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*********************************************** 
CAROL WALZER v. ROY WALZER

(AC 44313)

Alvord, Prescott and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and ordering the sale of

certain real property, namely, the former marital home. The parties’

separation agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of

dissolution, provided, inter alia, that the defendant would pay to the

plaintiff a property settlement of $2,580,000, in installments, to be

secured with a mortgage deed in favor of the plaintiff against the former

marital home. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to make

certain of the installment payments. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant in

contempt; the defendant conceded that he had defaulted on the payment

obligations set forth in the separation agreement, stipulated to the

amount owed, offered no evidence to support a finding that he was

unable to comply with his payment obligations, and submitted a financial

affidavit showing significant real and personal property assets that could

be liquidated or financed to satisfy his payment obligations, thus, the

court properly found that the defendant’s failure to pay was wilful.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

ordered the sale of the former marital home: the court did not lack

jurisdiction to enter the order as it did not alter the terms of the judgment

of dissolution but, instead, fashioned a remedy appropriate to protect

the integrity of the original judgment, as the separation agreement unambiguously tied the plaintiff’s interest in the former marital home to the

defendant’s payment obligations; moreover, during the hearing on the

plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the defendant’s counsel did not object

to the plaintiff’s request that the former marital home be sold; furthermore, the court’s remedial orders setting the terms of the sale, including

that the defendant sell the home with the assistance of a real estate

broker, were justified and appropriately tailored to the defendant’s violations and did not violate his right to due process, as the defendant had

previously taken two years to attempt to sell the property, opposed

selling it with a licensed real estate broker and listed it for a sale price

that was significantly higher than its fair market value.

Argued November 17, 2021—officially released January 4, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the court, Danaher, J., rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting

certain other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement; thereafter, the court, Shaban, J.,

granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and entered

a remedial order, and the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Roy S. Walzer, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Stephanie M. Weaver, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this marital dissolution action, the

self-represented defendant,1 Roy Walzer, appeals from

the trial court’s postdissolution judgment in favor of

the plaintiff, Carol Walzer, finding the defendant in contempt. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly (1) found that his admitted failure to make

property settlement payments to the plaintiff in accordance with the dissolution judgment was wilful, and

(2) ordered the sale of the former marital home.2 We

affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts, as found by the court or as stipulated by the parties, and procedural history are relevant

to this appeal. The marriage of the parties was dissolved

by the court, Danaher, J., on February 19, 2014. The

parties’ separation agreement (agreement), executed

on the same date, was incorporated into the judgment

of dissolution. Article II of the agreement provides in

part that the defendant would retain title to the real

property located at 141 5 1/2 Mile Road in Goshen.

Article IV of the agreement, titled ‘‘Cash to the [Plaintiff],’’ provides: ‘‘4. The [defendant] shall pay to the

[plaintiff] as additional property settlement, Two Million, Five-Hundred Eighty Thousand ($2,580,000) Dollars, in installments as follows:

‘‘4.1 One million dollars ($1,000,000) during calendar

year 2014 as follows:

‘‘1.) One hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000)

on or before March 1, 2014;

‘‘2.) Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)

on or before June 1, 2014;

‘‘3.) Three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) on

or before September 30, 2014;

‘‘4.) Three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) on

or before December 31, 2014;

‘‘4.2 One Million, Five-Hundred and Eighty Thousand

($1,580,000) Dollars payable in quarterly installments

over ten years beginning in 2015 as follows: On or before

February 15, 2015, and every quarter of a year thereafter

(on May 15, August 15, and November 15) for calendar

years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 the [defendant] shall

pay to the [plaintiff] quarterly installments of forty two

thousand five hundred dollars ($42,500) totaling

$170,000 each year to the [plaintiff]. On or before February 15 and every quarter of a year thereafter (on May

15, August 15, and November 15) for calendar years

2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024, the [defendant]

shall pay to the [plaintiff] quarterly installments of thirty

seven thousand five hundred dollars ($37,500) totaling

$150,000 each year to the [plaintiff].

‘‘4.3 Said two million five hundred eighty thousand

dollars ($2,580,000) shall be secured with a mortgage
deed in the amount of two million five hundred eighty

thousand dollars as provided in paragraph 4.1 above in

favor of the [plaintiff] against the [defendant’s] real

property located at 141 5 1/2 Mile Road, Goshen, Connecticut [former marital home]. Said amount owed by

the [defendant] to the [plaintiff] shall bear no interest.

The [defendant] shall provide the [plaintiff] with legally

sufficient evidence that he has title to said real property

located at 141 5 1/2 Mile Road, Goshen, and that said

real property bears no encumbrances other than the

presently existing first mortgage in the amount of three

million dollars owed to Hudson City Savings Bank. The

[plaintiff] shall provide the [defendant] a yearly release

for the amount that has been paid off by the [defendant].

If the [defendant] sells said real property at 141 5 1/2

Mile Road, Goshen, or otherwise wishes to substitute

security to the [plaintiff] for his obligation herein, he

shall provide sufficient substitute security to the [plaintiff] for any unpaid balance at that time.’’

On January 21, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for

contempt. On August 19, 2020, the plaintiff filed a supplemental motion for contempt,3 alleging that the defendant had failed to make property settlement payments

as set forth in article IV of the agreement. Specifically,

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed an arrearage of $10,000 at the time of her January 21, 2020 motion

for contempt and that the defendant had not made any

of the quarterly payments due on February 15, May 15,

and August 15, 2020. With respect to the former marital

home, the plaintiff alleged that it was the subject of

two foreclosure actions. The plaintiff represented that

the defendant’s counsel had indicated that the former

marital home would be placed on the market for sale

but that it was off the market. The plaintiff maintained

that the defendant had overpriced the home when listing it in the past.

The plaintiff requested that the court find the defendant in contempt, order the defendant to pay all arrearages and current amounts owing, and order the former

marital home be placed on the market for sale with

a licensed broker and with a ‘‘realistic’’ listing price

commensurate with other listings in the area. She further requested that, in the event an agreement establishing the listing price could not be reached, the listing

broker mutually selected should set the price. The plaintiff requested sufficient substitute security for the

amounts owed her under the dissolution judgment and

sought attorney’s fees.

On September 1, 2020, the court, Shaban, J., held a

hearing at which the parties were both represented by

counsel. The defendant submitted a financial affidavit

dated September 1, 2020. On September 28, 2020, the

court issued its memorandum of decision. The court

first found, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation

offered at the hearing, that the defendant owed an
arrearage of $112,000.4 The court then recited the following additional facts, to which the parties had stipulated. ‘‘The property distribution payments due the

plaintiff were secured by a lien on the parties’ marital

home . . . . The fair market value of the property is

estimated to be $11,000,000. At the time of the agreement, there was a mortgage encumbering the property

that now has a balance due of approximately $3,000,000.

Following the mortgage is the plaintiff’s lien securing

the property settlement payments. The balance of the

lien is presently $740,000. Subsequent to the filing of

the plaintiff’s lien, the defendant secured a second mortgage on the premises for approximately $3,000,000.

Both mortgages are now under foreclosure. From 2018

to February, 2020, the defendant marketed the property

for sale through a broker. The property had been listed

at a price of $13,900,000. The defendant is now

attempting to sell the property himself.’’

The court noted that, during the hearing, the defendant requested permission to market the property without professional assistance through November 1, 2020,

and that, if he were unable to find a buyer, requested

that he then be permitted to choose a broker and a

‘‘ ‘reasonable’ ’’ selling price. With respect to the listing

price, the court referenced the defendant’s position that

‘‘the unique premium nature of the property is such

that a comparative analysis could not realistically be

done by a broker.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court also noted the defendant’s representation

that there remained sufficient equity in the property to

secure the payments due to the plaintiff and his offer

to pay interest on any amount in arrearage.

The court found by clear and convincing evidence

that the defendant had wilfully failed to make the payments due. It further found that the order was clear

and unambiguous. Thus, the court found the defendant

in contempt.

The court reviewed the defendant’s financial affidavit, which revealed that the defendant had ‘‘significant

real and personal property assets that could be used

to make payment of the amounts due either through

financing or liquidation.’’ Specifically, the court identified the defendant’s full ownership in Litchfield Equities, Ltd., which owns two properties valued at $600,000

and $550,000 with no encumbrances. The court further

noted that the defendant had identified on his financial

affidavit personal property assets valued at $468,775,

including an art collection, Oriental rugs, antiques, a

wine cellar, furniture, tools, equipment, and miscellaneous items.

On the basis of the foregoing, the court ordered the

defendant to bring current all payments due on or

before November 15, 2020. The court ordered the former marital home ‘‘be immediately listed for sale

through a mutually agreed upon licensed real estate
broker. In the event the parties cannot agree on a broker, each shall select a broker of their choosing and

the two brokers shall choose a third broker who shall

market the property. The selection of the broker and

the execution of a listing agreement shall be done within

ten days of this order. The list price shall be set by the

broker and the parties shall thereafter abide by the

recommendations of the broker as to the frequency

and amount of any alterations in the list price for the

property. Any offer for purchase within 5 percent . . .

of the list price shall be accepted by the parties.’’5 This

appeal followed.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. Specifically, he contends that no evidence was

presented that his failure to make property settlement

payments in accordance with the dissolution judgment

was wilful. The plaintiff responds that the record before

the court, including the defendant’s financial affidavit,

which showed significant assets at his disposal and

available to satisfy the judgment, was sufficient for the

court to find that his nonpayment was wilful. We agree

with the plaintiff.

The applicable principles of law and standard of

review are well settled. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience

to the rules and orders of a court which has power to

punish for such an offense. . . . Our review of a trial

court’s judgment of civil contempt involves a two part

inquiry. [W]e first consider the threshold question of

whether the underlying order constituted a court order

that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to

support a judgment of contempt. . . . Second, if we

conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing,

or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which

includes a review of the trial court’s determination of

whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good

faith dispute or misunderstanding. . . . Whether a party’s violation was wilful depends on the circumstances

of the particular case and, ultimately, is a factual question committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

. . . [T]his court will not disturb the trial court’s orders

unless it has abused its legal discretion or its findings

have no reasonable basis in fact. . . . It is within the

province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper

inferences from the evidence presented. . . . [E]very

reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the

trial court’s ruling, and [n]othing short of a conviction

that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a

clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Giordano v. Giordano, 203 Conn. App. 652, 656–57, 249

A.3d 363 (2021).
On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the

court’s conclusion that the order was clear and unambiguous, but he claims that the court improperly determined that his noncompliance with that order was wilful. Specifically, he argues that ‘‘[i]t is clear upon the

facts of [his] financial affidavit that he had neither the

income nor the liquid funds at the present time to pay

the plaintiff the cash installments in accordance with

the terms contained in the judgment,’’ and that ‘‘[n]o

evidence was presented that [his] failure to pay was

wilful nor was wilfulness stipulated.’’ He contends that

his assets are illiquid and that ‘‘[n]o reasonable inference can be drawn or assumption made, therefore, on

the issue of wilfulness or [his] prior and continuing

efforts to assemble the funds to comply with the payment schedule in the agreement.’’ We are not persuaded.

‘‘To constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be

wilful. . . . Noncompliance alone will not support a

judgment of contempt. . . . [I]nability to pay is a

defense to a contempt motion. However, the burden of

proving inability to pay rests upon the obligor.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 187

Conn. App. 375, 393, 202 A.3d 458 (2019). ‘‘Whether [a

party has] established his inability to pay the order by

credible evidence is a question of fact. Questions of

fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of

review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when

there is no evidence in the record to support it . . .

or when although there is evidence to support it, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function

to weigh the evidence . . . we give great deference to

its findings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Afkari-Ahmadi v. Fotovat-Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 397–98,

985 A.2d 319 (2009).

In the present case, the defendant conceded that he

had defaulted on the payment obligations set forth in

article IV of the agreement, and he stipulated to the

amount of the arrearage owed. The defendant offered

no evidence at the hearing to support a finding that he

was unable to comply with his payment obligations. To

the contrary, as the trial court found, the defendant

submitted a financial affidavit showing ‘‘significant real

and personal property assets that could be used to make

payment of the amounts due either through financing

or liquidation.’’ These assets included ownership of two

properties valued at $600,000 and $550,000 with no

encumbrances, and $468,775 in personal property

including an art collection, Oriental rugs, antiques, a

wine cellar, furniture, tools, equipment, and miscellaneous items.6

In sum, the defendant’s financial affidavit,

which showed ample assets that could be liquidated or

financed to satisfy his payment obligations, provided a

basis for the court reasonably to infer that his failure
to pay was wilful. His failure to utilize those assets to

meet his court-ordered dissolution obligations does not

insulate him from a finding of contempt.7 Accordingly,

we conclude that the court properly found that the

defendant’s failure to pay was wilful and, consequently,

did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in

contempt.8

II

We next address the defendant’s claim that the court

improperly ordered the sale of the former marital home.

He offers several arguments related to this claim. First,

he argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter an

order relating to the sale of the former marital home,

on the basis that the order constituted an improper

modification of the final property division. Second, he

maintains that the court abused its discretion in issuing

orders related to the sale of the former marital home.

Specifically, he contends that ‘‘[t]he trial court had the

discretion to order the defendant to pay the arrearage

by a date certain which the trial court did order. But

the court went far beyond that by ordering, in addition,

that the defendant sell his residence through a real

estate broker, inserting the plaintiff into the real estate

broker selection process [and] the listing price determination process and ordering that a mathematically

determined offer be accepted irrespective of the terms

of the offer beyond price.’’ Third, he argues that the

terms of the sale ordered by the court violate his right

to due process. We disagree.

We first set forth relevant principles of law and our

standard of review. It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he court’s

authority to transfer property appurtenant to a dissolution proceeding rests on [General Statutes] § 46b-81.

. . . Accordingly, the court’s authority to divide the

personal property of the parties, pursuant to § 46b-81,

must be exercised, if at all, at the time that it renders

judgment dissolving the marriage. . . . A court, therefore, does not have the authority to modify the division

of property once the dissolution becomes final. . . .

‘‘Although the court does not have the authority to

modify a property assignment, a court, after distributing

property, which includes assigning the debts and liabilities of the parties, does have the authority to issue

postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment. . . .

[I]t is . . . within the equitable powers of the trial court

to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the

integrity of [its original] judgment. . . . This court has

explained the difference between postjudgment orders

that modify a judgment rather than effectuate it. A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which

introduces new elements into the details, or cancels

some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect

of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast, an order

effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to

protect the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring
the parties’ timely compliance therewith. . . .

‘‘If a party’s motion can fairly be construed as seeking

an effectuation of the judgment rather than a modification of the terms of the property settlement, this court

must favor that interpretation. . . . Similarly, when

determining whether the new order is a modification,

we examine the practical effect of the ruling on the

original order. . . . In order to determine the practical

effect of the court’s order on the original judgment, we

must examine the terms of the original judgment as

well as the subsequent order. [T]he construction of [an

order or] judgment is a question of law for the court

. . . [and] our review . . . is plenary. As a general rule,

[orders and] judgments are to be construed in the same

fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered

from all parts of the [order or] judgment. . . . The

interpretation of [an order or] judgment may involve

the circumstances surrounding [its] making. . . .

Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied

as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The [order

or] judgment should admit of a consistent construction

as a whole.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Cords,

165 Conn. App. 473, 482–85, 139 A.3d 778, cert. denied,

322 Conn. 907, 140 A.3d 221 (2016).

Relatedly, ‘‘[f]aced with a party in contempt of court,

it is within the court’s province to fashion appropriate

remedial orders. Courts have in general the power to

fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a

prior . . . judgment. . . . Having found noncompliance, the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers,

necessarily ha[s] the authority to fashion whatever

orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ciottone v. Ciottone, 154 Conn. App. 780, 793–94, 107

A.3d 1004 (2015).

The defendant argues that because ‘‘[t]here is no provision in the judgment requiring [him] to sell his residence and the associated real property’’ but, rather, a

payment schedule and ‘‘descending security provision,’’

the court’s order requiring the sale of the property and

setting the terms of the sale are ‘‘not the mere technical

implementation of the judgment.’’ We conclude that the

court’s decision on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt

did not alter the terms of the judgment of dissolution

but rather fashioned a remedy appropriate to protect

the integrity of its original judgment.

The agreement incorporated into the judgment of

dissolution provides that the amount owed the plaintiff

under articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the agreement shall be

‘‘secured with a mortgage deed in the amount of two

million five hundred eighty thousand dollars as provided in paragraph 4.1 above in favor of the [plaintiff]

against the [defendant’s] real property located at 141 5
1/2 Mile Road, Goshen, Connecticut.’’ The parties, in

agreeing to the provision, unambiguously tied the plaintiff’s interest in the property to the defendant’s payment

obligations. The effect of this provision is to ensure that

the plaintiff receives the installment payments owed to

her under the terms of the dissolution judgment. In

the event of the defendant’s default in his installment

payment obligation, the sale of the property is exactly

what the agreement contemplated, in that the defendant’s obligation could be satisfied either through foreclosure of the mortgage or through the court’s contempt power.

Despite the first motion for contempt having been

filed in January, 2020, the defendant remained in complete default on his quarterly installment payments

more than eight months later at the time of the hearing

in September, 2020. Thus, the defendant’s continued

default rendered strict adherence to the terms of the

agreement impossible; see Santoro v. Santoro, 70 Conn.

App. 212, 218, 797 A.2d 592 (2002) (‘‘noncompliance on

the part of the parties made strict adherence to the

terms of the [decree] impossible’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)); and the court appropriately fashioned

the remedy of sale to protect the integrity of the courtordered dissolution agreement.

Moreover, we note that the defendant’s counsel did

not object, during the hearing on the motion for contempt, to the plaintiff’s request that the former marital

home be sold. To the contrary, he requested only that

the court allow additional time for the defendant to

continue to market the property himself. Specifically,

the defendant’s counsel proposed: ‘‘[The defendant] just

. . . wants eight more weeks to try to market this. And,

then, he would like to be able to choose the broker and

choose a reasonable selling price because, after all, [the

plaintiff] is gonna get the cash that she gets in the

settlement agreement, but he’s trying to manage what

he was left after the divorce. And, Your Honor, if—we

will report to [the plaintiff] on November 1, who the

broker is and the . . . listing price. And if [the plaintiff

is] not in agreement with it we can . . . say we’re

gonna come back to court and argue the listing price

and the broker.’’ Thus, the defendant cannot now be

heard to complain that the court erred in ordering the

former marital home sold. See Scalora v. Scalora, 189

Conn. App. 703, 732–33, 209 A.3d 1 (2019) (declining

to review claim that court erred in crafting arrearage

payment schedule without obtaining evidence of ability

to pay where parties had effectively invited court to

focus on merits of motions without reference to current

finances, as parties had not filed financial affidavits nor

objected at time of orders that court had not considered

their financial conditions).

As to setting the terms of the sale, we conclude that

the court’s remedial orders were justified and appropri-
ately tailored to the violations and did not violate the

defendant’s right to due process. The record before the

court included stipulations demonstrating the defendant’s two year long undertaking to sell the property,

his opposition to listing it with a licensed broker, and

his listing of the property for sale at a price significantly

higher than its fair market value, all of which provided

a sufficient basis for the court to conclude that its

remedial order needed to address the terms of the sale

to ensure that the plaintiff would receive the sums owed

to her. See Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn. App. 794, 821,

6 A.3d 184 (2010) (court’s order prohibiting defendant

from encumbering assets without approval of court was

not abuse of discretion where it was clear court believed

order was necessary to secure defendant’s debt to plaintiff); see also Ciottone v. Ciottone, supra, 154 Conn.

App. 793 (rejecting claim that remedial orders deprived

plaintiff of due process where orders were justified and

appropriately tailored to violations). Accordingly, we

conclude that the court did not improperly order the

sale of the former marital home, abuse its discretion,

or violate the defendant’s right to due process.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the defendant is self-represented on appeal, he was represented

by counsel at the time of the contempt hearing before the trial court.

2

In his principal appellate brief, the defendant asserts four separate claims

of error. For ease of discussion, we address certain claims together and in

a different order than they appear in the defendant’s appellate brief.

3

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that ‘‘[t]he second

motion was necessary due to the coronavirus pandemic that closed the

court in March, 2020, before the matter could be heard. The courts remained

closed to normal operations for several months thereafter.’’

4

In their appellate briefs, both parties represent that the defendant owed

the plaintiff $112,500 at the time of the contempt hearing. Specifically, the

defendant states: ‘‘As of August 19, 2020, the date upon which plaintiff filed

the motion for contempt which is the subject of the instant appeal, the

defendant owed to plaintiff $112,500, under the payment schedule contained

in the agreement.’’ The plaintiff states: ‘‘At the time of the hearing, three

payments in 2020 for $37,500 were due, for a total of $112,500.’’ Neither

party, however, challenges on appeal the court’s finding that the parties had

stipulated to an amount owed of $112,000.

5 The court also awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the

amount of $1009.30, and ordered the defendant to pay such amount on or

before November 15, 2020.

6 We also note that the defendant’s financial affidavit, filed on the date

of the contempt hearing, reported a net weekly income of $2348.80. During

oral argument before this court, the defendant was questioned regarding

whether he was receiving income of approximately $2400 weekly at the

time of the contempt hearing, and he responded that he was.

7

In his reply brief, the defendant argues: ‘‘Had plaintiff . . . made any

effort whatsoever to support her claim of willfulness, by means of inquiry

or evidence, or had the court below made any inquiry, there would be a

record below. For example, gross income does not equal available funds to

service defendant’s . . . payment schedule and assets do not equal the

ability to finance, which requires sufficient income to carry the debt. No

such record exists. Without such record, there is no clear and convincing

evidence upon which to base a finding of willfulness.’’ Our Supreme Court

previously has rejected arguments that the trial court was obligated to comb

through the financial situation of the nonpaying party as being in conflict with

‘‘the well settled law of this state requiring the contemnor to demonstrate

his or her inability to comply with a payment order.’’ Afkari-Ahmadi v.

Fotovat-Ahmadi, supra, 294 Conn. 398.

8 During oral argument before this court, the defendant represented that
he neither had complied with the court’s contempt remedial order that he

bring current his payments by November 15, 2020, nor had filed a motion

for a stay of that order. The defendant additionally represented that, although

he had listed the former marital home for sale following the court’s issuance

of its memorandum of decision, the selection of the broker and the list price

were both his decision. Although the defendant’s actions subsequent to the

court’s issuance of its memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s motion

for contempt are not before us in this appeal, we note that the defendant’s

admitted and continued failure to comply with the court’s order may subject

him to further remedial orders should the plaintiff elect to file a subsequent

motion for contempt with the trial court.