# Xinjiang - United States Department of State

- The Tenth Anniversary of Human Rights Activist Ilham Tohti’s Detention Office of the SpokespersonToday marks the tenth year of detention for Uyghur human rights activist Ilham Tohti. Tohti remains in detention simply for advocating for the rights of Uyghurs and other minority groups in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). His life sentence demonstrates the PRC’s efforts to silence those brave enough to speak out against the government’s discriminatory practices and other human rights abuses, which include genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.We once again condemn the PRC’s ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang, and we call on the PRC to respect the human dignity of members of ethnic and religious minority groups and to immediately and unconditionally release Tohti and all those arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang and throughout all of China.
- Issuance of an Addendum to the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe Department of State, together with the Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Department of Labor, issued an Addendum to the 2021 Updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory to call attention to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and the evidence of widespread use of forced labor there.The Addendum highlights the following:Reports from both governmental and non-governmental sources that contain information about the ongoing, widespread, and pervasive risks in supply chains posed by state-sponsored forced labor and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang.The urgency for businesses to undertake appropriate human rights due diligence measures as described in the Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China. This guidance is issued pursuant to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.The United States will continue to promote accountability for the PRC’s atrocities and other human rights abuses through a whole-of-government effort and in close coordination with the private sector and our allies and partners.For the full text, please see Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory.
- Xinjiang HomeReportsOffice of International Religious FreedomChina (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang)&#8230;Xinjiang				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang): Xinjiang																																																																																												 In this section										/																							Read a Section: Xinjiang																																													Read a Section: Xinjiang																															Executive Summary																																																																																		Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																																																																								Read a Section: Xinjiang				China | Hong Kong | Macau | Tibet																																					Executive Summary						    																																															The constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining “normal.” National regulations require all clergy to pledge allegiance to the CCP and socialism, “resist illegal religious activities and religious extremist ideology, and resist infiltration by foreign forces using religion.” Additional Xinjiang-specific “Construction of Public Safety” regulations took effect on January 1 that call for a “crack down” on “ethnic separatist forces, evil terrorist forces, religious extremist forces, and other illegal and criminal activities that endanger national security.” No religious group may carry out any religious activities without government approval. Regional regulations implementing the national counterterrorism law permit the establishment of “vocational skills education training centers” to “carry out anti-extremist ideological education.” Minors are prohibited from receiving religious education or participating in religious activities.The U.S. government estimates that since April 2017, authorities have detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, members of other Muslim groups, as well as some Christians in specially built internment camps or converted detention facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) under the national counterterrorism and regional counterextremism laws. Several human rights groups estimate the number of individuals detained in internment camps or other facilities was higher, possibly including up to 3.5 million. The PRC government continued to cite what it called the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” to justify enacting and enforcing restrictions on religious practices of Muslims and members of non-Muslim religious minority groups. In August, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published an assessment that stated the government committed “serious human rights violations” in the region that may “constitute international crimes, in particular, crimes against humanity.” The assessment stated that in recent years, the government reduced the number of persons interned in “re-education” camps but increased the number formally incarcerated under vague charges of terrorism and “extremism.” Media and human rights organizations reported individuals received lengthy prison sentences for personal expressions of religious identity and beliefs, such as praying, owning a Quran, or growing a beard. The OHCHR cited survivors’ accounts of forced disappearance, torture, other physical and psychological abuse, including forced sterilization and sexual abuse, political indoctrination, and prolonged detention without trial because of their religion and ethnicity.In a February report, the International Labor Organization (ILO) said the government engaged in a “widespread and systematic program” involving the “extensive use of forced labor” of Uyghurs and members of other predominantly Muslim minority groups for agriculture and industrial activities in the region. The whereabouts of hundreds of prominent Uyghur intellectuals, religious scholars, cultural figures, doctors, journalists, artists, academics, and other professionals, in addition to many other citizens the government arrested or detained, remained unknown. There continued to be reports of individuals dying of injuries sustained during interrogations, medical neglect, and torture. The OHCHR assessment said the government linked reproduction “to an expansive notion of religious ‘extremism.’” In June, the European Parliament found “credible evidence about birth-prevention measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families amount[Ing] to crimes against humanity and represent[ing] a serious risk of genocide.”Media, academics, and nongovernmental (NGO) advocacy groups reported authorities continued to implement a variety of different methods, including home inspections, to ensure families were not observing religious practices such as praying, banned civil servants, students, and teachers from observing Ramadan, and limited fasting for the holiday. According to government sources, eyewitness accounts, and media reports, the government encouraged and, in some cases, required neighbors to spy on each other. Other surveillance techniques included the use of ubiquitous and increasingly sophisticated technology, as well as the government’s ongoing “Pair Up and Become Family” program, which forced Uyghurs to accept government officials and CCP members as assigned “relatives” to live in their homes. In June, a security and technology research group stated that police screened “23 million Xinjiang residents for ‘terrorism’ with facial recognition and license plate cameras, flagging those with ties overseas for ‘immediate arrest.’”  According to media reports, the government continued to close and, in some cases, destroy mosques in the XUAR, or remove their Islamic features; it converted some mosques into tourist attractions. Data from 2020 (the most recent available) estimated that nearly 900,000 Uyghur children, including some preschool-aged, were involuntarily separated from their families and living in boarding schools or orphanages, where they studied ethnic Han culture, Mandarin language, and CCP ideology. The government continued to seek to forcibly repatriate Uyghur and other Muslim citizens from abroad and detained many who returned. The government continued to harass and threaten Uyghurs living abroad, particularly those who spoke out against regime abuses. During his visit to the region in July, President Xi Jinping promoted the government’s ongoing policy of “Sinicizing” Islam and bringing religious doctrine in line with CCP ideology.Unequal treatment in society of Uyghur Muslims and Han Chinese continued in parallel with authorities’ policy of suppressing Uyghur language, culture, and religious practices while promoting the Han majority in political, economic, and cultural life. Muslims reported severe societal discrimination in employment and business opportunities and travel.The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officials met with national government officials to advocate for the human rights of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang. The U.S. government used a variety of diplomatic and economic tools to promote religious freedom and accountability in Xinjiang, including sanctions, visa restrictions, controls on exports and imports, and a business advisory to raise awareness among U.S. companies of the risks of doing business in the region. In February, the United States declined to send diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games due to concerns with what the presidential press secretary described as the PRC’s “ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses.” Throughout the year, senior U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of State, made multiple statements condemning the PRC’s atrocities and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and President Joe Biden raised the issue with President Xi during their meeting in November during the G20 conference in Bali, Indonesia. In June, the United States joined a group of 47 countries in issuing a joint statement in the UN Human Rights Council and in October joined 50 countries in a statement at the UN General Assembly condemning human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The embassy and consulates general delivered direct messages about religious freedom in Xinjiang through social media posts and promoted online engagement on the issue of freedom of religion or belief for members of Xinjiang’s ethnic Muslim minorities.																																					Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															A 2021 report on the XUAR issued by the Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics estimates the total population at 26 million.  The report states Uyghurs, along with Kazakhs, Hui, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups constitute approximately 15 million individuals, or approximately 58 percent of the total population.  According to the report, 12 million of these are Uyghurs.  The largest segment of the remaining population is Han Chinese (11 million, or approximately 42 percent of the population), with additional groups including Mongols, Tibetans, and others constituting less than 1 percent.  Uyghurs are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim.  The Globe and Mail reported in 2019 that according to sources in the region, Uyghur and Han Chinese Christians likely number in the thousands.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										The constitution, which cites the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping Thought, states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining “normal.” The constitution provides for the right to hold or not to hold religious belief. It provides that state organs, public organizations, and individuals may not discriminate against citizens “who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.”The government recognizes five official religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Roman Catholicism. Only religious groups belonging to one of five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (the Buddhist Association of China, the Chinese Taoist Association, the Islamic Association of China, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association) representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities.The Regulations on Religious Affairs require that religious activity “must not harm national security.” While the regulations stipulate religious groups must abide by the law, safeguard national unity, and respond to “religious extremism,” the term “extremism” is undefined. Measures to safeguard unity and respond to “religious extremism” include monitoring groups, individuals, and institutions, and recommending penalties such as suspending groups and canceling clergy credentials.In addition to the national counterterrorism law, Xinjiang has its own counterterrorism and “de-extremification” laws containing similar provisions to the national law regarding “religious extremism.” These laws ban wearing long beards, full-face coverings, and religious dress; expanding halal practice beyond food and daily prayer; and “interfering” with family planning, weddings, funerals, or inheritance, among other provisions. The law limits the information that may be released to the public following any incident authorities define as a terror attack. Other XUAR regulations prohibit veils that cover the face, homeschooling children, “abnormal beards,” practicing religion in government buildings, and wearing clothes associated with “religious extremism.” These regulations do not define “abnormal” or “religious extremism.”Regional regulations implementing the national counterterrorism law permit the establishment of “vocational skills education training centers” (which the government also calls “education centers” and “education and transformation establishments”) to “carry out anti-extremist ideological education.” The regulations stipulate that “institutions such as vocational skills education training centers should carry out training sessions on the common national language, laws and regulations, and vocational skills, and carry out anti-extremist ideological education, and psychological and behavioral correction to promote thought transformation of trainees and help them return to the society and family.”CCP members and retired government officials, including Uyghurs, are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices. CCP members who are found to belong to religious organizations are subject to various types of punishment, including termination of their employment and expulsion from the CCP.Authorities in the XUAR have defined 26 religious activities as illegal without prior government authorization. Regional regulations stipulate no classes, scripture study groups, or religious studies courses may be offered by any group or institution without prior government approval. No religious group may carry out any religious activities, including preaching, missionary work, proselytizing, and ordaining clergy, without government approval. Regional regulations also ban editing, translation, publication, printing, reproduction, production, distribution, sale, and dissemination of religious publications and audiovisual products without authorization.Xinjiang officials require minors to complete nine years of compulsory public education before they may receive religious education outside of school. Xinjiang regulations also forbid minors from participating in religious activities and impose penalties on organizations and individuals who “organize, entice, or force” minors to participate in religious activities. A regulation further bans any form of religious activity in Xinjiang schools and stipulates parents or guardians who “organize, lure, or force minors into religious activities” may be stopped by anyone and reported to police. Xinjiang’s regional version of the national Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency Law states children affected by ethnic separatism, extremism, and terrorism, or committing offenses that seriously endanger society but do not warrant a criminal punishment, may be sent to “specialized schools for correction” at the request of their parents, guardians, or the school.The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” a set of nationwide regulations that took effect in May 2021, require all clergy to pledge allegiance to the PRC and socialism and to create a database of “religious personnel” to track their performance. These regulations apply to Xinjiang.On January 1, the “Regulations of the XUAR on the Development of Public Safety” went into effect. The regulations call for a “crack down” on “ethnic separatist forces, violent terrorist forces, religious extremist forces, and other illegal and criminal activities that endanger national security....” The regulations also call for “controlling illegal religious activities, illegal religious propaganda materials, and illegal religious network dissemination in accordance with the law and continuing to promote de-radicalization.” The regulations reference xie jiao (literally “heterodox teachings”) and state that authorities will “carry out anti-cult [i.e., anti-xie jiao] propaganda and education, prevent and crack down on various cult organizations, and effectively educate and reform individuals involved in cults.” They also call for full implementation across the entire XUAR of a grid system of social surveillance that had previously been used only in certain parts of the region.On March 1, the “Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services” came into effect nationwide, banning unauthorized domestic online religious content and prohibiting overseas organizations and individuals from operating online religious information services in the country. The new measures ban content that uses “religion to incite subversion of state sovereignty, oppose the leadership of the Communist Party, undermine the socialist system, national and ethnic unity, and social stability, or to advocate extremism, terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious fanaticism,” and that uses “religion to obstruct the implementation of the state&#8217;s judicial, educational, marriage, social management, and other systems.” The measures require that any individual or organization engaging in “cyberspace religious information releasing services, reposting services, and dissemination platform services,” such as streaming or publishing sermons, obtain a permit to do so within six months of the measures taking effect and validate that permit every three years. Without a permit, organizations and individuals “must not proselytize online and must not carry out religious education or training, publish religious sermons or repost or link to related content, must not organize the carrying out of religious activities online, and must not broadcast religious rites such as obeisance to Buddha, burning incense, ordinations, services, masses, or baptisms through means such as text, images, audio, or video either live or in recordings.” To acquire a permit, individuals and organizations must apply to the religious affairs department of the government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality where they are located.In addition to these nationwide rules, XUAR regulations on the administration of religious affairs require clerics to “uphold the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system, safeguard the reunification of the motherland and ethnic unity, be patriotic and loyal, and have high prestige and religious knowledge.”National regulations of the Islamic Association of China, which is managed by the SARA under the leadership of the United Front Work Department, a CCP organ, require Muslim clerics to meet the following requirements: “uphold the leadership of the CCP; love Islam and serve Muslims; possess a degree or receive formal training in Islamic scriptural education; have graduated from junior high school or above, in addition to attaining competency in Arabic; and be at least 22 years old.”To apply to become an Islamic cleric, applicants first need to submit an “Application Form for the Qualification of Islamic Clerics.” In addition, they must provide a certificate of education from an Islamic school, an education certificate from junior high school or above, and a physical examination certificate issued by a designated hospital (including items such as “mental history”). Applicants are also required to submit a household registration certificate and national identification card. The applicant must receive a letter of recommendation written by the Administration of Islamic Activity Sites where the applicant’s household registration is located and submit it to the Islamic Association of the province, autonomous region, or municipality after review and approval by the local Islamic Association.																																				Government Practices										According to multiple human rights NGOs and academic sources, authorities held more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim groups as well as some Christians in a vast network of camps since 2017. Many camps were reportedly co-located with factories, where sources said detainees were subjected to forced labor and “re-education.” Several human rights groups estimated the number of individuals interned to be up to 3.5 million. The government continued to use detentions to implement a XUAR-specific counterextremism policy that identified “extremist” behavior (including growing beards, wearing headscarves, praying, and abstaining from alcohol) in concert with the National Counterterrorism Law, which contains provisions on “religious extremism.”According to media and NGO reports, the central government and XUAR authorities continued to cite what they called the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as justification to enact and enforce restrictions on religious practices of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups.On June 9, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the government’s treatment of Uyghurs and other indigenous peoples in Xinjiang. The resolution said the Uyghur community was “systematically oppressed by brutal measures, including mass deportation, political indoctrination, family separation, restrictions on religious freedom, cultural destruction, and the extensive use of surveillance.” It also said the “credible evidence about birth-prevention measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families amount to crimes against humanity and represent a serious risk of genocide.” The resolution called on the government “to put an immediate end to the practice of arbitrary detention without charge, trial or conviction for criminal offenses targeted against Uyghurs and other ethnic Turkic peoples, to close all camps and detention centers, and to immediately and unconditionally release those detained.”Then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet visited Xinjiang in May and released an assessment on August 31 that concluded the government committed “serious human rights violations” in the region. Specifically, the OHCHR assessment stated, “The extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups, pursuant to law and policy, in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” The report said the government appeared in recent years to use fewer “re-education” centers, in favor of “a shift towards formal incarcerations as the principal means for large-scale imprisonment and deprivation of liberty. This is of particular concern, given the vague and capacious definitions of terrorism, ‘extremism,’ and public security-related offences under domestic criminal law.”On September 7, 40 UN independent experts and special rapporteurs issued a statement in support of the OHCHR assessment. The statement said, “China’s policies and practices have limited the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of religion or belief, the right to family life including reproductive rights for women, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to assemble and associate peacefully, the right to privacy, the right to cultural life, and the right to live free from arbitrary detention, forced labor as well as freedom from any violation of the right to life and from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and from enforced disappearance as well as the right of religious and ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”In April, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism Fionnuala Ni Aolain,presented a report to the UN Human Rights Council about global practices on secret detention. The report stated her team found “grave concerns about practices of arbitrary mass and secret detention with other serious violations of international law directed at the Uighurs and other ethnic groups” in the Xinjiang region. She also said, “Justified under the banner of ‘re-education,’ we have found that these detention practices impinge on the most fundamental of rights, including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty.”In March, Amnesty International in its report The State of the World’s Human Rights stated that “crimes against humanity persisted against Muslims living in Xinjiang, and the human rights situation deteriorated.” The report said that despite government claims to have closed internment camps by 2019, there remained credible evidence that “the government continued a campaign of arbitrary mass detention, combined with violence and intimidation to root out Islamic religious beliefs and Turkic Muslim ethno-cultural practices.”In a report published on July 6, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) stated, “Under the pretext of combating instability and countering terrorism, the CCP is coercively altering the human and physical geography of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through the mass surveillance, detention, and re-education of its indigenous Turkic-speaking population.”The ASPI’s Xinjiang Data Project satellite analysis indicated the government continued to operate 385 detention centers in Xinjiang. In some cases, authorities used repurposed schools, factories, and prisons to hold detainees, although reports from the region indicated authorities closed or repurposed the makeshift detention centers in cities and built larger detention centers outside the cities. In September, the Washington Post published an article on a reporter’s July visit to Kashgar (Chinese: Kashi) and Hotan Prefectures. The reporter found that some of the sites the Xinjiang Data Project identified as re-education camps appeared to have been converted into coronavirus quarantine facilities, teacher training schools, or vocational schools. According to the Post, “Satellite images show watchtowers, a security feature of detention centers, had been removed from the perimeters of some buildings in 2020.”In May, the Journal of the European Association of Chinese Studies published an analysis titled, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” The author analyzed a cache of more than 300,000 personal records and 23,000 detainee records in Konasheher (Shufu) County, Kashgar Prefecture, and Tekes County, Ili Kazakh (Yili Hasake) Autonomous Prefecture, from 2000 to 2018. The records were leaked to researchers and known as the “Xinjiang Police Files.” The analysis indicated that in 2018, authorities maintained police files on virtually every one of the 280,000 inhabitants in Konasheher County. Authorities sentenced approximately one in 25 persons to prison on “terrorism-related charges.” The analysis concluded the approximately 12.3-12.7 percent of Konasheher County’s adults were in some form of internment in re-education, detention, or prison facilities in 2018, meaning Konasheher’s combined per capita internment/imprisonment rate was more than 64 times higher than the national imprisonment rate.The Xinjiang Police Files analysis stated the files contained a spreadsheet entitled “Persons subject to the Strike Hard campaign because of religion,” referencing the campaign against terrorism. The spreadsheet listed 330 persons whom authorities sentenced for illegal religious activities such as studying the Quran. The spreadsheet included information on one man from Konasheher whom authorities sentenced to 13 years in prison because “from August 2014 to April 2017, the suspect, Tursun Kadir, grew a beard under the influence of religious extremism.” Authorities imprisoned another man, Ghulam Tursun, for “illegal study of the scriptures” and having one “extra” child. An unnamed woman was sentenced to six years in prison for “possessing Wahhabist ideology and currently engaging in extremist religious speech and practice.” Authorities also detained her husband and 14-year-old daughter for what the author called “guilt by association.”In March, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported the government detained 500 men and 270 women in one prison camp in Manas County in Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture. A former prison guard said most of the detainees had been arrested for “serious crimes,” such as “praying five times a day.”There continued to be numerous reports of individuals being incarcerated, sometimes for lengthy periods of time, held under harsh conditions, physically and sexually abused, and subjected to involuntary sterilization. Many individuals disappeared in prior years, but relatives only learned what happened to them during the year. Some ethnic Uyghur and Kazakh individuals who had been held in detention facilities managed to emigrate abroad during the year, where they were able to speak with human rights NGOs and journalists about their experiences. Local observers continued to say that many incidents related to abuses or pressure on Uyghurs and other Muslims went unreported to international media or NGOs due to government restrictions on the free flow of information.The OHCHR interviewed multiple former prisoners and detainees who reported authorities subjected them to beatings, rape, electric shock, waterboarding, stress positions, sleep deprivation, force-feeding, forced prostitution, forced sterilization, forced administration of unknown medication, and other physical and psychological abuse. Authorities denied prisoners adequate food and medical treatment. The report stated, “Some [former detainees] also noted that they were not allowed to speak their own language (whether Uyghur or Kazakh) and could not practice their religion, such as pray, which they experienced as a further hardship.” Although prison authorities abused ordinary prisoners, they reportedly singled out political and religious dissidents for particularly harsh treatment. Survivors said they were subject to relentless political indoctrination. According to one individual, “We were forced to sing patriotic song after patriotic song every day, as loud as possible and until it hurt, until our faces became red and our veins appeared on our face.”The Associated Press (AP) reported in February that authorities sentenced Sattar Sawut to death and three others to life in prison in 2021 for publishing textbooks that referenced historical resistance movements, information that previously was CCP approved. Sawut was a former Uyghur official in the Xinjiang Education Department. The AP said the severe sentences imposed on the four individuals illustrated the government’s determination to control the narrative taught to Uyghurs in schools.In January, Bitter Winter, an online publication that tracks religious liberty and human rights abuses, published a survivor’s account of an elderly Uyghur couple whom authorities detained in 2017 when they returned from attending a daughter’s wedding in Turkey. Authorities handcuffed them upon arrest and placed bags over their heads. The husband, a Uyghur scholar, described days-long interrogations about their travel to Turkey. The scholar said officials beat him so badly during his fifth interrogation session that he sustained a significant lung injury. He said that after authorities gave him emergency medical treatment, they released him. He said that while he was detained, he observed authorities taking some inmates away for “medical checkups,” during which the inmates reportedly received injections that caused them to die within hours of returning to their cells.During the year, RFA reported on multiple deaths in prison of persons accused of religious crimes that occurred in prior years but were not previously known. On March 14, RFA reported Uyghur Abdureshid Obul died in prison in 2020. In 2017, authorities sent Obul to a reeducation camp for two years for helping his wife evade authorities to avoid undergoing a forced abortion, before sentencing him in 2019 to eight years in prison for “disrupting the social order” and “religious extremism.” On March 29, RFA reported that Uyghur Zeynebhan Memtimin died in prison in 2020 from unknown causes while serving a 10-year sentence for “disturbing the social order” and “religious extremism” after she escaped from a hospital to avoid undergoing a forced abortion in 2014. On May 22, RFA reported that Uyghur Yaqup Hesen died on May 1, days after authorities released him from a prison in Ghulja (Yining) County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. According to a neighborhood committee official, authorities jailed Hesen “for praying.” An area resident told RFA many Uyghurs died after being released from nearby prisons and camps.The online newsletter TheConversation.com reported in January that according to an academic from Simon Frazer University in Canada specializing in Xinjiang, authorities appeared to detain fewer individuals during the year than in prior years, but there continued to be widespread family separation and “hundreds of thousands of people” were still missing. The academic said individuals outside the internment and prison system lived under repressive surveillance in “sort of an open-air prison.”In February, the Los Angeles Times reported that Uyghur Shemsiye Ali’s parents disappeared after they returned to Xinjiang from visiting her in Istanbul in 2016. Ali said her parents called her and her sister in 2017 to tell them not to contact them. After the phone call, Ali’s other relatives began deleting her from WeChat, a Chinese social media platform. She later learned from a family friend in the region that in 2019 and again in 2021 authorities sent her father to “training,” a euphemism for internment in a reeducation camps. According to the Times, “It was as if [Ali’s] family in China had vanished into a parallel world. Detentions were so widespread that every Uyghur whom Ali knew had lost someone.”In February, the online magazine Geopolitics (TGP) reported the authorities’ campaign of arbitrary detention had targeted ethnic Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz intellectuals as carriers of “cultural memory.” Citing a December 2021 Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) report, The Disappearance of Uyghur Intellectual and Cultural Elites: A New Form of Eliticide, TGP said authorities had arrested, detained, or disappeared at least 312 leading Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim intellectuals in the region as of late 2021. TGP stated, “The persecution of intellectual and cultural producers is nothing less than a form of ‘eliticide’ that effectively destroys any hope of collective resistance to the Chinese government’s campaign to ideologically purify Uyghurs. The Uyghur eliticide is a key tool to control – or perhaps altogether annihilate – Uyghur identity.” The UHRP report highlighted the 2017 disappearances of Gulnisa Imin, a literature teacher and poet who promoted Uyghur language and culture through her self-published works; Abdubesir Shukuri, a professor and dean of the Literature Department at Xinjiang Normal University, noted for his scholarship, conducted in Uyghur and Mandarin, on Uyghur classical literature and Turkic Central Asian philosophy, religion, and belief systems; and Exmet Momin Tarimi, a calligrapher, scholar, and editor of the Xinjiang People’s Press. In December 2021, RFA reported authorities sentenced Imin to 17 years and six months’ imprisonment on unknown charges.The OHCHR’s August assessment stated authorities sexually abused prisoners in detention centers. According to the report, “Allegations were also made [by former detainees] of instances of sexual and gender-based violence...including of rape, which also appear credible and would in themselves amount to acts of torture or other forms of ill-treatment. The government’s blanket denials of all allegations, as well as its gendered and humiliating attacks on those who have come forward to share their experiences, have added to the indignity and suffering of survivors.”The OHCHR assessment described survivor accounts of sexual and gender-based violence, including prisoners “having been forced by guards to perform oral sex in the context of an interrogation and various forms of sexual humiliation, including forced nudity. The accounts similarly described rapes taking place outside the dormitories, in separate rooms without cameras. In addition, several women recounted being subject to invasive gynecological examinations, including one woman who described this taking place in a group setting which ‘made old women ashamed and young girls cry.’” In its report published in March, The State of the World’s Human Rights 2021/2022, Amnesty International stated the PRC conducted a “smear campaign” against former women detainees for publicly discussing the sexual violence they experienced in government “re-education centers.”In November, the UHRP published a report, Forced Marriage of Uyghur Women:  State Policies for Interethnic Marriage in East Turkistan. The report said the government pressured single Uyghur women to marry Han Chinese men as “a tactic intended to assimilate Uyghurs into Han society” through various policy incentives, including monetary “ethnic intermarriage awards.” The report cited local propaganda, which quoted the father of a Uyghur woman married to a Han husband as saying authorities “introduced many policies to encourage [Uyghur-Han] intermarriage, such as land, cash, and subsidies for housing, children’s education, and other things.” The report stated that in a general atmosphere of intimidation and facing the threat of internment, many Uyghur women felt unable to refuse marriage offers from Han men. According to the report, “Forced and incentivized marriages in the Uyghur region are forms of gender-based crimes that violate international human rights standards and further the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity being committed” there.In January, RFA reported the welfare and whereabouts of Uyghur Hasiyet Ehmet, a resident of Manas (Manasi) County, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, remained unknown at year’s end. Authorities arrested Ehmet at her home in 2017 and subsequently sentenced her to 14 years in prison – seven for teaching children the Quran and seven for attempting to hide two copies of the Quran when police began confiscating religious books from residents. Sources told RFA Ehmet had stopped teaching children two years prior to her arrest.Sources reported many prominent figures remained in prison. These included Uyghur scholars Ilham Tohti; Rahile Dawut; Hushtar Isa, brother of Uyghur World Congress president Dolkun Isa; retired Uyghur medical doctor Gulshan Abbas; and Uyghur entrepreneur Ekpar Asat. In February, Newsweek published an essay by Ziba Murat about her mother Dr. Abbas. Murat wrote that she had not heard from her mother since Abbas’s detainment in 2018. She stated her mother’s imprisonment was due to “one simple fact: the Chinese Communist Party can’t see past her ethnicity. She is in prison for the crime of being Uyghur.”In March, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that authorities had imprisoned seven Uyghur students who studied under imprisoned Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. According to a government list of prisoners leaked in December 2021, authorities arrested Abduqeyum Ablimit, Mutellip Imin, Perhat Halmurat, Atikem Rozi, Shohret Nijat, Akbar Imin, and Luo Yuwei in December 2014 and sentenced the group to between three-and-a-half to eight years in prison. Although all seven students should have completed their sentences by the end of 2022, their whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.RFA reported in April that Qurban Mamut, former editor in chief of the Uyghur journal Xinjiang Civilization, was serving a 15-year sentence for “political crimes.” RFA stated it was unclear exactly when Mamut was sentenced but an anonymous local police officer stated to RFA that he had received a document two years earlier about Mamut’s sentencing. Mamut disappeared in 2017 shortly after visiting his son in the United States.Also in April, RFA reported authorities arrested approximately 100 Uyghur residents from Sheyih Mehelle village, Ghulja County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, on unknown charges. According to RFA, those arrested included multiple members of the same families and represented 14 percent of the town’s population. An RFA source said that based on the government’s crackdown in the region, it was “not surprising” authorities detained such a large number of persons. RFA also reported that at first, authorities required relatives of those detained to attend political study sessions, but subsequently authorities transported the relatives, mostly women and some elderly men, by bus to government-run factories in Ghulja City where they worked 10-12 hours a day under close supervision, making clothing and earning 1,000-2,000 renminbi (RMB) ($150-$300) per month.In May, citing a 2021 report by the UHRP titled Islam Dispossessed: China’s Persecution of Uyghur Imams and Religious Figures, RFA said authorities detained or imprisoned more than 1,000 imams and religious leaders in Xinjiang from 2014 to 2019. In its report, the UHRP stated this was likely “just the tip of the iceberg,” given the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on these detentions.In October, RFA reported that beginning in July, authorities detained hundreds of Uyghurs in Xinjiang in a new round of its “Strike Hard” antiterrorism campaign in the lead-up to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress that month. RFA said the detentions targeted “Uyghurs who had recently turned 18, those released from internment camps in recent years, and those who managed to elude government monitoring in recent years.” A police officer in Aksu (Akesu) Prefecture told RFA the detentions were “safeguarding stability” and preventing incidents. An officer in Ghulja County told RFA police detained 125 individuals because they were “members of the dangerous generation,” a reference to Uyghurs who eluded arrest in 2017. The CCP branch secretary in lower Panjim village in Ghulja said that those most recently detained in that area “were mainly youth born after 2000 from the dangerous generation.” He said these young Uyghurs were “easily influenced” and “easily misled, so ... they need ‘education’ for a while.”The NGO China Political Prisoners of Concern reported that in December, it learned that in 2018, authorities arrested ethnic Kazakh imam Serik Muqai, from Tacheng District, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, and sentenced him to 20 years in prison for teaching Islam to children and the public. In 2017, authorities destroyed his rural mosque for being “too big for the village.”During the year, RFA reported several cases of authorities detaining Uyghur educators. In April, RFA reported municipal education officials said that authorities had detained Uyghur high school principal Dilmurat Abdurehim in Ghulja County; he disappeared after leaving his home during Eid al-Fitr in May 2021. Sources told RFA they did not know what the charges were against Abdurehim or whether he was being held in prison or a reeducation internment camp. An official at one of the high schools where Abdurehim used to work told RFA information about his whereabouts was a “state secret” and that the school was not authorized to comment. In May, RFA reported authorities detained approximately 30 teachers from one high school in Ghulja County. Local authorities reported to RFA that they sent most of the detained teachers to reeducation centers but sentenced seven to prison. Local officials told RFA they could not divulge the charges against those seven because the details were “state secrets.”Media outlets reported authorities continued to detain Uyghurs who had contacts with relatives living abroad. In November, RFA reported authorities sentenced the mother and sister-in-law of an ethnic Uyghur member of the Royal Netherlands Air Force to 15 years in prison for having contact with him. Captain Munirdin Jadikar, an ethnic Uyghur Dutch citizen living in the Netherlands since 2006, said his mother came to his wedding in the Netherlands in 2014. In 2018, using WeChat, his sister-in-law told him police in Xinjiang had arrested his mother and sent her to an internment camp. In 2019, Jadikar learned police subsequently arrested his sister-in-law for telling him about his mother. In 2021, after the Dutch Foreign Ministry inquired with the Chinese embassy, Jadikar learned that authorities sentenced both women to 15 years in prison – his mother for “supporting terrorist activities” and his sister-in-law for “providing national intelligence to enemy forces” i.e., the Royal Netherlands Air Force.Dozens of media sources cited the colocation of detention facilities and industrial parks constructed in the region and in operation since 2017 as evidence that the government continued to utilize its mass detention system to carry out forced labor practices. The OHCHR assessment concluded, “The close link between the labor schemes and the counter-‘extremism’ framework, including the [reeducation] system, raises concerns in terms of the extent to which such programs can be considered fully voluntary.” The OHCHR assessment stated, “The Vocational Education and Training Center system amounts to large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty through involuntary placements in residential facilities and compulsory ‘training.’” The OHCHR said none of the former detainees interviewed for the report said they were able to exit their facilities or go home for a visit. At the centers, those interviewed said they “observed significant security presence and guards armed with guns and/or batons (including electric ones), and mostly wearing police uniforms.” Detainees in centers told OHCHR they had to work within those facilities as part of the “graduation process” and risked being kept longer if they refused to comply. The OHCHR assessment said it could not confirm the government’s claim that it “closed” the centers in 2019, “primarily due to the lack of relevant official or other information since the end of 2019 and access for on-the-ground verification.” The assessment also stated, “Provisions in the [Xinjiang] Regulation on De-extremification, and other laws, regulations, and policies, impose deradicalization duties on enterprises and trade unions, based on the law’s own expansive criteria of religious ‘extremism.’”In February, the ILO published its annual Application of International Labor Standards Report, in which it said the government, under the rubric of “poverty alleviation,” “vocational training,” “re-education through labor,” and “de-extremification,” was “engaging in a widespread and systematic program involving the extensive use of forced labor of the Uyghur and other Turkic and/or Muslim minorities for agriculture and industrial activities” in the region. Further, the report stated a key feature of the program is the use of forced or compulsory labor “in or around internment or ‘re-education’ camps housing 1.8 million” persons. According to the report, the camps were central to an indoctrination program focused on separating and “cleansing” ethnic and religious minorities from their culture, beliefs, and religion. The report stated authorities also utilized separate “centralized training centers” that had similar security features to the reeducation camps, such as high fences, security watchtowers, and barbed wire, provided similar education programs, such as classes on legal regulations and the Mandarin language, and conducted military drills. The ILO also reported the government used prison labor in the region, mainly in cotton harvesting and the manufacture of textiles, apparel, and footwear. The report stated the number of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities imprisoned on charges of “terrorism,” “separatism,” and “religious extremism” increased dramatically beginning in 2017.In February, the Atlantic Council published an investigative report, Financing and Genocide: Development Finance and the Crisis in the Uyghur Region, which concluded that authorities utilized public-private partnerships to carry out forced labor, providing financial incentives to domestic and international investors and companies to work on development projects in the region. Companies that accepted these financially advantageous deals were involved in arrangements that included building factories inside or adjacent to detention facilities, assisting in forced labor transfers or accepting forcibly transferred laborers, and failing to follow internationally acceptable guidelines to prevent forced labor from occurring. The report stated, “Because of the government&#8217;s significant financial and political investment in these programs, it is unclear to what extent companies have a choice as to whether they accept transferred laborers or engage in other poverty alleviation programs in the region.” The report indicated that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and other development finance institutions had made significant investments in entities in the region that were engaged in forced labor practices.In March, the China Digital Times published an interview with a professor from Sheffield Hallam University in the United Kingdom specializing in forced labor practices in Xinjiang. The professor said Xinjiang’s “poverty alleviation” and “labor transfer” programs differed from those in other areas of the country because any Xinjiang resident who refused to participate could be punished with internment. “It is the specter of the internment camps that makes government programs in the Uyghur region coercive and nearly ubiquitous.” Discussing Xinjiang’s cotton industry, the professor said the mechanization process left Uyghur farmers unemployed. The government treated these farmers as “surplus labor” and therefore subject to coercive state-sponsored labor transfers; individuals were not allowed to refuse such transfers. The professor said the government’s forced labor and forced labor transfer policies were “not so much capitalist as ideological, political, and cultural. Government directives clearly indicate that the purpose of the programs is to transform the Uyghur people from supposedly being ‘backwards’ and ‘lazy’ to being more like Han Chinese people. It is meant to urbanize the population and to move them to cities where the state can better control their behaviors and religious practices. It is designed to control Uyghurs and to make them docile workers in the larger project of industrialization and Sinicization of the region.”In a report published in April, the think tank Horizon Advisory stated there were “pervasive” indicators of forced labor across the aluminum industry in the region. The report said that “every one of the major aluminum companies operating in Xinjiang...is associated with government-led transfer of labor programs or related subprogramming in the region.”According to the OHCHR’s August assessment, Xinjiang’s official birth rate sharply declined starting in 2017 following government implementation of a new family planning policy that limited the number of children couples could have, regardless of ethnicity, to two in urban areas and three in rural areas. The report stated, “Although the policies in XUAR have appeared nominally consistent with the government’s broader approach to population planning, it appears they are linked to an expansive notion of religious ‘extremism’, raising further concerns about discriminatory enforcement of these policies against Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities.” According to the OHCHR, the government, in regional and county-level regulations as well as in documents such as its 2021 White Paper on “Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data,” connected childbearing with religious extremism and family planning with counterextremist measures. XUAR religious affairs regulations prohibited “the use of religion” to obstruct family planning, and the XUAR 2017 Regulation on De-extremification included “deliberately interfering with or undermining the implementation of family planning policies” as one of the 15 “primary expressions” of religious extremism.The OHCHR assessment concluded there were “credible indications of violations of reproductive rights” in the region through the government’s “coercive enforcement of family planning policies since 2017.” It stated predominately Uyghur areas saw the steepest declines in birth rates after 2017, with official statistics noting a sharp increase in sterilizations and intrauterine device (IUD) placements in the region at the same time. According to the OHCHR, the sterilization rate in Xinjiang was 243 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018, compared with 32.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in the country overall. Several Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh women told the OHCHR that authorities conducted forced birth control, in particular forced IUD placements and possible forced sterilizations. The women also said they were forced to have abortions after reaching the permitted number of children under the family planning policy. The OHCHR stated it found these first-hand accounts credible, and noted government documents indicating women who violated the family planning policy were also sent to reeducation centers.NGOs and media reported the government continued its policy of “Sinicizing” religion, including Islamic practices in Xinjiang, as part of what RFA on May 22 characterized as its campaign to erase cultural distinctions by encouraging the narrative of a single Chinese identity. State-run Xinjiang Daily reported that XUAR chairman Erkin Tuniyaz said when he visited the Noghay Mosque in Urumqi on April 30, “According to the arrangements&#8230;of the autonomous region party committee, we must hold absolutely tight to the plan for Sinicizing the Islamic religion in Xinjiang and actively take the lead in fitting the Islamic religion into socialist society.” RFA reported Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui wrote of Sinicization in the People’s Daily, emphasizing “the shared sense of belonging to the Chinese nation” and “ethnic fusion.”President and General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang in July, marking his first visit to the region since 2014. Many academics, research institutions, and human rights groups identified the 2014 trip as the starting point for the crackdown on the region’s ethnic minority communities. According to state media outlet Xinhua, during his July visit, Xi said, “We must better uphold the principle of developing Islam in the Chinese context and provide active guidance for the adaptation of religions to the socialist society... We must ensure that reasonable demands of religious believers be met and rally them around the Party and the government.” In a government video covering one event, a slogan behind Xi read, “All ethnicities are one loving family; collectively building the China Dream with one heart.”In May, Turghanjan Alawudun, a vice chair of the executive committee of the World Uyghur Congress, told RFA, “The Sinicization of Islam is the eradication of Islam.”The OHCHR’s August assessment detailed numerous restrictions on religious activities in the region. According to the OHCHR, the government used the overly broad counterterrorism law to target Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups for lawful religious practices by creating an environment “in which religious or cultural practice or expression is conflated with ‘extremism.’” The report concluded government policies “specifically restrict and suppress practices that are part of the identity and cultural life of persons belonging to Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities” and “raise concerns of discrimination against such minorities on prohibited grounds” under international human rights law.In May, RFA reported that authorities forced Muslims in detention facilities to renounce their faith. In addition, authorities gathered and burned copies of the Quran, forced Uyghurs to eat pork, restricted the wearing of beards for men and of long clothing and headscarves for women, prohibited Uyghur parents from giving their children names such as “Muhammad” and “Ayishe” and, in cases where those names were given, implemented strict policies to change them.RFA reported authorities continued to ban civil servants, students, and teachers from fasting during Ramadan. In April, RFA reported authorities sent notices to neighborhood committees in Urumqi and multiple prefectures that only 10-50 Muslims in certain areas would be allowed to fast during Ramadan and individuals observing the fast must register with the government. A local police officer in Kashgar Prefecture’s Tokkuzak (Toukezhake) township told RFA the purpose of the registrations was to “allay the fears of [Muslims] who are afraid to fast, in addition to security, because there should not be any misconception about the CCP’s religious policy. The Party never said to abolish religion, but to Sinicize it.” One village administrator who oversaw 10 families in Ghulja County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, said only the elderly and adults with no school-age children were allowed to fast “to avoid religion having negative effects on children’s minds.” Another administrator who oversaw 10 families in Atush (Atushi) City, Kizilsu Kirghiz Authonomous Prefecture, said only two persons were allowed to fast – an elderly couple with no children at home. Turghunjan Alawudun of the World Uyghur Congress told RFA the fasting restrictions were “pathetic and tragic.”In October, the human rights NGO Dui Hua (Dialogue) reported that Muslim prisoners who were caught performing namaz (daily prayers) were at risk of receiving harsh punishment, including possible extensions of their sentences. Dui Hua cited the case of Uyghur Ismayil Sidiq, originally sentenced to 10 years in prison of promoting extremism. In 2021, a court added 13 years to his original sentence when guards in Kuitun Prison caught him using what the authorities said was “a disguised and simplified method” of performing daily prayers in the prison dormitory. The court convicted him of “sabotaging prison supervision” and “provoking ethnic hatred.”In November, a representative of the World Uyghur Congress told RFA that between August and October, authorities fined more than 7,000 Uyghurs in Hotan and Kashgar prefectures for reading the Quran in their homes. According to the NGO, under the pretext of checking for compliance with pandemic protocols, local authorities in Hotan and Kashgar forcibly entered Uyghur homes in locked down neighborhoods to check for “illegal activities” and confiscate “illegally collected” items such as Qurans, other Muslim religious books and periodicals, and prayer rugs. Authorities arrested more than 80 individuals and charged them with using social media to spread illegal religious information during the COVID-19 lockdowns.In May, the government announced that individuals were still allowed to seek permission to make Hajj pilgrimages but in practice, the government’s continued COVID-19 restrictions made travel for this purpose impossible, as was the case in 2020 and 2021. SARA regulations stating only the Islamic Association of China was permitted to organize Muslims’ pilgrimage trips remained in effect. These regulations stated that those who applied to join the Hajj must be “patriotic, law-abiding, and have good conduct,” must have never participated in the Hajj, and must be in sound physical and mental health. They also must be able to completely pay the costs associated with going on the Hajj and must oppose religious extremism.The government continued to control the administration of mosques and to restrict access to houses of worship, requiring worshipers to apply for mosque entry permits.According to human rights groups and international media, in addition to the government’s Integrated Joint Operation Plan (IJOP) big data collection program, Xinjiang authorities continued to maintain extensive and invasive security and surveillance, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices. Human rights groups said surveillance was more severe in parts of the country where religious minorities predominated, including the XUAR, compared with other parts of the country with ethnic Han Chinese majorities, due to the connection between religion and the ethnic and cultural identities of these groups. During the year, the government extensively used mobile phone apps, cameras, and other electronics to monitor all speech and movement. Authorities employed a comprehensive database that tracked the movements, mobile app usage, and even electricity and gasoline consumption of inhabitants in the region.According to media reports, the Ministry of Public Security used tens of millions of surveillance cameras throughout the country to monitor the general public. Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the cameras and other forms of surveillance to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, religious leaders and adherents, Tibetans, and Uyghurs. These included facial recognition and “gait recognition” video surveillance, allowing police not only to monitor a situation but also to quickly identify individuals in crowds. In June, Internet Protocol Video Market, a security and technology research group, reported Xinjiang authorities used state-owned technology company Hikvision’s facial recognition cameras as part of the IJOP to carry out widespread surveillance against Uyghurs. The report stated that police screened “23 million Xinjiang residents for ‘terrorism’ with facial recognition and license plate cameras, flagging those with ties overseas for ‘immediate arrest.’”In February, the online newsletter ChinaFile reported authorities increasingly relied on technology to operate an “integrated grid management platform,” a state-imposed invasive surveillance system to monitor society at the neighborhood level. The report stated authorities believed the population contained “enemies,” requiring “constant and draconian” surveillance measures. The report stated the government poured resources into the region’s technology companies to improve authorities’ ability to monitor every aspect of Xinjiang residents’ lives. The ChinaFile report concluded, “The party-state has deployed cutting edge technologies from the research and commercial sectors to fashion an unrivaled system of population monitoring, assessment, and control.”In September, the Washington Post reported that while there were indications authorities closed some reeducation centers in Kashgar and Hotan Prefectures, pervasive surveillance continued. According to the Post, “Signs in the backs of taxis remind passengers their conversations are being recorded.” A photograph accompanying the article showed the interior of a taxi where a surveillance camera was prominently mounted to observe the back seat. The article stated, “Outside several mosques, police officers rushed over to demand a Post reporter delete photos, saying it was forbidden to publish images of the religious structures. Such a rule does not exist elsewhere in China.”According to government documents, Han Chinese officials also continued to implement an in-person surveillance system in which teams of six – composed of police or local officials and one Uyghur language speaker – went to each house and compiled information on occupants. Since the program began in 2014, more than 200,000 cadres from all levels of the government were deployed to more than 8,500 villages. The teams reported on “extremist” behavior, such as abstaining from alcohol, fasting during Ramadan, and wearing long beards. They reported on the presence of “undesirable” items, such as Qurans, or occupants’ perceived propensity for “extremist” ideology. The February ChinaFile report said government officers were instructed to visit “low threat” households once every two months, “basic households” once a month, “key work households” once every three days, and “key control households” once a day, using “precise positioning, precise personnel selection, and precise assignment of responsibilities.”According to media and the accounts of Uyghurs living abroad, authorities continued to have more than one million CCP officials from other parts of the country live part-time with local families in Xinjiang, who were required to accept this arrangement. Throughout the year, propaganda signage regarding the “Pair Up and Become a Family” was visible around the region. According to international media, the government instituted these mandatory home stays in 2014 to target agricultural households in southern Xinjiang. The government said the program was part of efforts to combat “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.” The government required families to provide detailed information on their personal lives and political views during the officials’ visits to their homes. A Xinjiang government statement available online in 2018 indicated officials had to inspect the homes in which they were staying for any religious elements or symbols, and the statement instructed officials to confiscate such items if found.Government demolition of mosques continued under a campaign called “Mosque Rectification” that began in 2016. The OHCHR assessment stated, “Alongside the increasing restrictions on expressions of Muslim religious practice are recurring reports of the destruction of Islamic religious sites, such as mosques, shrines and cemeteries... several researchers, predominantly based on detailed analysis of publicly available satellite imagery, consider that a large number of mosques have been destroyed in XUAR over the last years. This trend has also been reported by investigative journalists who have visited the region and compared satellite images with the current physical conditions of the geographic sites in question.” The OHCHR said the government consistently denied improperly altering or destroying religious sites, saying instead that mosques were “in disrepair and being reconstructed for safety reasons.”There were reports authorities continued to remove visibly Islamic architectural features from mosques, such as minarets and domes, throughout the region. In May, RFA reported that in recent years, authorities removed the Arabic shahada (statement of faith) from the gate of the Noghay Mosque in Urumqi and installed a security checkpoint that required worshippers and visitors to pass through facial recognition scanners before entering. In June, BuzzFeed reported authorities had destroyed thousands of mosques in the region, and some former mosques had become cafes and restaurants. Local authorities converted some remaining mosques into more appealing attractions for Han tourists by, for example, removing traditional Islamic architecture, painting over Arabic lettering, installing PRC flags and signs with Party slogans, and displaying photographs of President Xi. This was part of the government’s efforts in recent years to promote the region as a tourist destination. A historian of Islam in China at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom told BuzzFeed the ancient city of Kashgar had become “a theme park.” BuzzFeed stated that at the Id Kah Mosque, the main mosque in Kashgar, attendance at Friday prayers had decreased from 4,000-5,000 in 2011 to just 800.The government continued to enforce laws prohibiting children younger than 18 from taking part in religious observances and traditions, including fasting during the month of Ramadan and entering mosques. Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities remained strictly prohibited by law from providing their children with any religious education at home.Numerous media reports indicated the government continued to operate a network of boarding schools for ethnic minority children whose parents had been detained in Xinjiang’s internment camp systems. In February, National Public Radio (NPR) interviewed two Uyghur children who attended government-run boarding schools who said school officials beat children, locked them in dark rooms, forced them into stress positions as punishment for perceived transgressions, and shaved their heads. The children interviewed said the boarding schools also required all students to sing and recite political slogans that praised the CCP. According to NPR, authorities removed documents from government websites that referred to the boarding schools, but a Ministry of Education document indicated authorities had built 1,300 such schools and sent nearly half a million children to them as of 2017. While the PRC claimed that the schools provided children with better educational opportunities, Uyghur families and international experts said the schools were designed to erase Uyghur culture.In February, the Los Angeles Times reported that Abdurahman Tohti’s son, mother, and grandmother disappeared after traveling to Xinjiang from Turkey in 2016 when the son was two years old. Tohti remained behind in Turkey. In 2019, Tohti found a video of his son on the social media site Douyin in which the boy was shouting pro-PRC and CCP slogans. According to the Times, Tohti’s son appeared to be in a “state-run institution, one of many ‘orphanages’ and boarding schools” in the region. One year later, an official located Tohti’s son and arranged a telephone call between the two during which Tohti’s son said in Mandarin that he had no father.In 2020, a research study published online on parent-child separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar Prefecture, analyzed data from government spreadsheets not previously available. According to the study, government statistics showed that between 2017 and 2019, the number of boarding students in primary and middle schools (grades one to nine) increased by 76.9 percent, from 497,800 to 880,500. The data indicated that 53.1 percent of all students in Yarkand lived in boarding facilities. Government records showed that among a subset of 10,000 children with at least one parent in custody, there were more than 1,000 children who had both parents interned. Nearly all of the children were Uyghur, apart from 11 who were of Kazakh and Tajik ethnicity. No ethnic Han child had a parent in custody.In February, a professor and Xinjiang expert at Simon Frazer University in Canada published an essay on the website The Art of Life in Central Asia describing the “ethnic extinction” taking place in the region. The professor stated the government increasingly hired ethnic Han teachers to replace Uyghur and other ethnic minority teachers in schools. He wrote, “In order to remain in teaching positions, Uyghurs had to prove they could speak and teach Chinese language with near-native fluency and have spotless family backgrounds. For most Uyghur educators, this was simply impossible.” The professor stated that Uyghur children “across the region are now effectively raised in a non-Muslim, Mandarin-speaking environment.”In January, the UHRP published a report, Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children. The eponymous plan, launched in September 2021 in Yengisheher County, Kashgar Prefecture, paired 30 Uyghur children with Han children from across the country as “brothers” and “sisters” to engage in cultural exchange. According to the UHRP, however, the exchange was “unidirectional,” with Han children sending Uyghur children items that reflected Han culture. On July 15, state media’s China Central Television (CCTV) reported that during his visit to the region, President Xi said again it was necessary for all ethnic groups to hug each other tightly like pomegranate seeds to forge a firm Chinese heart and soul. The UHRP stated, “We are deeply concerned that the Pomegranate Flower Plan is little more than a vehicle of assimilation and thus a continued violation of Uyghurs’ cultural and linguistic rights as well as rights to family life, unity, and privacy.”International media and NGOs reported that PRC authorities or their representatives continued to pressure Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims and members of ethnic and religious minority groups from Xinjiang living abroad to spy on fellow expatriates. They also reportedly pressured individuals to return to China or cease advocacy on behalf of residents of Xinjiang and threatened retaliation against family members still in Xinjiang if the individuals living overseas did not comply. According to international human rights groups, Xinjiang authorities continued to use “proof of life” videos to pressure overseas Uyghurs into silencing their criticism of abuses taking place in the region. These videos took many different forms, but generally, authorities posted videos of family members in Xinjiang stating they were alive and doing well, free to experience their culture and practice their religion, or denouncing their Uyghur relatives overseas for being critical of the PRC.RFA reported in May that authorities warned Uyghurs and others in Xinjiang that they “may suffer consequences if their relatives living abroad spoke out about internment camps in the region.” A U.S.-based Uyghur individual reported security officials threatened her mother in Xinjiang, saying, “Your daughter in the United States is speaking out against the government. If you don’t talk to this girl and ask her to agree to delete everything on Twitter, you will be convicted of being a two-faced person [i.e., corrupt or disloyal to the Communist Party] yourself.”The online newsletter Coda reported in February that Rahima Mahmut and Arslan Hidayat, ethnic Uyghurs working overseas as translators for researchers investigating PRC human rights violations in the region, said authorities first attempted to stop them from their activism by threatening their families who still lived in the region. When those efforts failed, authorities forced the Xinjiang-based families to cut ties with Mahmut and Hidayat.The Guardian reported in May that according to Oslo-based Uyghur activists, “close to 100 percent” of the 2,500 Uyghur asylees in Norway faced “surveillance, threats, and censorship” from China. One asylee continued to receive threatening phone calls, even though he lived north of the Arctic Circle. Chinese speakers on those calls told him, “[From] wherever you can see the moon, we can find you.” The asylee said that after his last time abroad, authorities detained him in China, where they beat and interrogated him about his connections in Europe and pressured him “to infiltrate and spy on Uyghur groups” who were critical of the regime’s human rights violations in the Xinjiang region. Another Uyghur refugee and activist in Norway said Chinese security officials threatened his parents in Xinjiang in 2018 and threatened him in 2019 and 2020, “suggesting ‘maybe I would get in a car accident’ or ‘thieves might come into my house while I was on night shift.’” He said one official offered him money if he would spy on fellow Uyghurs. According to the Guardian, the Chinese embassy in Oslo denied allegations that PRC officials persecuted individuals living in Norway. The embassy said it had warned expatriates in Norway about “telephone fraud” committed by callers claiming to represent the PRC government.International media and NGOs also reported the PRC put pressure on foreign governments to deport Uyghur refugees back to China. In March, the UHRP published a report, Beyond Silence:  Collaboration between Arab States and China in the Transnational Repression of Uyghurs, which stated the PRC successfully pressured or persuaded at least six Arab governments, primarily Egypt but also Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates, to deport or detain as many as 292 Uyghurs living abroad between 2004 and 2021. According to the report, “China’s transnational repression of Uyghurs in [the Arab world] has been growing in scale and scope as the country’s relations with Arab states have strengthened.” For its findings, the report drew upon China’s Transnational Repression of Uyghurs Database of the UHRP, interviews with witnesses and experts, and analyses of English and Arabic-language source materials, including government documents, human rights reports, and reporting by news agencies. The report said, “China’s Party-state uses five primary mechanisms of transnational repression to target Uyghurs in Arab states: 1) transnational digital surveillance [i.e., the IJOP], which enables them to track and closely monitor Uyghurs living outside their homeland; 2) Global War on Terror narratives, which serve as justification for the detention or rendering of Uyghurs to China; 3) institutions of Islamic education where Uyghur students enroll, which the Party-state targets for crackdowns; 4) the Hajj and Umrah in Saudi Arabia, which they use to surveil or detain Uyghur pilgrims (a trend accelerating with the increasing involvement of Chinese tech companies in Hajj digital services); and 5) denial of travel documents to Uyghurs in Arab states, rendering them stateless and vulnerable to deportation to the PRC.” China’s embassies and consulates played “a key role in the use of technology as a mechanism for transnational repression.” The UHRP stated individuals who returned from abroad were particularly vulnerable to being arrested or sent to reeducation camps in China.In March, NBC News reported Saudi Arabia had increasingly cooperated with the government’s requests to return Chinese Uyghurs. In March, the think tank The Wilson Center published a report titled Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs. The report found that Saudi authorities deported at least six Uyghurs to China in the last four years who were either making the Hajj or living in Saudi Arabia legally. RFA reported in April that the PRC sought the refoulement of four Uyghurs held in deportation centers in Saudi Arabia: Nurmemet Rozi, Hamidulla Wali, Abula Buheliquemu, and Buheliquemu’s 13 year-old daughter Miremaiti Baibure. Saudi authorities detained Rozi and Wali in 2020 at the Chinese embassy’s request after they traveled to Mecca from Turkey on pilgrimage, and detained Abula and her daughter on March 31 near Mecca. An Amnesty International researcher told RFA the three adults would likely face detention and torture upon their return to China and the child would be forcibly separated from her mother. The four Uyghurs remained in detention in Saudi Arabia at year’s end. Foreign governments, Amnesty International, other NGOs including the World Uyghur Congress, and legal experts from the United Nations called on the Saudi government in this case to uphold its international commitment not to refoul individuals who would face torture, cruel punishment, or persecution upon returning to their home country.On July 19, HRW reported Turkey-based Uyghur activist Yidiresi Aishan (also known as Idris Hasan) remained in custody in Morocco and under threat of extradition to China. Aishan, originally from Xinjiang, fled to Turkey in 2012 after Chinese authorities increasingly harassed him. In Turkey, he was known for advocating for the rights of Uyghurs in the PRC. According to media reports, Moroccan authorities detained Aishan at the airport in Casablanca after he arrived from Turkey in July 2021 because of a PRC-filed 2017 Interpol red notice identifying him as a “terrorist” that Interpol subsequently cancelled on the grounds that it was “of a political, military, religious, or racial character.” In December 2021, the Court of Cassation in Rabat issued a favorable opinion on the extradition request. A panel of experts in the OHCHR and international NGOs advocated for Aishan’s release, stating that if returned, Aishan “risks serious human rights violations including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, or torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”In May, the RFA reported the government increased its efforts to restrict the number of ethnic and religious minority community members and political dissidents living abroad, noting that between 2014 and 2021, the government had repatriated nearly 10,000 persons. The human rights NGO Safeguard Defenders told RFA, “The diversity of the CCP’s so-called ‘extradition’ is something that worries us. For example, the Interpol red notice mechanism is increasingly being abused to persuade other countries to cooperate.” The NGO said it was common for Chinese police to call and harass Uyghurs overseas, including in the United States and Europe, and that many were forced to go back when the authorities threatened to detain their loved ones.Voice of America (VOA) reported in June that attorneys representing Uyghurs living abroad urged the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate China&#8217;s treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim populations in the Xinjiang region. The lawyers said they presented the ICC with new evidence of the PRC&#8217;s efforts to implement “a policy of rounding up Uyghurs and other ethnically Turkic people from outside China, including ICC member states such as neighboring Tajikistan, and forcefully deporting them back to China.” The attorneys stated, “The ICC has jurisdiction over these crimes that commence on ICC territory and continue into China and is urged to act immediately to open an investigation.” According to VOA, the attorneys’ submission to the ICC in June, which included “firsthand evidence from a witness” who was deported to China, detained in internment camps, and subjected to “interrogation and torture” before escaping, followed similar complaints of Uyghur mistreatment submitted to the ICC in 2020 and 2021.In September, the National Endowment for Democracy published excerpts of interviews that the International Forum for Democratic Studies conducted with international experts on the government’s actions against Xinjiang diaspora groups. The senior director of research at the NGO Freedom House told the forum, “Beijing’s primary tool in its global campaign of transnational repression is bilateral pressure...Transnational repression against Uyghurs as a community is well known and well documented by numerous groups, including the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Safeguard Defenders, and Freedom House.” A University of California Berkeley researcher said, “Countless members of the Uyghur diaspora have also experienced the long reach of the CCP’s authoritarian state in the form of relentless harassment, intimidation, and coercion,” noting this type of repression had increased since 2017.Advocacy groups, analysts, and media outlets reported that the government continued a sustained propaganda campaign to counter evidence and international criticism of human rights abuses in the region. In February, several human rights organizations and media outlets criticized the government for attempting to “sports-wash” its human rights abuses, citing the selection of Dilnigar Ilhamjan (Dinigeer Yilamujiang), an ethnic Uyghur athlete, to participate in the final leg of the 2022 Winter Olympics torch lighting ceremony. HRW stated, “The choice of a Uyghur was widely seen as the Chinese government’s rebuff of international criticism of its human rights violations in Xinjiang.” Amnesty International told al Jazeera the Olympics “should not be used as a distraction from China’s appalling human rights record.” The same month, RFA reported ethnic Uyghur Adil Abdurehim, a 2008 Beijing Olympic torchbearer, was serving a 14- year prison sentence for watching unspecified “counterrevolutionary” videos. According to RFA, Abdurehim had been a member of the CCP and worked for the Culture and Sports Bureau in Urumqi before authorities detained him in 2017.In August, the information office of the XUAR issued a response to the OHCHR’s assessment titled Fight against Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts. The government stated, “Xinjiang’s fight against terrorism and extremism [was] both necessary and just,” measures were pursued in accordance with the rule of law, and “vocational education and training centers” were “schools intended for de-radicalization established in accordance with the law.” The government stated that the administration of the centers “fully respected trainees’ customs and habits and their right to use their own ethnic languages, and fully protected trainees’ freedom of religious belief and such rights as personal freedom and the freedom of correspondence.”In September, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin said OHCHR’s August Xinjiang assessment was “completely illegal, null, and void.” Wang called the assessment “a patchwork of false information that serves as political tools for...Western countries to strategically use Xinjiang to contain China ...It once again shows that the OHCHR has been reduced to an enforcer and accomplice of...Western countries in forcing the developing countries to fall in line with them.”The XUAR government, often cohosting with the MFA, held 15 press conferences during the year to refute international criticism of human rights violations taking place in the region. In a January press conference, XUAR spokesperson Xu Guixiang said, “So-called forced labor in Xinjiang is a completely false proposition. It is a card played by anti-China forces in the United States and the West to meddle in Xinjiang affairs.” In an April press conference, scholars and business executives joined Xu in condemning the U.S. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, with Xu saying the law was “putting on the cloak of ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ in a plot to suppress Xinjiang and cover up the ‘black hand’ of the United States’ long-armed jurisdiction.”On July 6, ASPI published a report titled Cultivating Friendly Forces: The Chinese Communist Party’s influence operations in the Xinjiang diaspora. ASPI stated the CCP was “actively monitoring members of the diaspora, including Uyghurs, creating databases of actionable intelligence, and mobilizing community organizations in the diaspora to counter international criticism of its repressive policies in Xinjiang while promoting its own policies and interests abroad.” ASPI also said many diaspora community organizations “purported to represent and speak on behalf of ‘Xinjiang’ and its indigenous peoples,” but in reality, “play[ed] important roles in muting alternative and independent voices from the community while amplifying CCP messaging and spreading disinformation.” ASPI said these organizations “exploit the openness of democratic and multicultural countries while assisting the CCP and its proxies to surveil and even persecute members of the Xinjiang diaspora community or individuals who are critical of the CCP’s Xinjiang policies.”July 15, CCTV reported that during his visit to the region, President Xi said party and government cadres should be proficient in Marxist religious views, familiar with religious work, and good at working with religious believers, and that religious leaders should be politically reliable. Xi said it was necessary to firmly unite religious believers around the CCP and the government.In May, the official XUAR news outlet Tianshan reported XUAR chairman Erken Tuniyazi visited “patriotic religious figures” at the Xinjiang Islamic Association and the Yanghang Mosque in Urumqi on the eve of Eid al-Fitr. There, Tuniyazi told his audience that religious leaders in the region must study and implement President Xi’s vision for governing religious practices in the region and adhere to the “Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang... and actively guide Xinjiang Islam to better adapt to socialist society.”																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															Because the government and individuals closely linked religion, culture, and ethnicity, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity.  Local sources continued to state that unequal treatment of Uyghurs and Han Chinese ran parallel with official suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religion, and the promotion of the Han majority in political, economic, and cultural life.  Muslims in Xinjiang continued to face discrimination in hiring, retaining their positions, and pursuing other business opportunities.  Local sources continued to state it was difficult for Uyghurs to book hotel reservations for travel.An international journalist who traveled to the region in September reported manifestations of Uyghur religion and culture were packaged as tourist items for Han Chinese visitors.  The journalist described, for example, Han tourists participating in a mock Uyghur wedding.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy and Engagement												    																																															During the year, the U.S. government used a variety of diplomatic and economic tools to promote religious freedom and accountability in Xinjiang, including sanctions, visa restrictions, controls on exports and imports, and an updated business advisory raising awareness among U.S.-based companies about the risks of doing business in Xinjiang.  The Ambassador and other embassy officials also met with national government officials to advocate for the human rights of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang.In February, the United States joined several nations in declining to send diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games due to concerns with what the President’s press secretary described as the PRC government’s “ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses.”During testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 6, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State said the PRC’s treatment of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang was “an ongoing atrocity” that the Secretary and the President had called a genocide.  The Deputy Secretary called upon PRC authorities “to immediately release all arbitrarily detained people, abolish the internment camps, cease forced sterilization, end all torture, and stop prosecuting Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”In May, the Secretary of State said of then High Commissioner for Human Rights Bachelet’s visit to the Xinjiang region, “We are concerned the conditions Beijing authorities imposed on the visit did not enable a complete and independent assessment of the human rights environment in the PRC, including Xinjiang, where genocide and crimes against humanity are ongoing.”  On September 1, the Secretary of State issued a statement about the OHCHR’s August assessment of the region, noting it outlined “in alarming detail the human rights violations and abuses occurring in Xinjiang.”  The Secretary said, “This report deepens and reaffirms our grave concern regarding the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity that PRC government authorities are perpetrating against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”On June 14, the United States joined a group of 47 countries in issuing a Canada-led joint statement in the UN Human Rights Council condemning human rights abuses in Xinjiang.The Department of State in August published a report, PRC Efforts to Manipulate Global Public Opinion on Xinjiang.  The report detailed the PRC’s “attempts to manipulate and dominate global discourse on Xinjiang and to discredit independent sources reporting ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity conducted against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” using misinformation and disinformation.  The report also stated the PRC used “digital transnational repression” tools, and deployed trolls to engage in cyberbullying targeting critics, particularly in Chinese diaspora communities, “with on- and offline harassment to prevent them from sharing their stories or to intimidate them into self-censorship.”  The report said the PRC also used coordinated campaigns of inauthentic social media posts to convey “positive stories” designed to counter negative narratives about Xinjiang.On October 31, the United States joined a group of 50 countries in issuing a UK-led joint statement at the UN expressing concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, and especially the detention of Uyghurs.  The statement read, in part, that the release of the OHCHR assessment “corroborates these concerns in an impartial and objective manner...Such severe and systematic violations of human rights cannot be justified on the basis of counterterrorism...[W]e urge the Government of China to uphold its international human rights obligations and to fully implement the recommendations of the OHCHR assessment.  This includes taking prompt steps to release all individuals arbitrarily deprived of their liberty in Xinjiang, and to urgently clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing family members and facilitate safe contact and reunion.”On November 30, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce said, “Our trade and investment with China should reflect our core democratic values.  That is why President Biden signed the bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act into law, requiring companies to certify that they are not sourcing goods that relied upon forced labor in their production.”The embassy continued to amplify Department of State religious freedom initiatives directly to local audiences through postings to the embassy website and to its Weibo, WeChat, and Twitter accounts.  The embassy also posted or retweeted a series of posts concerning repression of religious freedom in Xinjiang.  In total, the embassy created 15 unique posts that generated nearly two million views and more than 85,000 engagements.  For example, in January, the embassy amplified the Secretary of State’s statement criticizing the PRC government for sanctioning members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.  The embassy also highlighted the Secretary of State’s speech in May and his comments on Xinjiang.  In June and July, the embassy posted several tweets criticizing the PRC government for illegal detentions of Uyghur Muslims and highlighting the implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.  In August, the embassy also amplified the Department of State’s report detailing the PRC government’s attempts to manipulate global public opinion on Xinjiang.  The embassy released several social media posts about the OHCHR’s August assessment across all platforms, including WeChat and Weibo.  PRC officials quickly censored the posts, but more than 68,000 individuals were able to view them before they were removed.  In November, the embassy highlighted that the President raised concerns about PRC practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong in his Bali meeting with Xi Jinping.  PRC censors quickly removed related posts on WeChat and Weibo.																																				    							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U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																							Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom																															Xinjiang
- Усилия КНР по манипуляции международным общественным мнением о Синьцзяне Global Engagement CenterРЕЗЮМЕ: Китайская Народная Республика (КНР) активно работает над манипуляцией и контролем глобальной риторики о ситуации в Синьцзяне, а также над дискредитацией независимых источников, свидетельствующих о совершаемом геноциде и преступлениях против человечности, которым подвергаются уйгуры, преимущественно мусульманский народ, и другие этнические и религиозные меньшинства, проживающие в Синьцзян-Уйгурском автономном районе.  Управляемые КНР и имеющие связи с Китаем игроки предпринимают координированные усилия по продвижению предпочитаемых Пекином сюжетов о Синьцзяне, чтобы заглушить и изолировать голоса, критикующие репрессии КНР в отношении уйгуров, а также травить критиков китайских властей.   ПРОПАГАНДИСТСКИЕ ПРИЕМЫ: Пропагандистские методы, применяемые КНР, стремятся заглушить критические голоса, наполняя международное медиапространство и ограничивая доступ к противоречащим официальной позиции Пекина источникам, и создавая искусственную видимость поддержки политики КНР. Средства передачи информации используют генерированные ИИ изображения, создавая правдоподобные фейковые аккаунты.  КНР заглушает критические голоса, проводя транснациональные репрессии в цифровом пространстве, занимаясь троллингом и травлей в интернете.НАПОЛНЕНИЕ МЕДИАПРОСТРАНСТВА, ЗАГЛУШАЯ ГОЛОСА КРИТИКОВ: КНР наполняет информационное пространство на поисковых сайтах и в соцсетях, заглушая голоса, которые, как считают китайские власти, противоречат их интересам, и продвигая предпочитаемые Пекином сюжеты об обращении с уйгурами. Провластные заинтересованные лица наполняют информационные экосистемы альтернативными сюжетами, теориями заговора и ни с чем не связанными информационными справками, чтобы ограничить распространение сюжетов о зверствах, совершаемых властями КНР в Синьцзяне.  В частности, в ходе Зимней Олимпиады в Пекине в 2022 году, провластные аккаунты опубликовали множество твитов на не связанные темы с хештегом #GenocideGames, рассчитывая на отвлечение внимания от цели хештега: обращения внимания на геноцид КНР против уйгуров в Синьцзяне.  Правительственные аккаунты в социальных СМИ, подконтрольные китайским властям СМИ и группы ботов, вероятно контролируемые китайскими властями, принимают в этом участие. АСТРОТЕРФИНГ С ЦЕЛЬЮ СОЗДАНИЯ ВИДИМОСТИ ПОДДЕРЖКИ Для манипуляции сюжетами о Синьцзяне поддерживающие КНР стороны занимаются «астротерфингом», проводя координированные кампании или публикуя неаутентичные посты для создания видимости масштабной массовой поддержки определенной политической меры, отдельного лица или точки зрения в ситуации, в которой эта поддержка отсутствует.   По аналогии с наполнением медиапространства, КНР с помощью астротерфинга делает то же самое, распространяя «положительные сюжеты» о Синьцзяне и об уйгурах, включая ложные описания того, как они живут «простой счастливой жизнью», и подчеркивая экономическую выгоду, которую китайская политика принесла Синьцзяну.  В середине 2021 года более 300 фейковых провластных китайских аккаунтов вывесили тысячи видео уйгуров, которые, как казалось, отрицали наличие плохого обращения с ними, заявляя, что они «очень свободны». На этих видео якобы можно было увидеть, как большинство жителей Синьцзяна противоречили заявлениям международных СМИ о репрессиях в отношении уйгуров.  Однако по данным The New York Times и ProPublica, большинство из этих видео, которые впервые появились на базирующихся в КНР платформах, а затем распространились на YouTube и Twitter, были созданы пропагандистами в Синьцзяне в целях манипуляции общественным мнением.   ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЯ,  СДЕЛАННЫЕ СИСТЕМОЙ ИСКУСТВЕННОГО ИНТЕЛЛЕКТА, ЧТОБЫ СОЗДАТЬ ВИДИМОСТЬ АУТЕНТИЧНОСТИ: Как минимум с января 2021 года провластные китайские сети используют контент, разработанный продвинутыми системами искусственного интеллекта, такими как созданные системой машинного обучения StyleGAN изображения, в качестве главного фото профиля.  В отличии от украденных фотографий настоящих людей, эти системы создают составные фотографии, которые невозможно отследить к оригиналу с помощью поиска обратного изображения для выявления фейковых аккаунтов.  Некоторые из этих аккаунтов многократно вывешивали посты, отрицая совершаемые КНР в Синьцзяне зверства, делая ложные заявления о том, что подавляющее большинство объективных данных о зверствах были сфабрикованы США и американскими союзниками.   ЗАГЛУШЕНИЕ КРИТИЧЕСКИХ ГОЛОСОВ: ТРАНСНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ РЕПРЕССИИ, ТРОЛЛИНГ И ТРАВЛЯ В ИНТЕРНЕТЕ: Финансируемые КНР транснациональные репрессии направлены против тех, кто критикует КНР, в особенности членов китайской диаспоры. Они становятся жертвами травли в интернете и в реальной жизни потому, что им хотят помешать делиться своим опытом, запугать или заставить их заниматься самоцензурой. Скоординированный троллинг направлен на глушение голосов критиков КНР и инакомыслящих, а также на отравление медиапространства за счет недобросовестных заявлений.  Скоординированный троллинг часто перерастает в угрозы убийства, изнасилования или нападения; вредоносные кибератаки; травлю в интернете или через доксинг &#8211; раскрытие в сети персональной информации о человеке без его разрешения, такой как имя и фамилия, домашний адрес или место работы.   В марте 2021 года Министерство иностранных дел (МИД) КНР публично поставило под сомнение заявления нескольких человек о жестоком обращении. СОДЕРЖАНИЕ СЮЖЕТОВ: Сюжеты о Синьцзяне, разработанные властями КНР, делают упор на отрицание критики и на распространение «положительных сюжетов» в попытке опровергнуть обвинения в совершении геноцида и преступлений против человечества.  Самые агрессивные китайские пропагандисты часто атакуют других, создавая ложные эквиваленты с действиями других стран в попытке отвлечь внимание от критики действий КНР со стороны международного сообщества.ОПРОВЕРЖЕНИЕ/ОТРИЦАНИЕ КРИТИКИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ МЕДИА: Китайские пропагандисты публикуют и распространяют контент, в котором отрицаются заявления международных СМИ и известных на международном уровне аналитических центров.  В ответ на обвинения третьих сторон о том, что КНР использует принудительный труд уйгуров, целый ряд аккаунтов китайских дипломатов и подконтрольных Китайской Коммунистической Партии (КПК) СМИ и организаций, а также подозреваемые бот-сети опубликовали сюжеты о механизированном сборе хлопка в Синьцзяне, подразумевая, что в секторе хлопка в Синьцзяне не используется принудительный труд.  Таким образом они избежали реакцию на сообщения о перевозе около 100 тыс. уйгуров из Синьцзяна в «места принудительного труда» &#8211; на работу в заводах в других регионах КНР. РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЕ «ПОЛОЖИТЕЛЬНЫХ СЮЖЕТОВ» С ТЕМ, ЧТОБЫ БОРОТЬСЯ ИЛИ «ОПРОВЕРГНУТЬ» ОБВИНЕНИЯ В СОВЕРШЕНИИ ГЕНОЦИДА И ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЙ ПРОТИВ ЧЕЛОВЕЧНОСТИ: Лица, действующие от имени КНР, используют такие хештеги, как #AmazingXinjiang «Замечательный Синьцзян» и #Xinjiang, опровергая сообщения независимых СМИ о совершении властями КНР преступлений против человечности и геноцида.  Создается контраст между сюжетами, посвященными живущему в гармонии мультикультурному обществу, и реальностью: масштабным отслеживанием уйгуров китайскими властями, в частности, путем вселения китайских должностных лиц в дома уйгуров в течение как минимум шести недель в год.  Данная пропаганда распространяется с целью отвлечения внимания от сообщений о кампании КНП по «демографической инженерии», направленной на систематическое повышение ханьского населения в Синьцзяне и на «разбавление» концентрации уйгуров в регионе.  «КАКНАСЧЕТИЗМ» И СОЗДАНИЕ ЛОЖНЫХ ЭКВИВАЛЕНТОВ, ЧТОБЫ ОТВЛЕЧЬ ВНИМАНИЕ/ИЗБЕЖАТЬ КРИТИКУ: Представители КНР, которые активно общаются, такие как дипломаты Чжао Лицзянь и Хуа Чунинь, используют «какнасчетизм» и ложные эквиваленты с тем, чтобы отвлекать внимание от политики КНР в Синьцзяне, обвиняя других в лицемерии.   Их аргументы не создают впечатление о том, что китайские власти ни в чем не виноваты. Они считают, что другие страны несут аналогичную ответственность за правонарушения.  Несмотря на усилия по отвлечению внимания от ситуации в Синьцзяне, независимые СМИ, преподаватели и борцы за права человека опубликовали многочисленные свидетельства очевидцев и поддающиеся проверке данные о том, что около миллиона человек были заключены в тюрьмы властями КНР, что существуют достоверные доказательства пыток, вынужденной стерилизации и других нарушений. КИТАЙСКИЕ ПРОПАГАНДИСТЫ: Самые активные пропагандисты КНР &#8211; небольшая группа китайских дипломатов, известных своей агрессивной деятельностью. Кроме того, СМИ, имеющие связи с КНР и КПК, во всем мире распространяют дезинформацию, связанную с Синьцзяном, более чем на десяти разных языках.  Для того, чтобы охватить глобальную аудиторию и привлечь ее внимание, КНР полагается на частные медиакомпании и многоязычных инфлюенсеров в соцсетях.  Интернет-тролли оскорбляют и атакуют других, заводят споры, организуют травлю пользователей интернета, чтобы отравить информационное пространство и отвлечь внимание от голосов, критикующих КНР.АГРЕССИВНАЯ ПРОПАГАНДА НЕКОТОРЫХ КИТАЙСКИХ ДИПЛОМАТОВ: Большинство пропаганды, распространяемой китайскими дипломатами в соцсетях, направлено на подчеркивание хороших отношений Китая с другими странами и улучшении его имиджа. Некоторые сотрудники китайского МИДа, которых комментаторы прозвали «волками-воинами», используют социальные СМИ для защиты национальных интересов КНР, часто разжигая споры.  Именно они занимаются отрицанием, «опровержением» и отхода от ответа на фоне сюжетов, которые противоречат официальной линии КНР.   Например, чтобы отвлечь внимание от совершаемых в Синьцзяне зверств, китайские пропагандисты распространяют ложный сюжет о том, что ЦРУ якобы стремилось спровоцировать волнения с целью свержения правительства КНР.  Этот агрессивный стиль позволяет КНР экспериментировать с разными видами пропаганды, чтобы определить, что работает хорошо в Китае и в других странах.  Например, некоторые аккаунты сотрудников МИДа часто распространяют дезинформацию и теории заговора о происхождении вируса COVID-19 и о несправедливой и неспровоцированной войне, развязанной Россией против Украины. ИМЕЮЩИЕ СВЯЗИ С КНР И КПК СМИ ВО ВСЕМ МИРЕ РАСПРОСТРАНЯЮТ ДЕЗИНФОРМАЦИЮ О СИТУАЦИИ В СИНЬЦЗЯНЕ: СМИ, связанные с КНР и КПК, такие как China Global Television Network, China Daily, China Radio International и Синьхуа предлагают контент не менее чем на 12 языках и выделяют значительные средства на рекламу в соцсетях.  В феврале 2021 года на фоне растущего интереса со стороны международного сообщества к вопросу геноцида, совершаемого КНР в Синьцзяне, Синьхуа опубликовала «информационный бюллетень», содержащий ложные заявления о том, что содержащие уйгуров лагеря для интернированных представляют собой «центры профессионально-технического обучения» и «полностью гарантируют личную свободу и достоинство учащихся». Однако из опубликованных Amnesty International свидетельств задержанных следует, что КНР подвергала их регулярным допросам, пыткам и иным формам жестокого обращения. КНР в рамках партнерств с иностранными СМИ публикует контент, подготовленный и поддерживаемый китайскими властями, предназначенный для местной аудитории. Таким образом выбранные Пекином сюжеты приобретают авторитетность и убедительность, которой они не смогли бы добиться без этой поддержки.  В частности, Кенийская радиовещательная корпорация в ноябре 2019 года опубликовала статью анонимного автора о политике «борьбы с бедностью» китайских властей в Синьцзяне, что привело к тому, что обозреватели усомнились в ее правдоподобности, и появились подозрения в том, что она является примером китайской пропаганды.КНР ВСЕ ЧАШЕ ОБРАЩАЕТСЯ К ЧАСТНЫМ МЕДИЙНЫМ КОМПАНИЯМИ, ЧТОБЫ РАЗРАБОТАТЬ КАМПАНИИ МАНИПУЛЯЦИИ ИНФОРМАЦИЕЙ ДЛЯ ИНОСТРАННЫХ АУДИТОРИЙ: КНР привлекает третьих сторон к распространению пропаганды на иностранных языках и приватизировала некоторые агентства с тем, чтобы воспользоваться инновациями частного сектора.  Правительство КНР работает как минимум с 90 базирующимися в Китае компаниями над созданием кампаний по манипуляции информацией для иностранной аудитории, содействуя положительному имиджу КНР.  Например, издательство, управляемое Бюро радио, кино и телевидения Синьцзян-Уйгурского автономного района и связанное с департаментом Единого фронта КПК, заплатило маркетинговой компании за создание многочисленных видео, изображающих поддерживающих правительство КНР уйгуров, которые затем были распространены фейковыми аккаунтами на Twitter и в YouTube. ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ НЕАУТЕНТИЧНЫХ СЕТЕЙ ДЛЯ РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЯ ПРОВЛАСТНЫХ СЮЖЕТОВ: Сочетание неаутентичных сетей, состоящих из ботов, и настоящих аккаунтов, которые публикуют твиты и делают ретвиты провластных сюжетов, наполняют информационное пространство и содействуют астротерфингу.  Одна сеть аккаунтов публикует информацию, отрицая совершение зверств в Синьцзяне, или обвиняя «Запад» в лицемерии. Другая, более крупная сеть аккаунтов затем публикует ретвиты и репосты.  Центр киберполитики Интернет-обсерватории Стэнфордского университета считает, что англоязычные неаутентичные сети КНР провалились в попытке приобрести популярность среди иностранной аудитории. ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ИНФЛЮЕНСЕРОВ, ЧТОБЫ ОХВАТИТЬ МОЛОДЕЖЬ СРЕДИ ИНОСТРАННОЙ АУДИТОРИИ: Власти КНР считают, что инфлюенсеры благодаря своей узнаваемости и аутентичности смогут продвигать пропаганду КНР в соцсетях, влияя на местное медиапространство.  Китайское руководство стремится приспособить подход к молодым потребителям СМИ во всем мире и иностранную пропаганду к более «молодежной» аудитории, производя больше популярного контента, в то же время строго придерживаясь политической «красной черты». В июне 2021 года Шэнь Хайсюн, глава государственной компании China Media Group, которая находится в ведении отдела пропаганды КПК, предложил использовать «студии для многоязычных интернет-звезд» в целях улучшения имиджа КПК в ключевых регионах.  Аналитическая компания Miburo Solutions выявила более 200 инфлюенсеров из третьих стран, имеющих связи с китайскими государственными СМИ, которые выпускают контент более чем на 38 языках, в том числе на английском, испанском, французском, арабском и русском языках. У каждого из них в среднем 309 тыс. подписчиков.  По данным Miburo, КНР с помощью инфлюенсеров продвигает сюжеты о Синьцзяне, скрывая связь сотрудников с государственными СМИ и организуя поездки в Синьцзян для провластных западных инфлюенсеров. ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ТРОЛЛЕЙ ДЛЯ ЗАЩИТЫ ПОЗИЦИИ КНР, ОСКОРБЛЕНИЯ И ТРАВЛИ КРИТИКОВ ВЛАСТИ, СОВЕРШЕНИЯ АТАК НА НИХ: Интернет-тролли, в основном работающие под руководством Народно-освободительной армии, Центральной комиссии по вопросам киберпространства или Коммунистической молодежной лиги, непосредственно атакуют критиков в сети.  Как сообщает Институт стратегических исследований Французской военной школы, тролли из КНР используют такие тактики, как защита КНР, атаки на критиков и их дискредитация, разжигание споров, оскорбления и травля.  В Комиссии по делам киберпространства и Центральном управлении пропаганды КНР в этом качестве непосредственно работает около двух миллионов человек по всей стране, и еще 20 млн работают на полставки в качестве «волонтеров сетевой цивилизации». Их деятельность направлена на внутреннюю аудиторию и на китайскую диаспору.   В ответ на протесты в Гонконге в 2019 году КНР начала больше инвестировать в пользователей таких базирующихся в США платформ, как Twitter, Facebook и YouTube, а также международных платформ, например VKontakte и Telegram.  В 2021 году отдел Mandiat Threat Intelligence компании в сфере кибербезопасности FireEye и Группа анализа угроз Google выявила элементы продолжающейся информационной операции, проводимой при поддержке китайских властей, посвященной целому ряду вопросов, в том числе и Синьцзяну, переведенные на разные языки и публикуемые на 30 платформах социальных сетей и 40 вебсайтах. 
- سنکیانگ کے بارے میں عالمی رائے عامہ کو اپنے حق میں تبدیل کرنے کی چینی کوششیں Global Engagement Centerخلاصہ: عوامی جمہوریہ چین (پی آر سی) سنکیانگ کے بارے میں عالمگیر بحث کو اپنے حق میں تبدیل کرنے اور اس پر غالب آنے اور ویغوروں کے خود مختار علاقے سنکیانگ میں ویغوروں، جو زیادہ تر مسلمان ہیں اور دیگر نسلی اور مذہبی اقلیتی گروہوں سے تعلق رکھنے والے افراد کے خلاف جاری نسل کشی اور انسانیت کے خلاف جرائم کی رپورٹنگ کرنے والے آزاد ذرائع کو بدنام کرنے کی کوششوں میں سرگرم عمل ہے۔ چین کے زیر ہدایت اور چین سے وابستہ عناصر بیجنگ کے ترجیحی بیانیوں کو پھیلانے کی مربوط کوششوں کی قیادت کر رہے ہیں تاکہ اُن بیانیوں کو ختم کرنے کے علاوہ بے وقعت بھی بنایا جا سکے جو ویغوروں پر کیے جانے والے ظلم پر چین کے ناقد ہیں۔ اسی طرح یہ عناصراُن کو بھی ہراساں کرتے ہیں جو چین پر تنقید کرتے ہیں۔پیغام رسانی کے ہتھکنڈے: چین کے پیغام رسانی کے ہتھکنڈوں کا مقصد تنقیدی بیانیوں کو بے اثر بنانا ہے۔ اس مقصد کے لیے چین دو کام کرتا ہے۔ ایک تو وہ بیجنگ کے سرکاری موقف کی نفی کرنے والے بیانیوں تک رسائی کو محدود کرنے کی خاطر معلومات کے بین الاقوامی ماحول میں معلومات کی بھرمار کرتا ہے۔ دوسرا وہ چینی پالیسیوں کی حمایت کی مصنوعی شکلیں تخلیق کرتا ہے۔ پیغام رسان نقلی صارفین کے پروفائل کو حقیقی صارفین کی شکلیں دینے کے لیے مصنوعی ذہانت سے تیار کی جانے والیں پیچیدہ تصاویر استعمال کرتے ہیں۔ چین اختلاف رائے رکھنے والوں کو خاموش کرانے کے لیے بین الاقوامی جبر، ٹرولنگ اور آن لائن ڈرانے دھمکانے کا کام کرتا ہے۔تنقیدی بیانیوں کو بے اثر بنانے کے لیے معلومات کی بھرمار: چین سرچ انجنوں اور سوشل میڈیا کی فیڈز پر موجود اُن پیغامات کو بے اثر بنانے اور ویغوروں کے ساتھ روا رکھے جانے والے اپنے سلوک کے بارے میں بیجنگ کے من پسند بیانیوں کو بڑہاوا دینے کے لیے اُن گفتگوؤں میں معلومات کی بھرمار کر دیتا ہے جنہیں وہ اپنے مفادات کے خلاف سمجھتا ہے۔ چین نواز فریق چینی حکام کے سنکیانگ میں ڈھائے جانے والے مظالم کی تفصیلات بیان کرنے والے بیانیوں کو دبانے کے لیے  معلومات کے نظاموں میں جوابی بیانیوں، سازشی نظریات، اور غیرمتعلقہ خبروں کی بھرمار کر دیتے ہیں۔ مثال کے طور پر 2022 میں بیجنگ میں ہونے والے اولمپک کے سرمائی کھیلوں میں چین نواز اکاؤنٹوں کے ذریعے ٹوئٹر ہیش ٹیگ #GenocideGames  سے توجہ ہٹانے کے لیے ایسی پوسٹوں سے بھر دیا گیا جن کا مقصد سنکیانگ میں ویغوروں کے خلاف چین کی نسل کشی کی طرف توجہ دلانے والے اِس ہیش ٹیگ کو بے اثر بنانا تھا۔ اس کام میں سوشل میڈیا کے سرکاری اکاؤنٹ، چین سے منسلک میڈیا، نجی اکاؤنٹ، اور باٹ کلسٹر معاونت کرتے رہے۔ اس بات کے قوی امکانات ہیں کہ اِن سب کو چینی حکام ہدایات جاری کرتے رہے ہوں گے۔حمایت کی جھوٹی صورت بنانے کے لیے پیغام رسانوں کی حقیقی شناخت کو چھپانا: سنکیانگ میں بیانیوں کو اپنے حق میں تبدیل کرنے کے لیے چین نواز عناصر پس پردہ کارفرما حقیقی کرداروں کی شناخت کو چھپانے کا کام کرتے ہیں۔ باالفاظ دیگر وہ غیرمستند پوسٹوں کی مربوط مہمیں چلاتے ہیں تاکہ کسی پالیسی، فرد یا نقطہ نظر کے حق میں عوامی سطح پر وسیع حمایت کا تاثر پیدا کیا جا سکے۔ حقیقت میں ایسی حمایت کا کوئی وجود نہیں ہوتا۔ معلومات کی بھرمار کی طرح چین سنکیانگ اور ویغوروں کے بارے میں &#8220;مثبت کہانیوں&#8221; سے  معلوماتی ماحول کو بھرنے کے لیے حقیقی شناخت کو چھپانے کا استعمال کرتا ہے۔ اِن کہانیوں میں ویغوروں کی &#8220;سادہ خوشگوار زندگیاں&#8221; گزارنے کی خود ساختہ کہانیاں گھڑنے کے ساتھ ساتھ اُن فرضی اقتصادی فوائد والی پوسٹوں پر بھی زور دیا جاتا ہے جو سنکیانگ میں چین کی پالیسیوں کی وجہ سے حاصل ہوئے ہیں۔ 2021 کے وسط میں 300 چین نواز غیرمستند اکاؤنٹوں سے ویغوروں کی ہزاروں ایسی ویڈیوز پوسٹ کی گئیں جن میں بظاہر ویغور سنکیانگ کے علاقے میں اپنے ساتھ ہونے والی کسی زیادتی کی تردید کرتے اور یہ دعوی کرتے ہوئے دکھائی دیتے ہیں کہ وہ &#8220;بالکل آزاد ہیں۔&#8221; بین الاقوامی میڈیا میں ویغوروں پر ظلم کیے جانے کے دعووں کی روشنی میں اِن ویڈیوز میں کیے جانے والے دعووں کے بارے میں پورے سنکیانگ میں وسیع پیمانے پر اختلاف رائے پایا جاتا ہے۔ تاہم نیویارک ٹائمز اور پروپبلیکا کے مطابق اِن میں زیادہ تر ویڈیوز سنکیانگ کے پراپیگنڈہ کے عہدیداروں نے بنائیں۔ سب سے پہلے یہ ویڈیوز چین میں قائم پلیٹ فارموں پر دیکھنے میں آئیں اور اس کے بعد انہیں یو ٹیوب اور ٹوئٹر پر پھیلایا گیا تاکہ رائے عامہ میں کو اپنے حق میں تبدیل کیا جا سکے۔تصاویر کو مستند بنانے کے لیے مصنوعی ذہانت سے تیار کردہ تصاویر کا استعمال: کم از کم جنوری 2021 سے چین نواز نیٹ ورک اپنے غیر مستند اکاؤنٹوں کے لیے حقیقی دکھائی دینے والی پروفائل تصویریں بنانے کے لیے جدید مصنوعی ذہانت سے تیار کیا جانے والا مواد استعمال کرتے چلے آ رہے ہیں۔ اس کی ایک مثال سٹائل جی اے این مشین لرننگ سے تیار کی جانے والی تصویریں ہیں۔ حقیقی لوگوں کی چوری شدہ تصاویر کے برعکس اِن تکنیکوں کے ذریعے مختلف تصویروں کو جوڑ کر بنائی جانے والی کسی بھی جامع تصویرکے حقیقی ہونے کا &#8216;ریورس امیج سرچ&#8217; نامی تکنیک کا استعمال کرتے ہوئے سراغ لگانا ناممکن ہے۔ لہذا اِن اکاؤنٹوں کے مستند یا غیر مستند ہونے کا تعین کرنا مشکل ہوتا ہے۔ ان میں سے  بعض اکاؤنٹوں کے ذریعے سنکیانگ میں چین کی طرف سے ڈھائے جانے والے مظالم کی بار بار تردید کی جاتی رہی اور یہ جھوٹے دعوے کیے جاتے رہے کہ  مظالم کے مضبوط اور آزاد معروضی شواہد کا مجموعہ امریکہ اور اس کے اتحادیوں کی من گھڑت اختراع ہے۔اختلاف رائے رکھنے والوں کو خاموش کرانے کے لیے بین الاقوامی جبر، ٹرولنگ اور آن لائن ڈرانے دھمکانے کا استعمال: چین کے خلاف بولنے والوں کو چینی حکومت کی سرپرستی میں بین الاقوامی جبر کا نشانہ بنایا جاتا ہے۔ اس کا نشانہ خاص طور پر بیرونی ممالک میں مقیم چینی کمیونٹیوں کے لوگ ہوتے ہیں۔ انہیں آن لائن اور آف لائن ہراساں کیا جاتا ہے تاکہ انہیں اپنی کہانیاں دوسروں تک پہنچانے سے روکا جا سکے یا انہیں ڈرا دھمکا کر اپنی سنسرشپ آپ کرنے پر مجبور کیا جا سکے۔ ٹرولنگ کی مہموں کا مقصد چین کے خلاف بولنے والوں کو خاموش کرانا، بدنیتی پر مبنی دلائل کے ساتھ معلوماتی ماحول میں زہر گھولنا اور مخالف نقطہائے نظر کو ختم کرنا ہوتا ہے۔ ٹرولنگ کی مہمیں اکثر موت، عصمت دری، یا جسمانی حملوں، بدنیتی پر مبنی سائبر حملوں، اور ڈاکسنگ کے ذریعے آن لائن ڈرانے دھمکانے یا ہراساں کرنے کے خطرات میں بدل جاتی ہیں۔ ڈاکسنگ سے مراد کسی فرد کی ذاتی معلومات کو اس کی اجازت کے بغیر آن لائن شائع کرنا ہے۔ اِن ذاتی معلومات میں اُس فرد کا پورا نام، گھر کا پتہ، یا نوکری سے متعلق معلومات شامل ہوتی ہیں۔ مارچ 2021 میں چین کی خارجہ امور کی وزارت  نے عوامی سطح پر کئی افراد کے بدسلوکی کے دعووں پر سوالات اٹھائے۔بیانیوں کی توجہ کا مرکز: سنکیانگ کے بارے میں چین کے بیانیوں کی توجہ تنقید کی اجازت نہ دینے اور &#8220;مثبت کہانیوں&#8221; کو بڑہا چڑہا کر پیش کرنے پر مرکوز ہوتی ہے۔ یہ اقدامات نسل کشی اور انسانیت کے جرائم کے الزامات کا توڑ نکالنے کی کوششیں ہوتی ہیں۔ چین کے جارح ترین معلومات رساں جب حملہ آور ہوتے ہیں تو وہ چین کے رویے پر کی جانے والی بین الاقوامی تنقید سے توجہ ہٹانے کے لیے دوسرے ممالک کے اقدامات کے ساتھ جھوٹ پر مبنی مماثلتیں تخلیق کرتے ہیں۔میڈیا کے آزاد ذرائع کی تنقید کو رد کرنا/مسترد کرنا: چین کے پیغام رساں، میڈیا کے آزاد ذرائع اور بین الاقوامی شہرت کے حامل تھنک ٹینکوں کی طرف سے کیے جانے والے دعووں کو مسترد کرنے والے مواد کو پوسٹ کرنے اور اجاگر کرنے کا کام کرتے ہیں۔ کسی تیسرے فریق کی طرف سے چین کے ویغوروں سے جبری مشقت کروانے کے الزمات کے جواب میں چین کے سفارتی اکاؤنٹوں، پی آر سی- اور چینی کمیونسٹ پارٹی (سی سی پی) سے وابستہ میڈیا کی تنظیموں، اور مشتبہ بوٹ نیٹ ورکوں کی طرف سے سنکیانگ میں مشینوں سے کپاس کی چنائی کے بارے میں پوسٹ کی جانے والی کہانیوں کی ایک لہر اٹھائی جاتی ہے جس سے یہ باور کرایا جاتا ہے کہ سنکیانگ کی کپاس کی صنعت میں جبری مشقت سے کام کروانے کی سرے سے کوئی ضرورت ہی نہیں۔ اس پیغام رسانی میں چینی حکام کی طرف سے اندازاً ایک لاکھ ویغوروں کو سنکیانگ سے باہر چین میں کسی دوسری جگہ قائم فیکٹریوں میں کام کرنے کے لیے &#8220;جبری مشقت کی حامل تعیناتیوں&#8221; کے بارے میں رپورٹوں کا جواب دینے سے گریز کیا جاتا ہے۔نسل کشی اور انسانیت کے خلاف جرائم کے الزامات کا مقابلہ کرنے/&#8221;جھوٹا ثابت کرنے&#8221; کے لیے &#8220;مثبت کہانیوں&#8221; کو اجاگر کرنا: چینی آلہ کار سنکیانگ کے بارے میں مثبت کہانیوں کو اجاگر کرنے اور چینی حکام  کے خلاف لگنے والے انسانیت کے خلاف جرائم اور نسل کشی کے الزامات کی آزادانہ رپورٹنگ کا مقابلہ کرنے کے لیے  #AmazingXinjiang  اور #Xinjiang  جیسے ہیش ٹیگ استعمال کرتے ہیں۔ ہم آہنگی سے رہنے والے ایک کثیر الثقافتی معاشرے کی کہانیوں اور ویغوروں کی چین کی طرف سے کی جانے والی کڑی نگرانی کے درمیان تضاد پایا جاتا ہے۔ اس نگرانی میں چین کے اہلکاروں کا ویغوروں کے گھروں میں سال میں کم از کم چھ ہفتے کے لیے رہنا بھی شامل ہے۔ اس پیغام رسانی کا مقصد چین کی &#8220;آبادی میں نسلی حوالے سے تبدیلی&#8221; کی مہم کے بارے میں رپورٹوں سے توجہ ہٹانا ہے۔ اس تبدیلی کا مقصد سنکیانگ میں ہان چینی آبادی کو منظم انداز سے بڑھانا اور خطے میں ویغور آبادیوں کے ارتکاز کو &#8221; گھٹانا&#8221; ہے۔تنقید سے توجہ ہٹانے/اس کا رخ موڑنے کے لیے &#8220;دوسروں پر انگلی اٹھانے&#8221; اور جھوٹی مماثلتوں کا استعمال: چین کے خارجہ امور کے اطلاعاتی محکمے کے ژاؤ لیجیان اور ہوا چن ینگ جیسے فصیح و بلیغ سفارت کاروں سمیت چین کے عہدیدار بھی چین کی سنکیانگ کی پالیسیوں سے توجہ ہٹانے اور الزامات لگانے والوں کو منافق قرار دینے کے لیے &#8220;دوسروں پر انگلیاں اٹھانے&#8221; اور جھوٹی مماثلتوں سے کام لیتے ہیں۔ اُن کے دلائل اس بات کو ثابت نہیں کرتے کہ چین بے قصور ہے۔ اس کے برعکس وہ یہ نکتہ اٹھاتے ہیں کہ دوسرے ممالک بھی زیادتیوں کے برابر کے مجرم ہیں۔ سنکیانگ کی صورت حال سے توجہ ہٹانے کی اِن تمام کوششوں کے باوجود میڈیا کے آزاد اداروں، ماہرین تعلیم، اور انسانی حقوق کے کارکنوں نے کئی افراد کے آنکھوں دیکھے واقعات اور قابل تصدیق اعداد و شمار شائع کیے ہیں۔ یہ واقعات اور اعداد و شمار بتاتے ہیں کہ چین نے ایک اندازے کے مطابق 10 لاکھ افراد کو قید کیا ہے جبکہ اس بات کے قابل اعتبار ثبوت موجود ہیں کہ اِن لوگوں کو تشدد، جبری نس بندی اور دیگر زیادتیوں کا نشانہ بنایا گیا ہے۔چینی خبر رساں افراد: اپنی مخاصمانہ خبر رسانی کے لیے مشہور چین کے جارح ترین خبر رساں، چین کے سفارتی اہل کاروں کا ایک ذیلی گروہ ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ چین اور چین کی کمیونسٹ پارٹی سے منسلک میڈیا عالمی سطح پر کم از کم ایک درجن زبانوں میں سنکیانگ سے متعلق غلط معلومات پھیلاتے ہیں۔ عالمی سامعین تک پہنچنے اور اُن میں دلچسپی پیدا کرنے کے لیے چین میڈیا کی نجی کمپنیوں اور سوشل میڈیا کے کثیراللسانی با اثر افراد  سے رجوع  کرتا ہے۔ معلومات کے ماحول کو زہر آلود بنانے اور چین پر تنقید کرنے والے بیانات سے توجہ ہٹانے کے لیے نیٹیزنز پر حملہ کرنے، تنازعات کو ہوا دینے، بے عزتی کرنے اور ہراساں کرنے میں ٹرولنگ کا کلیدی کردار ہوتا ہے۔جارحانہ خبر رسانی کے ساتھ قیادت کرنے والا چینی سفارت کاروں کا ذیلی گروہ: چین کے سفارتی سوشل میڈیا کی زیادہ تر پیغام رسانی مثبت ہوتی ہے۔ اُن میں دوسرے ممالک کے ساتھ اچھے تعلقات کو اجاگر کرنے پر توجہ مرکوز کی جاتی ہے اور چین کے بارے میں تاثر کو بہتر  بنانے کی کوششیں کی جاتی ہیں۔ خارجہ امور کی وزارت کے اہلکاروں کا ایک اقلیتی گروہ چین کے قومی مفادات کا دفاع کرنے کے لیے سوشل میڈیا کے پلیٹ فارم استعمال کرتا ہے جس میں اس گروہ کے لوگ بالعموم جارحانہ طریقے استعمال کرتے ہیں۔ اس گروہ کو بعض مبصرین نے &#8220;جنگجو بھیڑیوں&#8221; کا نام دے رکھا ہے۔ اس گروہ میں شامل افراد کے بارے میں غالب امکان یہ پایا جاتا ہے کہ وہ چین کے سرکاری پیغام کے خلاف چلنے والے بیانیوں کو مسترد، &#8220;غلط ثابت کرنے&#8221;  اور اِن بیانیوں سے توجہ ہٹانے کی کوشش کرتے ہیں۔ مثال کے طور پر سنکیانگ میں ڈھائے جانے والے مظالم سے توجہ ہٹانے کے لیے چین کے خبر رساں یہ غلط بیانیہ پھیلاتے ہیں کہ سی آئی اے چین کو نیچا دکھانے کے لیے سنکیانگ میں بے چینی پھیلانے کی کوشش کر رہی ہے۔ یہ جارحانہ انداز چین کو مختلف قسم کے پیغام رسانی کے طریقے استعمال کرنے کے تجربات کرنے کا موقع دیتا ہے تاکہ یہ دیکھا جا سکے کہ ملک کے اندر اور بیرونی ممالک میں کیا چیز مقبولیت پا سکتی ہے۔ مثال کے طور پر خارجہ امور کی وزارت کے اہلکاروں کے اکاؤنٹوں کے ذریعے کووڈ-19  کے وائرس کے اصلی مقام اور اس کے اسباب کے بارے میں بار بار غلط معلومات اور سازشی نظریات پھیلائے جاتے ہیں۔ اسی طرح یوکرین کے خلاف روس کی بلاجواز اور بلا اشتعال جنگ کے بارے میں بھی غلط معلومات اور سازشی نظریات پھیلائے جاتے ہیں۔چینی حکومت اور چین کی کمیونسٹ پارٹی سے منسلک میڈیا عالمی سطح پر سنکیانگ سے متعلق غلط معلومات پھیلاتا ہے: چائنا گلوبل ٹیلی ویژن نیٹ ورک، چائنا ڈیلی، چائنا ریڈیو انٹرنیشنل، اور شنہوا جیسے چینی حکومت اور چین کی کمیونسٹ پارٹی سے منسلک میڈیا کے ادارے کم از کم 12 زبانوں میں مواد تیار کرتے ہیں اور سوشل میڈیا پر تشہیر کے لیے اچھے خاصے وسائل وقف کرتے ہیں۔ فروری 2021 میں جب سنکیانگ میں چین کو نسل کشی پر بڑھتی ہوئی بین الاقوامی جانچ پڑتال کا سامنا تھا تو شنہوا نے ایک &#8220;حقائق نامہ &#8220;جاری کیا جس میں کئی ایک جھوٹے دعوے کیے گئے۔ اِن جھوٹے دعووں میں کہا گیا کہ سنکیانگ میں ویغوروں کو رکھنے والے حراستی کیمپ ایسے &#8220;پیشہ ورانہ تعلیمی اور تربیتی مراکز&#8221; ہیں جن میں &#8220;تربیت حاصل کرنے والوں کو ذاتی آزادی اور وقار کی مکمل ضمانت حاصل ہوتی ہے۔&#8221; تاہم ایمنسٹی انٹرنیشنل کی طرف سے شائع کیے جانے والے زیر حراست افراد کے شہادتی بیانات میں الزام لگایا گیا ہے کہ چین نے انہیں باقاعدہ طور پر پوچھ گچھ، تشدد اور دیگر زیادتیوں کا نشانہ بنایا۔ چین کے خود کے تیار کردہ اور چینی تائید سے تیار کردہ مواد کو مقامی سامعین کے لیے دوبارہ شائع کرنے کے لیے، چین غیرملکی میڈیا کے ساتھ شراکت داری کرتا ہے۔ اِس اقدام سے بیجنگ کے پسندیدہ بیانیوں کو ایسے درجے کی سند اور اعتبار حاصل ہو جاتا ہے جو چین اپنے تئیں حاصل نہیں کر سکتا۔ مثال کے طور پر کینیا براڈکاسٹنگ کارپوریشن نے نومبر 2019 میں ایک گمنام مصنف کی ایک کہانی نشر کی جو  سنکیانگ میں چین کی &#8220;غربت کے خاتمے&#8221; کی پالیسی کے بارے میں تھی۔ مبصرین نے اس کہانی کی صداقت پر سوالات اٹھائے اور پوچھا کہ یہ چین کا پراپیگنڈہ تو نہیں ہے۔چین کا غیرممالک کا سامنا کرنے والی معلوماتی مہموں کو اپنے حق میں ترتیب دینے کے لیے میڈیا کی نجی کمپنیوں سے رجوع کرنے کا روز افزوں رجحان: چین نجی شعبے کی جدت طرازیوں سے فائدہ اٹھانے کی خاطر غیر ملکی زبانوں میں معلومات کے اپنے بعض آپریشنز کو آؤٹ سورس کرنے کے ساتھ ساتھ اِن کی نج کاری بھی کر رہا ہے۔ چینی حکومت چین میں قائم کم از کم 90 کمپنیوں کے ساتھ مل کر کام کر رہی ہے تاکہ چین کو مثبت انداز سے پیش کرنے کے لیے غیرممالک کا سامنا کرنے والی معلوماتی مہموں کو اپنے حق میں ترتیب دیا جا سکے۔ اس کی ایک مثال سنکیانگ کے ویغوروں کے خود مختار خطے کے ریڈیو، فلم اور ٹیلی ویژن کے بیورو کی طرف سے چلائی جانے والی ایک اشاعتی تنظیم ہے۔ یہ تنظیم چینی کمیونسٹ پارٹی کے یونائیٹڈ فرنٹ ورک کے محکمہ سے منسلک ہے۔ اس تنظیم نے ویغوروں کی ایسی ویڈیوز بنانے کے لیے مارکیٹنگ کی ایک کمپنی کو ادائیگی کی جِن میں انہیں چینی حکومت کی حمایت کرتا ہوا دکھایا گیا ہے۔ بعد میں اِن ویڈیوز کو غیر مستند اکاؤنٹوں کے ایک نیٹ ورک نے ٹوئٹر اور یو ٹیوب پر پھیلایا۔چینی بیانیوں کو پھیلانے کے لیے استعمال کیے جانے والے غیرمستند نیٹ ورک: چین کے منظور شدہ بیانیوں کو ٹویٹ اور ری ٹویٹ کرنے والے بوٹس کے غیرمستند نیٹ ورک اور حقیقی اکاؤنٹ، معلومات کی جگہوں میں معلومات کی بھرمار کر دیتے ہیں اور حقیقت کو چھپانے کی مہموں میں مدد کرتے ہیں۔ اکاؤنٹوں کا ایک نیٹ ورک ایسی معلومات پوسٹ کرتا ہے جن میں سنکیانگ میں ہونے والے مظالم کی تردید کی جاتی ہے یا &#8220;مغرب&#8221; پر منافقت کا الزام لگایا جاتا ہے جبکہ دوسرا نسبتاً بڑا نیٹ ورک ان معلومات کو ری ٹویٹ اور دوبارہ پوسٹ کر کے بڑہاوا دیتا ہے۔ سٹینفورڈ یونیورسٹی کے انٹرنیٹ آبزرویٹری سائبر پالیسی سنٹر نے اندازہ لگایا ہے کہ چین کے انگریزی زبان کے غیر مستند نیٹ ورک غیر ملکی سامعین میں قبولیت پانے میں کامیاب نہیں ہوئے۔نوجوان بین الاقوامی سامعین تک رسائی کو بہتر بنانے کے لیے اثر و نفوذ کے حامل افراد کا استعمال : چینی حکام کا خیال ہے کہ سوشل میڈیا کے اثر و نفوذ کے حامل افراد چین کی پیغام رسانی کو پھیلا سکتے ہیں تاکہ اُن کے تعلق اور سند کی وجہ سے معلومات کے مقامی ماحولوں کی صورت گری کی جا سکے۔ چینی کمیونسٹ پارٹی کے منصوبہ سازوں کی کوشش ہے کہ وہ عالمی سطح پر میڈیا کے نوجوان صارفین تک پہنچنے کے طریقوں کو اپنا سکیں۔ وہ غیر ملکی پراپیگنڈے کو &#8220;زیادہ نوجوان&#8221; رنگ دے رہے ہیں اور وائرل بنا رہے ہیں۔ ایسا کرتے ہوئے وہ سیاسی &#8220;سرخ لکیروں&#8221; کی سختی سے پابندی کرتے ہیں۔ جون 2021 میں ریاست کے زیر انتظام کام کرنے والے چائنا میڈیا گروپ کے سربراہ، شین ہئی شونگ  نے اہم خطوں میں چین کے تاثر کو بہتر بنانے کے لیے &#8220;کثیر اللسانی انٹرنیٹ سیلیبریٹی سٹوڈیوز&#8221; کے استعمال کو فروغ دیا۔ یہ میڈیا گروپ چین کی کمیونسٹ پارٹی کے پروپیگنڈا ڈیپارٹمنٹ کے ماتحت کام کرتا ہے۔ &#8220;می بورو سولیوشنز&#8221; نامی تجزیاتی کمپنی نے چین کے ریاستی میڈیا سے وابستہ تیسرے ملک کے اثر و نفوذ کے حامل 200 سے زیادہ ایسے افراد کی نشاندہی کی جو کم از کم 38 زبانوں میں سوشل میڈیا کا مواد تخلیق کرتے ہیں۔ اِن زبانوں میں انگریزی، ہسپانوی، فرانسیسی، عربی، اور روسی زبانیں بھی شامل ہیں جن کے فالورز کی  اوسط تعداد 309,000 ہے۔ می بورو کو پتہ چلا ہے کہ چین اثر و نفوذ کے حامل افراد کو سنکیانگ سے متعلق اپنے بیانیوں کو فروغ دینے کے لیے استعمال کرتا ہے۔ چین یہ کام سرکاری میڈیا کے ملازمین کی وابستگیوں کو پوشیدہ رکھ کر اور مغرب سے تعلق رکھنے والے اثر و نفوذ کے حامل چین نواز افراد کے لیے سنکیانگ کے دورے ترتیب دے کر کرتا ہے۔چینی موقفوں کا دفاع کرنے اور ناقدین پر حملے کرنے، بے عزت کرنے اور ہراساں کرنے کے لیے ٹرولنگ کا استعمال:بنیادی طور پر انٹرنیٹ ٹرولز یپلز لبریشن آرمی، سائبر سپیس کے امور کے مرکزی کمیشن، یا کمیونسٹ یوتھ لیگ کے تحت  کام کرتے ہوئے ناقدین پر آن لائن براہ راست حملے کرتے ہیں۔ فرانس کے ملٹری سکول کے سٹریٹیجک ریسرچ انسٹی ٹیوٹ کے مطابق چین کی ٹرولز کی چالوں میں چین کا دفاع کرنا، ناقدین پر حملے کرنا اور ناقدین کو بدنام کرنے کی کوششیں کرنا، سازشوں کی آگ کو ہوا دینا، بے عزت کرنا، اور ہراساں کرنا شامل ہیں۔ چین کے سائبر سپیس کے کمشن اور پراپیگنڈے کے مرکزی محکمے نے اس حیثیت سے ایک اندازے کے مطابق 20 لاکھ افراد کو براہ راست ملازم رکھا ہوا ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ دو کروڑ افراد &#8220;نیٹ ورک تہذیب کے رضاکاروں&#8221; کے طور پر جزوقتی کام کرتے ہیں۔ یہ افرادی قوت چین میں موجود سامعین اور بیرونی ممالک میں مقیم چینی بولنے والی کمیونٹیوں کے افراد کو نشانہ بناتی ہے۔ 2019 میں ہانگ کانگ کے مظاہروں کے ردعمل میں چین نے ٹوئٹر، فیس بک اور یو ٹیوب جیسے امریکہ میں قائم پلیٹ فارم استعمال کرنے والوں پر اثرانداز ہونے کے لیے مزید سرمایہ کاری کرنا شروع کی۔ چین نے اسی نوعیت کا طرزعمل وی کنٹیکٹے اور ٹیلی گرام جیسے بین الاقوامی پلیٹ فارموں کے صآرفین کے بارے میں بھی اپنایا۔ 2021 میں &#8220;فائر آئی&#8221; نامی کمپنی کے &#8220;مینڈی انٹ تھریٹ انٹیلی جنس&#8221; ادارے اور گوگل کے &#8220;خطرات کا تجزیہ کرنے والے گروپ&#8221; نے چین کی پشت پناہی میں جاری ایک معلوماتی آپریشن کے اُن عناصر کی نشاندہی کی جنہوں نے سوشل میڈیا کے 30 پلیٹ فارموں اور 40 ویب سائٹوں پر مختلف زبانوں میں سنکیانگ سمیت مختلف مسائل کو نشانہ بنایا۔
- Esfuerzos de la República Popular China para manipular la opinión pública mundial respecto a Xinjiang Global Engagement CenterRESUMEN EJECUTIVO: La República Popular China (RPC) intenta activamente manipular y dominar el discurso mundial sobre Xinjiang y desacreditar las fuentes independientes que informan sobre el genocidio y los crímenes contra la humanidad que se están cometiendo contra los uigures, predominantemente musulmanes, así como contra los miembros de otros grupos étnicos y religiosos minoritarios de la Región Autónoma Uigur de Xinjiang. Los actores dirigidos y afiliados a la RPC dirigen un esfuerzo coordinado para amplificar las narrativas preferidas por Beijing sobre Xinjiang, para ahogar y marginar las narrativas que critican la represión de los uigures por parte de la RPC, y para acosar a quienes son críticos con la RPC.TÁCTICAS DE COMUNICACIÓN: Las tácticas de mensajería de la RPC tratan de ahogar los relatos críticos inundando el entorno informativo internacional para limitar el acceso a los contenidos que contradicen la línea oficial de Beijing, así como creando una apariencia artificial de apoyo a las políticas de la RPC. Los mensajeros utilizan sofisticadas imágenes generadas con inteligencia artificial (IA) para crear la apariencia de autenticidad de perfiles de usuario falsos. La RPC trabaja para silenciar la disidencia mediante la represión digital transnacional, el troleo y el ciberacoso.INUNDAR PARA AHOGAR LAS NARRATIVAS CRÍTICAS: La RPC inunda las conversaciones para ahogar los mensajes que percibe como desfavorables para sus intereses en los motores de búsqueda y en las redes sociales, así como para amplificar los relatos preferidos por Beijing sobre su trato a los uigures. Las partes interesadas pro RPC inundan los ecosistemas de información con “contranarrativas”, teorías de conspiración y noticias no relacionadas para suprimir los relatos que detallan las atrocidades de las autoridades de la RPC en Xinjiang. Por ejemplo, durante los Juegos Olímpicos de Invierno de Beijing 2022, las cuentas pro RPC inundaron la etiqueta #GenocideGames (juegos de genocidio) de Twitter con mensajes de distracción diseñados para neutralizar el objetivo de la etiqueta de llamar la atención sobre el genocidio de la RPC contra los uigures en Xinjiang. Las cuentas gubernamentales de las redes sociales, los medios de comunicación afiliados a la RPC, las cuentas privadas y los grupos de bots, probablemente todos dirigidos por las autoridades de la RPC, contribuyen a esta actividad.USO DE LA APARIENCIA (“ASTROTURFING”) PARA CREAR UNA FALSA APROBACIÓN: Para manipular las narrativas sobre Xinjiang, los actores pro RPC se dedican al “astroturfing”, o campañas coordinadas de publicaciones no auténticas para crear la ilusión de un amplio apoyo de base a una política, individuo o punto de vista, cuando no existe tal apoyo generalizado. Al igual que en el caso de inundar, la RPC utiliza el astroturfing para inundar el espacio informativo con “historias positivas” sobre Xinjiang y la población uigur, incluyendo descripciones fabricadas de uigures que viven “vidas sencillas y felices”, así como mensajes que enfatizan las supuestas ganancias económicas que las políticas de la RPC han traído a Xinjiang. A mediados de 2021, más de 300 cuentas no auténticas pro RPC publicaron miles de vídeos de uigures que parecían negar los abusos en la región y afirmaban ser “muy libres”. Estos vídeos pretendían mostrar el desacuerdo generalizado en todo Xinjiang con las afirmaciones de los medios de comunicación internacionales de que los uigures estaban oprimidos. Sin embargo, según el diario The New York Times y el sitio de información ProPublica, los funcionarios de propaganda de Xinjiang crearon la mayoría de estos vídeos, que aparecieron primero en plataformas de la RPC y luego se extendieron a YouTube y Twitter, con el fin de manipular la opinión pública.IMÁGENES GENERADAS CON I.A. UTILIZADAS PARA CREAR UNA APARIENCIA DE AUTENTICIDAD: Desde al menos enero de 2021, las redes pro RPC han utilizado contenidos avanzados generados con inteligencia artificial, como las imágenes generadas con máquinas de aprendizaje StyleGAN, para fabricar fotos de perfil de aspecto realista para sus cuentas no auténticas. A diferencia de las imágenes robadas de personas reales, estas herramientas crean imágenes compuestas que no pueden rastrearse mediante una búsqueda inversa de imágenes, lo que hace más difícil determinar si la cuenta no es auténtica. Algunas de estas cuentas negaron repetidamente las atrocidades de la RPC en Xinjiang, afirmando falsamente que el conjunto de pruebas independientes, abrumadoras y objetivas, de las atrocidades es simplemente una invención de Estados Unidos y sus aliados.REPRESIÓN TRANSNACIONAL, TROLEO Y CIBERACOSO PARA SILENCIAR LA DISIDENCIA: La represión transnacional patrocinada por la RPC tiene como objetivo a quienes se manifiestan en contra de la RPC, especialmente en las comunidades de la diáspora china, con acoso dentro y fuera de la red Internet para impedir que compartan sus historias o para intimidarles y que se autocensuren. Las campañas de troleo están diseñadas para silenciar a quienes se manifiestan en contra de la RPC, para envenenar el entorno informativo con argumentos de mala fe y para silenciar los puntos de vista opuestos. Las campañas de troleo suelen derivar en amenazas de muerte, violación o agresión, ciberataques malintencionados y ciberacoso mediante “doxxing”, es decir, la publicación de información personal de un individuo en Internet sin su permiso, incluyendo su nombre completo, su dirección o su empleo. En marzo de 2021, el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la República Popular China puso en cuestión públicamente las denuncias de maltrato de varias personas.ENFOQUE DE LA NARRATIVA: Las narrativas de la RPC sobre Xinjiang se centran en negar las críticas y amplificar las “historias positivas” en un intento de contrarrestar las acusaciones de genocidio y crímenes contra la humanidad. Los mensajeros más agresivos de la RPC suelen pasar a la ofensiva, creando falsas equivalencias con las acciones de otros países para distraer de las críticas internacionales al comportamiento de la RPC.REFUTAR/DESMENTIR CRITICISMOS DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN INDEPENDIENTES: Los mensajeros de la RPC publican y amplifican contenidos que niegan las afirmaciones realizadas por medios de comunicación independientes y grupos de investigaciones académicas de renombre internacional. En respuesta a las acusaciones de terceros de que la RPC somete a los uigures a trabajos forzados, una oleada de cuentas diplomáticas de la RPC, organizaciones de medios de comunicación afiliadas a la RPC y al Partido Comunista Chino (PCC), y supuestas redes de bots, publicaron historias sobre el proceso mecanizado de cosechar algodón en Xinjiang, sugiriendo que la industria algodonera de Xinjiang no necesita trabajos forzados. Estos mensajes evitaron responder a los informes sobre el traslado por parte de las autoridades de la RPC de unos 100.000 uigures fuera de Xinjiang en “colocaciones laborales coercitivas” para trabajar en fábricas de otros lugares de la RPC.AMPLIFICACIÓN DE LAS “HISTORIAS POSITIVAS” PARA CONTRARRESTAR/“DESMENTIR” LAS ACUSACIONES DE GENOCIDIO Y CRÍMENES CONTRA LA HUMANIDAD: Los actores de la RPC utilizan etiquetas como #AmazingXinjiang (asombroso Xinjiang) y #Xinjiang para amplificar las historias positivas sobre Xinjiang y contrarrestar la información independiente sobre las acusaciones de crímenes contra la humanidad y genocidio por parte de las autoridades de la RPC. Las historias de una sociedad multicultural que vive en armonía contrastan con la realidad de la amplia vigilancia que ejerce la RPC sobre los uigures, que incluye a funcionarios de la RPC que viven en hogares uigures durante al menos seis semanas al año. Este mensaje pretende desviar la atención de los informes sobre la campaña de “ingeniería demográfica” de la RPC para aumentar sistemáticamente la población china han en Xinjiang y “diluir” las concentraciones de población uigur en la región.UTILIZAR EL “QUÉ DICEN DE ESTO” Y FALSAS EQUIVALENCIAS PARA DISTRAER/DESVIAR LAS CRÍTICAS: Los actores de la RPC, incluidos volubles diplomáticos del Departamento de Información del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la RPC como Zhao Lijian y Hua Chunying, utilizan el “qué dicen de esto” y las falsas equivalencias para distraer la atención de las políticas de la RPC en Xinjiang y presentar a los acusadores como hipócritas. Sus argumentos no defienden la inocencia de la República Popular China, sino que señalan que otros países son igualmente culpables de los abusos. A pesar de estos esfuerzos por desviar la atención de la situación en Xinjiang, los medios de comunicación independientes, los académicos y los activistas de derechos humanos han publicado múltiples relatos de testigos presenciales y datos verificables de que la RPC ha encarcelado a un millón de personas y de que existen pruebas creíbles de torturas, esterilización forzada y otros abusos.MENSAJEROS DE LA RPC: Los mensajeros más agresivos de la RPC son un subconjunto de funcionarios diplomáticos de la RPC conocidos por sus mensajes de confrontación. Además, los medios de comunicación afiliados a la RPC y al PCC difunden desinformación relacionada con Xinjiang a escala mundial en al menos una docena de idiomas. Para llegar a públicos de todo el mundo y tener eco en ellos, la RPC recurre a empresas privadas de medios de comunicación y a influenciadores multilingües en las redes sociales. Los troles se encargan de atacar, suscitar polémicas, insultar y acosar a los internautas para envenenar el entorno informativo y distraer de las narrativas críticas con la RPC.UN SUBGRUPO DE DIPLOMÁTICOS DE LA RPC LIDERA CON MENSAJES ASERTIVOS: La mayor parte de los mensajes diplomáticos de la RPC en las redes sociales son positivos y tienden a centrarse en destacar las buenas relaciones con otros países y buscan mejorar la imagen de la RPC. Una minoría de funcionarios del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, denominados “guerreros lobo” por algunos comentaristas, utilizan las plataformas de las redes sociales para defender los intereses nacionales de la RPC, a menudo en forma de confrontación. Estos individuos son los más propensos a tratar de negar, “refutar” y desviar las narrativas que van en contra de los mensajes oficiales de la RPC. Por ejemplo, para distraer la atención de las atrocidades cometidas en Xinjiang, los mensajeros de la RPC difundieron una narrativa falsa en la que se afirmaba que la CIA estaba tratando de fomentar los disturbios en Xinjiang para hacer caer a la RPC. Este estilo agresivo permite a la RPC experimentar con diferentes tipos de mensajes para ver qué funciona bien en su país y en el extranjero. Por ejemplo, las cuentas de algunos funcionarios del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la RPC difunden repetidamente desinformación y teorías de conspiración sobre el origen del virus que causa COVID-19 y sobre la guerra injustificada y no provocada de Rusia contra Ucrania.MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN AFILIADOS A LA RPC Y AL PCC DIFUNDEN GLOBALMENTE DESINFORMACIÓN RELATIVA A XINJIANG: Los medios de comunicación afiliados a la RPC y al PCC, como China Global Television Network, China Daily, Radio Internacional de China y Xinhua, producen contenidos en al menos 12 idiomas y dedican importantes recursos a la publicidad en las redes sociales. En febrero de 2021, ante el creciente escrutinio internacional sobre el genocidio de la RPC en Xinjiang, Xinhua publicó una “hoja informativa” que contenía numerosas afirmaciones falsas, como la de que los campos de internamiento que retienen a los uigures en Xinjiang son “centros de educación y formación profesional” que han “garantizado plenamente la libertad personal y la dignidad de los aprendices”. Sin embargo, los testimonios de los detenidos publicados por Amnistía Internacional alegan que la RPC los sometió a interrogatorios regulares, torturas y otros malos tratos. La RPC se asocia con medios de comunicación extranjeros para reeditar contenidos producidos y respaldados por la RPC para públicos locales, lo que da a las narrativas elegidas por Beijing un nivel de autoridad y credibilidad que no podrían alcanzar por sí solas. Por ejemplo, la empresa Kenya Broadcasting Corporation publicó en noviembre de 2019 un artículo de un autor anónimo sobre la política de “alivio de la pobreza” de la RPC en Xinjiang, lo que hizo que los observadores cuestionaran su validez y de si se trataba de propaganda de la RPC.LA RPC UTILIZA CADA VEZ MÁS COMPAÑÍAS PRIVADAS DE MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN PARA ELABORAR CAMPAÑAS DE MANIPULACIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN DEDICADAS A PÚBLICOS EXTRANJEROS: La RPC subcontrata y privatiza algunas de sus operaciones de información en el extranjero para aprovechar la innovación del sector privado. El gobierno de la RPC colabora con al menos 90 empresas con sede en la RPC para diseñar campañas de manipulación de información para el extranjero con el fin de presentar a la RPC de forma positiva. Por ejemplo, una organización editorial gestionada por la Oficina de Radio, Cine y Televisión de la Región Autónoma Uigur de Xinjiang y afiliada al Frente Unido del Departamento de Trabajo del PCC pagó a una empresa de mercadeo para que creara vídeos en los que aparecieran uigures apoyando al gobierno de la RPC, que una red de cuentas no auténticas amplificó después en Twitter y YouTube.REDES NO AUTÉNTICAS UTILIZADAS PARA AMPLIFICAR LAS NARRATIVAS DE LA RPC: Las redes no auténticas de bots, así como cuentas reales que tuitean y retuitean narrativas aprobadas por la RPC, inundan el espacio informativo y apoyan las campañas de astroturfing. Una red de cuentas publica información que niega las atrocidades en Xinjiang o acusa a “Occidente” de hipocresía y otra red de cuentas más amplia la amplifica mediante retuits y compartiendo entradas. El Centro de Política Cibernética del Observatorio de Internet de la Universidad de Stanford evalúa que las redes no auténticas en inglés de la RPC no han tenido éxito a la hora de ganar adeptos entre el público extranjero.INFLUENCIADORES UTILIZADOS PARA LLEGAR MEJOR A LOS PÚBLICOS INTERNACIONALES JÓVENES: Las autoridades de la RPC creen que los influenciadores de las redes sociales pueden ayudar a impulsar los mensajes de la RPC para dar forma a los entornos informativos locales debido a su relacionabilidad y autenticidad. Los planificadores del PCC buscan adaptar la forma de llegar a los consumidores más jóvenes de los medios de comunicación a nivel mundial y están diseñando la propaganda extranjera para que sea más “juvenil” y viral, al tiempo que se adhiere estrictamente a las “líneas rojas” políticas. En junio de 2021, Shen Haixiong, director del Grupo de Medios de Comunicación de China, de propiedad estatal y bajo la dirección del Departamento de Propaganda del PCC, promovió el uso de “estudios multilingües de celebridades en Internet” para mejorar la imagen de la RPC en regiones clave. La empresa de análisis Miburo Solutions identificó a más de 200 influenciadores de terceros países afiliados a los medios de comunicación estatales de la RPC que creaban contenidos en las redes sociales en al menos 38 idiomas, incluidos el inglés, el español, el francés, el árabe y el ruso, con un alcance medio de 309.000 seguidores. Miburo descubrió que la República Popular China utiliza a los influenciadores para promover su narrativa sobre Xinjiang, ocultando las afiliaciones de los empleados de los medios de comunicación estatales y orquestando visitas a Xinjiang de influenciadores occidentales pro RPC.TROLES UTILIZADOS PARA DEFENDER LAS POSICIONES DE LA RPC Y ATACAR, INSULTAR Y ACOSAR A LOS CRÍTICOS: Los troles de Internet, que trabajan principalmente bajo los auspicios del Ejército Popular de Liberación, la Comisión Central de Asuntos del Ciberespacio o la Liga de la Juventud Comunista, atacan directamente a los críticos en línea. Según el Instituto de Investigación Estratégica de la Escuela Militar de Francia, las tácticas de los troles de la RPC incluyen defender a la RPC, atacar e intentar desacreditar a los críticos, alimentar las controversias, insultar y acosar. La Comisión de Asuntos del Ciberespacio y el Departamento Central de Propaganda de la RPC emplean directamente a unos dos millones de personas en todo el país en esta función y a otros 20 millones que trabajan como “voluntarios de la civilización de la red” a tiempo parcial. Estas fuerzas se dirigen al público nacional de la RPC y a las comunidades de la diáspora de habla china. En respuesta a las protestas de Hong Kong en 2019, la RPC comenzó a invertir más en influir en los usuarios de las plataformas con sede en Estados Unidos, como Twitter, Facebook y YouTube, así como en plataformas internacionales, como VKontakte y Telegram. En 2021, la rama de inteligencia sobre amenazas Mandiant de la empresa de ciberseguridad FireEye y el Grupo de análisis de amenazas de Google identificaron elementos de una operación de información en curso respaldada por la RPC que apuntaba a una serie de temas, incluido Xinjiang, en varios idiomas a través de 30 plataformas de redes sociales y 40 sitios web.
- UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report on the Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe August 31st report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights outlines in alarming details the human rights violations and abuses occurring in Xinjiang. It concludes that “the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of the Uyghur and predominantly Muslim groups&#8230; may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity,” and that “serious human rights violations have been committed&#8221; in Xinjiang.The United States welcomes this important report, which describes authoritatively the appalling treatment and abuses of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).This report deepens and reaffirms our grave concern regarding the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity that PRC government authorities are perpetrating against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.We will continue to work closely with our partners, civil society, and the international community to seek justice and accountability for the many victims.  We will continue to hold the PRC to account and call on the PRC to release those unjustly detained, account for those disappeared, and allow independent investigators full and unhindered access to Xinjiang, Tibet, and across the PRC.
- PRC Efforts To Manipulate Global Public Opinion on Xinjiang Global Engagement CenterThis report is also available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively attempts to manipulate and dominate global discourse on Xinjiang and to discredit independent sources reporting ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity conducted against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.  PRC-directed and -affiliated actors lead a coordinated effort to amplify Beijing’s preferred narratives on Xinjiang, to drown out and marginalize narratives that are critical of the PRC’s repression of Uyghurs, and to harass those critical of the PRC.MESSAGING TACTICSPRC messaging tactics seek to drown out critical narratives by both flooding the international information environment to limit access to content that contradicts Beijing’s official line, and by creating an artificial appearance of support for PRC policies. Messengers use sophisticated A.I. -generated images to create the appearance of authenticity of fake user profiles.  The PRC works to silence dissent by engaging in digital transnational repression, trolling, and cyberbullying.Flooding To Drown Out Critical NarrativesThe PRC floods conversations to drown out messages it perceives as unfavorable to its interests on search engines  and social media feeds, and to amplify Beijing’s preferred narratives on its treatment of Uyghurs.  Pro-PRC stakeholders flood information ecosystems with counternarratives, conspiracy theories, and unrelated news items to suppress narratives detailing PRC authorities’ atrocities in Xinjiang. Government social media accounts, PRC-affiliated media, private accounts, and bot clusters, likely all directed by PRC authorities, assist in this effort.Astroturfing To Create a False Appearance of SupportTo manipulate narratives on Xinjiang, pro-PRC actors engage in “astroturfing ,” or coordinated campaigns of inauthentic posts to create the illusion of widespread grassroots support for a policy, individual, or viewpoint, when no such widespread support exists.  Similar to flooding, the PRC uses astroturfing to inundate the information space with “positive stories ” about Xinjiang and the Uyghur population, including manufactured depictions of Uyghurs living “simple happy lives,” as well as posts emphasizing the purported economic gains that the PRC’s policies have brought to Xinjiang.  In mid-2021, more than 300 pro-PRC inauthentic accounts posted thousands of videos of Uyghurs seeming to deny abuse in the region and claiming they were “very free.” These videos claimed to show widespread disagreement throughout Xinjiang with claims in international media that Uyghurs were oppressed.  However, according to the New York Times  and ProPublica , propaganda officials in Xinjiang created most of these videos, which first appeared on PRC-based platforms and then spread to YouTube and Twitter, in order to manipulate public opinion.A.I.  Generated Images Used To Create the Appearance of AuthenticitySince at least January 2021 , pro-PRC networks have used advanced artificial intelligence-generated content, such as StyleGAN machine-learning  generated images, to fabricate realistic-looking profile pictures for their inauthentic accounts.  Unlike stolen images of real people, these tools create composite images that cannot be traced using a reverse image search, making it harder to determine whether the account is inauthentic.  Some of these accounts repeatedly denied the PRC’s atrocities in Xinjiang, falsely asserting that the body of overwhelming and objective independent evidence of the atrocities is simply a fabrication of the United States and its allies.Transnational Repression, Trolling, and Cyberbullying To Silence DissentPRC-sponsored transnational repression targets those who speak out against the PRC, particularly in Chinese diaspora communities , with on- and offline harassment to prevent them from sharing their stories or to intimidate them into self-censorship. Trolling campaigns are designed to silence  those who speak out against the PRC, to poison the information environment with bad-faith arguments, and to silence opposing viewpoints.  Trolling campaigns frequently evolve into threats of death, rape, or assault; malicious cyber-attacks; and cyberbullying or harassment through doxxing  – publishing an individual&#8217;s personal information online without their permission, including their full name, home address, or job.  In March 2021, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) publicly questioned  several individuals’ claims of maltreatment.Narrative FocusPRC Xinjiang narratives focus on denying criticism and amplifying “positive stories” in an attempt to counter accusations of genocide and crimes against humanity.  The most aggressive PRC messengers often go on the offensive, creating false equivalencies with the actions of other countries to distract from international criticism of PRC behavior.Rebutting/Denying Criticism from Independent Media SourcesPRC messengers both post and amplify content that denies claims made by independent media outlets and internationally renowned think tanks.  In response to third-party accusations  that the PRC subjects Uyghurs to forced  labor , a wave of PRC diplomatic  accounts , PRC- and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated media  organizations , and suspected bot  networks  posted stories about the mechanized  cotton harvesting process in Xinjiang, suggesting that the Xinjiang cotton industry has no need for forced labor.  This messaging avoided responding to reports regarding the PRC authorities’ transfer of an estimated 100,000 Uyghurs out of Xinjiang in “coercive labor placements ” to work in factories elsewhere in the PRC.Amplifying &#8220;Positive Stories&#8221; To Counter/&#8221;Disprove&#8221; Accusations of Genocide and Crimes Against HumanityPRC actors use hashtags such as #AmazingXinjiang and #Xinjiang to amplify positive stories about Xinjiang and counter independent reporting of allegations of crimes against humanity and genocide by PRC authorities.  Stories of a multicultural society  living in harmony  stand in contrast to the reality of the PRC’s extensive surveillance  of Uyghurs, including PRC officials living  in Uyghur homes for at least six weeks a year.  This messaging aims to divert attention from reports regarding the PRC’s “demographic engineering ” campaign to systematically increase  the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang and to “dilute ” Uyghur population concentrations  in the region.“Whataboutism&#8221; and False Equivalencies Used To Distract/Deflect CriticismPRC actors, including voluble diplomats in the MFA’s Information Department use “whataboutism” and false equivalencies  to distract from the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang and to portray accusers as hypocritical .  Their arguments do not advance the case that the PRC is innocent; rather, they make the point that other countries are equally guilty of abuses.  Despite these efforts to distract from the situation in Xinjiang, independent media outlets, academics, and human rights activists have published multiple eyewitness accounts and verifiable data that the PRC has imprisoned  an estimated one million people  and that credible evidence exists of torture , forced  sterilization , and other abuses.PRC MESSENGERSThe PRC’s most aggressive messengers are  a subset of PRC diplomatic officials known for their confrontational messaging.  Additionally, PRC- and CCP-affiliated media spread Xinjiang-related disinformation on a global scale in at least a dozen languages.  To reach and resonate with global audiences, the PRC turns to private media companies and multilingual social media influencers.  Trolls take the lead on attacking, stirring controversies, insulting, and harassing netizens to poison the information environment and distract from narratives critical of the PRC.Subset of PRC Diplomats Lead with Assertive MessagingMost of the PRC’s diplomatic social media messaging is positive and tends to focus on highlighting good relations with other countries and seeks to burnish the PRC’s image. A minority  of MFA officials – dubbed “wolf warriors ” by some commentators – use social media platforms to defend the PRC’s national interests, often in confrontational ways .  These individuals are most likely to try to deny, “disprove,” and deflect narratives that run counter to PRC official messaging.  For example, to distract from the atrocities in Xinjiang, PRC messengers spread a false narrative  claiming that the CIA was trying to foment unrest  in Xinjiang in order to bring down the PRC.  This aggressive style allows the PRC to experiment with different types of messaging to see what plays well at home and abroad.  For example, some MFA officials’ accounts repeatedly spread disinformation and conspiracy theories  regarding the origin  of the virus  that causes COVID-19 and about Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war  against Ukraine.PRC- and CCP-Affiliated Media Spread Xinjiang-Related Disinformation GloballyPRC- and CCP-affiliated media outlets like China Global Television Network, China Daily, China Radio International, and Xinhua produce content in at least 12 languages and devote significant resources to advertising on social media.  In February 2021, facing growing international scrutiny over the PRC’s genocide in Xinjiang, Xinhua released a “fact sheet ” containing numerous false claims, such as stating that the internment camps holding Uyghurs in Xinjiang are “vocational education and training centers”&#8217; that have “fully guaranteed the trainees’ personal freedom and dignity.” However, detainees’ testimonies published by Amnesty International  allege that the PRC subjected them to regular interrogation, torture, and other mistreatment. The PRC partners with foreign media to republish both PRC-produced and PRC-backed content to local audiences, giving Beijing’s chosen narratives a level of authority and credibility they would not be able to achieve on their own.  For example, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation ran a story by an anonymous author in November 2019 on the PRC’s “poverty alleviation ” policy in Xinjiang, causing observers to question its validity  and whether it was PRC propaganda.PRC Increasingly Turns to Private Media Companies To Craft Foreign-Facing Information Manipulation CampaignsThe PRC outsources and privatizes  some of its foreign language information operations to take advantage of private sector innovation.  The PRC government engages with at least 90 PRC-based firms to design foreign-facing information manipulation campaigns to portray the PRC positively.  For example, a publishing organization operated by the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Radio, Film and Television and affiliated with the CCP’s United Front Work Department paid a marketing company  to create videos depicting Uyghurs supporting the PRC government, which a network of inauthentic accounts then amplified on Twitter and YouTube.Inauthentic Networks Used To Amplify PRC NarrativesInauthentic networks  of bots as well as real accounts that tweet and retweet PRC-approved narratives flood the information space and support astroturfing campaigns.  One network of accounts posts information denying  atrocities in Xinjiang or accusing “the West” of hypocrisy and another, larger network of accounts amplifies it through retweets and reposting.  Stanford University’s Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center assesses that the PRC’s English-language inauthentic networks have not been successful  at gaining traction among foreign audiences.Influencers Used To Better Reach Young International AudiencesPRC authorities believe social media influencers can help to push PRC messaging to shape local information environments due to their relatability and authenticity.  CCP planners seek to adapt how they reach younger media consumers globally and are designing foreign propaganda to be more “youthful” and viral while strictly adhering to political “red lines .” In June 2021, Shen Haixiong, the head of state-run China Media Group – which falls under the direction of the CCP’s Propaganda Department – promoted  the use of “multilingual internet celebrity studios ” to enhance the PRC’s image in key regions.  Analytics firm Miburo Solutions identified more than 200 third-country influencers  affiliated with PRC state media creating social media content in at least 38 languages, including English, Spanish, French, Arabic, and Russian with an average reach of 309,000 followers.  Miburo found that the PRC uses influencers to advance its narratives regarding Xinjiang by obscuring state media employees’ affiliations and by orchestrating pro-PRC Western influencers’ tours of Xinjiang.Trolls Used To Defend PRC Positions and Attack, Insult, and Harass CriticsInternet trolls mainly working under the auspices of the People’s Liberation Army, the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, or the Communist Youth League directly attack critics online.  According to the French Military School Strategic Research Institute , PRC trolls’ tactics include defending the PRC, attacking and trying to discredit critics, feeding controversies, insulting, and harassing.  The PRC’s Cyberspace Affairs Commission and Central Propaganda Department directly employ an estimated two million people nationwide in this capacity and another 20 million working as part-time “network civilization volunteers .”  These forces target the PRC’s domestic audience and Chinese-speaking diaspora communities.  In response to the Hong Kong protests  in 2019, the PRC started to invest more in influencing users of U.S.-based platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, as well as international platforms, such as VKontakte and Telegram.  In 2021, cybersecurity firm FireEye’s Mandiant Threat Intelligence arm  and Google’s Threat Analysis Group identified elements of an ongoing PRC-backed information operation  that targeted a range of issues, including Xinjiang, in various languages across 30 social media platforms and 40 websites.
- 2022 Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 5 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-441) Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization OperationsThe Department of State submits this annual report on the United States’ work to prevent and respond to atrocities.  The United States is committed to promoting respect for human rights around the world and reaffirms atrocity prevention as a core national security commitment and core moral responsibility.  This report highlights several countries of concern, the public release of the U.S. Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, and illustrative examples of efforts coordinated by the Atrocity Prevention Task Force from June 2021 to May 2022. These examples represent a wide range of efforts in prevention, response, and recovery contexts through individual Department and Agency efforts as well as joint interagency efforts.United States Response to Current or Recent Atrocities – Country HighlightsThe following are illustrative examples demonstrating how the Biden Administration is working to prevent atrocities in a wide range of contexts.On March 23, 2022, after a careful review of information from public and intelligence sources, Secretary Blinken announced the U.S. government’s assessment that members of Russia’s forces have committed war crimes in Ukraine. There are credible reports of individuals killed with their hands bound, executions of Ukrainians attempting to surrender, torture, targeting of civilian objects, forced displacements of civilians to Russia and Belarus, and conflict-related sexual violence, as well as sexual violence perpetrated in view of children and family members with the apparent intent to traumatize them. This mounting body of evidence reflects a pattern of reports of atrocities.  In concert with our partners, the United States supports a range of mechanisms to document these actions and pursue accountability for potential war crimes and other atrocities.  This includes support to Ukrainian authorities, journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society actors along with international investigative and accountability-related mechanisms, such as those conducted by the International Criminal Court and the United Nations’ Commission of Inquiry, and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism.  USAID is continuing its long-term support, since 2014, for government and civil society efforts to document human rights abuse, including atrocities, support truth-telling efforts, strengthen the legal enabling environment, build capacity of legal practitioners to investigate and prosecute these crimes, and provide legal assistance to conflict-affected civilians to ensure justice and accountability, and put an end to impunity.  The Department of State continues to support and coordinate with the Office of the Special Rapporteur of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and other relevant special procedures experts. The Department of State is reinforcing these efforts with initiatives, such as the new Conflict Observatory platform, supporting documentation, verification, and dissemination of evidence of Russia’s violations of international humanitarian law. The Department of State is also supporting teams of expert international criminal prosecutors and investigators to assist the War Crimes Units of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in conducting investigations and prosecutions of atrocities.The United States continues to support the Sudanese people’s desire to achieve a democratic transition under full civilian leadership and justice for past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses, including related to violence against protestors, rape and other forms of gender-based violence, unjust detentions, restrictions on freedom of expression, and recent violence in West Darfur.  This includes the imposition of sanctions in connection with serious human rights abuse against protesters and the providing of foreign assistance to Sudanese civil society actors supporting the democratic transition (U.S. assistance to the government was suspended in response to the military takeover on October 25). The United States also works with civil society to buttress local peacebuilding efforts and advance transitional justice efforts; and supports local actors across the country to advance human rights monitoring, documentation, and advocacy for accountability when violations occur.The United States is increasingly concerned over ongoing commission of atrocities, including reports of conflict-related sexual violence employed as a weapon of war, in South Sudan as well as increased inter-communal violence in Abyei, an area contested between Sudan and South Sudan. Recent clashes between the South Sudan People’s Defense Force’s (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-In Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) in Upper Nile state and sub-national violence in Leer County and Unity State reflect an alarming rise in tensions. Recent violence in Abyei similarly highlights increased inter-communal tensions in that disputed region and carries with it attendant risks of atrocities.  The Department of State also supports ongoing community conflict resolution efforts in the disputed Abyei region.   The Department of State supports early warning and early response efforts in internally displaced civilian protection sites and in the border region with the Democratic Republic of Congo. To capture evidence of past and ongoing atrocities and pursue survivor-centered accountability efforts in South Sudan, the Department of State also underwrites civil society-led human rights documentation, psychosocial support, and strengthening local capacity to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes.  USAID also provides community-based support and technical assistance to launch and manage community peace and reconciliation processes between communities in conflict and supports civil society efforts and community-based trauma awareness activities meant to help communities manage and prevent cycles of violence and atrocities.The United States continues to work with allies and partners to call on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to end crimes against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang.  In July 2021, Secretary Blinken met with Uyghur internment camp survivors, advocates, and relatives of individuals detained in Xinjiang to express the U.S. commitment to accountability for atrocity crimes and PRC human rights abuses more broadly.  This commitment is reflected in measures taken to promote accountability, including denying entry into the United States of certain PRC officials involved in repressive acts against members of ethnic and religious minority groups and religious and spiritual practitioners, as well as the imposition of financial sanctions and implementation of export restrictions.  The Department of State and USAID also support investigation, reporting, NGO capacity-building, and advocacy efforts related to forced labor in Xinjiang.  These efforts resulted in the publication of reports on forced labor practices that helped to discredit PRC disinformation aimed at diminishing these abuses and informed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act that President Biden signed into law on December 23, 2021.  The United States continues to assist those fleeing state-sponsored forced labor, persecution, and other abuses in the PRC.  The United States remains engaged in ongoing efforts to prevent refoulement of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups from Xinjiang back to the PRC.  In the past year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) increased public outreach on PRC-backed transnational repression, to include launching public-facing websites and a threat intimidation guide for potential victims.  In addition, federal authorities announced charges against six individuals working on behalf of PRC police and intelligence services in the United States to silence critics of PRC abuses.The United States remains vigilant regarding the continued threat of genocide and other atrocities by ISIS, including against members of religious minority groups such as Christians and Yezidis, in Iraq and Syria.  In Iraq, the Department of State continues to support civil society-led documentation and investigation efforts.  The United States also has provided support to the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability Against Da’esh (UNITAD) since its creation to collect, preserve, and store evidence of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Iraq.  In October 2021, the Department of State launched an analytic program on the political, economic, and military networks of armed groups in Sinjar district, the epicenter of ISIS’s genocide against Yezidis, which helped focus attention on factors that prevent displaced persons from returning home.  The Department of State’s efforts supported broader work on atrocity prevention activities, including the recovery of members of religious and ethnic minority groups in Ninewa Provinces and other areas liberated from ISIS.The United States continues to address atrocities by the Assad regime in Syria, which has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.  These atrocities include torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and the use of chemical weapons.  The United States continues to promote accountability, including through targeted sanctions against those connected to abuses in Syria.  The United States supports the work of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to collect, consolidate, preserve, and analyze evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses, and to prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings in national, regional, or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes.  The Department of State also continues to support civil-society and UN-led documentation and investigation efforts, the Survivors of Torture Initiative, and the integration and empowerment of women in transitional justice efforts to ensure that atrocities committed against women and girls are addressed in a survivor-centered manner.The United States remains deeply concerned by reports of atrocities, including widespread reports of gender-based violence in northern Ethiopia.  The Department of State supported the joint efforts of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations committed by all parties.  USAID supported local non-governmental organizations and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission to monitor, document, and report violations and abuses of human rights and atrocities.  The United States co-sponsored a Human Rights Council resolution establishing an International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia on December 17, 2021. Many of these ongoing efforts will help collect and preserve victims’ and survivors’ accounts to contribute to future accountability and reconciliation processes.  The United States is also pursuing robust diplomacy to support the humanitarian truce and advance a peaceful resolution to the conflict, an inclusive and credible national dialogue, and comprehensive and inclusive transitional justice.On March 21, 2022, Secretary Blinken announced his determination that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim.  The United States is committed to justice for victims, survivors and their families, and to accountability for those responsible for past atrocities, as well as prevention of future atrocities against any group.  This commitment includes extensive documentation of abuses against Rohingya and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups before the 2021 coup, as well as support for the people of Burma to achieve truth, justice, and accountability.  Coinciding with the genocide and crimes against humanity determination, the United States announced a contribution of $1 million to support the mandate of the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to collect, consolidate, preserve, and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law.  The United States has shared information with The Gambia in connection with the case The Gambia has filed against Burma under the Genocide Convention before the International Court of Justice.  The United States seeks swift and full implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus call for the immediate cessation of violence in Burma.  The United States has also imposed financial sanctions on certain Burmese military-related revenue-producing enterprises, and financial sanctions and visa restrictions on those involved in abuses against Rohingya and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups.  The Department of State and USAID are supporting large-scale efforts to provide emergency support to human rights defenders, document human rights violations and abuses, and help prevent and respond to human rights abuses and atrocities.  In October 2021, USAID began a $45 million program focused on human rights and atrocity prevention in Burma.The United States has repeatedly called on the Taliban to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially for women and girls, members of ethnic and religious minority groups such as the Hazara, and other marginalized populations in Afghanistan.  U.S. delegations led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Tom West engaged Taliban leaders on several occasions from October 2021 to March 2022 to press for an inclusive and consultative process among Afghans on the country’s political future, respect for human rights, reversal of restrictions on women and girls, protection of members of minority communities, and accountability for atrocities.  The United States coordinated closely with international partners and allies to issue joint statements calling on the Taliban to respect the human rights of Afghan women and girls, allow girls’ access to education at all levels, and end retaliatory killings.  Special Representative West and Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights Rina Amiri continued to consult with Afghan civil society, women leaders, and representatives of ethnic and religious minority groups to discuss challenges facing their communities and ways the international community can support them.  Foreign assistance programs by the Department of State and USAID supported efforts to promote respect for human rights and to provide emergency support to human rights defenders.  The United States supported a renewed mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the appointment of a new United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur for the human rights situation in Afghanistan, advocating for a focus on the human rights of women, girls, and members of religious and ethnic minority groups in their respective mandates.Notable Milestones in 2021-2022 towards Accountability for Past AtrocitiesIn 2021, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) identified and indicted 34 persons “most responsible” for war crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred during the armed conflict in Colombia.  In April 2022, the JEP organized a public admission by ten military officials and one civilian of culpability for war crimes and crimes against humanity against at least 120 civilians connected to extrajudicial killings.  These followed the JEP’s landmark rulings in 2021 that “false positives” of 6,402 innocent civilians as combatants were systematic crimes perpetrated by the army, and that the FARC kidnapped or took hostage 21,396 persons for fundraising and strategic advantage in cases that sometimes also involved torture, sexual abuse, and forced disappearance.  In April 2022, the JEP ruled that 5,733 persons were killed or disappeared in retaliation for participation in the Union Patriótica political party.  Moreover, the Truth Commission will publish its final report this year, which will document the truth of Colombia’s five-decade conflict and provide recommendations to prevent future conflicts.   In addition to foreign assistance to the transitional justice system, the United States supports victims’ organizations to engage transitional justice mechanisms, including the locating and identifying missing and disappeared conflict victims.The Guatemalan justice sector and civil society actors took important legal steps, such as in the “Diario Militar” case and the Maya Achi case, which helped pursue justice for the families of victims of atrocities committed during Guatemala’s internal armed conflict. While the United States is deeply concerned about attacks on judicial independence in Guatemala and threats against independent justice actors, the United States supports an independent, fair judicial process that ensures victims and survivors can seek accountability for claims of atrocity crimes through fair, independent judicial processes. The United States has used public diplomacy and programming to support the efforts undertaken by those in Guatemala’s domestic judicial system, civil society, and victim representatives who fairly and independently investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate historical crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.Courts in Germany convicted two individuals in connection with atrocity crimes against Yezidis in Iraq by ISIS.  With Department of State support, UNITAD supported the successful prosecution in a German court of Taha al-Jumailly, a 29-year-old Iraqi citizen for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes after joining ISIS in 2013.  A German court sentenced al-Jumailly to life in prison.  In a separate trial in 2021, al-Jumailly’s wife, German citizen Jennifer Wenisch, received a ten-year sentence for crimes against humanity.  Al-Jumailly’s conviction was the world’s first genocide conviction of a fighter for the Islamic State.  It was also the first trial ever of an ISIS fighter based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.  The following year, a German court also convicted Anwar Raslan, a former Syrian regime official, of crimes against humanity.  Raslan was found responsible for torture, rape and sexual assault, the arbitrary detention of at least 4,000 Syrians, and complicity in the murder of at least 27 people.  The IIIM provided evidence to support the court in the Raslan case, and Departmental grantees provided evidence and testified publicly.Strategic Prevention InitiativesThe United States is committed to the prevention of destabilizing violence, the promotion of human rights globally, and the pursuit of robust atrocity prevention and response efforts.  The below strategic prevention initiatives comprise a holistic, whole-of-government approach in furtherance of these goals.U.S. Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to AtrocitiesThe Elie Wiesel Act calls on the United States government to pursue a strategy to “identify, prevent and respond to atrocities” in coordination with international, civil society, and local partners.  In July 2022, the Atrocity Prevention Task Force publicly launched the U.S. Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities.  This whole-of-government strategy offers an evidence-based approach to addressing inherent challenges in preventing and responding to atrocities.  The strategy orients the Task Force’s use of early warning assessments and input from civil society and Congress to guide the Task Force’s response in coordination with international partners and through multilateral fora.U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security: The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act made the United States the first country with a comprehensive domestic law on WPS.  WPS is a cross-sectoral issue which requires interagency coordination to help ensure that the implementation of the WPS Act, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, and the Global Fragility Act are mutually enforcing and beneficial to assist and protect survivors and their families of atrocities, gender-based violence, and conflict related sexual violence.U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability: Consistent with the Global Fragility Act, on April 1, 2022, the United States launched the implementation of the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability with five partner countries and region, including Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo).  The Strategy outlines a ten-year, evidence-based effort to foster peace and long-term stability through locally driven solutions.  The Strategy references the importance of civilian protection and transitional justice as a critical part of addressing fragility and the underlying causes of conflict, and it requires that the work of the Atrocity Prevention Task Force is integrated into country and regional plans where appropriate.Current Efforts by SectorThe United States uses a wide range of programmatic, financial, diplomatic, and transitional justice actions to prevent and respond to atrocities.  Utilizing Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 funding, the Department of State and USAID reported approximately $54.41 million for atrocity prevention programming in FY 2021, including $2.5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), and $2.5 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) earmarks for atrocity prevention.  The significant growth in reported funding, from $6.2 million in FY 2019 to $54.41 million in FY 2020, reflects increased reporting of programs that support atrocity prevention objectives, especially in Iraq.Diplomacy and Foreign AssistanceOver the last year, the Department of State utilized ESF directed for atrocity prevention programming, including the above noted ESF earmark for atrocity prevention, to support context-tailored and community-based early warning and early response systems to protect at-risk communities and monitor human rights violations and abuses especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa and South-Central Asia regions.  These programs also bolstered the engagement of local civil society and survivors in a range of truth, justice and reconciliation initiatives to overcome community-level divisions, intolerance, and violence.  These initiatives contributed to breaking the cycle of impunity that often drives atrocities and developed the capacity and resiliencies of local civil society and survivors to identify risk factors in their communities and employ violence prevention strategies to mitigate those risks and contribute to local-level peacebuilding.  The Department used INCLE funds to strengthen criminal justice system capacity to address atrocity crimes, including through training for law enforcement and justice professionals on how to recognize and respond to early warning signs of potential atrocities.  INCLE funds supported research on the connection between atrocities and related criminal justice topics such as organized crime, corruption, terrorism, and women, peace, and security; findings and recommendations from this research are being made available online to criminal justice practitioners. INCLE funding also engaged justice institutions to strengthen awareness of and accountability for gender-based violence as both a driver and component of atrocities.  Given the link between corruption, human rights abuses, and atrocity risks, Treasury hosted the 3rd Annual Partnership to Combat Human Rights Abuse and Corruption in October 2021.USAID supports atrocity prevention programming around the world, focused on prevention, response, and recovery related to atrocities.  During this reporting period, USAID implemented rapid response activities to respond to atrocity risks in a matter of weeks, long-term development programs in a range of sectors designed to reduce risks of atrocities, conflict and human rights programs to respond to atrocities underway and reduce the risk of recurrence, and atrocity-informed planning and policies to ensure USAID’s entire development portfolio is addressing atrocity risks wherever possible.Defense and SecurityThe Department of Defense published Joint Publication 3-07 on Joint Stabilization Activities in February 2022. This manual provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess the military contribution to stabilization efforts across the competition continuum and addresses atrocity prevention through a protection-of-civilians lens.Law EnforcementIn FY 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) arrested seven individuals for human rights-related violations, facilitated the removal of 18 individuals known or suspected to be involved in human rights violations or abuses, and stopped an additional 20 individuals from entering the United States.  DHS is investigating over 160 human rights cases involving suspects from 95 countries and DHS is pursuing nearly 1,700 additional human rights-related investigative leads. The FBI’s International Human Rights Unit supported accountability for perpetrators of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and torture.Within the Department of Justice, the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section (HRSP) primarily investigates and prosecutes cases against human rights violators and other international criminals.  HRSP investigates and prosecutes individuals for genocide, torture, war crimes, recruitment or use of child soldiers, female genital mutilation, and for immigration and naturalization fraud arising out of efforts to hide their involvement in such crimes.  Successful past cases have involved the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and other countries.  Ongoing cases involve human rights abuses that have occurred in Estonia, The Gambia, Ethiopia, and Liberia.  Additionally, the Office of International Affairs (OIA) works with domestic and foreign partners to extradite or lawfully remove criminals sought for prosecution in the United States or abroad for human rights related offenses.  Furthermore, the Criminal Division’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) and its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provide capacity-building to countries throughout the world, as well as training, advice, and assistance to prevent human rights abuses, as well as how to investigate and prosecute human rights violations when they occur.Atrocity Prevention TrainingThe Department of State provided two courses on atrocity prevention; a total of 272 participants enrolled between January 1, 2021 and May 1, 2022.  Course participants came from 164 overseas posts and 56 bureaus, offices, and interagency partner organizations.  USAID updated its atrocity prevention training to shift from early warning to early action.  In 2021, 65 USAID staff, including 50 Foreign Service Officers, participated in Atrocity Prevention training, including a dedicated training course conducted for USAID and Department of State staff in Ethiopia.The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) incorporated atrocity prevention and response themes into its Rule of Law seminars.  These and similar courses trained 815 foreign partner participants in FY21 and 320 participants in the first half of FY22.  DIILS courses included lessons on genocide, gender-based violence, protection of civilians, and transitional justice as a means of restoring and maintaining post-atrocity peace, as well as examination of how breakdowns in military discipline can result in the commission of atrocities.  DHS and FBI also delivered capacity-building programs through their component offices to partner governments that support law enforcement and security professionalization.The interagency Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center offered training related to its justice and accountability mission.  For example, in FY2021, Homeland Security Investigations trained over 1,900 personnel about combatting female genital mutilation, and the FBI’s International Human Rights Unit provided more than 45 training events related to the investigation of war crimes, genocide, torture, and other human rights offenses.  DOJ’s offices of HRSP, OPDAT, ICITAP, and OIA provide training to U.S. government and foreign partners on the tools that can be used in support of accountability for atrocity crimes and on the methods by which foreign partners can prepare requests for evidence production and extradition or other lawful return of fugitives.Multilateral and External EngagementThe United States continued to expand its atrocity prevention work with likeminded partners and the Offices of the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide and the UN Special Advisor for the Responsibility to Protect.  The United States resumed its membership in the UN Human Rights Council, which took numerous steps to promote respect for human rights and accountability for atrocities in FY2021, including a resolution establishing an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.  The United States also secured broad, cross-regional support for language on atrocities by members of Russia’s forces in Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly and in other UN bodies, at the G7, NATO, and in other multinational venues.  The United States worked closely with partners to draw attention to atrocities in Burma and Ethiopia that were inadequately addressed in other fora and convened partners across the UN and civil society to coordinate efforts and share emerging best practices and supportive technologies, including as part of the International Atrocities Prevention Working Group.  DOJ, FBI, and DHS maintain observer status at the Eurojust Genocide Network, which promotes close cooperation between European national authorities investigating and prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes.The Atrocity Prevention Task Force prioritized outreach with civil society, in particular the Prevention and Protection Working Group, and Congress.  This collaboration led to revisions of the Atrocity Assessment Framework and informed the dissemination of innovative technologies and tools for protecting lawyers and activists in unstable environments, and the release of multilateral statements drawing attention to atrocities in Burma, and Ethiopia.Recommendations for the Coming YearThe Atrocity Prevention Task Force has taken concrete steps towards its 2021 recommendations, including integrating atrocity prevention into Global Fragility Act implementation, incorporating gender into atrocity assessments and prevention tools, and proposing revisions to country strategies based on assessed atrocity risks. In 2022, the Atrocity Prevention Task Force will continue to implement the 2021 recommendations and will prioritize the following, based on consultations with Congress and civil society:Identify and respond to select priority prevention cases, where longer-term drivers of atrocity risk can be effectively addressed in permissive environments.In priority cases, map gaps in assistance against identified risks and seek to streamline assistance, where possible, to respond to those gaps and more effectively apply a holistic prevention approach.Monitor progress of the implementation of the U.S. Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities and further refine monitoring, evaluation, and learning across the atrocity prevention architecture.  Particular emphasis will be placed on atrocity prevention training for officers covering countries at-risk of atrocities.Apply the Atrocity Assessment Framework to inform country and regional strategies to unique aspects of prevention, response, and recovery stages.
- Xinjiang HomeReportsOffice of International Religious FreedomChina (Includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Macau)&#8230;Xinjiang				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						China (Includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Macau): Xinjiang																																																																																												 In this section										/																							Read a Section: Xinjiang																																													Read a Section: Xinjiang																															Executive Summary																																																																																		Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																																																																								Read a Section: Xinjiang				CHINA | Tibet | HONG KONG | Macau																																					Executive Summary						    																																															The constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining “normal.”  The U.S. government estimated that since April 2017, the government has detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim groups, as well as some Christians, in specially built internment camps or converted detention facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) under the national counterterrorism law and the regional counterextremism policy.  Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics estimated the number of individuals detained in internment camps or other facilities was higher.  According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) analysis of satellite imagery data, the government built or expanded 385 detention centers between 2017 and 2021, including at least 61 between July 2019 and July 2020 and five built during the year.  Human rights NGOs and former detainees said authorities subjected individuals to forced disappearance, torture, other physical and psychological abuse, including forced sterilization and sexual abuse, forced labor, political indoctrination, and prolonged detention without trial because of their religion and ethnicity.  There were reports that authorities moved tens of thousands of individuals from their home areas to work elsewhere in the region and the country.  During the year, multiple organizations found the government’s widespread and systematic physical abuses targeting Uyghurs amounted to crimes against humanity and its actions suppressing the group’s regenerative capacity amounted to genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.  A legal opinion by a group of British barristers stated there was a “plausible inference” that President Xi Jinping, Zhu Hailun, Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang People’s Congress, and Chen Quanguo, XUAR Party Secretary since 2016, each possessed “the necessary intent to destroy the Uyghurs as a group, so as to support a case against them of genocide.”  The government continued to cite what it called the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as justification for enacting and enforcing restrictions on religious practices of Muslims and members of non-Muslim religious minority groups.  In May and September, the CCP adopted Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy and Administrative Measures for Religious Schools, respectively.  These measures placed greater scrutiny and rules on clergy and religious schools to uphold CCP ideological principles.  The whereabouts of hundreds of prominent Uyghur intellectuals, religious scholars, cultural figures, doctors, journalists, artists, academics, and other professionals, in addition to many other citizens the government arrested or detained, remained unknown.  There were reports of individuals dying of injuries sustained during interrogations, medical neglect, and torture.  According to PRC government documents, eyewitness accounts, and victims’ statements, the government continued to use family separation, forced sterilization, involuntary birth control, and abortion to reduce the birthrate among Muslims.  Authorities continued to implement a variety of different methods, including home inspections, to ensure families were not observing religious practices such as praying, and it banned certain groups from observing Ramadan.  According to government sources and eyewitness accounts, the government encouraged – and in some cases required – neighbors to spy on each other.  Other surveillance included behavioral profiling and forcing Uyghurs to accept government officials and CCP members living in their homes.  Government documents revealed extensive use of surveillance cameras and security checkpoints in public spaces, including religious venues, as well as telephone, online, and financial surveillance.  In December, the “Uyghur Tribunal,” an international group of attorneys, academics, and NGO representatives, stated surveillance was so pervasive, “parts of Xinjiang have become, to some of those ethnic minorities, an open-air prison.”  Based on satellite imagery and other sources, researchers estimated authorities had destroyed, damaged, or desecrated approximately 16,000 mosques in the region (65 percent of the total), and demolished a further 30 percent of important Islamic sacred sites.  Research conducted in 2020 estimated nearly 900,000 children, including some preschool-aged children, were separated from their families and living in boarding schools or orphanages, where they studied ethnic Han culture, Mandarin, and CCP ideology.  In November, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) issued a report stating the goal of these schools was to erase Uyghur cultural and religious practice from the younger generation.  International media reported that in September, state media announced the launch of the “Pomegranate Flower” program, which assigned Han children from across the country as “relatives” to maintain contact with Uyghur toddlers and young children, in what activists and analysts said was a further effort to assimilate Uyghur children and eliminate their language and culture.  Textbooks in the Xinjiang Islamic Institute, which trains imams, emphasized the need to “be grateful to the Party” and build a socialist Xinjiang.  The government continued to seek to forcibly repatriate Uyghur and other Muslim citizens from overseas and detained some of those who returned.  The government harassed and threatened Uyghurs living abroad.Unequal treatment in society of Uyghur Muslims and Han Chinese continued in parallel with authorities’ suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religious practices while promoting the Han majority in political, economic, and cultural life.  Muslims reported severe societal discrimination in employment and business opportunities, and in travel.  A journalist who traveled to the region reported manifestations of Uyghur culture, such as song, dance, and clothing, were packaged as tourist items for visiting Han Chinese in what one Western scholar referred to as the “museumification” of Uyghur culture.U.S. embassy officials met with national and regional government officials to advocate for the human rights of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang.  On January 19, the then Secretary of State publicly announced a determination that since at least March 2017, the government has committed crimes against humanity and genocide against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.  On February 16 during a CNN townhall, the President said the United States would continue to speak out against human rights abuses China perpetrated against, among others, Uyghurs.  During the year, the U.S. government used a variety of diplomatic and economic tools to promote religious freedom and accountability in Xinjiang, including sanctions, visa restrictions, controls on exports and imports, and an updated business advisory raising awareness among U.S.-based companies about the risks of doing business in the region.  On June 22, the United States joined a group of 44 countries in issuing a Canada-led joint statement condemning human rights abuses in Xinjiang, as well as the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in Tibet.  On October 21, the United States joined a group of 43 countries in issuing a France-led joint statement condemning human rights abuses in Xinjiang.  The embassy and consulates general delivered direct messages about religious freedom in Xinjiang through social media posts and promoted online engagement on the issue of religious freedom for Xinjiang’s ethnic minority Muslim populations.																																					Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															A June report on the XUAR issued by the Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics estimates the total population is 26 million.  The report states Uyghurs, along with Kazakh, Hui, Kyrgyz, and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups constitute approximately 15 million residents in Xinjiang, or approximately 58 percent of the total population.  According to the report, of these, 12 million are Uyghurs.  The largest segment of the remaining population is Han Chinese (11 million, approximately 42 percent), with additional groups including Mongols, Tibetans, and others constituting less than 1 percent.  Uyghurs are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims.  The Globe and Mail reported in September 2019 that according to sources in the region, Uyghur and Han Chinese Christians likely number in the thousands.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										The constitution, which cites the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping Thought, states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining “normal.”  The constitution also stipulates the right of citizens to believe in or not believe in any religion.  The government recognizes five official religions – Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Roman Catholicism.  Only religious groups belonging to one of five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (the Buddhist Association of China, the Chinese Taoist Association, the Islamic Association of China, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association) representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities.The Regulations on Religious Affairs require that religious activity “must not harm national security.”  While the regulations stipulate religious groups must abide by the law, safeguard national unity, and respond to “religious extremism,” the term “extremism” is undefined.  Measures to safeguard unity and respond to “religious extremism” include monitoring groups, individuals, and institutions, and recommending penalties such as suspending groups and canceling clergy credentials.In addition to the national counterterrorism law, Xinjiang has its own counterterrorism and “de-extremification” laws that went into effect in 2016 and 2017, respectively, containing similar provisions to the national law regarding “religious extremism.”  These laws ban wearing long beards, full-face coverings, and religious dress; expanding halal practice beyond food and daily prayer; and “interfering” with family planning, weddings, funerals, or inheritance, among other provisions.  The law limits the information that may be released to the public following an incident the government defines as a terror attack.Regional regulations passed in 2018 to implement the national counterterrorism law permit the establishment of “vocational skills education training centers” (which the government also calls “education centers” and “education and transformation establishments”) to “carry out antiextremist ideological education.”  The regulations stipulate that “institutions such as vocational skill education training centers should carry out training sessions on the common national language, laws and regulations, and vocational skills, and carry out antiextremist ideological education, and psychological and behavioral correction to promote thought transformation of trainees and help them return to the society and family.”CCP members and retired government officials, including Uyghurs, are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices.  CCP members who are found to belong to religious organizations are subject to various types of punishment, including termination of their employment and expulsion from the CCP.Regulations in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, prohibit veils that cover the face, homeschooling children, and “abnormal beards.”  A separate regulation bans the practice of religion in government buildings and the wearing of clothes associated with “religious extremism.”  Neither “abnormal” nor “religious extremism” are defined in law.  Similar regulations are in effect in other parts of Xinjiang.Authorities in the XUAR have defined 26 religious activities, including some practices of Islam, Christianity, and Tibetan Buddhism, as illegal without prior government authorization.  Regional regulations stipulate no classes, scripture study groups, or religious studies courses may be offered by any group or institution without prior government approval.  No religious group may carry out any religious activities, including preaching, missionary work, proselytizing, and ordaining clergy, without government approval.  Regional regulations also ban editing, translation, publication, printing, reproduction, production, distribution, sale, and dissemination of religious publications and audiovisual products without authorization.Xinjiang officials require minors to complete nine years of compulsory public education before they may receive religious education outside of school.  Xinjiang regulations also forbid minors from participating in religious activities and impose penalties on organizations and individuals who “organize, entice, or force” minors to participate in religious activities.  A regulation in effect since 2016 further bans any form of religious activity in Xinjiang schools and stipulates parents or guardians who “organize, lure, or force minors into religious activities” may be stopped by anyone and reported to police.  Xinjiang’s regional version of the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency Law states children affected by ethnic separatism, extremism, and terrorism, and/or committing offenses that seriously endanger society but do not warrant a criminal punishment may be sent to “specialized schools for correction” at the request of their parents, guardians, or the school.The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) issued new regulations, effective May 1, entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” that require all clergy to pledge allegiance to the PRC and socialism and that create a database of “religious personnel” to track their performance.  Article 3 of the regulations states clergy “should love the motherland, support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, support the socialist system, abide by the constitution, laws, regulations, and rules, practice the core values of socialism, adhere to the principle of independent and self-administered religion in China, adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion in China, and operate to maintain national unity, religious harmony, and social stability.”  Article 6 states, in part, clergy should “resist illegal religious activities and religious extremist ideology, and resist infiltration by foreign forces using religion.”  Article 41 states “entrance to religious places of worship should be regulated through strict gatekeeping, verification of identity, and registration.”  The regulations also stipulate that authorities will hold religious organizations and institutions responsible for the behavior of individual religious clergy.  Article 7 stipulates religious staff should “focus on improving their own quality, improving their cultural and moral literacy, studying the contents of doctrines and regulations that are conducive to social harmony, progress of the times, and health and civilization, and integrate [these values and practices] into preaching, and play a role in promoting the Sinicization of religion in our country.”In addition to these nationwide rules, XUAR regulations on the administration of religious affairs, revised in 2014, require clerics to “uphold the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system, safeguard the reunification of the motherland and ethnic unity, be patriotic and loyal, and have high prestige and religious knowledge.”The SARA also issued new regulations on September 1 requiring all religious schools to teach Xi Jinping Thought and adhere to the “Sinicization of religion.”The Islamic Association of China, managed by the SARA under the leadership of the United Front Work Department, passed regulations in 2019 regarding the qualifications for Muslim clerics throughout the country.  The national-level regulations require Muslim clerics to meet the following requirements: “uphold the leadership of the CCP; love Islam and serve Muslims; possess a degree or receive formal training in Islamic scriptural education; have graduated from junior high school or above, in addition to attaining competency in Arabic; and be at least 22 years old.”To apply to become a cleric, applicants first need to submit an “Application Form for the Qualification of Islamic Clerics.”  In addition, they must provide a certificate of education from an Islamic school, an education certificate from junior high school or above, and a physical examination certificate issued by a designated hospital (including items such as “mental history”).  Applicants are also required to submit a household registration certificate and national identification card.  The applicant must receive a letter of recommendation written by the Administration of Islamic Activity Sites where the applicant’s household registration is located and submit it to the Islamic Association of the province, autonomous region, or municipality after review and approval by the local Islamic Association.On September 28, the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of XUAR adopted “Regulations of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on the Construction of Public Safety,” effective on January 1, 2022.  The regulations instruct authorities to “crack down” on “ethnic separatist forces, evil terrorist forces, religious extremist forces, and other illegal and criminal activities that endanger national security[.]”  The regulations also call for “control[ing] illegal religious activities, illegal religious propaganda materials, and illegal religious network dissemination in accordance with the law, and continu[ing] to promote de-radicalization.”  The regulations further state authorities will “carry out anti-cult or xie jiao [literally ‘heterodox teachings’] propaganda and education,” prevent and crack down on various “cult” organizations, and effectively educate and reform the individuals involved in “cults.”  The regulations also call for full implementation across the entire XUAR of a grid system of social surveillance that had previously been used only in certain parts of the region.																																				Government Practices										According to media and NGO reports, the central government and XUAR authorities continued to cite what they called the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as justification to enact and enforce restrictions on religious practices of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups.  Police raids and the government’s restrictions on Islamic practices continued throughout the year.On January 26, barristers Alison Macdonald, Jackie McArthur, Naomi Hart, and Lorraine Aboagye of the Essex Court Chambers published an opinion entitled International Criminal Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity and Genocide against the Uyghur Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (the Essex Court Chambers Opinion).  The opinion stated, “There is evidence of crimes against humanity being committed against the Uyghur population, within the meaning of Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  First, there is sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a widespread and systematic attack on the Uyghur population of the XUAR, within the meaning of Art. 7.  Second, there is sufficient evidence to amount to an arguable case that, as part of that attack, the actus reus [physical elements of the crime] requirements for the following specific crimes against humanity have been fulfilled:  (a) Enslavement... by the use of forced labour by former and current inmates of detention facilities.  (b) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty... constituted by widescale deprivations of liberty of members of the Uyghur population held in detention facilities without charge or trial.  (c) Torture... in detention facilities, including the use of ‘tiger chairs’ [immobilizing chairs] and sexual violence.  (d) Rape... in detention facilities.  (e) Enforced sterilization&#8230; of Uyghur women, as part of efforts to reduce the Uyghur population.  (f) Persecution... ranging from the deprivation of liberty to sexual violence and enslavement, directed against persons on the basis that they are members of the Uyghur population and/or Muslim.  (g) Enforced disappearance... of members of the Uyghur population.”The Essex Court Chambers Opinion stated, “We consider that there is evidence that the crime of genocide is currently being committed in XUAR.  First, the Uyghur population of XUAR constitutes an ethnical group within the meaning of Art. 6 of the Rome Statute.  Second, it is at least arguable on the available evidence that there is an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Uyghur population of XUAR as such.  The evidence also demonstrates that the acta rei [physical elements of the crime] listed below are taking place in the context of a ‘manifest pattern of similar conduct’ directed against the Uyghur population.  Third, in our view, there is sufficient evidence to amount to an arguable case that the actus reus requirements for the following specific crimes of genocide have been fulfilled, with respect to members of the Uyghur population:  (a) Causing serious bodily or mental harm... to Uyghurs in detention, including acts of torture and forced sterilisations.  (b) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.  (c) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  The opinion further stated there was a “plausible inference” that Xi Jinping; Zhu Hailun, Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang People’s Congress; and Chen Quanguo, Party Secretary of XUAR since 2016, each “possesse[d] the necessary intent to destroy the Uyghurs as a group, so as to support a case against them of genocide.”  The opinion also stated, “China is a tightly controlled single-party State.  It is therefore highly unlikely that an attack on the scale of that which the evidence reveals, and especially systematic detention on such a scale, would be carried out by State authorities other than on the orders of senior State officials.”In March, think tank Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy released a report entitled The Uyghur Genocide:  An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention.  The report examined whether China was committing genocide against Uyghurs as defined by Article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The report included contributions of more than 30 scholars and researchers and found that the PRC bears responsibility for committing genocide against Uyghurs.  The report stated, “High-level officials gave orders to ‘round up everyone who should be rounded up,’ ‘wipe them out completely,’ ‘break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections and break their origins.’”  The report stated the PRC also pursued a “dual systematic campaign of forcibly sterilizing Uyghur women of childbearing age and interning Uyghur men of child-bearing years, preventing the regenerative capacity of the group.”On April 19, international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a 53-page report entitled “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots”:  China’s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims, authored with assistance from Stanford Law School’s Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic.  Based on research conducted by the authors, reports by human rights organizations, media, activist groups, and others, and internal CCP documents, the report found that “[s]ince at least 2014, the Chinese government has subjected Turkic Muslims to various crimes against humanity, including mass arbitrary detention, torture and deaths in detention, and enforced disappearances.”In June, UK-based NGO Amnesty International released a 160-page report entitled “Like We Were Enemies in a War”:  China’s Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang, documenting the accounts of more than 50 former detainees who experienced torture, violence, and other mistreatment in detention camps.  The report detailed the government’s systematic use of detention and “re-education” centers to target Uyghurs and members of other ethnic minority groups living in Xinjiang.  The report concluded “members of the predominately Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang have been subjected to an attack meeting all the contextual elements of crimes against humanity,” and that the evidence demonstrated the PRC government had at least committed the crimes against humanity of “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; and persecution.”  The report also stated security officials’ use of rape and sexual violence constituted a crime against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(1)(g) “Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilizations, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”In November, the USHMM Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a 60-page report entitled “To Make Us Slowly Disappear”:  The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs.  The report stated the USHMM was “gravely concerned that the Chinese government may be committing genocide against the Uyghurs.”  It further built on the USHMM’s March 2020 announcement that “there was a reasonable basis to believe that the CCP had perpetrated the crimes against humanity of persecution and of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty against Uyghurs.”  USHMM stated, “This report analyzes additional information available in English in the public domain concerning the treatment of China’s Uyghur community in Xinjiang, and finds there is now a reasonable basis to believe that the crimes against humanity of forced sterilization, sexual violence, enslavement, torture, and forcible transfer are also being committed.”On December 9, the “Uyghur Tribunal,” an international group of attorneys, academics, and NGO representatives, released its “Summary Judgment.”  Based on the tribunal’s research and investigation, including the use of eyewitness testimonies, it concluded “in Xinjiang and at the hands of some part or parts of the PRC government and the CCP:  (a) Hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs – with some estimates well in excess of a million – have been detained by PRC authorities without any, or any remotely sufficient reason, and subjected to acts of unconscionable cruelty, depravity and inhumanity.  Sometimes up to 50 have been detained in a cell of 22 square metres [240 square feet] so that it was not possible for all to lie on concrete (or similar) floors, with buckets for toilets to be used in view of all in the cell, observed at every moment by CCTV.  (b) Many of those detained have been tortured for no reason, by such methods as:  pulling off fingernails; beating with sticks; detaining in ‘tiger chairs’ where feet and hands were locked in position for hours or days without break; confined in containers up to the neck in cold water; and detained in cages so small that standing or lying was impossible.  (c) Many of those detained have been shackled by heavy metal weights at their feet and sometimes with feet and hands connected, immobilised for months on end.  (d) Detained women – and men – have been raped and subjected to extreme sexual violence.  One young woman of twenty or twenty-one was gang raped by policemen in front of an audience of a hundred people all forced to watch.  (e) Women detainees have had their vaginas and rectums penetrated by electric shock rods and iron bars.  Women were raped by men paying to be allowed into the detention centre for the purpose.  (f) Detainees were fed with food barely sufficient to sustain life and frequently insufficient to sustain health, food that could be withheld at whim to punish or humiliate.  (g) Detainees were subjected to solitary confinement in cells permanently dark or permanently lit, deprived of sleep for days at a time and ritually humiliated.”According to multiple human rights NGOs and academic sources, authorities held more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Hui, and members of other Muslim groups as well as some Christians, in a vast network of camps since 2017, many of them co-located with factories, where sources said detainees were subjected to forced labor and “reeducation.”  Several human rights groups estimated the number of individuals interned to be up to 3.5 million.  The government continued to use detentions to implement a XUAR-specific counterextremism policy that identifies “extremist” behavior (including growing beards, wearing headscarves, and abstaining from alcohol) in concert with the National Counterterrorism Law, which contains provisions on “religious extremism.”In September, the Jamestown Foundation released academic research providing evidence that the PRC’s top government officials were closely involved in the creation of the internment camp system in Xinjiang.  The research, based on an examination of government documents and state-run media commentary, found that the “XUAR De-Extremification Regulation” was spearheaded by three government bodies:  the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, and the SARA.  Two of the three institutions were under the direct supervision of Li Zhanshu and Wang Yang, members of the CCP’s seven-person Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP’s highest-ranking body.Researchers at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre continued to maintain the Xinjiang Data Project, an online database that uses satellite imagery, PRC government documents, official statistics, and other sources to document human rights abuses in the region.  The project locates, maps, and analyzes suspected detention facilities.  According to the data, the government built or expanded 385 detention centers between 2017 and 2021, including at least 61 facilities built or expanded between July 2019 and July 2020 and five built during the year.  Based on satellite imagery analysis of security features including high perimeter walls, watchtowers, internal fencing, and other features and usage patterns, analysts concluded 109 were low security facilities, 94 were medium security facilities, 72 were high security facilities, and 110 were maximum security facilities.In July, BuzzFeed News published an analysis of the scale of the detention centers in Xinjiang and concluded that “China has built space to lock up at least 1.01 million people in Xinjiang at the same time,” i.e., one in every 25 residents in the region.  The news outlet stated this was likely an underestimate, based on accounts of former detainees who described overcrowded conditions in the detention centers.In July, authorities permitted an Associated Press (AP) reporter to enter a detention camp in Dabancheng, north of Urumqi.  In its subsequent article, AP estimated the site could hold approximately 10,000 people.  The article stated detainees all wore uniforms and sat with “their legs crossed in [the] lotus position and their backs ramrod straight, numbered and tagged, gazing at a television playing grainy black-and-white images of Chinese Communist Party history.”  AP reported 25-foot-tall concrete walls surrounded the camp, with watchtowers and topped with electric wire as well as face-scanning turnstiles and guards holding rifles placed at the entrance.  The AP also described rooms in which inmates could speak through computers to lawyers, relatives, and police as well as medical rooms with instructions on the wall instructing staff on procedures to deal with sick inmates and to force-feed inmates on hunger strikes.  The AP stated that although the government claimed in 2019 it had closed “training centers,” satellite imagery and interviews with experts and former detainees suggested it converted some, like Dabancheng, into prisons or pretrial detention facilities.In September, former detainee Baqitali Nur told the Guardian that surveillance cameras were ubiquitous in detention camps.  “Inside the cell, here was a camera, there was a camera, on all sides and angles there were cameras,” he said.  “The only camera-free place was where the toilet was.”  The Guardian reported at least four other survivors who testified recalled cells and facilities that were surveilled from floor to ceiling.  In April, the New Yorker reported that former detainee Anar Sabit, an ethnic Kazakh, said there were cameras even in the toilet and shower areas.The Financial Times reported in October that one researcher who studied Xinjiang’s internment system indicated the detention facilities were the largest internment of a religious minority since the Second World War.  According to the researcher, some detainees were able to escape punishment with displays of loyalty, but “those who lacked these masks were dehumanised under the lights and cameras of the camps.”There were numerous reports of individuals being incarcerated, sometimes for lengthy periods of time, held under harsh conditions, physically and sexually abused, and subjected to involuntary sterilization.  Many individuals disappeared in prior years, but relatives only learned what happened to them during the year.  Some ethnic Uyghur and Kazakh individuals who had been held in detention facilities managed to emigrate abroad during the year, where they were able to speak with human rights NGOs and journalists about their experiences.  Local observers said many incidents related to abuses or pressure on Uyghurs and other Muslims went unreported to international media or NGOs due to government restrictions on the free flow of information.In October, CNN interviewed a former Chinese police officer who served multiple tours in Xinjiang and was directly involved in the severe physical mistreatment and violence undertaken against Uyghurs and other ethnic minority communities.  The former police officer stated 150,000 police officers had been recruited to participate in the province-wide “strike hard” campaign and that there were arrest quotas they had to meet.  The officer stated, “We took (them) all forcibly overnight.  If there were hundreds of people in one county in this area, then you had to arrest these hundreds of people.”  During interrogations, police officers would “kick them, beat them (until they’re) bruised and swollen... Until they kneel on the floor crying.”  “Interrogation” methods included shackling people to a metal or wooden “tiger chair” (rendering them immobile), sexual violence against men and women, electrocutions, and waterboarding.  The source said guards forced inmates to stay awake for days and denied them food and water.  Authorities accused detainees of terror offenses, but the source said he believed “none” of the hundreds of prisoners he was involved in arresting had committed a crime.On October 23, the Globe and Mail published the account of one Uyghur woman’s experiences teaching Chinese in a detention the camp where she described a systematic “dehumanization” campaign targeting the detainees.  Due to overcrowding, detainees had to take turns sleeping on the concrete floor.  Many of the cells did not have toilets, so detainees used a bucket that they were permitted to empty once a week.  According to the Globe and Mail, detainees “took on a haunted expression that came with the physical and psychological violence that permeated the camp.  The detainees became deeply fearful.  Their voices trembled when they answered questions in class.”In June, Deutsche Welle reported that during the year several members of the Uyghur diaspora learned authorities had arrested their family members and sentenced them to lengthy prison terms.  Sources in Xinjiang confirmed to Deutsche Welle that authorities sentenced the brother and sister of Uyghur linguist and refugee from Xinjiang Abduweli Ayup to 14 years and 12 years in prison, respectively.  According to Ayup, police had arrested and detained 72 Uyghurs associated with him.In May, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that Mihray Erkin, Abduweli Ayup’s niece, died in November 2020 while being held in an internment camp.  Authorities had detained her after she returned to Kashgar (Chinese:  Kashi) Prefecture from Japan in August 2019, reportedly at the insistence of her parents.  A source from her hometown told RFA that authorities falsified a medical report stating she died of a disease and forced her family members to record video testimonies stating she had this disease and that she died at home.  The source said her death may instead have been the result of abuse suffered during interrogation.RFA reported in July that sources confirmed Uyghur anthropology Professor Rahile Dawut of Xinjiang University, who had been missing and presumed detained since 2017, was sentenced to prison.  The charges, length of sentence, and whereabouts of Dawut remained unknown at year’s end.RFA reported in December that sources confirmed Uyghur Shazadigul Tomur died from an unknown stomach ailment while working in a forced labor facility after authorities had denied her medical treatment.  Sources told RFA that authorities detained Tomur in 2018 and eventually sent her to an internment camp where they forced her to work in a sock factory.  Tomur reportedly informed camp officials that she had severe abdominal pain, but authorities ignored her repeated requests for medical treatment.  Sources told RFA that in September 2020 she began vomiting blood, lost consciousness, and eventually died.  RFA reported local officials confirmed the details of her detention and death.In December, RFA reported authorities confirmed a retired Uyghur civil servant, Niyaz Nasir, died in an internment camp in late 2020.  According to RFA sources, officials detained Nasir in 2018, although the details of his arrest were still unknown.  Nasir’s family reportedly requested authorities release him in 2018 due to his deteriorating health, but officials rejected the family’s request.Sources stated authorities continued to use detailed information to rank citizens’ “trustworthiness” using various criteria.  The Economist in 2018 described the rankings as “explicitly racist:  people are suspected merely on account of their ethnicity.”  According to the Economist, being labelled “untrustworthy” could lead to being detained by authorities.  Officials deemed individuals as trustworthy, average, or untrustworthy depending on how they fit into the following categories:  ages 15 to 55 years old (i.e., of military age); of Uyghur ethnicity; unemployed; possessed religious knowledge; prayed five times a day; had a passport; had ever overstayed a visa; wore religious clothing or had long beards; had family members living abroad; homeschooled their children (which was prohibited throughout the country); or had visited one of the “sensitive countries.”  According to HRW, the 26 “sensitive countries” were Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.RFA reported that in January, Haji Mirzahid Kerimi, an 82-year-old poet, died while serving an 11-year sentence in a Xinjiang prison for publishing “problematic” books on Uyghur history.  PRC authorities had previously banned five books written by Kerimi and sentenced him in 2017 despite his significant health issues.  According to RFA, an anonymous prison official said Kerimi “jumped and fell.”In February, the New Yorker published the accounts of several former detainees, all of whom had been detained in 2017 or later.  Erbaqyt Otarbai, an ethnic Kazakh, described lengthy interrogations after being detained for having WhatsApp – which authorities described as “illegal software” – on his phone.  Otarbai stated authorities beat him and kept him for long periods of time in “tiger chairs,” and that he witnessed the torture of other detainees.The New Yorker article also described a similar experience for Aynur, a primary school teacher, and her husband Nurlan Kokteubai, a mathematics teacher, both ethnic Kazakhs.  They had been living in Kazakhstan since 2011, but in 2017 the Party secretary of Aynur’s former school in Chapchal County contacted her by phone and WeChat insisting she return to Xinjiang.  She arrived in Xinjiang in 2017 after authorities told her she would only need to stay for two weeks.  Once there, however, authorities required her to remain longer, so her husband joined her three months later.  Police accused Kokteubai of being “under suspicion of having dealings with individuals suspected of terrorist activities.”  While her husband was detained, authorities forced Aynur to attend “reeducation” training and Mandarin language lessons.In March, RFA reported that Uyghur textile trader and entrepreneur Kurbanjan Abdukerim had died four days after his February 23 release from an internment camp in Atush (Atushi) City, Kizilsu Kirghiz (Kezileisu Keerkezi) Autonomous Prefecture.  While RFA was unable to confirm the exact details of Abdukerim’s cause of death, he had reportedly lost more than 100 pounds during three years of imprisonment in an internment camp beginning in early 2018, which raised questions as to whether his death was linked to malnutrition or an infectious disease.  Authorities originally imprisoned him for traveling to Mecca several years earlier, which was legal at the time.In April, the New Yorker reported that ethnic Kazakh Sabit from Kuytun City, Ili Kazakh (Yili Hasake) Autonomous Prefecture, who emigrated to Canada, returned to Xinjiang via Kazakhstan in 2017 to manage the affairs of her recently deceased father.  At the airport in Urumqi when she tried to depart, authorities flagged her for detainment and “reeducation” due to her international travel.  Authorities transferred Sabit back to Kuytun, where they detained and interrogated her for 19 days.  They forced her to undergo a medical exam that included giving blood and urine samples, and taking an electrocardiogram, an ultrasound, and a chest X-ray.  At the police station, officers took photographs, fingerprints, and a DNA sample.  Authorities gave her an iris scan and compelled her to speak into a microphone to capture her voiceprint.  The New Yorker article said this data was uploaded to the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), a massive database authorities in Xinjiang maintain that collects a variety of personal information on the lives and movements of individuals.  After being initially told she would be allowed to leave the country, officials rearrested Sabit and sent her to a “reeducation” camp where she and other detainees lived in overcrowded conditions and under constant surveillance – including in the toilet and shower areas – and studied CCP propaganda.  Sabit said she and the other women had to learn communist songs and sing them loudly before each meal.  If they did not show sufficient zeal, guards threatened to withhold food.  After 20 months in detention, authorities finally allowed Sabit to leave the country.In HRW’s report “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots,” the NGO reported that ethnic Uyghur Mihrigul Tursun witnessed physical and psychological punishment, ill-treatment, and poor medical care during her time in the detention camps.  During a three-month period, she said she witnessed nine deaths.  She described “being stripped naked, forced to undergo a medical examination, and being electroshocked and beaten” during interrogations.  According to Tursun, 40 to 68 women, chained at the wrists and ankles, were placed in the same 420 square-foot underground cell in which they were expected to urinate and defecate.  The cell “had just one small hole in the ceiling for ventilation.”In May, RFA reported that Uyghur businessman Abduhelil Hashim from Ghulja (Yining), Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, died under mysterious circumstances while being treated at a prison hospital.  A court had sentenced Hashim in 2020 for “religious extremism.”  According to the report, 40 years earlier, Hashim had received religious education from a neighbor, which was the basis for his conviction of extremism.  RFA and family members requested more information on the cause of death, but the hospital nurse said the cause was “unclear.”  Hashim’s nephew stated he believed Hashim may have died as a result of torture or other mistreatment while in prison.In September, RFA reported that Yaqub Haji, a Uyghur businessman who donated money for the construction of a mosque in Ghulja, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, and was later arrested for “religious extremism” in 2018, was tortured and died in an internment camp.  A friend told RFA that officials tortured Haji because he would not confess to the “crime” of contributing money to the construction of religious buildings.In December, the New York Post reported Tursunay Ziyawudun’s account of detainment in a “reeducation” center in northern Xinjiang.  Authorities detained Ziyawudun in 2017 and again in 2018.  She reported camp officials required her to sing patriotic songs and told her that Islam did not exist.  While in the camp, she said, “I was gang-raped and my private parts were tortured with electricity.”  She also reported that officials required her to take “sterilization pills,” which she said rendered her unable to have children.In February 2020, Foreign Policy reported authorities detained Hui Muslims in Xinjiang for travel overseas, including to Pakistan, for work or study, accessing religious content on the internet, performing the Hajj, and visiting mosques.  According to one former detainee, authorities treated all Muslim prisoners the same.  “It didn’t matter if you were Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Hui... If you had gone to a mosque before, you were there.”In October, RFA reported that Uyghur imam Qeyimahun Qari died in 2018 after spending two years in an internment camp.  Sources said police frequently interrogated Qari inside the camp to try to obtain information on Uyghurs who came to his mosque, and they tortured him when he declined to reveal their names and personal details.  Sources also said 59-year-old Qari was healthy at the time of his arrest in 2017 and had previously survived a 15-year prison sentence.  The sources said this incident showed recent conditions in the detention camps were harsher than in prisons and other detention facilities before 2017.In March, Amnesty International reported that Ekpar Asat, a Uyghur journalist and entrepreneur, held a three-minute video conversation with his family in late January.  This was his first contact with family since April 2016, when public security officers detained him.  Asat reportedly told family members that his health was declining both physically and mentally.  His family said Asat had lost significant weight and that he looked pale and had many black spots on his face.In December, Metro News reported that Omer Faruh’s two youngest daughters, ages five and six, had been missing for five years after he, his wife, and two eldest daughters fled Xinjiang.  In 2016, Faruh’s wife Meryem called him while he was visiting Saudi Arabia to inform him that authorities had ordered her and their two eldest daughters to turn over their passports.  Meryem and the two eldest daughters were able to book flights out of the country.  The family left the two youngest daughters, who did not have passports, with Meryem’s parents in Xinjiang.  Faruh told Metro News that he learned authorities had sent Meryem’s parents to internment camps in 2017.RFA reported in April that sources learned authorities in Kashgar (Kashi) Prefecture had sentenced renowned Uyghur author Ahtam Omer in a 2018 secret trial to 20 years in prison for “separatism.”  Authorities arrested Omer on March 12, 2017, and held him incommunicado.  In 2020, authorities included a collection of Omer’s short stories entitled Child of the Eagle in a book burning campaign.  Sources told RFA authorities arrested Omer, his brother Anwar Omer, and his nephew Iskander Omer ostensibly because Ahtam had sent Iskander to study in Egypt and sent money to him.In October, the U.S.-based NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported on the arrest and disappearance of three Uyghur intellectuals:  Gheyratjan Osman, a professor of Uyghur language and literature at Xinjiang University whom authorities arrested in 2018 and sentenced to 10 years in prison for “separatism”; Qeyum Muhammad, an actor and associate professor at the Xinjiang Institute of Arts; and Tursunjan Nurmamat, a medical researcher at Shanghai Tongji University whom authorities arrested in April.In September, the NGO Campaign for Uyghurs marked the third anniversary of the disappearance of Gulshan Abbas, a Uyghur doctor missing since September 2018, and noted that the PRC had held her prisoner to “punish family members for speaking the truth about the Chinese regime’s genocidal crimes against humanity.”  In December 2020, human rights groups and family members reported that authorities had sentenced Abbas to 20 years in prison on terrorism-related charges.  The government issued the sentence in March 2019 following a secret trial, but Abbas’ family only learned of the sentence in December 2020.In April, USA Today reported that ethnic Uyghur Imamjan Ibrahim, a doctor and medical researcher living in Boston, disappeared in 2017 when he traveled back to Kashgar to visit his parents.  Friends in the United States told USA Today they feared PRC authorities had detained him and taken him to an internment camp.  A Uyghur American friend who tried to learn his whereabouts said two Uyghur women contacted her and said authorities had released Ibrahim and he was in good condition, but the friend said she thought this was a lie.In March, Amnesty International profiled several Uyghur families living outside China whose children had disappeared as a result of the government’s detention campaign.  Mihriban Kader and Ablikim Memtinin left their four children with grandparents when they fled to Italy in 2016 after facing harassment from Xinjiang authorities.  Authorities detained the children’s grandparents soon thereafter and sent the four children to various orphanages and boarding schools.  When Kader and Memtinin received approval in Italy to have their children join them, PRC authorities seized the children on their way to the Italian consulate in Shanghai.  Kader stated, “Now my children are in the hands of the Chinese government and I am not sure I will be able to meet them again in my lifetime.”There were multiple reports that individuals sexually assaulted women in internment camps.  On February 2, the BBC published accounts of several former detainees and one guard stating they experienced or saw evidence of an organized system of mass rape, sexual abuse, and torture.  Tursunay Ziyawudun said authorities removed women from the cells “every night” and one or more masked Han Chinese men raped them.  She said she was raped and sexually assaulted on three occasions over the course of her nine-month detention, each time by two or three men.  She also witnessed masked men taking several other women away to a “black room” where there were no surveillance cameras.  She also described authorities forcibly fitting women with intrauterine devices (IUDs) or sterilizing them.  Gulzira Auelkhan, an ethnic Kazakh woman who was detained for 18 months in the camp system, told the BBC that authorities forced her to strip Uyghur women naked and handcuff them, before leaving them alone with Han Chinese men.  She said Han Chinese civilians from outside the camp also assaulted detainees and “would pay money to have their pick of the prettiest young inmates.”  She stated the camp had a system of organized rape.  One female detainee told the BBC that prison guards raped her with an electric baton.  Sayragul Sauytbay, a former teacher forced to work in the camps, said rape was common and described an incident in which police took turns raping a woman in front of 100 other inmates.  During the attack, “they watched people closely and picked out anyone who resisted, clenched their fists, closed their eyes, or looked away, and took them for punishment.”In February, Bitter Winter, an online publication that tracks religious liberty and human rights abuses in the country, reported that sexual abuse, including rape, of males, in particular younger boys, was a regular rather than an occasional occurrence in internment camps.  Amnesty International also reported camp officials raped male detainees.In March, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy reported that former detainees described “systematic mass rape and other sexual abuse in the detention facilities.  There [were] also accounts of gang rapes perpetrated by security officials, including references to masked men, the use of an electrified stick,” and other methods.  Authorities attempted to sexually humiliate detainees by forcing them to “routinely undress, squat in the nude, and smear ground chili pepper paste on their genitals in the shower while filmed.”  Multiple women said there were surveillance cameras in both toilet and shower facilities, giving detainees no privacy when using them.In October, CNN reported a former Xinjiang police officer stated he witnessed security officials at the detention centers using sexual torture methods to extract confessions.  He said, “We would tie two electrical wires on the tips [of an electric baton] and set the wires on their genitals while the person is tied up.”  Uyghur scholar Abduwli Ayup stated he was gang raped while in police custody in 2013 after authorities arrested him for teaching the Uyghur language at a kindergarten.In May, BBC reported that since 2014, the PRC had imprisoned or detained at least 630 Muslim religious leaders in Xinjiang.  Many of the detained clerics faced charges such as “propagating extremism,” “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” and “inciting separatism.”  According to testimonies of relatives, these charges stemmed from activities such as preaching, leading prayer groups, and other regular activities of imams.  The BBC article drew from a joint Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP)-Justice for All report, which stated that of the 630 detained Muslim religious leaders, authorities sentenced 304 to prison rather than sending them to the “reeducation camps.”  Court documents or testimony indicated 96 percent received sentences of at least five years, with 26 percent receiving sentences of 20 years or more, including 14 individuals who received life sentences.  The UHRP-Justice for All report also found evidence that 18 religious figures had died in detention or shortly after their release.  Several media outlets reported religious figures, students, imams, and persons who prayed regularly often received lengthy prison sentences.In February, RFA reported that sources learned that in 2019, authorities sentenced Abdusalam Rozi from Ghulja County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, to 18 years in prison in a case that was “connected to politics.”  Authorities had previously arrested Rozi in 1998 and sentenced him to 18 years in prison on charges of “splitting the country and distributing antigovernment propaganda” following protests in 1997.  RFA stated there were other reports of authorities resentencing political prisoners as punishment or for not being “thoroughly reformed.”In July, Bloomberg News reported PRC authorities continued to deny European Union diplomats access to Xinjiang on the grounds that the diplomats wanted to meet with Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti, whom authorities sentenced in 2014 to life imprisonment for “separatism.”  Xinjiang government spokesman Xu Guixiang stated, “They want to talk to Ilham and other criminals – this is disrespect for China’s sovereignty.”  Before his imprisonment, Tohti was a professor at Minzu University of China in Beijing and an outspoken critic of relations between Uyghurs and the Han majority.  The European Parliament awarded him the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2019.RFA reported in February that in 2017, authorities in Kashgar Prefecture sentenced Obulqasim Abdurehim, a Uyghur engineer, and 13 other individuals he associated with in a meshrep, a fraternal organization that is traditional in Uyghur culture, to lengthy prison terms for “illegal gathering and organizing.”  Authorities interrogated Abdurehim for more than six months to force him to admit that 10 years earlier he had paid a fine rather than comply with authorities’ demands that his wife abort their third child – a violation of regulations at the time that restricted ethnic minorities to two children per family.  Authorities reportedly claimed Abdurehim and his wife’s refusal to get an abortion constituted evidence of “religious extremism” and sentenced him to 17 years in prison.  RFA sources learned in February that another member of the meshrep, Kashgar Prefecture transportation chief Abliz Tohtaji, received seven years in prison for his involvement with the meshrep.RFA reported in February that it had confirmed authorities sentenced Bakihaji Helil, a Uyghur student from Atush City, Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture, to nine years in prison in 2017 for being “opposed to national education” and “pos[ing] a danger” to China.  Helil was among 5,000 other Uyghur students Xinjiang authorities ordered to return starting in 2017.  Helil had been studying religion in Egypt, but authorities threatened to harass his family if he did not return to Atush City.According to RFA, in March, authorities upheld the conviction of Mamatali Kashgarli, an ethnic Uyghur and Turkish national, for “terrorist activities.”  He was arrested in 2017 and sentenced the same year, although a court overturned the case in 2018.  At the retrial, the court reinstated Kashgarli’s 15-year prison sentence.  RFA sources indicated that Kashgarli returned to Xinjiang from Turkey in 2001.  His family told RFA that Kashgarli’s ties to his family in Turkey were likely the cause for his sentencing.  Kashgarli’s brother Ahmet Kashgarli told RFA that he had lived in Turkey for 33 years and never had any problems with the Turkish government and said, “In the view of China, all of us living outside [the homeland] right now are terrorists.”AP reported in April that Uyghurs Sattar Sawut, former head of the regional education department, and author Yalqun Rozi both received suspended death sentences for charges including writing and publishing school textbooks in 2003 and 2009 that authorities said were designed to “split the country.”  Rozi’s son called the charges “absurd,” telling AP, “[t]hese textbooks were sanctioned by the state.”  Rozi’s son told AP the textbooks contained historical tales of Uyghurs that had nothing to do with terrorism, and that the prosecutions were aimed at cultural destruction and forced assimilation.RFA reported that in January, authorities sent Zaytunhan Ismail, a Uyghur village elder in Turpan (Tulufan) City, to an internment camp after accusing her of “religious extremism.”  Ismail was a prominent member of her village, participating in a number of community and religious activities such as weddings and funerals.  According to a Turpan police officer, in 2020, Ismail had successfully mediated a domestic violence dispute, but authorities detained her for “getting involved in a legal matter.”In June, RFA reported that according to the Norway-based NGO Uyghuryar Foundation, authorities in Atush City, Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture, sentenced four Uyghur entrepreneurs to prison in April.  Authorities sentenced Iminjan Rahmitulla, founder of a shopping mall and one of the founders of the Grand Bazaar in Kashgar City, to 20 years in prison for “supporting terrorists” for providing donations to the family members of detained Uyghurs.  Authorities also detained Rahmitulla’s sister and daughter, but their whereabouts and status were unknown at year’s end.  Courts handed down 20-year sentences to brothers Rehmutulla Semet and Abdusopur Semet and a 17-year sentence to Musajan Imam for “engaging in separatist activities.”RFA reported that on September 1, authorities arrested Arkin Iminjan, an ethnic Uyghur carpenter from Chapchal Xibe (Chabuchaer Xibo) County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, for making a telephone call to a “marked” person (person under surveillance).  Iminjan previously served six years in prison following 2009 unrest in Urumqi.  From 2017 to 2019, authorities held him in a “reeducation” center.  A former classmate of Iminjan told RFA, “I believe that, actually, the officials wanted to detain Arkin again in order to meet official quotas on the numbers of Uyghurs to detain.”On January 4, BuzzFeed News published an analysis of the connection between Xinjiang’s detention centers and forced labor.  The report’s analysis of satellite imagery indicated that of the 385 detention centers built in the region since 2017, “at least 135 of these compounds also hold factory buildings.  Forced labor on a vast scale is almost certainly taking place inside facilities like these, according to researchers and interviews with former detainees.”  Satellite imagery analysis indicated the factory facilities collectively covered more than 21 million square feet.  According to BuzzFeed News, detention camp factories were woven deeply into the region’s economy.  Former detainee Auelkhan told BuzzFeed News she and other women traveled by bus from their detention center to a factory where they sewed gloves.  Former detainees said they were never given a choice to work or not work and that they “earned a pittance or no pay at all.”  Dina Nurdybai, who was detained in 2017 and 2018, said at a factory inside the internment camp she worked in a cubicle that was locked from the outside, sewing pockets onto school uniforms.BuzzFeed News reported that the U.S.-based nonprofit research institute Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) compared the locations of factories identified by BuzzFeed News to a database that compiles address information from China’s government registry for businesses.  C4ADS identified 1,500 Chinese companies located at or directly next to the factories.  Of those, 92 listed “import/export” as part of the scope of their business.In February, the New Yorker reported that a government program called Xinjiang Aid transferred more than 150,000 “surplus rural workers” to jobs outside the region since 2018.  The New Yorker stated, “Official claims that camp populations are declining may therefore be accurate, as detainees are increasingly sent to work in factories and on farms, or else sentenced and transferred to conventional prisons.”  A 2020 ASPI report entitled Uyghurs for Sale stated workers lived in segregated factory dormitories, underwent organized Mandarin language and ideological training outside working hours, were subject to constant surveillance, and were forbidden from participating in religious observances.  ASPI said, “Numerous sources, including government documents, show that transferred workers are assigned minders and have limited freedom of movement.”In October, ASPI stated that according to PRC media reporting, between 2017 and 2021, 600,000 workers in Xinjiang were scheduled to be trained or transferred to different parts of the country under various labor schemes.  ASPI’s research of government documents revealed that the labor transfer programs often sent workers to development projects connected to government-owned entities.In March, the BBC reported that Xinjiang authorities’ use of labor transfer programs ran a “high risk of coercion and [was] similarly designed to assimilate minorities by changing their lifestyles and thinking.”  The report described a video from 2017 showing authorities attempting to persuade workers to sign up for labor transfer schemes that would send them far away from their homes.  When no one agreed to sign up initially, authorities went door to door pressuring individuals.  Eventually, a young woman reluctantly said, “I’ll go if others go.”  The BBC report stated authorities intended through the labor and detention programs to “replace ‘old’ Uyghur loyalties to culture and the Islamic faith with a ‘modern’ materialist identity and an enforced allegiance to the Communist Party.”The June Amnesty International report “Like We Were Enemies in a War” included testimonies of former detainees that showed a clear link between detention centers and compulsory labor.  Once detainees had been determined to be ready for release, authorities decided whether to send them to a “skills improvement class.”  Some detainees reported they had “little or no choice or control but to accept employment or ‘training placement.’”  According to one detainee, authorities said if he volunteered to work as a security guard at one of the camps, he would then be allowed to leave the detention facility.On May 2, the Jamestown Foundation published a report entitled Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program.  According to the report, Chinese academics maintained that due to a lack of population mobility “the excessively strong atmosphere of religious belief cannot be diluted, and the development of social modernity is retarded.”  Chinese academic publications described labor transfers as a crucial means to fragment Uyghur society and mitigate the “negative” impact of religion.  The report stated analysis of government documents showed a “state-run scheme to forcibly uproot [minorities in Xinjiang], assimilate them and reduce their population density.”  The Jamestown Foundation report also stated there were “credible grounds for concluding” that the forced labor system met the criteria for crimes against humanity and that “Beijing’s use of coercive labor transfer to suppress religiosity, achieve poverty alleviation targets, and ‘educate’ Uyghurs in the political ideology of the state” directly violated the International Labor Organization’s Convention for the Abolition of Forced Labor.In early October, Reuters reported a foreign electronics manufacturer employed 365 Uyghur workers from Xinjiang for the company’s plant in Qinzhou City, Guangxi Province.  According to Reuters, in at least one instance, government authorities paid for a charter flight that delivered the workers under police escort from Hotan City to the plant.  A notice posted on an official Qinzhou police social media account in February 2020 also described the transfer.  Later in October, the manufacturer told Reuters it decided to “end its relationship with the staffing agency that hired these workers based on feedback on how to best secure its supply chain and in light of ongoing regulatory and legislative changes globally.”The USHMM’s November report “To Make Us Slowly Disappear” stated official government documents suggested “the CCP views larger families within the Turkic Muslim communities as both being a result of, and a catalyst for, religious extremism and ‘splittism.’”  The report stated, “Chinese policy appears to be largely directed toward destroying, in substantial part, the Uyghur community’s ability to regenerate, primarily through attacking the reproductive capacity of Uyghur women.”  Starting in 2017, government statistics indicated the government began to implement a series of coercive measures intended to reduce the population growth rate among Xinjiang’s ethnic and religious minorities.  These policies reportedly included forced sterilizations, forced insertions of IUDs, involuntary abortions, the separation of Uyghur couples of child-bearing age through detentions and forcible transfer, and “the coercion of young, unmarried Uyghur women into marriages with Han Chinese men.”In May, ASPI published a report entitled Family De-planning:  The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-rates in Xinjiang.  Citing the PRC’s own population statistics, the ASPI report showed that birth rates in the region dropped nearly 50 percent between 2017-2019.  The report stated the largest declines occurred predominately in prefectures with high concentrations of minority communities.  According to 2019 and 2020 data, the birth rate across the 29 counties with indigenous-majority populations fell by 58.5 percent from the 2011-2015 baseline average.  In counties that were over 90 percent indigenous, the birth rate fell by as much as 66.3 percent in 2019-2020.  ASPI also reported that the government deployed other coercive measures, including large fines, disciplinary punishment, extrajudicial internment of men and women, or the threat of internment for “illegal births.”In October, ASPI published a report entitled The Architecture of Repression:  Unpacking Xinjiang’s Governance that examined a series local government documents from 2017-2021.  These previously unpublished documents detailed authorities’ approach to preventing births.  Starting in 2017, authorities retroactively punished women from ethnic minority groups for violations of family planning policies as far back as 1992.  These punishments included fines, forced sterilization, and internment.  The report analyzed government documents that indicated that in 2020, the Xinjiang Health Commission spent 140 renminbi ($22 million) on reducing birthrates and punishing illegal births in southern Xinjiang.  In addition, “a taskforce called the ‘Targeted Crackdown on Illegal Births Leading Small Group’ was created at the prefecture, county, and township levels, as well as inside government departments and companies.”  At the community, village, and neighborhood level, “[p]unishing illegal births [was] a key performance indicator for local officials, and any violation of family planning regulations [was] grounds for their immediate demotion or dismissal.”RFA reported that in September, the State Council Information Office issued a white paper entitled Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data, stating the population of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the region had increased between 2010 and 2016.  Independent academics, analysts, and human rights advocates questioned the veracity of the underlying statistics and stated the report ignored the precipitous drop in minority populations from 2017 onward.  A human rights attorney stated, “Statistics are the CCP’s tool only.  They are definitely not credible.  China’s narrative is to counter Western accusations of genocide.”According to the XUAR government-run news agency Tianshan, on September 1, Nurlan Abelmanjen, Chairman of the Xinjiang Regional Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), presided over a meeting of the CPPCC on “promoting the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang.”  Abelmanjen stated it was necessary to study President Xi’s writings, actively guide Islamic religious leaders and believers to reform their ideas, promote changes in customs, pursue what he called modern civilization and progress, create a social atmosphere conducive to the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang, and implement relevant Xinjiang Party Committee policies and measures.A September report by UHRP entitled “They Sent Her to a Concentration Camp Because She Came to Turkey”:  The Persecution of Uyghurs Based on Their Turkic and Muslim Identity included the transcript of a January interview with Zumrat Dawut, a Uyghur woman living in exile who spent two months in an internment camp.  In the interview, Dawut described how camp officials and indoctrination teachers told detainees, “You were not originally Muslims.  Islam is an infectious virus that reached you later from Arabia.”The November USHMM report stated authorities required imams to undergo training and state certification in order to practice, and that religious weddings and funerals required written permission from the state.  Media reported authorities continued to conduct regular, sometimes daily, inspections of private homes to ensure no religious activities were occurring.In January, RFA reported that authorities restricted Muslims from performing circumcision and the religious rites associated with it.  According to a local source, authorities required that circumcisions be performed in designated hospitals.  The source said that in January, authorities placed ethnic Uyghur Memet Ibrahim from Alaqagha, Aksu Prefecture, in an internment camp because he had his six-year-old son circumcised outside of a hospital.Media and human rights organizations reported that 2020 SARA regulations stating only the Islamic Association of China was permitted to organize Muslims’ pilgrimage trips remained in effect.  These regulations stated that those who applied to join the Hajj must be “patriotic, law-abiding, and have good conduct,” must have never before participated in the Hajj, and must be in sound physical and mental health.  They also must be able to completely pay the costs associated with going on the Hajj and must oppose religious extremism.  According to a notice issued by the Islamic Association of China on June 15, citing the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government suspended all Hajj organization activities; therefore, there were no organized pilgrimage trips during the year.Reports published from March through May on the official websites of local governments in the XUAR indicated authorities restricted or banned certain groups of Muslims, including CCP members (who were required to be atheists), their relatives, students, and employees of state-owned enterprises and state-run organizations, from observing Ramadan.In April, RFA reported it contacted a police officer in Sheher (Shufu) County, Kashgar Prefecture, who stated restrictions on fasting during Ramadan eased in 2021 compared with previous years and that authorities told local residents they were free to fast “if they want to.”  He stated, however, that meetings about Ramadan were “always being held” at his police station, with authorities informing the public to “stay far away from religious extremism.”  The officer said he had not seen anybody who appeared to be fasting.  According to other sources, local Muslims remained afraid of punishment or being associated with extremism if they observed the fast.  A resident of Yengisheher (Shule) County, Kashgar Prefecture, when asked by RFA if he intended to observe Ramadan, stated, “Oh no – there’s no such thing now.”  The resident said he and his relatives did not know the dates on which Ramadan fell in 2021.The government continued to control the administration of mosques and to restrict access to houses of worship, requiring worshipers to apply for mosque entry permits.  In March, the Council on Foreign Relations reported that authorities regarded attending services at mosques to be “extremist” behavior.  Sending texts containing Quranic verses was also considered “extremist.”  Individuals who did either of these things risked being sent to detention camps or prison.  In May, the Christian Science Monitor reported worshippers at the Great White Mosque in Urumqi had to go through x-ray machines and metal detectors, and pass face-scanning cameras to enter.Witnesses and former prisoners stated authorities forced Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in custody to renounce Islam, criticize their own Islamic beliefs and those of fellow inmates, and recite CCP propaganda.In May, the Christian Science Monitor reported that only 800 to 900 Muslims attended Friday prayers at the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar City, according to the mosque’s imam, Mamat Juma, compared with 4,000 to 5,000 persons a decade previous.  He attributed the drop to a natural shift in values, not government policy, saying the younger generation wanted to spend more time working than praying.  One imam living in exile told the newspaper attendance at services were “staged” for outside visitors, such as foreign journalists.  The imam said, “People know exactly what to do, how to lie, it’s not something new for them.”According to human rights groups and international media, in addition to the IJOP big-data collection program, Xinjiang authorities continued to maintain extensive and invasive security and surveillance, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices.  Human rights groups said surveillance was more severe in parts of the country where religious minorities predominated, including the XUAR, compared with other parts of the country with ethnic Han Chinese majorities, due to the connection between religion and the ethnic and cultural identities of these groups.According to government documents, Han Chinese officials continued to implement a surveillance system, in which teams of six – composed of police or local officials and one Uyghur language speaker – went to each house and compiled information on occupants.  Since the program began in 2014, more than 200,000 cadres from all levels of the government were deployed to more than 8,500 villages.  The teams reported on “extremist” behavior, such as abstaining from alcohol, fasting during Ramadan, and wearing long beards.  They reported on the presence of “undesirable” items such as Qurans or occupants’ perceived propensity for “extremist” ideology.In January, the investigative journalism organization The Intercept reported on a leaked police database that showed how authorities used a vast array of tools to conduct surveillance and monitor ethnic minority communities living in the region.  According to the report, police in Urumqi used a tool that plugged into mobile phones, known as the “antiterrorism sword,” that allowed authorities to download the contents of individuals’ mobile phones.  This tool was “deployed so frequently that authorities worried it was alienating the populace.”  The leaked database detailed the presence of ubiquitous security checkpoints and surveillance cameras on the streets as well as telephone, online, and financial surveillance, “showing how granular surveillance purportedly on the watch for extremism is often simply looking at religious activity.”  The Intercept stated these tracking policies succeeded in driving down mosque attendance.  The database also offered evidence that “the ‘Physicals for All’ biometric collection program, which authorities insisted was solely a health initiative, [was] intended as part of the policing system.”  The Intercept told of one man whom police investigated based on the religious activities of his eldest sister five months prior.  The sister and her husband had invited another Uyghur couple to join a religious discussion group on the messaging app Tencent QQ.  Because he had contact with his sister, police confiscated the brother’s mobile phone and assigned a cadre member to “control and monitor” him.In March, Reuters reported the Internet Protocol Video Market (IPVM), which researches surveillance technology, published a report stating the government enlisted a number of technology companies to develop cameras capable of identifying specific characteristics of ethnic minorities using facial recognition software, including eyebrow size, skin tone, hair color, and hair style.  The report stated, “It’s the first time we’ve ever seen public security camera networks that are tracking people by these sensitive categories explicitly at this scale.”  IPVM and human rights groups said using such criteria would make it easier for authorities to comb different databases for specific individuals, or members of a particular ethnic group such as Uyghurs.In May, the BBC reported authorities were also combining facial recognition technologies with artificial intelligence to assess individuals’ emotional states in an effort to implement predictive policing.  Citing an anonymous software engineer who had worked on this technology, the report stated authorities deployed cameras to detect “minute changes in facial expressions and skin pores.”  The software engineer said, “The Chinese government uses Uyghurs as test subjects for various experiments just like rats are used in laboratories.”In its October report, ASPI stated the surveillance regimen utilized a combination of local neighborhood police stations, neighborhood grid management, home visits conducted by local government and party officials, and “joint households” (families formally assigned to monitor each other) to systematically monitor ethnic minority communities.  This system was designed to “collect intelligence,” cultivate informants to report on their neighbors, share party propaganda, and monitor changes in the behavior of individuals of concern.In its “Summary Judgment” released in December, the “Uyghur Tribunal” concluded based on research and eyewitness testimony that “[b]y means of intense monitoring, surveillance, facial recognition and advanced technologies specifically targeted at Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, parts of Xinjiang have become, to some of those ethnic minorities, an open-air prison... Neighbours, members of families, and other members of the community were incentivised or coerced in various ways to spy on each other.”According to HRW, officials considered turning off one’s mobile phone repeatedly or using a cellular phone that was not registered to the individual as suspicious behavior.  Both actions could lead to detention.According to media and the accounts of Uyghurs living in exile, authorities continued to have more than one million CCP officials from other parts of the country live part-time with local families, who were required to accept this arrangement.  According to a 2018 CNN report, the government instituted these home stays (the “Pair Up and Become a Family” program) in 2014 to target agricultural households in southern Xinjiang.  The government said the program was part of efforts to combat “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.”  The government required families to provide detailed information on their personal lives and political views during the officials’ visits to their homes.  A Xinjiang government statement available online in 2018 indicated officials had to inspect the homes in which they were staying for any religious elements or symbols, and the statement instructed officials to confiscate such items if found.Government demolition of mosques continued under a campaign called “Mosque Rectification” that began in 2016.  Based on analysis of satellite imagery, ASPI, in its September 2020 report entitled Tracing the Destruction of Uyghur and Islamic Spaces in Xinjiang, estimated approximately 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang (65 percent of total mosques) had been destroyed or damaged as a result of government policies; the majority of the destruction took place since 2017.  According to the report, authorities had demolished an estimated 8,500 outright, with satellite images showing vacant land where they previously stood.  Approximately 7,500 had sustained damage.  The government had demolished a further 30 percent of important Islamic sacred sites, including shrines, cemeteries, and pilgrimage routes, across the region, mostly since 2017, and damaged or altered in some way an additional 28 percent.  ASPI stated, “The Chinese government’s destruction of cultural heritage aims to erase, replace and rewrite what it means to be Uyghur.”  According to the Wall Street Journal, in response to the report, the PRC Foreign Ministry said there were 24,000 mosques in the region.In April, the Global Times, a CCP-owned newspaper, quoted a spokesperson for the Xinjiang government’s Information Office who stated, “There’s no so-called forced demolition of mosques problem in Xinjiang.”  He stated the government was reconstructing or repairing mosques for the safety of worshipers.  In May, Reuters reported officials in Xinjiang and Beijing denied that any religious sites in the region had been forcibly destroyed or restricted; the officials said some mosques were demolished while others were upgraded and expanded as part of “rural revitalization.”  The report said journalists visited the region where they observed signs outside mosques stating local Muslims needed to register to enter the mosque, and officials banned citizens from outside the area, foreigners, and persons younger than the age of 18 from entry.  Functioning mosques featured surveillance cameras and included Chinese flags and propaganda displays declaring loyalty to the CCP.  During a series of visits to the region during the year, eyewitnesses observed most mosques were closed throughout the day.  Local officials claimed these mosques were closed due to COVID-19 protocols, despite the region’s reporting very low numbers of new cases during the year.There were reports that authorities continued to remove Islamic features from mosques, minarets, and domes throughout the region.  In May, Reuters reported the Jiaman Mosque in Qira City, Hotan Prefecture, was “hidden behind high walls and Communist Party propaganda signs, leaving passersby with no indication that it is home to a religious site.”In September, the Telegraph reported the government had given permission for an international hotel chain to build a hotel on the site of a former mosque in Hotan Prefecture that was destroyed in 2018.In April, RFA reported that Xinjiang authorities had leased a mosque in Ghulja City, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, to an ethnic Han businessman for use as tourist hotel.  The report said videos and photographs showed ethnic Han individuals drinking tea and performing Uyghur-style folk dances alongside ethnic Uyghur dancers in the prayer hall of the mosque, which a Uyghur former detainee identified from the videos as the Uzbek Mosque.  According to RFA, these videos caused outrage online among the Uyghur diaspora.In March, the Catholic news outlet AsiaNews reported that authorities did not demolish the Sacred Heart Catholic Church in Ghulja City, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, in February as planned; however, churchgoers were unable to use the building because, in preparation for demolition, authorities removed all furnishings and cut off electricity, water, and other services.  Authorities ordered the demolition of the Sacred Heart Church despite the congregation’s having all legal permits to operate.  Reportedly, one of the original reasons authorities gave for demolishing the church was that it was “too visible” along a road that leads from the city to the airport in an area slated for commercial development.  According to AsiaNews, in recent years authorities destroyed at least four other churches that had legal permits so they could convert the land the churches were built on to commercial purposes:  one each in Hami (Kumul) Prefecture and Kuitun City, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, and two in Tacheng Prefecture.  AsiaNews stated all the churches had permits, but they were demolished, and the state paid no compensation, contrary to law.The government continued to enforce laws prohibiting children younger than 18 from taking part in religious observances and traditions.  Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities remained strictly prohibited by law from providing their children with any religious education at home, and children younger than 18 were prohibited from entering mosques and fasting during the month of Ramadan.  In May, an imam living in exile told the Christian Science Monitor the ban on religious education for children meant a significant part of Uyghur culture would disappear.  “The next generation will accept the Chinese mindset,” he said.  “They’ll still be called Uyghurs, but their mindset and values will be gone.”Numerous media reports indicated the government continued to operate a network of boarding schools for ethnic minority children whose parents had been detained in Xinjiang’s internment camp systems.  In 2020, a research study published online on parent-child separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar Prefecture, analyzed data from government spreadsheets not previously available.  According to the study, government statistics showed that between 2017 and 2019, the number of boarding students in primary and middle schools (grades one to nine) increased by 76.9 percent, from 497,800 to 880,500.  The data indicated that 53.1 percent of all students in Yarkand lived in boarding facilities.  Government records showed that among a subset of 10,000 children with at least one parent in custody, there were more than 1,000 children who had both parents interned.  Nearly all of the children were Uyghur, apart from 11 who were of Kazakh and Tajik ethnicity.  No ethnic Han child had a parent in custody.According to a March Forbes report, the government issued a document that stated, “The CCP set a 2020 goal of running one to two such boarding schools in each of XUAR’s over 800 townships.”  Government documents indicated that the proliferation of these state-run institutions was specifically intended for children of parents detained in internment camps or relocated under forced labor schemes.  Children in these schools studied ethnic Han culture, Mandarin, and CCP ideology.  In its November report, the USHMM stated, “Parents and other family members serving as children’s guardians indicated that they were threatened with being sent to detention centers if they resisted the removal of their children and their transfer to these schools.  While held there, the children are prevented from practicing their Muslim faith, and are forbidden to use their own language, forcing them to learn Mandarin, thereby erasing the practice of Uyghur culture and religion in the community’s younger generations.”RFA reported that in September, state media announced the launch of the “Pomegranate Flower” policy.  The program assigned Han children from across the country as “relatives” to Uyghur toddlers and young children, with the intention that the Han children would maintain contact with the Uyghur children by phone and in visits to the XUAR.  RFA stated the program reflected the government’s slogan that all ethnic groups in the country must “hug each other tightly like pomegranate seeds” to achieve a Chinese nationality that transcends ethnicity.  Uyghur activists and analysts criticized the program as forced assimilation.  One analyst said, “These children are still in their own homeland, but [the state is attempting to] assimilate them, to eliminate their language, their culture.”  RFA stated that according to a report published on September 11 on the XUAR government-run Tianshan website, in one week, nearly 40 toddlers and primary school pupils in one Kashgar Prefecture village, including one-year-old Mahliya Mahmut, were matched with 36 pairs of Pomegranate Flower “relatives” from 30 cities across 13 provinces, regions, and municipalities in the country.On February 11, Bitter Winter published an analysis of the SARA’s “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” which entered into force on May 1.  According to Bitter Winter, registration in the government database of government-approved clergy in the country was “complicated.”  Individuals who were not listed in the database but claimed to be clergy would be committing a crime.  Individuals unable to obtain a “clergy card” would include anyone not belonging to one of the five officially recognized patriotic religious associations, including the Islamic Association of China.  Bitter Winter stated individuals had to prove they “support[ed] the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and support[ed] the socialist system.”  According to Bitter Winter, the regulations created “an “Orwellian system of surveillance, and strengthen[ed] the already strict control on all clergy.”According to an AP journalist who visited the Xinjiang Islamic Institute in October, textbooks in the government-run school for imams were written in Chinese rather than Arabic.  Textbooks encouraged students to learn Mandarin.  One lesson stated, “We must be grateful to the Party and the government for creating peace” and another stated, “We must strive to build a socialist Xinjiang with Chinese characteristics.  Amen!”International media and NGOs reported PRC authorities or their representatives continued to pressure Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims from Xinjiang living abroad to spy on fellow expatriates.  They pressured individuals to return to China and/or cease advocacy on behalf of residents of Xinjiang, and threatened retaliation against family members still in Xinjiang if the individuals did not comply.  The Karakax List, a set of PRC government documents originally leaked in 2019 that described the systematic targeting and imprisonment of Muslim populations in Karakax (alternate Uyghur spelling:  Qaraqash, Mandarin spelling:  Moyu) County, Hotan Prefecture, contained personal data on more than 300 Uyghurs living abroad.International media reported the PRC put pressure on foreign governments to deport Uyghur refugees back to China.  In June, UHRP published a report entitled No Space Left to Run:  China’s Transnational Repression of Uyghurs that found that since 1997, more than 1,151 cases of Uyghurs being detained and 395 cases of Uyghurs being deported in 28 countries had occurred.U.S. News and World Report reported that the Moroccan Court of Cassation ruled on December 16 to refoul Turkey-based Uyghur activist Yidiresi Aishan (also known as Idris Hasan) from Morocco to China.  Aishan, originally from Xinjiang, fled to Turkey in 2012 after authorities increasingly harassed him.  In Turkey, he was known for advocating for the rights of Uyghurs in the PRC.  According to media reports, Moroccan authorities detained Aishan at the airport in Casablanca after he arrived from Turkey in July because of a PRC-filed 2017 Interpol red notice identifying him as “a terrorist.”  In August, Interpol cancelled the red notice on the grounds that it violated articles of Interpol’s constitution and was “of a political, military, religious, or racial character.”  A panel of experts in the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and international NGOs advocated for Aishan’s release.  The UN panel said in a statement that if returned, Aishan “risks serious human rights violations including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, or torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  On December 20, the Committee Against Torture, a UN-linked body of experts that monitors implementation of the UN Convention against Torture, issued interim measures, requesting Aishan not be extradited under Morocco’s bilateral extradition treaty with the PRC until a complaint regarding his case had been fully examined.  At year’s end, Aishan remained in Morocco and international organizations continued to call on the Moroccan government to not send him to China.UHRP reported in February that since 2019, Xinjiang authorities used “proof of life” videos to pressure overseas Uyghurs into silencing their criticism of abuses taking place in the region.  These videos took many different forms, but generally authorities posted videos of family members in Xinjiang stating they were alive and doing well, free to experience their culture and practice their religion, or denouncing their Uyghur relatives overseas for being critical of the PRC.  An author of the UHRP report wrote in a February edition of the Hong Kong Free Press that “these pleas have a sinister implication for Uyghurs who know their families are in danger.”The International Federation of Journalists reported that on April 9, authorities broadcast a video featuring Uyghur TV producer Erkin Tursun making a “confession” and calling on his son, who lives abroad and advocates for Tursun’s freedom, to return to China.  Detained by authorities since 2018, at year’s end Tursun was serving a 20-year sentence on charges of “inciting ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination and covering up crimes.”  Erkin’s son said his mother, once detained in 2017, was forced “to speak against me” on a similar propaganda video two years prior.According to the UHRP report No Space Left to Run, since 2017, China’s transnational repression of Uyghurs had “accelerated dramatically.”  Repression included intimidation on social media apps, deployment of malware, and threating or intimidating telephone calls from PRC government officials.  Some individuals reported receiving demands to spy on their diaspora community on behalf of the PRC government, backed up by threats and intimidation.  UHRP said, “Unreported cases would likely raise these figures substantially, with our database presenting just the tip of the iceberg due to our reliance on publicly reported instances of repression.”In March, RFA reported a Chinese hacking group called “Evil Eye” was sending links to Uyghurs living abroad, often links to news articles or other items of special interest to their targets, which, when clicked on, allowed the hackers to install malware on their targets’ devices, particularly their mobile telephones.  Hackers were then able to monitor their targets’ activity, passwords, and even their physical location.  This hacking could also enable authorities to monitor and arrest the individuals’ contacts living in Xinjiang.  Facebook reportedly stated it was taking measures to shut down the hacking group’s ability to distribute malware through its products.In August, UHRP released a report entitled “Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky”:  China’s Hunt for Pakistan’s Uyghurs.  According to UHRP, one Pakistani gemstone trader from Gilgit-Baltistan, who was married to a Uyghur woman, was denied entry into the XUAR unless he brought his wife with him.  After the trader complied and returned to the border with his wife, Xinjiang authorities detained and later incarcerated her.  The report included several cases in which PRC authorities detained women married to Pakistani men who were living in Xinjiang.In August, RFA reported that PRC authorities arrested the relatives of ethnic Uyghurs living overseas, including in the United States, who spoke out against human rights abuses in Xinjiang.  One Uyghur activist living in the United States told RFA that ever since she began searching for her sister, authorities had increasingly interrogated and harassed her family.  Authorities had also begun to pressure the woman directly to stop her advocacy for her sister, whom the government sentenced sometime after 2017 to 17 years in prison for observing religious rites following the death of their father and for keeping religious books in her possession.  The activist said the government treated families of Uyghurs living abroad as “hostages.”In November, UHRP published a report entitled “Your Family Will Suffer”:  How China is Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies that described the PRC’s efforts to hack, harass, and intimidate Uyghurs living abroad.  According to a UHRP survey of Uyghurs living abroad, 95.8 percent of the 72 respondents reported feeling threatened and 73.5 percent reported experiencing “digital risks, threats, or other forms of online harassment.”In November, HRW reported that starting in October 2016, government authorities began confiscating the passports of XUAR residents for “collective management” or “collective safekeeping” amid what the government described as the rising threat of terrorism.  The World Uyghur Congress said that although the measures were ostensibly aimed at all residents of Xinjiang, they effectively targeted the Uyghur community.  Government officials continued to exert strict control over the ability of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities to travel abroad.  There were additional reports PRC embassies and consulates continued to refuse to renew passports for Uyghurs living abroad.  Instead, PRC officials reportedly destroyed their passports and replaced them with one-way travel documents to the PRC in order to force their return.Advocacy groups, analysts, and media reported the government continued a sustained propaganda campaign launched in late 2020 attempting to counter evidence and international criticism of human rights abuses in the region.  In total, the XUAR government, often hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held 59 Xinjiang-related press conferences by year’s end.  XUAR spokesperson Xu led these press conferences and often invited scholars from universities in Xinjiang to present arguments that Xinjiang was a “beautiful place.”  In February, spokesperson Xu said, “We welcome foreigners from all fields, including relevant officials of the new U.S. administration, to take a walk and have a look in Xinjiang, so as to understand the real situation of Xinjiang, so as not to be blinded by [the U.S. Secretary of State’s] lies.  But we also have a bottom line of principle, and we will never accept any so-called ‘investigation’ of presumption of guilt.”In January, XUAR spokesperson Xu denied that the government forced birth control measures, including IUD insertions, tubal ligations, and abortions, on women in Xinjiang.  Xu stated, “The growth rate of the Uyghur population is not only higher than that of the whole Xinjiang population, but also higher than that of the minority population, and more significantly higher than that of the (Chinese majority) Han population.”In January, the PRC embassy in Washington, D.C. posted a statement on Twitter that read, “Study shows that in the process of eradicating extremism, the minds of Uygur women in Xinjiang were emancipated and gender equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no longer baby-making machines.  They are more confident and independent.”  Days later, Twitter locked the embassy’s account, “for violating our policy against dehumanization.”  The account remained suspended at year’s end.In February, RFA reported that authorities had released a video purporting to show Habibulla Abdurehim, an imam of a mosque in Hotan Prefecture, refuting the U.S. government’s determination that the PRC government was committing genocide against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and saying that the government recently renovated his mosque.  A local source told RFA that Abdurehim was not an imam but a former party secretary of Yawa township in Hotan Prefecture, and RFA contacted the police department in Yawa to confirm the source’s information.  The officer who answered said he was unsure whether Abdurehim was a religious figure or party secretary, but that 50 to 60 of the 70 to 80 religious leaders in Yawa were imprisoned.In December, ASPI published evidence that the CCP used foreign social media influencers to “shape and push” its propaganda about Xinjiang.  ASPI collected data from January 2020-August 2021 that showed foreign social media influencers created content on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms to be amplified on PRC-operated news websites.  The report stated, “By leveraging the popularity of foreign media influencers in China, the Chinese state propaganda apparatus can package their messages through potentially more persuasive voices in an attempt to neutralize critical reporting about human rights abuses in Xinjiang and depict a more positive image of the region.”UHRP published a study in December entitled Meet the “New” Uyghurs:  CGTN’s Role in Mediawashing Genocide that examined 307 articles and videos propagated by the state-owned international media organization China Global Television Network (CGTN) between 2017-2020 about “reeducated” Uyghurs being “thankful,” designed to counter international criticism of human rights abuses taking place in Xinjiang.  The study stated CGTN’s goal was to present a narrative that PRC policies in Xinjiang had successfully “transformed Uyghurs from ‘extremists’ to state-compliant, economically productive individuals.”On March 29, following the announcement that the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States had sanctioned officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the PRC held a press conference to address the protection of human rights in Xinjiang, ethnic minority culture, freedom of religious belief, and labor and employment.  Spokesperson Xu said, “Xinjiang has gotten rid of terrorism and extreme poverty....  Now that Xinjiang had achieved stability and prosperity, and people’s lives are stable and peaceful, the anti-China forces in the United States and the West are not able to achieve their ulterior goals and are very restless, so they try to blame Xinjiang and lie with their eyes open.”In May, AP reported that during a government reception in Beijing held on Eid al-Fitr, several Muslim leaders from Xinjiang spoke, rejecting accusations that the government was suppressing the religious freedom of Muslims in the region.  Abdureqip Tomurniyaz, head of the Xinjiang Islamic Association and the School for Islamic Studies in Xinjiang, said of Western nations, “They want to sabotage Xinjiang’s harmony and stability, contain China’s rise, and alienate relations between China and Islamic countries[.]”  Religious leaders from five mosques also spoke at the conference.  Mamat Juma, imam of the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar, stated all ethnic groups in Xinjiang approved of government actions to combat terrorism in the region.  He said people were grateful to the ruling Communist Party for restoring stability and promoting economic growth.In May, AP reported that Chinese state media released dozens of videos showing Uyghurs angrily denouncing the U.S. government’s declaration that the PRC government was committing genocide in Xinjiang.  PRC officials said these videos were recorded solely by Uyghurs and were “spontaneous outpourings of emotion.”  AP reported it had obtained proof the government had commissioned the videos and had ordered officials in Xinjiang to find Uyghurs fluent in Mandarin and ensure they included certain talking points in their one-minute videos.  Tahir Imin, a Uyghur activist who fled China in 2017, said the videos were almost certainly government-orchestrated and that, since information in Xinjiang was heavily censored, it was highly unlikely Uyghurs in the region would be aware of the U.S. government declaration.In June, RFA reported Xinjiang government officials held a news conference in which they presented relatives of ethnic Uyghurs who spoke about human rights violations committed in Xinjiang at the “Uyghur Tribunal” in London.  Those who spoke at the Xinjiang government conference refuted the statements their relatives made at the London tribunal.  Spokesperson Xu said individuals who testified at the tribunal were actors who “make a living by smearing Xinjiang abroad” in exchange for refugee and other benefits.  Members of the tribunal later invited Xu to send the news conference participants to the tribunal’s next meeting to freely testify.  In a statement, Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress, stated, “There’s no doubt these family members are being held hostage and were forced to say what they were told against their loved ones by the authorities[.]”In July, local media reported spokesperson Xu held a press conference following the U.S. government’s announcement to impose trade restrictions on several Chinese solar panel production companies for using forced labor in Xinjiang.  Xu said, “We have stated many times that Xinjiang-related issues are not human rights, ethnic, or religious issues at all, but are antiviolence, de-radicalization, and antiseparatism issues... Xinjiang has never been afraid of sanctions.  All sanctions are a piece of waste paper.”  During the press conference, he also said U.S. sanctions were “self-serving” for U.S. industries and would only harm U.S. interests.During the year, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) released two white papers on Xinjiang.  In July, SCIO issued the Respecting and Protecting the Rights of All Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang white paper, which stated the government upheld “respect for and protection of freedom of religious belief in Xinjiang.”  In September, SCIO released the Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data white paper, which stated, “Xinjiang’s evolving demographics are a natural result of local economic and social development, and of industrialization and modernization.”																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															Because the government and individuals closely linked religion, culture, and ethnicity, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity.  Local sources stated unequal treatment of Uyghurs and Han Chinese continued in parallel with official suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religion, and promotion of the Han majority in political, economic, and cultural life.  Muslims in Xinjiang faced discrimination in hiring and in retaining their positions, and in pursuing other business opportunities.  Local sources stated it was difficult for Uyghurs to book hotel reservations for travel.According to an AP journalist who visited the region in October, although Han Chinese and Uyghurs lived side by side, there was “an unspoken but palpable gulf between them.”  While the Uyghur language was widely spoken, public signage in some urban neighborhoods was only in Mandarin.  Han Chinese enjoyed freedom of movement not available to Uyghurs.  In bookstores, Uyghur language materials were available but labeled “ethnic minority language books.”  Manifestations of Uyghur culture, such as song, dance, and clothing, were packaged as tourist items for visiting Han Chinese in what one Western scholar referred to as the “museumification” of Uyghur culture.  The journalist saw signs in Mandarin promoting Lunar New Year, a holiday Uyghur Muslims did not traditionally celebrate.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy and Engagement												    																																															In July, the Secretary of State met virtually with Uyghur family members, Xinjiang internment camp survivors, and advocates to express the U.S. commitment to calling for the government to end atrocities in Xinjiang.  Embassy officials routinely raised concerns about the treatment, and advocated for the human rights, of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang with national and regional government officials.  Embassy staff visited the region during the year, although at a reduced rate compared with previous years due to COVID-19 restrictions.  When the region was not under travel restrictions, embassy staff could travel there without requesting prior permission, but local governments denied or impeded access to schools, “reeducation camps,” and residences.During the year, the U.S. government used a variety of diplomatic and economic tools to promote religious freedom and accountability in Xinjiang, including sanctions, visa restrictions, controls on exports and imports, and an updated business advisory raising awareness among U.S.-based companies about the risks of doing business in Xinjiang.On January 19, the then Secretary of State publicly announced a determination that since at least March 2017, the PRC has committed crimes against humanity and genocide against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.On February 16 during a CNN townhall, the President said the United States would continue to speak out against human rights abuses China perpetrated against, among others, Uyghurs.During testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 10, the Secretary of State called on the PRC to allow the international community, including the United Nations, access to Xinjiang to confirm the government’s claims it was committing no wrongdoing in the region.  While speaking of the PRC’s treatment of Uyghurs, he said, “We’ve been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as genocide, [and] other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll continue to make that clear.”On June 22, the United States joined a group of 44 countries in issuing a Canada-led joint statement expressing grave concern about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, as well as deep concern about the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in Tibet.  On October 21, the United States joined a group of 43 countries in issuing a France-led joint statement on the human rights situation in Xinjiang.  The statement read, in part, “Credible-based reports indicate the existence of a large network of ‘political re-education’ camps where over a million people have been arbitrarily detained.  We have seen an increasing number of reports of widespread and systematic human rights violations, including reports documenting torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, forced sterilization, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced separation of children.  There are severe restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and the freedoms of movement, association and expression as well as on Uyghur culture.  Widespread surveillance disproportionately continues to target Uyghurs and members of other minorities.”The embassy continued to amplify Department of State religious freedom initiatives directly to local audiences through postings to the embassy website and to its Weibo, WeChat, and Twitter accounts.  The embassy also posted or retweeted a series of posts concerning repression of religious freedom in Xinjiang.  For example, in March, the embassy posted the Secretary’s remarks to PRC State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, noting that the Secretary “raised concerns about a range of PRC actions that undermined the international rules-based order and that run counter to our values and interests and those of our partners, including actions related to human rights, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan.”  Following the November virtual meeting between the U.S. and Chinese presidents, the embassy posted on WeChat and Weibo, “President Biden raised concerns about the PRC’s practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as human rights more broadly.”  On December 17, the embassy reposted the Secretary of State’s tweet:  “We are holding to account PRC tech entities that actively support surveillance and tracking of ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC, predominantly Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang.”  On December 24, when the President signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act “to ensure that goods made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the [PRC] do not enter the United States market,” the embassy posted, “President Biden [at]POTUS:  Today (December 24), I signed the ‘Prevention of Forced Uyghur Labor Law,’ which is supported by both parties.  The United States will continue to use all the tools at our disposal to ensure that the supply chain does not use forced labor – including forced labor from Xinjiang and other parts of China.”  Almost 10 million social media users viewed these social media posts, and almost 240,000 engaged with them, participating in online discussions with embassy staff and with each other.  The tone of the comments from Chinese social media users was largely critical of embassy posts, especially concerning Xinjiang and Tibet issues, yet the coverage presented the U.S. perspective to a wide Chinese audience.Read a SectionCHINA | Tibet | HONG KONG | Macau																																				    							View report by:																				Hong Kong											Macau											Tibet											Xinjiang																										On This Page				search													>																										Read a Section: Xinjiang																Executive Summary																																																	Section I. Religious Demography																																																	Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																							Legal Framework																																																						Government Practices																																																			Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																	Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																							Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom																															Xinjiang