# Syria - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – May 7, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; May 7, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; May 7, 2024																																																					May 7, 2024																																																								1:21 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon. Sorry to be late. Again, I don’t have anything to start with so Matt &#8212;QUESTION: Really? Nothing again?MR MILLER: &#8212; if you have – if you have a curveball for me two days in a row?QUESTION: A curveball. Okay, let me see.MR MILLER: I should not – I should not have walked into that. That’s tempting &#8212;QUESTION: You have &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s tempting – that is tempting fate. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Let’s go with – let’s go with New Caledonia.MR MILLER: I’m going to take the question. (Laughter.)QUESTION: All right. So seriously, can we – on Rafah and the situation there – and I recognize that your colleague at the White House just went over this for about an hour recently, so I’m not sure you’re going to have anything different to say. But since he spoke, has there been any change in the administration’s understanding of what the Israelis are doing there?MR MILLER: No, so a couple of things that we have seen over the past 24 hours. So obviously, there was the operation that they launched overnight last night to take control of Rafah gate. They have described that as a limited operation. It appears to be – at least that piece – a limited operation at this time. They have also, as we discussed yesterday, ordered the evacuation of some 100,000 people in neighborhoods in Rafah.This military operation that they launched last night was targeted just to Rafah gate. It wasn’t an operation in these civilian areas that they had ordered to be evacuated. So we will continue to make clear that we oppose a major military operation in Rafah, make that clear to them privately as well as publicly.QUESTION: So, but your sense of this is that this is not yet – the Israelis have not yet – at least not yet &#8212;MR MILLER: Not yet.QUESTION: &#8212; overstepped &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah. Not &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; what you have &#8212;MR MILLER: So – sorry.QUESTION: &#8212; warned them against doing.MR MILLER: This appears to be a limited operation. But of course, it – much of that depends on what comes next. They have said I think quite clearly, it’s no secret that they want to conduct a major military operation there. We have made clearly – made clear that we oppose such an operation. And separately, but of course it’s related, we are trying to achieve an agreement that would bring an immediate ceasefire and the release of hostages.QUESTION: And on that, how is that going?MR MILLER: Negotiations are ongoing in Cairo today. We continue to believe that there is space to reach a deal, and we are trying incredibly hard to push one over the line.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you. On Rafah, are the actions that Israel is taking so far reflective of the advice that U.S. officials have been giving regarding targeted precise strikes in Rafah, or are the Israelis’ actions beyond that sort of thing?MR MILLER: I am not going to get into the – either the – I’m not going to two thing. Number one, I’m not going to get into the private advice that we have given them. Two, I’m not going to offer an assessment about whether that it aligns wholly with the advice that we have given, because to do that I’d kind of have to lay out what it is that we have told them.I will say that this does appear to be a limited operation so far. But as I made clear, it does to a great extent depend on what comes next. And what we have seen so far is the ordering – is not just this limited operation, but the ordering of the evacuation of 100,000 people. And we have made clear that we don’t think the kind of military operation that would follow such an evacuation is one that we can support because of the dramatic impact it would have on the civilian population there and the ability to get humanitarian assistance in and delivered to those people.QUESTION: You and other American officials have reminded us consistently that the U.S. has been clear about what it thinks about a major Rafah offensive. Have you been coordinating with allies and partners on the potential consequences should Israel launch such an offensive?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to that. We have – largely because I’m not going to speak to what decisions that we may make if Israel does launch such an operation. We have made clear that they have to make their decisions about policy, and we will make our decisions about our policy. Obviously, we discuss that with our allies and partners around the world. The Secretary – every time he meets with one of our allies, one of the first things on the table, oftentimes even before whatever bilateral issue we have to discuss, they want to talk about what is going on in the Middle East and what is going on with respect to the war in Gaza. So we do talk about this sometimes in quite detail – in quite a bit of detail, but I’m not going to talk about – I’m not going to read that out publicly.QUESTION: Okay. I have two more on the region. One is, on the hostage talks, there’s been some reporting that the U.S. may be making promises about the length and the permanence of the cessation of hostilities, promises that Israel may not be willing to keep. So can you clarify whether the U.S. and Israel are actually aligned on that front or whether the U.S. is making some unilateral promises?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to talk about the details of these negotiations, and I hope you’ll understand why. It’s something we have tried to do since the beginning is not to talk in too much detail about these negotiations because of how sensitive are, and they maybe have never been more sensitive than they are at this moment where we think a deal is possible, and we are trying to push one over – over the line.I will say that we have closely coordinated with the Government of Israel on this matter. We have been in touch with them on a daily, oftentimes an hourly basis, and we’ll continue to do so.QUESTION: Okay. One more. Without getting into what the conclusion is, tomorrow is the deadline for the national security memorandum that this building needs to deliver to Congress. Again, I don’t expect you to tell us what, if any, conclusion has been made, but has a conclusion been made as to whether Israel has violated U.S. or international law?MR MILLER: I’m not going to answer that question directly because the report is not yet finished. We are working incredibly hard to get that report finished, get that report finalized, and get it – to get it delivered to Congress as soon as possible.QUESTION: Do you expect it to be delivered tomorrow?MR MILLER: We are trying very hard to meet that deadline. It is, I will just note, a self-imposed deadline. It’s not one that is in statute, but we are trying very hard to get the report done. It is a complicated report. This is the first time the department has ever written something like this, first time we’ve ever gone through and made these kind of assessments about the two questions that are at issue in the report. So there is a lot of work that has to be done; that work is ongoing. We know we’re up against a deadline. We’re trying to get it – we’re trying to meet it. It’s possible it slips just a little bit, but we are still at this point trying to get it done by tomorrow.QUESTION: Sorry. This is the first time you guys have ever written a report about whether &#8212;MR MILLER: It is &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; whether your military sales to a foreign country are being used &#8212;MR MILLER: It is the &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; are being used in violation or not in violation of &#8212;MR MILLER: It is the first time we have had to write this kind of report that’s called for in the NSM. There may be other ones. Let me &#8212;QUESTION: But you know successive you and your predecessor and then previous administrations have always talked about how you’re always looking into whether or not the weapons that you provide to &#8212;MR MILLER: That &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; to countries are used in compliance with them. This is now all of a sudden it’s the first time?MR MILLER: That is – no, those are different questions, Matt. We are always looking into how things are used, but those are ongoing assessments. And right now, these are ongoing assessments. And that’s what makes the process a little difficult. We have ongoing assessments that are being made, and in the middle of that process we are, because we decided it was a good idea to do on our own volition, stopping in the middle of that and making assessments about or answering questions about Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance.And I should add it’s not just Israel. I always make this point. There are other countries as well that this applies to. It is the first time State has ever written a report of this nature, especially in the middle of a conflict, that goes to Congress, and so we want to make sure we have it right.QUESTION: All right. And then just one other thing that I was confused on is that you seem to be bothered by the idea that the Israelis have told 100,000 people to evacuate from part of Rafah. And yet it was my understanding that over the course of the last month or so you guys have been telling the Israelis that they – you would oppose one, you would oppose a major operation there, unless they had a plan to get civilians out. Are you suggesting that moving – or telling 100,000 people to get out of the way is a bad thing &#8212;MR MILLER: No &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; if they’re going to do – if they’re going to do an operation?MR MILLER: It is not &#8212;QUESTION: I mean, it seems to me that that is a plan.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Whether or not it’s &#8212;MR MILLER: It is &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; worthy or not, but it is a plan &#8212;MR MILLER: It is not in theory a bad &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; to get people out of harm’s way.MR MILLER: It is not in theory a bad thing to do. Of course, if you’re going to conduct a military operation you want to see people evacuated. But those people need to have somewhere to go, and the place that they go to needs to have sufficient food, sufficient water, sufficient housing, sufficient sanitation, and we have not yet seen a plan that would deliver that.And I will add there is also the question that if you evacuate 100,000 people and launch military operations, will it be only 100,000 people that move, or will it be more, other people that see the conflict and flee in the face of it? Our assessment is it’s probably a lot more than 100,000 that would move, and so you have to have plans not just for 100,000 people but hundreds and hundreds of thousands of additional people to take care of their needs. And that’s not what we have seen.QUESTION: Can I?MR MILLER: So Simon, go ahead.QUESTION: Yes, I’m wondering – you’ve been warning, obviously, for – that this operation shouldn’t go ahead without – without that plan. You seem to be holding back from saying that it has gone ahead. But in terms of what you’ve been warning about – the humanitarian impacts – it seems there is already an impact in terms of another border crossing is closed and at the moment we understand both border crossings are closed. So do Israel’s actions over the last 24 hours set back the work that you’ve been pushing them to do on the humanitarian situation given that there’s near-famine conditions in Gaza.MR MILLER: Certainly, the closing of Kerem Shalom and the closing of Rafah set back the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Now, to some extent, the full answer to that question depends on what happens next and whether they’re quickly reopened. And Israel has committed to reopen Kerem Shalom tomorrow – we’re working to make sure that that actually happens – so humanitarian assistance can continue to come through.And I should add that Kerem Shalom didn’t close just because of an action by Israel; it closed because it was bombed by Hamas. So we want to see it reopened as soon as possible. They’ve said they’ll do it tomorrow. Same thing with Rafah. They said that Rafah will reopen for the delivery of fuel, which is incredibly important to desalinization of water, it’s incredibly important to fueling the trucks that deliver humanitarian assistance once it’s inside Gaza, and it’s incredibly important for running bakeries that deliver bread for the population there that needs it so much. But we want to see it fully reopened; and so when I say it depends on what happens next, if Kerem Shalom opens and Rafah reopens, those will be important steps because we don’t want to see humanitarian assistance limited or impeded in any way.QUESTION: Have they told you that now they’ve got control of Rafah this is actually going to be better in terms of getting humanitarian aid? Is that what you – you sort of seem to be suggesting &#8212;MR MILLER: No, that’s not what I’m suggesting. I don’t want to get into any private conversations. They’ve said it would reopen for fuel. We want to see it reopened for everything because it is &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: Rafah is a crossing that – should note that the amount of humanitarian assistance that has gone in through Rafah has gone down over time as assistance has shifted more to Kerem Shalom, but that assistance is still critical. We’re not in a position where we can afford to see any delivery mechanism shut down, even if it’s one of the relatively small ones. And I only say relatively small in relation to the amount coming in through Kerem Shalom.But we also want to see it opened for fuel. It is the entry point for humanitarian workers that come in. It is the exit point for people that come out of Rafah. So it’s important that gate be open not just for the delivery of humanitarian assistance but so that humanitarian workers can come in and out of Gaza to do the important work that they do every day.QUESTION: And just finally, we’re already seeing I think there’s some videos of tanks rolling over civilian infrastructure as they’ve entered into – into the area around the border crossing. There’s a lot – there are reports of civilian loss of life. There’s been airstrikes in Rafah. I guess just to try and get clarity on it, does the U.S. oppose what Israel has done so far, or are – you’re just saying we’ll have to wait and see?MR MILLER: So we clearly oppose the destruction of any civilian infrastructure if it does not constitute a legitimate military target. Now, when you get to – you’re looking at any one – any one video, we’d have to be able to assess whether that’s a legitimate military target, are Hamas fighters in there – the issues that we have gone through a number of times. But certainly we don’t want to see civilian infrastructure damaged, destroyed in any way.But that said, to the larger question, it is not our assessment that a military – a major military operation has begun at this point, but that could obviously change at any moment. And we will continue to make clear that we don’t – it’s not one that we can support.QUESTION: There’s one video in question has a – an Israeli tank rolling over an “I love Gaza” sign. Doesn’t – does that seem like something that could be a legitimate military target?MR MILLER: That does not seem like it would serve any legitimate military purpose, no.QUESTION: Well, do you consider an “I love Gaza” sign to be critical infrastructure?MR MILLER: No. So I’ve seen the video, but I don’t know where the tank was going or – but – just on the face of it, no, that would not seem to be so.Go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, on the NSM, is that taking into account anything that’s happening in Rafah over these past few days?MR MILLER: So it is a looking-backwards report. I’m not going to get into it. You’ll have to wait and see when we make it public.QUESTION: Yes or no, though? Can you say if that’s part of why you might not meet the deadline?MR MILLER: Again, when it comes to any of the content of the report, I think you’re just going to have to wait and see – something that we’re still working on.QUESTION: And the Jordanians say that another one of their aid convoys was attacked by Israeli extremists and the way to Erez. Do you have any comment on this? Has there been any discussion with the Israeli Government since this latest incident, which is I think the second one in recent days?MR MILLER: It is something that we have raised with the Israeli Government. We have made it clear to them that they need to take action to prevent these attacks and they need to take action to hold people accountable. This is something that happened for the first time – the first time with this particular route – last week when we were in Israel, and the Secretary raised it directly with Prime Minister Netanyahu. And in that case, they made three arrests of people responsible. That is obviously the appropriate thing to do. They need to make arrests in this case, hold people accountable, and send a strong public message as a deterrent that they will not tolerate these attacks on convoys that are just trying to deliver humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians that need it.QUESTION: There’s also – our team has reported that nine children have been killed in Rafah since the start of the Israeli “limited operation,” as you described it. Do you have any comment on this?MR MILLER: Obviously every death of any civilian, but especially children, is a tragedy, whether they’re in Rafah or anywhere else inside Gaza. And we have made that clear since the outset of this operation.QUESTION: Can I follow up on (inaudible)?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just to clarify on NSM20 &#8212;MR MILLER: I heard you sort of jumping in back there several times. I always get to you, Said.QUESTION: I know you – I know you will. I’m just getting some exercise. (Laughter.) So &#8212;MR MILLER: I think you can do – I think we can all do better than that.QUESTION: Yeah, exactly.MR MILLER: Than counting what we do in here as exercise. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Yeah, that’ s about the extent of it. Anyway, the NSM20 – now, it’s been 90 – it’s been three months. How do you think – how long will it be before it is released?MR MILLER: We are – we &#8212;QUESTION: Do you have any expectations like next week or the week after?MR MILLER: So we are working incredibly hard to get it done. We want to get it done tomorrow. It’s possible it slips just a very short period of time, but as I said, our goal is still to try to get it done tomorrow.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: If we don’t, I’ll have an update for you, but we want to get done as soon as possible.QUESTION: So it could come out tomorrow?MR MILLER: It – absolutely.QUESTION: Okay. Now, a couple of things on the – on Rafah. You said that your understanding is that this is a very limited operation. So the Israelis can conceivably do a number of limited operations. In other words, collectively it will be a big operation, but they can hit – strike this area of Rafah and that area of Rafah and so on. Would that always be – would that also be okay with you?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speculate about some hypothetical scenario that may happen in the future. But obviously &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; there is a point where a series of limited operations are one large one. That is – that just as a theoretical point is obviously true. But in terms of what might happen, I’m just not going to speculate on that or comment on such a hypothetical.QUESTION: All right. On the crossing – on the crossing, I mean, it – you said that the crossing of Karem Abu Salem, or Kerem Shalom, was closed because of the strike, but in fact that – what was struck was a military base or a military encampment for the Israelis, and not really the crossing itself. I’m just saying logistics &#8212;MR MILLER: So, I mean, you could make that argument. It was that strike at Kerem Shalom that precipitated its closure. And I would say yes, it appears that the strike was aimed at IDF forces there. It could have hit the humanitarian workers; could have hit everyone coming through. It’s that strike that precipitated its closure. But that said, our – you should be very clear about what our position is. We want to see it open. We want to see it open as soon as possible. They’ve said that they’ll open it tomorrow. We’ll – we are going to work to see that that happens.QUESTION: Isn’t it a bit cynical of the Israelis to do this on the day after Cindy McCain came out and said there is a full-blown famine in Gaza? They closed Rafah; they closed Karem Abu Salem. They closed all these things.MR MILLER: I’m &#8212;QUESTION: Is that – doesn’t that bother you that right after the head of the World Food Program comes out and says there’s a full-blown famine in Gaza, they went and closed that?MR MILLER: So I don’t think you have to draw a connection between those comments and the closing of those two gates. It doesn’t matter. We want to see the gates open because we know the humanitarian assistance – or I’m sorry, the humanitarian situation is dire in Gaza. We know that people need food and need water and need medical supplies, and that’s why we want to see those crossings open. It’s also why we worked to get Erez crossing open. It’s why we’re working on a maritime option. It’s why we have continued to work hard, from the President on down, to get humanitarian assistance delivered into Gaza.QUESTION: One last question on the settlements. Israeli settlers seem to use – they shepherd their sheep and so on to – using their guns and so on – to basically take over, to seize, West Bank land. Are you aware of this report?MR MILLER: I don&#8217;t know – I’m not aware of this specific report, but obviously that has been something that has been well reported and well documented over the past several months, as well as preceding that time.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: And I should add – I thought there was going to be a follow-up question. Since not, I’ll just go ahead. We have made clear that the Israeli Government needs to do more to crack down on settler violence. They need to do more to police settler violence; they need to do more to hold extremist settlers accountable for their violent actions. And we have also made clear – and you’ve seen us roll out sanctions to this effect – that when we don’t see sufficient action, we are ready and willing to take action ourselves, and we will continue to do so.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The UN Secretary-General Mr. António Guterres said that the closing of Rafah crossing is adversely going to affect the humanitarian aid that’s getting into Gaza to a situation that’s already catastrophic. Do you believe that’s a violation of international law?MR MILLER: So to answer that question, you have to look at all the other deliveries of humanitarian assistance. I can’t offer you a legal definition from here because you have to weigh it against other factors, including whether sufficient humanitarian assistance is coming in through other crossings. If that’s – you could theoretically come up with a situation where all the aid that’s going in through one crossing diverts to another.That said, that’s not a situation that we want to see, because there is not enough humanitarian assistance going in right now. We have seen it increase over the past four, five weeks, since the President had that phone call on April 4th with Prime Minister Netanyahu. But we are not yet at the point where we can afford to shut down Rafah or any other one crossing. We need to see humanitarian assistance come in. And so that’s why we’ll work to continue to see it reopen.Now that said, one of the things that Israel said is very much accurate, which is Hamas did control the Gaza side of Rafah crossing and Hamas was continuing to collect revenue from that crossing being open. So it is a legitimate goal to try and deprive Hamas from revenue, money that they could use to continue to finance their terrorist activities. That said, we want to see the crossing open, and we’re going to work to try to get it back open.QUESTION: Okay, so you’re justifying basically that the Israelis closing it because they have many reasons, like &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s not – that’s not what I said – it’s not – not at all – just not at all a take that that’s what I said &#8212;QUESTION: You were just saying that they – collecting revenue &#8212;MR MILLER: No – you could find another way to open that crossing, hopefully, without Hamas being the one that is manning the Gaza side of it and collecting revenue as goods flow through Rafah, collecting revenue – some of it licit, some of it probably illicit, when you think of bribes and other things that happen with the crossing of traffic through that crossing. So I will say, yes, it is a legitimate goal to try to deprive Hamas of that revenue, but we need to find a way of doing that that keeps Rafah open.QUESTION: I see. Let me just express concern about this 100,000 civilians who’ve been evacuated, and you said there is no place for them to go. In our reporting from Gaza – basically that there is no safe place for people to go. And as you know, many people have been walking 10 kilometers to go somewhere else. Isn’t this already defying what you’ve been calling the Israelis not to do? Whether evacuating a million and a half or 100,000, the evacuation has to be with a viable plan, as you said. But there is no viable plan, so the Israelis already defying you. Any consequences for that?MR MILLER: So we have made clear we don’t want to see a major military operation. This does look like the prelude of a major military operation, we have not yet seen that operation commence, and in terms of any policy response, we’ll wait to see what happens next before we make those determinations.QUESTION: Okay. One final question. Don’t know if I got a satisfactory answer, but anyway, one final question about these mass graves. Almost 400 people have been buried in mass graves. Some of them, according to the latest UN report – not eyewitnesses on the ground – the UN report or Palestinian media – that they’ve been buried alive, and some were children and some were women.I know you’ve been saying that you’re a bit slow in writing reports and delivering them on time, but while we’ve been calling about this investigation, what’s holding this investigation? Because there’s serious concern here about 400 people are being rounded and buried, and some have been buried alive.MR MILLER: So we have made clear that Israel needs to continue to be transparent about this issue. Israel has said that, with respect to this issue of mass graves, there were places where they were operated where there were mass graves, where Palestinians have buried their dead in – all together, probably because of the extraordinary circumstances in which they have been forced to live. And Israel has come in and exhumed some bodies to try to identify whether there were hostages here. They have gotten intelligence that there were hostages contained in those mass graves, and so they’ve exhumed them to check that and then rebury them after the fact.We believe they ought to continue to be transparent about what exactly took place, and that’ll continue to be our position.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, can I clarify just one thing?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: Haaretz just reported that the crossing at Rafah would be managed by an American company. Are you aware of this kind of suggestion?MR MILLER: I’m not aware of that at all, no.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.QUESTION: That was my question.QUESTION: Ah, sorry about that.MR MILLER: That’s two days in a row I came to you and you had – (laughter) – somebody else had asked your question.QUESTION: I came to sit next to him and he steal my turn. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Right. (Laughter.)QUESTION: On this?MR MILLER: Yeah, Michel. Go ahead.QUESTION: (Laughter.)QUESTION: News reports said today that the administration is holding up munition shipments to send a political message to Israel. Is that true, and what is the message?MR MILLER: Look, our support for Israel’s right to defend itself, our support for Israel’s right to ensure that October 7th never happens again, remains strong. And with respect to any individual shipments, I’m just not going to speak to them from here.QUESTION: And second, did the U.S. give any guarantees to Hamas on ending the war in Gaza?MR MILLER: So I am not going to speak to what are very sensitive, delicate, ongoing negotiations. And you should not read into my kind of blanket refusal to do that anything as regards to your question; it’s just a rule that, given the nature of the negotiations right now, I don’t think it would be helpful, I don’t think it would be productive to get into it. There have been, obviously, a lot of reports over what has been in various proposals over the past 24 hours. Some of those reports have been more accurate than others; some of it – them have been completely off-base. I don’t think it serves our purpose, given the status of negotiations, to kind of parse through those here and talk about them.QUESTION: And what about this report, on sending the guarantees? Is it accurate, or &#8212;MR MILLER: I think I just answered the question; I don’t have anything further to add.QUESTION: On the – on the arms shipments – Michel’s first question.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So your position is that you don’t comment about individual shipments?MR MILLER: I’m not going to – not in this case, no.QUESTION: Because you do in pretty much every other case.MR MILLER: It’s &#8212;QUESTION: In fact, I’ve looked – looked back over the last three weeks. I got one to Argentina, one to Iraq, one to the Netherlands, one to Poland, one to Saudi Arabia. You don’t have any problem talking about those.MR MILLER: It – it always depends on the situation, but we have made clear in this &#8212;QUESTION: Well &#8212;MR MILLER: It often does. There are times that we have congressionally mandated rules about the things we need to disclose; there are times that we disclose arm shipments because we want to rally our &#8212;QUESTION: So you don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; hold on – we want to rally our allies and partners to do the same, and there are times that we keep those shipments – some of those shipments private. There’s – it’s also true – as you know; you know this more than me – that there are a variety of different arms sales programs. There are different disclosure mechanisms for each of those.QUESTION: I am well aware &#8212;MR MILLER: I’ve – I – (laughter) &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I know where you’re coming from on this. I just think that it just is – it doesn’t make any sense. Because you guys – basically you just have to come out and say that you are not consistent about this, and that when it suits you to announce an arms sale or an arms shipment, you’ll do it; and when you don’t think that it suits you, then you don’t. And that’s inconsistency at its &#8212;MR MILLER: There &#8212;QUESTION: That is the definition of being inconsistent.MR MILLER: There are different situations all around the world, and of course we look at them differently.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR MILLER: Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Shifting to &#8212;MR MILLER: Are you –QUESTION: I want to stay in the region.MR MILLER: Yeah, if you stay in the region, I’ll – I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Thank you so much.MR MILLER: Go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: Just one quick one. Is there any update on whether the U.S. has come to a new determination on possible Leahy Law violations &#8212;MR MILLER: No, it’s &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; by Israel in the case of that one IDF unit?MR MILLER: Sorry, didn’t mean to interrupt. No, we continue to look through new – look through and review new information that Israel has provided to us and are working on what that assessment will be.QUESTION: And you have no expectation for how long that process could take?MR MILLER: I don’t. We’re trying to get it finished as soon as possible, but it’s important that we get it right as well.QUESTION: Yeah, I want to stay in the region, but farther east. On Syria. The U.S. repatriated several dozen, I believe – around 20, two dozen Westerners from the camps in al-Hol. There were apparently 11 Americans that were repatriated. Can you give us any details on how that operation played out? And could you tell us, if you have that number or a ballpark number, of how many Americans we’re talking about left in these camps?MR MILLER: So in terms of the operation that just happened overnight, there were 11 Americans, and then one family member who is not a U.S. citizen but a family member of a U.S. citizen, part of this 11 who were repatriated and brought to the United States. It’s something that we have been working on with our international partners, as well as humanitarian partners, because we believe that repatriation is the only durable, long-term solution to the humanitarian and security situation in northeast Syria. And just as we have done in this instance, we urge all countries of origin to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and where appropriate, prosecute their nationals upon return to – from Syria.And then with respect to the number of Americans that remain, we’re aware of approximately 25 U.S. citizens who may be located in displaced persons camps and detention facilities in northeast Syria – around 25.QUESTION: Okay. Beyond the 11 that came &#8212;MR MILLER: Yes, beyond.QUESTION: Yep, okay.QUESTION: Follow-up.QUESTION: Follow-up – a follow-up on that.MR MILLER: Sure, go ahead.QUESTION: Just quick follow – so this was not the product of direct talks with Syrians, right?MR MILLER: No, it was not.QUESTION: If that’s the case, did you hear anything about the case of Austin Tice during this process?MR MILLER: So the – with respect to Austin Tice, we continue to call on the Syrian regime to ensure Austin Tice and every U.S. national held in Syria are able to return home. We continue to work every available path to ensure his return home. We’ve engaged extensively with regard to this case, trying to bring him home, and we’re not going to give up until we do.QUESTION: You might as well take this one for me. As you know, Austin’s mother was in town last week. She gave an interview and she said that she’s seeking an access to State Department report from 2020 fall about the trip of – of Trump administration officials to Syria. The report was not shared with the family, which contains significant details about how the Syrians are trying to provide proof of life. Are you willing to come up with the report?MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to that specific report. We have obviously been engaged with Austin Tice’s family, including his mother. I will just say we – as a parent, I think every parent in this room can’t – cannot imagine what it is she must be going through. And so people here from the department engage with her on a regular basis to talk about this case and update her on the work that we are doing to try to bring him home.QUESTION: Thank you. This might also be a good segue to details about the latest information about the U.S. soldier who was detained in Russia. What do you know? Anything new? And are you guys seeking access to him?MR MILLER: So there is – this is one where it’s often the case there’s not much I can say. You’re aware of the privacy rules and our inability to say very much about these cases when we don’t have a privacy waiver. I can confirm that a U.S. citizen has been detained in Russia. Whenever a U.S. citizen is detained abroad, consular officers seek to aid him with all appropriate assistance, and we are doing so in this case. I’m not able to say more, unfortunately. The Pentagon is able to say some more, and I think they’ve done so publicly, and would refer you to them for that.But I just have to say the same thing I always do when asked about a U.S. citizen who has traveled to Russia, which is our Travel Advisory is it a Level 4 for a reason. U.S. citizens should not travel to Russia for any reason. It’s dangerous. You risk being detained; you risk other threats to your health and well-being. And so for any American citizen anywhere in the world, whether they are here in the United States or whether they’re in some other country, if you are considering going to Russia, don’t do it. Just could not be less complicated.QUESTION: Thank you. One last one from me. We have heard a litany of statements coming from Russia about British potential participation in Ukraine war. And they say that they’re going to target British weapons, whether inside or outside of Ukraine. This begs the question – goes back to a question I’ve discussed with you, with Vedant, with Ned a – more than a year and a half. Why is it that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to target Iranian, North Korean targets, whether it’s inside or outside of the region?MR MILLER: You’re proposing that they – Ukraine should widen the conflict beyond even Russia &#8212;QUESTION: If you apply – if you apply &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; to other countries, and bring other countries directly &#8212;QUESTION: If you apply same standards &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on – you’re – bring other countries directly into the conflict? I would just say there – that is a rare question that answers itself. I don’t think that would be in anyone’s interest.Go ahead.QUESTION: Sir? Thank you, sir.MR MILLER: No, no, go – in front of you, sorry.QUESTION: Me?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Okay. Thanks so much, Matt. Just a quick follow-up on Rafah offensive. You said it is limited, not a major operation. But do you think it’s a constructive approach to go into Rafah right after Hamas accepted a ceasefire and at a time – and many Palestinians were on the streets celebrating the possibility of a ceasefire?MR MILLER: So let me just make one thing clear, which is Hamas did not accept the – a ceasefire proposal. Hamas responded and, in their response, made several suggestions. It’s not the same as accepting. The statement that was issued yesterday that was widely reported – and I’ll blame the reportings – because what the statement said is not an accurate reflection of what happened. They responded, as people do in a negotiation process, but it was not an acceptance.Now, that said, we are trying very hard to get a ceasefire agreement over the line, as I said a moment ago. And I will just say, separate and apart from an operation in Rafah, the scenes that we saw in Gaza, when you see people coming out in the streets and celebrating what they thought was a ceasefire, number one, tells you just what they’ve lived through. I mean, you know that obviously, but you really see just the joy on people’s face – what they’ve lived through and the emotion in thinking that they might have some hope that this conflict will come to an end. But also, I can say for everyone here, just confirms why we think it’s so important to get this ceasefire agreement over the line and why we are going to continue to push for it.QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up. You – I think you didn’t comment on whether or not you find Israel’s approach constructive.MR MILLER: So I mean, I spoke to this earlier in the process, which is we don’t want to see a major military operation. They have said this is a limited operation. There are some legitimate purposes, like I said, in keeping Hamas from depriving revenue from Rafah gate, but at the same time we don’t want to see Rafah gate shut, so we want to see it reopened. So I’m not going to comment. I’m not going to pass judgment one way or the other, whether it’s constructive or not. What is important from our perspective is that we not see a major military operation go forward, and we’ve made that, I think, pretty clear.QUESTION: But you said &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just clarify? It sounds like this is the case. The Secretary last week, multiple times, referenced this generous and flexible offer that Israel had put forward, and you’re saying this is not what he was referring to that Hamas put forward or accepted yesterday?MR MILLER: There was an offer – he was referring to offer that was put forward some 10, 11 days ago, April 26th, I believe it was. That’s the offer that was on the table. Hamas seemed to make clear that they – in their public statements that they accepted that offer yesterday. That is not what they did. They responded with amendments – call it a counterproposal if you want – and we’re working through the details of that now.QUESTION: And can you give us any updates on the military pier that’s being constructed in Gaza? Do you expect that the Rafah operation is going to delay its construction or (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So I would really refer you to the Pentagon for details on that just because they are the ones that are actually doing the construction and doing the operation. They’ll have the latest details on it. I would certainly hope that a Rafah operation would not delay it. It’s in a different part of Gaza from where they would be operating. If anything, it just shows what why it’s so important to get that pier finished.But that said, no one should think that the pier – I mean, you could see – no one should think that the completion of this pier and the opening of that route is in any way a replacement for Kerem Shalom and Rafah being open. Getting that pier finished is not sufficient means to close other gates. It’s not sufficient reason to operate in the south and disrupt the delivery of humanitarian assistance, because even when that pier is open, the amount of aid it can deliver a day – somewhere around 100 trucks – in no way can replace what needs to come into Gaza through these other gates.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;QUESTION: I think they already said it’s opening tomorrow.MR MILLER: Very good. Someone that’s been watching the Pentagon briefings. (Laughter.) I wish I had – I wish – no offense. I wish I had time to watch their briefings as well as do my own. I just don’t.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Regarding the U.S. and South Korea’s defense cost sharing, it has been reported that if former President Trump is re-elected, South Korea’s defense cost sharing would increase significantly. Recently there was a discuss on the defense cost sharing between South Korea and the United States in Hawaii, and you know that. Would defense cost sharing be increased under the Biden administrations? If so, what percent will it increase?MR MILLER: I just don’t have that – those numbers at my fingertips. Sorry. I &#8212;QUESTION: So you can’t – but you don’t have anything for the – because you have a &#8212;MR MILLER: I mean, in terms of the percentage, I just – it’s not something that I &#8212;QUESTION: But someone already have &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m happy – I’m happy to take – I’m happy to take it back and try to get you an answer.QUESTION: All right, thank you. And have another one. And recently a UN resolution to prevent nuclear weapons in space were rejected by Russia’s veto. What do you think about the UN’s permanent members imposing penalties to veto abuse?MR MILLER: So as we said at the time, we are incredibly disappointed that Russia vetoed what should have been a quite uncontroversial resolution regarding the obligations of state parties under the Outer Space Treaty. It should be clear, I think, that no country should have reservations about prohibiting putting a nuclear weapon into orbit. And in terms of potential actions, I don’t have anything to preview from here.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. Politico just reported that the – and I’m quoting from the report – “administration is holding up shipments of two types of Boeing-made precision bombs to send a political message to Israel,” end quote. Is this true?MR MILLER: I think Michel asked me that exact question five, ten minutes ago, and I answered it.QUESTION: Okay, sorry. Now that Israel has invaded Rafah, is the department considering any actions such as sanctions or withholding aid from Israel?MR MILLER: I also answered that question earlier when I said we are not going to preview policy options at this time.QUESTION: And finally, six lawmakers from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China have sent a letter to the State Department asking for State to use its existing rewards program to seek firsthand information on forced organ harvesting in communist China and disrupt the illicit trade. The State Department has expressed concerns about this issue before publicly and did in the Human Rights Reports. Do you have any response to the letter and will State consider using the rewards program to stop forced organ harvesting?MR MILLER: We, I’m sure, have received that letter and will respond in due course to the members themselves.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Two questions – comment – questions. One, as far as conflict in the Middle East or Gaza or Hamas and Israel is concerned, first, on October 7th Hamas attacked the innocent people in Israel. Now innocent people are being killed or they are dying in Gaza because of basics they are not getting. My question is that Hamas may be a common problem for the common people in Gaza, and how can you describe for the common people we are negotiating with Hamas? Is Hamas a terrorist organization or is it a political organization?MR MILLER: It is absolutely a terrorist organization.QUESTION: So why are we negotiating then with them?MR MILLER: Well, we don’t – Hamas is holding civilians hostage, including American citizens, and we want to see those American citizens return home. So it’s also true that Hamas is one of the parties to this conflict and has the ability to end it, so we think it’s appropriate. We’re not in direct negotiations with Hamas, but obviously we are engaging with countries in the region – Qatar and Egypt – who have the ability to talk to them. And we think it’s appropriate to do so because we want to see these hostages return home, especially the American hostages but the hostages of Israel and every other country – remember there’s not just Israeli citizens who are being held hostage – and we believe this is the best way to do so.QUESTION: Second, sir, Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury both were in China recently and both warned Chinese leadership about not to interfere in the U.S. elections, and among others. Can you describe that? What kind of warning was and what was the response from the Chinese leadership?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak that – to that in any level of detail, but the Secretary did make clear, reiterating something that we have – a message that we have delivered previously to the Chinese Government, that any interference, any attempt to influence our upcoming election is something that would be unacceptable.QUESTION: Thank you very much, sir.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you. Just to clarify, you’ve called the Rafah operation limited, but you also said it had the appearance of being a prelude – your word – to a major operation.MR MILLER: I don’t think that’s what I said. It’s not what I intended to – I said that they have – number one, they have described it as limited. It looks at this way to not be the major operation that you would see, say, for example, if they entered the neighborhoods where they have ordered evacuations. We don’t know if it’s a prelude or not. They have made clear that they intend to offer – to launch a major military operation, and we have made clear that we are opposed to that. I can’t speak to &#8212;QUESTION: So you’re not calling it a prelude?MR MILLER: No, I can’t speak to whether this is the beginning or not.QUESTION: Because Yoav Gallant is – I’m sorry.MR MILLER: No, go ahead.QUESTION: Yoav Gallant is touring Rafah, the Rafah area today, and he said, “I directed the IDF to enter the Rafah area, take the crossing... carry out its missions. This operation will continue until we eliminate Hamas in the Rafah area and the entire Gaza Strip.” So that doesn’t sound limited to me.MR MILLER: So they have made similar statements in the past about what their policy continues to be &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, but they’re there now. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: &#8212; and we have made our statements about what our policy is, and we will continue to make that clear.Yeah, Leon.QUESTION: Yeah, I want to move to another region, Haiti. Do you have any updates for us on where we are, where we’re at in terms of the deployment of that police force, a security force, now that the presidential council was put into place? What is the status of play on that at this point?MR MILLER: So we welcome the process – the progress in the political process that has taken place. We continue to work with our Kenyan partners and other countries for the deployment of the MSS. In terms of an exact deployment schedule, we have, I think for operational security reasons, not wanted to affix a public date to it, but it’s something that we’re working to make happen as soon as possible.QUESTION: But are there any pre-elements or forward people going in now in Haiti from the U.S. or from &#8212;MR MILLER: Not that I am aware of. Not that I’m aware of.QUESTION: I mean, it’s more of a Pentagon question, I &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, that’s why I was – kind of like why I’m – yeah.Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah. So just back to Rafah. Prior to Israel taking control, Hamas is collecting revenues, you said, of those goods. Can you go into more detail on how Hamas was benefitting from that crossing, and also how you navigate the fine line of ensuring that they’re deprived while also keeping it open?MR MILLER: Well, Hamas is the – has been the government in Gaza, so they were performing – in addition to being a terrorist organization, they were the de facto government in Gaza and so were performing government functions. And that includes running a border crossing where you can collect customs. You can also, if you control a border crossing, collect – let’s call them more irregular payments, and we have seen both of those things happen. And so it is a legitimate goal to try to shut off and choke off that revenue stream to Hamas.That said, we want to see Rafah opened, so someone needs to be on the Gaza side of Rafah to – on that side of the crossing. The Egyptians can’t do it. We talked about this very early in the conflict when we were trying to open Rafah in the first place. So someone needs to be there to do it, and we continue to work through how to get that gate open and how to keep it open.QUESTION: And there’s a report – can you confirm that there was a plot to assassinate Zelenskyy and other top Ukrainian figures that failed?MR MILLER: So obviously, the Ukrainian Government has made an announcement to that effect. We have been in close contact with them about that. I would defer to the Ukrainian Government to speak to the details of it. But obviously, it just speaks to the depravity that we’ve seen on display from the Putin regime since the outset of this conflict.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Ryan.QUESTION: So given that Israel is pledging to wage an operation in Rafah using U.S. weapons that the U.S. opposes, is there any internal process going on to figure out what went wrong internally? It’s like, how did the process allow the weapons to be shipped and then into a situation in which Israel is going to use them in opposition to what the United States wants done?MR MILLER: I don’t think I can answer that question without presupposing a policy decision that we have not yet announced. We have made clear that – we have made clear – I’ve said it here – what our position is on a major military operation in Rafah. And Israel will make its policy decisions, and we will make ours.QUESTION: But if they do continue this operation, will it result in a review of what went wrong internally?MR MILLER: Again, I’m just not going to speak to what policy determinations we might make or what internal – internal kind of mechanisms would go into answering such a question.QUESTION: A Pakistan question real quick?MR MILLER: Sure, yeah.QUESTION: Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer recently met with the Pakistan ambassador, and he relayed to the ambassador that Imran Khan’s safety in prison was a high priority of the United States. Did he coordinate that conversation with the State Department? Does the State Department share that view that his safety in prison is a high priority of the U.S.?MR MILLER: So I’m not aware of any coordination. It may have happened; may have been conversations between this building and Senator Schumer, his staff, and I’m just not aware of them. It’s certainly possible. But obviously, we want to see the safety and security of every prisoner in Pakistan or anywhere else in the world – something that every person, every detainee, every prisoner, is entitled to basic human rights and protection under the law.QUESTION: Follow-up, please.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. U.S. ambassador in Pakistan Don Blome met with the current leadership of Imran Khan’s party, and after that meeting there were, like, dozens of stories circulating in Pakistani media. Could you just tell us something about that, as that meeting was arranged under guest of U.S. Ambassador Don Blome?MR MILLER: Dozens of stories circulating about a meeting with our ambassador?QUESTION: (Laughter.) Different stories.MR MILLER: What a new thing. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Different stories. Every single &#8212;MR MILLER: I haven’t got a Donald Blome question in a while.Yes, U.S. Ambassador Donald Blome met with the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, Omar Ayub Khan, and other senior members of the opposition to discuss a broad range of issues important to the bilateral relationship. This includes U.S. support for continued economic reforms, human rights, and regional security.QUESTION: Sir, after that meeting, the leadership of PTI, Imran Khan’s party, told media that they have expressed their concerns about human rights violations, fabricated cases against Imran Khan, freedom of speech, and others. What is your position on these issues, sir?MR MILLER: So we have addressed this any number of times, and our position is the same as we have stated it previously, which is we take no position on elections in Pakistan, we take no position with respect to any particular political party, and of course, we want to see basic human rights upheld, as I said in my answer to Ryan’s question.QUESTION: So one last question.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Saudi Crown Prince MBS is visiting Pakistan in new few days. Recently, Iranian president was in Pakistan too. So how you see these trips when there is too much tension in the region?MR MILLER: So certainly, we always support diplomatic engagement between our partners. I don’t have any further comment on the visit between the Saudi crown prince to Pakistan, but it’s – that kind of diplomatic engagement is routine and something that we support and encourage.But when it comes to Iran, of course, while we welcome regional de-escalation, we’ve seen the outbreak of limited conflict between Iran and Pakistan; we do remain skeptical about Iran’s intentions given its continued destabilizing behavior broadly in the region.QUESTION: Thank you so much.MR MILLER: Take one more and then we’ll wrap for today. You can go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I want to ask you about Rafah. You said you don’t – you do not want to see a wide-scale military operation. But on a scale of limited versus large military operation, like, what is acceptable for you when you consider for the concerns of the lack of humanitarian aid, that this can be a problem? When you talk about the possible displacement of the people who are there already in the region, like, where is this line for you, United States? Are you going to say, like, okay, this is now large-scale operation and we don’t support that?MR MILLER: So yeah, I’m not going to get into trying to define it here. I will add, though, that we have had detailed conversations with the Israeli Government about this, much more detailed for obvious reasons than what we are willing to say publicly or what is productive to say publicly. And they know quite clearly what our position is, and I think I’ll leave it at that.With that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:11 p.m.)						Tags																					China																								Haiti																								Israel																								Jordan																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Syria																								Ukraine
- Repatriation of U.S., Canadian, Dutch and Finnish Citizens from Northeast Syria Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateToday the United States repatriated 11 U.S. citizens from northeast Syria, including five minors.  Additionally, we resettled in the United States the nine-year-old non-U.S. citizen sibling of one of the U.S. citizen minors.  This is the largest single repatriation of U.S. citizens from northeast Syria to date.In conducting this complex repatriation and resettlement the Department coordinated closely with our interagency partners.  I would like to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Health and Human Services for their assistance.Approximately 30,000 individuals from more than 60 countries outside Syria remain in the al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps, the majority of whom are children.  As governments undertake repatriation of their nationals, we urge thoughtfulness and flexibility to ensure that to the maximum extent possible family units remain intact.The only durable solution to the humanitarian and security crisis in the displaced persons camps and detention facilities in northeast Syria is for countries to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and where appropriate, ensure accountability for wrongdoing.  The United States remains committed to helping those nations which seek to repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, and to finding solutions, including resettlement, for those who are unable to return to their communities or countries of origin.As a part of this operation the United States also facilitated the repatriation of six Canadian citizens, four Dutch citizens, and one Finnish citizen, among them eight children.  We thank these governments for their partnership and applaud their demonstration of leadership by bringing their nationals home.  We thank the Government of Kuwait for its support, and also the Syrian Democratic Forces for its assistance.
- Department Press Briefing – May 2, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – May 2, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – May 2, 2024																																																					May 2, 2024																																																								1:21 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Let me just raise this a little.QUESTION: Welcome back.MR MILLER: Thank you. Good to be back. Good to see everyone.QUESTION: Good to see you.MR MILLER: Forgive me if I’m a little slow on the draw today. There’s been a lot of – a lot of travel the past week and a half or so.QUESTION: Between the &#8212;MR MILLER: Ellen, do you want to do the honors?QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. I’m impressed you’re here today.MR MILLER: We’ll see. We’ll see if you still feel that way at the end of this briefing. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Okay. (Laughter.) As things stand now, how does the international community keep the bar from being lowered in setting the stage for future conflicts in the Middle East and globally to allow for the bombing of schools and hospitals and ambulances and aid convoys and journalists and places of worship if there – and with the conclusion that there won’t be practical penalties for them?MR MILLER: So I would say we absolutely do not want the bar to be lowered. This bar should be – the same standard should be applied to every conflict everywhere in the world, including in this one. Now, the nature of this conflict does make it a little bit more difficult because, for example, when you look at other conflicts around the world, it is not always true that you see one side of the conflict hiding itself in civilian sites, hiding – using ambulances to hide the passage of fighters around territory, embedding themselves under hospitals, inside hospitals. So that it makes it a difficult – that makes it a much more difficult conflict, but the principles of international humanitarian law apply the same to this conflict as they do anywhere else in the world, and they should be upheld the same way in this conflict as they are anywhere else in the world.QUESTION: And do there need to be penalties to make sure that happens?MR MILLER: International humanitarian law needs to be enforced – absolutely. That is true – that is the position of the United States everywhere in the world.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. What’s the latest on the hostage deal? A delegation from Hamas is set to visit Egypt soon for further ceasefire talks according to a statement today, and Israel’s war cabinet is meant to meet today on hostages and a plan for Rafah. Has there been any movement toward a deal?MR MILLER: There has not been any movement in the past few days. You heard the Secretary speak about this extensively while he in the region, that there is a proposal on the table that answers much of the demands that Hamas made in previous rounds of negotiations. Israel made a significant offer in this last proposal that went forward. They compromised on many long held positions that they had taken, and as I said, met many of the demands that Hamas had said they needed to agree to a deal. So we believe it’s now incumbent upon them to take the deal. The deal that they demanded that has been offered, they should accept and move forward. It is Hamas that is the only barrier to a ceasefire right now – an immediate ceasefire – and we’re awaiting their response.QUESTION: Why do you think they’ve taken so long?MR MILLER: I am not at all going to put myself in the heads of the leadership of Hamas, but I will say every day that goes by without a ceasefire right now is on Hamas, because they’re the ones that are holding up an answer to this proposal and they are the ones that are holding up reaching an immediate ceasefire that would help alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people in Gaza.QUESTION: And then just quickly, there’s been reporting that a Saudi-U.S. bilateral defense pact is close to completion as part of a wider Saudi-Israeli normalization deal. When do you plan to announce the full plan, and how confident are you that it will materialize if no truce between Israel and Hamas is reached?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to a U.S.-Saudi defense pact in specific terms. What I will say is that the Secretary did meet with the crown prince of Saudi Arabia this week when he was in Riyadh, as he’s met with him on previous meetings, and we are very close to reaching an agreement on the bilateral pieces of a normalization agreement – normalization agreement would, of course, be between the – Saudi Arabia and Israel, but as part of the bilateral piece – the package that is between the United States and Saudi Arabia, we are very close to reaching an agreement on that.There are a few details that we have to continue to work through, but we think we can reach agreement on those details in very short order. There is still more work to be done on a separate piece of that, which is the proposal for a pathway to a Palestinian state, but we are actively discussing that with our Saudi counterparts, as we are with the broader group of Arab countries that the Secretary met with also Monday in Riyadh, where we were looking at not just a path to two states but also the reconstruction of Gaza, governance in Gaza, security for Gaza.So we are working on all of those. Some pieces are further along than others – the bilateral piece between the United States and Saudi Arabia most relevantly – and some pieces are a little bit further along. We hope to make progress on that and have the agreements ready to put forward as soon as is possible.QUESTION: So – sorry, just to clarify, you’re close on U.S.-Saudi part &#8212;MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: &#8212; but not the Israeli part?MR MILLER: The – so the – let me unpack that a little bit.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: The idea of this agreement is that you would have a bilateral peace that are agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia. I’m not going to speak to those in specific, but the details of them have been widely reported. I think everyone knows what they are. As part of that there would – and that part is fairly well advanced, and the Secretary has spoken to this. We have work to do to finalize some of the details, but we were very far along. I think the Saudi foreign minister also spoke to this on Monday in Riyadh after we met with him.Separately, and it will – I say “separate” but it will be a part of this package – there are pieces that that relate to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel. That’s something that’s important to the United States; it’s something that is important and essential to Saudi Arabia and would be a key part of the deal. So while there are pieces of it that are closer than that, the entire package will include all of those pieces together.QUESTION: And how confident are you that that will materialize while there’s no truce between Israel and Hamas?MR MILLER: So we could reach an agreement – this gets – a little bit of speculating about timing, because we don’t know whether there’ll be a ceasefire. That’s in Hamas’s hands right now. But I’ll say we could reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia on what this package ought to look like, and we could reach agreement with some – the other Arab countries we’re working with about what the broader package looks like, right – not just normalization but the post-conflict issues that relate to Gaza.But Saudi Arabia has been very clear for this – putting a proposal on the table is one thing, a proposal that we could take to Israel, but there will be no agreement in this regard while the conflict in Gaza is still raging. Saudi Arabia has made very clear that as part of any normalization deal with Israel, they have two requirements: one, calm in Gaza, and two, a path to an independent Palestinian state. So you could put a – you could you could see where we might reach agreement with Saudi Arabia on what this package ought to look like, but in terms of an actual deal that includes normalization with Israel, there needs to be calm in Gaza.QUESTION: And sorry, just one more follow-up. Netanyahu has repeatedly objected to a Palestinian statehood, a key condition for Saudi to agree to normalization, as you’ve said. What’s the point of your progress with Riyadh if in the end Netanyahu will end up objecting anyway?MR MILLER: So the Secretary has spoken to this in detail a number of times, including quite extensively in Israel in January when we first put together this group of Arab countries with whom we wanted to work on these issues. And the point he made then – and it continues to be our point today – is that we believe broader integration is key to Israel’s long-term security. It’s not just the right thing to do for the Palestinian people – and it is very much the right thing to do for the Palestinian people to answer their legitimate political aspirations – it is also the best thing that you can do to achieve Israel’s long-term goal, the goal they have had – the goal that that Israel’s had since the founding of its country, which is normal relations with its neighbors.It would provide broader security to Israel, it would isolate Iran, and significantly, it would address some very real challenges Israel is going to face in Gaza when you look at the end of this conflict with determining – with figuring out how to rebuild Gaza, with figuring out how to provide security to Gaza. So ultimately, the Government of Israel will have to make the choice about what’s in the best interest of their people. But for the United States, we have a point of view, we’re going to work to finish up the proposals that we are working on with our Arab partners, and we’re going to put that point of view forward, and Israel can decide.QUESTION: On this?QUESTION: Thanks, Matt.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Following up on Daphne’s question, I understand you could reach an agreement, I guess, in principle with the Saudis on this bilateral component, but is there any world in which that would be operationalized without this broader Negev two-state normalization deal?MR MILLER: We have been very clear, Saudi Arabia has been very clear that this is a package deal that would include a bilateral component and also include a path to two states.QUESTION: So there was no discussion in the meetings in Riyadh about breaking off that bilateral piece and getting it into the &#8212;MR MILLER: No. No.QUESTION: Okay. And then on Rafah, did you get any sense of timing on when the Israelis plan to move forward on their incursion?MR MILLER: I will let Israel speak to that question.QUESTION: Do you get the sense that they are waiting on Hamas’s response before making a final decision?MR MILLER: Again, I’m just going to let Israel speak to what their plans are. I will speak on behalf of the Secretary, and the Secretary in his conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday made very clear the United States position on Rafah, which is that we do not support a major military operation there. We do not believe a major military operation is in Israel’s long-term security interests. We believe there are better ways to address the threat that Hamas does still propose – or does still pose in Gaza because of the four battalions that are in Rafah. Secretary spoke in some detail about our ideas in that regard yesterday, and I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: What was the reception to those deals &#8212;MR MILLER: We had a very direct conversation about it, and I’ll just leave it at that.QUESTION: And are – did you get any sort of commitment or is it your understanding that if a deal was reached on the hostages and ceasefire, that Israel would not move forward on Rafah incursion?MR MILLER: I think let’s take it one step at a time. The proposal that is on the table right now, as I said, is a significant offer that would achieve an immediate ceasefire. That is our goal; that’s what we’re trying to accomplish. We have always said that we – if we get a ceasefire, we want to work to build enduring peace, enduring calm from that ceasefire, but let’s get a ceasefire first and then we can talk about what would be – what would be the next step.QUESTION: And if I could quickly – on the determinations under Leahy Law, are there any updates on the status of cutting off military assistance to that fifth unit?MR MILLER: No. With that one remaining unit, we are still engaged in a process where we’re collecting information from the Government of Israel that they have provided to us and examining that information. And I don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Is that new information – sorry.MR MILLER: One second – I don’t have a timetable.QUESTION: Is that new information since the last time you guys said there was new information? Have they presented even more information &#8212;MR MILLER: Which was what, a couple of days ago, I think, when Vedant said it?QUESTION: A couple days ago, yeah.MR MILLER: No, it’s – Michel, did you – did you – she answered – okay.QUESTION: Sure.MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Just to follow up on something that Ellen raised on the hospitals and ambulances and so on, I want to bring your attention – I don’t know how we could probe this issue further. The Palestinian surgeon Ahmed – Adnan Ahmed Bursh was killed on the 19th of April. He was taken from Shifa Hospital back in December and was killed by the Israelis recently. I mean, he was shot I guess in cold blood and so on. Is there any way that the United States could look into this issue and find out the authenticity of such a &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m not familiar with that case. I’m happy to see if we have any further information.QUESTION: Okay, okay, all right, all right. Just to follow up on a couple of things. Now, you said that it’s a generous offer. Everybody used that word and so on. Now, if the prime minister of Israel keeps saying that there is no – he will not agree to any permanent ceasefire, that this war will go on, I ask you: What incentive is there for Hamas or the militant groups to say okay, I mean, we will give whatever leverage we have and then they can come and so on?MR MILLER: What &#8212;QUESTION: I’m just curious.MR MILLER: What incentive is there for Hamas?QUESTION: No &#8212;MR MILLER: How about – hold on. How about the well-being of the Palestinian people in Gaza?QUESTION: Yeah, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. Let me say that ought to be an incentive enough.QUESTION: I’m with you. I’m with you.MR MILLER: That ought to be incentive enough.QUESTION: Of course.MR MILLER: Good. Well, then that answers the question because that &#8212;QUESTION: But they – but &#8212;MR MILLER: To be clear, that is the incentive.QUESTION: No. Okay, well maybe we have just a &#8212;MR MILLER: The incentive for Hamas is that an immediate ceasefire &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; would help alleviate the suffering of the &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: Hold on. Of the Palestinian people. It would allow aid – it would make it easier for aid to get in. It would make it easier for aid to move to people in Gaza.QUESTION: Fine.MR MILLER: It would allow people in Gaza to return to their homes and their neighborhoods &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; and rebuild them. So &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: I get your point about arguing about leverage, but let me &#8212;QUESTION: But let me ask you &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, Said, let me finish.QUESTION: Not &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, just let me finish. You will get your chance.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: The well-being of the people in Gaza that Hamas has always claimed they represent ought to be incentive enough for them to take this deal, period.QUESTION: I agree.MR MILLER: Period.QUESTION: I agreed.MR MILLER: Good.QUESTION: But – but the prime minister is not committing himself to a ceasefire. He’s saying that his war will continue. I am saying that in the long run he has the prerogative to continue this war however they please – go in, destroy, conquer, whatever, take hostages, do all kinds of things in the future. I am not talking – I’m not defending or saying – I’m asking, exploring, if the prime minister of Israel, if the cabinet in Israel, is determined not to have a ceasefire, doesn’t that make it less generous than people think it is?MR MILLER: So no, I would not agree with that. First of all, as the Secretary said yesterday, we’re going to judge every entity in this conflict by their actions.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: And the actions that Israel has shown in this negotiation process is making an offer for a ceasefire that, as I said, was a significant offer that answers a number of the demands that Hamas had said were prerequisites for them to agree to a deal. So if Hamas really does care about the Palestinian people, they should agree to the deal, period. This is &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Let me ask you about &#8212;MR MILLER: This is one of those rare issues where it’s just actually not that complicated.QUESTION: Okay. Let me ask you a couple of question on the aid. Israeli settlers have vandalized Gaza aid trucks and so on, I think the trucks that left from Jordan that – probably the ones that you guys bade farewell to. I don’t know. Do you have any comment on that? Do you know of what happened and do you have any &#8212;MR MILLER: I do. I’ve been following this issue very closely because it happened while we were in Israel. And I’ll tell you what the Secretary said about it to the prime minister, which is that these attacks on aid shipments are unacceptable and that Israel ought to take steps to prevent them and ought to take steps to hold people accountable for them. And I will tell you we were glad to hear that Israel yesterday arrested three of the people involved in the attacks on this convoy. That is the appropriate step. That’s the step that they ought to take whenever there are attacks on aid convoys, and that furthermore they ought to prevent these attacks from happening in the first place. That’s what we will hope they’ll do because these are aid shipments that are being delivered to innocent civilians who had nothing to do with October 7th and they ought to continue unimpeded.QUESTION: Now, lastly, the prime minister of Israel said that the ICC arrest warrant would be an antisemitic hate crime. Do you agree with that?MR MILLER: I will let the prime minister speak for himself. On behalf of the United States, we have made clear that the ICC in our view has no jurisdiction in this conflict and we oppose this investigation.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, Ellen.QUESTION: Can you say anything about how distribution of that aid after the settlers – the aid shipment that was attacked by settlers, how the distribution went once inside Gaza?MR MILLER: I think you’re referring to these reports and the statement that Hamas put out about the diversion of that aid. So those aid convoys came from Jordan into Erez crossing, which was just opened – something that the President insisted on in his April 4th phone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Yesterday was the first major shipment of aid from Jordan over this new land route through Erez crossing. The convoys from the Jordan military that brought the aid in unloaded the aid inside Gaza. It was then picked up by a humanitarian implementer for distribution inside Gaza, and that aid was intercepted and diverted by Hamas on the ground in Gaza.And ultimately, the UN is either in the process or has by now recovered that aid, but it was an unacceptable act by Hamas to divert this aid to begin with, to seize this aid. We have made clear that it’s an unacceptable act. I think the UN partners will be also making clear that it’s an unacceptable act. If there is one thing that Hamas could do to jeopardize the shipment of aid, it would be diverting it for their own use rather than allowing it to go to the innocent civilians that need it, so they certainly should refrain from doing that in the future.QUESTION: Has this been a widespread issue, Matt? (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: No, it has not.QUESTION: No &#8212;MR MILLER: This is the first widespread case of diversion that we have seen. Hamas had diverted these trucks for some time after – not the original, just to be clear, because that could be misleading. The original trucks came in, unloaded the aid; they were then picked up on different trucks for distribution inside Gaza. They did divert those trucks; they were held for some time. To my understanding, the aid has now been released. It’s been returned to the humanitarian implementer that was responsible for it in the first place. And we have made clear – and we think the United Nations relief organizations involved will also make clear – it’s an unacceptable act that Hamas should not repeat in the future &#8212;QUESTION: But &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; because it jeopardizes the delivery of aid to the Palestinian people.QUESTION: But in terms of the number of occurrences that Hamas has diverted aid, is this – how many times would you say this has happened?MR MILLER: There may have been minor ones in the past. I can’t speak to – this is the first major diversion of aid. And as I said, it ultimately has now been returned to the humanitarian implementer, so it will get where it needed to go. But that doesn’t change the fact that it was an unacceptable act.QUESTION: And what happened to the team that was with the aid at the time?MR MILLER: I can’t speak to that. I don’t have the details.QUESTION: Do you know &#8212;MR MILLER: I do know that they are all safe now. I don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Do you know which organization it was?MR MILLER: I do, but I don’t think it’s my – should be my prerogative to speak for them.Anything else on the region before we go – Michel, yeah.QUESTION: Are you talking now about a permanent ceasefire or a temporary ceasefire? And did you talk to the – and how will you build on it, as the Secretary has said yesterday? And second, did you talk to the Israelis about the – their northern front with Hizballah?MR MILLER: So the proposal that is on the table is for an immediate ceasefire for a defined period of time. But as we have always made clear, we do want to build that into an enduring calm. We don’t want this conflict to go on a day longer than it has to. We want to see it brought to a close in a way that ends Hamas’s ability to repeat the attacks of October 7th, in a way that alleviates the suffering of the Palestinian people, and ultimately gets to this broader point I was making in response to some of the earlier questions – in a way that establishes a political path forward for the Palestinian people, for the citizens of Israel, that provides greater peace, security, stability for the entire region.QUESTION: And on &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, and on the north, sorry. It was a conversation – it was a subject of our conversations. I don’t have any updates. Our goal remains the same as it has been since the outset of this conflict, which is to resolve the dispute in the north of Israel diplomatically.QUESTION: And one more on Syria, if you don’t mind. Why did the administration oppose to include the Assad regime Anti-Normalization Act to the – or in the supplement aid package that passed last week?MR MILLER: So I don’t have any specific comment to that. We generally don’t comment when it involves pending legislation. Our position, however, has been clear, which is that we will not normalize relations with the Assad regime until there is meaningful progress toward a political solution, consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Our sanctions remain in full effect; I know that was one of the other pieces of this particular legislation. And we remain committed to using all tools at our disposal to promote accountability in Syria, including by issuing sanctions under the Caesar Act and other authorities.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?QUESTION: A different &#8212;MR MILLER: Sure, go ahead.QUESTION: Just also under the Syria policy. It’s reported that the Caesar Act that you just mentioned expires at the end of this year. Are you guys looking to extend that?MR MILLER: I’ll have to take that one back and get you a specific answer.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: And secondly, just can you talk about – there was a report – or a group in Bahrain today claimed to have attacked Israel. And that seems to be a new – if accurate and true – that’s a new front that’s open. Is it the department’s assessment that U.S. policy towards trying to contain this conflict in Gaza is successful to this &#8212;MR MILLER: So I’m not aware of that report, so I wouldn’t want to comment on it or the veracity of it specifically. But it has been our goal to prevent this conflict from spreading. We’ve seen a couple points where – during – or a couple points since October 7th where there have been serious – the serious potential of it spreading and having it escalate, and you’ve seen us work quite intensively during that period. Of course, the last month, with respect to Iran, was one of the most intense periods. So it continues to be our goal, and it is something that you have to work on every day. When you see the conflict in Gaza continue, obviously it adds to tensions in the region, and so it’s one of the – it is a type of thing that you can never rest on, in terms of trying to prevent the conflict from spreading.Go ahead.QUESTION: My question is out of the region if that’s okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. I wanted to ask if the State Department is aware of the American that has gone missing in Mexico on a surfing trip – Jack Carter Rhoad, along with two Australians. Was wondering if the State Department’s aware, is working on it, and/or has comment.MR MILLER: There may be people who are aware of it; I’m not personally, and often, I think as you know, that we have Privacy Act rules when it involves cases of Americans overseas. I’ll have to take that back and get a more – check with others in the building, see if we have a more specific answer.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two topics – Russia, Russia first. I was wondering, in light of your latest finding that Russia that has been using chemical weapons in Ukraine, is the department getting any closer to state the obvious: that Russia is a terrorist state?MR MILLER: We have not changed our position with regard to that designation. But it in no way changes the actions that we have taken to hold Russia accountable. You’ve seen since the outset of this conflict the United States imposing sanctions on Russia, imposing export controls on Russia. We imposed new sanctions on Russia yesterday. You’ve seen us use our diplomacy to press other countries to stop their support from Russia – for Russia. It was a focus of the Secretary’s recent trip to China, where he made clear that China should stop supporting Russia by rebuilding its defense industrial base and also making clear that if they didn’t take action we would. And most significantly, we’ve taken action to hold Russia accountable by supporting Ukraine in its fight for its territory.So I know you always like to ask this question about this one particular designation, but if you look at the entirety of our policy with respect to Russia, I think you would see that it shows us taking actions across the board to hold them accountable for their aggression.QUESTION: But just so I understand correct, is there any ongoing effort for that SST designation, or this is just done deal, you are not going to review?MR MILLER: I’m going to defer to my previous answer on this.QUESTION: Thank you. On Georgia, if I may.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: We’ve seen all the warning lights are blinking bright these days. So the embassy made a statement saying that we offered them engagement, they refuse. We have heard oligarch Ivanishvili’s statements about the U.S. and NGOs. I don’t want to repeat everything he said. But there are calls from the Hill for a policy shift. I know that you made clear that you are deeply concerned, but that’s not enough, so when is it going to be &#8212;MR MILLER: Are you going to make policy claims now? Or are you going to ask a question, Alex? No offense, but – (laughter).QUESTION: When is it the right time? When is it the right time for the U.S. Government to announce the policy shift?MR MILLER: So I will say, as we reiterated in the statement we put out last night, we are deeply concerned with the legislation that is currently working its way through the Georgian legislature. And we’re also concerned and condemn the false narrative that government officials have adopted to defend the legislation. And the anti-Western rhetoric of Georgia Dream’s leadership has put Georgia on a precarious trajectory that jeopardizes Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic path and undermines the U.S.-Georgia relationship. It is still draft legislation, and I’m not going to comment on specific responses that we might take or preview specific responses that we might take while it remains pending legislation. But I think we have made quite clear how seriously we take this issue and how concerned we are about it.QUESTION: How closely the Secretary has been involved with this? We haven’t heard from him on this very &#8212;MR MILLER: I can assure you he’s watching incredibly closely. Even on our travels around the world and other countries, it’s something that he’s regularly updated on.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Janne.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions, if I might. National Security Communication Advisor Kirby said this morning about the Russian refined petroleum, and their shipment have already pushed North Korea input above the 500- barrel and your cap mandated by the UN Security Council. March alone, Russia shipped more than 165,000 barrels of refined petroleum to North Korea. So any refined oil import limit is 500- barrels. Kirby said 165,000 barrels transactions was over the limit. 165,000 is less than the actual import limit of 500,000 barrels. What is the North Korea’s actual annual limit on the refined petroleum imports?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to that – that number. I will just say that the United States will continue to impose sanctions against those working to facilitate arms and refined petroleum transfers between Russia and the DPRK. We are currently working with our partners, including Australia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom to announce new coordinated sanctions designations this month.QUESTION: Do you think Kirby made &#8212;MR MILLER: I think I just violated one of my own rules. How many times have – I say I’m not going to preview sanctions actions? (Laughter.)QUESTION: Yeah. Please &#8212;MR MILLER: Always an exception to every rule.QUESTION: And do you think Kirby made a little mistake about numbers? Because &#8212;MR MILLER: I will defer to him to comment on his remarks.QUESTION: And one more quick, regarding terrorist threat alert. South Korea’s national intelligence services reported that North Korea is searching for terrorist attacks targeting diplomatic missions and officers abroad. Can you give us some comment, or are there any terrorist threat alert for U.S. diplomatic missions or abroad?MR MILLER: The safety and security of our personnel is our first – is our number one priority. I don’t have any specific assessment to offer, but we are constantly monitoring the situations around the world and adjusting to events, as is appropriate and necessary.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shannon.QUESTION: Thank you. I know these cases have been addressed from the podium before, but I wanted to ask about Bryan Hagerich and Ryan Watson, the two Americans who are facing more than a decade behind bars in Turks and Caicos potentially for carrying a relatively small amount of hunting ammunition in the country. Do you have any updates on their cases or assistance that the State Department might be offering?MR MILLER: So the safety and security of United States citizens is our first priority, and as you know, oftentimes we are limited in what we can say about some of these cases. There are times when there’s much that I’d like to say from the podium that I’m not able for privacy reasons. But we are aware of the arrests of U.S. citizens in Turks and Caicos. When a U.S. citizen is arrested overseas, we stand ready to provide all appropriate consular assistance, and we do that in every case where we can.QUESTION: And just as more generally speaking, there have been a spate of high-profile cases involving U.S. citizens who are facing very serious punishments for carrying what would be considered domestically innocuous items into foreign countries. Is the State Department considering any action to either warn Americans, or address the issue by perhaps coordinating with TSA to stop them from carrying these items overseas?MR MILLER: Well, presumably, if you make it through an – you shouldn’t be able to make it through an airport with ammunition in the first place, but we constantly update our Travel Alerts to make sure or to warn people that they are of course subject to local laws when they travel overseas. That’s true – we expect – when citizens of other countries come to the United States, we expect them to abide by United States law, and we hold them accountable if they don’t. And that is true for people traveling overseas.In Turks and Caicos, firearms, ammunitions, or other weapons are prohibited. Our Travel Alert for the Turks and Caicos makes that clear so people are aware of that before they travel. And I would once again, as we always do, urge every American to check State Department Travel Alerts before they travel to a country. We’ve put them out for every country in the world so they can see what the local rules, what the local laws are, and it’s very important they follow those laws so they aren’t put in this position.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Two questions, please. As far as these demonstrations are concerned across the U.S. cities and colleges, before my question, if I say one thing – that when I used to go to college and university in Chandigarh in India, my mother told me you are going there to study, not create any troubles for yourself and for others. My question is now here that – who is behind these demonstration and how the U.S. diplomacy with other countries around the globe, who also have many students from across other nations also in these higher universities and colleges there studies are also affecting? Because I’m getting many calls from the Indian American community and their parents also. So how the relations affecting as far as these demonstrations are concerned? Violations are going on and breakings and all the – we never heard in the U.S. as far as students in colleges and university except during Vietnam War, because there was a cause, because America was in war in the – U.S. in Vietnam War, but America is not in war as far as these – what’s going on in Palestine and other places.MR MILLER: So the President spoke to this earlier today, and I don’t have much to add to his remarks. And but the thing that he made very clear is that one of the things that makes this country great is the right to free expression and free speech, and we welcome free speech and we welcome free expression even when it’s about – even when it is people protesting in opposition to policies that we have promulgated in this administration. But it’s also true that we expect people to follow the law, and law enforcement has a right and responsibility to enforce the law when people don’t. I’ll leave it – leave it at that.QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: One more?QUESTION: My other question, please. Thank you so much. These are in connection with that – in one side, India’s largest democracy is going on elections, like more than 700 million people are going elections. In Pakistan, other side, in the parliament of Pakistan, they are saying that U.S. and IMF and other countries should not give any aid to Pakistan because it’s not reaching to the basics people are needing today, and parliamentarians are saying that Pakistan is now going bankrupt. And Pakistan’s prime minister is going in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia and IMF and all there – because otherwise Pakistan will break down and will be filing bankruptcy and all them.My question is: People of Pakistan are telling me and saying that U.S. and other international institutions give aid to the basics and people for the development of Pakistan’s, and at the same time recently State Department held four companies in China and Belarus – held – and that they were supplying ballistic missile parts to Pakistan.So in the one hand they are saying in Pakistan, Pakistan is spending all this money on the ballistic missile parts and others have done – not on the people of Pakistan. What they are saying finally, look at India today and look at Pakistan today, and both countries got freedom on the same day, and today India is the – one of the largest trading partner with the United States. So where do we stand as far &#8212;MR MILLER: I was waiting for the question. (Laughter.) That was a lot. I was wondering what the question was going to be.QUESTION: So what message do we have for Pakistan from the Secretary of State &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; that basics – that Pakistan can be uplifted like India in the future and their people?MR MILLER: So a couple things. First, when it – as it relates to the ballistic missile program, we’ve made quite clear our position on that, including through the actions that we take – we took last month that you referenced. But when it comes to efforts to stabilize its economy, including through reaching an agreement with the IMF, we support those efforts. We support the progress that Pakistan has made to stabilize its economy and manage its daunting debt burden. We encourage the government to prioritize and expand economic reforms to address its economic challenges, and our support for Pakistan’s economic success is unwavering and we will continue to engage with them through technical engagements as well as through our trade and investment ties, all of which are priorities of our bilateral relationship.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Thank you, Matthew. Excuse me. Is the administration looking to admit into the United States refugees from Gaza? If so, how would the administration ensure there is no Hamas infiltration?MR MILLER: So since the beginning of the conflict, we have helped more than 1,800 American citizens and their families leave Gaza, many of whom have come to the United States. At President Biden’s direction, we have also helped and will continue to help some particularly vulnerable individuals, such as children with serious health problems and children who are receiving treatment for cancer get out of harm’s way and receive care at nearby hospitals in the region. And Palestinians may be eligible for a variety of existing pathways to enter the United States, such as immigrant or nonimmigrant visas. We are constantly evaluating policy proposals to further support Palestinians who are family members of American citizens and may want to join them in the United States. I don’t have any potential changes to preview at this time, but as is true everywhere in the world, we have strict vetting whenever we admit people to the United States.QUESTION: And Republicans have called for the administration to revoke visas of students on American college and university campuses who express support for Hamas. What’s the administration’s reaction to those calls? Would the administration do such a thing?MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that.QUESTION: And one more thing.MR MILLER: Go – yeah.QUESTION: What is the administration doing regarding Qatari funding of America’s college and universities that critics have said have contributed to Israelis &#8212;MR MILLER: Has there been – hold on – wait, is the evidence of that?QUESTION: That Qatar is the largest donor – foreign donor of the American college university campuses? Yes.MR MILLER: No, but I mean of – if they are supporting the protests. I’ve heard that claim but I’m just asking before I comment on – whether there’s evidence that you can put forward to substantiate it.QUESTION: Well, I mean, like, not – not just these protests, but, like, the protests on American college university campuses regarding Israel, like, even before October 7th – there have been critics who have said that Qatari money has contributed to this &#8212;MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; like through funding, like, university programs.MR MILLER: So what – what critics – just what critics, specifically, so I know what I’m responding to?QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah, the critics, yeah.MR MILLER: No, no, but who?QUESTION: Like conservatives, foreign policy folks, like scholars.MR MILLER: I just – before I respond to something in general, I’d like to see a piece of evidence or &#8212;QUESTION: Like folks that are &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; or a specific – a specific – I would just – I would love to see a specific charge or a piece of evidence before I respond to something that may or may not be true.QUESTION: I can send.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Me?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said last week that Ukraine and the United States are working on a new bilateral agreement on security and have already begun discussing a specific text of this agreement. Do you have any comments, confirmation?MR MILLER: So I’m not going speak to it in specific – other than to say that we have made clear that we are working on ways to provide long-term support for Ukraine’s security. Obviously we provide significant assistance to Ukraine to defend itself from Russia’s aggression, and we have been working on long-term security arrangements. That’s something that the President made public around the time of the last NATO summit. Those discussions continue but I’m not going to speak to them in any detail.QUESTION: One more question. Polish media reported last week that Poland has made a formal request to the U.S. to deploy American nuclear weapons in the country. Is the United States discussing this with them?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matthew. I just want to get back to the protests and ask if there’s any concern in the State Department about these protests reflecting a spread of the conflict that you been expressing fears about earlier? And secondly, have these protests at the universities featured in any of the conversations that the Secretary had on his recent trip?MR MILLER: So when we speak to being concerned about the spread of the conflict, we’re worried about kinetic conflict in the region. We’re not talking about free speech on United States campuses. So I’m not sure I understand what the linkage is between the two? But &#8212;QUESTION: Well, it is a spread of conflict regardless, in many people’s eyes, that there is a conflict emerging on U.S. campuses as a direct result of Israel’s actions in Gaza.MR MILLER: Okay, it’s a very different thing than what we’re talking about when we talk about diplomatic efforts, which are by nature overseas, to address the spread of the conflict between Israel and other terrorist organizations, between Israel and other countries in the region. That’s specifically what we’re referring to. It’s in no way related to, I think, the actions you’ve seen on United States campuses.And then the second question, remind me again, was?QUESTION: Was it the – did it come up in any of the conversations?MR MILLER: Oh, did it come up. Yeah, it did come up somewhat in conversations, as you would expect. It’s been all over TV. People around the world watch American television, and so of course it’s come up in conversations, but not in any substantive or serious way.Go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Follow-up on that – is Israel seeing these protests, and is it a concern about the – losing the messaging war? And then conversely, are there any concerns that Hamas is seeing these protests in his feeling emboldened by the anti-Israel sentiment of them?MR MILLER: So I will let Israel speak for itself, and I’m not going to speak for Hamas either.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. The world’s largest election has begun in India. However, there has been significant increase in intimidation, harassment. Prime Minister Modi’s inflammatory rhetoric against the Muslim community has heightened fear and uncertainty within the 200 Muslim community in India. At the same time, major social media platform like Twitter, YouTube, Google, and Meta are removing critical content and blocking channels at the request of the Indian authority, raising concern about the censorship and the impact on free speech. What steps are being taken to protect these U.S.-based social media platforms and ensure that the right to free expression is upheld?MR MILLER: So let me take that one back – regards to any specific actions, not – which is not to say there are any. But of course we support freedom of expression all around the world, in every country in the world.QUESTION: One more – just I &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I draw your attention one of my colleague was asking a question about India, and it is very difficult, someone asking questions and facing harassment. I also have faced even life threat sometimes in my social media message and texts that I’m receiving. So – and they are questioning about the ethnicity. Is that a matter that someone is asking questions – he has to be – or he or she has to be the – that ethnicity or from that country’s background in this briefing room?MR MILLER: So I don’t even know where to go with that question. Obviously, we welcome people from all over the world, of any ethnicity, from countries all over the world, to ask whatever questions they want to ask us. Unfortunately, one of the sad features of social media is that people make all sorts of inappropriate comments and threats and intimidation. I see that on social media; I’m sure you do too. It doesn’t make it acceptable in anyway.Go ahead.QUESTION: Except for &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On the student protests in the U.S., have you find any sign of foreign intervention, be it social media campaigns, funding, et cetera?MR MILLER: It’s not the kind of assessment we make here at the State Department, but, no, we’ve not that made that – any – that assessment.QUESTION: Are you going to look for it or it’s not part of &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s just not – it’s not the kind of thing that we do here at the State Department.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: We are – so no.QUESTION: And on the bilateral agreement you have with Saudi Arabia, I got a bit confused there when you were answering at the beginning. So the disagreement that you’re going to have with Saudi Arabia, is it tied to the conflict between Israel and Palestinian, because you said it’s a package?MR MILLER: Yeah, so I realized as I was going through it it was probably a bit confusing. So in the normalization agreement, the potential normalization agreement that we are talking about with Saudi Arabia, there are several components. One component is a package of agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Another component is normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. And another package would be a path to two states for the Palestinian people. All of them are linked together; none go forward without the others.QUESTION: So obviously you are not going to have a final package to present to Senate to give the approval, to get Senate’s approval. So my question is that a few of these components – like the AI or nuclear or the security agreement, all of that – can they be executed before the other components even being finalized or achieved or &#8212;MR MILLER: So I would say this is a package deal, but we are also putting the cart before the horse a little bit here and getting too much into the details, and that’s because, as I said, one of the things that Saudi Arabia has made clear is a prerequisite for them agreeing to any normalization deal in the first place is calm in Gaza, which of course we don’t have right now. And it’s not the reason why we’re trying to pursue a ceasefire – we’re trying to pursue a ceasefire with the release of hostages for its own sake and the benefits it would bring – but it is absolutely one of the things that we would try to push forward should we achieve that ceasefire that includes the release of hostages.QUESTION: But you’re going to go ahead with the nuclear agreement regardless of what is happening with &#8212;MR MILLER: No, as I just said, it is a package deal.And Guita go ahead, and we’ll wrap for the day.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple of questions on Iran. You may have seen that the BBC World has obtained some documents which seem to be minutes of a hearing in Iran on the reason – on the how and when and who caused the death of Nika Shakarami, one of the – a teenage protestor a couple years ago.MR MILLER: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: The UN spokesperson suggested that if this document – if these documents were presented to the UN Human Rights Council that they could start a proceeding, look into it, those conversations that outline how she was killed. As a member of the UNHCR, would the United States encourage presentation of these documents to hold the people responsible for the death of Nika Shakarami?MR MILLER: So let me just apologize. I haven’t seen that actual report. I’ve been on the road a little bit, as I spoke about at the beginning of the briefing, but let me take that back and get you an answer to it.QUESTION: Okay. It’s kind of follow-up, but it can go separately, I think.MR MILLER: Yeah, I’ll get – I – yeah, I’ll get you an answer. If you have a follow-up, we can get an answer to that too. So &#8212;QUESTION: Well, the follow-up could be – I mean, it’s not dependent necessarily.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: So the Iranian constitution – the constitution of the Islamic Republic, actually. It says that the supreme leader sets the policies and is – the ultimate decision maker in the country. So as such, does the State Department believe that Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader, is responsible for the suppression of demonstrators and death of a high number of people two years ago and general suppression of the public?MR MILLER: He is absolutely responsible for the actions that government has taken. With that, we’ll end for today. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:07 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Georgia																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								South Korea																								Syria																								Ukraine
- Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Elizabeth Richard Travel to Türkiye Office of the SpokespersonDepartment of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Elizabeth Richard will visit Ankara, Türkiye, April 22 for the U.S.-Türkiye Counterterrorism Consultation. The United States and Türkiye relaunched their counterterrorism consultations at the Strategic Mechanism meetings in Washington D.C. in March 2024.Ambassador Richard and Turkish government counterparts will broaden and strengthen U.S.-Türkiye counterterrorism cooperation to thwart terrorist travel; combat terrorism-related networks engaged in organized crime; ensure the defeat of terrorist organizations such as PKK, DHKP-C, and ISIS in Syria and Iraq; and cooperate to counter the threat of ISIS and al-Qa&#8217;ida affiliates present in Africa and South and Central Asia. Ambassador Richard will also engage Turkish officials on ways to further combat exploitation of global finance channels by terrorist organizations.
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the Middle East Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union. Iran We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, condemn in the strongest terms Iran’s direct and unprecedented attack against Israel of April 13-14, which Israel defeated with the help of its partners. This was a dangerous escalation, as Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones.We also condemn the Iranian boarding and seizure, in breach of international law, of the Portuguese flagged merchant vessel MSC Aries by armed personnel, which occurred while the merchant vessel was sailing near the Strait of Hormuz. We call for the immediate release of the vessel, its crews and cargo.Israel and its people have our full solidarity and support and we reaffirm our commitment towards Israel’s security. Iran’s actions mark an unacceptable step towards the destabilization of the region and a further escalation, which must be avoided. In light of reports of strikes on April 19th, we urge all parties to work to prevent further escalation. The G7 will continue to work to this end.We call on all parties, both in the region and beyond, to offer their positive contribution to this collective effort.We call on Iran to refrain from providing support to Hamas and taking further actions that destabilize the Middle East, including support for Lebanese Hezbollah and other non-state actors.  Iran’s continued provision of arms and related materiel to the Houthis in violation of UNSCR 2216 and to other non-state actors in the region are dangerously increasing tensions. We call on all countries to prevent the supply of components or other items to Iran’s UAV and missile programmes.We demand that Iran and its affiliated groups cease their attacks. We will hold the Iranian government accountable for its malicious and destabilizing actions and we stand ready to adopt further sanctions or take other measures, now and in response to further destabilizing initiatives.We reiterate our determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We urge Iran to cease and reverse nuclear escalations and to stop the continuing uranium enrichment activities reported by IAEA in the framework provided by UNSCR 2231 that have no credible civil justification and pose significant proliferative risks. Tehran must reverse this trend and engage in serious dialogue, returning to full cooperation with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. We support IAEA’s monitoring and verification role regarding Iran’s nuclear-related obligation and commitments and express strong concern about Iran’s current lack of cooperation with the Agency.We are extremely concerned by reports that Iran is considering transferring ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.  We call on Iran not to do so, as it would represent a substantive material escalation in its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Were Iran to proceed with providing ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia, we are prepared to respond in a swift and coordinated manner, including with new and significant measures against Iran.We reiterate our deep concern over Iran’s human rights violations and abuses, especially against women, girls and minority groups, and in light of the first report issued on March 8 by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council, which said that certain violations against “Women, Life, Freedom” protestors amounted to crimes against humanity.We strongly reject Iran’s targeting and arbitrary arrest of dual and foreign citizens and call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions. We condemn Iran’s harassment, intimidation and plots to kill perceived dissidents and opponents of the regime overseas, including journalists and religious figures, as well as the targeting of Jewish individuals and institutions.Conflict in Gaza We condemn in the strongest terms the brutal terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas and other terrorist groups against Israel that began on October 7, 2023. In exerting its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian law. Hamas must release all hostages immediately and unconditionally. We continue to press for the full investigation of the horrific reports of sexual violence committed by Hamas and other terrorist groups and for perpetrators to be held accountable.We deplore all losses of civilian lives and note with great concern the unacceptable number of civilians, including thousands of women, children and persons in vulnerable situations who have been killed in Gaza. We call for urgent action to address the devastating and growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, particularly the plight of civilians throughout the territory. We reiterate our opposition to a full scale military operation in Rafah that would have catastrophic consequences on the civilian population. We reiterate our call for a credible and actionable plan to protect the civilian population there and address their humanitarian needs. We are deeply concerned by the internal displacement within Gaza and the risk of forcible displacement from Gaza. Israel must act in compliance with its obligations under international law and treat individuals humanely and with dignity, and should thoroughly and transparently investigate credible allegations of wrongdoing and ensure accountability for any abuses or violations.We underscore the urgent need for specific, concrete, and measurable steps to significantly increase the flow of aid into Gaza in light of imminent risk of famine for a majority of Gaza’s population.  We urge the rapid implementation of steps announced by the Government of Israel including the commitment to expand flow of aid through existing land crossings, opening new land crossings, and facilitating aid to northern Gaza where humanitarian needs are most acute, including by opening more routes into Gaza.  We welcome efforts to establish a maritime corridor to further increase the flow of much-needed humanitarian assistance into Gaza, in coordination with the United Nations. We reiterate that such corridors must complement and not be a substitute to expanded and sustained assistance flows by land.Securing full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access in all its forms remains an absolute priority. We call on Israel to do more to ensure protection of international and local humanitarian aid workers, journalists, and Palestinian civilians, to improve humanitarian deconfliction, including communications, and to pursue full accountability, as appropriate, for incidents of harm against aid workers and civilians.  We call on all parties to allow the unimpeded delivery of aid, including food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel, shelter, as well as facilitate the restoration of basic services and ensure access for humanitarian workers. All parties must protect civilians, especially those most vulnerable, particularly women, children, and people with disabilities, consistent with international humanitarian law.Since the onset of the crisis, the G7 has been among the largest providers of assistance to the affected population in Gaza. We reiterate our intention to continue doing so and we call on all our partners to strengthen their efforts. We welcome the initiative “Food for Gaza” launched by Italy together with FAO, WFP and IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society), aimed at better meeting the urgent demand for food security and primary health of the population.We recognize the crucial role played by UN agencies and other humanitarian actors in delivering assistance. UNRWA has a vital role in the Gaza humanitarian response. We welcome the swift decision by the UN Secretary General to initiate an immediate investigation on UNRWA to provide full transparency on the serious allegations against its staff and to appoint an independent review group also in view of the implementation of the needed reforms. We agreed it is critical that UNRWA and other UN organizations and agencies’ distribution networks be fully able to deliver aid to those who need it most, fulfilling their mandate effectively.We call for an immediate release of hostages and a sustainable ceasefire that allows for a surge of the urgently needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered safely throughout Gaza. In this context, we strongly support the ongoing mediation efforts undertaken by the United States and regional partners to that aim, respected by all parties, leading to a sustainable cessation of hostilities, in order to facilitate the immediate return of all hostages, a surge of assistance and for the urgent implementation of UNSC resolutions 2712, 2720, and 2728. Hamas’ refusal to release hostages is only prolonging the conflict and the suffering of civilians.We welcome the new Palestinian Authority cabinet and remain ready to support the Palestinian Authority as it undertakes the reforms that are indispensable to enable it to take up its responsibilities in the aftermath of the conflict, in both Gaza and the West Bank.We are also working, including by imposing sanctions and other measures, to deny Hamas the ability to raise funds to carry out further atrocities. Likewise, we will also continue our work to fight against the dissemination of terrorist content online.All parties must refrain from unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution. We are concerned by rising levels of settlers’ violence. Extremist settlers responsible for violent acts against Palestinian communities must be brought to account.A viable solution to the conflict can only be the result of a coordinated regional effort. We remain committed to a lasting and sustainable peace based on a two-State solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel and the Palestinians. We call for upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem. We concur that the final territory of a Palestinian state should be defined through negotiations based on 1967-lines. We note that the recognition of a Palestinian state, at the appropriate time, would be a crucial component of that political process.We are working intensively – along with partners in the region – to prevent the conflict from escalating further. We are particularly concerned by the situation along the Blue Line. We recognize the essential stabilizing role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in mitigating that risk. We urge all involved to exercise restraint and to work toward de-escalation.We oppose all discrimination and violence based on religion or belief and we call for effective protection of all members of religious minority groups. We strongly reject all forms of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred.Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea We condemn the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the navy ships protecting them. We are greatly concerned by the deaths of three innocent mariners aboard the True Confidence and the sinking of the Rubymar, which created a navigational hazard and a serious environmental threat. We call for the immediate release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader and its crew, seized on 19th November 2023. In line with UNSCR 2722, we reiterate our support for countries that exercise the right to defend their vessels from attacks, in accordance with international law. We also call for continued international involvement in close cooperation with the United Nations and coastal states, as well as with regional and sub-regional organizations to prevent further escalation with possible multidimensional consequences.We welcome the continued efforts of the EU maritime operation “Aspides” and of the U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian” along with UK and 10 other countries to protect these crucial shipping lanes.We are concerned by the hindrance to the transit of energy supplies, raw materials and other commodities through the Red Sea. The countries most negatively affected by the Houthis’ attacks include those in the region. Maritime security and navigational rights and freedoms are critical to ensuring free movement of essential commodities to destinations and populations all over the world. This includes delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to more than half the population of Yemen and to Sudan and Ethiopia.Yemen We express great concern for the situation in Yemen, notably for the humanitarian conditions of the Yemeni civilian population. Yemeni parties must allow safe, rapid, and unimpeded access to all those in need, halt requirements that restrict women’s freedom of movement and impede delivery of humanitarian aid, and remove obstacles to the delivery of assistance, notably to the most vulnerable. All parties must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.We reiterate our strong support to the United Nations and to UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg for his efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen.We welcome the understanding reached in December 2023 between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthis that included a commitment on a set of measures to implement a nation-wide ceasefire and to improve living conditions in the country. We urge all involved parties and in particular the Houthis to engage in good faith in preparations for an inclusive political process in consultation with civil society and under UN auspices.We call for accountability for human rights violations, including grave violations of children’s rights, and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.Syria   We remain committed to a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, and we fully support the mandate of the UN Special Envoy, Geir O. Pedersen. We call on the Syrian regime to engage meaningfully with the UN-facilitated political process to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis and national reconciliation. Normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions would only be considered in the framework of a credible inclusive and enduring political process consistent with UNSC resolution 2254. Stability and peace in Syria cannot be achieved without the enduring defeat of Daesh. As members of the Global Coalition against Daesh we are committed to ending Daesh’s presence in Syria.We remain committed to advancing justice for victims and accountability for all actors responsible for violations of international law in Syria, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We reiterate our condemnation of the use that the Syrian régime has made of chemical weapons in Syria. We continue to urge the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention and to eliminate its chemical weapons programme completely and verifiably.We continue to call for the immediate release of all civilians arbitrarily detained and to clarify the fate of those forcibly disappeared. We support the work of organizations such as the Commission of Inquiry and the International Independent and Impartial Mechanism, which document the crimes perpetrated in Syria. We stand ready to support the newly established UN Independent Institution for Missing Persons in Syria.We will continue to support the Syrian people through humanitarian assistance to meet their needs, including early recovery assistance and measures fostering resilience, and demand that the regime facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians, including through UN cross-border humanitarian assistance, for which there is no alternative. We remain grateful to regional countries for continuing to host Syrian refugees, and we call upon the Syrian regime to create the conditions for voluntary, safe, and dignified refugee returns.The upcoming Eighth Brussels Conference on the Future of Syria and the Region is important in maintaining a high level of engagement and mobilisation of the international community in this regard.
- Syria HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Syria				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Syria																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Syria during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the regime and other actors; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence; unlawful recruitment and use of children in armed conflict by the regime and other armed actors; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, or enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, femicide, and other forms of such violence; substantial barriers to sexual and reproductive health services access; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic groups including Kurdish and Yezidi residents; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; enforcement of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.The regime did not take credible steps or government action to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Regime-linked paramilitary groups reportedly engaged in frequent abuses, including massacres, indiscriminate killings, kidnapping of civilians, physical abuse, sexual violence, and unjust detentions.  Regime-aligned militias reportedly launched numerous attacks that killed and injured civilians.  Russian and Iranian forces, as well as affiliated paramilitaries such as Lebanese Hizballah, caused civilian deaths and destroyed civilian infrastructure and property.  Armed terrorist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham committed a wide range of abuses, including killings, kidnappings, physical abuse, and recruitment or use of child soldiers.  ISIS carried out killings, attacks, and kidnappings, including against civilians.  There were no reports of investigation into or prosecution for such actions.  Abuses by armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey (Türkiye) in the northern region of the country reportedly focused on Kurdish and Yezidi residents and other civilians, and included:  killings; abduction and disappearance of civilians; physical abuse, including sexual violence; forced displacement from homes; looting and seizure of private property; transfer of detained civilians across the border into Turkey; recruitment or use of child soldiers; and looting and desecration of religious sites.  Opposition governance entities, including the Syrian Interim Government “Ministry of Defense” and Military Judiciary Department, investigated some claims of abuses committed by the armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey that made up the Syrian National Army, and conducted some judicial proceedings, but there was no information available during the year regarding their conclusions.  Elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces reportedly engaged in abuses, including abuses involving attacks striking residential areas, physical abuse, unjust detention, recruitment or use of child soldiers, restrictions on expression and assembly, and destruction and demolition of homes.  The Syrian Democratic Forces investigated some allegations against its forces and imposed punishments on some members for abuses, but statistics were unavailable.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports the regime or its agents, as well as other armed actors, committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, in relation to the conflict during the year.  No governmental bodies meaningfully investigated whether security force killings were justifiable or pursued prosecutions.According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), at least 1,032 civilians, including 181 children and 150 women, were killed by conflict parties during the year.  The regime was responsible for 225 of these documented killings, according to the SNHR.The UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria (COI) and numerous human rights groups reported the regime killed persons in detention facilities, both by execution and torture.  According to the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison, detainees were not notified regarding their execution decisions in advance, and instead were transferred to execution chambers in the evening for a sentence to be carried out on the same day or the following day.  According to the SNHR, at least 59 individuals, including one child and two women, died due to torture by conflict parties during the year, with the regime responsible for 34 of these deaths.On August 14, the SNHR and local media reported regime security forces stormed the house of Muhammad Saeed al-Khadija in southern Idlib Governorate, beat him with rifle butts, and then shot and killed him.  Regime security forces reportedly prevented al-Khadija’s family from burying him until the family signed a document declaring he died of a heart attack.  The attack reportedly happened after al-Khadija criticized the deterioration of services in his city and the mistreatment of individuals returning to it.On August 21, the SNHR reported regime security forces shot dead a child, age 15, following a verbal dispute at a checkpoint in the Deir Ez-Zour Governorate.Other actors in the conflict were also implicated in unlawful killings (see section 1.i.).																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of regime authorities, and the vast majority of those disappeared since the start of the conflict remained missing.  In its annual report on enforced disappearance, the SNHR reported the regime used enforced disappearance “in a systematic manner” to intimidate society, spread fear, and consolidate control.  The SNHR documented at least 112,713 individuals, including 3,105 children and 6,698 women, remained forcibly disappeared by conflict parties from March 2011 through August.  According to the SNHR, the Assad regime was responsible for 85 percent of those disappearances (96,103), including 2,327 children and 5,739 women.  The SNHR documented 1,923 persons were forcibly disappeared during the year by conflict parties, with the regime responsible for 942 of these cases.  The regime forcibly disappeared critics, perceived dissidents, journalists, medical personnel, and protesters, as well as their families and associates.  Most disappearances reported by domestic and international human rights documentation groups appeared to be politically motivated, and a number of prominent political prisoners detained in previous years remained missing.According to nongovernmental organization (NGO) and UN reporting, many families were unaware of the status of their detained or disappeared family members and learned relatives they believed to be alive had died months or even years earlier.  In some instances, families learned the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones by identifying images of victims in published photos or videos of killings and massacres.  In many cases the regime denied the presence of these individuals in its detention centers until it released death notifications.A report issued by the COI in July found “there is little known about the fate or whereabouts of those detained incommunicado.”  The COI reported “families are rarely provided official information even when their family members died in custody, with return of bodies and personal effects being rarer.”  According to the SNHR, the regime withheld death certificates until victims’ families signed false statements exonerating it.  The regime did not announce publication of notifications on updated state registers, return bodies to families, or disclose locations of remains.  The SNHR recorded at least nine forcibly disappeared persons in regime detention centers had been registered as dead in the civil registry records during the year.  The SNHR also obtained during the year hundreds of unreleased death certificates spanning different years for forcibly disappeared persons in regime detention centers about whom the regime failed to notify families.  The SNHR alleged these deaths were due to torture, since the regime did not return victims’ bodies to their families and the deaths were not announced at the time of their occurrence.  For example, the SNHR reported that on August 7, the family of Faraj Foad al-Jamous, whom the regime arrested in 2018 and forcibly disappeared in 2022, learned al-Jamous had been registered as dying in 2019; the SNHR alleged he died due to torture and medical negligence.NGOs and UN entities reported families of the disappeared often feared reprisals, extortion, and requests for bribes when reporting cases and that authorities harassed and verbally abused women who inquired regarding the fate of their detained or disappeared spouse or attempted to obtain a death certificate.Some terrorist groups and armed opposition groups not affiliated with the regime also reportedly abducted individuals, targeting religious leaders, aid workers, suspected regime affiliates, journalists, and activists (see section 1.i.).The regime made no effort to prevent, investigate, or punish such actions and did not comply with measures, such as search commissions, to ensure accountability for the disappearances.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices and prescribed up to three years’ imprisonment for violations, but there were credible reports regime authorities engaged in systemic torture, abuse, and mistreatment to punish perceived opponents.While most accounts of regime abuse concerned male detainees, there were reports of women suffering abuse in regime custody during the year.  Activists maintained that many instances of abuse went unreported.  Some detainees declined to allow reporting of their names or details of their cases due to fear of regime reprisal, according to the COI.  Many torture victims reportedly died in custody.NGOs and the COI continued to report the regime employed torture, including forcing objects into the victim’s rectum or vagina, administering electric shocks, suspension by one or two limbs for prolonged periods, folding persons into car tires, whipping exposed body parts, burning body parts, and extracting nails and teeth.In its July report on torture, the COI reported that in February, members of the General Intelligence Directorate suspended a man detained in Idlib by his limbs for prolonged periods and folded him in car tires.  Although he did not know the reason for his detention, the man reportedly agreed to confess to anything after being hung by his hands with his feet off the ground.The COI and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported regular use of torture against perceived regime opponents at regime facilities.  Human rights groups identified numerous detention facilities where regime officials reportedly tortured prisoners, including the Mezzeh Airport detention facility; Military Security Branches 215, 227, 235, 248, and 291; Adra Prison; Sednaya Prison; the Harasta Air Force Intelligence Branch; Harasta Military Hospital; Mezzeh Military Hospital 601; and the Tishreen Military Hospital.  The Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison reported in October security forces subjected detainees to torture and mistreatment in military hospitals, often obstructing medical care or exacerbating existing injuries as a technique of abuse and interrogation.  It reported once a detainee at Tishreen Military Hospital was killed, the body was transferred to a mass grave where it was beaten and trampled before burial and the cause of death was recorded as a cardiac arrest.NGOs assessed the regime perpetrated violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the detention and torture of medical workers.The COI’s July report detailed the regime’s widespread practice of sexual violence, including rape, against men, women, and children in detention.  The report documented the case of one detainee in the Military Intelligence’s “Palestine” branch who was sexually abused by guards who repeatedly inserted sticks or glass bottles into his rectum to “torture” him and cause him to “lose his honor.”  The report also documented the case of a woman detained for months at a Military Intelligence branch in Homs whom a guard removed from her cell and sexually assaulted after placing a plastic bag over her head.  The guard reportedly severely beat her with a cable all over her body, including her eyes, after she fought back.There was a significant number of reports of abuse of children by the regime.  Officials reportedly targeted and tortured children because of their familial relationships, real or assumed, with political dissidents, members of the armed opposition, and activist groups.  According to witnesses, authorities detained children to compel parents and other relatives associated with opposition fighters to surrender.Impunity was pervasive for regime security and intelligence forces.  Numerous NGOs concluded that regime forces continued to inflict systematic, officially sanctioned torture on civilians in detention with impunity.  There were no known prosecutions or convictions in the country of regime security force personnel for abuses and no reported regime actions to increase respect for human rights by the security forces.On November 16, however, in a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) brought by the Netherlands and Canada against Syria for violating its responsibilities as a state party to the Convention Against Torture, the ICJ issued provisional orders for the regime to “take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” as well as to “prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of any evidence related to allegations of such acts.”  The ICJ also ordered the regime to “ensure that its officials, as well as any organizations or persons which may be subject to its control direction, or influence do not commit any acts of torture or other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  The regime requested a postponement to facilitate its participation in the hearings that led to the provisional measures decision and did not participate in the hearings.  Instead, it submitted a letter on October 10 and outlined its position denying allegations of torture for the court’s consideration.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention center conditions remained harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical and psychological abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Prison facilities were grossly overcrowded with little space to sit or sleep, contributing to extreme exhaustion from lack of sleep.  Access to and quality of food, potable water, sanitation, heating, proper ventilation, lighting, and medical care were poor and life threatening.  Authorities kept prisoners confined in cells for long periods without an opportunity for movement, exercise, or use of showers and sanitary facilities.The regime maintained a vast network of detention centers where detainees were subjected to human rights abuses.  In July, the COI reported dire and appalling conditions in regime detention facilities amounted to ill-treatment and in some cases could amount to torture.  Reports from human rights groups and former detainees suggested that there continued to be many informal detention sites and that authorities held thousands of prisoners in converted military bases and in civilian infrastructure, such as schools and stadiums, and in unknown locations.  Activists asserted the regime housed detainees in factories and vacant warehouses that were overcrowded and lacked adequate sanitary facilities.In some cases, authorities transferred detainees from unofficial holding areas to intelligence services facilities.  Detention conditions at security and intelligence service facilities continued to be the harshest, especially for political or national security prisoners.Inside prisons and detention centers, the prevalence of death from disease remained high due to unsanitary conditions and the withholding of food, medical care, and medication.  The COI reported infestations of mites, lice, ants, and rats exacerbated the lack of adequate washing facilities in various facilities.  Regime authorities did not undertake remedial action.  Prisoners received inadequate or no medical care, leading to death from preventable conditions in unhygienic cells.  Local NGOs and medical professionals reported authorities denied medical care to prisoners with pre-existing health needs, such as diabetes, asthma, and cancer, and often denied pregnant women any medical care.  Released prisoners commonly reported sickness and injury resulting from such conditions.  According to NGO reporting, survivor detainees collectively reported hundreds of detainee deaths in custody of government security branches, from both torture and inhuman treatment.The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) oversaw more than 20 detention centers in the northeast holding approximately 9,000 ISIS fighters detained during defeat-ISIS Coalition operations.  The largest of these was the Provincial Internal Security Forces detention center in Hasakah, estimated to hold the bulk of ISIS detainees in the country.  Detainees were not provided with sufficient food and water, and medical care was lacking, raising concerns regarding malnutrition and the overall lack of medical supplies throughout the northeast region.According to the COI, conditions in detention centers run by nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), violated international law.Administration:  There were no credible mechanisms or avenues for prisoners in regime facilities to complain or submit grievances, and authorities routinely failed to investigate allegations or document complaints or grievances.  Activists reported there was no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees.In areas where regime control was weak or nonexistent, localized corrections structures operated.  Reports of control and oversight varied, and both civilian and religious leaders oversaw facility administration.  Former police forces or members of armed opposition groups operated facilities in areas not under regime control.  Nonstate actors often lacked training to run facilities.Independent Monitoring:  The regime prohibited independent monitoring of prison or detention center conditions, and diplomatic and consular officials had minimal access.  The regime similarly ignored UN and international community calls for unhindered access by independent, impartial, international humanitarian and medical organizations to all regime detention centers.The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) attempted to gain access to detention centers across the country through negotiation with all parties and made more than 80 visits to places of detention that included support related to nutrition, water, and health care for detainees in 13 of the visited sites.  The ICRC had access to some regime-controlled central prisons under the Ministry of Justice but was unable to access regime-controlled intelligence and military detention facilities.  Syrian armed opposition groups did not provide the ICRC access to its detention facilities in the northwest during the year.  In the northeast, the SDF provided the ICRC access to some of its detention facilities.Reportedly, the regime often failed to notify foreign governments when it arrested, detained, released, or deported their citizens, especially when the case involved political or national security charges.  The regime also failed to provide consular access to foreign citizens known to be in its prisons and, on numerous occasions, claimed these individuals were not in its custody or even in the country.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, but a 2011 decree permitted the regime to detain suspects for up to 60 days without charge if suspected of “terrorism” or related offenses.  According to the COI, local news sources, and various human rights organizations, regime security forces made arbitrary arrests and held individuals in prolonged or indefinite detention.  The law provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but the regime did not observe this requirement.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law generally required a warrant for arrest in criminal cases, but police often cited emergency or national security justifications for acting without a warrant, which was permitted under the law.  Under the constitution and code of criminal procedure, defendants had to be informed of the reasons for their arrest, were entitled to legal aid, and were presumed innocent until convicted by a court in a fair trial; however, the regime did not observe these requirements.  Civil and criminal defendants had the right to bail hearings and possible release from pretrial detention on their own recognizance, but the regime applied the law inconsistently.  At the initial court hearing, which could be months or years after the arrest, the accused could retain an attorney at personal expense or the court could appoint an attorney, although authorities did not ensure lawyers’ access to their clients before trial.  In its September report, the COI stated detainees continued to be held incommunicado and in dire conditions, particularly in branches run by the security apparatus.  NGOs reported families of detainees paid bribes to regime officials, including judges, to identify the location of detainees or obtain their release, during both pretrial and trial phases.In cases involving political or national security offenses, authorities reportedly often made arrests in secret, with cases assigned in an apparently arbitrary manner to the Counterterrorism Court (CTC), courts martial, or criminal courts.  The CTC, military field courts, and military courts were exempt from the code of criminal procedure applied by ordinary courts, and they denied basic rights to defendants.  On September 3, the regime issued a decree dissolving the military field courts.  The SNHR assessed the regime did so to mitigate perception of its involvement in enforced disappearance as approximately a quarter of those forcibly disappeared by the regime were previously referred to the military field courts.By law persons arrested or detained, regardless of whether on criminal or other grounds, were entitled to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention and any delay in obtaining judicial process.  If the court found authorities detained persons unlawfully, the detained persons were entitled to prompt release, compensation, or both.  The regime did not observe this requirement, however, and few if any detainees had the ability to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court or obtain prompt release and compensation for unlawful detention.The regime reportedly detained suspects incommunicado for prolonged periods without charge or trial and denied them the right to a judicial determination of their pretrial detention.Arbitrary Arrest:  According to NGO reports, confirmed by regime memoranda secured and released by human rights documentation groups, regime security branches secretly ordered many arrests and detentions.  Because the regime continued to withhold information on detainees, estimates varied widely, but the COI assessed regime forces and affiliated militias held thousands of persons arbitrarily or unlawfully in detention facilities.  As of December, the SNHR reported at least 156,457 persons, including 5,235 children and 10,199 women, remained arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared by conflict parties; it attributed approximately 87 percent of these cases to the regime (136,047 including 3,696 children and 8,495 women), including the Syrian Arab Army, General Intelligence Directorate, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, General Administration Division, and Political Security Directorate.  During the year, the SNHR documented at least 2,317 cases of arbitrary arrest, including 129 children and 87 women, by conflict parties.  The regime was responsible for 1,063 of these arbitrary arrests, according to the SNHR.Human rights organizations reported those arrested were typically not told why they were arrested.  Those informed of the charges rarely had access to evidence supporting the charges.  The COI noted arbitrary actions by the regime’s security apparatus, coupled with unfair proceedings by the counterterrorism and military field courts, exposed Syrians to further violations and crimes.In most cases authorities reportedly did not identify themselves or inform detainees of charges against them until their arraignment, often months or years after their arrest.  Individuals detained without charge did not qualify for release under regime-issued amnesty decrees.The SNHR documented the regime’s arbitrary arrest of at least six health-care sector workers during the year, and reported authorities arbitrarily arrested men and boys at checkpoints often without citing a reason.  The cases included defectors returning following the issuance of an amnesty, only to be arrested.  During the year, the SNHR documented at least 386 arbitrary detentions involving individuals who had agreed to reconciliation agreements with the regime; some were detained from several days to several months and many were forcibly disappeared.According to the COI’s September report, a father was arbitrarily arrested at an army checkpoint with his family at the beginning of the year and was held incommunicado for nearly one month by several intelligence agencies and suffered torture and ill-treatment.On April 4, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported regime security forces arrested a young man inside an immigration and passport office building in Damascus while he was trying to receive a passport, without informing him of the charges pressed against him.  There was no further information on whether he subsequently was released.There also were instances of nonstate armed groups reportedly engaging in unjust detention (see section 1.i.).Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem.  Authorities reportedly held thousands of detainees incommunicado for months or years before releasing them without charge or bringing them to trial, while many detainees died in prison.  A shortage of available courts and lack of legal provisions for speedy trial or plea bargaining contributed to lengthy pretrial detentions.  There were numerous reported instances in which the length of detention equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime.  Official statistics on the detainee population held in pretrial detention were not available.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality.  Authorities regularly subjected courts to political influence and prosecutors and defense attorneys to intimidation and abuse.Outcomes of cases where defendants were affiliated with the opposition appeared predetermined, although defendants sometimes bribed judicial officials and prosecutors to affect their cases.  NGOs reported the regime at times shared with proregime media outlets lists of in-absentia sentences targeting armed opposition groups before the court issued the sentences.  The SNHR reported most individuals detained by regime authorities during the year were denied access to a fair public trial.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.  The constitution did not provide for a public trial.  According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, a public trial was required for the verdict to be valid except in cases of public morality or national security.  Requirements for public trials did not apply to special courts such as military courts.  Human rights organizations assessed Syrian security services interfered with the judiciary’s independence by intimidating judges and lawyers and reported that the judicial system was known for summary decisions, corruption, and a lack of due process.The constitution provided for defendants’ right to a presumption of innocence until proven guilty, but numerous reports indicated the CTC or courts martial did not respect this right.  Defendants had the right to prompt, detailed notification of the charges against them, with interpretation as necessary, but authorities did not respect this right, and a number of detainees and their families reported they were unaware of the charges against them.  Defendants were sentenced without being present at hearings.  In September, the COI reported young men and women were sentenced to death in absentia without being represented by legal counsel.  Some reportedly learned their verdict months after their trial.The law entitled most defendants to representation of their choice but did not permit legal representation for defendants accused of spying.  The law provided for a court-appointed lawyer in all stages of a trial, with the exception of the preliminary investigations that could be conducted without the presence of a lawyer.  Courts generally did not uphold these provisions.  NGOs reported court-appointed attorneys did not mount effective defenses for the clients.  Special courts, such as military courts, were exempted from these provisions and did not appoint attorneys for defendants.In September, the COI reported that the regime, HTS, and the SDF continued to deny detainees access to a lawyer and subjected detainees to incommunicado detention.  The SNHR reported detainees on trial in military courts were often transferred to unknown locations.  Human rights groups reported families of individuals detained by the regime continued to be unable to access information on the status of their relatives.Human rights groups reported the regime, if it provided anything at all to defense lawyers, in some cases provided prosecution case files that did not include any evidence.  By law defendants could present witnesses and evidence or confront the prosecution witnesses, but authorities often did not respect this right.  Defendants could not legally be compelled to testify or confess guilt, but family members and NGOs routinely reported defendants were coerced, tortured, and intimidated to acquire information and force confessions.  In September, the COI reported courts continued to use forced confessions.Convicted persons could appeal verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to the Court of Cassation.  Not all citizens enjoyed these rights equally, in part because interpretations of religious law provided the basis for elements of family and criminal law and discriminated against women.  Some personal status laws applied sharia regardless of the religion of those involved.Numerous human rights organizations asserted trials before the CTC, military field courts, and military courts were unfair and summary in nature, sometimes resulting in death sentences.  Death sentences issued by extraordinary courts were not subject to review by the Ministry of Justice’s Special Pardon Committee, whose mandate was to review final death sentences referred to it by criminal courts.  The president had the power to appoint and dismiss members of the Special Pardon Committee.Media and NGO reports suggested the regime denied some, and in certain cases all, constitutionally guaranteed protections to those accused of political crimes, violence against the regime, or providing humanitarian assistance to civilians in opposition-held areas.  Sentences for persons accused of antigovernment activity tended to be harsh, if the cases reached trial, with violent and nonviolent offenders receiving similar punishments.  The regime did not permit defendants before the CTC to have effective legal representation.Nonstate actors often did not respect fair trial guarantees.  In opposition-controlled areas, legal accountability procedures varied by locale and the nonstate armed group in control where local governing structures assumed these responsibilities.  NGOs reported civilians administered these processes employing customary sharia laws in some cases and national laws in others.  Sentencing by opposition sharia councils sometimes resulted in public executions without an appeals process.In the areas under its influence, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), previously known as the Self Administration of North and East Syria, continued to implement a legal code based on its “Social Contract.”  Reports described the Social Contract as a mix of Syrian criminal and civil law, with laws concerning divorce, marriage, weapons ownership, and tax evasion drawn from EU law, but without certain fair trial standards, such as the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the right to judicial review, and the right to appoint a lawyer.  The justice system within DAANES’ areas consisted of “courts,” legal committees, and investigative bodies.  There was no comprehensive court structure in the areas under the influence of DAANES.  The Autonomous Administration, as a nonstate actor, ran a limited justice system to adjudicate the disposition of Syrian detainees in the northeast, and many Syrian detainees remained in detention awaiting such adjudication.  Non-Syrian detainees remained in these detention centers until they could be repatriated to their home countries.  The SDF managed a program to release nonviolent Syrian detainees who had been tried through the SDF justice system and served at least part of their sentences back to their home communities under a tribal sponsorship program.Human rights groups and media organizations reported HTS denied those it had detained the opportunity to challenge the legal basis or unjust nature of their detention in its sharia justice system.  HTS reportedly permitted confessions obtained through torture and executed or forcibly disappeared perceived opponents and their families.  According to the September COI report, HTS held detainees “incommunicado in secret detention facilities referred to as ‘security prisons.’”						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were numerous reports of political prisoners and detainees.  Amnesty International and other human rights organizations reported the regime continued to detain civilians on a massive scale, particularly those perceived to oppose the regime, including peaceful demonstrators, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, doctors, humanitarian aid workers, and political dissidents and their families.  Authorities refused to release information regarding the numbers or names of persons detained on political or security-related charges.  The four government intelligence agencies – Air Force, Military, Political Security, and General – were responsible for most arrests and detentions.Prison conditions for political or national security prisoners, especially accused opposition members, reportedly were much worse than those for ordinary criminals.  According to local NGOs, authorities deliberately placed political prisoners in crowded cells with convicted and alleged felons and subjected them to verbal and physical threats and widespread torture.  Political prisoners also reported they often slept on the ground due to lack of beds and faced frequent searches.  Some former detainees and human rights observers reported the regime also denied political prisoners access to reading materials and prohibited them from praying in their cells.Many prominent civilian activists and journalists detained or forcibly disappeared following the 2011 protests reportedly remained in detention at year’s end.  There were no known developments in the majority of cases of reported disappearances from prior years, including persons believed to be forcibly disappeared by regime forces.NGOs reported the regime used the counterterrorism law to arrest and convict nonviolent activists on charges of aiding terrorists in trials that violated basic due process rights.  Although authorities reportedly brought charges under the guise of countering violent militancy, allegations included peaceful acts such as distributing humanitarian aid, participating in protests, and documenting human rights abuses.Amnesty:  On November 16, the regime issued Decree No. 36 purportedly granting general amnesty, with some conditions, to detainees who were charged with misdemeanor crimes, terminally ill, or were at least age 70 and whose crimes were committed prior to the decree issue date.  The decree also purportedly granted amnesty to those who absconded from the military and either remained in the country or left the country providing that the person surrendered themselves within three or six months, accordingly.  It also purportedly issued partial amnesties commuting death sentences to life imprisonment and reducing life sentences to 20 years in prison.  Local media and NGOs reported the amnesty announcement came less than two hours after the ICJ’s ruling for the regime to cease the use of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  Human rights organizations claimed the amnesty did not facilitate the release of political prisoners.  The regime’s attorney general in Damascus claimed on November 20 that 500 detainees were released through the amnesty, according to local media.  The SNHR recorded no releases of political prisoners or others in connection to the November 16 amnesty at year’s end.Limited detainee releases occurred as part of localized settlement agreements with the regime.  During the year regime forces violated prior amnesty agreements by conducting raids and arrest campaigns against civilians and former members of armed opposition factions in areas with signed settlement agreements.																										f. Transnational Repression										The government engaged in transnational repression directly and through others to intimidate and exact reprisal against individuals outside of its sovereign borders, including members of diaspora populations such as political opponents, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and journalists.  The regime used its embassies as outposts, activists’ in-country relatives as proxies, and digital technologies as tools of surveillance and harassment.Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence:  The regime allegedly killed or used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries for politically motivated reprisal.  On May 21, unknown assailants in Essen, Germany, stabbed to death a Syrian activist who had revealed a number of regime officials involved in human rights violations who had sought refuge in Germany, according to activists and local media.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion:  Regime and regime-affiliated groups threatened and harassed witnesses in trials against regime officials in national courts in Europe, as well as their families in Syria.  Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) reported in May and July that several witnesses in the trial in Germany of Alaa M., a Syrian physician accused of torturing and killing civilians in military hospitals and in a regime intelligence services detention center, received personal threats for testifying.  At least two witnesses for the trial also reported their families in Syria being intimidated, according to SJAC.  SJAC contended witnesses were reluctant to participate in Syria-related investigations in European countries because of these kinds of threats.In May, SJAC reported the regime, through its staff in its embassies and missions abroad and regime-affiliated groups, maintained a global surveillance apparatus to track systematically dissidents’ activities both inside and outside of the country and intimidate Syrian political opponents.  Its security agencies used consular services, such as passport renewal, as an opportunity to gather information on dissidents and perceived dissidents abroad.NGOs reported the regime threatened in-country family members of diaspora activists and witnesses to exert additional pressure on them and their work abroad.  The regime also continued to engage in a range of digital attacks against members of civil society to surveil and harass them, both inside and outside its borders, including through account and device hacking.  Syrians in the diaspora were targeted with phishing attempts.Efforts to Control Mobility:  There were reports the regime attempted to control mobility to exact reprisal against citizens abroad by revoking their identity documents, denying them consular services, or otherwise engaging in actions aimed at jeopardizing their legal status, restricting their movement, or provoking their detention in the country where they were located.Bilateral Pressure:  There were reports the regime for politically motivated purposes attempted to exert bilateral pressure on other countries aimed at having them take adverse action against specific Syrian activists and refugees.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Regime security forces evicted persons from their places of residence and routinely seized, auctioned, or demolished detainees’ property and personal items without due process or adequate restitution.  The law provided for the confiscation of movable and immovable property of persons convicted of terrorism.  Security forces did not catalog these items in accordance with the law, and although detained individuals had the right to retrieve their confiscated belongings after release, authorities often did not return the property.  Persons with a backlog of service bills or back taxes who were unable to pay their debt to the regime were given a brief window to leave their property, while intelligence forces summarily seized homes and businesses of some former opposition members.  The regime seized land, houses, and capital of perceived opponents living abroad and redistributed them to its supporters.  The COI reported in March that regime seizures of property, auctioning of rights, and prohibition of access to property without due process or compensation could amount to violations of housing, land, and property rights.In May, the SNHR reported more than 14 million citizens lost their land and property due to the regime’s property laws.  The military conscription law allowed the Ministry of Finance to confiscate the assets of “[military] service evaders” and their families who failed to pay the military exemption fee, without requiring authorities to provide notice or the opportunity to challenge the decision.  Human rights groups described this practice as an attempt to extort citizens living abroad and to dissuade refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning.  According to the Ministry of Defense, military exemption fees ranged from approximately 17.5 million Syrian pounds (SYP) to 25 million SYP ($7,000 to $10,000).  Civilian pilots applying for military exemption were required to pay the equivalent of $10,000 to $15,000.According to media reports and activists, regime forces also seized property left by refugees and IDPs and used confiscations to target regime opponents.  The CTC could try cases in the absence of the defendant, providing legal cover for the confiscation of property left by refugees and IDPs.  In its March report, the COI found some displaced persons who returned to regime-controlled territory were prevented from accessing their homes or had to pay bribes to members of the local administration to regain access to their residential properties.  According to local media, the regime continued to auction the land of displaced persons to investors.On March 26, 15 militia members affiliated with the regime’s military security branch arrested a farmer and his son in Eastern Ghouta, transferred them to an unknown location under the pretext of excavating the property in search of weapons and ammunition buried by the opposition, and confiscated furniture, electrical tools, and other items from around the farm, according to local media.On September 15 and October 31, local media reported the regime indiscriminately demolished dozens of buildings in the Hajar al-Aswad neighborhood in the Rif Dimashq Governorate under the pretext of removing rubble.  Media reported the regime did not differentiate between buildings posing a threat to public safety and those that did not, and alleged the regime’s actions violated the law.Armed groups also reportedly evicted persons from their places of residence and seized residents’ properties.  In March, the COI reported factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of armed Syrian opposition groups supported by the government of Turkey, prevented civilians from regaining access to their properties, threatened them with arrest for reclaiming properties, or forced them to pay “fees” to return to their properties.  NGOs reported factions of the SNA often carried out detentions in conjunction with property appropriation, forcing many to leave the area and preventing their return.  Although some persons reported instances of property restitution, the vast majority remained unable to reclaim their homes and lands.  Due to threats of detention during the year and potential reprisal from SNA factions involved in both the complaint and the restitution process, many refrained from submitting, or withdrew, complaints to informal local grievance committees concerning extortion, property appropriation, and the imposition of levies.  The COI also reported women faced additional challenges due to pre-existing gender inequalities and were reluctant to seek redress for property-related violations from such all-men committees.The COI concluded SNA members “continued to commit&#8230;pillage&#8230;which may amount to&#8230;war crimes.”  NGOs continued to assess these and other abuses by armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey were part of a systematic effort to enforce demographic change targeting Kurdish Syrians.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary searches, but the regime routinely failed to respect these prohibitions.  Police and other security services frequently bypassed search warrant requirements in criminal cases by citing security reasons or emergency grounds for entry into private property.  Arbitrary home raids occurred in large cities and towns of most governorates where the regime maintained a presence, usually following antigovernment protests, opposition attacks against regime targets, or resumption of regime control.The regime continued to open mail addressed to both citizens and foreign residents and routinely monitored private internet communications arbitrarily and unlawfully, including email.  It also utilized surveillance technologies and practices including internet and social media controls, blocking or filtering of websites and social media platforms, sensors, spyware, data analytics, recording devices, and nonconsensual location tracking.Numerous reports confirmed the regime punished large numbers of family members for offenses allegedly committed by their relatives, such as by arbitrarily placing them on a list of alleged terrorists, freezing their assets, lodging threats against them, detaining them, torturing them, and even killing them.  The regime also threatened to arrest or arrested children to punish dissent of their parents or for other political purposes.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The regime, proregime militias such as the National Defense Forces, armed opposition groups supported by Turkey that made up the SNA, the SDF, violent extremist groups such as HTS and ISIS, foreign terrorist groups such as Hizballah, and the governments of Russia, Turkey, and Iran were all involved in armed conflict throughout the country during the year.The regime systemically disregarded the safety and well-being of its population, used violence against civilians and civilian institutions, and refused to protect most individuals from state and nonstate violence.Numerous human rights organizations reported the regime continued to arbitrarily and unlawfully kill, forcibly disappear, torture, and detain persons.Attacks impacting and destroying schools, hospitals, places of worship, water and electrical stations, bakeries, markets, civil defense force centers, densely populated residential areas, and houses were common throughout the country.  According to the COI, the regime’s arbitrary requirement that citizens obtain its clearance (“security clearance”) to move, construct a house, open a shop, or apply for a job restricted freedoms and housing-related rights and led to extortion, property seizures, and the loss of livelihoods and basic services.As of December, there were more than 5.1 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and 6.8 million IDPs in the country.  According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 15.3 million Syrians, nearly 70 percent of the population, were in dire need of humanitarian assistance and 90 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty.Killings:  Media sources and human rights groups varied in their estimates of how many persons were killed since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, with estimates ranging up to 550,000 killed.The SNHR reported parties to the conflict killed 1,032 civilians, including at least 181 children and 150 women, during the year.  According to the SNHR, during the year the regime and its Russian and Iranian allies killed 245 civilians, including 63 children and 41 women.  The SNHR recorded at least 19 massacres, which they defined as any incident in which a party killed five or more noncombatants, resulting in the deaths of at least 362 persons during the year.  The regime, Russian forces, or aligned militias were responsible for seven of the massacres killing 77 persons, including 26 children and eight women.The Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict reported in June that it had verified 2,438 grave violations against 2,407 children in 2022, including the killing and maiming of at least 711 children, the plurality of which were attributed to regime and proregime forces.Regime and proregime forces reportedly conducted aerial bombardments and shelling of civilian areas, attacking civilians in hospitals, ambulances, residential areas, schools, and IDP settlements throughout the year.  In its September report, the COI found regime forces “may have launched indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or injury of civilians” and “direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects,” which the COI concluded could amount to war crimes.The SNHR reported the regime bombed areas affected by the devastating February 6 earthquake 119 times from February 6 to April 10, killing five civilians and wounding 42 others.NGOs reported hostilities continued in the country’s southern region during the year, including through attacks by unknown assailants targeting individuals affiliated with the regime, progovernment figures, and “reconciled” opposition fighters and civilians.  For the first time in five years, the regime’s air force carried out airstrikes on Dara’a and conducted military raids on Tafas and Nawa, where large numbers of opposition fighters who refused to “reconcile” with the regime remained, according to the COI’s September report.On October 5, an unclaimed drone attack during a graduation ceremony for cadets at a regime military academy in Homs killed at least 120 persons, including women and children, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.  The regime claimed in a statement that “armed terrorist groups” were responsible without identifying a group.  On the same day, the regime and Russian forces launched a military campaign in the northwest affecting more than 2,300 locations across Idlib and western Aleppo, killing at least 70 persons and displacing 120,000, according to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  HRW reported the regime used cluster munitions and incendiary munitions during these attacks, which also damaged critical services and infrastructure including 23 health facilities and hospitals, 17 schools, mosques, displacement camps, and markets.  On October 24, an airstrike hit an IDP camp in Idlib Governorate, killing five family members including a pregnant woman, two infants, and their grandmother, age 70, according to HRW.The Syria Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, reported regime forces conducted “double-tap” attacks – a practice of striking a location, then striking the same location again soon after to kill and maim rescuers trying to help the injured – in the northwest during the year.The regime reportedly killed four medical professionals, including one woman, and one member of the civil defense during the year.  On July 11, a regime guided missile killed White Helmets volunteer Abdul Basit Ahmad Abd al-Khaleq after it struck his rescue vehicle as he traveled to inspect areas affected by regime artillery shelling in Aleppo, according to the SNHR.  On October 30, local media reported a regime missile strike on an ambulance in Idlib killed a paramedic and injured two others.On January 27, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) released a report concluding there were reasonable grounds to believe that on April 7, 2018, the Syrian Arab Air Force conducted a chlorine attack in Douma that killed 43 persons and affected dozens more.  Observers assessed that the regime retained a residual chemical weapons capability during the year.The SNHR documented the SDF killed 74 civilians, including nine children and 11 women, during the year.  On August 10, the SNHR reported the detention, torture, and death of an elementary school teacher by the SDF.  On December 3, the SNHR reported the SDF shot to death Faransa Hamad al-Rouzaq while she was riding a motorbike in eastern Deir Ez-Zour Governorate.The SNHR documented HTS killed 16 civilians, including two children and five women, during the year.  On December 9, HTS fired multiple shells in response to the regime, striking towns in western rural Aleppo Governorate, killing two women and a child and injuring 22 civilians, according to the SNHR.The SNHR documented ISIS killed one civilian during the year.  On March 24, April 15, and April 16, local media with ties to the regime attributed the shooting and killing of at least 50 persons while collecting truffles in the countryside of Hama to members of ISIS; dozens more of the truffle collectors went missing, according to local media.The SNHR documented the SNA killed 17 civilians, including five children and one woman, during the year.  On March 20, members of the SNA faction Jaysh al-Sharqiyah shot and killed four Kurdish men outside their home in Jindires while they celebrated Newroz, the Kurdish New Year holiday, according to local media and human rights NGOs.  HRW reported the SNA military police division announced the detention of the alleged attackers.  The Syrian Interim Government’s adjudicatory proceedings to determine the alleged attackers’ disposition continued at year’s end.  Jaysh al-Sharqiyah denied that its members had acted on official orders.  In its September report, the COI found the killing of the four Kurdish men could amount to the war crime of murder.The COI in March and September reported multiple instances of torture and death in SNA detention, primarily in detention centers in Raju, Ra’s al-Ayn, and Hawar Killis.  Local media reported on August 18 a civilian named Hazem Mohsen Tafiliya in Afrin died under torture in a SNA military detention facility after attempting to cross into Turkey.The COI, the SNHR, and other human rights groups reported dozens of civilian deaths from multiple car bombings, other attacks involving improvised explosive devices, and fighting among armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey in the north.The COI reported on January 18 “a likely Turkish guided air-to-ground missile” – apparently fired from a drone – hit a pickup truck located east of Qahtaniyah town, killing the “two men inside” as well as a civilian man and a boy, age 11, nearby, and injuring several other civilians, including children.  In September, the COI reported ground and aerial attacks between Turkey and SNA factions and the SDF led to civilian deaths and injuries in Aleppo, Hasakah, and Raqqa governorates.From December 23 to 27, Turkey launched airstrikes into northeast Syria, mainly in Hasakah, Kobani, and Qamishli, that killed 10 civilians and caused significant damage to civilian infrastructure including hospitals and factories, according to local media and human rights organizations.  The Turkish defense minister publicly announced on December 27 these attacks were in retaliation for December 22 and 23 attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on Turkish military outposts in Iraq that killed 12 Turkish service members.The COI reported that on May 8, “an airstrike on a house&#8230;east of Suwayda, widely attributed to the Royal Jordanian Air Force, killed seven civilians including a man accused of drug trafficking, his wife and five children, and injured another child.”  The COI noted that while there was no claim of responsibility, the strike came shortly after Jordan warned that it would take military action inside the country to address drug trafficking.Abductions:  Regime and proregime forces reportedly were responsible for most disappearances during the year.Armed groups not affiliated with the regime also reportedly abducted individuals, targeting religious leaders, aid workers, suspected regime affiliates, perceived dissidents, journalists, and activists.The COI reported the SDF continued to unjustly detain civilians, including women and children, and held them in detention without charge.  According to the SNHR, the SDF detained 641 civilians, including 91 children and six women, during the year.  The SNHR and the NGO Syrians for Truth and Justice reported instances of SDF fighters detaining civilians, including journalists, human rights activists, and opposition party members.  NGOs reported cases of unjust detention at the hands of the SDF in the context of anti-ISIS operations.  In some instances, the detainees’ locations remained unknown.  In its September report, the COI reported there were reasonable grounds to believe the SDF “continue[d] to unlawfully deprive individuals of their liberty.”  On February 26, the SDF detained Kurdish journalist Goran Azm, two other men, and a boy, age 15, suffering from cancer in a Qamishli market without revealing their whereabouts, according to local media.DAANES maintained telephone lines for persons in Hasakah and Raqqa to inquire if their relatives had been detained during the year.  The SDF allowed the ICRC access to some detention facilities to monitor and report on conditions.  The SDF investigated most allegations against its forces.  Some members of the SDF were prosecuted for abuses, but statistics were unavailable.According to the COI and human rights organizations, HTS continued to unjustly detain political opponents, journalists, activists, and civilians perceived as critical, including on social media, of their rule or religious doctrine.  According to the SNHR, HTS detained 248 individuals, including four children and seven women, during the year.  On July 12, local media reported HTS raided Killi camp for displaced persons in northern Idlib and detained 37 individuals, including 12 women, on charges of incitement against the entity due to their participation in protests.Although ISIS no longer controlled territory, the fate of 8,648 individuals, including 319 children and 255 women, abducted by ISIS since 2014 remained unknown, according to the SNHR.  More than 2,700 women and children, mainly Yezidis, remained unaccounted for after ISIS reportedly transferred them and others from Iraq to Syria and sold them into sex trafficking, forced them into nominal marriage to ISIS fighters, or gave them as “gifts” to ISIS commanders.  On June 3, Yezidi human rights activist Nadia Murad announced six Yezidi women were rescued after more than eight years of ISIS captivity and returned to Iraq.There were no updates during the year on the fate or whereabouts of activists and religious leaders believed to have been abducted by ISIS, armed opposition, or unidentified armed groups at the earlier stages of the conflict.The COI and the SNHR reported kidnapping and unjust detention by factions and police forces of the SNA continued.  According to the SNHR, SNA factions detained at least 365 individuals, including 10 children and 25 women, during the year.  According to COI reporting in September, persons detained by factions and individual members of the SNA were held incommunicado for up to a year, not informed of the reasons for their detention, and not permitted access to legal representation.  Family members were denied information concerning detainee whereabouts and some family members seeking information on the fate or whereabouts of loved ones were threatened or arrested.  In some instances, relatives were allowed contact with detainees only after paying bribes or pressuring SNA members.The COI reported in September that many of the victims of detention by SNA factions were Kurdish and were suspected of having ties to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the SDF.  It reported in March that Kurdish detainees were routinely questioned on their alleged ties to these entities.  On August 21, local media reported SNA faction Suleiman Shah Brigade raided the houses of and detained 18 Kurds for resisting participation in demonstrations against the imposition of U.S. sanctions on the group earlier that month.The COI gathered several reports of abductions, among other retaliatory acts such as threats and beatings, by SNA members against owners who lodged complaints for property compensation or restitution.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  According to the COI and NGOs, the regime and its affiliated militias consistently engaged in physical abuse, punishment, and torture of opposition fighters and civilians.  Numerous organizations and former detainees reported nearly all detainees in regime detention experienced physical abuse and torture at some point during their detention.The SNHR estimated parties to the conflict committed at least 15 incidents of sexual violence against women and girls during the year, attributing five cases to the regime, six to the SNA, and four to the SDF.  The COI reported in February that members of armed groups, such as the SNA and HTS, committed the war crime of rape and other forms of sexual violence.There were also reports of armed opposition groups engaging in physical abuse, punishment, and treatment equivalent to torture, primarily targeting suspected regime agents and collaborators, proregime militias, and rival armed groups.During the year, the SNHR attributed 10 deaths due to torture, including one child, to the SDF.  In its July report on torture, the COI documented SDF torture and ill-treatment including against activists, NGO workers, and political opponents.  On March 14, local media reported a young man, Khader al-Sattam, was tortured to death by the SDF in the Alaya prison in Qamishli city four months after his arrest.During the year, the SNHR attributed three deaths due to torture to the SNA.  In September, the COI reported there were reasonable grounds to believe SNA members continued to “arbitrarily deprive individuals of liberty and may have committed the war crime of torture and cruel treatment.”  In July, the COI reported credible accounts during the year of beatings and other torture by members of the SNA to extract confessions, noting the use of tasers and electric shocks including to the genitals and other forms of sexual violence in makeshift detention facilities.  The COI also noted persons suspected of YPG or SDF ties were among victims of such acts and detainees primarily of Kurdish origin were interrogated regarding their faith and ethnicity and denied food or water.  On August 18, local media reported civilian Hazem Mohsen Tufayli was tortured to death in an SNA Afrin military police prison after he was arrested trying to cross the border to Turkey.  SNA police allegedly prevented activists from examining his body after it was handed over to the military hospital in Afrin.The COI and other human rights organizations reported the frequent presence of Turkish officials in SNA detention facilities, including in interrogation sessions where torture was used.  In July, the COI reported that during an interrogation session in the Sultan Murad-operated Hawar Kilis prison in Azaz, a Turkish official assisted in suspending a Kurdish detainee by his limbs for a prolonged period while interrogating him through an interpreter on his alleged links to the YPG, and threatened the detainee with rape.During the year, the SNHR attributed eight deaths due to torture, including one woman, to HTS.  In July, the COI reported that HTS continued to “carry out the war crime of cruel treatment and torture” and that these tactics were most commonly used to force confessions or punish individuals.  According to the COI and human rights organizations, HTS continued to torture and abuse activists, media workers, and others critical of HTS.  Human rights groups also reported HTS routinely detained and physically abused civilians deemed to have violated the group’s stringent interpretation of sharia, which rejected secularism.  HTS reportedly permitted confessions obtained through torture in its sharia “courts,” denied detainees the opportunity to challenge the legal basis or unlawful nature of their detention, and executed or disappeared perceived opponents and their families.Child Soldiers:  The Secretary of State determined Syria had governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces and pro-Syrian regime-affiliated militias that forcibly recruited and used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023.  See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/.The UN Secretary-General Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict, published in June, reported the recruitment and use of 1,696 children (1,593 boys and 103 girls) in the conflict between January and December 2022.  According to the report, 1,688 of the children served in combat roles.  The report attributed 637 verified cases to the SDF (633 to the YPG and YPG-affiliated Women’s Protection Units and four to other components of the SDF), 611 verified cases to the SNA, 383 verified cases to HTS, and 25 verified cases to Syrian government forces and proregime militias, among other actors.According to the UN Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the SDF “progressed in implementing the 2019 action plan” to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, resulting in the disengagement of a further 33 children from SDF ranks.  The SDF took disciplinary measures against personnel who violated action plan commitments.  The report noted, however, increased numbers of verified cases of recruitment and use of child soldiers by the SDF.Other Conflict-related Abuse:  In cities where the regime regained control during the year, the COI reported the regime restricted residents’ movement and access to health care and food.  Human rights groups reported the regime and its allies frequently imposed these and other collective measures to punish communities, including by restricting humanitarian access; looting and pillaging; expropriating property; extorting funds; engaging in arbitrary detentions and widespread conscription; detaining, forcibly disappearing, or forcibly displacing individuals; engaging in repressive measures aimed at silencing media activists; and destroying evidence of potential war crimes.In April, the White Helmets reported millions of Syrian civilians lived in areas contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance due to years of bombing by the regime and Russia.  The SNHR reported 114 civilians, including 26 children and 11 women, were killed by remnants of war and unexploded ordnance during the year.  On January 31, a remnant of war exploded in a town south of Idlib and killed a civilian and injured two others, according to the White Helmets and local media.  The White Helmets reported from January to November 13, its teams documented 15 explosions of remnants of war in the northwest that killed two men and four children and injured 23 civilians, including 16 children and three women.The United Nations estimated approximately 12 million Syrians were food insecure.  Various human rights and various media organizations found the regime implemented a policy and legal framework to manipulate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction funding to benefit itself, reward those loyal to it, and punish perceived opponents.  The regime regularly restricted humanitarian organizations’ access to communities in need of aid, selectively approved humanitarian projects, and required organizations to partner with vetted local actors to ensure the humanitarian response was siphoned centrally through and for the benefit of the regime, at the cost of preventing aid from reaching the population unimpeded.  Organizations reported entities such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent faced difficulties accessing areas retaken by the regime.The regime routinely disrupted the supply of humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and assistance, to areas under siege as well as to some recaptured areas.  In areas under its control, the regime insisted that independent humanitarian groups implement most assistance through regime-linked organizations.  It reportedly pressured Syrian employees of humanitarian groups to submit to regime demands that violated humanitarian principles.  The regime refused to provide unfettered access in areas under its control for needs assessments, aid distributions, and post-distribution monitoring.  UN agencies and NGOs continued to seek to deliver humanitarian assistance to opposition-held areas subject to regime offensives, but the regime continued to restrict crossline operations originating from Damascus.In February and March, local media and Amnesty International reported the regime diverted and stole humanitarian aid meant for those impacted by the February 6 earthquakes.In July, Russia, backed by the regime, vetoed the UN Security Council’s reauthorization of UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for the country.  The regime then offered its consent to further UN cross-border assistance from Turkey but under a set of conditions the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) deemed unworkable.  In August, the regime withdrew most of its conditions but affirmed UN cross-border access would be for only a limited period.On August 16, local media reported that hundreds of tons of expired UN humanitarian aid, including food and medical supplies, was found buried in Tartous.  The media attributed it to prolonged storage within regime warehouses and the regime’s refusal to distribute the aid to its citizens.Turkey maintained restrictions on the provision of humanitarian and stabilization aid to areas of the northeast from Turkey.In March, Amnesty International reported some SNA factions obstructed and diverted humanitarian aid aimed at alleviating the suffering of tens of thousands of civilians in Aleppo after the February earthquakes.The SNHR documented 77 attacks on schools throughout the year, attributing 44 attacks to the regime.  Human rights organizations reported that repeated attacks on schools, growing poverty rates amidst economic crisis, recruitment of child soldiers, and violent treatment of children in detention centers continued to hamper the ability of children to receive an education.NGOs and media outlets documented repeated and continuing attacks striking health facilities and other infrastructure in northwest Syria perpetrated by regime and Russian forces.  According to UNOCHA, more than half of all health facilities in the country were closed or partially functioning.Human rights organizations detailed the practice in which, after hostilities ceased and local truces were implemented, regime and proregime forces required certain individuals to undergo a reconciliation process as a condition to remain in their homes.  Various sources continued to report cases during the year in which the regime targeted persons who agreed to reconciliation agreements.On January 5, Syrians for Truth and Justice reported on the regime’s use of security clearances as a systematic tool of oppression against citizens.  The report noted the process loomed large over all aspects of life in the country and put citizens at the mercy of security forces to do many activities, including to buy, sell or rent an apartment, start and license a business, organize a concert, obtain a passport, or obtain a graduation diploma.Regime forces and armed opposition groups, including SNA factions, also reportedly pillaged and destroyed property, including homes, farms, and businesses of their perceived opponents.The regime renewed in October its efforts to recapture areas in Idlib under the control of HTS, resulting in civilian casualties, with HTS reportedly launching counterattacks against regime positions.  These attacks, although much fewer and smaller in scale than those by the regime and proregime forces, reportedly caused some civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure.The COI and NGOs continued to report armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey engaged in the systemic and repeated looting and seizure of civilian homes and property, particularly those of Kurds, resulting in civilian displacement.  The COI and NGOs reported SNA militias continued to profit from their control over real estate and agricultural exports seized from the local population.During the year, local media reported Turkey, sometimes in cooperation with factions of the SNA or SNA military police, transferred civilian detainees to Turkey.  On August 26, local media reported Turkish security forces, in cooperation with SNA military police, transferred three Kurdish detainees from a detention center in Tal Abyad, Syria to a prison in Urfa, Turkey.  The three detainees, including a young woman, were arrested in April for trying to cross into Turkish territory and were alleged to have worked for and belonged to the PKK.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										While the constitution provided for limited freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, the regime severely restricted this right, often terrorizing, abusing, arresting, or killing those who attempted to exercise this right.Freedom of Expression:  The law contained a number of speech offenses limiting the freedom of expression, including provisions criminalizing expression that, for example, “weakens the national sentiment” in times of war or defamed the president, courts, military, or public authorities.  The law included several categories for material banned from publication, including content affecting national unity and national security, harming religions and beliefs or state symbols, or inciting sectarian strife.  The law imposed a one- to three-year sentence on anyone who criticized or insulted the president.  Additionally, the law imposed a minimum six-month jail sentence and fine for citizens residing in the country or abroad found responsible for broadcasting or spreading disinformation that undermined the state’s reputation or financial standing or improved the reputation of unnamed enemy states.The law similarly criminalized the broadcasting of false news or claims undermining confidence in the national currency.  It also provided for a prison sentence of at least one year for anyone who, in writing or in speech, called for the relinquishing of Syrian territory.  The regime routinely characterized expression as illegal, and individuals could not criticize the regime publicly or privately without fear of reprisal.  The regime also stifled criticism by broadly invoking provisions of law prohibiting acts or speech inciting sectarianism.  The regime monitored political meetings and relied on informer networks.On March 25, local media reported the regime arrested activist and blogger Rami Vitale in Latakia on charges of insulting the minister of interior by publishing a Facebook post calling for the perpetrators of torture and violence against detained child beggars in Latakia to be held accountable.On August 20, local media reported regime security services arrested activist Ahmed Ibrahim Ismail in Latakia after he criticized living conditions and regime corruption on his Facebook page.Violence and Harassment:  Regime forces reportedly detained, arrested, harassed, and killed journalists, including ones associated with networks favorable to the regime, and other writers for works deemed critical of the state.  Both the regime and violent extremist groups routinely detained, intimidated, and tortured YouTubers and other citizen journalists.The regime and, to a lesser extent, HTS, ISIS, and other armed groups targeted and killed both local and foreign journalists, according to Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and Freedom House.  The SNHR documented the regime killed one journalist and arrested at least nine journalists and media workers, including two women, during the year.  RSF reported the risk of arrest, abduction, torture, or death caused journalists to flee the country.On August 10, local media reported Khalil al-Mousa, a journalist and war correspondent working for regime-aligned media outlets, was killed under torture in Sednaya Prison a year after a proregime Iranian-backed paramilitary group kidnapped him and another journalist.  He faced allegations of “undermining the state’s prestige” and “weakening national morale” for reporting that exposed Iranian and Syrian figures involved in drug trafficking.On August 17, local news outlets reported regime forces beat, shot, and killed a civilian in Maarat al-Numan for criticizing the deterioration of public services and the mistreatment of returning residents.  According to local news, the regime prevented the victim’s family from burying him until they agreed to attribute his death to cardiac arrest.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  Although the law provided for the “right to access information about public affairs” and banned “the arrest, questioning, or searching of journalists,” press and media restrictions outweighed freedoms.  Forms of censorship included intimidation, banning individuals from the country, dismissing journalists from their positions, and ignoring requests for continued accreditation.The law contained many restrictions on freedom of expression for the press, including provisions criminalizing publication of so-called false news and content affecting “national unity and national security.”  The law further prohibited publication of any information regarding the armed forces and the publication on social media of false news causing fear and panic, with prison sentences of up to 15 years with hard labor.The regime strictly controlled the dissemination of information, including on developments regarding fighting between the regime and the armed opposition, the spread of disease, human rights abuses perpetrated by the regime, and trials of regime officials in third-country courts.  Prohibited topics included criticism of the regime, sectarian tensions, and problems facing religious and ethnic minority communities.  The Ministries of Information and Culture censored domestic and foreign publications prior to circulation or importation and prevented circulation of content determined to be critical or sensitive.  The regime prohibited publication or distribution of any material security officials deemed threatening or embarrassing to the regime.  Censorship was usually more stringent for materials in Arabic.The regime exercised extensive control over local print and broadcast media, and the law imposed strict punishment for reporters who did not reveal their sources in response to regime requests.Only print publications whose reporting promoted and defended the regime remained in circulation.  Books critical of the regime were illegal.  The regime owned some radio stations and most local television companies, and the Ministry of Information closely monitored all radio and television news broadcasts and entertainment programs for adherence to regime policies.  Despite restrictions on ownership and use, citizens widely used satellite dishes, although the regime jammed some foreign Arabic-language networks.Local journalists reported they engaged in extensive self-censorship on subjects such as criticism of the president and his family, the security services, and Alawite religious groups due to fear of reprisal, including arrest, torture, and death.On July 8, the Ministry of Information canceled the accreditation of the BBC in areas under its control following the outlet’s June 27 investigative report into the regime’s involvement in the captagon drug trade, according to local media.On July 13, local media reported the General Authority for Radio and Television suspended the sports program entitled The Captain, presented by Mohammed al-Khatib, after the broadcast mentioned Iran and Russia’s control of Syria.Libel/Slander Laws:  The law criminalized libel, slander, insult, defamation, and blasphemy, and the regime used such provisions to restrict public discussion and to detain, arrest, and imprison journalists perceived to have opposed the regime.National Security:  The regime regularly cited laws protecting national security to restrict freedom of expression, including for members of the press, to arrest and punish critics of the government, and to deter criticism of regime policies or public officials.Nongovernmental Impact:  According to Freedom House, media freedom varied in territory held by armed opposition groups, but local outlets were typically under heavy pressure to support the dominant militant faction.  Human rights organizations reported violent extremist opposition groups detained, tortured, and harassed journalists and posed a serious threat to press and media freedoms.In March and September, the COI reported HTS continued to detain civilians “arbitrarily” including activists, journalists, and others who were critical of their rule and religious doctrine.  HTS also reportedly continued to restrict the work of media workers whom it perceived as challenging their rule and disparaging their ability to provide security or services to residents.  HTS reportedly referred to violations of its media “law” – a text that was not publicly available – when silencing critical reporting and intimidating journalists.  The COI reported those held for voicing negative views of HTS were forced to sign a pledge committing not to criticize the group to secure their release.  In March, the COI reported on a journalist HTS and its “media directorate” repeatedly threatened, harassed, and interrogated over the previous year regarding his reporting on living conditions in Idlib and alleged violations committed by HTS.  The “media directorate” reportedly suspended the journalist from work for three months and forced him to sign a pledge to stop speaking publicly regarding HTS.  According to the COI, HTS’s restrictive actions led to self-censorship by residents who removed social media posts for fear of retaliation; some individuals were subjected to online defamation campaigns, including for work promoting gender equality.In March, the COI reported SNA members arrested individuals who expressed opposing or critical views.  On June 23, members of the SNA civil police assaulted media activists Ahmed al-Khatib and Abu Bakr al-Saqqa in Azaz and prevented them from doing their job, according to the Syrian Journalists’ Association, and did the same in October, in the same northern town, to journalist Ayham Hilal.Local media reported DAANES and the SDF subjected journalists to arrest, suspension from work, and nonrenewal of journalistic assignments under the pretext of violating laws or supporting media outlets the SDF considered prohibited.  Activists alleged that although DAANES’ “media law” stipulated penalties ranging from a warning to a fine and a one-week suspension, DAANES suspended journalists for up to two years and permanently withdrew the licenses of channels.  On August 15, a masked military group affiliated with SDF intelligence raided the workplace of journalist Barzan Hussein.  The group allegedly assaulted the journalist and members of his family who tried to prevent his arrest.  Self-Administration officials acknowledged his arrest and Barzan was reportedly released from custody in October.  On November 6, DAANES issued a circular threatening journalists with legal accountability if they prepared reports for unlicensed media organizations or without obtaining prior authorization.																Internet Freedom						The regime restricted and disrupted access to the internet and censored online content.The regime continued to block circumvention tools used to access censored content, internet security software that could prevent state surveillance, and other applications that enabled anonymous communications.  The Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE) and private internet service providers (ISPs) implemented censorship using various commercially available software programs.  ISPs did not publicize the details of how blocking was implemented, or which websites were banned.  It was unclear which state agency typically made the blocking decisions the STE implemented.  Websites covering politics, minorities, human rights, foreign affairs, and other sensitive topics were censored or blocked outright.In areas controlled by the regime, the STE served as both an ISP and a telecommunications regulator, enforcing tight control over internet infrastructure.  Independent satellite-based connections were prohibited but heavily employed across the country, given damage to information and communication technology infrastructure in the conflict.  ISPs and cybercafes operating in regime-controlled areas required a permit from the STE and another security permit from the Interior Ministry, and cybercafe owners were required to monitor customers and record their activities.  The regime controlled and restricted access to the internet and monitored email and social media accounts.Freedom House reported self-censorship was widespread online and continued as users contended with threats and violent reprisals for critical content.  Sensitive topics included President Assad, former president Hafez Assad, the military, the ruling Baath Party, and influential government officials.  Other sensitive subjects, including religious and ethnic tensions, and corruption allegations related to the president’s family, were also off limits.  Individuals and groups reportedly could not express views via the internet, including by email, without prospect of reprisal.  The regime applied the law to regulate internet use and prosecuted users.  During the year, the SNHR documented the arrest of 114 individuals, including eight women, under the cybercrimes law.  Citizen journalists and other civilians were frequently targeted based on their digital activism.  Hackers linked to Iran and Russia continued cyberattacks against those reporting on human rights violations.The regime interfered with and blocked internet service, text messages, and two-step verification messages for password recovery or account activation.  The regime employed sophisticated technologies and hundreds of computer specialists for filtering and surveillance purposes, such as monitoring email and social media accounts of detainees, activists, and others.  The security branches were largely responsible for restricting internet freedom and access, and the regime did not prosecute or otherwise restrict their activities.The regime also restricted or prohibited internet access in areas under attack.  Regime officials obstructed connectivity through their control of key infrastructure, at times shutting down the internet and mobile telephone networks entirely or in areas of unrest.  Authorities limited the amount of data citizens were able to use through an “internet rationing” scheme.  There was generally little access to state-run internet service in besieged areas unless users could capture signals clandestinely from rooftops near regime-controlled areas.  Some towns in opposition-held areas had limited internet access via satellite connections.  Some activists reportedly gained access independently to satellite internet or through second- and third-generation (2G and 3G) cellular telephone network coverage.The regime manipulated online content, including by creating false content aiming to undermine the credibility of human rights and humanitarian groups.  The progovernment Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) hacker group frequently launched cyberattacks to disable websites and post proregime messages.  In addition to promoting hacking and conducting surveillance, the regime and groups it supported, such as the SEA, reportedly planted spyware and other malware in cellphone applications to target human rights activists, opposition members, and journalists.  Local human rights groups blamed regime personnel for instances in which malware infected activists’ computers.  Arbitrary arrests raised fears that authorities could detain internet users at any time for online activities perceived to threaten the regime’s control, such as posting on a blog or social media.Observers accused the SEA of slowing internet access to force self-censorship on regime critics and diverting email traffic to regime servers for surveillance.  The SEA allegedly targeted women online during the year including by defaming women who participated in antiregime protest in Suwayda.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The regime limited the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution provided for the freedom of peaceful assembly, but the law granted the government broad powers to restrict this freedom.  The regime generally restricted freedom of peaceful assembly whether through these broad powers or unlawful measures.The Ministry of Interior required permission for demonstrations or any public gathering of more than three persons.  As a rule, the ministry authorized demonstrations only by regime-affiliated groups or the Baath Party, which orchestrated them on numerous occasions.  Throughout the year, the regime suppressed peaceful protests, including in Dara’a, Suwayda, and Deir Ez-Zour, at times shelling these locations, opening fire, and arresting perceived and actual protesters.Local media reported on regime attempts to suppress months-long antiregime protests that began in August in Suwayda against poor living conditions.  The protests’ scope grew significantly, with thousands participating in the governorates of Dara’a and Suwayda, in addition to other protests in Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Latakia, Tartus, Aleppo, and Deir Ez-Zour.  On August 26, the SNHR reported it documented the regime’s use of arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance of protesters and slandering of protesters or anyone criticizing the regime as traitors or collaborators working with foreign entities.  The SNHR also alleged the regime attempted to stage counterdemonstrations where loyalists chanted proregime slogans and threatened regime opponents.  On September 13, local media reported the regime fired on protesters in Suwayda attempting to close the Baath Party branch headquarters, injuring three individuals.On November 7, local media reported regime security forces arrested three Palestinian activists in southern Damascus for organizing a Gaza solidarity protest in which approximately 100 Palestinians from local refugee camps participated without obtaining prior security approval, and dispersed demonstrators.According to human rights activists and press, the SDF suppressed freedom of peaceful assembly in areas under its influence.  On January 23, the SDF arrested more than 100 participants in demonstrations in Raqqa following the killing of a baby girl and her mother, according to local media.  On February 4, local media reported the SDF fired on dozens of demonstrators in villages in Deir Ez-Zour protesting the SDF and demanding the release of detainees.HTS continued to suppress freedom of peaceful assembly in areas under its influence.  In September, the COI reported HTS arrested at least three women protesting the group’s large-scale May and June arrest campaign targeting alleged opposition party members.  HTS also detained three journalists covering the same demonstrations, according to the COI.According to human rights activists and press, SNA factions suppressed freedom of peaceful assembly in its areas of influence.  On May 4, local media reported a member of the SNA’s civil police attacked women in Raju camp for displaced persons, located in Afrin, when they tried to gather to demonstrate in front of the Turkish base.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for the freedom of association, but the law granted the regime latitude to restrict this freedom.  The regime generally did so through broad powers or unlawful measures.  The regime required prior registration and approval for private associations and restricted the activities of associations and their members.  Executive boards of professional associations were not independent of the regime.None of the local human rights organizations operated with a license, due to the regime’s practice of denying or failing to act on registration requests, reportedly on political grounds, but some functioned under organizations with requisite registration.  The regime continued to block the multiyear effort by journalists to register a countrywide media association, but journalists in exile continued efforts to improve press freedom and freedom of expression through the Syrian Journalists’ Association, an independent democratic professional association established in 2012 by Syrians in exile.The regime selectively enforced the 2011 decree allowing establishment of independent political parties, permitting only proregime groups to form official parties (see section 3).  According to local human rights groups, opposition activists declined to organize parties, fearing the regime would use party lists to target opposition members.Under laws criminalizing membership and activity in illegal organizations, as determined by the regime, security forces detained individuals linked to local human rights groups, prodemocracy student groups, and other organizations perceived to be supporting the opposition, including humanitarian groups.HTS and other armed groups also restricted freedom of association, including civil society activity, in areas under their influence or control.  The SDF continued to unjustly detain individuals belonging to, or perceived to be affiliated with, political parties opposing the Kurdish Democratic Union Party or DAANES.  Detainees included opposition members, civil society activists, and media workers, according to the COI.  Armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey reportedly detained residents based on their affiliation with DAANES.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of movement “within the territories of the state unless restricted by a judicial decision or by the implementation of laws,” but the regime and other armed groups restricted internal movement and travel and instituted security checkpoints to monitor travel throughout the regions under their respective control.  The regime impeded some activists and journalists from traveling abroad, while others who received clearance to travel were interrogated upon return.In-country Movement:  In areas outside regime control, regime forces blocked humanitarian access, leading to severe malnutrition, lack of access to medical care, and deaths.  The same impacts resulted from regime attacks on Idlib Governorate and southern parts of the country, while fear of death and regime retribution resulted in mass civilian displacement and additional breakdowns in service provision and humanitarian assistance.  Violence, coupled with significant cultural pressure, severely restricted the movement of women in many areas.  Additionally, the law allowed certain men relatives to place travel bans on women.Regime security forces, as well as local and foreign militias, controlled checkpoints to monitor and limit movement.  The COI reported regime security officials extorted residents at checkpoints, and in some cases prevented civilians from fleeing besieged towns.  The regime also barred foreign diplomats, including UN and OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) delegations, from visiting most parts of the country and rarely granted them permission to travel outside Damascus.  The consistently high level and unpredictability of violence severely restricted movement throughout the country.The regime’s requirement for individuals to obtain a security clearance to enter and leave regime-held areas, or move freely within such areas, hampered freedom of movement and created obstacles for refugees and IDPs seeking to return to their home areas.  Regime authorities often withheld security clearances from perceived critics of the regime and their relatives, former opposition members, and former residents of areas considered strongholds of the opposition thus restricting their freedom of movement.In areas they influenced or controlled, armed opposition groups and terrorist groups such as HTS also restricted movement, including with checkpoints.  NGOs continued to report HTS imposed restrictions on women and girls’ freedom of movement and attempted to control and interfere with the delivery of humanitarian assistance.While the Syrian Democratic Council and the SDF generally supported IDP communities in the northeast, approximately 50,000 individuals, one-third of whom were Syrian nationals, remained at al-Hol and al-Roj displaced persons camps in northeast Syria without freedom of movement.An international NGO and local authorities managed the overcrowded al-Hol camp, with security by the SDF and Asayish, the DAANES internal security forces.  Many residents were from former ISIS-held areas, and half were children under age 12.  The COI reported in September that boys in the camp risked being transferred to military detention centers alongside adult alleged former ISIS fighters once they reached puberty.  The COI reported the SDF transferred at least 10 foreign, non-Iraqi boys from al-Hol to the Orkesh child rehabilitation center in Hasakah on January 31 without providing families a reason for their removal or opportunities for regular contact or visits following the separation.Living conditions in al-Hol camp remained difficult and camp residents were not able to freely move or leave the camp.  In September, the COI reported conditions continued to worsen with insufficient medical care and education, and noted malnourishment was a concern.  In the same report the COI assessed conditions in the al-Hol and al-Roj camps amounted to unlawful deprivation of liberty and cruel or inhuman treatment.  On April 22, the SDF killed a boy, age 11, in al-Hol camp after he allegedly crossed the camp fence to retrieve a soccer ball, according to local media.  While humanitarian organizations continued providing basic, life-saving assistance, at times services were reduced due to security incidents and operations as well as lockdowns.Foreign Travel:  While citizens had the right to travel internationally, the regime denied applications for passports and other vital documents, based on the applicant’s perceived political views, association with or support for opposition groups, or ties to geographic areas where the opposition dominated.  Additionally, the regime often banned travel by journalists and human rights or civil society activists, their families, and affiliates.  The regime comprehensively banned international travel of opposition members, often targeting any such individual who attempted to travel.  Local media and human rights groups repeatedly stated opposition activists and their families hesitated to leave the country, fearing attacks and arbitrary detention at airports and border crossings.The regime also imposed exit visa requirements and routinely closed the Damascus International Airport and border crossings, claiming the closures were due to violence or threats of violence.  Difficulty in accessing the free online portal to apply for a passport and the exorbitant costs to obtain them were prohibitive for many.  Many citizens reportedly learned of the ban against their travel only when authorities stopped them at points of departure.  The regime reportedly applied travel bans without explanation or explicit duration, including in cases when individuals sought to travel for health reasons.Women older than 18 had the legal right to travel without the permission of men relatives, but a husband could file a request with the Interior Ministry to prohibit his wife from departing the country.  The regime allowed Syrians living outside of the country whose passports had expired to renew at consulates, but many who fled as refugees were reluctant to do so fearing the regime could direct reprisals against family members still in the country.Citizenship:  Syrians born abroad to parents who fled the conflict and remained in refugee camps generally did not have access to Syrian citizenship documents.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The regime inconsistently cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to noncitizens seeking refugee and asylum status in the country.  The regime provided some cooperation to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which assisted Palestinian refugees in the country.  As of August 2022, the most recent data available, UNRWA recorded more than 568,000 Palestinian refugees residing in the country.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the regime had a system for providing protection to refugees.  UNHCR and UNRWA were able to maintain limited protection spaces for refugees and asylum seekers, although violence hampered access to vulnerable populations.  In coordination with both local and international NGOs, the United Nations continued to provide such individuals essential services and assistance.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  Both regime and opposition forces reportedly besieged, shelled, and otherwise made inaccessible some Palestinian refugee camps, neighborhoods, and sites, which resulted in severe malnutrition, lack of access to medical care and humanitarian assistance, and civilian deaths.  The United Nations estimated at least 40 percent of Palestinian refugees remained in protracted displacement.Freedom of Movement:  Regime and opposition forces reportedly restricted the freedom of movement of Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps.  On November 19, Action Group for Palestinians of Syria stated the regime tightened security measures on Palestinian camps and neighborhoods by adding checkpoints and limiting exit-entry movements.Refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities in the country also faced protection risks, multiple displacements, tightened security procedures at checkpoints, and difficulty obtaining required residency permits, all of which resulted in restrictions on their freedom of movement.Employment:  The law did not explicitly grant refugees, except Palestinians, the right to work.  While the regime rarely granted non-Palestinian refugees a work permit, many refugees found work in the informal sector including as guards, construction workers, and street vendors.Access to Basic Services:  The law allowed Palestinian refugees to receive identity cards and the same access to basic services provided to citizens.  The regime also allowed Iraqi refugees access to publicly available services, such as health care and education, but residency permits were available only to refugees who entered the country legally and possessed a valid passport.  The lack of access to residency permits exposed refugees to risks of harassment and exploitation and severely affected their access to public services.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										During the year, the United Nations estimated there were more than 6.8 million IDPs in the country and 5.1 million Syrian refugees outside the country due to the conflict since 2011.  The regime forcibly displaced populations from besieged areas and restricted movement of IDPs.  The regime generally did not provide sustainable access to services, assistance, and protection for IDPs or returning Syrian refugees.  UNHCR estimated the February earthquake displaced more than 500,000 persons.Violence and instability continued to be the primary cause for displacement, most often citizens fleeing regime and Russian aerial attacks.  UNOCHA reported a military campaign by the regime and Russian forces in October displaced 120,000 persons across Idlib and western Aleppo.  On October 24, local media reported Russian airstrikes killed five civilians, including women and children, and injured others in an IDP camp in western Idlib.UNOCHA reported more than 275,000 spontaneous IDP return movements between January and November.The regime did not promote the safe, voluntary, and dignified return, resettlement, or local integration of IDPs, and in some cases authorities refused to allow IDPs to return home.  UN humanitarian officials reported most IDPs sought shelter with host communities or in collective centers, abandoned buildings, or informal camps.  IDPs were routinely denied return to their places of origin due to regime restrictions, while others feared arrest in retaken or formerly besieged areas, including Rif Dimashq, Dara’a, Quneitra, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.During the year, the SNHR documented the regime arrested at least 156 individuals returning to regime-controlled areas after displacement, including 119 refugees returning from abroad, mostly from Lebanon, and 37 IDPs.  The arrests were primarily concentrated at Lebanese and Turkish border crossings and the Damascus International Airport.  Some of those released were rearrested or forcibly conscripted into the military.NGOs reported the regime’s confiscation of property from citizens it perceived as threats impeded the return of IDPs and of Syrians from abroad.  According to the COI, security clearances were a precondition for access to basic property and housing rights, a challenge for some IDPs.  Former detainees who could not obtain a security clearance were denied lease agreements in their former areas of residence.  Those residing outside regime-held areas needed a security clearance to obtain a power-of-attorney, which was needed to be represented by a lawyer in property matters.Humanitarian actors noted access remained a key obstacle to assisting vulnerable persons in areas controlled by both the regime and nonstate actors.  The regime and the Russian government routinely refused to approve UN requests for assistance delivery to the Rukban camp for Syrian IDPs, and Jordan restricted cross-border movements.Armed opposition groups and terrorist groups such as HTS also impeded humanitarian assistance to IDPs.  Humanitarian actors reported HTS and the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government attempted to regulate, benefit from, or interfere with the delivery of aid and services in areas of the northwest.  This included attempts to impose “taxes” and fees on humanitarian organizations, impose licensing and registration protocols, and interfere with beneficiary selection and aid distribution.  On November 12, local media reported the SNA faction Suleiman Shah Brigade opened fire on a displaced persons camp in Afrin, injuring three civilians.  The shooters reportedly aimed to seize residential blocks for faction members.The SDF and DAANES generally facilitated the safe and voluntary return of IDPs during the year, particularly to Deir Ez-Zour and Raqqa.  On June 17, however, the SDF attacked a group of residential units housing IDPs in the suburbs of Afrin, according to the SNHR.  The shelling reportedly injured four civilians, including two women and a girl.UNHCR continued to assess the conditions in the country were not yet in place for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Syrian refugees from abroad on a large scale.  According to UNHCR, 37,561 Syrian refugees returned during the year.  The COI and various NGOs, including Amnesty International and HRW, reported cases of the regime subjecting citizens returning from abroad to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture, at times accusing them of treason and support for terrorism, even in cases where reconciliation agreements were in place.  The COI reported in February some returnees had to pay bribes to members of the local administration to regain access to their residential properties or were prevented from accessing their homes.Human rights organizations reported an additional obstacle for Syrians considering returning to the country was the military conscription law, which allowed for the seizure of assets of men who evaded military conscription and failed to pay military exemption fees.In July, HRW reported the Syrian military arbitrarily detained, tortured, and forcibly conscripted into its reserve force a man whom Lebanon had forcibly deported in April.Throughout the year, the regime, Russia, and Turkey all encouraged the return of refugees to the country.  Russia reportedly sought to use Syrian refugee returns to secure international donations for reconstruction efforts.  Press reports and some NGOs claimed hundreds, and possibly thousands, of Syrian refugees were deported from Turkey daily, although UN and NGO partners in Turkey could not confirm these numbers based on field observations at the border.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center at  https://www.internal-displacement.org&nbsp;.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The regime contributed to statelessness, including through arbitrary or discriminatory denationalization, discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, and discrimination against women in nationality laws.Approximately 40,000 stateless Kurds were registered as “foreigners” and an estimated additional 160,000 “unregistered” stateless Kurds remained unable to obtain or regain citizenship lost following the 1962 census.  Kurds who lost their citizenship, and their descendants, lacked identity cards and could not access government services, including health care and education.  They also faced social and economic discrimination.  Stateless Kurds did not have the right to inherit or bequeath assets, and their lack of citizenship or identity documents restricted their travel to and from the country.Children derived citizenship solely from their father.  Because women could not confer nationality on their children, an unknown number of children whose fathers were missing or deceased due to the continuing conflict were at risk of statelessness.  Mothers also could not pass citizenship to children born outside the country, including in neighboring countries hosting refugee camps.  Children who left the country during the conflict also experienced difficulties obtaining identification necessary to prove citizenship and obtain services.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Although the constitution provided for citizens’ ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, citizens were not able to exercise that right.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  The most recent national elections, for the presidency in 2021, were widely reported to not be free and fair, with many allegations of abuses and irregularities, including:  registration restrictions on potential voters and candidates’ ability to be listed on a ballot, lack of candidate access to media, ballot stuffing, campaigning at polling stations, lack of ballot secrecy, and intimidation.On November 20, local media reported the regime issued a decree to rerun several September 2022 local council elections after results were canceled due to alleged fraud; they were rerun on December 11.  There was limited information available on the conduct of these elections.Political Parties and Political Participation:  The constitution allowed for the existence of political parties but imposed serious restrictions on political activities and organizations based on a “religious, sectarian, tribal, regional, class‐based, or professional” nature, with exceptions for farmers and labor unions.  The Baath Party maintained its control over all government and popular associations, including workers’ and women’s groups.Since the 2020 parliamentary elections, the National Progressive Front, an alliance of the Baath Party with nine smaller political parties, held 183 of the 250 assembly seats, with Baathists holding 167.The regime showed little tolerance for political parties other than the Baath Party and its affiliates.  Membership in the Baath Party or close familial relationships with a prominent party member or powerful regime official assisted in economic, social, and educational advancement.  Party or regime connections also made it easier to achieve greater advancement and power within the government, military, and security services.  Judges and prosecutors were “essentially required to belong to the Baath Party,” according to Freedom House.  Freedom House reported political access was primarily a function of proximity and loyalty to the regime, noting those Alawites, Christians, Druze, and members of other religious minorities considered outside the regime’s inner circle were “politically disenfranchised along with the rest of the population.”The law prohibited individuals convicted of a felony or misdemeanor that “shakes public trust,” as determined by the Ministry of Justice, from voting for 10 years after their conviction, resulting in large numbers of citizens unable to vote, including those arrested on political charges, according to NGOs.DAANES generally controlled the political and governance landscape in the northeast while allowing for Arab and other ethnic and religious community representation in local governance councils.  The DAANES Social Contract limited political participation of IDPs and stipulated that 60 percent of council seats could be elected through popular vote and 40 percent appointed by a nonelected committee.  DAANES-affiliated internal security forces at times reportedly detained and disappeared perceived opponents.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Although there were no formal restrictions, cultural and social barriers largely excluded women from decision-making positions, except for within DAANES, which enforced a minimum of 40 percent women representation in all civilian entities.  Alawites, the dominant religious minority in the regime and to which the president and his family belonged, held greater political power in the cabinet than other minorities, as well as more authority than the majority Sunni sect.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						Although the law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the regime did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of regime corruption.Corruption:  Corruption continued to be a pervasive problem in police forces, security services, migration management agencies, and throughout the regime.  There were no reports the regime sought to combat the widespread corruption it helped perpetuate.  Freedom House reported foreign allies benefited from opaque government contracts and trade deals.  Basic state services and humanitarian aid reportedly were extended or withheld based on a community’s demonstrated political loyalty to the regime, providing additional leverage for bribe-seeking officials.  Individuals in government-held territory who sought to expose or criticize official corruption faced reprisals including dismissal from employment and detention, according to Freedom House.Human rights lawyers and family members of detainees stated regime officials in courts and prisons solicited bribes for favorable decisions and provision of basic services.  Numerous NGOs reported families of arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared persons faced requests for bribes for information on the whereabouts and fate of their loved ones or to secure their release, assaults and blackmail by individuals claiming to have information on or be able to influence the fate of the missing person, and a black market in fraudulent documentation.  In July, after leaks revealed widespread corruption in the Military Intelligence division – including bribery and financial exploitation of individuals seeking information from the regime or detainees seeking their release – the regime replaced at least eight heads of intelligence branches, according to local media.There were multiple reports regarding corruption in Latakia Governorate during the year.  In March, regime-linked media stated preliminary investigations into forgery in the Latakia Customs Secretariat included more than 20 cases valued over 20 billion SYP ($2.7 million).  In September, local media reported the head of the Latakia City Council disclosed five corruption cases involving the misappropriation of billions of SYP in service and local project funds.Citizens sometimes had to pay bribes to brokers to secure passport appointments.  On July 26, local media reported the regime’s 40-day lead time for appointments led to passport brokers in Damascus charging high fees for expedited service.  Although the regime claimed the reason for the wait was a shortage of passport printing paper, one broker opined the regime implemented the delay to ensure persons applied for an expedited passport, which cost more.The regime sought to control production and distribution of narcotics, while selectively enforcing relevant laws, to enrich regime officials.  Entities with known or suspected links to regime officials and the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah reportedly produced and trafficked illicit narcotics in the country, particularly the stimulant known widely as captagon.  Media outlets and NGOs reported the Fourth Armored Division of the Syrian Army, headed by President Assad’s brother Maher, oversaw much of the production and distribution of captagon.  Al Jazeera reported in May the production and smuggling of captagon reportedly brought in billions of dollars for President Assad, his associates, and his allies.  Throughout the year, authorities in Europe and the Middle East seized at least 250 million captagon pills originating from regime-controlled areas of the country.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						The regime restricted attempts to investigate alleged human rights violations, criminalized their publication, and refused to cooperate with any independent attempts to investigate.  The regime did not grant permission for formation of any domestic human rights organizations.  Nevertheless, hundreds of such groups operated in the country without government registration.The regime was highly suspicious of and hostile to human rights NGOs and did not allow international human rights groups into the country.  The regime normally responded to queries from human rights organizations and foreign embassies regarding specific cases by denying the facts of the case or by reporting the case was still under investigation, the prisoner in question had violated national security laws, or, if the case was in criminal court, the executive branch could not interfere with the judiciary.  The regime denied organizations access to locations where security force abuses and violations reportedly took place or prisoners were allegedly being detained on political grounds.The SDF and other opposition groups occasionally imposed restrictions on human rights organizations or harassed individual activists, in some cases detaining them.  Terrorist groups, including HTS, violently attacked organizations and individuals seeking to investigate human rights abuses or advocating for improved practices.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  The regime engaged in direct and indirect repression to intimidate and exact reprisal against human rights defenders (HRDs) or civil society activists.  Reported tactics included monitoring and surveillance, travel bans, harassment of and threats against HRDs and their families, censorship, seizing property and assets, arbitrary arrest, detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and death.  Officials reportedly targeted and tortured children because of their familial relationships, real or assumed, with HRDs and activists.  Many prominent HRDs and civilian activists detained or forcibly disappeared following the 2011 protests reportedly remained in detention or disappeared.NGOs continued to report the regime abused the counterterrorism law to arrest and convict HRDs on charges of aiding terrorists in trials that violated basic due process rights.  Although authorities reportedly brought charges under the guise of countering violent militancy, allegations included peaceful acts such as distributing humanitarian aid, participating in protests, and documenting human rights abuses.  Armed groups not affiliated with the regime also reportedly engaged in retribution against HRDs and civil society activists.  There continued to be reports of reprisals against HRDs residing outside the country.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The regime continued to deny access for the COI, established by the UN Human Rights Council, to document and report on human rights violations and abuses in the country.  The regime did not cooperate fully with numerous UN and other multilateral bodies, resulting in restrictions on access for humanitarian organizations, especially to opposition-controlled areas.  In addition, the regime did not allow the OPCW IIT to access the sites under investigation, despite the requirement under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 for full cooperation with the OPCW.The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (UNWGEID) continued to request information on reported cases of enforced disappearances, but the regime failed to respond.  The regime also did not respond to UNWGEID requests for an invitation to visit the country, dating back to 2011.A July 11 press statement announced the UN special rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation “was forced to cancel his visit” to the country, set to begin July 9, “due to the lack of full cooperation of the Syrian government.”  The statement confirmed the special rapporteur received an invitation from the regime and that his team carried out preparations entirely in accordance with the terms of reference and code of conduct for the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, but indicated the regime did not ensure and facilitate the special rapporteur’s “freedom to choose whom to meet and where to travel.”																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized rape and sexual assault of women, men, and children, but the regime did not enforce the law effectively.  Rape was punishable by imprisonment and hard labor for at least 15 years (at least nine years in mitigating circumstances), which was aggravated if the perpetrator was a government official, religious official, or had legitimate or actual authority over the victim.  Rape of men was punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.  The law specifically excluded spousal rape, and it reduced or suspended punishment if the rapist married the survivor.  The survivor’s family sometimes agreed to this arrangement to avoid the social stigma attached to rape.The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and other UN agencies, NGOs, and media outlets characterized rape and sexual violence as endemic, underreported, and uncontrolled in the country.  Women and girls continued to be at risk of sexual violence, including at checkpoints, schools, workplaces, markets, and in the displacement and detention settings.  Despite the demands of survivors, safe spaces remained limited.Regime officials in the intelligence and security services perpetrated sexual and gender-based violence with impunity, according to NGOs.  NGOs reported regime forces subjected refugees who returned to Syria, particularly women and children, to sexual violence, including rape.Survivors often feared reporting rape and sexual abuse, according to the UNFPA and the COI, due to the stigma associated with their victimization and threat of retaliation.  Security forces consistently treated violence against women as a social rather than a criminal matter.  The law did not specifically prohibit domestic violence; it stipulated men could discipline their women relatives in a form permitted by general custom.  The UNFPA reported intimate-partner violence was one of the most common types of gender-based violence in the country against women and girls.  Observers reported when some abused women tried to file a police report, police did not investigate thoroughly, if at all, and that in other cases police officers responded by abusing the women.Women and girls subjected to sexual violence lacked access to immediate health care, particularly in regime detention facilities where reports of sexual violence continued to be prevalent, and authorities often denied medical care to prisoners.  In March, the COI reported rape and other forms of sexual violence in regime-controlled detention facilities amounted to “crimes against humanity.”In June, the UNFPA reported the lives of women and girls were “marked by mutually reinforcing forms of violence and gender inequality, often exacerbated by discriminatory attitudes based on age, displacement status, disability, and/or marital status,” creating an environment in which they were “consistently devalued, controlled, exploited, and then blamed for the violence they face.”  Women and girls throughout the country told the UNFPA the violence against them had become normalized.In March, the COI reported members of armed groups such as the SNA and HTS committed the war crime of rape and other forms of sexual violence.  In August, the COI reported it continued to receive credible accounts of sexual violence by members of the SNA from both male and female survivors.  In the September report, one woman described to the COI how she was raped in a car by four SNA members.  The COI was informed the four alleged perpetrators were among nine SNA members under investigation for sexual violence; the investigations continued at year’s end.According to the COI, in addition to the social stigma for survivors of sexual violence, there were no shelters in areas under SNA control to accommodate survivors, who also were reluctant to seek redress before ineffective all-men grievances committees.There were no known government-run services for women outside Damascus.  According to human rights organizations, local coordination committees and other opposition-related groups offered programs specifically for protection of women.  These programs were not available throughout the country, and none reported reliable funding.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law permitted judges to reduce penalties for murder and assault if the defendant asserted an “honor” defense, which often occurred.  The regime kept no official statistics on use of this defense in murder and assault cases and reportedly rarely pursued prosecution of so-called honor crimes.  On August 10, Nagham Dhiab al-Nazzal was killed by her brother in their parents’ home in Hasakah, according to Syria Direct.  Nagham’s mother alleged her son “washed his shame” by killing her daughter after neighbors and relatives called her “dirty” and accused her of using drugs and asked her family to kill her.Families ostracized survivors of violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage because of their abuse.  The UNFPA reported women and girls who experienced social stigma due to sexual violence risked physical harm or even death by suicide or homicide.  As a result, many did not disclose or speak regarding sexual violence, according to the UNFPA.Sexual harassment was pervasive and uncontrolled.  The law prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis of gender but did not explicitly prohibit sexual harassment.  The regime did not enforce the law effectively.  The UNFPA reported sexual harassment and sexual assault were often cited as the reason to restrict the movement of women and girls and to remove adolescent girls from school.The UNFPA also reported a marked growth in the risks of technology-facilitated gender-based violence, primarily in the forms of online harassment and “sextortion.”  In most reported cases perpetrators accessed personal media through mobile apps and used some form of deception, such as phishing attacks, to exploit the woman or girl, according to the UNFPA.Discrimination:  Although the constitution provided for equality between men and women, the law did not provide for the same legal status and rights for women as for men.  Criminal, family, religious, personal status, labor, nationality, inheritance, retirement, and social security laws discriminated against women.  For example, if a man and a woman separately committed the same criminal act of adultery, by law the woman’s punishment was double that of the man.  The law generally permitted women to initiate divorce proceedings against their spouses but did not entitle a divorced woman to alimony in some cases.  Under the law a divorced mother lost the right to guardianship and physical custody of her sons when they reached age 13 and of her daughters at age 15, when guardianship transferred to the paternal side of the family.Personal status laws applied to Muslims were derived from sharia and were discriminatory toward women.  Church law governed personal status questions for Christians, in some cases barring divorce.  Some personal status laws mirrored sharia regardless of the religion of those involved in the case.  The regime’s interpretation of sharia was the basis of inheritance law for all citizens except Christians.  Accordingly, courts usually granted Muslim women half the inheritance share of men heirs.  In all communities, men heirs had to provide financial support to women relatives who inherited less.  If they refused to provide this support, women had the right to sue.According to local NGOs, opposition-run sharia councils discriminated against women, not allowing them to serve as judges or lawyers or to visit detainees.While the constitution provided the “right of every citizen to earn his wage according to the nature and yield of the work,” the law did not explicitly stipulate equal pay for equal work.The law provided women and men equal rights in owning or managing land or other property, but cultural and religious norms impeded women’s property rights, especially in rural areas.  Discriminatory inheritance practices meant property documents were often registered in the name of men family members, thereby posing challenges to women attempting to claim inheritance rights.  Women whose spouses were detained or forcibly disappeared had difficulty accessing family properties.Numerous NGOs reported lack of access to government-issued civil documentation remained a significant problem for the population in northern Aleppo, Raqqa, Hasakah, Deir Ez-Zour, and Idlib, limiting access to assistance, basic services, and freedom of movement.  This situation posed specific challenges for widowed or divorced women, limiting their ability to register and obtain custody of children, inherit property, and legally remarry.Women could not pass citizenship to their children.Governmental involvement in civil rights claims, including cases against sexual discrimination, was stagnant and most claims went unanswered.According to the COI’s June report on the gendered impact of the conflict, civil society activities, including those focusing on women’s rights, remained under strict control and scrutiny by regime agencies and required multiple levels of approval to support projects related to women’s rights and sexual and gender-based violence.  The regime reportedly often rejected humanitarian organizations’ proposals for unclear reasons; only the Syria Trust for Development, an organization led by Asma Assad, the president’s wife, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent were formally authorized to offer services.HTS reportedly placed discriminatory restrictions on women and girls, including imposing a dress code and forbidding women from initiating divorce or voting, in the areas it held.  HTS also banned women and girls from wearing makeup, forbade women from living alone, and required that they be accompanied by a mahram (a man in their immediate family) in public.The COI’s June report noted HTS and some SNA factions on occasion intimidated and restricted certain outreach and awareness-raising activities related to violence against women, or activities addressing topics such as child and early marriage.  Some women’s rights activists reportedly faced harassment and negative speech from local religious authorities.Reproductive Rights:  There were no known reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization by the regime.In its June report, the COI reported 7.3 million women and girls in the country needed critical sexual and reproductive health services, as well as support for gender-based violence, as vulnerabilities to forms of physical and sexual violence and child marriage continued to increase.  The regime did not provide access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, and emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis were not available as part of the clinical management of rape.Violence throughout the country made accessing medical care and reproductive services both costly and dangerous.  Syrian activists reported the regime and armed extremists sometimes denied pregnant women passage through checkpoints, forcing them to give birth in unsterile and often dangerous conditions, without pain medication or adequate medical treatment.  In a March report, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) stated women in the northwest feared or experienced bombings, kidnapping, or exploitation, all of which undermined their ability to access health clinics, left them without care, or made them reliant on informal health service provision.  PHR assessed attacks on humanitarian actors by the regime, Russia, and, to a lesser degree, armed groups caused medical providers to operate in secret or in some cases to leave the country.  According to PHR, attacks on health-care facilities were frequent enough that a high number of pregnant women in the northwest preferred to undergo a caesarean section instead of vaginal birth, partly to reduce the time spent inside a health-care facility.  They also reportedly avoided prenatal care visits.Activists reported regime detention centers did not provide medical care to women during pregnancy or birth.Many pregnant women living in IDP camps in Idlib Governorate and camps such as al-Hol and Rukban lacked access to hospitals, doctors, or skilled birth assistants.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The regime actively restricted members of national and ethnic minority groups from conducting traditional, religious, and cultural activities.  The regime continued to limit the use of the Kurdish language, restricting publication in Kurdish of books and other materials and Kurdish cultural expression.  The Kurdish population faced official and societal discrimination and repression, as well as regime-sponsored violence.  Regime and proregime forces, as well as ISIS and armed opposition forces such as the Turkish-backed SNA, reportedly arrested, detained, tortured, killed, or otherwise abused numerous Kurdish activists and individuals, as well as members of the SDF during the year.  NGO reporting suggested SNA members continued detaining, beating, and kidnapping Kurdish women in Afrin and Ra’s al-Ayn.  Kurdish women activists were particularly affected, with some ceasing all engagement in public life as they feared detention by the SNA.The minority Alawite community to which President Assad belonged enjoyed privileged status throughout the regime and dominated the state security apparatus and military leadership.  Nevertheless, the regime reportedly also targeted Alawite opposition activists for arbitrary arrest, torture, detention, and extrajudicial killing.  Violent extremist opposition groups targeted Alawite communities on several occasions for their perceived proregime stance.ISIS members targeted members of ethnic and religious minorities in attacks.HTS violently oppressed and discriminated against members of all non-Sunni Arab ethnic minorities in the territories it held.Starting August 28, weekslong fighting between Arab tribal militias and members of the Kurdish-led SDF in the northeast killed dozens and caused displacement among civilians, according to media reports.  According to a September 7 Al Jazeera report, Arab tribal leaders blamed the violence on “years-long discrimination” by the SDF in Deir Ez-Zour and other parts of the northeast.  SDF leadership denied discrimination against the predominantly Arab population in the area under its influence.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Birth registration was provided on a discriminatory basis.  In large areas of the country where civil registries were not functioning, authorities often did not register births.  The regime did not register the births of Kurdish noncitizen residents, including stateless Kurds.  Failure to register resulted in deprivation of services, such as diplomas for high school-level studies, access to universities, access to formal employment, and civil documentation and protection.Education:  Approximately 2.4 million children were out of school, representing nearly half of the 5.5 million school-age children in the country, according to UNICEF.The regime provided free public education to citizen children from primary school through university.  Enrollment, attendance, and completion rates for boys and girls generally were comparable.  Noncitizen children could also attend public schools at no cost but required permission from the Ministry of Education.  While Palestinians and other noncitizens, including stateless Kurds, could generally send their children to school and universities, stateless Kurds were ineligible to receive a degree documenting their academic achievement.  The regime continued to limit the teaching of the Kurdish language.The education system remained fractured and under resourced, thereby limiting the ability of children to access education services regularly, according to UNOCHA.  In March, UNICEF reported seven million children needed humanitarian assistance, negatively impacting their ability to remain in school.Combatants on all sides of the conflict attacked or commandeered schools.  Repeated attacks impacting schools; economic factors, including children working to support the household; recruitment of boys for military roles; and the detention of children continued to hamper the ability of children to receive an education.  The White Helmets reported attacks on schools killed and injured children and adults, damaged buildings, and interrupted education services.  Many school buildings required extensive repairs, sometimes including clearance of explosive remnants of the war, and administrators required assistance to obtain basic supplies for learning.On August 26, regime and Russian forces shelled schools where summer clubs for children and supplementary courses took place in southern Idlib, according to the White Helmets.  The shelling reportedly killed two children and injured three children and two women.HTS reportedly imposed its interpretation of sharia on schools and discriminated against girls in the territories it held.  HTS imposed dress codes on women teachers and pupils where it allowed girls to remain in school, while preventing large numbers of girls from attending school at all, according to the COI.The SDF reportedly imposed penalties on school administration staff members who did not use their curriculum.Child Abuse:  The law did not specifically prohibit child abuse, but it stipulated parents could discipline their children in a form permitted by general custom.  The regime did not take steps to combat child abuse.NGOs reported extensively on reports of regime and proregime forces, as well as HTS and ISIS, sexually assaulting, torturing, detaining, killing, and otherwise abusing children.  HTS subjected children to extremely harsh punishment, including execution, in the territories it held.  The SNHR reported at least 181 children were killed, and at least 129 children were arrested, by conflict parties during the year.  The majority of the deaths were attributed to the regime.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal age for marriage was 18 for men and 17 for women.  A boy as young as 15 or a girl as young as 13 could marry if a judge deemed both parties willing and “physically mature” and if the fathers or grandfathers of both parties consented.  Many families reportedly arranged marriages for girls, including at younger ages than typically occurred prior to the start of the conflict, believing it would protect them and ease the financial burden on the family.  Deteriorating economic conditions and the death or disappearance of men heads of household, at the hands of the regime and other armed groups, negatively affected children, for example, increasing rates of child labor and child marriage, and limiting access to education.  The UNFP reported increasing situations of sexual exploitation and abuse compelled some girls to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as serial or temporary marriages.  According to the COI, parents were forced to take children out of school and child marriage continued to increase in the country.There were instances of early and forced marriage of girls to members of regime, proregime, and armed opposition forces.NGOs reported early and forced marriages were prevalent in areas under the control of armed groups, and citizens often failed to register their marriages officially due to fear of detention or conscription at regime checkpoints.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law stipulated penalties of up to three years in prison for certain forms of child abuse associated with trafficking crimes, including forced “prostitution.”  The law considered child pornography a trafficking crime, but the punishment for child pornography was set at the local level with “appropriate penalties.”  There were no known prosecutions for child pornography.The age of sexual consent by law was 15 with no close-in-age exemption.  Premarital sex was illegal, but observers reported authorities did not enforce the law.  Rape of a child younger than 15 was punishable by not less than 21 years’ imprisonment and hard labor.  There were no reports of regime prosecution of child rape cases.																																				Antisemitism										The small Jewish populations from Aleppo and Damascus left the country before the start of the conflict.  The national school curriculum did not include materials on tolerance education or the Holocaust.  The law maintained no designation of religion on passports or national identity cards except for Jews.  Government-controlled radio and television programming continued to disseminate antisemitic news articles and cartoons.  The regime-controlled Syrian Arab News Agency frequently reported on the “Zionist enemy” and accused the Syrian opposition of serving “the Zionist project.”For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, defined as “carnal relations against the order of nature,” and stipulated imprisonment of up to three years.  The Human Dignity Trust reported some evidence the regime enforced this law in recent years against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals.  There were no reports of prosecutions under the law during the year; however, the Human Dignity Trust reported an Interior Ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, revealed some 200 Syrians were in prison “convicted of gay sex” during the year.  The lack of protections in the legal framework created an environment of impunity for targeted threats and violence against LGBTQI+ persons and those perceived to be such.  NGO reports indicated the regime arrested dozens of LGBTQI+ persons since 2011 on charges such as abusing social values, selling, buying, or consuming illegal drugs, and organizing and promoting “obscene” parties.Violence and Harassment:  The regime incited, perpetrated, condoned, and tolerated violence against LGBTQI+ individuals or those reporting such abuse.  According to human rights organizations, state and nonstate actors subjected members of the LGBTQI+ community to physical, psychological, and sexual violence, resulting in severe physical and mental health consequences.  NGOs continued to report the regime and other armed groups subjected perceived members of the LGBTQI+ community to humiliation, torture, and abuse in detention centers, including rape, forced nudity, and anal or vaginal “examinations.”  There was no reporting to suggest the regime or armed nonstate actors took any official action to investigate, prosecute, and punish those complicit in violence and abuses against LGBTQI+ persons.HTS and other armed groups used unauthorized “courts” to impose draconian social restrictions, particularly against LGBTQI+ individuals.Discrimination:  The law did not protect against discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, nor did it actively protect the rights of LGBTQI+ persons.  The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ couples and their families.  Human rights activists reported overt societal discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in all aspects of society and in all territories, regardless of the governing authority.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  There was no process for legal gender recognition by the regime or other nonstate actors.  There was little to no societal recognition of transgender individuals or matters related to gender identity and expression of transgender individuals.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  The law did not provide for protections against involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices specifically targeting LGBTQI+ persons.  So-called conversion therapy was not banned, but there was limited reporting on the use of such practices.  Information on medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries being performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons also was not available.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There was no reporting to suggest LGBTQI+ persons publicly expressed themselves, peacefully demonstrated, or publicly associated themselves with issues related to sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, likely due to fear of reprisal by the regime or other nonstate actors.																																				Persons with Disabilities										While the law provided some protections for persons with disabilities, the regime did not make serious attempts to enforce applicable laws effectively during the year.Persons with disabilities did not have access to education, employment, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  The destruction of schools and hospitals, most often by regime and proregime forces, further limited access to education and health services for persons with disabilities.  Government and nongovernment social care institutes reportedly existed for blindness, deafness, cerebral palsy, and physical and intellectual disabilities.  The regime did not effectively work to provide access for persons with disabilities to information, communications, buildings, or transportation.  UN reporting noted the difficulties experienced by children with disabilities caused by the conflict.  In February, HRW reported children with disabilities experienced greater risks during attacks and lacked access to basic services.  It also found international and local humanitarian organizations providing services to children with disabilities “either do so in so-called special settings or separated from other children” and that sometimes only disability-focused organizations provided such services.There were reports during the year of the regime and armed opposition groups detaining, mistreating, and killing persons with disabilities.On March 13, the SNHR reported regime forces arrested without a warrant a child with disabilities, age 14, in Rif Dimashq Governorate March 9.  None of the boy’s relatives were reportedly informed of his arrest and he was prevented from communicating with his family or a lawyer.  Information on his status was unavailable at year’s end.On April 1, local media reported the SDF handcuffed and killed a child with Down Syndrome, age 13, who was present at a demonstration in Deir Ez-Zour that called for the release of detainees in SDF facilities.On August 19, local media reported SNA police officers dragged a man with disabilities, Ahmed Badie al-Suf, in a Ras al-Ain market and brutally beat him, causing bleeding from his eyes, nose and mouth, after accusing him of verbally harassing a girl.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Yezidis, Druze, Christians, Shia, and members of other religious minority groups were subject to violence and discrimination by ISIS, HTS, the SNA, and other groups.  There were no reports of violence or discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS, but human rights activists believed such cases were underreported.See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										While the law provided for the right to form and join unions, conduct legal labor strikes, and bargain collectively, there were excessive restrictions on these rights.  The law prohibited antiunion discrimination but also allowed employers to fire workers at will.The law required all unions to belong to the regime-affiliated General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU).  The law prohibited strikes involving more than 20 workers in certain sectors, including transportation and telecommunications, or strikes resembling public demonstrations.  Restrictions on freedom of association also included fines and prison sentences for illegal strikes.  The regime did not make any serious attempt to effectively enforce applicable laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers during the year.  It was unclear whether penalties for violating such laws were commensurate with or less than those for analogous crimes.  Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The law required that government representatives be part of the bargaining process in the public sector, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor could object to and refuse to register any agreements concluded.  The law and relevant labor protections did not apply to workers covered under civil service provisions, under which employees were considered to need collective bargaining rights.  The law did not apply to foreign domestic servants, agricultural workers, NGO employees, or informal sector workers.  There were no legal protections for self-employed workers although they constituted a significant proportion of the total workforce.Foreign workers could join the syndicate representing their profession but could not run for elected positions, except for Palestinians who could serve as elected officials in unions.The Baath Party dominated the GFTU, whose quasi-official constituent unions, according to Baath Party doctrine, were to protect worker rights.  The GFTU president was a senior member of the Baath Party and he and his deputy could attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs.  The GFTU controlled most aspects of union activity, including which sectors or industries could have unions.  It also had the power to disband union governing bodies.  Union elections were generally free of direct GFTU interference, but successful campaigns usually required membership in the Baath Party.  Because of the GFTU’s close ties to the regime, the right to bargain collectively did not exist in practical terms.  Although the law provided for collective bargaining in the private sector, regime repression dissuaded most workers from exercising this right.There was little information available on employer practices regarding antiunion discrimination.  The dire economic situation gave employers the stronger hand in disputes.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law provided for the protection of children from exploitation in the workplace and prohibited all the worst forms of child labor, including limitations on working hours, occupational safety, and health restrictions for children.  Child labor, including its worst forms, occurred in the country in both formal and informal sectors, including begging, domestic work, and agriculture.  Organized begging rings continued to subject children displaced within the country to forced labor.  Conflict-related work such as lookouts, spies, and informants subjected children to significant dangers of retaliation and violence.  Various forces, particularly terrorist groups and regime-aligned groups, continued to recruit and use child soldiers.The law specified that authorities were to apply “appropriate penalties” to violators; however, it was unclear whether such penalties were commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping.  There was little publicly available information on enforcement of the child labor law.  Restrictions on child labor did not apply to those who worked in family businesses and did not receive a salary.The minimum age for most types of nonagricultural labor was 15 or the completion of elementary schooling, whichever occurred first, and the minimum age for employment in industries with heavy work was 17.  Parental permission was required for children younger than 16 to work.  Children younger than 18 could work no more than six hours a day and could not work overtime or during night shifts, weekends, or on official holidays.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law provided for a national minimum wage for all sectors of the economy.  The law divided the public-sector monthly minimum wage into five levels based on job type or level of education, almost all of which fell below the World Bank’s poverty indicator.  Benefits included compensation for meals, uniforms, and transportation.  The law stated the minimum wage should rise gradually to meet the cost of living, but the regime took no action in this regard.The public-sector workweek was 35 hours, and the standard private-sector workweek was 40 hours, excluding meals and rest breaks.  Hours of work could be adjusted based on the industry and associated health hazards.  The law provided for at least one meal or rest break totaling no less than one hour per day.  Employers were required to schedule hours of work and rest such that workers did not work more than five consecutive hours or 10 hours per day in total, and to provide premium pay for overtime work.  There was little information available on the sectors in which alleged violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were common.Occupational Safety and Health:  It was unclear whether occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were generally appropriate for the main industries in the country.  Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with experts and not the worker.  The law did not protect workers who removed themselves from situations endangering their health or safety from losing their employment.  There was little information available on the sectors in which alleged violations of OSH standards were common.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The government did not effectively enforce laws related to the minimum wage and overtime.  There was no employer liability for late payment of wages, allowances, or other social benefits.  Many public-sector employees relied on bribery to supplement their income.  Private-sector companies usually paid much higher wages, with lower-end wage rates semiofficially set by the regime and employer organizations.  Many workers in the public and private sectors took additional manual jobs or relied on their extended families to support them.The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor was responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and other regulations pertaining to acceptable conditions of work.  The government did not effectively enforce OSH laws or standards as set by the regime.  Penalties for violations of labor-related laws were less than other laws and were rarely enforced.  The Ministries of Health and of Social Affairs and Labor designated officials to inspect worksites for compliance with health and safety standards.  Workers could lodge complaints regarding health and safety conditions with special committees established to adjudicate such cases.  There was little information on regime enforcement of labor law or working conditions during the year.  There were no health and safety inspections reported.  Enforcement of labor law was lax in both rural and urban areas, since many inspector positions were vacant due to the conflict, and their number was insufficient to cover more than 10,000 workplaces.There was little information on the size of the informal sector in the country, but many refugees found work in the informal sector as guards, construction workers, or street vendors and in other manual jobs.  The scope of enforcement of labor laws for the informal sector was unclear.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Syria
- FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Proposals for NGO Programs Benefiting Displaced Persons in Al-Hol and Roj Camps, Syria HomeBureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Proposals for NGO Programs Benefiting Displaced Persons in Al-Hol and Roj Camps, Syria				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Proposals for NGO Programs Benefiting Displaced Persons in Al-Hol and Roj Camps, Syria																																		Funding Opportunity Announcement																														April 5, 2024																																							Basic InformationFunding Opportunity Number: DFOP0009877Assistance Listing (CFDA) number: 19.519 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Program for Near EastAnnouncement issuance date: Monday, March 18, 2024 Announcement type: Cooperative AgreementProposal application submission deadline: Wednesday, April 24, 2024, at 11:59:59 p.m. Eastern Time (23:59:59). Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Anticipated timeframe to award for selected proposals: Pending the availability of funds, PRM anticipates, but makes no guarantee, that awards will be made less than 6 months from the proposal submission deadline.																											                        Download the Announcement							 [768 KB]																									Tags																					Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																																Humanitarian Aid																																							Refugees																															Syria
- Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) HomeBureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)																																		Report																														April 4, 2024																																							IntroductionThis Report is submitted consistent with Condition (10)(C) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).  The Convention was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997.  This report covers the period January 1 through December 31, 2023.Condition (10)(C) provides that the President shall submit on January 1 annually to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth—a certification of those countries included in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms Control Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)) that are determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to adherence of the country to its obligations under the Convention;the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party:to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of non-compliance;to call attention publicly to the activity in question; andto seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); anda detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the United States described in clause (iii).It is the view of the United States that, in most cases, efforts to resolve compliance concerns discovered through review of declarations or inspection results should first be attempted through diplomatic means.  This does not preclude or prevent the escalatory step of requesting challenge inspections, but diplomatic outreach is an initial mechanism to attempt to resolve compliance concerns before the need to resort to challenge inspection requests.For its part, both as a matter of national policy and as a guide to national policy, the United States undertakes its own independent review – based upon the best available information, including intelligence information – of the compliance of CWC States Parties with their obligations under the Convention.  The United States believes that CWC States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance with specific declaration and implementation provisions (e.g. Articles III, IV, V, VI, and VII) and the “general obligations” provision under Article I. Information and assessments in this report are current as of December 31, 2023.  This report highlights developments since the conclusion of the reporting period included in the Condition (10)(C) Report published in 2023, and, to the extent possible, refrains from repeating older information found in previously submitted reports. The United States continues to take extraordinary steps, bilaterally and in close coordination with Close Allies and like-minded states, to address CWC non-compliance and restore deterrence of chemical weapons (CW) development and use.The United States continues to be a member of the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (“the Partnership”), a French-led initiative created in 2018 in which participating states made a political commitment to increase pressure on those responsible for the use of CW.  As of December 2023, the Partnership had 40 members, plus the European Union.Further, the United States engaged in bilateral efforts throughout 2023 to encourage Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member States to pay their arrears, so that their voting rights could be reinstated.  The United States, along with allies, lobbied countries that usually do not attend the annual Conference of the States Parties (CSP) meeting and encouraged them to do so.The United States also works diligently with partners and the OPCW to support and encourage effective national implementation by other States Parties of their obligations under the Convention.The OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) reported, as of July 31, 2023, the following regarding Article VII implementation:Somalia, which became a State Party in 2013, does not have a designated National Authority.Sixty eight1 States Parties had not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures (scheduled chemical transfers, prohibitions, penalties, extraterritorial obligations, legal basis of regulations, establishment of national authority, and other initial measures).  They were:  Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cabo Verde, Chad, Congo, Cook Islands, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.One State Party, Tonga, has not yet submitted its required initial declaration (due July 28, 2003) pursuant to the Convention.  The TS is unable to fulfill its verification tasks with regard to this State Party.  The United States made efforts in 2023 to encourage Tonga to prepare and submit its initial declaration.As of December 31, 2023, there were 192 CWC States Parties.2  Four States have neither ratified nor acceded to the CWC and, therefore, are not States Parties to the Convention (one signatory State, Israel, and three non-signatory States, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan).During the reporting period, South Sudan, working with the OPCW TS has undertaken efforts to prepare to accede to the CWC.  The Department of State met with South Sudanese representatives on the margins of the CWC Fifth Review Conference and the 28th session of the CSP to acknowledge progress made and to urge South Sudan to complete its process to accede to the CWC.  The Director-General (DG) of the OPCW met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of South Sudan, on the margins of CHEMEX held in Algeria between September 28 and October 4, 2023.  They discussed the importance of upholding the global norm against the use of chemical weapons and signed a joint communiqué on their work together to complete the accession process.Four States Parties – Burma, Iran, Russia, and Syria – are certified in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia and Syria were first certified in non-compliance in April 2018.  Iran was first certified in non-compliance in November 2018.  Burma was first certified in non-compliance in 2019.  Additional information is available in the 2024 classified Condition (10)(C) Reports.  The United States also cannot certify the People’s Republic of China’s compliance, which was first reported in 2021.COUNTRY ASSESSMENTSBURMAFINDINGThe United States certifies that Burma is in non-compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare its past CW program and destroy its historical CW production facility (CWPF) near Tonbo.  The United States has concerns that a CW stockpile may remain at Burma’s historical CWPF.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSFor the reasons described in previous reports, the United States continues to assess that Burma is in violation of its obligations under CWC Article I, paragraph 4, and Article III, paragraph 1 of the CWC; and continues to have concerns about Burma’s compliance with Article I, paragraphs 1(a) and 2. BACKGROUNDThere is no additional information to report in 2023.  See previous years reports for additional details.  Most of the original buildings associated with Burma’s legacy research, production, weaponization, and storage of sulfur mustard munitions during the 1980s remain at the historical CWPF. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSBurma did not attend the annual CSP sessions in 2021, 2022, and 2023.  The United States has not engaged with Burma bilaterally on these issues following the February 2021 military coup, but continues to monitor the situation in Burma closely.PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)FINDINGBased on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(a), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.”  The United States is concerned about the PRC’s interest in PBAs and toxins because these agents have utility for CW applications.BACKGROUNDThe PRC signed the CWC on January 13, 1993, ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997, and submitted its initial declarations in 1998.  Since then, scientists at a PRC military research institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, such as fentanyl.3  Other PRC research organizations have been conducting and directing military research, discovery, testing and characterization of animal venoms and marine toxins  – which raises further questions about the intended purposes of the work conducted by the military researchers.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSDuring the November 2023 CSP, in bilateral discussions with the PRC, the United States reiterated its concerns about the PRC’s potential development of aerosolized fentanyl.  In response to U.S. concerns, the PRC reiterated that it does not use fentanyl for law enforcement purposes.  The PRC objected to the 2021 CSP decision on the aerosolized use of central nervous system (CNS)-acting chemicals and issued a joint statement with Iran, Russia, and Syria that, “Article II, paragraphs 1(a) and 9(d) of the Convention permits the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes’ as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.  Therefore, the Convention allows States Parties to choose their own method of law enforcement in full conformity with the provisions of the Convention including the General Purpose Criterion (GPC).”In November 2023, the United States and the PRC met in Washington for bilateral discussions on arms control, during which meeting the U.S. side raised concerns about PRC CWC compliance and emphasized the importance of preserving the international prohibition on chemical weapons.  The United States continues to engage the PRC about the implementation of its CWC obligations.  The United States will continue to monitor and report, as well as pursue substantive bilateral engagement with the PRC.  The United States will also continue to engage our partners on this issue, both to raise awareness of the threat and build diplomatic pressure on the PRC to address these concerns.ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Iran is in non-compliance with the CWC due to (1) its failure to declare its transfer of CW to Libya during the 1978-1987 Libya-Chad war, (2) its failure to declare its complete holdings of Riot Control Agents (RCAs), (3) its failure to submit a complete CWPF declaration, and (4) its pursuit of PBAs for offensive purposes. ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone” or to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”  Iran maintains a chemical weapons program that includes pursuit of certain PBAs as part of a broader category of “incapacitating agents” for offensive purposes.  The development and proliferation of such agents is in violation of Iran’s obligations under Article I.See previous reports for analysis of Iran’s violation of its obligations under Article III, paragraph 1(a) (iv); Article III, paragraph 1(c)(i) and (ii); and Article III, paragraph 1(e).BACKGROUNDDevelopment of PBA WeaponsSince 2005, some of Iran’s military-controlled facilities, Imam Hossein University (IHU) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), have researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects.  Most recently on September 23, 2023, an X (formerly Twitter) account representing Lab Dookhtegan – whose members claim to be hacker organization in opposition to Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors &#8212; posted confidential documents detailing an Iranian military university’s development of grenades meant to disseminate medetomidine, an anesthetic that is a central nervous system-acting chemical.  According to the documents, this development included information on the production and testing of prototype weapons.For further background on Iran’s history of non-compliance and background on Iranian PBA and toxin development, including undeclared chemical weapons transfers, incomplete RCA declarations, and incomplete declaration of chemical weapons production facilities, see the 2023 10(C) Report.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS and Next StepsOn November 22, 2018, the United States addressed Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC in its national statement to the CWC’s Fourth Review Conference.  In 2019, the G7 also issued a statement of concern about Iranian CWC compliance further reinforcing the U.S. non-compliance finding.  In 2020, the United States designated Iranian defense entity Shahid Meisami Group (SMG) and its director, Mehran Babri, for sanctions under Executive Order 13382 because of its responsibility for projects involving the testing and production of chemical agents for use as so-called incapacitation agents. In part to address concerns about Iran’s work on PBAs, the United States led an effort in 2021 at the OPCW CSP that concluded with the adoption of a decision affirming that “the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals is understood to be inconsistent with law enforcement purposes as a ‘purpose not prohibited’ under the Convention.”  Iran—along with Russia, the PRC, and Syria—was a principal opponent of the decision.No bilateral discussions with Iran occurred during the 2023 reporting year regarding the CWC.  The last CWC compliance-related bilateral exchanges occurred in 2001 and 2004, on the margins of OPCW EC meetings, but discussions did not resolve any of the issues raised by the United States.Additionally, in November 2023 at the twenty-eighth session of the OPCW’s CSP, the OPCW adopted a U.S. co-sponsored decision on “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use”.  This decision creates a mandate for the OPCW Director-General to report to States Parties annually on information available on transfers of scheduled chemicals.  This reporting could help facilitate transparency on any declared transfers of scheduled chemicals from Iran to Syria.The United States will continue to monitor and report on Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC and continue to raise awareness of the issue with partners.  Additional U.S. action at the OPCW to put additional pressure on Iran will focus on addressing potential threats posed by central nervous system-acting chemicals and toxins.RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Russia is in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia has used chemical weapons at least twice in recent years in assassination attempts using Novichok nerve agents – also known as fourth generation agents (FGAs)—in 2018 and 2020.  Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program.  During the reporting period, Russia also used RCAs as a method of warfare in Ukraine, in violation of its CWC obligations.  Russia is also in non-compliance for the lack of its complete declarations of its: (1) CWPFs; (2) CW development facilities; and (3) CW stockpiles.  Russian scientific institutes have researched and developed chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies to deliver CW agents.  Russia has conducted chemical weapons-related testing at the Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground.  The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding Russia’s assistance to Syria regarding the regime’s use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Douma in April 2018.  Furthermore, the United States has concerns that Russia’s PBA program is for offensive purposes.  In addition to its use of RCAs, the United States also has concerns about reports that Russia has used other chemical agents against Ukrainian armed forces.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons” or “to use chemical weapons.”  On August 20, 2020, the Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) officers used a Novichok nerve agent to poison a Russian opposition leader, Aleksey Navalny, while he was traveling back to Moscow after campaigning in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia, against pro-Kremlin candidates in regional elections.  On March 4, 2018, Russia attempted to assassinate two individuals in the UK using a Novichok nerve agent.  These acts are clear violations of the CWC Article I, paragraph 1 prohibition on the use of CW. In accordance with Article 1, paragraph 5, each State Party “undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”  The United States assesses that Russian forces have used RCAs against Ukrainian armed forces in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine.  Although not all uses of riot control agents by armed forces amount to use “as a method of warfare,” use by military forces against combatants on the battlefield in an armed conflict violates Article I, paragraph 5 of the CWC.   In accordance with Article I, paragraph 2, each State Party “undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses.” Each State Party is also required to declare its chemical weapons program in accordance with Article III.  Russia completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile on September 27, 2017.  Based on existing information, however, the United States does not believe Russia has declared all of its CW stockpile, CWPFs, and all CW development facilities.  Rather, the United States assesses that Russia maintains an undeclared CW program. In addition to these violations, the United States is concerned about reports of use of other chemical agents by Russia in Ukraine.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative asserted that Russian troops had begun adding the CWC Schedule 3 chemical Chloropicrin to grenades already containing RCAs.The United States is also concerned that Russia has a PBA program intended for purposes inconsistent with the CWC.  Russian Health Minister Shevchenko acknowledged to the press that Russian special operations forces employed “derivatives of fentanyl” to resolve the October 2002 Dubrovka theater hostage crisis.  The United States is concerned that Russia is pursuing these types of agents for offensive purposes, which would be a violation of Article I.  Russia long opposed the efforts to adopt a decision on the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals, which was adopted at the OPCW in 2021.  According to a non-paper Russia published at the OPCW in November 2018 entitled, Aerosolisation of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes, Russia believes use of these agents “is not regulated under the  Convention.” In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(d), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.  In January 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) reported Russia’s military presence and cooperation with Syrian forces in Douma at the time of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma on April 7, 2018, including exclusive control of the airspace over Douma by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Areospace Defence Forces.  Russia’s joint air operations and negotiations to retake eastern Ghouta from opposition forces, and its activities assisting the Syrian regime to cover up the use of CW after the attack, raise serious questions about Russia’s possible role assisting the Syrian regime’s use of CW on April 7, 2018.  Further, Russia maintained a joint operations room with Syria and Iran in charge of war strategy and coordination in Syria at a time when the Syrian forces repeatedly used chemical weapons.  Russia continues to conduct a global disinformation campaign in defense of the Syrian regime.BACKGROUNDThe Convention entered into force for Russia on December 5, 1997, and Russia made its initial declaration in March 1998.  Russia’s declaration included CWPFs, CW storage facilities (CWSFs), a CW development facility, and a stockpile of almost 40,000 MT of CW agent, in both bulk and weaponized form.  As of September 27, 2017, Russia had completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile.  Its Article VI declaration included Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and other chemical production facility plant sites. Use of CWRussia has denied any responsibility for the use of a Novichok chemical agent in an assassination attempt against UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, despite the evidence that Russia is responsible, including UK identification and video of officers from Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate.  The Soviet Union developed these toxic Novichok agents in the 1970s and 1980s as part of its development of a new class of “fourth-generation” nerve agents.  It is highly likely these agents were developed to prevent detection by the West and circumvent international CW controls.  The OPCW TS confirmed, as part of two separate Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) to the UK in 2018, that the chemical agent used to poison the Skripals matched the UK’s analysis and was, at that time, unscheduled.   With respect to the poisoning of Aleksey Navalny in August 2020, analysis from several national laboratories, including laboratories in Germany, France, Sweden, and other OPCW-designated laboratories, concluded that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from a group of chemical agents, Novichoks.  In addition, the FSB was tracking and surveilling Navalny during his stay in Tomsk, Russia.  Navalny has for many years been the target of FSB surveillance, including wiretapping and covert video surveillance.  Russia continues to deny any responsibility for the attack.  On February 16, 2024, Aleksey Navalny died while imprisoned in Russia. The OPCW TS also confirmed, as part of a TAV to Germany in September 2020, the analytical findings of German, French, and Swedish laboratories that determined Navalny was exposed to an unscheduled nerve agent from the Novichok group.  Specifically, the unclassified TAV summary stated that the unscheduled nerve agent had “structural characteristics similar to the toxic chemicals belonging to Schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15, which were added to the Annex on Chemicals at the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019.”Use of RCAs as a Method of WarfareThe United States assesses that Russia has repeatedly used RCAs as a method of warfare across the frontlines in Ukraine. In May 2023, Russia’s state-controlled Channel 1 broadcasted an interview with a Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.  In the video, drone footage shows a grenade being dropped into a trench, smoke billowing from the trench, and then soldiers fleeing from the trench.  On the broadcast, the soldier states, “We are trying to force them out with smoke.”  The broadcast then goes on to state, “Soldiers from the 88th Brigade are using the so-called ‘Bird-Cherry’ tear grenades.”  In December 2023, Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade stated on its Telegram channel that the brigade is using a “radical change in tactics” by dropping K-514 grenades on Ukrainian forces.In addition to these Russian reports, there have been several Ukrainian reports on use of RCAs by Russia’s forces.  On September 23, 2022, Ukraine’s Operational Command South alleged a Russian drone strike dropping grenade devices that released a noxious smoke in a Facebook post.  Operation Command South identified a Soviet-era K-51 tear gas grenade designed to disseminate the powdered, highly irritating riot control agent CS (2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile).  Ukraine’s General Staff of the Armed Forces (AFU) posted photos of a spent K-51 tear gas grenade and a downed quadcopter on Facebook on October 12, 2023.  The AFU Facebook allegation stated that Russian forces had dropped K-51 grenades from drones on Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhzhia region.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative expressed serious concerns about “the Russian Federation uses  riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine”.  On December 4, 2022, the Naval Forces of AFU charged on their Facebook page that Russia dropped K-51 grenades on Ukrainian “defenders in the East” who were able to hold their positions through their chemical defenses.Incomplete DeclarationsThe United States believes the Russian CW declaration is not complete, in particular with respect to its chemical agent and weapons stockpile, as demonstrated by the 2018 and 2020 Novichok poisonings.  The United States also notes that Russia may have additional facilities that require declaration as CWPFs.  Lastly, the United States does not share Russia’s narrow interpretation of the CWC that Article III only requires declaration of facilities that are used “primarily for” the development of CW.  Instead, the United States believes that all CW development facilities, including CW testing facilities, need to be declared.CW Development FacilitiesIn violation of Article I, the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute, 27th Scientific Center, and the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) have engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies for delivering such weapons.  GosNIIOKhT is a Russian institute with a longstanding role in researching and developing chemical weapons, and GosNIIOKhT developed Russia’s Novichok chemical weapons.  Since 2016, GosNIIOKhT has expanded its research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute and the 27th Scientific Center are organizations subordinate to the Russian Federation Armed Forces Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense troops.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute stewards Russia’s Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground, where Russia conducts chemical weapons-related testing.  The 27th Scientific Center has been involved with Russian chemical weapons research and testing activities.Assistance to the Syrian RegimeRussia’s assistance to the Syrian regime may have facilitated and enabled the regime’s use of chemical weapons.  Beginning in September 2015 until present, the Russian Government has been directly involved in the Syrian civil war, assisting the Syrian regime to execute its military offensive by providing Russia’s airpower and other material support to the regime. For example, in its report dated January 27, 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe that around 7:30 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.  The report also points out that the IIT received credible information corroborated through multiple sources that Russian forces were co-located at Dumayr airbase alongside the Tiger Forces.  It also concludes that, based on the extensive review of military analysis and of Russia’s and Syria’s public statements and open sources that, prior to the eastern Ghouta offensive – and since the early stages of the intervention of the Russian Federation in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic – the relationship between the Tiger Forces and the Russian Forces was one of special proximity and close coordination at the operational and tactical level.  The IIT also obtained information that, at the time of the attack, the airspace over Douma was exclusively controlled by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces.  For additional details, see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.Moreover, Russia has continued supporting Syria by seeking to obstruct discussion of Syrian CW use in international fora in 2023, including at the UN and at the OPCW.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSThe United States has had longstanding concerns about Russian compliance with the CWC, and has engaged in numerous exchanges with Russia regarding a number of compliance issues.  The United States has also taken significant action to address its concerns with Russian non-compliance.  For historical details see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.The United States has imposed a range of sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) and other authorities in response to Moscow’s chemical and biological weapons activities.  The sanctions imposed under the CBW Act will remain in place until Russia (1) is no longer using chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in violation of international law, (2) has provided reliable assurances it will not engage in any such activities in the future, and (3) is willing to allow on-site inspection to ensure it is not using CBW in violation of international law.  To date, Russia has not met those conditions.    Furthermore, in August 2023 the United States designated four FSB operatives pursuant to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 for their involvement in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny in August 2020.  The United States also imposed visa restrictions on these operatives for their involvement in a gross violation of human rights pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023.The United States has played a leading role in countering Russian disinformation at the OPCW and highlighting that Russia has a history of chemical weapons use.  For additional details see previous reports.On October 10, 2023, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States submitted questions to Russia in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article IX of the CWC to ask Russia if its armed forces used RCAs in combat operations in the conflict in Ukraine, and to ask it to explain the above-described Channel 1 broadcast showing an interview with a Russian soldier describing use of tear gas against Ukrainian forces.  To date, Russia has claimed that its forces’ statements were a “misunderstanding.”In November 2023 – during the 28th session of the OPCW CSP – the United States and thirty-one other countries made statements condemning Russia for its use of chemicals weapons and its brutal war in Ukraine.On November 27, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, the United States co-hosted a side event with a panel of experts to discuss the prohibition on use of RCAs as a method of warfare under Article I of the CWC.  During the event, the United States showed the Channel 1 broadcast of the Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.On November 29, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, States Parties voted by secret ballot to fill the three available Executive Council seats of the Eastern European Group.  The Conference elected Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine with the Russian Federation losing a vote for a seat on the Executive Council for the first time since it became a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.  This rejection demonstrated States Parties’ resolve to hold Russia to account for its actions – including its war of aggression and continued violations of the Convention.SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Syria is in non-compliance with the CWC.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime used CW more than fifty times against the Syrian people since acceding to the Convention in 2013, in violation of its obligations under Article I of the CWC.  In addition, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime did not declare all elements of its CW program, as required by Article III of the CWC, and in fact retains CW as defined by the CWC.  Further, Syria has failed to cooperate with the OPCW’s work to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Syrian declaration.  Rather, Syria’s actions continue to impede resolution of these matters. ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(b), each State Party is obligated never under any circumstances to use CW.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime repeatedly used chlorine and sarin as chemical weapons after its accession to the CWC, from 2014 through 2019, in violation of Article I of the CWC.  In spite of compelling evidence, which included findings of attribution by two independent international mechanisms, Syria continues to deny it used CW.In accordance with CWC Article III, paragraph 1, each State Party is obligated to declare its CW program.  The Syrian declaration contains obvious gaps, discrepancies, and omissions, in violation of Article III of the CWC and the additional declaration requirements outlined in operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 2118.  In light of the persistent and significant gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in the declaration, and Syria’s repeated use of CW, as independently confirmed by both the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW IIT, and the additional instances that the United States assesses can be attributed to the Syrian regime, the United States assesses that Syria retains a CW capability and has not disclosed the full history and scope of its CW-related activities.BACKGROUNDDetailed background information on Syria’s CW use and OPCW and U.S. responses to the Syria’s noncompliance in previous years may be found in the 2014 – 2023 reports.  Following the threat of military force in response to the use of sarin in multiple, small-scale attacks in opposition areas, and in a large-scale attack using surface-to-surface rockets in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August 2013, Syria deposited its instruments of accession to the CWC on September 14, 2013.  The United States and Russia then negotiated the Framework for Elimination of the Syrian CW Program.  This Framework led to the September 27, 2013, OPCW EC decision and to UNSCR 2118, which, taken together, established milestones for the full disclosure and elimination of Syria’s CW program and stringent verification, including unfettered access for the OPCW to Syrian sites and individuals. After a preliminary disclosure of its CW program, Syria submitted to the OPCW its treaty-mandated initial declaration in October 2013, followed by numerous subsequent amendments.  The sum of Syria’s disclosures, declarations, and amendments provided an incomplete declaration of Syria’s CW program.  In April 2014, the OPCW Director-General established the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to attempt to clarify these concerns.  To date Syria has not provided adequate information to resolve all declaration issues, with most of the issues raised by the DAT still outstanding.During 2023, Syria continued to fail to fully cooperate with the DAT and instead obstructed its work, including by preventing the deployment of the entire team in country for most of the year by denying visas to its lead technical expert.  During the period in which the full DAT team was unable to visit Syria in 2023, the DAT completed two deployments of a reduced team to Damascus, in January (17-22) and April (12-19), for limited in-country activities.  A separate meeting between the OPCW TS and Syria was held at a higher level in Beirut, on 22-23 June 2023. On October 10, 2023, the OPCW Director General (DG) announced to the 104th session of the Executive Council that Syria agreed to hold the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus, after two and a half years’ delay.  Syria announced, via Note Verbale dated 9 October 2023, that it would allow the entire DAT team back into the country to meet with the Syrian National authority, during dates suggested by the Secretariat (30 October – 5 November 2023).  The December 2023 inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) did not result in new information that resolved any outstanding issues.  The DAT will continue its work in 2024.    In an unclassified report dated November 24, 2023, the Director-General noted that analysis of samples collected by the DAT in April 2023 revealed the presence of indicators of several chemical warfare agents that were not declared.  The Secretariat requested Syria to provide plausible and verifiable explanations.During this reporting period, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which investigates whether toxic chemicals have been used as a weapon in Syria, had no deployments to Syria.  The FFM continues to look into several incidents from 2016-2019.  The FFM is currently extracting data from interviews and analyzing all information obtained. On January 27, 2023, the OPCW IIT, which is responsible for identifying the perpetrators of specific instances of chemical weapons use in Syria, released its third report. The IIT found reasonable grounds to believe that between 7:10 and 7:40 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Sryian special forces known as the Tiger Forces, dropped two chlorine cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more. This is the ninth case of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime independently attributed by the IIT and OPCW-UN JIM.Ahead of the 104th session of the EC, on 27 September 2023, the TS issued a report marking ten years since Syria joined the CWC.  The report, titled “Accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Ten Years On,” recounts developments since Syria joined the CWC, including uses of chemical weapons and efforts related to Syria’s initial declaration.  Among other things, the report identifies three areas of unresolved outstanding issues of concern with respect to Syria’s initial declaration, namely: unverified quantities of chemical weapons, undeclared production of chemical weapons, and undeclared chemical weapons and facilities.  According to the report, these “issues give rise to concerns regarding the potential existence of undeclared stockpiles of chemical weapons, activities, and/or facilities.”EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSThe United States continues to seize every available opportunity to bring attention to Syria’s non-compliance with the CWC and continues to take action to deter the regime from continuing to maintain its chemical weapons capability.  For past efforts, see the previous reports. At the OPCW, the United States uses its statements before the EC and the CSP to underscore that Syria:  1) admit its past use of CW; 2) cooperate with the FFM, DAT, and IIT; 3) adopt a proactive and fully transparent approach, as recommended by the DG; and (4) resolve the gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in its declaration.  During 2023, the United States denounced Russia’s actions to hinder efforts to address Syria’s violations at the OPCW EC and CSP, issued replies to Syria at the OPCW EC; issued a statement at the CWC Review Conference; and continued to express its support for the IIT and the DAT and their mission.  The National Security Council and Secretary of State also issued statements marking the 10th anniversary of the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta that killed over 1,400 individuals. In 2023, the United States led an effort with other States Parties to further accountability and deter Syria from maintaining its chemical weapons by co-sponsoring a decision adopted at the 28th CSP titled: “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use.”  The decision calls for, among other things, 1) capacity-building for States Parties to address the threat from non-state actors; 2) greater transparency of the transfer of scheduled chemicals to Syria to deter states from providing scheduled chemicals to Syria; and 3) implementation of collective measures by States Parties under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, including to take steps to prohibit and prevent the transfer of certain high risk chemicals and dual use equipment to Syria.  This is the first decision taken in the history of the OPCW to recommend States Parties take collective measures under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, demonstrating the resolve of the CSP to take incremental steps to further address the Syrian CW threat.  The decision not only addresses the continued Syrian non-compliance, but also the threat of non-state actors.  It highlights the risk of chemical weapons proliferation to all actors in Syria as well as the possibility that other states may be identified as using chemical weapons in the future.  The decision importantly requests the Technical Secretariat to report on transfers of scheduled chemicals to Syria, which will enable discussion of risks associated with such transfers at meetings of the policy-making organs of the Organization.  The decision also calls on the OPCW Director-General to bring to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council the continuing threat related to Syria’s possession and use of CW, and urges the General Assembly and Security Council to take appropriate actions to address the situation and advance accountability. Supplementing and reinforcing this work in the OPCW, the United States and our allies also implemented a highly effective diplomatic engagement strategy to maintain international focus on the Syrian CW issue and project the vital importance of preserving the prohibition on chemical weapons.  U.S. diplomats led this strategic outreach with countries across the globe, including through bilateral engagement with regional groups. The 2024-2025 OPCW budget, adopted at the 28th session of the CSP, includes funding for investigative efforts into the use of CW in Syria and was approved overwhelmingly, signaling continued broad support for the OPCW’s mandate.  The adoption of the OPCW CSP budget decisions also further highlights the isolation of Russia and others who levy attacks on the OPCW to shield the Syrian regime from accountability for CW use. The United States previously imposed sanctions on numerous Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in Syria’s production and use of CW in contravention of its CWC obligations.  Where feasible, the United States will continue to explore new sanctions in coordination with allies and partners.The United States will continue to seek accountability for the regime’s chemical weapons use and take action to urge the regime to return to compliance with the CWC in 2024. The Report by the Director-General Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 31 July 2023 also includes the “State of Palestine” in its list of States Parties that have not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures.  On May 18, 2018, the Palestinians deposited a purported instrument of accession to the CWC. On June 18, 2018, the United States submitted to the UN Secretary General, the Depositary for the CWC, a letter detailing U.S. objections to the purported accession of the “State of Palestine” to the CWC. This letter was circulated to all States Parties by the Depositary.  Fentanyl has been referred to by some as an “incapacitating agent,” but during the 2002 Moscow Dubrovka theatre hostage crisis, over 100 people were killed by aerosolized fentanyl analogs (including both civilians and hostage takers), demonstrating the potential toxicity of fentanyl and its derivatives/analogs.  Grenades produced in the 1970s by the Soviet Union to disperse the riot control agents CS. 						Tags																																											Arms Control and Nonproliferation																															Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability																								Burma																																Chemical Weapons																																							Chemical Weapons Convention																															China																								Iran																								Russia																								Syria
- Announcement of Additional Visa Restriction Targets for Individuals Involved in the Repression of Syrians Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThis month marked 13 years since the Assad regime began its violent suppression of peaceful protests in Syria. The regime has committed atrocities, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. In December 2023, Secretary Blinken announced a new visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that includes current and former Syrian government officials and other individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the repression of Syrians, especially through violence and serious human rights abuses.Today, pursuant to this authority, the Secretary is taking steps to impose visa restrictions against 10 government officials and members of their immediate families for these officials’ involvement in serious human rights abuses. This comes in addition to the 11 Syrian regime officials and their immediate family members the Secretary announced were subject to visa restrictions in December 2023.The United States is committed to promoting accountability for those involved in repression of Syrians and justice for victims and survivors. We will not normalize relations with the Assad regime absent authentic progress towards a lasting political solution in line with UNSCR 2254. We reaffirm our unwavering support for the Syrian people, including in their ongoing peaceful demands for freedom and dignity. We will continue to seek and pursue visa restrictions against regime officials and other individuals who engage in the repression of Syrians.
- Sanctions on Financial Facilitators and Illicit Drug Traffickers Supporting Syria’s Assad Regime Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is today designating 11 individuals and entities supporting the Assad regime in Syria by facilitating illicit financial transfers and trafficking of illegal drugs.  We are also imposing sanctions on entities that are helping the Assad regime reap millions from the mining sector.Under Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad&#8217;s regime, Syria has become the leading producer and exporter of Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine-type stimulant trafficked throughout the Middle East and Europe.  The Assad regime derives significant revenue from the illicit Captagon trade and also from the export of commodities mined and exported from Syria with the help of foreign entities.  The regime also relies on Syrian money service businesses to circumvent sanctions and execute financial transfers on its behalf.The illicit profits from these activities sustain the Assad regime’s repression of Syrians and also undermine stability, security, and public health in the wider region.  The United States will continue to use its tools to counter the regime’s illicit financial activity and combat the trafficking of Captagon and other synthetic drug threats.The Department of the Treasury’s designations were taken pursuant to the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (“Caesar Act”), which includes secondary sanctions for anyone found to knowingly provide significant support to the Government of Syria, and Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011, “Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Actions With Respect to Syria.”  For more information on today’s action, see Treasury’s press release.