# Cambodia - United States Department of State

- Cambodia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Cambodia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cambodia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Forced Organ Harvesting																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Cambodia during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests of journalists, censorship, and enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on and harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence; trafficking in persons; significant and systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										In contrast with 2022, there were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings. There were, however, deaths in prison that raised suspicions of fatal abuse.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.More than three years after prominent Thai activist Wanchalearm Satsaksit’s abduction in Cambodia in 2020, the government provided no significant update of its investigation, despite constant appeals by his family and local human rights defenders.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported military police and civilian law enforcement officials used physical and psychological abuse, including during interrogations. Victims turned to social media to draw public attention to their cases rather than working through human rights NGOs. In August a journalist reported via Facebook on a case in which police allegedly arrested two men in Phnom Penh and accused them of using drugs. Police allegedly beat the two individuals and demanded a bribe to close the case.A local NGO recorded four cases of alleged torture from January to June involving members of political opposition groups and human rights activists. NGO reports claimed members of certain groups, especially the opposition and human rights activists, were most likely to be tortured in detention. A young man arrested on drug charges in August was taken to a Banteay Meanchey provincial hospital where he died after suffering a “heart attack.” A medical NGO disputed that finding, and alleged the victim was abused as evidenced by a photograph that showed bruises on his chest and blood in his mouth.A local NGO recorded several cases of cruel and degrading treatment of political opposition supporters from January to June.Although the law required police, prosecutors, and judges to investigate all complaints of official abuse, government officials and their family members enjoyed impunity for human rights abuses. Judges and prosecutors conducted investigations only when there was public outcry or when a senior government official took a personal interest, and in those there were frequent allegations of interference by senior officials. Judges often passed down verdicts in abuse cases based predominately on written reports from police.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions throughout the country remained harsh due to gross overcrowding, physical abuse, inadequate sanitary conditions, inadequate food, lack of clean water, and rampant corruption.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding remained a problem. As of July, there were more than 45,000 prisoners in a 28-prison system designed to accommodate 11,000.Some human rights NGOs speculated shortages of food and sundries were designed to force prisoners and detainees to purchase the items from guards and other prison officials at inflated prices. A few NGOs also alleged some prison officials acted as loan sharks. Family members seeking to provide incarcerated relatives necessities often had to pay bribes to prison officials. An NGO reported that an estimated 11 prisons were unable to provide clean water to inmates. A local NGO in Banteay Meanchey Province reported some prisoners developed skin diseases due to a lack of clean water for bathing. Prisons across the country lacked adequate facilities to support persons with disabilities.Most NGO observers agreed that many patients in government, private, and NGO-run inpatient rehabilitation centers were involuntarily detained or committed by police or family members. Observers noted that employees at rehabilitation centers frequently controlled detainees with physical restraints and subjected them to intense physical exercise or labor.Administration: There was little evidence to support the government’s assertion it investigated allegations of mistreatment and monitored prison and detention center conditions.Independent Monitoring: The government allowed international and domestic human rights groups to visit prisons with restrictions. Representatives of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported they could visit prisons and hold private meetings with prisoners of interest, in accordance with an agreement with the General Department of Prisons. Some NGOs, especially locally based organizations, reported limited cooperation from local authorities that made it difficult to gain access to pretrial detainees.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and limited pretrial detention to a maximum of 18 months. The government did not observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required police to obtain a warrant from an investigating judge prior to making an arrest unless police apprehended a suspect in the act of committing a crime. The law allowed police to hold suspects for up to 48 hours to facilitate an investigation, excluding weekends and government holidays, before police had to file charges or release a suspect. In felony cases of exceptional circumstances prescribed by law, police could detain a suspect for an additional 24 hours with the approval of a prosecutor. Nevertheless, authorities routinely held persons for extended periods before charging them.There was a bail system, but many prisoners, especially those without legal representation, had no opportunity to seek release on bail. Authorities routinely denied bail in politically sensitive cases, leading to lengthy pretrial detention.Authorities occasionally held detainees without legal representation.Arbitrary Arrest: As of October, one local human rights NGO recorded 40 arbitrary arrests of 28 political activists, 11 persons whose land had been taken, and one union member. Another local NGO recorded two illegal arrests and five illegal detentions. Human rights NGOs estimated that the actual number of arbitrary arrests and detentions was much higher but due to fear of reprisal, victims and their families chose not to report incidents.The government continued to arbitrarily charge individuals with “incitement,” using the law to levy criminal charges against political opposition leaders and their supporters, labor and environmental activists, and persons who made comments deemed politically objectionable. The law criminalized the “direct incitement to commit a felony or disturb social security,” a vague term commonly used to suppress and punish peaceful political speech and dissent.Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention was common and, in some cases, was longer than the minimum sentence for the offense. Government officials stated prolonged detentions were frequently the result of the limited capacity of the court system. In addition to systemic delays, refusal to grant bail also contributed to excessive pretrial detention. For example, in cases of “incitement,” individuals were rarely granted bail, according to reports; most “incitement” suspects in the country were held in pretrial detention until the end of their trial, almost always beyond the statutory minimum sentence of six months.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. Court decisions were often subject to political influence. Judicial officials, up to and including the chief of the Supreme Court, simultaneously held senior positions in the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Observers assessed only those with strong ties to the CPP or personal relationships with senior officials received judicial appointments. Corruption among judges, prosecutors, and court officials was widespread. The judicial branch was inefficient and could not ensure due process or fair trials. At times the outcome of trials appeared predetermined, especially in cases involving former members of the Cambodian National Rescue Party, dissolved by the government in 2017.Court delays and corrupt practices often allowed accused persons to escape prosecution. NGOs believed court officials focused on cases that might benefit them financially. There were widespread allegations that rich or powerful defendants, including members of the security forces, often paid victims and authorities to drop criminal charges. These allegations were supported by NGO reports and instances of wealthy defendants appearing free in public after their high-profile arrests were reported in media (and absent additional coverage of court proceedings or verdicts in their cases).Authorities sometimes urged victims or their families to accept financial restitution in exchange for dropping criminal charges or for failing to appear as witnesses.																Trial Procedures						While the law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.Trials were rarely carried out in a manner that presumed a defendants’ innocence and defendants were often not notified of their charges promptly, as the law stipulated. Trials were not always public nor made known to the public. Although defendants had the right to be present at their trials, the law allowed trials in absentia. Courts at times convicted suspects in absentia with no defense representation. The right to an attorney was often not enforced. In felony cases, if a defendant could not afford an attorney, the law required the court to provide free legal representation; however, the judiciary was not always able to provide legal counsel, and most defendants either sought assistance from NGOs or pro bono representation, or “voluntarily” proceeded without legal representation. In the absence of a required defense attorney in a felony case, trial courts routinely adjourned cases until defendants could secure legal representation, a process that often took months. Trials were typically perfunctory, and extensive cross-examination usually did not take place. NGOs reported that sworn written statements from witnesses and the accused in many cases constituted the only evidence presented at trials.In some cases, authorities allegedly coerced confessions through beatings and threats, or forced defendants to sign a written confession without informing them of the content. Courts accepted forced confessions as evidence despite legal prohibitions against this practice.The law allowed the accused to file an appeal but did not require appeals court judges to hold a trial hearing, which often resulted in significant delays.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						As of October, a local human rights NGO recorded 28 political prisoners and detainees, an estimated 15 detained since January.																										f. Transnational Repression										There were credible reports that the government engaged in transnational repression.Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence: Unlike in previous years there were no credible allegations that the government used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: There were reports of threats, harassment, and arbitrary surveillance by the government against individuals located outside the country. In April then Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to remove a relative of a prominent opposition member from his position in the army. The opposition member, exiled in France, hosted a popular online show that often criticized senior members of the government.Efforts to Control Mobility: There were reports the government, as a form of reprisal, revoked the identity documents of government critics and opposition leaders, thereby blocking their return to Cambodia and other travel.Bilateral Pressure:  There were credible reports the government exerted pressure on regional countries, seeking repatriation to Cambodia or other adverse action against specific individuals. During the year, senior government officials including then Prime Minister Hun Sen on several occasions publicly called on neighboring countries to arrest and deport exiled opposition officials if they were to travel to those countries. On July 7, Thai police arrested a Cambodian opposition party youth activist in Bangkok while he was en route to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there. The activist fled to Thailand earlier that month, reportedly to escape arrest. Prior to his leaving Cambodia, the government allegedly attempted to convince the activist to defect to the ruling CPP and issued an arrest warrant for him when he refused.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The law stated that any person who peacefully occupied private or state land (excluding public land) or inhabited state buildings without contest for five years prior to 2001 had the right to apply for definitive title to that property. Most citizens, however, lacked the knowledge and means to obtain formal title.Early in the year, Kong Korm, a leading advisor to the opposition Candlelight Party (CLP), was forced to return his family home of 40 years to the government despite reportedly holding the title. Korm drew the ire of then Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP after allegedly making comments about the origins of the CPP that demonstrated “malicious intent to incite unrest,” according to the CPP in a lawsuit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs filed a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Unit and a civil lawsuit against Korm after Hun Sen stated the property belonged to the ministry. The Foreign Ministry alleged Korm illegally built a house on land that belonged to the ministry during Korm’s tenure as foreign minister in the 1980s. Korm was threatened with further “punishment” if he did not vacate his home, leading him to transfer the land – worth an estimated $20 million – to the government, after which all legal actions were dropped.Provincial and district land offices continued to follow pre-2001 land registration procedures, which were not based on accurate land surveys and did not provide opportunities for public comment. Land speculation in the absence of clear title fueled disputes in every province and increased tensions between poor rural communities and domestic and international real estate speculators. Residents of some urban communities faced forced and uncompensated eviction to make way for commercial development projects.Authorities continued to force inhabitants from disputed land despite residents’ strong legal claims to ownership and title. Some persons used the threat of legal action or eviction to intimidate poor and vulnerable persons into selling their land at below-market values.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but there were reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions. NGOs reported police routinely conducted searches and seizures without warrants, in contradiction to the law which provided for the privacy of residences and correspondence and prohibited illegal searches. The government allegedly continued to leak personal correspondence and recordings of private telephone conversations of opposition and civil society group leaders to government-aligned media.The government also reportedly employed an informant system and, in some instances, punished or threatened to punish family members for offenses allegedly committed by relatives.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government did not generally respect this right. The government greatly restricted free expression, including by independent news media and other dissenting voices; many individuals and institutions reported widespread self-censorship, particularly on social media.Freedom of Expression: The constitution provided for freedom of speech, yet penalized any speech deemed to damage public security. The criminal code also criminalized defamation and lese&#8211;majeste (insulting the king). Election laws required civil society organizations to remain “neutral” during political campaigns and prohibited them from “insulting” political parties in media.The government arrested and prosecuted several citizens on politically motivated disinformation and misdemeanor “incitement” charges. In September, Banteay Meanchey provincial authorities arrested and charged with incitement six Candlelight Party activists soliciting support to register a new political party. Candlelight Party stated the six individuals were arrested after refusing to defect to the ruling party.The government restricted academic freedom and political discussion at schools and universities. Scholars exercised caution when teaching politically sensitive subjects due to fear of offending politicians or government officials.Violence and Harassment: Threats and violence against journalists and reporters was common.From January to March, the Cambodian Center for Independent Media and the Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association recorded at least eight incidents of harassment against journalists. In the run-up to and following the February closure of one of the few remaining independent media outlets, Voice of Democracy, affiliated journalists reported an increase in harassment, especially online from CPP supporters. In one instance, a woman Voice of Democracy reporter was harassed with misogynistic language and vulgar social media posts after publishing a contentious article.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government, military, and ruling party owned or otherwise influenced most newspapers and broadcast media; there were few significant independent sources for news. Although the law prohibited censorship and no formal censorship system existed, the government used other means to censor media, most notably through its control of permits and licenses for journalists and media outlets not controlled directly by the government or the CPP. Private media admitted to practicing self-censorship, in part from fear of government reprisal. Reporters claimed newspaper editors told them not to write on topics that would offend the government, and reported self-censoring due to the chilling effect of recent criminal cases against journalists.The government accused Voice of Democracy of intentionally misleading the public and subsequently revoked the outlet’s media license in February. The accusation followed Voice of Democracy’s report on Hun Manet’s February approval of $100,000 in earthquake assistance to Turkey on his father’s behalf. The reporter who wrote the piece fled the country out of fear of reprisal, despite having directly quoted the government spokesperson in the report.Libel/Slander Laws: The law criminalized expression that libeled or slandered the monarch (lese-majeste) and prohibited publishers and editors from disseminating stories insulting or defaming the king, government leaders, or public institutions. The government used the law to restrict public discussion on topics it deemed sensitive or against its interests. The lese-majeste law was applied arbitrarily and authorities often used it to arrest persons expressing a disfavored opinion. In March authorities arrested former opposition members Yim Sinorn and Hun Kosal and accused them of mocking the king. Both were released weeks later after delivering a public apology; they subsequently defected to the ruling CPP. On July 22, Kampong Speu provincial authorities arrested Svay Sophat, age 48, a reporter for online press outlet Neak Mirl Phlov, accusing him of insulting the king.National Security: The government continued to cite “national security” concerns to justify restricting and prosecuting critics of government policies and officials. In October a senior Candlelight Party official received a 3-year sentence for a Facebook post commenting on then Prime Minister Hun Sen’s relationship with Vietnam. The prosecutor theorized that the post could have incited others to mobilize and destroy monuments to Vietnamese-Cambodian friendship.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted or disrupted access to the internet and censored online content. There were also credible reports that government entities monitored online communications.The law gave the government legal authority to monitor all telephone conversations, text messages, email, social media activity, and correspondence between individuals without their consent or a warrant. Any opinions expressed in these exchanges that the government deemed to impinge on its definition of national security could result in a maximum 15 years’ imprisonment. There were several reports of government officials “crashing” private online meetings of political opposition groups.The government had authority to shut down any social media page or website that published information leading to “turmoil in the society that [might] undermine national defense, national security, national relations with other countries, the economy, social order, discrimination, or national culture or tradition.” One week before the July 23 elections, the government blocked access to nine social media accounts of at least three independent news outlets, according to Voice of America.A “cyber war team” in the Council of Ministers’ Press and Quick Reaction Unit monitored and countered “incorrect” information from news outlets and social media.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government limited the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Although the constitution provided for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government restricted the right, especially for labor activists, opposition supporters, and those who had land taken from them.The law required advance notification for protests, marches, or demonstrations, but authorities inconsistently enforced this requirement. One provision required five days’ notice for most peaceful demonstrations, while another required 12 hours’ notice for impromptu gatherings on private property or protests at designated venues and limited such gatherings to 200 persons. Lower-level government officials, particularly in Phnom Penh, generally denied requests unless the national government specifically authorized the gatherings. All levels of government routinely denied permits to groups critical of the ruling party. Authorities cited the need for stability and public security (terms left undefined in the law and therefore subject to wide interpretation) as reasons for denying permits. In May the opposition CLP announced it would mobilize 10,000 supporters to protest the party’s possible banning. Senior government officials threatened party members with imprisonment if they attempted to gather and the party cancelled the gathering.There were reports the government prevented associations and other NGOs from organizing human rights-related events and meetings, with local authorities denying necessary permits. Government authorities occasionally cited the law to break up meetings and training programs deemed hostile to the government.Despite these restrictions, some unauthorized public protests took place, including against land seizures, in labor disputes, and to demand the release of political prisoners. In previous years, when unauthorized demonstrations occurred, authorities tended to act quickly and forcefully to disperse them, but there were no such reported incidents.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for freedom of association, but the government restricted it, targeting specifically groups it believed could be involved in political dissent. The law required all associations and other NGOs to register and to be politically neutral, which restricted the right to association and those organizations’ right to free expression. For restrictions on NGOs and trade unions, see sections 5 and 7 respectively. For restrictions on political associations, see section 3.Vague provisions in several laws prohibiting any activity that could “jeopardize peace, stability, and public order” or harm “national security, national unity, traditions, and the culture of Cambodian society” created a substantial risk of arbitrary and politicized restriction of the right of association. According to critics, the laws on associations and trade unions established heavily bureaucratic, multistep registration processes that lacked both transparency and administrative safeguards, thereby reinforcing political objections to registering groups. Laws on reporting activities and finances, including the disclosure of all successful funding proposals, financial or grant agreements, and bank accounts also imposed burdensome obligations that allowed officials to restrict or close organizations. Some NGOs and unions complained that police carefully monitored their activities and intimidated participants by sending uniformed or plainclothes police to observe their meetings and training sessions. A local NGOs reported that as of July, there were 60 instances of authorities closely monitoring private meetings.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. The government retained lookout alerts in immigration systems against political opposition figures barred from participating in political activity (many under the court decision dissolving the Cambodia National Rescue Party in 2017), resulting in the delay or denial of free movement out of the country through both land border checkpoints and airports.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and there was a system for providing protection to refugees. The system, however, was not equally accessible to all refugees and asylum seekers and was not transparent. Asylum seekers who entered the country without documentation or overstayed their visas were vulnerable to deportation. The government did not grant resident status or a resident book to refugees, only a refugee card that was generally unrecognized and did not offer access to employment, housing, banking services, and other benefits to which refugees were legally entitled.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to 199 Afghan asylum seekers in 2022. As of August, 56 (including a child born in Cambodia) remained in the country and 143 had relocated to third countries, according to the General Department of Immigration. Two from this group returned to Afghanistan.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country had habitual residents who were de facto stateless. Official statistics on statelessness were not available. The government’s Immigration Office reported 75,000 ethnic Vietnamese had their legal documentation revoked in 2014. The 2021 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey reported that 47,252 stateless ethnic Vietnamese resided in Cambodia. In December 2022, Kampong Chhnang provincial authorities dismantled the houseboats of 520 families, mostly ethnic Vietnamese who long resided in the area, and relocated them to a site approximately 15 miles away. The government did not effectively implement laws or policies to provide stateless persons the opportunity to acquire or document their Cambodian nationality. According to an NGO, individuals without proof of nationality often did not have access to formal employment, education, marriage registration, or the courts, or have the right to own land.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Although the constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, there was no such ability. By law the government could dissolve parties and ban individuals from party leadership positions and political life more broadly. The law also barred parties from using any audio, visual, or written material from a person convicted of a crime. Under the National Election Committee code of conduct, journalists could be fined if they “disrupt election processes,” interview any voter inside a polling station, or publish news that could affect “political stability” or cause the public to lose confidence in the election.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: The most recent national election occurred on July 23. The largest opposition party, the CLP, was barred from contesting the election. Local and international NGOs and many foreign governments judged the election neither free nor fair, noting the disqualification of the CLP, extensive harassment and intimidation of political opposition figures and voters, and measures taken to shutter independent media outlets.The CLP was disqualified in May from participating in the election for alleged paperwork errors in registering; observers assessed the CLP ban was intended to ensure a landslide victory for the ruling CPP.NGOs and observers reported irregularities including voter harassment by commune or village chiefs in the run-up to elections.Responding to calls from overseas opposition figures to boycott the election or spoil ballots, the government changed the election law weeks before balloting, imposing heavy fines on those found guilty of disrupting the election process and banning anyone who failed to vote from running for office in future elections. At least 38 opposition party members and activists were convicted of inciting voters to spoil their ballots, according to local media reports. Authorities banned 21 of these individuals, including opposition figure Sam Rainsy, from holding office for at least 20 years.On election day, dozens of opposition supporters shared photographs of spoiled ballets on social media. Of those, at least five were reportedly arrested; as of October, it was unclear whether they were still detained.Although campaign law required news outlets to give equal coverage to each party participating in an election, the law was not enforced during the election campaign. News outlets, mostly government owned or controlled, gave significantly greater coverage to the CPP than to other parties; in rural areas, where independent media were particularly weak, this was a significant benefit.Intimidation of opposition personalities and supporters took physical form. Violence against opposition supporters included physical assaults in public locations and assaults on persons driving motorbikes.The National Election Committee claimed it registered a record number of local and international observers for the election, but NGOs assessed that the vast majority of those were from the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia, led by Hun Many, youngest son of then Prime Minister Hun Sen. One local election watchdog reduced the number of its observers because of the banning of the CLP. The watchdog’s representatives in several provinces reported CPP local officials intimidated and harassed them when they attempted to recruit local observers. Progovernment media targeted leaders of independent NGOs who monitored previous elections; the government accused them of “engaging in color revolution.”Following the closure of polls, ballots were frequently counted behind closed doors.Political Parties and Political Participation: Independent political parties suffered from numerous abuses, described above. These contributed significantly to the CPP’s effective monopolization of political power. The CLP’s disqualification from the July election was the most recent step in a long-running campaign against leading opposition parties and their members.Coercing opposition leaders to join the CPP was a long-standing tactic and prior to the July 23 general election, defections to the ruling CPP increased sharply. Most of those who defected were reportedly threatened with lawsuits or enticed with prominent government roles. Those who did not join the CPP faced financial ruin or prison if they remained in the country.In March opposition figure Kem Sokha was sentenced to 27 years in prison on fabricated treason charges for conspiring with a “foreign power” to overthrow the government, following a more than five-year long trial.A local election-focused NGO noted that opposition parties could not compete equally with the CPP, which, in addition to active repressive measures, drew on state resources to assist in campaigning. Local media reported, for example, that contrary to the law prohibiting any activity by a political party in educational establishments, teachers and students were asked to join CPP election campaigns.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No laws restricted the participation of women and members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process. Chbab Srey, the traditional code of conduct for women; their generally low educational level; and family and domestic obligations combined to limit women’s role in politics and government. Ethnic minorities tended to receive less civic education and had lower participation rates in politics.Women made up just over 10 percent of commune chiefs elected in 2022, a slight increase from the proportion in the 2017 communal elections. In August Khuon Sudary became the first woman president of the National Assembly. The new government was overwhelmingly male; only three women held minister positions on the cabinet. Women made up only 10 percent of the 125-member National Assembly elected in July.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption. In December 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng publicly accused the Ministry of Public Works and Transport of large-scale corruption involving collusion with construction companies to inflate road construction costs and siphon off approximately one million dollars.Corruption: Corruption was endemic in society and government. There were reports that police, prosecutors, investigating judges, and presiding judges took bribes from owners of both legal and illegal businesses. While information on Anti-Corruption Unit investigations was generally not publicly available, following its February investigation, the governor of Baseth District was dismissed by Kampong Speu provincial authorities for illegally selling 395 acres of state land.Meager salaries contributed to “survival corruption” among low-level officials, while a culture of impunity enabled corruption to flourish among senior officials. Those who reported or challenged suspected corruption sometimes faced criminal charges. Victims of corruption took to social media to seek support and government intervention. In May a video posted to Facebook alleged that a police officer in Battambang Province defrauded 11 individuals by promising them government positions in exchange for a total of more than $90,000. Despite a public outcry, there was no indication that the Anti-Corruption Unit acted against the police officer as of October.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes. The Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report includes information on criminal activity allegedly involving corruption by government officials.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						There were multiple reports that the government did not cooperate with human rights investigations by domestic or foreign NGOs. In some cases, government officials intimidated investigators.Approximately 25 human rights-focused NGOs operated in the country, with another 100 NGOs operating with some measure of emphasis on human rights. A few of the NGOs investigated human rights abuses.Government Human Rights Bodies: There were three government human rights bodies: committees for the Protection of Human Rights and Reception of Complaints in both the Senate and National Assembly, and the Cambodian Human Rights Committee, which reported to the prime minister’s cabinet. The Cambodian Human Rights Committee submitted government reports for international human rights review processes, such as the Universal Periodic Review, and responded to reports by international organizations and government bodies, but did not conduct independent human rights investigations. Human rights NGOs considered the government committees of limited efficacy and criticized their role in vocally justifying the government crackdown on civil society and the opposition.Cases before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which was established to investigate and prosecute leaders of the former Khmer Rouge regime who were most responsible for the mass atrocities committed between 1975 and 1979, were closed in 2022. The chambers continued to operate as a residual mechanism to oversee the tribunal’s winding down and the enforcement of sentences and monitoring of prisoners. Their Victim Support Section, charged with protecting victims and witnesses, continued to engage with victims who were civil parties to cases and to monitor the delivery of reparations.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape (including of men), spousal and domestic or intimate partner rape, and in some cases domestic violence. The penalty for rape was five to 30 years’ imprisonment.Rape and domestic violence were significant problems, underreported due to distrust of the judicial system and police, fear of reprisal by perpetrators, social stigma, and discrimination.The Ministries of Information and Women’s Affairs implemented a code of conduct for media reporting on gender-based violence, which banned publication of a survivor’s personally identifiable information, photographs of victims, depictions of a woman’s death or injury, depictions of nudity, and the use of certain words deemed offensive or disparaging to women.Police and other government agents often condoned domestic violence and the government rarely enforced the law on domestic violence, especially violence committed by a legal wife against a mistress of her husband. NGOs reported authorities frequently avoided responding to and involvement in domestic disputes.In February the legal wife of a man, supported by family members, beat up and forcibly disrobed her husband’s alleged mistress and posted video of the beating on Facebook. The Ministry of Women Affairs decried the act but took no legal action against the perpetrators.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Social discrimination against widows was far stronger than discrimination against widowers, according to academic studies and UN officials. Dowry-related deaths occurred during the year. Sexual harassment of women including in the workplace remained a problem. According to a UN report, the sexual harassment law was broad, vague, and inadequately enforced.Discrimination: The law (including family, religious, marriage, inheritance, business, employment, and labor laws) provided the same legal status and rights for women as for men. The government, however, did not enforce the law effectively. Women generally held inferior roles and received lower wages than men in both the private and public sector. A United Nations Development Program survey in 2021 found that a gender pay gap persisted and women in the country earned, on average, 19 percent less for the same work than men.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Women’s access to contraceptives was limited by lack of access to information, financial barriers, lack of financial resources, and fear of side effects. NGOs reported unmarried, sexually active persons were often too shy or embarrassed to ask for contraceptives at health centers, clinics, and pharmacies.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services to survivors of sexual violence, and emergency contraception was available as part of the services. The government did not provide postexposure prophylaxis. There were reports that the public and survivors of sexual violence preferred NGO clinics, if available, because of chronic understaffing and poor facilities at government-run clinics. An NGO reported that the staff of government health centers was more responsive to survivors of sexual violence if an NGO representative was present.According to the Cambodian Demographic and Health Survey, in 2021 the maternal mortality rate was 154 deaths per 100,000 live births. Major factors influencing high maternal mortality rates included shortages of adequate health facilities, medication, and skilled birth attendants.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution provided for equality before the law and criminalized discrimination and violence due to “membership in a particular ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion.”Experts noted widespread negative attitudes toward nationals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in part due to links with criminal activity, particularly in Sihanoukville city. Newspapers reported stories of crimes committed by PRC residents and business owners (mostly against fellow PRC nationals), including murder, shootings, armed robbery, gang violence, kidnapping, trafficking in persons, extortion, counterfeiting, pornography, drunk driving, and drug possession.There were reports of discrimination against ethnic Vietnamese residents, including government destruction and forced relocation of houseboats, many of which belonged to ethnic Vietnamese fisherfolk.One NGO representative working with ethnic minority groups said employment discrimination against members of ethnic minorities remained a problem.																																				Indigenous Peoples										According to the Ministry of Rural Development, there were 24 indigenous groups in the country. Indigenous NGOs estimated the number of Indigenous persons at approximately 1 percent of the total population. Indigenous communities reported they continued to face land appropriation, social discrimination, and economic hardship. Authorities reportedly treated Indigenous groups as political opponents if they gathered to raise their concerns with local government administrators.The land rights of Indigenous persons or communities were not respected or protected effectively, although the law recognized collective land ownership by Indigenous communities. The government was slow to issue legal titles for such land. One NGO found that the government took 11 years to register 37 community land titles for Indigenous groups.																																				Children										Birth Registration: The Ministry of Interior administered the birth registration system on a nondiscriminatory basis. Not all births were registered immediately, primarily due to lack of public awareness of the importance of registering births and corruption in local government. Children of ethnic minorities and stateless persons were disproportionately unlikely to be registered.Failure to register births resulted in the denial of public services. NGOs that serve disenfranchised communities reported authorities often denied access to education and health care services for children without birth registration. NGOs stated such persons, when adults, were also often unable to gain employment, own property, vote, or access the legal system.Child Abuse: There were laws against child abuse, but it remained common; it remained culturally acceptable for parents, especially fathers, to violently discipline children. According to a 2022 Cambodian Demographic and Health Survey report, more than three million children aged one to 14 years experienced physical or psychological violence in their homes. Enforcement of laws prohibiting child abuse was selective due to cultural acceptability. Laws were generally only enforced when perpetrators could not pay bribes or when the crime did not involve government officials.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal age for marriage was 20 for men and 18 for women. Men and women could marry earlier with the consent of their parents if the woman became pregnant before age 18. The government did not enforce the law effectively. According to Girls Not Brides, 19 percent of the country’s residents married before age 18, and 2 percent before 15. A local NGO documented seven cases of forced marriage to Chinese nationals (followed by relocation to China) in the first half of the year.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Sexual intercourse with a person younger than 15 was illegal, and the law prohibited the commercial sexual exploitation of children and the production or possession of child pornography. Although authorities responded to reports and attempted to enforce the law, child sexual exploitation was common. The government continued to raid brothels to identify and remove child sex trafficking victims, but the majority of child sex trafficking was clandestine, occurring in beer gardens, massage parlors, beauty salons, karaoke bars, other retail spaces, or noncommercial sites, or was arranged online. Police investigated child sex trafficking in brothels or when victims or their family members filed complaints directly but did not typically pursue more complicated cases, for example those involving online sexual exploitation. The government said it used undercover investigative techniques on a “case-by-case basis” as authorized by a judge but did not disclose details on how often this authority was used.The country remained a destination for child sex tourism. The government prosecuted both sex tourists and residents of the country for the sexual exploitation of children.																																				Antisemitism										A small Jewish foreign resident community lived in Phnom Penh. There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Forced Organ Harvesting										In July media reported Cambodian and Indonesian police were investigating alleged illegal organ trading by traffickers at a Phnom Penh military hospital, Preah Keto Mealea Hospital. Traffickers reportedly sent 122 Indonesian nationals there to have their kidneys removed and sold. Victims were offered $9,000. Indonesian police arrested 12 individuals in the case, including three in Cambodia.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.Violence and Harassment: There were no reports of state or nonstate actor violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. No law addressed hate crimes. No criminal justice mechanisms existed to aid in the prosecution of bias-motivated crimes against LGBTQI+ individuals. Stigma or intimidation could have inhibited reporting of incidents.Discrimination: There was no legal prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or sex characteristics, and no sanctions against those who discriminated against members of the LGBTQI+ community. Civil society advocates and public figures who identified as members of the LGBTQI+ community were generally tolerated by government and society. LGBTQI+ individuals sometimes experienced employment discrimination and exclusion. Advocacy groups noted discrimination was more common in rural areas. LGBTQI+ persons occasionally faced discrimination for working in the entertainment and commercial sex sectors.In August then Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that same-sex marriage would not be legalized and blamed the LGBTQI+ community for increasing HIV transmission in the country.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The government did not allow for changes to legal documents to bring gender markers into alignment with an individual’s gender identity. There were no nonbinary or intersex options on government documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of forced or involuntary so-called conversion therapy or intersex infant genital surgery; there was no law prohibiting these practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Although NGOs reported no such restrictions specifically against LGBTQI+ individuals or groups, they noted the absence of antidiscrimination laws likely limited expression and association.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, or transportation on an equal basis with others. The law prohibited discrimination, neglect, exploitation, or abandonment of persons with physical or intellectual disabilities including in employment, but was not effectively enforced; the law did not explicitly address access to transportation.Persons with disabilities faced significant societal discrimination, including in obtaining skilled employment. Children with limited physical disabilities attended regular schools. Children with more significant disabilities attended separate schools sponsored by NGOs in Phnom Penh; the government did not provide education for students with more significant disabilities, and it was also unavailable outside Phnom Penh. A local NGO reported that at least 60 percent of children with disabilities did not attend school, compared with an overall school attendance rate greater than 80 percent. Although there were no legal limits on the rights of persons with disabilities to vote or participate in civic affairs, the government made no concerted effort to enable their civic engagement.Institutionalized Children: The government had no policies for children with disabilities in residential institutions, including for those in nominally adult psychiatric facilities, social care homes, orphanages, and nursing homes. Despite having some broader alternative care policies, the government did not properly track and monitor residential care centers, and observers alleged many private orphanages were mismanaged and populated by sham orphans to lure donations from foreigners.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law broadly provided for the right of private-sector workers to form and join independent trade unions of their own choice, to bargain collectively, and to strike. The law excluded certain categories of workers from joining unions, placed significant restrictions on the right to organize, limited the right to strike, facilitated government intervention in internal union affairs, permitted the government as well as third parties to seek the dissolution of trade unions, and imposed only minor penalties on employers for unfair labor practices. The government failed to effectively enforce laws that protected union and labor rights. Penalties for antiunion discrimination in hiring and dismissing employees were commensurate with those for other types of discrimination. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. Union leaders had the legal right to make complaints against antiunion discrimination, but as of July the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (Ministry of Labor) reported zero instances of noncompliance resulting in punishments or fines.Civil servants, teachers, state-owned firm employees, and workers in the banking, health care, and informal industries could organize only &#8220;associations,&#8221; not trade unions, which gave them fewer protections than unionized trades. The law also prohibited illiterate workers from holding union leadership positions. Unregistered unions were illegal.Union leaders reported a variety of difficulties in founding their unions. In some circumstances, employers and local government officials allegedly did not provide essential papers for unions to register. In other cases, provincial-level labor officials reportedly stalled registration applications indefinitely by requesting additional materials or resubmissions due to minor errors late in the 30-day application cycle (although anecdotal evidence suggested this practice had decreased, particularly for unions in the garment and footwear sectors). Some employers used the lengthy registration process to fire elected union officials prior to a union&#8217;s formal registration, rendering them unable to serve as union executives and further drawing out the registration process. Some banks reportedly refused to provide accounts for unregistered unions, preventing the union from receiving legal recognition, which required a bank account. Due to insufficient awareness of applicable rules and regulations, some local unions reported it took months or years to form their unions.Unions encountered significant challenges in organizing in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which operated under the authority of the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board (under the Council for Development of Cambodia) and were exempt from a variety of rules and regulations. Employers reportedly worked with authorities to thwart labor organizing in certain SEZs, and companies fired workers because of union action without consequence. Some government officials indicated that independent unions were not welcome in the SEZs they administered; only progovernment unions were permitted to exist in those zones.Many factory owners hired employees using short-term contracts, which according to union officials, allowed companies to remove union organizers by letting contracts expire. While a decline in global demand resulted in closures and suspensions of around 500 factories during the reporting year, union activists described how some factory owners closed their factories, ending unions and dismissing aging workers, only to turn around and launch a new operation with younger, nonunionized, and lower-paid employees.While workers enjoyed the right to strike, the legal requirements for doing so were cumbersome. The law stipulated that workers could strike only after meeting several requirements, which included successfully registering a union; exhausting other methods of dispute resolution (such as conciliation, mediation, and arbitration); completing a 60-day waiting period following the emergence of the dispute; conducting a secret ballot in which the absolute majority of union members had to support the strike; and providing seven days’ advance notice to the employer and the Ministry of Labor. Strikers could be criminally charged if they engaged in behavior interpreted by local authorities as harmful to public order.During the year, authorities turned down several requests from independent unions for rallies and strikes, citing social order and security concerns. In some rare cases, the permits were granted, but unions were ordered to arrange their rallies with a limited number of participants on the outskirts of the locality, with no marching or parading allowed.There were reports of workers dismissed on spurious grounds after organizing or participating in “illegal” strikes, however since participation in a strike was not in itself a legally acceptable reason for dismissal, employers often cited other, thinly supported grounds for dismissal. In some cases, employers failed to renew the short-term contracts of union activists who participated in a strike; in others they pressured union personnel or strikers to accept compensation and quit.In May a court sentenced Chhim Sithar, the union leader of NagaWorld, the country’s largest casino, to two years in prison, and eight other union members to judicial monitoring (18 months) or suspended sentences (12 months) for “incitement” after union members proceeded with a strike in December 2021 in violation of a court order.The government did not investigate injuries to at least 25 strikers during clashes with NagaWorld security and police in 2022, according to NagaWorld union members.The International Labor Organization’s June Committee on the Application of Standards “deeply deplored” the government’s continued use of the law to prosecute and punish, including by forced labor during imprisonment, those who participated in strikes. The president of the Cambodia Labor Union Federation, Ath Thorn, reported that the number of strikes and protests decreased to fewer than 40 in 2022, down from nearly 400 five years previously. Ministry of Labor officials interpreted this as evidence of the government&#8217;s success in enhancing labor conditions and benefits, citing measures such as raising the minimum wage, providing bonuses, and easing travel during lengthy holidays. Union leaders, however, said the decline in strike and demonstration activity reflected authorities&#8217; increasing restrictions on workers&#8217; ability to exercise their rights. Most strikes throughout the year were in response to unpaid wages and the denial of benefits due to factory closings.There was reported progress in smaller unions’ ability to represent workers in collective disputes. As of June, the Arbitration Council, an independent alternative dispute resolution mechanism, heard 16 labor disputes, compared to 36 in the same period last year. Council officials attributed the decline to more cases classified as “individual” instead of “collective” disputes, making them ineligible for referral to the council. “Individual” disputes could be brought before the courts, which were neither impartial nor transparent. There was no specialized labor court.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The minimum wage covered only the garment, footwear, and textile industries, and was higher than the official poverty level. Union members said, however, that a worker needed around $300 per month on average to cope with rising living expenses, more than the minimum wage of $200.The law provided for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours, not to exceed eight hours per day. The law established a rate of 130 percent of daytime wages for nightshift work and 150 percent for overtime, which increased to 200 percent if overtime occurred at night, on a Sunday, or on a holiday. Employees could work a maximum two hours of overtime per day. The law stated that all overtime had to be voluntary and provided for paid annual holidays. Workers in marine and air transportation were not entitled to social security and pension benefits and were exempt from limitations on work hours prescribed by law.Workers and labor organizations raised concerns that rising sub- and short-term contracts (locally known as fixed-duration contracts) allowed firms, especially in the garment sector, to avoid wage and other requirements. Fixed-duration contracts also allowed employers greater freedom to dismiss pregnant women simply by failing to renew their contracts. The law limited such contracts to a maximum of two years, but more recent directives allowed employers to extend this period to up to four years. The Arbitration Council and the International Labor Organization disputed this interpretation of the law, noting that after 24 months an employee should be offered a more permanent “unlimited duration contract.” Forced overtime remained a problem in factories producing for export. Unions and workers reported some factory managers fired workers who refused to work overtime. Workers reported overtime was often excessive and sometimes mandatory; many complained that employers forced them to work 12-hour days, although the legal limit was 10, including overtime. Workers often faced dismissal, fines, or loss of premium pay if they refused to work overtime.Occupational Safety and Health: By law workplace health and safety standards had to be adequate to provide for workers’ well-being. Compliance with occupational safety and health (OSH) standards continued to be a problem, particularly in the garment export sector, largely due to improper company policies, procedures, and poorly defined supervisory roles and responsibilities. According to unions, some garment factories occupied old buildings that were not built according to OSH standards and subjected workers to a hot, confined, and unsanitary working environment.In addition to extensive reporting of OSH concerns in the garment industry, several labor representatives noted that most workers at construction sites and brick kilns had little knowledge of OSH regulations, nor were systems in place to protect workers from injuries and illnesses or to enable reporting of violations.Ministry of Labor officials acknowledged that OSH problems remained but claimed the government proactively worked to address those concerns by increasing the Ministry of Labor’s capacity to identify unsafe conditions and to respond to workers’ OSH complaints, which the ministry stated resulted in a decrease in the number of workers fainting in factories. According to National Social Security Fund officials, only one case of fainting (involving 11 workers) had been reported as of June. There were eight cases of fainting involving 266 workers in 2022. Workers could legally remove themselves from unsafe situations without jeopardizing their jobs.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce the minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. Although Ministry of Labor inspectors were permitted to conduct unannounced inspections, prior notice was always given to local police and authorities. Outside of the export garment industry, working-hour regulations were rarely, if ever, enforced.Penalties for OSH violations were rarely assessed and were insufficient to suppress violations. Penalties for violating laws on minimum wage (six days to one month’s imprisonment) and overtime (a fine of 31 to 60 times the prevailing daily base wage) were less than those for other crimes, such as fraud.Government inspection of construction worksites was insufficient. The government did not have enough inspectors to enforce compliance. Inspectors had, however, the same status as “judicial police,” enabling them to make arrests and build criminal court cases for labor violations.According to the most recent estimates, the informal sector employed approximately 85 percent of the country&#8217;s workforce. As of June, nearly 3.3 million workers had registered with the National Social Security Fund, with the informal sector accounting for 5.5 percent of them. Ministry of Labor inspectors could investigate informal worksites, but finding and contacting unregistered employees was difficult, and investigations usually occurred when the ministry received a complaint; no information on the scale or scope of such investigations was known.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Forced Organ Harvesting																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Cambodia
- Khmer New Year 2024 Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I wish all Cambodians in the Kingdom of Cambodia and around the world a Khmer New Year full of joy, prosperity, and good fortune.Khmer New Year is a special time to celebrate the vibrance of Cambodian culture.  As we move ahead, the United States will continue to work with the Cambodian people to build a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country.  We are committed to strengthening the people-to-people ties that underpin the longstanding partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Cambodia.To all those in the Kingdom, as well as the Cambodian-American community in the United States:  Happy Khmer New Year.  May the year of the dragon bring happiness, good health, and opportunity to you and your families.
- Cambodia (23-830.1) – Extension and Amendment to Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of Archaeological Material Office of Treaty AffairsCultural Exchanges, Property and Cooperation: Import RestrictionsSigned at Phnom Penh August 30, 2023; entered into force August 30, 2023.Extension and amendment of Memorandum of Understanding signed September 12, 2018: TIAS 18-919.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink’s Travel to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink will travel to Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, February 23-March 4 to underscore the United States’ strong and enduring commitment to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia.In Singapore, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue alongside Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua.  They will discuss the wide-ranging U.S.-Singapore partnership, including defense and security ties, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.In Phnom Penh, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Cambodian officials to advance our shared vision of a free, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.  The Assistant Secretary will also underscore U.S. commitment to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a democratic and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the 9th U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue alongside Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi.  He will also co-lead the Second Strategic and Defense Dialogue alongside Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Royal.  During these two dialogues, under the auspices of the U.S.-Thai Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will work to advance bilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.In Hanoi, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Vietnamese officials and participate in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue.  Building on the recent upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will seek to further deepen U.S.-Vietnam relations and advance our shared vision of a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful Indo-Pacific Region.In Bandar Seri Begawan, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei relations.  He will also meet with senior Bruneian officials to discuss key issues in the bilateral relationship, including economic and security initiatives, efforts to tackle climate change, and regional cooperation.
- Department Press Briefing – December 14, 2023 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWashington, D.C.QUESTION: Okay. So I just want to go back to the President’s comments the other day about indiscriminate bombing and then reports that have been coming out since the weekend about U.S. assessments of what the Israelis are doing with U.S.-supplied munitions. The State Department clearly has a stake in this whole thing as part of the rest of the administration, and I am still finding it hard to understand how it is that you guys have not at least come to some kind of preliminary conclusion as to whether you think these weapons are being used in the correct way or if there are questions about that.MR MILLER: So it remains the case that we just have not made that type of assessment. We are monitoring. We are collecting information, as we do in every conflict around the world. We are engaged in conversations with the Israeli Government about steps that they can take to minimize civilian harm, but that’s not an assessment that we have made.QUESTION: Well, can I just ask why not?MR MILLER: We’re not at that point. We are collecting information. We are monitoring &#8212;QUESTION: Well, at what point – at what point do you think it would be appropriate to make an assessment?MR MILLER: So I am going to – what I will say is &#8212;QUESTION: Well, others seem – others have already.MR MILLER: Of course they have. We have, I think, a responsibility to be careful and deliberate when we make those kind of assessments, and we’re not at the point yet where we have been able to state that with any degree of certainty.QUESTION: So you think it is still possible or – not still possible. You think that it is possible that everything that Israel is doing with the weapons that you supply it is fine?MR MILLER: That is just not an assessment we have made. We have been in conversation with &#8212;QUESTION: No, I know, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I’m asking you do you think that it is possible that there haven’t been any – they haven’t violated any of the end user agreements or &#8212;MR MILLER: There is no way I can sit here from this podium in the middle of a conflict in which they have taken a number of – I mean, they have taken a number of airstrikes, they have engaged on a ground invasion – and make an assessment about how every single action that they have taken was conducted. There’s just no way I can do it. I don’t have the facts to do that. I don’t have the – we don’t have the legal determination to do it. These are always very fact-specific, legal determination. As I said, we’re collecting information and monitoring, as we do with any other – as we do with any conflict around the world, but we’re just not at the point where I can make an assessment.QUESTION: Well, I get that you haven’t made a determination. But what I’m asking you right now is that because you haven’t made one, is still possible in the minds or the eyes of the administration that everything that Israel is doing is perfectly legit?MR MILLER: Again, I just don’t want to – I don’t want to speculate about where we might land on every strike, every action that has been taken. We are at the place now where we’re collecting information and monitoring but not able to make an assessment.QUESTION: There’s legislation that’s been – being – if it hasn’t already been, it’s being introduced on the Hill today that would require you to make such a determination. Is that something that you think is necessary, or is it something that you will make at some point whenever you find it appropriate, that you will make a determination either, yes, they are complying or, no, they’re not complying, or somewhere in the middle? Like &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, I haven’t seen that legislation yet so I can’t comment on it.QUESTION: All right, last one. I just want to ask about Kerem Shalom and the aid. Is it your understanding that it is still only open for inspections and it has not yet been opened as an actual route?MR MILLER: That is my understanding: it’s open for inspection, not for a route. We continue to push for it to be open and hope that we will achieve that.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR MILLER: Humeyra.QUESTION: Can I get into the details of this collecting information a little bit, Matt? What kind of information are you guys collecting exactly?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak to that with any degree of specificity, other than to say that we are doing the same thing in this conflict that we do with respect to any conflict in the – around the world.QUESTION: Okay. And &#8212;MR MILLER: We monitor what’s happening and collect information, but I’m not going to get into any specifics.QUESTION: And what would that process look like? Are you looking at sort of how Israel is carrying out the airstrikes, the ground offensive? Is it only the military conduct, or does it include things like, for example, these Gazan men who were stripped down to their underwear? Does that include those kinds of incidents as well?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to get into our internal deliberative process, other than to say that we follow the same actions with respect to this conflict, as I said a moment ago, as we do with every conflict in the world. We engage in conversations with our Israeli Government – with our Israeli counterparts about things that we think they can do better. We’ve seen them make progress on a number of areas. And when we have concerns, you often seem them point – speak to those concerns publicly, as we did with respect to those images of detained Palestinian men.QUESTION: With our Israeli Government?MR MILLER: I said counterparts, counterparts. (Laughter.) You try getting up here and – you try getting up here and &#8212;QUESTION: I wouldn’t want to do it. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. I wanted to ask about my colleagues reporting on the use of dumb bombs in this conflict. How does the – how does that square with the repeated statements we’ve heard from this building that Israel is taking steps to protect civilians, that they do have the intent to protect civilians?MR MILLER: So I’m just not going to comment on how they are using any specific weapons. Obviously, the circumstances would – the circumstances of how any weapon are used would be required to draw any kind of definitive judgment. There are different ways you can use any number of munitions. It’s not something I can do from here.But I will say, I will reiterate, that we have these conversations with our Israeli counterparts at a range of different levels and talk with them about steps we think they can take to minimize civilian harm. We’ve seen them take some of those steps. There are always things that we think that they can do better, and we’ll continue to engage in conversations with them to that effect.QUESTION: And the Israelis said that Gallant told Jake Sullivan today that they intend for this offensive to carry on for several more months. Is that something the U.S. sees as acceptable?MR MILLER: I am not going to talk about what the Israeli Government may or may not have said in that meeting. I will let the NSC speak to it. I will say to the broader question that we have engaged in conversations with them about the duration of this conflict. We don’t want to see it go on any longer than is necessary. We want Israel to be able to accomplish its legitimate military aims, which is to ensure that the attacks of October 7th can never be repeated. But beyond that, I will leave it to the NSC to talk about what was discussed.QUESTION: Is the U.S. assessment that it would be necessary for this to carry on for many more months?MR MILLER: I am not going to make an assessment of how long it will take for them to accomplish their military objectives. That really is for them to speak to. But we do want to see, of course, the conflict or their military campaign executed in a way that minimizes – minimizes civilian harm and allows humanitarian assistance to get in, humanitarian assistance to reach those who need it. And that, of course, is what we’re discussing with them all the time.QUESTION: And last one. Given the President’s comments the other day about the waning support for Israel given this indiscriminate bombing, is the U.S. position that it would be tenable to support Israel at the same pace that you are right now for several more months?MR MILLER: So again, you’re asking me – it wasn’t the way the question was framed, but to answer that question I’ve got to speculate about how long the campaign would go, and that’s just not something I’m willing to do.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just to follow up on Matt and Humeyra’s thing on the review that you are doing, don’t you need to do that in conjunction with the weapons transfer? I mean, you are transferring weapons right now. Shouldn’t you be doing this according to law as you send the weapons?MR MILLER: So there are rules and conditions that attach to any weapons that we transfer to any government in the world – not just Israel. And one of those – one of those requirements is – and expectations is that they act in accordance with international humanitarian law.QUESTION: Right. But you don’t have to wait until such time that you’ve accumulated all that information to say aha, we cannot send this weapon. You have to do it, as I understand it, and I may be wrong, exactly as you send these weapons. And you are in the process of sending lots of weapons.MR MILLER: And we are constantly in conversations with them about ensuring that those weapons are used in accordance with international humanitarian law and the laws of war.QUESTION: I have a couple more. Now, when the President said indiscriminate, he knows what he’s talking about that. This is just not – not just a casual expression on his part, is it? Right? I mean, he has enough information to say &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry, I didn’t know there was a – I thought there was a question coming.QUESTION: I mean, I’m asking you. This is not just – I mean, he’s been briefed on what happened in the battlefield, what is happening in the bombing, for him to make that assessment. Would you think that would be the case?MR MILLER: You heard the White House speak to this yesterday. You heard me speak to this yesterday. And what I said is while the White House will speak to his specific comments – and they have – what I believe he was referring to was the impact of the large-scale bombing campaign that even when the intent is to minimize civilian harm you can end up with results where far too many civilians are killed, which is – are the results that we have seen. And as you’ve heard the Secretary say, we have engaged in conversation with them to try to get to narrow the – to try to narrow the gap between their intent and the actual results on the ground.QUESTION: A couple more questions. Now, there were reports that apparently the Israeli – Israeli soldiers were executing in an UNRWA school some people that they arrested or whatever last week. Are you aware of this report? Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: I have seen the media report. I am obviously not able to make an independent assessment of that. I will reiterate what I have said, which is that it is important that Israel conduct this operation in a way that complies with international humanitarian law, that complies with the law of war. It’s essential that when there are allegations of wrongdoing that Israel look into those and investigate those. But I’m not able to confirm the reliability or veracity of that particular report.QUESTION: And lastly, I promise. You said that you understand Israel’s goal at the end to disallow Hamas from committing whatever. Do you believe that it is getting close to that goal? I mean, do you have like any kind of – do you envision a timetable that &#8212;MR MILLER: Again &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that this is happening?MR MILLER: Sorry, I didn’t mean to interrupt. If you’re done.QUESTION: Yeah, sure, sure.MR MILLER: Sorry.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: Again, this is Israel’s military campaign. They are the ones conducting the campaign. It is up to them to make assessments about how long it will take and where they stand in accomplishing their goals.QUESTION: Because the reason I ask this is because the defense minister today told Mr. Sullivan that this can go on for months, many more months.MR MILLER: And I will let the NSC respond to those conversations, as I said in response to the question from Jennifer.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Can I get your comments on some of the comments that Putin made today, particularly him talking about U.S. support for Ukraine, saying that gradually it’s, quote/unquote, “running out”? How concerned are you by the fact that delaying aid to Ukraine might have – appeared to have encouraged Putin and, even worse, have emboldened the actions in Ukraine, given the latest attacks?MR MILLER: Let me say a few things about that. So number one, I think what President Putin confirmed today was that, despite his military suffering hundreds of thousands of causalities, despite the crippling of the Russian economy, despite isolating Russia internationally and making himself an international pariah as a result of this conflict, his war aims have not changed in any way. He still wishes to conquer Ukraine, he still wishes to subjugate Ukraine, and nothing that he set out to accomplish in this campaign has he given up on, despite the fact that his army has been rolled back from their initial objectives, despite the fact, as I said, they’ve suffered a multitude of battlefield defeats. They still – he still has all the same war aims that he had from the beginning.The second thing I’ll say is that you heard President Putin, I believe for the first time, confirm something that we have said. You have heard us say from the beginning of this campaign that Vladimir Putin’s bet was that he could outlast the West and that the West would weaken, the West would stop supporting Ukraine, and that Russia would still be there ready to fight, and he just had to outlast us. We have said that from the beginning, that his – that was his assessment. But I don’t believe that – and I don’t believe that until today he had actually ever come out and said it.And so what I will say is, for the part of this administration, we have made clear that we believe that bet is wrong and we believe that he will not outlast the West and he will not outlast the United States of America. And now it’s up for the United States Congress to prove that that bet is wrong.QUESTION: Thank you. Separate topic. Any comment on &#8212;QUESTION: On this, can I ask &#8212;QUESTION: Of course.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. President Putin has said too that he is ready to build relations with the U.S. and the European Union too, and added that the U.S. is an important and necessary country on the world stage, which is why Russia is prepared for talks when conditions are met. Are you prepared for talks with Russia?MR MILLER: Let me say a few things. Number one, if he really wanted to repair relations with the United States or other countries in the West, I will say with respect to the United States, he could start by releasing the Americans that he has wrongfully detained. We’ve put significant proposals on the table, and he has refused to release those Americans which never should have been detained in the first place.The second thing that he could do would be to withdraw his military from Ukraine and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.The final thing I say – I will say is, with respect to ultimate negotiations, which I think maybe is what this question is getting at, to the future of Ukraine, as we have said before, that is a decision for Ukraine to make about if and when there are negotiations about how to end the war. But despite President Putin’s claim today about wanting to improve relations, he has shown no ability or no willingness to actually negotiate. And in fact, as I said a moment ago, just reaffirmed today that his aims for the results of this conflict have not changed in any way, shape, or form.Alex, go back to &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: I had a separate topic.MR MILLER: This is only because, like, Alex got interrupted.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. It’s &#8212;MR MILLER: I’ll come to you. Allowed himself to be interrupted, I should say.QUESTION: I appreciate that. On Iran, may I get a reaction to reporting that Iran has accessed $10 billion that it has received under sanctions waiver? Are you in a position to confirm or deny those reports?MR MILLER: I am not. Go ahead.QUESTION: Just following up on the detainees, I wanted to ask about – Putin was asked today about Evan Gershkovich, my friend and colleague, and he seemed to express some optimism in the negotiations, saying it’s not easy, I will not go into details, but in general it seems we are speaking a language that we both understand; I hope that we will find a solution, ongoing dialogue, reaching an agreement, this kind of language.Is that – what does that mean to you, and does it reflect any further offer since the last time you mentioned a previous offer that the U.S. has made? Has there been other progress toward a deal? Are you more optimistic we can get Evan home?MR MILLER: Let me say it this way. We very much want a deal. We very much want to bring Evan Gershkovich home. We very much want to bring Paul Whelan home. We have put multiple offers on the table. There is one significant offer that we made as recently as a few weeks ago. We have seen those offers rejected every time by the Russian Government. So we would welcome them negotiating in good faith. We would welcome them engaging seriously with us to obtain the release of Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan. But so far, we have seen them refuse to take us up on our proposals, and we hope that they will – that they will change the way they’ve handled this going forward.QUESTION: I mean, President Putin is the boss over there. This is a sign. Are you optimistic that it will improve, because he said these comments?MR MILLER: I am going to be very careful about how I speak about this, just because this is obviously a sensitive process. I don’t want to say much more than I said already. But if Vladmir Putin is serious about this, all he has to do is look at the proposals that we have made to secure their release, which were significant proposals that were made in good faith and I think show the willingness and the determination of the United States to bring both Paul and Evan home and, as I said, come to the table and help us reach an agreement to actually bring them home.We’ll go – Janne.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. On North Korea, recently, North Korean Kim Jong-un announced that he would declare the North Korea to the world as a nuclear state. What is the U.S. plan B regarding resolving North Korea’s nuclear programs?MR MILLER: So we will continue to work with our partners in the region, our allies in the region. We will continue to make clear that our first option in this case is diplomacy and that we want to pursue diplomacy with North Korea. As I’ve said before, we have seen those offers rejected by the North Korean Government, but we will continue to make clear that diplomacy is our first option, but also that we stand strongly with our allies North Korea and Japan.Go ahead.QUESTION: South Korea.MR MILLER: South Korea and Japan. Lord, I’m – that’s the second time I’ve – (laughter) &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: It’s the last briefing of the week. You get a little tired.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: South Korea and Japan, just for the record.QUESTION: Quick follow up, then. Do you think it is possible &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead. Thank you, Matt.QUESTION: Yeah. Do you think it is possible to lift the economic sanctions against North Korea if North Korea freezes its existing nuclear weapons rather than abandoning its nuclear development program?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to comment about very hypothetical scenarios when they have shown no willingness to move in that direction at all. We are committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we will continue to work to try to achieve that goal.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: UNESCO’s director-general today asked for a full and transparent investigation to determine the circumstances behind the killing of Anadolu cameraman Montaser Al-Sawaf in Gaza. Does the U.S. support an independent investigation into the killing of journalists in Gaza?MR MILLER: So I will say that we have spoken to this – I’m not going to speak about that specific report, because I don’t know the circumstances in which that journalist was killed. I have said from this podium before, when we have seen reports of deaths of journalists in this conflict, we have engaged with the Israeli Government. They have said that they would conduct an investigation, and we think that’s the appropriate step to take.QUESTION: But – and then – but what would you say about an independent investigation?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to – I don’t know what independent investigation he’s proposing or who he’s proposing to conduct that investigation, so I wouldn’t want to speak to it from here. But I will say we always support getting to the truth if a journalist is killed, if a civilian is killed, and if appropriate, we support accountability.QUESTION: And have you seen the video of Israel soldiers recording themselves reciting Jewish prayers inside the mosque in Jenin, and do you have any reactions to that?MR MILLER: I did see that video. That’s obviously not appropriate. We were concerned when we saw the reports. But we have seen since that the IDF leadership has announced that the involved soldiers would be disciplined according to IDF codes of conduct, and we think that’s an appropriate step for them to take.QUESTION: Can I also have just a quick one on Azerbaijan?MR MILLER: Sure, of course.QUESTION: Turkish foreign minister &#8212;MR MILLER: Alex is going to get angry. Someone else is taking his Azerbaijan question. (Laughter.) Sorry, Alex.QUESTION: You owe me one more then.QUESTION: It’s a Türkiye-Azerbaijan-related question. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan was in Baku today, where he encouraged peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He also said that peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia will have a positive effect on normalization between Türkiye and Armenia. How does the U.S. see Türkiye as a force for peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and was that discussed last week between Blinken and Fidan?MR MILLER: So I will say that in all of our conversations – or all the conversations between the Secretary – between Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Fidan, that is a topic that comes up for conversation – as part of the conversation. So I won’t give a specific readout, but that is something that they regularly discuss when they either get together in person or when they talk on the phone. We welcome Türkiye playing a productive role in resolving this conflict. We agree with what the foreign minister said, that peace is conflict and we – or is possible and we would support direct talks between the two parties to achieve that.QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you, Matt. Today, the Iraqi Government announced their results of their investigation about those who were responsible for attacking the U.S. embassy. So what – he mentioned that in the investigation, they said that these people they arrested, there were some connections between the Iraqi Security Forces and those who were attacking the U.S. embassy. Are you satisfied with these results? And to what extent are you concerned about the links between these groups who are attacking you with the Iraqi Security Forces?MR MILLER: So what I will say about that is we made clear to Prime Minister Sudani that we wanted to see the Iraqi Government take action to investigate the attacks on our embassy and to hold those responsible accountable, and we are pleased that he has taken those steps. If the Iraqi Government finds that there were others involved, of course, we would support additional steps to hold those responsible accountable.QUESTION: And the last question: Today, you and the UK jointly announced some sanctions on the Iranian Qods Force and also Hamas. Does that meaning that Iranian Revolutionary Guards are trying to get involved in the war between Hamas and Israel?MR MILLER: So those specific sanctions were introduced by the Treasury Department, and I’ll defer to them to speak to them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. I have two questions, one on Bangladesh &#8212;MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: &#8212; and another one – yeah, Israel and Palestine. A wave of arson attacks on buses full of passengers and trucks, displacing rail tracks, petrol bombing train coaches during blockades, witnessed bus helpers burned alive with scored – injured to derail the election. Does U.S. consider such action undermine the prelude to free and fair election in Bangladesh?MR MILLER: So you have heard me say consistently from this podium that we want to see free and fair elections held in Bangladesh, and one of the components of a free and fair election is that that election be conducted without violence.QUESTION: Thank you so much. About Israel.MR MILLER: Let’s – before you – and I already said somebody else is going next. So go ahead. Go ahead and finish. Yeah, sorry.QUESTION: Oh, thank you. About Israel. Only one-line question that U.S. support two-state solution, do you have any timeline for that? Because it’s going longer and longer, about 70 years. Any timeline from U.S. from today?MR MILLER: So I think it would be incredibly foolish of me to try to give a timeline for that from here. I will say we are in the middle of a military campaign right now. The Secretary has laid out some principles that he thinks ought to be adhered to at the end of that conflict as it relates to a path forward. And one of the principles, he has said, is that we need to get back on a path to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.Go ahead, behind – going behind &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you so much.QUESTION: Yes. Regarding the future of Gaza, during the transition period, PA is not ready to manage the situation in Gaza. Why don’t elections be held and the Palestinian people decide by themselves who will represent them and who will control – rule them?MR MILLER: So we of course support elections for the – we support elections for the Palestinian people to decide their leadership, as we do for people around the world. We are in the middle of a conflict right now. You obviously can’t have elections in the middle of a conflict when people have a difficulty even moving around to get access to food and water, let – and medicine, let alone exercise their right to vote. But of course, as part of a transition moving forward, we do support elections, as we do everywhere in the world.Go ahead.QUESTION: Hi Matt, thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Mark Stone from Sky News. Following on from what my colleague said just now about the two-state solution, the Israeli ambassador to the UK made quite clear yesterday to Sky News when we spoke to her that the answer is absolutely no to a two-state solution. She echoed remarks the day before by, I think, the Israeli communications minister who said we live here, this is our country, there will be no Palestinian state here, we will never allow another state to be established between the Jordan and the sea.It seems pretty clear to me – and I’m keen for your view – that the ambassador’s remarks now put Israel in open defiance of American presidents’ policies going back 40 years. How do you square what you are – what you just said there at the podium with what the current Israeli Government is making quite clear, no two states?MR MILLER: So we have seen a number of different statements from different officials inside the Israeli Government with respect to two states. We are going to be – continue to be clear about what our policy is and what we think is the appropriate policy going forward. And I say this as an appropriate policy not just in the interests of the Palestinian people, but in the interests of the Israeli people, and in the interests of the long-term stability and security of Israel.I spoke to this a little bit yesterday. The October 7th attacks should have been a wake-up call to everyone that the status quo that has existed for a number of years is just not in the interests of Israel, that there needs to be a solution moving forward that addresses the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people while providing security to the Israeli people. We think the best way to achieve that is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. We have made that quite clear. We make that clear privately, we make that clear publicly, and it’s something we’ll continue to engage with the Israeli Government about.QUESTION: If I may follow up briefly.MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: The logical conclusion to what we’re seeing unfold at the moment seems to be that you are backing Israel militarily – with weapons, with funding – despite two starkly different end points.MR MILLER: So I don’t think you can draw that conclusion at this point. We are supporting Israel in its campaign to ensure that the October 7th attacks cannot be repeated. But that doesn’t mean we don’t have disagreements with them along the way. We’re a sovereign country; they’re a sovereign country. We don’t see eye-to-eye on everything. There are very few countries – maybe no countries in the world – where we are in complete agreement with everything.One of the things that you have heard the President say is that we have a longstanding relationship with Israel where we are close friends. And as close friends, we can have very frank and candid and sometimes quite difficult conversations. And we will continue to do so about this subject, and I’m sure a great many others.Yeah, Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. I have a question on Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities or police have issued bounties – up to a million pounds, I think – against five activists, including one which I think has asylum here in the United States. What is your reaction to that?MR MILLER: So we strongly condemn the egregious actions taken by Hong Kong authorities in announcing national security law changes and a new bounty list targeting democracy advocates overseas. That shows blatant disregard for international norms, for democracy and human rights.We deplore any attempt to apply the Beijing-imposed national security law extraterritorially and reiterate that Hong Kong authorities have no jurisdiction within United States borders, where the advocates for democracy and freedom will continue to enjoy their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights.And we deplore any attempt to apply the national security law extraterritorially and will remain committed to defending the rights and freedoms of our citizens and call on the PRC to act in accordance with its international commitments and legal obligations.QUESTION: Can you just explain to us what – how you see these bounties, quote/unquote “bounties,” as being different than the Rewards for Justice program that you guys administer?MR MILLER: So I will say that the Reward for Justice program is not used to target democracy advocates and people that are advocating for democracy and exercising constitutionally protected rights. That is the ultimate difference.QUESTION: Well, but it is used for – in addition to wanted terrorists, it is used for people who you guys think have violated U.S. law for things – for alleged crimes that fall short of murder, like cyber hacking and things like that.MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: So it’s okay for the U.S. to apply its laws extraterrestrially or territorially – not &#8212;MR MILLER: Now who’s misspeaking? (Laughter.)QUESTION: Exactly. It’s okay for you guys to apply your law extraterritorially to put out bounties, rewards for information leading to the arrest of these people, but it’s not okay for other governments to do so?MR MILLER: So I will say that we use our full range of criminal justice programs, including rewards, for the apprehension of individual who have violated our law in keeping with what are longstanding recognized crimes, not for what we believe are fundamental human rights – freedom of speech, freedom of expression, supporting democracy.Go ahead. I’ll come to you next, Michel.QUESTION: Yes, thank you.MR MILLER: Then Alex. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. How’s the situation with Sweden, Matt? Because there are reports that the foreign minister of Türkiye told Secretary Blinken last Friday that Türkiye is not ready to approve the membership of Sweden to NATO. Do you have anything you’re interested to tell us?MR MILLER: I will say that we continue to make clear to the Turkish Government that we think Sweden’s NATO accession should be approved as soon as possible. It’s long overdue. Sweden is ready to take its place in NATO, and we will continue to engage in conversations with the Turkish Government to push them to approve that accession as soon as possible.Michel.QUESTION: Yeah. Are you talking to the Lebanese and the Israeli governments regarding the situation on the border? And what’s your assessment of the situation there?MR MILLER: So we do continue to make clear to – not just to those two governments but of course everyone in the region that one of our top priorities moving forward is to keep this conflict from expanding, including from expanding to the north of Israel. That is one of our top priorities. You’ve heard the Secretary talk about this in the past. I don’t want to make any assessment other than that you have of course seen strikes back and forth – cross-border strikes between Israel and Hizballah – and we do want to see this eventually resolved without further escalation.Alex (inaudible).QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Going back to Azerbaijan, I wanted to get your reaction to ongoing media crackdown which led to the arrest of leading journalist Hafiz Babali and concerns about potential spillover as they’re going after opposition leader as well.MR MILLER: So the recent trend of detaining journalists is deeply troubling, and we continue to urge the Azerbaijani Government to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of everyone, including those exercising freedom of expression.QUESTION: Has this topic been discussed recently during the engagement with Azerbaijani Government &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to any specific engagement, but yes, we have raised this on a number of occasions with them.QUESTION: Thanks so much.MR MILLER: Ryan, go &#8212;QUESTION: Matt, follow-up. Question on Cuba. At the end of the Trump administration, they designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terror. Last week in a briefing with Congress, the State Department told members of Congress that they have not even begun a review of whether Cuba should be removed from the State Sponsor of Terror list. As you know, there’s been 450,000 migrants that have flown out of Cuba over the last two years. The economy has been decimated as a result of this designation. Why hasn’t the review begun?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to either an internal deliberative process here inside the State Department or our conversations with members of Congress, though they of course are &#8212;QUESTION: Matt, follow-up.MR MILLER: I’m in the middle of answering someone else’s question right now. You might – maybe hold for just a second. As we have said previously, should there be any rescission of the State Sponsor of Terrorism status, it would need to be consistent with a specific statutory criteria for rescinding that determination. Any review of Cuba’s status on the list, should one ever happen, would be based on the law and the criteria established by Congress, but the President and Secretary Blinken remain committed to the policies that we have advanced that will advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.QUESTION: There’s a six-month statutory requirement, as you know. Is the administration nervous that you will run out of time in this term in order to make a decision if you haven’t started the review yet?MR MILLER: So again, I don’t think I can answer that with violating what I said I wasn’t going to do at the outset, which is comment on internal deliberations.QUESTION: Question on China.MR MILLER: So go ahead, question on China.QUESTION: Thank you, Matthew. In a congressional hearing yesterday, multiple victims shared about violence they experienced during the APEC summit in San Francisco, believed to be orchestrated by agents of the CCP. One person had bruises and cuts around his eyes and lips. How concerned is the U.S. about such possibly state-sanctioned violence? And what measures do you think can be used to protect Chinese dissident groups? And then I have another question.MR MILLER: So we are always concerned about acts of violence. We support freedom of speech in the United States. When we see acts of violence, we make quite clear to other governments that they’re inappropriate, and beyond that I would refer for these – for – with respect to these specific reports to local law enforcement.QUESTION: And on the issue of transnational repression, would the State Department support a measure to cancel student visas of those who spy on their fellow Chinese students critical of the CCP, which was brought up in yesterday’s hearing?MR MILLER: Again, I – we’d have to see the specific details of it and examine it. I can – am not in a position to do so here.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto recently said that during their meetings in Brussels, NATO foreign ministers admitted that Ukraine’s counteroffensive had failed. Do you share this view?MR MILLER: No, we do not, and I was at those meetings of the foreign ministers in Brussels, and what I heard – and you heard some of them say this publicly when they came out and talked – was an assessment that Ukraine has continued to achieve successes in the battlefield. Those successes include wiping out a great deal of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and reopening a channel for grain to be exported from Ukraine, something that the Russian Government had tried very hard to block. So no, I do not share that assessment.QUESTION: One more? One more?MR MILLER: Yeah, one more. Go ahead.QUESTION: You just said that Russian economy is crippling because of the sanctions and so on and so on, and at the same time, Bloomberg recently reported that Russia will end this year with a surplus of 75 billion while the United States economy will add 2 trillion in deficit. Do you really believe that Russian economy is crippling, Matt?MR MILLER: So that is not the only way to judge the relative health of the economy, and I think if you look at the relative health of our economy and Russia’s, I will – my colleagues at the Treasury Department should really speak to that, but I think it’s not a comparison the Russian Government would like. And yes, we have seen the Russian Government or the Russian economy crippled across a number of different sectors as a result of the sanctions and the export controls that we have imposed.Does that mean that we don’t – does that mean that it’s time to step back and abandon Ukraine because they’re ready to move forward on their own? No, it means we need to stay the course and continue supporting them because, despite the effect that our sanctions and export controls have had on the Russian economy, President Putin has chosen that he will continue to use everything at his disposal to fund the Russian war machine, will continue to send Russian soldiers to their deaths – their tragic deaths – in Ukraine. And so it means from our perspective that we need to stay committed, and we hope the United States Congress will be there.Go ahead.QUESTION: The European Union Council president announced that the EU has agreed to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. Can you give us your reaction to that?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to comment specifically because that is a decision for the EU and its member-states to make, but we do broadly support countries in – Ukraine and other countries’ European aspirations.QUESTION: Quick follow-up on Bangladesh, please.MR MILLER: And let me just – I think we’ll end there. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Wait, wait, wait.MR MILLER: You have – yeah, yeah.QUESTION: I have one more, and this is far afield, on Cambodia. Yesterday, a bunch of senators and members – and House members sent a letter to the Secretary about political prisoners in Cambodia, and in particular raised the case of Theary Seng, who I’ve asked about in here before. Is there – has there been any progress made on whether she will be declared wrongfully detained?MR MILLER: There has not.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Still a case that’s under review.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: But we do continue to urge her release.QUESTION: And then in the meantime, do you have any specific reaction to this letter that was sent about – which included not just her but others?MR MILLER: No. I’ve seen the reports, but I haven’t reviewed it in detail or discussed it with anyone.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 1:18 p.m.)# # #&nbsp;
- United States Ambassador-at-Large Cindy Dyer’s Travel to Cambodia Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Cindy Dyer will travel to Cambodia November 15-17 to meet with a wide range of government and civil society stakeholders on efforts to combat human trafficking in Cambodia and the region.The trip will serve as an opportunity for information sharing and coordination on anti-trafficking efforts.  Ambassador Dyer will meet with government officials from the Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Labor; Ministry of Social Affairs; National Police; and the National Committee for Counter Trafficking (NCCT) with the objective of building a relationship with the new government for future coordination and advocating for progress in the most critical areas, including increased investigations and prosecutions of cyber scam operations.Ambassador Dyer will also participate in discussions with civil society organizations working on anti-trafficking efforts.  The discussions will focus on Cambodia’s efforts to protect trafficking victims including providing protection assistance services for victims of trafficking and vulnerable migrants, capacity building for service providers and government officials to improve victim identification and referral, and addressing emerging trends in forced criminality.Learn more about the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons or follow the office on Twitter,  Facebook, and Instagram .  Read Understanding Human Trafficking to learn more about trafficking in persons.For additional information, contact the Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at TIPOutreach@state.gov.
- Cambodia National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I extend my best wishes to the people of Cambodia as you honor the 70th year of your nation’s independence.The United States will continue to work with Cambodia’s government to advance a shared vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific region. We will continue to build strong ties between our peoples, including through educational exchanges, support for the preservation of cultural heritage, and increasing economic linkages. Further, the United States values our cooperation with Cambodia on key regional and global issues.We send our sincere congratulations to the Cambodian people on the Kingdom’s National Day.
- Department Press Briefing – September 27, 2023 Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson													HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; September 27, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; September 27, 2023																																																					September 27, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									NORTH KOREA / CHINA / SWEDENARMENIA / AZERBAIJAN / RUSSIAISRAEL / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIESINDIA / CANADAIRANSERBIAINDIA / CANADAIRAQAFGHANISTANMEXICOPACIFIC ISLANDSCAMBODIANORTH KOREA / RUSSIA																													1:23 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. I’ll start with some &#8212;QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR MILLER: Start with some brief remarks. The United States has secured the return of Private Travis King from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Earlier today, he was transported to the border between North Korea and China, where he was met by our Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China Nicholas Burns. He then boarded a State Department OpMed plane and flew from Dandong China to Shenyang China, and then on from Shenyang to Osan Air Force Base in South Korea where he was transferred to the Department of Defense.We appreciate the professionalism of our diplomats, who worked with their counterparts of the Department of Defense and coordinated with the governments of Sweden and the People’s Republic of China, and we thank Sweden and the People’s Republic of China for their assistance in facilitating that transfer. He is now on his way to the United States, and we expect him to arrive in the coming hours.With that, questions.QUESTION: Oh, that’s it?MR MILLER: That’s it.QUESTION: Okay. Well, when I woke up this morning, I thought the news of the day was going to be about Israel and the Visa Waiver Program.MR MILLER: We like to keep you on – we like to keep you on your toes.QUESTION: But – yes, exactly – but obviously – can I just ask you, on Travis King, sorry, where did you say he – what base in South Korea?MR MILLER: Osan Air Force Base.QUESTION: Osan. Okay. And then – and you’re confirming that he has now left Osan and on his way &#8212;MR MILLER: Correct – and is on his way back to the United States.QUESTION: &#8212; back to the U.S. And how did he get from North Korea to China?MR MILLER: He was – so I don’t know how he got inside North Korea to the border. I’ll let the North Koreans speak to that if they want to.QUESTION: No, how did he get &#8212;MR MILLER: But then he was transferred &#8212;QUESTION: Today, how did he get &#8212;MR MILLER: He was – I believe he was driven by the North Koreans, but again, I don’t have perfect &#8212;QUESTION: Driven by the North Koreans or by the Swedes?MR MILLER: Let me just finish. I don’t have perfect fidelity on his movements inside North Korea. But let me just – he was taken to the border at Dandong where he was transferred to U.S. custody.QUESTION: Yeah. And then where? And that’s where Burns and the other &#8212;MR MILLER: Dandong. That’s where Burns met him – Dandong, China.QUESTION: Okay. And then he didn’t go anywhere else in China before leaving for Osan?MR MILLER: The plane – he got onboard an OpMed plane which stopped in Shenyang, China and then continued to Osan.QUESTION: Okay. And this OpMed plane – I don’t know how many you guys have – but it’s getting a lot of use – or if there’s only one, it’s – is this the same plane that brought back the people from Iran or from Doha?MR MILLER: I do not know. I don’t know how many we have. I don’t know if it’s the same plane.QUESTION: What kind of plane are you saying?MR MILLER: An OpMed plane – State Department OpMed plane.QUESTION: OpMed.MR MILLER: Yeah. Yeah.QUESTION: Jet plane?QUESTION: Can I just ask about the – sorry – about the diplomacy regarding this?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: What does it mean? I mean, obviously the U.S. wanted Travis King back, but does it mean something broader with North Korea? Could this be an opening for something broader? What does – what were the motivations as far as you could detect for North Korea releasing him?MR MILLER: So I would not want to speculate on any motivations on the North Korean side, and I don’t know that I would take from this that it heralds some breakthrough in diplomatic relations. Obviously, we’re pleased to have secured his return. We’re very thankful for the Government of Sweden for their work as the protecting power that they did to help facilitate his transfer back to the United States.I will restate – as I have said from this podium before and as we have said – we are open to diplomacy with North Korea; we would welcome diplomacy with North Korea. They have always rejected that. We tried to reach out to them when Travis King first crossed the border into North Korea. We tried to reach out a number of occasions. They rejected our direct approaches – ended up talking to Sweden, and Sweden talked to us and helped negotiate this transfer. But I would not see this as the sign of some breakthrough. I think it’s a one-off with them being willing to return this private.Yeah.QUESTION: Can I follow up on China’s role a little bit? Do you see them more as a transit point in this situation? Did they play any role as a mediator?MR MILLER: They did not play a role as a mediator, but their role in providing transit or – in facilitating transit is one we very much appreciate. We have always thought that China could play a useful role in any number of issues as it relates to North Korea. The Secretary said that directly to his Chinese counterparts; we’ve said it publicly on a number of occasions. And we do appreciate the role that they played here.QUESTION: And I mean, your working-level diplomats must have communicated on this. Do you think that these conversations can be described as a set of positive exchanges, or how would you describe these?MR MILLER: Well, we didn’t have direct exchanges with North Korea so certainly &#8212;QUESTION: Or – sorry.MR MILLER: &#8212; we had positive exchanges with Sweden.QUESTION: With China.MR MILLER: With China – yes, absolutely. Absolutely.QUESTION: And is there – I mean, the relationship’s not in a great place at the moment. Like is there any hope of seeing this as sort of a jumping off point for more communication, for better relations?MR MILLER: I would say that we have seen an increase in the tempo of our conversations with the Chinese Government across a number of fronts since the Secretary traveled to Beijing in June. Of course, you’ve seen that at the secretary level – not just here but at other departments in the United States Government. You’ve seen that at the assistant secretary level. We have other meetings that we’ll be able to make public in the very near future where we’re exchanging views with China on a number of issues. And we do think there is an opening to work with China – I think you saw that the department of – or the Department of Treasury just announced new working groups on economic issues, and we continue to pursue ways to work with them on stopping the trafficking of fentanyl, on returning United States detainees.So any time we can work together on areas that advance U.S. interests or that address shared concerns, we see that as a positive and hope that it will lead to more work together.QUESTION: And in the wake of this and Blinken’s meeting last week in New York, do you see the meeting between Biden and Xi on the sidelines of APEC in San Francisco is more likely now?MR MILLER: I wouldn’t want to say more likely, less likely. It’s always tough to make those assessments from here, really from anywhere with any degree of accuracy, because there are two parties at work here. I will just reiterate what we have said, which is that we think there’s no substitute for leader-to-leader communication. The potential for a meeting between the two leaders is something that Secretary Blinken discussed with the Chinese vice president last week at UNGA in New York. We believe it would be important to have that meeting, and we hope it will take place, but we don’t have anything to announce yet.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR MILLER: Let me go to Alex first.QUESTION: Thank you.This all seems rather sort of unilateral on the North Korean side. They let it be known to the south – to the Swedes that they were willing to release King. Understanding that this was the culmination of intense diplomacy, was there anything that the North Koreans asked for or received in exchange? Was there a trade at all?MR MILLER: I am not aware of them asking for anything. Doesn’t mean they didn’t, but I’m not aware if they did or – I’m just not aware whether they did or – did or did not ask for anything. We did not give them anything. We’ve made no concessions as a part of securing his return.QUESTION: Do you have any idea why they decided to suddenly expel him?MR MILLER: I am going to follow my general rule here and not try to get into the heads of foreign governments and certainly not that one.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Travis King voluntarily chose the North Korea. What punishment will he face when he comes home?MR MILLER: I would refer you to the Department of Defense for that question. He is an active member of the military, and that’s a question they’ll have to speak to.QUESTION: Because it’s violations for &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry?QUESTION: He had the violations of U.S. laws. He is active militaries.MR MILLER: Again, I’m going to refer that to the Defense Department, who would be the agency that would be – that would speak to that question.Yeah, one more?QUESTION: One more on North Korea. North Korea’s Ambassador to United Nations Song Kim said that nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula was imminent and blamed the United States and South Korea. How do you comment on this?MR MILLER: We would obviously find those remarks irresponsible, as we find any number of statements the – that North Korea makes threatening its neighbors or raising tensions in the region. And I will say we will continue to work with our partners in the region – the Republic of Korea, Japan – to ensure their security and prevent North Korea from taking aggressive – such aggressive actions.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go to the back – go to the back.QUESTION: Yeah, so after the release of Travis King, do you think communicate with DPRK is getting more easier to compared to before?MR MILLER: Do I think what? What was the &#8212;QUESTION: Communication to North Korea getting more easier to compared to before?MR MILLER: No, I wouldn’t say that, given that, as I just said, they refused all of our attempts to communicate with them over this matter. They have always had communications with other governments, and we found it possible to communicate with them through Sweden, which, as I said, is our protecting power. But I don’t think – as I said, I think in response to an earlier question, I do not see this as a sign of any diplomatic breakthrough that will have implications for other issues, other areas of concern we have with the DPRK regime.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, Olivia.QUESTION: Thank you. Private King was described by U.S. officials as being in good spirits and good health. What do you know about his treatment while in the custody of the North Koreans?MR MILLER: I don’t know anything at this point. It’s possible that people who were on the plane with him have gotten further information. It hasn’t been communicated back here yet. So I don’t have any information other than to confirm that, yes, he was in good spirits. He was in good health. But with respect to his treatment, that’s not something I can read out from the podium today.QUESTION: So no indications right now that he was interrogated or harshly treated in any way?MR MILLER: I just – I would certainly imagine that he was interrogated. That was – that would be consistent with past DPRK practice with respect to detainees. But I don’t have any readout from his conversations with the people on the plane with him or the people that he met at Osan Air Force Base.QUESTION: Okay. And did his release come as the result of an explicit ask by the United States, even if conveyed through Sweden, or do you view this as a sort of voluntary or even benevolent act on the part of Pyongyang, again, conveyed to Sweden?MR MILLER: I think it could be the result of both an ask and a voluntary decision. It was a request. We made the – we made it clear to North Korea that we wanted to secure his return, and they ultimately decided to do so.QUESTION: And one more. When did their willingness to release him get conveyed?MR MILLER: In the past few days, I would say.QUESTION: In the past few days. And &#8212;MR MILLER: In the past few days – in the past week, past few days, yeah.QUESTION: Okay. And was it the subject of any conversations between the Secretary and other interlocutors while at the UN General Assembly?MR MILLER: Not that I’m aware of. I was in most of those conversations and it didn’t come up. It certainly didn’t come up in our conversation with the Chinese vice president. This was handled more at the working level, not at the – not the secretary level.QUESTION: Okay. And sorry, but just to put a fine point on it, when did the U.S. become aware that they were going to get Travis King back?MR MILLER: I don’t have a specific date. We’ve been working on this for some time. But it takes you know, as we’ve seen with the release of other detainees, it can take some time from the time that you get indications that he might be returned until you know it for sure, until you can actually negotiate the specific details of the transfer.Anything else on North Korea before we – yeah.QUESTION: Well, did – when the plane stopped in Shenyang, did Nick Burns get off the plane?MR MILLER: I don’t actually know if he was on the plane to – I don’t know if he was on the plane, the first leg of the plane, or whether he got off. I don’t know. I don’t – just did not – I did not get a briefing on the manifest before coming up here, so &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Well, I mean, you just said you didn’t know &#8212;MR MILLER: He – he greeted &#8212;QUESTION: You didn’t know of anyone who had spoken to him on the plane. But presumably, if Burns was at the border and met him, and then got on the plane in Dandong and then flew to Shenyang, he was on the plane for &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, right.QUESTION: &#8212; however long that flight is.MR MILLER: Let me say this. I presume he was not on the plane by himself. I don’t know if it was the ambassador or other people. Whoever it was on the plane with him, I haven’t gotten a readout of anything he might have said to them, so – Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: And I have a few topics but let me start with Azerbaijan-Armenia, if you don’t mind. As I understand, senior officials are currently in Azerbaijan. You have eyes and ears on the ground. Give me a sense of what you have been observing there during the past 24 hours. There are calls for international community to prevent ethnic cleansing, something that (inaudible). What exactly is going on? And the sides are talking about also turning back to Brussels. What is being hoped for, actually?MR MILLER: So I would say a few things. Number one, as you noted, Samantha Power, the USAID administrator, and Acting Assistant Secretary Yuri Kim are in Azerbaijan today, where they stressed a number of things, the same things that the Secretary stressed in his conversation with President Aliyev yesterday and that I reiterated at the podium, which is that, number one, we want to see the ceasefire maintained; number two, we want to see humanitarian needs addressed; that means keeping the Lachin corridor open, it means ensuring that humanitarian supplies can come in, and that it means an international monitoring mission to ensure that humanitarian needs are addressed.And I will say that we did welcome the comments by the Government of Azerbaijan just a little while ago before I came out to this podium, that they would welcome such an international monitoring mission. That’s something that the Secretary had directly pushed the president for, and we’re glad to see his having agreed to it, and we will work with our allies and partners in the coming days to flesh out exactly what that mission will look like. But then ultimately what we do want to see is a return to the negotiating table, where they can ultimately reach a dignified, lasting peace.QUESTION: Speaking of the negotiating table, for months and months you had dialogue going on in Washington, in Brussels. Senior officials told us just last month that the sides had agreed to return back to Washington. Who dropped the ball, and when and why?MR MILLER: I don’t know what – so first of all, I reject the characterization about dropping the ball. We have been pursuing negotiations. The Secretary has been having direct conversations with the president of Azerbaijan, the prime minister of Armenia. We’ve had a number of officials travel to the region – not just in the past week or 10 days since hostilities broke out but going back months and months and months.We have done everything we can to pursue diplomacy, but ultimately, remember, it’s up to the two parties here who are the parties that have direct disagreements. We can do everything we can to push them but ultimately they have to agree to talk and they have to agree to ultimately come to some resolution. That’s what we’re going to do, is continue to play our part to facilitate that.QUESTION: And how much of this also can be pointed at Russia? I’m asking because Kremlin loves pointing at the West, and also the fact that Pashinyan chose Western orientation for Armenia. So what is Russia’s role here, and how do you – is it time to come out and call Russia out for what it has been doing?MR MILLER: I certainly do not think Russia has played a productive role here in the past week. We have seen them at times – there have been times where they facilitated negotiations, and that was something that we welcomed; but certainly in the last week their role has not been productive in this situation.QUESTION: I have one more on Russia, if you don’t mind.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: In the wake of today’s sanctions and also yesterday’s business advisory on Xinjiang, I want to ask you about business advisory on Russia. It has been more than a year and a half that we entered this war. There have been calls from different sides, Ukrainian business community and diaspora. The fact that you guys are still allowing the U.S. companies, business companies, to operate in Russia – some of them have left and returned back and earning money and pay taxes – is not consistent with your policy to isolate Russia, is it?MR MILLER: Let me say a few things about that. Number one, that since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February of last year, a number of U.S. international companies have looked at the legal, looked at the reputational risk, and decided that those risks were too high to continue involving – to continue operating in Russia. In fact, over a thousand U.S. companies have withdrawn from Russia in that time. In addition, Russia has passed restrictive new laws that I think have discouraged a number of businesses from operating.I will say this is a decision that every business has to make on its own, looking at the operational and legal and reputational risks of operating in Russia. But I do want to be clear that we have always emphasized that there are certain types of commercial activity that we are not trying to shut down with respect to Russia. All of our sanctions have had exemptions for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian purposes because we do not see the United States in conflict with the Russian people.So we have not tried to tell businesses that are working to provide food or pharmaceutical goods to the Russian people that they should stop doing business there. We have targeted our sanctions, our export controls, on the sectors of the Russian economy that fuel Russia’s war machine, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: Can I follow up one more on Armenia-Azerbaijan?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: One other development is that Azerbaijan says it’s arrested the head of the self-styled republican – the suffragist entity in Nagorno-Karabakh, which of course has fallen on Mr. Vardanian. Does the U.S. have anything to say about that, either the arrest or about what treatment you would expect to &#8212;MR MILLER: We are aware of the arrest. We’re closely monitoring the situation. I don’t have any further comment today.Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Changing topic to the visa waiver, which – is the – this department and the Secretary of State, Secretary Blinken, completely convinced that Israel has totally fulfilled all its obligations to join the visa program?MR MILLER: We are convinced that it has met the requirements to join the Visa Waiver Program. It’s a recommendation the Secretary made to the Department of Homeland Security, and it was ultimately decided by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Over the past few months, as we’ve been trialing this program with the Government of Israel, we’ve seen more than a hundred thousand American citizens enter Israel without a visa. That includes tens of thousands of Americans on the Palestinian registry who have travelled into Israel without a visa. And that said, we have ongoing monitoring programs that will be in place for Israel, as they are with every other member of the Visa Waiver Program. We’ll be closely monitoring their compliance as we go forward.QUESTION: Okay. So you are convinced that Israel is exactly, like all the other countries, the 40 other countries that belong to this program &#8212;MR MILLER: I –QUESTION: &#8212; they conduct themselves with the same kind of fidelity in treating all Americans the same?MR MILLER: I said that they have met the requirements of the Visa Waiver Program. As we have discussed many times from this podium, there are differences, especially with respect to Gaza. We have to remember that Gaza is controlled by a foreign terrorist organization. We would expect there to be different procedures. There are different procedures for entering the United States if you’re coming from a territory controlled by a foreign terrorist organization. So we do understand that there are different procedures, but we have looked at the plans and the policies that Israel has put into place and decided that they meet the Visa Waiver Program. But we will continue to monitor their compliance going forward.QUESTION: You are not concerned that Israel could use (inaudible) of this caveat that it has special security needs and so on to abuse this – these requirements that you demand of them?MR MILLER: I don’t know what you mean with respect to taking advantage of, but we will be watching for compliance with the program very carefully.QUESTION: And what recourse do Americans that are not treated equally upon entry or departure, what recourse do they have?MR MILLER: They should just – they should report that to the United States embassy.QUESTION: And in the event that there are repeated incidents, will there be, like, a pullback from that program?MR MILLER: I don’t want to get into – I don’t want to get into any hypotheticals, other than to say, as I just said, that we monitor ongoing compliance with the program and have ability – have the ability to take steps up to and including excluding people from the – countries from the program going forward if they fail to stay in compliance.QUESTION: Last question on this. A group of American rights groups – Arab American rights groups – have filed a suit against this. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: I don’t. I would refer you to the Department of Justice for comment on that.QUESTION: Can I ask you about the stat you just gave? You said since when more than a hundred thousand Americans have entered Israel without a visa?MR MILLER: Since we started this trial period, which was July or –QUESTION: So like, all Americans, right? That, like, includes people like me and you?MR MILLER: I said over a hundred thousand –QUESTION: Palestinian Americans?MR MILLER: No, hold on. Over a hundred thousand American – let me just –QUESTION: Matt, that means nothing. Americans who get into Israel with – unless they’re Palestinian Americans, with –MR MILLER: I think you missed the second part of what I said. Over a hundred thousand Americans since we began trialing this program have entered Israel without a visa, and that includes tens of thousands of Americans on the Palestinian registry.QUESTION: How many – all right. But saying more than a hundred thousand since the trial period began means absolutely nothing, okay?MR MILLER: It &#8212;QUESTION: No, it means nothing. Because you and I could get to Israel without a visa for years. That’s not the issue. So when you say tens of thousands of Palestinian Americans, or tens of thousands of Americans who are on the Palestinian registry, how many?MR MILLER: I don’t have the exact number. Tens of thousands.QUESTION: Well – but how do you know that they’re – how do you know it’s reciprocal? How do you know that this is reciprocity if you can’t give an exact number?MR MILLER: I’m giving you “tens of thousands.” I don’t often – I oftentimes walk out here with numbers that are in a range without the exact number to tell you the – down to the decimal point.QUESTION: How many was it – how many – well, tell me how many was it before the trial period began?MR MILLER: I don’t have that information.QUESTION: Well, then what – the point &#8212;MR MILLER: It – I – I think it is &#8212;QUESTION: It is a meaningless statistic.MR MILLER: I think it is important information that certainly the – given that the –QUESTION: Hold on. Okay, no one is –MR MILLER: Let me just say, given that the criticism –QUESTION: &#8212; claiming that there hasn’t been improvements to the way Palestinian Americans are treated when they go to or through Israel. No one is saying there haven’t been. But the question is the reciprocity issue. So let me ask you something. Will Israeli citizens need to get permission from the U.S. Government to leave the United States if they come in?MR MILLER: To leave the United States? I would refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for that level of specificity.QUESTION: Okay. Is it correct that Palestinian Americans who are on the Palestinian registration list, who are in Gaza, need to get permission – specific permission; not just checking a box on an ESTA form or whatever – to leave?MR MILLER: They do have to go through a different –QUESTION: Well, how is that – how is that reciprocal?MR MILLER: They do – I said they have to go through a different circumstance because of the unique nature of the fact that they live in a place that’s controlled by a foreign terrorist organization, which is something that we fully understand. So it is different, but we expect –QUESTION: Okay. But –MR MILLER: Hold on. We expect them to be &#8212;QUESTION: Okay, and I’m not suggesting that Israel – I’m not trying to say that Israel – that they shouldn’t be in the program for whatever reason, except for the fact that that is not reciprocity right there. That is – that is discriminatory. Whether it is based on sound national security strategy or not, it isn’t reciprocity, it doesn’t meet the requirements of the law, and that’s what this lawsuit that Said was just talking about is about. So how – are you just saying that, okay, it’s all right that some Palestinian Americans are going to be discriminated against and &#8212;MR MILLER: That is not at all what I said. I said that &#8212;QUESTION: But that is what it is.MR MILLER: I’ve said that Palestinian Americans coming from Gaza have to go through different procedures because they’re coming from a place that’s controlled by a foreign terrorist organization.QUESTION: Yeah, but &#8212;MR MILLER: But – but &#8212;QUESTION: But wait a second. But those Palestinian Americans do not have – they all – this is just to leave Gaza, to leave Israel, to get back to – to get back to the United States, presumably. It is not a U.S. requirement that they have to do this. It is an Israeli requirement, and that means that it is – that the treatment is not reciprocal.MR MILLER: We believe that under the procedures that the Government of Israel is &#8212;QUESTION: I know you believe.MR MILLER: &#8212; hold on – is putting – is putting into place &#8212;QUESTION: You can spin this all you want to, but it’s not reciprocity.MR MILLER: &#8212; they will – they will be able to travel – Americans on the Palestinian registry in Gaza or any American citizens in Gaza will be able to travel into Israel without a visa. There are different procedures, but ultimately they may have to go &#8212;QUESTION: But then they can’t leave?MR MILLER: &#8212; but ultimately it’s – they &#8212;QUESTION: So reciprocity is only getting in, it doesn’t include getting out? I don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m going to &#8212;QUESTION: This is really just what – because you don’t know.MR MILLER: No, I’m not – I &#8212;QUESTION: And because it doesn’t make any sense.MR MILLER: I would disagree with that. We believe that we have set up a program that allows them – first of all, again, is delivering an enormous benefit to &#8212;QUESTION: Well &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; enormous benefit to American citizens, including Palestinian Americans who have not been able to fly into Ben Gurion before now, who have not been able to transit in and out of the West Bank. There are different procedures for Gaza. We understand that. We expect it. We think it’s appropriate for there to be so. But at the end of the day, those American citizens who are in Gaza have the ability to transit with different procedures but without a visa.QUESTION: But I don’t – I’m not arguing and I don’t think anyone else is arguing that this isn’t a good thing for U.S.-Israeli relations or that Israel should – that Israeli citizens should have those. The question is whether they meet the legal criteria, okay?MR MILLER: And &#8212;QUESTION: And honestly, what you have just said now does not meet the criteria for reciprocity.MR MILLER: We have made a &#8212;QUESTION: It doesn’t. You – no, it doesn’t.MR MILLER: So – so I am not a lawyer, but we have looked at it inside the State Department &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not a lawyer either.MR MILLER: &#8212; and come to a different – well, then we’re really in the – we have come to a different determination.QUESTION: So would you agree that there is a two-tier system of – there is a two-tier – there is a different system for Palestinians? Do you agree with that?MR MILLER: I don’t know how many – I don’t know how many times I have to say this, which is that there is a &#8212;QUESTION: I understand, but &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; there is – there are different requirements for people that live in – that live in Gaza, and I think for understandable reasons.QUESTION: So the issue of reciprocity &#8212;QUESTION: So if an Israeli citizen wants to leave the United States and go back to Israel, and there &#8212;MR MILLER: An Israeli citizen?QUESTION: Yeah, under the Visa Waiver Program, right, so they can get in without a visa but they (inaudible). So, like, if they’re in Arizona or something &#8212;MR MILLER: So the – so I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that they can – that politically you think is suspect.MR MILLER: So I’m not going to &#8212;QUESTION: Would they have to apply for an exit visa to get out of the U.S.?MR MILLER: Now you’re – now you are getting beyond my knowledge of immigration law when we start talking about &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: &#8212; when we start talking about Israeli citizens here.QUESTION: Because I’ve read the 15-page DHS talking points (inaudible), and they don’t address this question, and not only do they not address the question of the Gaza issue and reciprocity, Israel is not even meeting right now the criteria for the West Bank, for Palestinians who are going – Palestinian Americans who are on the registry who are going into the West Bank. Now, yes, it has improved, no doubt. No one is saying it hasn’t. But they’re not meeting that requirement either. So it’s not an issue of whether Israel should get into the program based on it being a partner of the U.S. and a strategic ally in the Middle East. It’s a question of whether they meet the legal criteria under the law. And they don’t. And what your answers have just said &#8212;MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; is that they don’t meet the criteria and you’re letting them in anyway.MR MILLER: I – that is not at all what I have said. I have said we have made the determination that they do, and ultimately we have the ability to monitor this going forward.All right. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. When Secretary met his Indian counterpart Minister Jaishankar in New York for the Quad meeting, did he raise the issue of Canadian allegations with India?MR MILLER: Did he raise the issue of what?QUESTION: The Canadian allegations.MR MILLER: No, not in that meeting. It was a – that was not a bilateral meeting. It was a meeting of a number of countries and it did not come up in that meeting. But we have engaged with our Indian counterparts on this issue and urged them to fully cooperate with the Canadian investigation.QUESTION: And the minister is going to be here in the city this week. The Secretary has plans to meet him and raise this issue again?MR MILLER: Tomorrow. Yeah. And what?QUESTION: Will he be raising this issue with the – with Minister Jaishankar?MR MILLER: I don’t want to preview the comment – the conversations he will have in that meeting, but as we’ve made clear, we’ve raised this; we have engaged with our Indian counterparts on this and encouraged them to cooperate with the Canadian investigation, and we continue to encourage them to cooperate.QUESTION: So far engagement you had with the Indians, do you see sense of cooperation from them?MR MILLER: I’m not going to read in – I’m not going to speak to our private diplomatic conversations.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Se Hoon Kim, Global Strat View. Last week, the visit of President Raisi – President Raisi’s visit to the United Nations actually carried on a lot of conversation in the public sphere. However, there were incidences where journalists from Iran International were harassed and attacked on the streets by Iranian diplomats. Namely, the – Iran International’s journalist Kian Amani was directly attacked and harassed by the protocol officer of Raisi, Reza Naghipour. I’m just wondering what your comment on that is and for – also would like to see your comment regarding the constant harassment and the targeting of Iranian dissidents located in the United States who are U.S. citizens, green card holders, and a lot of times asylees.MR MILLER: So with respect to the first question, we actually put out a statement on this last week during the UN General Assembly in which we made very clear that we condemn the harassment and intimidation of journalists. And with respect to the harassment and intimidation of Iranian citizens living in the United States, of course we condemn that as well. We condemn transnational repression wherever it happens in the world.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Today, Serbia is holding day of mourning after violent clashes in Kosovo on Sunday. The State Department so far didn’t send a message of condolences to the Serbian victims, and while Secretary Blinken expressed condolences for the loss of Kosovo police officer, there has been noticeable absence of any mention of the Serbian victims in his statement. What kind of message does this convey to the Serbs in Kosovo?MR MILLER: I think we have pretty consistently expressed our condolences to the victims of violence in – both in this situation and around the world, and one of the messages we have had for both sides in this conflict is that they should refrain from violence and return to the EU-facilitated dialogue. That continues to be our message.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Jahanzaib Ali from ARY News. Congresswoman Ilhan Omar in her statement expressed concerns on the allegations of involvement of Indian Government in Canadian citizen killing. She also said that she has requested a briefing on whether there are similar operations in the United States. Any briefings scheduled, or she contacted the State Department?MR MILLER: Not that I’m aware of.QUESTION: Sir, secondly, how United States see this Khalistan campaign, as all these operations managed by U.S.-based group Sikhs for Justice &#8212;MR MILLER: I missed the first part of the question. Could you just &#8212;QUESTION: So how you – how United States see this Khalistan campaign? Because all their operations are managed by a U.S.-based education group, Sikhs for Justice.MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that. Sorry.QUESTION: Sorry, last question, sir. Has India asked United States to ban Khalistan operations in United States?MR MILLER: I’m not going to read out any private diplomatic conversations.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. What do you have for the tragic fire incident that happened late yesterday in a wedding party in Nineveh Province, Hamdaniya district in Iraq, where more than 100 people killed and many more injured?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So some of the victims are treat in local hospitals and some are in Kurdistan Region’s hospitals, but will you provide any medical assistance? And if needed, will you welcome them in – here in the United States hospitals?MR MILLER: So first of all, we mourn the loss of life in the horrific fire that took place at a wedding in Hamdaniya in northern Iraq that killed more than – at least a hundred people and, to our understanding, critically injured 150 others. We express, of course, our deepest condolences to the families who lost loved ones, and we hope for a speedy recovery for those wounded.With respect to the second part of your question, we do stand ready to support the Government of Iraq and its people at this tragic time. We have always stood by – we will always stand side by side with the people of Iraq and be ready to talk with the Iraqi Government about what – any assistance that we can provide. And with respect to the last question, I think it’s too early to get into what might occur.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. If you please, comment on the Moscow format meeting on Afghanistan scheduled for September 21, which is tomorrow. There is no representative of the U.S. invited. How do you see that? And second, a high-level delegation of the Taliban led by acting Foreign Affair Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has traveled to Russia to participate in the two-days meeting. Does the travel ban on Taliban leaders still exist? Aren’t they in the blacklist?MR MILLER: So I don’t have much to say about that other than that we’re aware of the Moscow format meeting taking place. We are not members of the Moscow format, so a U.S. representative will not be attending.Go ahead.QUESTION: Mexican media is reporting that Secretary Blinken will be hosting a high-level delegation of Mexican officials on Friday. Given the current situation at the U.S.-Mexico border, will this be the topic of discussion on Friday?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to get into – two days before the meeting what exactly we will talk about, but certainly migration issues are often issues that we talk about with our Mexican counterparts when we meet with them both here and in Mexico.QUESTION: Who will be taking part from the U.S. side on this – on this meeting on Friday?MR MILLER: Stay tuned. We’ll make announcements of that in the coming days.QUESTION: But you confirm the meeting is happening?MR MILLER: I’m going to make – we’ll make announcements about that in the very near future.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: All right. Do a few more.QUESTION: Hi, Matt. Could you talk a little about what may happen if Congress fails to pass the appropriation bills in regards to the compact of free associations for Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands?MR MILLER: So we are still working through the exact implications. As you can imagine, there are – we have to look at everything that the State Department does and determine what kind of work can continue in a government shutdown, what kind of work would have to be put on hold. We are concerned about the fact that Congress might not do its job and pass appropriations bills to keep the government open, and so we are doing the kind of planning that we have to do to respond to that situation if it occurs. But I’m not at this point ready to talk about what’s – what any specific implications might be.Go to the back.QUESTION: After Cambodia’s election in July, the U.S. &#8212;MR MILLER: Whose election?QUESTION: Cambodia.MR MILLER: Oh, yeah.QUESTION: The U.S. cut off $18 million in aid in apparent protest, I guess against the legitimacy of the election. On Friday, Hun Manet, the prime minister of Cambodia, met with the acting deputy secretary, Victoria Nuland, and the Cambodian Government says that that aid has been restored. Can you confirm that? And if so, why was that aid restored?MR MILLER: Let me take that one back, get you an answer.All right, we’ll do last one. Janne.QUESTION: Thank you. On Russia, Russian air force plane arrived in Pyongyang this week, and North Korea and Russia are taking steps to realize military cooperations. Any comment on that? Are you concerned about this?MR MILLER: Sure. We have spoken to this a number of times and warned that arms discussions between Russia and the DPRK almost certainly continued during Kim Jong-un’s trip to Russia, and we believe that they continue as – in the aftermath of that trip. We think a burgeoning military relationship between Russia and the DPRK, including additional transfers of weapons from the DPRK to Russia and technology transfers from the DPRK – from Russia to the DPRK, will further undermine the global nonproliferation regime, would be in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia itself voted for. And so we would urge the DPRK to abide by what it has said publicly and refrain from supplying arms to Russia.With that, we’ll wrap for today. Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:01 p.m.)# # #&nbsp;						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Cambodia																								Canada																								China																								India																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Serbia																								Sweden
- Digital Press Briefing with David M. Turk, U.S. Department of Energy David M. Turk, Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of EnergyMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with David M. Turk, the Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of Energy.  Deputy Secretary Turk will provide an overview of his ongoing visit to Bali, Indonesia, and Manila, Philippines, for the third ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting and the United States Exchange and East Asia Summit Energy Ministerial Meetings. With that, let’s get started.  Deputy Secretary Turk, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much, Natalie, and it’s a pleasure to be with you all.  Thanks to all our reporter colleagues who are joining this call.  Just a few thoughts of framing and then happy to take any and all questions as well. As Natalie mentioned, I’m here in Bali for a meeting we just concluded with our ASEAN minister colleagues, between ASEAN and the U.S., and sitting down here in a few minutes with a number of the ministers for bilateral discussions as well, and of course meeting with our Indonesian host, Minister Tasrif, earlier today also.  And then this comes on the – just after a visit to the Philippines earlier this week as well, and really exploring additional bilateral opportunities of cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines also. In addition, I had a chance not too long ago to visit Thailand and Vietnam and Indonesia again as well, and the reason we are spending – I am spending, we are spending so much time and effort on the region is because as we really step up and implement historic legislation in the U.S. on our clean energy transition – the Inflation Reduction Act, the bipartisan infrastructure legislation, truly groundbreaking efforts in the U.S. to walk the talk and get our own house in order – we also view a core, core part of our overall efforts to engage in partnership with key organizations like ASEAN, and I think ASEAN is an incredibly impactful organization that we are eager to support and to do what we can to help those countries and the ASEAN region more generally achieve its objectives; but also to make sure that if there are things we can be doing internationally, bilaterally, multilaterally, that we do that.  And we have a number of ongoing areas of collaboration with particular countries in the region but also with ASEAN as a group as well.  I’m happy to get into any particulars as there’s interest.  As the U.S. Government, we of course are working on JETP with Indonesia, with Vietnam.  We have our own flagship partnership at the Department of Energy called Net Zero World, where we try to bring terrific, independent, gold-standard technical expertise from our national laboratories – 10 of our national laboratories – to help Indonesia, to help Thailand, to help Singapore, and to help other countries as there’s interest as well, a variety of technical conversations working in particular technology areas; but also trying to help inform policymaking and decision-making as we make progress in the U.S., learn from others, and share examples from our end as well.  And we’re having incredibly fruitful and real-world conversations on that front, and we really try to strive to be a true partner for countries around the world and certainly in ASEAN, of course with our private sector partners as well helping to lead the way. We’re also having a range of conversations on clean energy supply chains and really trying to work with countries so that they benefit not only from the mining of their particular minerals and resources, but try to move up the value chain so that they get more economic benefit from those resources that they’ve been given.  We view that as a win for those countries and those people, assuming the mining and the manufacturing is done responsibly, but also a win for diversification of supply chains and making sure that we all can benefit from these technologies going forward.   So happy to get into any and all of that, and to certainly answer questions.  Back over to you, Natalie, to moderate.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Deputy Secretary Turk.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  So our first question is from Diep Nguyen Thi Ngoc from BizLIVE in Hanoi, Vietnam.  “What are the obstacles that some Southeast Asian countries face on the way to net zero by 2050?  And what are the deputy secretary&#8217;s recommendations and key points for Southeast Asian countries to achieve the net-zero target?”  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much for the question.  And I think the biggest obstacle in terms of not only Southeast Asian countries but all our countries to get to net zero by 2050 and to have a pathway towards decarbonization that’s in line with what science is telling us we need to to avoid even worse consequences of climate change, and it’s clear that all our countries are already experiencing horrific consequences of climate change – just look at what happened in Hawaii not too long ago, but we’ve got droughts, we’ve got extended heat spells, all sorts of more violent typhoons and hurricanes, et cetera, et cetera.  And the biggest obstacle is just the scale and pace of what we need to do: transforming our economies, not just electricity but transportation, manufacturing, building, across the board to truly net zero within just a few decades, a couple decades’ period of time.  It’s already 2023, and not too far from 2024.  So you think of transforming our entire economy to net zero is a huge, huge undertaking, and we’re all part of this transition.   We all need to support each other, we all need to push each other, and we all need to of course have guiderails and incentives for the private sector to really take off and help get us there. So it’s just the scale and pace of what we need to do, and then there’s particular obstacles of course underneath that.   And then to the second part of the question – recommendations for Southeast Asian countries to achieve net-zero targets.  Our approach is to work with countries to try to support their own objectives.  Governments – especially democratically elected governments – represent the people, and it is not our job to question what their duly-elected leaders want for their country.  What we’re doing is, especially for those countries who have ambitious targets, is:  Are there things that we can do to help support the cause along the way?  Whether it’s leveraging our phenomenal national lab expertise in the U.S. that’s helping us on our own transition, but there’s expertise there and sharing back and forth that’s useful, as we support the objectives to all get us to where we need to go. So we’ve certainly heard some phenomenal opportunities and potential for different technologies.  In the Philippines we had some really good conversations on offshore wind – 170 gigawatts of offshore wind potential has been estimated just in the Philippines itself, and there’s huge offshore wind potential in Vietnam and other countries in the region.  Geothermal, solar, including floating solar.  Working on the grids and building out transmission is a shared challenge.  We’ve got that in the U.S. and other countries do as well.   So we’re all trying to move and help support each other along the way.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  The next question goes to Aditya Hadi from The Jakarta Post in Jakarta, and I see your hand is raised.  If you would like to unmute and ask, please go ahead.  Okay.  Yes, go ahead.  Go ahead, Aditya.   QUESTION:  Right, thank you.  Yeah, I just want to raise a question because recently the (inaudible) secretary in Indonesia said that there’s no money left for the – especially for early retirement in all (inaudible) plans, and Indonesia may not hit the target if there is no money or financing available for the country.  I just want to ask how the U.S. and IPG support for the 10 billion pledge in JETP, and is there any punishment for – from you, from the U.S. for the recent proposal of JETP from Indonesia?   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, Aditya, for the question.  And the JETP, which stands for Just Energy Transition Partnership for those who aren’t tracking this closely, is a really innovative way to help support countries like Indonesia, but there are a few other countries around the world as well, in a comprehensive fashion – not just from the U.S. Government side of things, but other key partners around the world as well.  And it’s really trying to join in a true partnership to think, to see what we can bring to the table to help countries like Indonesia to achieve their own objectives in line with what the science tells us we all need to do. I think it’s important to underscore that this is a partnership and there’s a lot of discussion back and forth.  It’s also a long-term partnership.  So there are opportunities and needs in the near term, but this is also trying to think through comprehensively in terms of a comprehensive investment and policy plan and having that back and forth to make sure that we’re doing what’s necessary.   I think important to really underscore the “Just” part of Just Energy Transition Partnership:  This is meant to be a way to support Indonesia and the other countries who are working in the JETP partnership to not only decarbonize, but to do it in a way that has a just transition taking care of communities, taking care of affordability, taking care of energy security, and doing it in a real-world kind of way.   So it’s a very ambitious partnership.  There will be challenges along the way, as there are in any kind of ambitious partnership, and that’s what’s being worked through right now.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And we’ll go to a question from Maki Iwasaki from the Jiji Press news agency in Tokyo, Japan.  “How do you see the role of Japan and other Asian countries in driving the growth of the hydrogen energy industry in the United States?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, well, thanks for the question.  And I don’t think there’s an international meeting that I’ve gone to recently in which the subject of hydrogen and clean hydrogen in particular didn’t come up.  And there’s an awful lot of work being done in a variety of countries around the world.  Certainly want to give a shout-out to Japan, who has been a leader in hydrogen for many, many years.  And we’re certainly trying to do our part to help move along a clean hydrogen economy, not only for the benefit of the U.S. but the benefit of countries around the world to take advantage of this very versatile fuel carrier.  In the U.S. we have a very robust set of incentives to try to move our clean hydrogen economy along.  One of our most generous tax incentives through the Inflation Reduction Act – up to $3 per kilogram for hydrogen production, a production tax credit – is in place and we’re putting together the final rules of that particular tax credit, helping to support Treasury, the U.S. Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service, IRS.   We also have – in the Department of Energy, the department I work for, helps coordinate this directly – is $8 billion, U.S. dollars, in hydrogen hubs to take advantage of existing hydrogen but not clean hydrogen, and industrial clusters to try to build out the hydrogen economy in a very cost-effective kind of way.   So I think there’s a role for the U.S. and U.S. Government and U.S. companies to help support Japanese and other goals on hydrogen, certainly within the ASEAN countries but the region as a whole, and vice versa as well.  And we need to have some standards; we need to have some interoperability.  There’s a great interest in international trade in clean hydrogen, and we have many partnerships to try to move that along as well.  So I think there’s a role in all of us trying to help move this along, of course with key private sector leaders really stepping up to the plate.  But this is a moment for hydrogen, but it’s beyond a moment – it’s really a shared momentum going forward, especially for hydrogen being able to help us decarbonize harder-to-decarbonize so-called sectors, like industry, a variety of industries, heavy-duty freight, et cetera.  Hydrogen holds some real potential in those areas in particular. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question was submitted by Rong Wei Neo from S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  “With the recent affirmation for nuclear power between the U.S. and the Philippines, would promoting nuclear as a viable renewable energy source in Southeast Asia be in the cards during your visit?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, thanks for the question.  And we in the U.S. and other countries around the world have had extensive experience with nuclear power for quite a few years.  Twenty percent of our own U.S. electricity production is from nuclear right now, and it ends up being a very significant part of our overall generation of decarbonized electricity in our country.  What we’re finding is, not only in the Philippines but other countries in the region and countries around the world, is because these climate objectives that we all have put on the table – net zero by mid-century – are so ambitious, there’s a real need to explore a variety of different technologies, and not only the traditional nuclear people think about – the big, huge nuclear power plants – but there’s a real interest, including in the Philippines, for what’s called small modular reactors.   So these are smaller, safer reactors.  There’s a number of really interesting models, companies in the U.S. and elsewhere who are putting together some different technologies.  And there’s an awful lot of interest in it, including because this is base power, baseload power that can help complement increasing number of renewables, whether solar or wind, as part of an overall decarbonized electricity generation mix.  So I think the interest is only going to grow and there’s some real opportunities for governments, societies to take advantage.  We are very much, as I said before, in the mode of true partner in helping to support countries.  And some countries are interested in exploring nuclear, including small modular reactors, going forward, and other countries are not interested.  For those countries who are, we’re certainly sharing our expertise and having some good conversations and seeing what we can do to support their ambitions. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question comes from Nhu Nguyen, OEC, from Da Nang, Vietnam.  “Recently Vietnamese electric vehicle maker VinFast has joined NASDAQ.  What is your comment on the prospect of more Vietnamese companies like VinFast who will invest in the green economy in the U.S.?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks for the question, and there’s no doubt that there’s a huge market opportunity and business opportunity for a variety of companies than what’s going on in the U.S. with the various tax incentives and all that we’re doing to really accelerate our clean energy transition.   The point I’d like to underscore is we think this a win-win situation for companies, including whether Vietnamese companies or other companies from the region.  They can help shore up their own bottom line – they can make money – as part of our clean energy transition in the U.S.  But that makes them stronger companies, more financially sound companies, reduces their prices that they need to charge for their products because they’re able to do things at scale in the U.S. that will help them make money and help the decarbonization process in Vietnam and other countries in the region as well.  So we really view this as a win-win situation, public and private partnerships in countries around the world, and certainly between the U.S. and ASEAN countries.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Deputy Secretary, we’re going to go back to a question also submitted by S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  And you kind of touched upon this a little bit, but it’s a slightly different question:  “How do you think your visit to Indonesia may put pressure on them for the Just Energy Transition Partnership, seeing how the monetary injection has failed to shift the needle thus far?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, as I was mentioning earlier, the partnership – the JETP partnership with Indonesia, and we’ve got a few others around the region and around the world as well – really is a partnership.  And I think there’s a recognition that it’s very much a mutually beneficial partnership.  And we’re able to have very candid conversations back and forth and make sure that we’re all doing our parts in order for – in the Indonesia JETP context – for Indonesia to be successful, to the benefit first and foremost of the people in Indonesia, but for Indonesia to also be a responsible global player as well.   So I think it’s less pressure from my vantage point and more just having candid, real-world true partner conversations to all do our part in a partnership to Indonesia achieve the objective that it’s laid out.  So that’s the spirit, and I think that’s the modality of the conversations.  And I had a very constructive conversation with the minister of energy, Minister Tasrif, here in Indonesia just a few hours ago, including on JETP – all in that kind of spirit of true partnership.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And now, Deputy Secretary Turk, that’s it for the questions and answers.  If you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you.  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, again, Natalie, for moderating, and thanks to everyone who’s joined and had such terrific questions.  And we look forward to engaging with you all further.  As I mentioned at the outset, working hand-in-hand with countries in this region – ASEAN countries but other countries in this region – is a top, top priority from our end.  I hope you’ve heard that clearly from the President, the Vice President, others in the administration as well.   And so any number of us will be back in the region, available to talk further, and again trying to work in this true partnership mode to support the governments but support the people in the region to get the benefits from the clean energy transition and to all move along as quickly, as robustly as we need to from a climate perspective but also very much with an eye towards affordability and an eye towards resilience and reliability and making sure that we all have the energy sources, the energy supply chains that we need to be successful going forward.  So the U.S. – all of us in the U.S., not just the U.S. Department of Energy, all of us in the U.S. look forward to continuing to engage with you all, answering your questions but also working with public and private partners in the region for the long haul.  Thanks, everybody.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And that is all we have time for today.  Thank you for your questions, participants, and thank you to Deputy Secretary Turk for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists and all of those who are RSVP’d as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon. # # #