you, 

your reflection on the heartbreaking news that we had, that even 

someone in the Active military was involved in fraud, and stealing 

money from the American people, the kind of contractor abuse, the 

kind of overspending we’ve seen, the kind of money that’s been 

spent that we can’t account for. What, if anything, is being done 

on a day-to-day basis to address the incredible amount of money 

that’s being spent and a sense of urgency about making sure that 

every dime of it is spent wisely? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, a very important step is 

the support for the continuation of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), which I think is very important 

and has proven very, very useful. The formation of the Joint Contracting Command Iraq, I think over time, has improved very much 

the process that is conducted over there. The Iraqi First Program 

Initiative is also one that not only gets us, in many cases, lower 

costs and lower salaries, but gets the local people invested in our 

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success, as well. But those are just a couple of initiatives that I 

would mention. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Certainly, on the mission side, I would 

echo the importance of the SIGIR and the wisdom of the decision 

to continue that function. The Inspector General, Stuart Bowen, 

and his staff, he’s been with this from the beginning. He’s acquired 

a considerable amount of expertise and is, I think, extremely important in being an assurance to you and to us that resources are 

being used as wisely as possible and are accounted for in a comprehensive manner. 

With respect to privatization, I know that your comment was in 

the military context, but it also applies—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. 

Ambassador CROCKER. —on this side, as well. The reality is, for 

example, on the security function, much of our security, most of our 

security is provided by contractors, it is overseen by diplomatic security officers, Foreign Service Officers, but there is simply no way 

at all that the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

could ever have enough full-time personnel to staff the security 

function in Iraq. 

There is no alternative except through contracts, and I would 

have to say that the capability and courage of the individuals who 

provide security under contract is worthy of respect of all Americans. One of Blackwater’s helicopters went down yesterday, a hostile fire incident, fortunately no one was killed in that accident, but 

over 30 of our contract security Americans have been killed keeping the rest of us safe. So it is something that we have to do because we don’t have enough people in the State Department to do 

this, but I think it’s being done very well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think privatization is the future. I just 

think we need to work harder at getting it right. I don’t question 

that they’re very brave and courageous people. I think most of 

them are former United States military. They learned it right in 

place. So, I appreciate that, but I do think we have a long way to 

go, in terms of the accountability piece on the privatization issue. 

Thank you both very much. God bless you and congratulations. 

I think, with the exception, if the Chairman has some questions, 

you’re at the finish line. 

Chairman LEVIN. We have one more question. 

Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

This goes to General Petraeus. I want to clarify something. 

You’ve testified that the force reductions will continue beyond, 

which I understand means below, the pre-surge levels of 15 brigade 

combat teams that you’ll recommend we reach by mid-July 2008. 

You’ve testified that you won’t decide on the pace of those reductions until mid-March 2008. I understand from your testimony, 

that when the pre-surge level of 15 combat brigade teams is 

reached in July 2008, that you intend to keep on with the troop reductions. The decision that you are reserving to mid-March is the 

pace of those continuing reductions. Do I have it straight? Am I 

right? 

General PETRAEUS. You do, sir. Again, what I have recommended 

is making a recommendation in mid-March of the pace of the continued reductions at that time. 

286

Chairman LEVIN. But it is your recommendation and intention 

that those reductions would keep on going after the July 2008 level 

of 15 combat brigade teams is reached? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct. As I said, we will continue to 

reduce it at that point. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s intended not just that you will, in some future year, but that you intend to continue those reductions at that 

point, reserving the pace of the reductions beyond 15 combat 

teams, reserving that decision to mid-March. 

General PETRAEUS. Recommendation, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Recommendation. 

Your testimony, Ambassador Crocker, will be made part of the 

record. I did not say that. Thank you for your presentations, both 

of you here today. I think we all deeply appreciate it. I hope that 

appreciation to you and the men and women that you lead comes 

through here very loud and clear, because we all have that strong 

belief that you are, indeed, not only patriots, but that you are expending beyond the call of duty your own energies and your families’ in leading the men and women under your command and 

under your leadership. Thank you both. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT BYRD

IRAQI TRIBES

1. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, what assurance can you give that the tribes 

in al Anbar province—who until recently were shooting at American soldiers—will 

not resume their attacks against us once they feel we no longer serve their interests? 

General PETRAEUS. Both Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I) and the Government 

of Iraq recognize that there are many benefits, but also some risks, associated with 

the newfound participation of tribes and other concerned local citizens. As you pointed out in your question, many of these individuals at best condoned acts aimed at 

coalition and Iraqi forces and at worst actively fought against us. As such, we are 

working with the Government of Iraq to create a viable strategy that mitigates the 

risks, especially the risk of these concerned local citizens turning against coalition 

forces and the Government of Iraq, but that also allows us to seize this fleeting opportunity. Our strategy aims to do this by not just working with local citizens and 

tribes in Anbar and throughout Iraq, but more importantly by solidifying their support for the long-term. 

There are a number of ways we are doing this. We are putting these individuals 

under short-term security contracts, collecting their biometric data, ensuring they 

are fit for long-term service, and having them swear allegiance to the Government 

of Iraq. We are also working to place these volunteers into permanent positions in 

the Iraqi security forces or other forms of governmental employment. Specifically, 

we are filling available authorizations in the Iraqi police, so that these volunteers, 

once trained, can then provide security for their local communities. After all local 

security is in their interests, the Government of Iraq’s interest, and our interest. 

Moreover, by being employed by a governmental agency or as a member of the Iraqi 

security forces, these concerned local citizens will remain tied into the central government, as it provides their salaries and other financial resources.

2. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, during the hearing you noted that we are not 

directly supplying the tribes with weapons or money, but that does not alter the underlying point that we are now cooperating with groups that a few short months 

ago treated us as enemies. I fear that we are touting a short-term success while potentially doing damage to our long-term interests. Please confirm that we are not 

supplying arms or funding to the tribes; and why you believe that our new allies 

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in al Anbar province today will not be our bitter enemies tomorrow, and that this 

policy is in our long-term interests. 

General PETRAEUS. MNF–I is not arming tribes. In truth, most tribes were armed 

long before our arrival. We have, however, provided non-lethal equipment such as 

cell phones and uniform equipment to identify concerned local citizens, many of 

whom come from tribal elements, as being under security contract and cooperating 

with coalition and Iraqi security forces. We have also provided training in topics 

such as safe weapons handling procedures, human rights, law of land warfare, and 

proper reporting procedures. Additionally, MNF–I provides funding to groups of concerned local citizens through lawful contracts as part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. While the majority of this funding has gone to Sunnis to 

date, we are seeing an increasing number of Shiite citizens volunteer as well, given 

their rejection of extremist Shiite militias and Iranian influence. These contracts are 

for a specified length of time and a specified mission, such as providing security for 

a critical piece of infrastructure or a stretch of roadway. By using contracts, we have 

been able to provide these local citizens and tribal elements with a legitimate way 

to assist coalition and Iraqi forces in securing their areas as well as provide them 

with a stipend so that they can provide for their families. As we move forward, we 

will begin transitioning the responsibility for these security contracts to the Government of Iraq. 

As I stated above, we are mindful of the risks but believe we have a sound policy 

in place to mitigate these risks and take advantage of this important opportunity. 

Also, it is important to point out that by having these previously disaffected individuals provide security and by integrating them into Iraqi security forces, Iraq is taking the first steps toward turning bottom-up accommodation into national reconciliation. Helping to foster national reconciliation is critical to developing sustainable 

security in Iraq, which is one of our principal long-term interests.

MILITARY MISSION IN IRAQ

3. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, please tell me in your own words why our soldiers are in Iraq, what their military mission is, what the Iraqi military needs to 

do, and how long you expect it to take? 

General PETRAEUS. The mission of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 

coastguardsmen of MNF–I, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, is to secure 

the population of Iraq and employ political, security, economic, and diplomatic 

means to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security and commensurate political and economic development in order to foster continued reconciliation. I believe 

our troopers are here in Iraq building sustainable security because it is in our Nation’s interest to do so. A stable and secure Iraq will deny extremist enemies a safe 

haven, prevent further Iranian influence, be a stabilizing influence in a fragile region, and allow Iraq’s natural resource blessings to benefit its citizens and the greater global community. 

Within the mission statement listed above, our troopers are focused primarily on 

the security line of operation, performing tasks such as clearing, controlling, and retaining neighborhoods; capturing and killing irreconcilable enemies; developing Iraqi 

security forces; and partnering with concerned local citizens. However, our troopers 

also contribute considerably to Embassy-led efforts on the political and economic 

lines of operation. Indirectly they do so by increasing security, which allows the time 

and space for political and economic progress. They also work directly with their 

Iraqi partners to build governance capacity, execute reconstruction projects, improve 

essential services, and increase the economic opportunities in their areas of operation. Lastly, our troopers are taking part in advancing reconciliation. As I explained above, the bottom-up accommodation taking place is critical to the overall 

reconciliation effort, and our troopers are providing important assistance in moving 

bottom-up accommodation forward, separating those that are reconcilable from 

those they are not and helping their Iraqi counterparts to integrate the 

reconcilables—the concerned local citizens—into their efforts to secure neighborhoods and areas across the country. 

The Iraqi security forces, both the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police, work with 

our coalition troopers to clear, control, and retain neighborhoods and capture and 

kill irreconcilable enemies. As the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces continue 

to increase and based on conditions on the ground, we will begin transferring to our 

Iraqi partners responsibility for population security. As we do so, coalition forces 

will assume an overwatch position, providing quick-reaction force support, intelligence, and other key enablers, as well as transition teams to support the development of Iraqi forces. 

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Based on the security improvements we have made and additional improvements 

we expect to make, we have already recommended a drawdown of the five surge brigades, two Marine battalions, and Marine Expeditionary Unit. We believe that we 

will be able to execute this reduction in forces without jeopardizing the security 

gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Further reductions and potential 

changes to our mission will take place, but in my professional military judgment, 

it is premature to make those recommendations at this time. By mid-March of next 

year, we believe we will have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further troop 

reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008. By then, we will 

know more about the enemy situation, the capabilities of the Iraqi forces and the 

concerned local citizens, and further improvements to the security situation, and 

will then be prepared to make recommendations for additional drawdown and potential change in mission. 

As we move forward, we must remain mindful of the fact that the accomplishment 

of our mission in Iraq will not be quick or easy. Doing so will take continued time, 

commitment, and resources on the part of our country. Our plans call for sustainable security to be established nationwide by the summer of 2009, but that does not 

end the commitment of American forces, which I would expect to continue well into 

the next administration, though at a reduced level over time. I expect long-term 

force levels will be determined by a long-term strategic relationship that will be negotiated between the Government of Iraq and our own government.

4. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, what are our specific military goals, and precisely what is required from the U.S. military to achieve them? 

General PETRAEUS. In the near-term, by summer 2005, our goal is to protect the 

population and create a baseline of local security. Specifically, this includes the neutralization of irreconcilable armed groups, the containment of militias, the reduction 

of large-scale sectarian violence, the protection of infrastructure, and the further development of the Iraqi security forces. In various areas throughout the country, coalition forces will be leading and partnering with or in overwatch of their Iraqi counterparts. The baseline of localized security they create will ensure the population 

is protected, thus enabling political and economic progress and fostering reconciliation. 

In the intermediate-term, by summer of 2009, our goal is to create sustainable 

security. Specifically, this includes a greatly diminished level of violence that the 

Iraqi security forces will be able to sustain largely on their own and for the longterm. This includes not only the capabilities of the Iraqi units themselves, but also 

the abilities of the Ministries of Interior and Defense to effectively perform their institutional functions on their own. Coalition forces will largely be in an overwatch 

position by this point, responsible for monitoring developments and providing quickreaction force support, intelligence, and other key enablers. Transition teams will 

also continue to support the development of Iraqi forces. While in overwatch, should 

a situation develop that is beyond the capacity of Iraqi forces to handle on their 

own, coalition forces will be readily available to back up our Iraqi counterparts. 

Overall, this diminished level of violence will create the conditions for further political and economic progress. 

In the long-term, our goal is Iraqi security forces that are capable of protecting 

the population and controlling their borders and that are able to sustain themselves. 

Ministries of Interior and Defense that are capable of performing their institutional 

functions, and a coalition forces presence, one large enough to continue to provide 

a contribution in accordance with an agreed-upon long-term security relationship 

that is mutually beneficial to our Nation and to Iraq. 

Achieving local security, then sustainable security, and then ultimately a longterm security relationship will require a continued commitment of time, resources, 

and personnel, not just from the U.S. military but from other members of the interagency. However, in the future, we project that the number of personnel and resources required will be far smaller than at present time. As I stated above, we have 

already begun to transition responsibilities and draw down the surge forces, and we 

plan to make further recommendations on troop decreases and potential mission 

shifts in mid-March.

CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

5. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, please tell me the total number of private contractors in Iraq serving in combat, combat support, and security roles who are funded by the U.S. Government. Please break down the numbers of each and describe 

the range of duties that private contractors are involved in. 

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General PETRAEUS. There were 136,655 contractors supporting MNF–I as of the 

most recent CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census, which was conducted in July 

2007. The next census will be completed by the end of this month. MNF–I’s contractors perform two principal missions: supporting coalition operations and supporting 

Iraqi reconstruction operations, and they do this through combat support and security roles. Their breakdown is as follows:

Service Provided Total Contractors Percentage 

Security .................................................................................................................................... 9,702 7.1

Combat Support: Construction ............................................................................................... 39,057 28.6

Combat Support: Base Support .............................................................................................. 65,195 47.7

Combat Support: Transportation ............................................................................................ 6,012 4.4

Combat Support: Communications Support ........................................................................... 5,362 3.9

Combat Support: Translator/Interpreter .................................................................................. 8,120 5.9

Combat Support: Other ........................................................................................................... 3,207 2.4

Total ............................................................................................................................... 136,655 100

None of our contractors are in combat roles in the same way our infantry or armor 

soldiers are. The closest our contractors come to an actual combat role is our 1,237 

armed contractors who serve in personal security details and our 371 armed contractors who conduct convoy escort missions. In addition to those individuals, some 

of our other contractors inevitably do leave the confines of our bases, and when then 

they do, they—like all our troopers—are at risk of exposure to enemy contact such 

as small arms fire or improvised explosive devices. Their purpose in leaving the 

base, however, is to complete their combat support or security tasks such as getting 

to their reconstruction site, acting as an interpreter, or driving logistics supplies to 

another base, and not to perform specific combat tasks such as patrolling a street 

or conducting a raid. 

The Department of State (DOS) will be able to provide information on the quantity of personnel under DOS contracts and the specific roles those contractors perform.

IRAQI NATIONAL POLICE

6. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, the Report of the Independent Commission 

on the Security Forces of Iraq noted that the National Police are ‘‘operationally ineffective’’ and riven with sectarianism, and recommended that the entire force be disbanded and reorganized. Iraq’s police forces are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the National Police and its recommendation to disband it? Why or why not? 

General PETRAEUS. I respectfully disagree with the recommendation to disband 

the National Police. The National Police remain the part of Iraqi Security Forces 

of which we are most concerned, and we may, in time, recommend that some units 

be disbanded by the Government of Iraq. However, we also believe that overall, we 

have a viable strategy to assist the National Police in overcoming their two principal 

challenges, sectarianism and insufficient training, and that we are making progress 

in developing the National Police into a viable paramilitary force. Disbanding the 

National Police writ large would leave a significant gap in security capability, as 

there are currently about 32,000 National Police performing security operations 

across Iraq, and the vast majority operate within the Baghdad security belt in support of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. 

There has been considerable effort, led by the National Police leadership and supported by coalition forces, to overcome the challenges of sectarianism within this 

force. Numerous individuals who promoted sectarian agendas have been removed 

and replaced, to include 17 of 27 battalion commanders, 9 of 9 brigade commanders, 

and other key officers. National Police units have undergone ‘‘re-bluing’’ training 

programs, which have shown positive results in many units in building a more professional National Police force. This training is now being complemented by Italian 

Carabinieri-led training. Also, National Police units are advised, coached, and 

mentored by Coalition Force National Police Transition Teams and they often partner with coalition forces on operations. These partnerships remain crucial to our 

ability to strengthen the capabilities and professionalism of the National Police. 

Ultimately, our goal is to help the Ministry of Interior transform the National Police into a national, rapidly deployable, paramilitary police force operating in support of the Iraqi Police Service, under the command of the Ministry of Interior and 

when appropriate, under the direction or in support of the Provincial Governors in 

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order to provide the Government of Iraq with a proportional response option and 

bridging capability between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army. Achieving 

this goal will take considerable time and continued effort, and some units may, indeed, need to be disbanded, but the right strategy is in place to get there.

ARMY RETENTION RATES

7. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, in 2003, only 18 percent of West Point graduates quit the force. This low attrition rate has been attributed to the memories of 

September 11, the successful war in Afghanistan, and the fact that war in Iraq was 

just under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. However, last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their 

choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the Service’s highest loss 

rate in 3 decades. Some have suggested that there is a ‘‘trust gap’’ between junior 

and senior officers. Others have suggested that we are on a quixotic quest in Iraq 

to reach an unreachable goal, leading to disillusionment among our young officer 

corps. Some of the combat-tempered junior and mid-level officers have charged the 

general corps, many of whom lack combat experience because they attained their 

rank in peacetime, with demanding the impossible and providing too few resources 

to achieve success. The result is that the military is losing, at record rates, the very 

individuals that can best lead our Armed Forces. How does this exodus of the future 

leaders of the military weigh on your decision-making in attempting to achieve military objectives and goals in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. As Commander of MNF–I, my responsibility is to develop and 

execute a strategy focused on achieving our goal of sustainable security in Iraq. As 

such, the recommendations I presented before your committee were based on my 

view of how we are faring as we build sustainable security and what means are required to meet our stated goal. However, as a senior leader of our Nation’s Armed 

Forces, I am also acutely aware of the strain being put on our ground forces as a 

result of our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This understanding informed, but did not drive, my recommendations. 

Undoubtedly, to be successful—not just in the short-term, but more importantly 

in the medium and long-term—our military needs top-quality leaders. Today’s junior 

officers, who will be tomorrow’s senior leaders, are probably the most combat experienced generations of officers in the history of our Nation. Most Army and Marine 

Corps lieutenants and captains have deployed multiple times and learned first-hand 

what it takes to succeed in an exceedingly challenging environment. Now, many of 

these same leaders are choosing to leave military service because of, among other 

reasons, the high operational tempo. I am in my fourth year or longer deployment 

since September 11 and my family and I intimately understand the strain placed 

on our troopers and their families through repeated and lengthy deployments. Ideally, through both the expansion of the force as well as a gradual decrease in the 

number of our forces deployed, our military will be able to return to a more manageable deployment cycle, with at least double the time at home compared to the time 

deployed. In the meantime, the Army has recently released other initiatives designed to retain our junior officers, including expanded offers of graduate school and 

a retention bonus. Additionally, as I go out and visit with subordinate commanders 

across Iraq, I encourage them to mentor their junior officers and communicate to 

them their worth to this fight and to the long-term health of our organization. I do 

the same, taking the time to personally talk to company commanders (captains) on 

nearly every trip I take to see troops, listen to their concerns, and remind them that 

they matter a great deal—to all of us.

U.S. ARMED FORCES

8. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, what is the long-range impact of the war in 

Iraq on the U.S. Armed Forces? 

General PETRAEUS. At this stage of an ongoing conflict, it is difficult to predict 

what the long-range impact will be on the Armed Forces, but we do have some indicators already. On the positive front, we now have one of the most experienced combat forces in our Nation’s history, complete with a core of battle tested leaders, 

many of whom have multiple tours and often have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Our military has also demonstrated an ability to change doctrine and adapt 

training to the current fight, to become proficient at new tasks, and to field needed 

new equipment. While these adaptations did not necessarily happen fast enough 

during the early years of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are now occurring much more quickly. We can see the difference: more than ever before, I am 

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convinced that our troopers and especially our leaders get it—they understand how 

to operate in the exceedingly challenging environments they face in places like Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

There are negative impacts we’re watching closely as well, in particular the stress 

on our ground forces—most importantly on the mid-grade noncommissioned officers 

and junior officers who have that wealth of combat experience on which we will 

draw in the decades ahead. There are other stresses as well, such as stresses on 

equipment that has seen much wear and tear over 4+ years of sustained combat 

and stresses on the ability to train for other tasks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

individual Services are endeavoring to put policies in place to alleviate the stress 

on our troopers and on our equipment as much as possible and they are working 

to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize the All-Volunteer Force, while also ensuring our 

troopers are prepared to deploy and succeed in the current operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

BUDGETS

9. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, in the budgets for the global war on terror 

that the President sent to Congress in February, he did not request one thin dime 

for the cost of the troops serving in Iraq as a result of the surge. Can you explain 

to me, the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, why 8 months later, 

the President has still not asked for funds for the troops that have gone to Iraq as 

a result of the surge? 

General PETRAEUS. I am not able to provide insight into the details of the budgetary process. I respectfully recommend this question be addressed to the Office of 

Management and Budget.

10. Senator BYRD. General Petraeus, during the hearing you essentially asked 

Congress for patience to allow the military strategy in Iraq time to work. We have 

heard these requests virtually since the war began. Can you offer any evidence that 

6 or 12 more months are going to make a significant difference on the only important issues: achievement of the benchmarks and genuine progress toward national 

political reconciliation? 

General PETRAEUS. We are hopeful that over the next 6 to 12 months, we will 

see continued progress toward resolving the ongoing competition for power and resources among Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian communities. This resolution will in turn 

help achieve the benchmarks and allow for genuine progress toward national political reconciliation. 

Significantly, the gradual improvements to the security situation arc providing 

Iraqi leaders with the time and space to resolve their difficult political issues, foster 

reconciliation, and strengthen their economy. During the height of sectarian violence 

late last year, Iraqi leaders focused their energy simply on quelling the violence. 

Now that the levels of violence are more manageable—though admittedly still too 

high—Iraqi leaders are able to focus their energies on the key tasks that only they 

can solve. The 26 August communique ́ released by Iraq’s senior leaders was a heartening step towards resolving their difficult issues, and now that the Council of Representatives is back in session, it is up to Iraqi leaders to ensure the promises set 

forth in the communique ́ are translated into laws. Also, the groundswell of bottomup support is forcing Iraqi leaders to deal with difficult issues involving reconciliation, and their actions, to include conditional immunity in some areas, represent 

the first steps toward national reconciliation. In another sign of progress, other ongoing actions are also outpacing the laws. For example, the Government of Iraq has 

not yet passed a provincial powers law, a hydrocarbon law, or de-Baathification reform. Still, the central government is allocating budgets to the provinces and the 

provinces are spending their money; oil revenue is being shared in a manner generally consistent with what we believe the hydrocarbon law will codify; and, as I 

stated above, conditional immunity is beginning to occur. Such developments are 

tangible signs of political progress and are hopefully indicative of more progress to 

come in the coming months.

11. Senator BYRD. Ambassador Crocker, we are hearing that political reconciliation cannot take place without security, but there will be no security without political reconciliation. This is a singularly circular argument, but the bottom line is we 

have yet to see any real political reconciliation. I am not looking for an explanation 

about ‘‘progress’’; I want to know when Iraq will step up to its responsibilities, as 

have so many of our servicemen and women, and what you are doing to convey to 

the Iraqis that there is an urgency for them to act now. When can we expect to see 

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the benchmarks you were charged to report on—benchmarks originally proposed by 

the Iraqis themselves—achieved? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Like U.S. servicemen and women, Iraqi officials—including 

politicians, judges, and security forces—are stepping up and putting their lives at 

risk on a daily basis to sustain a democratic, Federal Iraq and continue progress 

on political reconciliation. 

Beyond benchmarks, the Government of Iraq is pursuing political reconciliation 

by ‘latching up’ the national and provincial governments. For example, on September 30, Iraq’s Finance Minister, Bayan Jabr, announced that the portion of the 

capital budget that goes directly to the 18 provinces would increase to nearly $4 billion next year. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, also announced that 

Babil Province would be rewarded for its effective budget execution with $70 million 

for a major loan program for small businesses and individuals. Previously, Vice 

Presidents al-Mahdi and al-Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister Salih announced 

a 70 percent increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million 

in compensation for losses suffered in Anbar in the fight against al Qaeda. 

While not yet meeting the legislative benchmark of passing a Hydrocarbon Law, 

sharing of hydrocarbon revenues is taking place equitably while deliberations over 

a revenue-sharing law continue. Further, U.S. leaders have stressed the importance 

of passing national hydrocarbon legislation during meetings with both Prime Minister al-Maliki and President Talabani.

12. Senator BYRD. Ambassador Crocker, the U.S. taxpayer has been called upon 

to provide hundreds of billions of dollars to support the war in Iraq. What specific 

assurances can you give, contrary to many of the other official reports we are receiving, including some from your own Department, that this war is making us safer 

here in the United States? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Our efforts in Iraq make the United States safer at home 

by helping to stabilize the region and by confronting al Qaeda. Should the United 

States abandon or drastically curtail its efforts, Iraq could fall into chaos or civil 

war and become a safe haven for terrorists who could strike America at home and 

abroad. Civil war in Iraq would also likely trigger the intervention of regional 

states, all of which have a vital national interest in Iraq’s future. The Iranian President has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. 

In partnership with courageous and dedicated Iraqis, we have weakened al Qaeda 

in Iraq and reduced its ability to carry out acts of terrorism. A growing number of 

communities in Iraq have joined the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq. Should the 

United States quit Iraq prematurely, the gains made against al Qaeda in Iraq and 

other extremist groups could easily be reversed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ

13. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the President’s Chief of Staff, Josh Bolten, 

was quoted in an interview with USA Today last week as saying President Bush 

wants to make it ‘‘possible for his successor—from whichever party that successor 

is from—to have a sustained presence in the Middle East, and have America continue to be a respected and influential power in the Middle East.’’ Was maintaining 

a long-term military presence in Iraq an objective provided to you by the Commander in Chief, or any member of his administration, when you took command of 

the Multinational Force in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. It was not a specific objective. Developing a long-term relationship with Iraq, though not specified to a particular military relationship of any 

set size, has been a strategic goal. The 10 January 2007 NSC Iraq Strategy Review 

defined the administration’s strategic goals and objectives (page 5 of attached unclassified briefing). The strategic goal was established before I took command and 

has not since been changed: A unified, democratic, Federal Iraq that can govern 

itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. 

The NSC noted that, ‘‘While our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship 

with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we 

believe are achievable in the next 12–15 months.’’

The following objectives are where we have focused the energies of MNF–I in coordination with our Embassy and Iraqi partners:

1. Defeat al Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe 

haven exists in Iraq. 

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2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain 

control over the capital. 

3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive 

Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq. 

4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the 

forces of tyranny. 

5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with the Iraqi 

Government clearly in the lead. 

6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government. 

7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping Iraq 

maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development. 

8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community.

MNF–I is focused on achieving the objectives outlined above. Conditions in Iraq 

and a coordinated agreement with the sovereign Government of Iraq will dictate our 

future presence or lack of presence. 


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14. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, if not, were you aware that a sustained 

presence in Iraq was desired by the President? 

General PETRAEUS. See answer to question 13.

15. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, was the President’s desire to maintain a 

sustained presence in Iraq beyond the end of his term in office a factor in your evaluation of recommended troop levels in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. No. My recommended troop levels in Iraq until next July were 

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My assessment was also informed by the strain on the ground forces, though that 

was not a determining factor. We do believe that accomplishing the mission will 

take until well into the next administration, but that belief is predicated on a realistic assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq and the objectives we have 

been given to accomplish.

16. General Petraeus, have you, or DOD, taken any steps to facilitate sustaining 

our long-term military presence in Iraq, such as building of permanent bases or negotiating long-term lease deals with the Iraqi government? 

General PETRAEUS. Currently, MNF–I basing is governed by the authorities of the 

existing United Nations Security Council Resolutions and Coalition Provisional Authority Orders. In recognition of the sovereignty of the Government of Iraq, and as 

we move forward in support of the Government of Iraqi’s request for DOS’s work 

on the Long-Term Security Relationship, MNF–I will establish a dialogue with the 

Government of Iraq to reach a mutual agreement on the future basing needs for coalition forces. In accordance with United States Central Command instructions, the 

military construction that has been conducted in Iraq has been and continues to be 

temporary in nature.

U.S. SECURITY

17. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the war in Iraq, which has lasted over 4 

years with a cost of over $500 billion before the end of next year, is having a major 

impact on our armed services in terms of their readiness and capability to respond 

to other potential crises. If our military is less ready to respond to other crises, then 

I suggest to you that our country has been made less safe. 

By not eliminating Osama Bin Laden and ‘‘al Qaeda Central,’’ a recent National 

Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that we have allowed them to reconstitute 

their organization in to a level equal to or greater than just prior to September 11, 

2001. Since we have allowed our enemy to gain its full strength back, then I suggest 

to you that our country has been made less safe. We have diverted significant resources unnecessarily into Iraq instead of focusing on ‘‘al Qaeda Central,’’ and because we do not have unlimited resources, we have reduced the total resources 

available to conduct the global war on terror. As Chairman of the Veterans Committee, I know that we will be paying for this war for many decades to come as we 

care for our wounded veterans. These costs also reduce our available resources for 

battling terrorist networks. Since our decision to go to war in Iraq has caused us 

to have less resources to utilize in the war on terror, I suggest to you, that our country has been made less safe. 

The April 2006 NIE concluded ‘‘The Iraq conflict has become the ‘‘cause celebre’’ 

for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world 

and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.’’ It further concluded 

that the ‘‘global jihadist movement—which includes al Qaeda, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.’’ The July 2007 NIE concludes that ‘‘al Qaeda Central is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland.’’ These 

conclusions from our intelligence agencies demonstrate that the Iraq war is fueling 

a growth in terrorist networks throughout the world, not just in Iraq, and I suggest 

to you, that this has made our country less safe. In your opinion, is the Iraq war 

making America safer? If so, why? 

General PETRAEUS. I recognize that there are many arguments as to whether or 

not the invasion of Iraq was the correct policy, but from where we are right now, 

pursuing our objectives in Iraq is making America safer. I believe this because of 

the effect we are having on the al Qaeda-Iraq, which al Qaeda Senior Leadership 

has determined as their central front in a global effort and which the July 2007 NIH 

noted in relation to al Qaeda Senior Leadership as ‘‘its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland.’’ 

I also agree with the findings in the April 2006 NIE that Iraq was an attractive 

cause for global jihadists. From that finding, the NIE also concluded that ‘‘should 

jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge 

fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.’’ We have done considerable 

damage to the global al Qaeda network by the killing and capturing of hundreds 

of skilled terrorist leaders, many of them foreigners to Iraq who would have been 

free to operate elsewhere if they were not in Iraq. The decrease in foreign fighters 

coming into Iraq in recent months may indicate that Iraq is losing its attractiveness 

to al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists, though it also likely reflects actions in source 

countries, as well as action in Syria and Iraq. 

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There is no doubt that the enemy we face constantly adapts to our efforts. At the 

same time, because of our experience in Iraq, I believe we are farther along in learning how their networks are organized, how they fund their activities, how they communicate, how they train, and how they recruit new members than we would have 

been without the past 4 years of learning on the battlefield. We continue to get better and adapt as well, by fine-tuning the synchronization of conventional and special 

operations, by improving our tactics and enhancing our technology, by fusing intelligence and by the accumulation of experience. 

The July 2007 NIE noted al Qaeda central as the most serious terrorist threat 

to the Homeland, as it was before September 11, but also stated, ‘‘We assess that 

greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past 5 years have constrained the ability of al Qaeda to attack the U.S. Homeland again and have led 

terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on September 11.’’ I believe our efforts in Iraq are a part of that equation and an important reason we must continue to work with our Iraqi partners to defeat terrorist 

networks here in Iraq.

18. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, every year our troops are in Iraq, the costs 

to our country are huge: thousands killed in action, thousands more permanently 

disabled or maimed, and hundreds of billions of dollars. With the money we have 

spent we could have contributed to rebuilding our aging transportation infrastructure, retooling our educational system to train our children to compete in the global 

market place, and strengthening the security of our borders. So we have a responsibility to this country to assess whether or not the mission is worth the cost: a cost 

measured in American lives, in foregone programs in America, in the health and 

welfare of our military, and in the risk if other areas of the world demand our military resources. Even if the mission is worth the cost, we must assess whether or 

not we can continue to afford to pay it. In your opinion, is the cost worth it and 

what does America gain for the expense? 

General PETRAEUS. Ultimately, this is a question for the national leadership of 

the United States. In my professional opinion, we have substantial national interests in Iraq. Failure in Iraq would mean that important American and global interests in Iraq and the region are not achieved. Should Iraq collapse into violence (and 

we got a glimpse of that during the height of ethno-sectarian violence in 2006), 

many of our vital and important national interests would be negatively affected. 

A withdrawal before achieving sustainable stability would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and would likely produce a number of 

dangerous results, including a high risk of the disintegration of the Iraqi security 

forces, a rapid deterioration of local security, a marked increase in violence, further 

ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience among 

Iraqi groups and other internal and external forces to gain advantages over their 

rivals. The recent DIA report confirms my assessment of the consequences of withdrawal. A failed state in Iraq would also allow al Qaeda-Iraq to regroup and regain 

the sanctuaries they had established and that Iraqi and coalition forces have secured in the past months. Al Qaeda writ large would also benefit from the psychological and recruiting boost to their cause that would be derived from the perceived 

failure of American policy. Beyond al Qaeda, Iranian hegemonic ambitions could be 

encouraged. Additionally, the developing nexus between Iraq, Tehran, Damascus, 

and Lebanese Hezbollah would solidify and exacerbate the underlying Sunni-Shiite 

conflict already in the Middle East. There is a significant risk that Iraq would be 

the catalyst for broader regional turmoil as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and other neighbors 

acted to defend their interests. These consequences would have an adverse impact 

on the global economy, as potential interruptions in the export of oil from Gulf Region would impact global economic markets. Such results would, in my view, constitute failure in Iraq; our shared vision of a stable and secure Iraq would not be 

achieved and American and global interests in Iraq and the region would not be protected. 

To be sure, the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and frustrating, but 

I believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time through our 

continued efforts, though doing so will not be quick, inexpensive, or easy. The costs 

of staying in Iraq are high, but the costs of withdrawal before achieving sustainable 

security may well be much higher. 

I believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.

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TROOP LEVELS

19. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you expressed concern in your opening 

statement about ‘‘the implications of a rapid withdrawal.’’ I am troubled by this 

characterization because I have not heard any Member of Congress who supports 

ending the war say that our withdrawal should be rapid. In fact, I believe that most 

of us advocate a gradual or phased drawdown that would lessen the shock of our 

troops’ departure on the Iraqi citizens and government, and give them an opportunity to, using the words of the President, ‘‘stand up.’’ Please define what you mean 

by a ‘‘rapid’’ drawdown. 

General PETRAEUS. I would describe a rapid withdrawal as any withdrawal that 

is solely time-based and fails to consider the operational environment and the current mission. The reduction of MNF–I forces that I proposed in my testimony 

matches our ability to secure U.S. national objectives in Iraq with the operational 

environment and available resources at an acceptable level of risk. This plan also 

allows for the orderly repositioning of equipment and personnel currently in Iraq. 

Any significant acceleration of this schedule without a significant improvement in 

the operational environment would constitute a rapid drawdown because it would 

fail to balance the mission and force level with the security conditions on the 

ground.

20. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, if you were to conduct a ‘‘gradual’’ drawdown of our presence in Iraq, at what pace would you recommend reducing our 

troop levels? 

General PETRAEUS. I do not recommend a ‘‘paced’’ reduction of troop levels. My 

recent recommendation to reduce the surge force of five BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine Infantry Battalions, taken in consultation with 

Ambassador Crocker and my chain of command, represents how I recommend reducing coalition forces against the progress we have achieved in Iraq and the operational environment. The recommendation reflected an assessment of a number of 

conditions, namely the security environment, the state of Iraqi security forces, and 

progress in governance and the Iraqi economy. The term ‘‘pace’’ infers a time-based 

drawdown of troop levels that provides the enemy greater predictability of our actions and cedes initiative. Adhering to a time-based drawdown with a specific ‘‘pace’’ 

would almost certainly jeopardize security and other gains we have made in Iraq. 

Our forces levels can and will come down further beyond the levels reduced in 

July 2008. As I testified, however, I cannot predict the pace of drawdowns past next 

July and therefore have offered pledges to present my assessment and recommendations in March 2008 for the way ahead after July 2008.

SAFE HAVENS

21. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, I am concerned about reports that there 

are some areas of Baghdad where coalition forces are not going. In effect, possibly 

establishing safe havens for our opponents. For example, there is one joint security 

station in Sadr City which is located not in the interior of the neighborhood but on 

the border with another district. Are there areas of the city in which our troops do 

not go? 

General PETRAEUS. There are districts in which we try to minimize our visible 

force posture, such as some of those in Sadr City, but coalition forces execute operations in every neighborhood and security district of Baghdad, including Sadr City. 

There arc Iraqi Police and National Police units responsible for daily policing within 

Sadr City and many other neighborhoods of Baghdad, but no areas of Baghdad can 

be considered a safe haven for the enemies of the Iraqi people. While we strive to 

conduct all of our operations with our Iraqi partners if they are not operating independently already, we can and do operate in any neighborhood of Baghdad as the 

mission requires it to ensure that no place in Iraq is knowingly left as a safe haven 

for extremists.

22. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, wasn’t the intention of the Baghdad Security Plan to eliminate safe havens? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, and we largely have. Coalition forces execute operations 

in every neighborhood and security district of Baghdad. Sustained precision strike 

operations that selectively target extremists and criminals continually reinforce the 

fact that there is no safe place for the enemy in Baghdad. Kinetic strikes are then 

reinforced by nonkinetic programs designed to bring clean water, electricity, fuel, 

and sewer service to the populace in order to build their allegiance to the Government of Iraq and to get them to reject extremist militias and terrorists who cannot 

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provide basic services, though much work remains to be done in this category. In 

addition, we continue to work with over 52.000 Iraqi security forces that operate in 

the Baghdad Security Districts, a number that is increasing, as this will lay the 

long-term foundation for sustainable Iraqi security.

IRAQI TRIBES

23. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, I understand that there are over 150 tribal 

groups in Iraq. During your hearings on September 10 and 11, 2007, you specifically 

denied media reports that you were arming Sunni tribes in al Anbar to assist them 

in fighting al Qaeda. However, I am still concerned about other forms of assistance 

that might be provided. You did not, for instance, discuss if you are providing any 

other kind of support to the tribes, such as funding and/or training. My concern is 

that we may provide them with support that could be utilized against the Shiites 

or, even our own troops once they are through battling al Qaeda. After all, some 

of these tribes were previously killing Americans. In addition, the appearance that 

we are favoring some tribal groups over others could exacerbate sectarian and ethnic conflict. I understand that assisting the Sunni tribes helps put al Qaeda on the 

defensive; however, I must caution that we must do so with great care in order to 

avoid unintended consequences. Please describe what resources and/or training you 

are providing to the Sunni tribes in any province to support their efforts against 

al Qaeda, and how you are ensuring that anything you provide is not used against 

our troops, the Shiites, or the Kurds. 

General PETRAEUS. I appreciate your well-founded note of caution, and this is indeed an area where we have had to accept some risk, though not without what we 

consider sufficient mitigation. In separating the armed tribes who are willing to 

work with us from extremist individuals and irreconcilable groups, we can gain two 

tangible benefits: we reduce the number of opponents on the battlefield, and we gain 

contributing partners who have staked their families’ well-being on working together with coalition and Iraqi security forces. 

As I testified, coalition forces are not arming tribes. Tribal members are already 

armed for the most part due to the Iraqi policy that allows every household to maintain one AK–47 assault rifle. The support of coalition force for Sunni tribes is focused on supporting community watch groups trying to rid al Qaeda elements from 

their midst and on providing basic skills to tribal members who agree to monitor 

key infrastructure or transportation routes in order to prevent its destruction or the 

emplacement of improvised explosive devices. Before any training takes place, a 

plan is developed that clearly defines the responsibilities for all parties, outlines the 

limitations of authorities, and explains the consequences if any person violates the 

agreement. The tribal sheikh or neighborhood leader selects and vets candidates 

who also sign an agreement and swear an oath to the Iraqi Government. Once the 

agreements are signed, the coalition forces’ Iraqi security forces in process and 

screen the candidates including the collection of biometric data, cross-matching with 

the biometrics database against criminal databases, and recording the serial numbers of candidates’ personal weapons. We then work with the Iraqi Government to 

get formal hiring orders for their integration into Iraqi security forces. 

The training provided to these groups covers defensively oriented skills such as 

checkpoint operations, detainee handling procedures, human rights, Law of Land 

warfare, safe weapons handling, and proper reporting procedures. The equipment 

provided to the Iraqis in these situations generally involves a uniform (usually a tshirt and arm band), cell phones, a phone card, and materials such as reflective 

belts, chemical lights, and, in some cases, GPS systems that help provide identifying 

information and locations to improve coordination and reduce fratricide.

24. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, if you are providing funding to the Sunnis 

tribes, please describe the purpose of the funding, and how you are ensuring that 

the funds are used as intended. 

General PETRAEUS. The funding we are providing to Shiite as well as Sunni tribal 

volunteers covers the initial costs of the broader Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) 

movement, in which there are now some 65,000 individuals participating. The majority of these CLCs are Sunni at the present time, though we are seeing rapid 

growth in the number of Shiite citizens who are also forming groups to reject extremist Jaish al Mahdi and Iranian influence in a similar manner that Sunni tribes 

rejected al Qaeda. We estimate that approximately $35 million will be spent on 

these citizen groups through the end of the year, which is a wise investment both 

in getting a large number of military age males into employment and in the dramatic reductions in violence we see in the areas in which active CLCs are present. 

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In fact, just the reduction in vehicle losses due to battle damage more than offsets 

the cost of the CLCs. The next step, which is crucial, is developing with the Government of Iraq the mechanism by which the CLCs go onto Iraqi payrolls. This effort 

is in its nascent stages now, and I expect to report more on it in the future.

AMERICAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

25. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, Dennis Ross, who is a leading Middle East 

expert, who served in several Republican and Democratic administrations, has stated that, ‘‘It is an illusion to believe that the new Iraq is going to act as our partner 

in the war on terrorism.’’ How sure are we that a new independent Iraq—even one 

at peace with itself—is going to be pro-American, especially given the pervasive influence of Iran on the dominant Shiite leaders, and what is the basis for your conclusion? 

General PETRAEUS. I cannot guarantee success in Iraq or even if we arc successful, that the new independent Iraq will remain pro-American. However, a free and 

independent Iraq is most likely to be a stabilizing force in the Middle East, and 

given that it is Shiite-led, and largely Arab, it is at least likely to oppose al Qaeda 

in Iraq in many areas, as well as Iran, based on historic suspicions and fighting. 

What I can say is that the building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi 

Government is in our best interest and that Ambassador Crocker and I are both 

committed to making this happen. Recently, Iraqi officials indicated that they wanted the United Nations Security Council to extend the mandate of the MNF–I 

through the end of 2008. Once that mandate extension expires, we believe that senior Iraqi leaders intend on seeking a long-term bilateral security agreement with the 

United States, an agreement similar to those that exist with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 

the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt.

IRAQI REFUGEES

26. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, it seems to me that the number of internally displaced people (IDP) is an indicator of sectarian violence. I understand that 

about 1.8 million Iraqis are now refugees in other countries and that the number 

of IDPs has increased from 499,000 in February to over 1.1 million in July. Do you 

agree that the increasing number of IDPs is an indicator of increasing sectarian violence and rising ethnic tensions? 

General PETRAEUS. As Ambassador Crocker and I testified, the fundamental 

source of conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for 

power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is necessary to produce long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the 

competition takes place more or less violently. Tragically, one of the by-products of 

this power struggle is the number of Iraqis and families that are displaced from 

their homes as a result of sectarian threats and violence. The surge of operations 

has led to increased security for Iraqis throughout the country and, while the number of displaced people remains far too high, we have seen positive signs: citizens 

beginning to return to neighborhoods and an Iraqi government that is working to 

guarantee the property rights of those who were displaced in order to help reintegrate them into civil society. All indicators are that overall sectarian violence 

in Iraq is significantly lower now than it was in the winter of 2006 and 2007.

27. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, the pace of IDPs does not seem to have 

been slowed by the surge. How do you respond to the criticism that this is further 

evidence that the surge has failed? 

General PETRAEUS. The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, 

being met. Though the improvements in security have been uneven across Iraq, the 

number of incidents, such as attacks and ethno-sectarian violence, has decreased 

since June. This decrease in sectarian violence and terrorist attacks, and the associated enhanced security that the surge enabled, have given government and community leaders valuable time to try and resolve pressing political, economic, and sectarian issues. As incidents continue to decline and confidence in the security situation stabilizes, many displaced Iraqis will eventually return to their homes and communities. In fact, as I mentioned above, we are beginning to see a small but significant number of families moving back into neighborhoods that have been secured by 

coalition and Iraqi security forces.

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BENCHMARKS

28. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, in its report on the Iraqi government’s 

progress in meeting its benchmarks, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

asserted that it could not confirm that there has been a reduction in sectarian violence since the surge, as a measure of sectarian violence is difficult since the perpetrator’s intent is not always clearly known. The report further stated that the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the 

last 6 months, and that the decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely 

due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. How is the 

MNF–I determining which killings or attacks are sectarian violence, and which are 

not? While some may be obvious, I am sure that many are not. 

General PETRAEUS. Ethno-sectarian violence is defined as an event and any associated civilian deaths caused by or during murders/executions, kidnappings, direct 

fire, indirect fire, and all types of explosive devices, identified as being conducted 

by one ethnic/religious person/group directed at a different ethnic/religious person/

group, where the primary motivation for the event is based on ethnicity or religious 

sect. Analysts review each event to determine the ethnicity and/or religious sect of 

the victim(s), the entity being attacked, the demographics of the area where the attack occurred, and the method of attack to determine whether a particular event 

should be included as ethno-sectarian violence. As you correctly point out, many of 

these events are obviously ethno-sectarian in nature, while others are less obvious 

until the full range of circumstances are closely examined. 

MNF–I employs a methodology that is consistent, rigorous, and thorough. We 

have shared our methodology with the CIA and DIA, and they concur with our system of measurements. In large part, the GAO’s criticism is based on a fundamental 

misunderstanding of our methodologies. We have always welcomed outside audits 

and will continue to do so and we continue to stand by our metrics.

29. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, you stated in the hearing that the current 

methodology has been used for over a year. From this, I conclude that the current 

methodology was changed approximately 3 years into the war. How long exactly has 

this methodology been in use, and why was it changed? 

General PETRAEUS. I have attached to this response the document ‘‘MNF–I EthnoSectarian Violence Methodology’’ which outlines the definitions and methodology we 

use to determine if violent acts should be classified as ethno-sectarian. This methodology has not changed since July 2005. MNF–I defines ethno-sectarian violence as 

‘‘an event and any associated civilian deaths caused by or during murder/executions, 

kidnappings, direct fire, indirect fire, and all types of explosive devices identified as 

being conducted by one ethnic/religious person/group directed at a different ethnic/

religious person/group, where the primary motivation for the event is based on ethnicity or religious sect.’’

The only significant change to the reported level of ethno-sectarian violence is one 

that resulted from our receipt of backlogged data from the Iraqi National Command 

Center in March 2007. After verifying the data, we updated previous accounts of the 

levels of sectarian violence with these reports to ensure we had the most accurate 

depiction of the sectarian violence we are measuring. This additional data did not 

arrive in time for inclusion in the March 9010 Report to Congress, but was reflected 

in the June 9010 Report. Since then, MNF–I has worked hard to improve our coordination with our Iraqi counterparts to ensure we receive Iraqi reports in a timely 

and consistent manner. We believe that using verified Iraqi data adds to the accuracy of our statistics. 

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30. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, how can you use this methodology to evaluate trends in sectarian violence against previous years when the methodology was 

changed? 

General PETRAEUS. The methodology for measuring ethno-sectarian violence has 

not changed since it was implemented in the summer 2005. Additionally, the rigorous methodology deals with interpreting data, rather than collecting it. Thus, 

when comparing data from different years, MNF–I analysis apply the same methodology to the entire data set to make the most accurate trends assessments possible. 

Prior to 2005, we weren’t as focused on ethno-sectarian violence as we are today. 

In fact, prior to the bombing of the Mosque of the Golden Dome in early 2006, 

ethno-sectarian violence was limited. The bombing of the mosque literally tore the 

fabric of Iraqi society, pining sects against one another and plunging neighborhoods 

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31. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to determine the intent of a killing, your method of measuring sectarian 

violence in Iraq seems subjective to me. Why not use objective measurements such 

as total civilian killings or average daily attacks to assess levels of violence? 

General PETRAEUS. We do, in fact, use total civilian deaths and daily attacks as 

metrics on which we focus. However, due to the damage done by sectarian violence, 

we do focus on that, as well. In fact, due to its divisive nature, sectarian-motivated 

violence poses the greatest threat to the long-term goals of reconciliation among the 

Iraqis. While no violence is acceptable, measuring the level of sectarian violence 

helps assess progress toward reconciliation. 

Sectarian violence is thus an important subset of total levels of violence as it is 

an indicator of the level of civil unrest among the various sects within Iraq. We 

therefore scrutinize various indicators and develop specific methods for accurately 

measuring the level of sectarian violence. We use a number of indicators to determine the levels of violence in Iraq. These include subjective assessments as well as 

objective measurements. While total civilian casualties and daily attacks are part 

of that set of measurements, those two indicators alone are not enough to determine 

if a violent act was sectarian-motivated. Therefore, our analysis teams review reports in detail, searching for the signs that suggest sectarianism. 

Securing the population from both internal and external threats is a priority and 

it is therefore essential to accurately measure trends in violence. Ultimately, I believe we are best able to do this by assessing a wide spectrum of violence indicators, 

including, as I noted earlier, total civilian deaths and average daily attacks. The nature of the conflict in Iraq is exceedingly complex and we use a variety of tools to 

measure it.

WEAPONS CACHES

32. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus, in your slides that you provided with your 

opening remarks at the hearing, you provided a slide on the numbers of weapons 

caches found. What percentage of the weapons caches found are weapons from: 1) 

Saddam Hussein’s military forces; 2) U.S. military weapons; 3) Iranian weapons; 4) 

Syrian Weapons; and 5) weapons from other nations? 

General PETRAEUS. While we attempt to collect as much information as we can 

to gain greater situational awareness, to include forensic data that is then shared 

with and analyzed by other governmental agencies such as the FBI, it is very difficult to assess the sources of weapons we have found in caches. Most of the weapons we are finding in theater are made from a variety of different countries. Due 

to the commonality of the type of weapons and the variety of different methods of 

entrance into Iraq, we cannot accurately track sources of origin. Further, the condition of the weapons caches we are finding vary greatly, from some that have been 

secured for long periods of time and lack markings to some that have just been recently emplaced. These factors make it extremely difficult and often nearly impossible to assess the weapons’ sources.

U.N. RESOLUTION 1723

33. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, United Nations (U.N.) Resolution 1723, 

the mandate under which coalition troops currently operate in Iraq, expires in December 2007, and would, therefore, require renewal to support continued coalition 

operations in Iraq. Have any efforts been made by the Iraqi Parliament to block the 

renewal of U.N. Resolution 1723? 

Ambassador CROCKER. No efforts have been made by the Iraqi Parliament to 

block the renewal of U.N. Resolution 1723. We are currently working with the Government of Iraq, coalition members, and members of the United Nations Security 

Council to renew UNSCR 1723. We have received assurances from the Government 

of Iraq that it supports this effort.

34. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, if so, what actions were taken by the 

Parliament, what further actions do they have planned, and what is the intent and 

current status of their efforts? 

Ambassador CROCKER. See answer to question 33.

MALIKI GOVERNMENT

35. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, on August 22, 2007, Time.com reported 

that Nouri al-Maliki’s government was teetering on the verge of collapse, and that 

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‘‘Baghdad’s Green Zone is humming with political maneuverings by Iraqi politicians 

who want his job.’’ The next day, CNN.com’s Political Ticker reported that former 

Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi had hired a Washington, DC, lobbying firm to 

begin a public campaign to undermine the Maliki government and replace him with 

Allawi. In your opinion, how likely is the Maliki government to survive? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to enjoy the support of his party and its coalition partners. Al-Maliki demonstrated his political tact 

through his success in achieving agreement on the principles of reconciliation contained in the August 26 communique ́ by top Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders. He 

enhanced his international support at the U.N. General Assembly in September and 

he will be attending the Expanded Neighbors Conference in Istanbul on November 

2–3. The United States is fully committed to continuing its work with Prime Minister al-Maliki to sustain a united, Federal, and democratic government in Iraq.

36. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, if the government were to fall and new 

elections held, how long would that set back negotiations for political reconciliation? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is impossible to determine what the exact impact on political reconciliation would be should the current governing coalitions in Iraq fall 

and new elections be held. As I stated in a previous response, Nouri al-Maliki continues to enjoy the support of his party and its coalition partners. Al-Maliki demonstrated his political tact through his success in achieving agreement on the principles of reconciliation contained in the August 26 communique ́ by top Sunni, Shiite, 

and Kurdish leaders. He enhanced his international support at the U.N. General 

Assembly in September, and he will be attending the Expanded Neighbors Conference in Istanbul on November 2–3. The United States is fully committed to continuing its work with Prime Minister al-Maliki to sustain a united, Federal, and 

democratic government in Iraq.

37. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, in your opinion, is Ayad Allawi actively 

working to undermine the Maliki government, and hindering the Prime Minister’s 

efforts to achieve political reconciliation? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Competition among politicians and among political parties 

is part and parcel of democracy. Iraq’s democratic, Federal governance system has, 

for the first time, allowed for competing political parties to publicly express different 

political views without fear of government retribution. Individual leaders, including 

Allawi, establish positions and pursue platforms which they believe will attract political support. Rather than seeing that competition of ideas as a challenge to reconciliation, I see it as an indispensable part of the political process, and one that 

helps ensure that the Iraqi people’s desire for reconciliation will be fulfilled.

STATE-OWNED BUSINESSES

38. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Crocker, in the last 4 years the United States 

has obligated nearly $370 billion to Iraq—as the GAO points out. We have been 

pouring money into state-owned plants which do not seem to be able to generate 

much business. It has been suggested that rather than trying to prop up stateowned businesses, the Bush administration should switch to supporting the private 

sector and letting the markets take over. What is your assessment of this idea? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Supporting private sector development is a key goal of our 

economic policy in Iraq. A dynamic and varied private sector will provide the source 

of long-term economic growth that generates employment and spurs innovation. To 

this end, the Embassy in Baghdad has been working for 3 years with the Iraqi Government on a range of initiatives to improve the business climate and facilitate the 

creation of Iraqi firms. This includes helping to streamline the business registration 

process, passing a landmark investment law, and creating a one-stop investment 

promotion center. The Embassy has also focused on helping Iraq improve laws and 

regulations to improve specific sectors that are key to private enterprise, such as 

telecommunications. 

In support of an emerging Iraqi private sector, USAID’s micro-credit program has 

also been very successful in helping thousands of businesses start up. More than 

55,000 loans have been issued over the past 3 years. USAID has also offered vocational education programs and business education initiatives. 

At the same time, DOD’s Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq, led by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Brinkley, is working 

to revitalize certain state owned enterprises (SOEs), with the aim of increasing employment, kick-starting economic activity (including in related private companies) 

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and attracting private investment in those SOEs, leading to their eventual privatization. 

We are working with DOD to fully integrate this initiative into our broader engagement with the Iraqi Government to promote the kinds of reforms Iraq will need 

to develop its economy. This initiative was conceived to play a part in creating 

short-term gains to improve the prospects for job creation and broader Iraqi economic growth. This should come within the context of an overall focus on promoting 

private sector development and supporting free-market enterprise.

INSURGENCY IN IRAQ

39. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, Admiral Fallon, 

in his testimony before this committee on May 3, 2007, stated that ‘‘Insurgent 

groups in Iraq have multiple and often competing motivations for perpetuating violence. However, a common thread is their opposition to U.S. and coalition presence 

and refusal to accept the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative government.’’ Do 

you agree with Admiral Fallon’s point? 

General PETRAEUS. First, I agree with Admiral Fallon that insurgent groups, terrorists, militias, and criminals have multiple and often competing motivations for 

perpetuating violence. There are a wide range of individual motivations and group 

dynamics that justify violent acts. Some of the motivations include anger, sense of 

disrespect and loss, fear of Iranian influence, fear of a Baathist return, anti-Western 

xenophobia, religious extremism, concern for the future, and the need to protect and 

provide for a family. A recent survey of detainees showed that the majority were 

drawn to the insurgency for economic reasons. On a larger scale, the violence we 

see today is driven by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces that include insurgency and terrorism; communal power struggles; and regional interference and foreign-fueled proxy war, all compounded by weak and divided institutions. That said, 

the conflict remains predominantly a reflection of a communal struggle for power 

and survival, with elements of both inter- and intra-sectarian violence, as well as 

al Qaeda-sponsored terrorism. 

A major driver for violence in Iraq for the Sunni Arab-based insurgency had been 

the rejection of what the Sunnis perceived as the disproportionate empowerment of 

the Shiite and Kurdish communities that occurred as a result of coalition force operations. For many insurgents, the coalition presence was a primary target because 

coalition forces enabled major societal and political changes at their expense. However, over the past several months, many Sunni Arab political, tribal, and religious 

leaders, as well some of the insurgent groups, have demonstrated increased pragmatism and willingness to assist in the suppression of violence, to work with the 

coalition force and Iraqi security forces to defeat al Qaeda, and to help secure their 

neighborhoods with Local Citizens Groups. 

In contrast to the spring of 2006, I would say that more and more Sunni Arabs, 

including insurgents and former insurgents, increasingly understand the value of 

our presence. In point of fact, the Sunni Arab Awakening movement has expanded 

well beyond al Anbar province, reflecting an increased willingness to work within 

the parameters of the current political process. Many have now reconciled themselves to the idea that the future of Iraq will be determined by political efforts rather than at the handle of a gun and what they really want is a seat at the table 

in Baghdad. It will take some strong confidence building measures to get many of 

the Shiite—who don’t know they have ‘‘won’’ to get over the years of Sunni suppression. The struggle to define legitimacy and a representative government is taking 

place, and its resolution is required to produce long-term stability in the new Iraq. 

The question is whether the competition takes place more—or less—violently. 

Ambassador CROCKER. While many insurgents in Iraq oppose the coalition presence and refuse to accept an inclusive and representative government, the Iraqi insurgency is dynamic and diverse. As Admiral Fallon stated, different groups have 

different motivations for their actions. Thus, the level of an insurgent’s opposition 

to either the coalition or the Iraqi government may vary dramatically based on that 

individual’s cultural, ethnic, political, and religious orientation as well as his or her 

interpretation of recent history. 

One commonality among insurgent groups in Iraq is the increasing popular opposition they are facing from Iraqis who have grown weary of violence. These citizens 

would rather cooperate with an inclusive, representative Iraqi government and coalition force than suffer continued violence and economic privation.

40. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, it is entirely possible that our presence in the region is fuel to the fire, and that the resistance to 

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the government is because it is seen as an extension of the American occupation 

force. Has anybody seriously researched the underlying cause for opposition to our 

presence? 

General PETRAEUS. There is undoubtedly an element of resistance to perceived occupation that adds ‘‘fuel to the fire,’’ particularly given Iraqi xenophobia, but overall 

I believe we are more of a stabilizing force than an irritant, as seen by the decrease 

in sectarian violence as additional coalition forces were brought into the country. I 

believe the resistance to the government stems more from internal Iraqi politics in 

that groups representing the diversity of the Iraqi populace are for the first time 

fairly competing for political power. 

Iraq is the one of the most complex and challenging situations we have ever faced 

as a nation, and perhaps one of the most thoroughly examined. In 2007, there were 

two in-depth NIEs, not to mention other government agency reports, academic and 

think tank studies, and, of course, our partnership with the Iraqis, all providing valuable insights into the motivations of groups opposing the Government of Iraq. 

Ambassador CROCKER. For some insurgent groups U.S. presence is an underlying 

reason for resistance to the Government of Iraq. Some view Iraqi security forces as 

extensions of the coalition forces that are helping to train and equip them. Others, 

like al Qaeda, are against any governmental system not based strictly on what they 

assert is the only true understanding of Islamic law. These extremists are violently 

opposed to the governments of most Muslim nations, regardless of outside influences. Still others simply wish to take control of power and resources for their own 

profit, seeking to subvert any force that would block their access. 

Among the studies devoted to this topic, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, led by 

James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, made some relevant observations. According to their research, ‘‘Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian 

casualties.’’ They note that, far from calling for quick withdrawal of forces, many 

Iraqis see the coalition presence as a crucial buffer against opposing sects—for 

Sunni leaders, a buffer against Shiite militias and, for Shiite leaders, a buffer 

against al Qaeda and former regime elements. For that reason, the study warned 

that any premature withdrawal of coalition forces would likely lead to much higher 

levels of violence.

41. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, has anyone spoken with leaders from the warring factions/insurgent groups to determine whether 

or not the removal of most of our troops might actually cool things down and facilitate acceptance of the government? 

General PETRAEUS. MNF–I has engaged in dialogue with warring factions and insurgent groups. On issues of potential security accommodations, we insist that no 

expedient agreement can be made that undermines the sovereign Government of 

Iraq. Over time, as sufficient Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped, they 

will increasingly allow us to thin our forces, which could potentially be used in bargaining with some warring factions/insurgent groups. It is our understanding, however, that many of these groups would fully support the removal of most of our 

troops in order to increase their relative power, which would not necessarily translate into support of the government. 

On a broader scale, we recognize that in many cases Iraqi public opinion favors 

the removal of coalition forces when the question is broadly asked. More nuanced 

polling elicits responses that indicate a hesitance to have coalition force leave before 

reaching a sustainable level of security and stability. Additionally, the coalition is 

seen as a fair arbiter in facilitating the reconciliation process, regardless of Iraqi 

opinion of coalition presence. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Coalition forces are serving in Iraq under a U.N. mandate 

and at the invitation of the democratically elected Government of Iraq. Accordingly, 

while the United States puts a priority on understanding the motivations and operations of the warring factions/insurgent groups, the United States consults first and 

foremost with the Iraqi government about policy regarding the withdrawal of forces 

or overall troop levels in Iraq. We have, however, engaged select insurgent groups, 

most notably in Anbar province, with positive results. Ultimately, it would be a mistake to assume there is a direct relationship between the level of coalition forces 

and the level of violence. For example, in some areas where there is a declining coalition presence, we have seen an increase in the level of violence among various militia groups as well as criminal gangs. Violence in Iraq and the motivations behind 

it are varied and dynamic.

42. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, the goal of this 

research would be to identify what is the underlying objection to our presence, 

which would provide us with the information we need to develop a successful stratVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:49 May 13, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00316 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\38716.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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egy for resolution. If a study of this nature has been conducted, how was the research done, and what were the results? If not, why have we not studied this possibility? 

General PETRAEUS. As described above, we recognize that our presence is not an 

‘‘either-or’’ proposition: we will be an irritant at the same time we are a stabilizer. 

We conduct all of our engagements with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi citizens 

with this understanding. Our own analysis of this problem is buttressed by other 

governmental and nongovernmental agencies that use differing methodologies for 

their research on Iraq. Through these broad approaches, we attempt to gain a 

nuanced understanding of the motives and objectives of the large number of diverse 

groups with whom we deal. 

Ambassador CROCKER. As I noted to your earlier question on the subject, Iraqi 

insurgent groups are dynamic and diverse, as are their reasons for opposing U.S. 

presence or the Government of Iraq, and it would be a mistake to assume that there 

is a direct relationship between the level of coalition forces and the level of violence. 

The level of an insurgent’s opposition to either the coalition or the Iraqi Government 

may vary dramatically based on that individual’s cultural, ethnic, political, and religious orientation as well as his or her interpretation of recent history. Among others, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, examined the underlying objection to U.S. presence in Iraq. It noted that 

many Iraqis see the coalition presence as a crucial buffer against opposing sects—

for Sunni leaders, a buffer against Shiite militias and, for Shiite leaders, a buffer 

against al Qaeda and former regime elements. This is critical because sectarianbased violence is one of the key sources of violence in Iraq. For that reason, the 

study warned that any premature withdrawal of coalition forces would likely lead 

to much higher levels of violence.

43. Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, should we not be 

assessing all of our options to determine the best course of action? 

General PETRAEUS. MNF–I’s planning efforts do examine all plausible options to 

develop the best courses of action. As we refine our plans, we take into account realities on the ground, such as the recent outburst of Concerned Local Citizens across 

Iraq, and endeavor to put into place solutions that are feasible in execution and sustainable by Iraqis over time. We continually assess our progress, options, and possible outcomes. Our in-depth assessment process uses resources that include think 

tanks, Red Teams, panels, experts, and staff from all sectors of society and government. 

Ambassador CROCKER. U.S. diplomatic and military officials continually examine 

all policy options to ensure the best course of action to go forward in Iraq. This examination is done in consultation with the Government of Iraq and other coalition 

partners and focuses on options that protect and advance U.S. interests and the 

U.N. Chapter VII mandate to maintain security and stability in Iraq.

[Whereupon, at 7:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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