### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: LATASHA DENELL MITCHELL , Debtor. BAP No. EC

- 21

- 1265

- TLB

Bk. No. 2:10

- bk

- 41906

- CMK

Adv. No. 2:20

- ap
- 02166

- CMK

MEMORANDUM ∗ LATASHA RICHARDSON , aka Latasha Denell Mitchell , Appellant,

v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC

. , Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California Christopher M. Klein , Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: T AYLOR, LAFFERTY, and BR AND , Bankruptcy Judges

. INTRODUCTION Appellant Latasha Richardson removed a two

- year
- old state court lawsuit to the bankruptcy court approximately eight years after her

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R . Ap p. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value , s ee 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024

- 1. 

# FILED

JUL 12 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 chapter 7 1 case closed

. She then sought a determination of contempt based on a theory n ever before the state court

. The bankruptcy court remanded
the case and denied the motion alleging contempt. Appellant never attempted an appeal of the remand order, but she
filed a m otion seeking additional time to appea l the denial of sanctions ( the “Ext ension Motion” )

. In its caption and prayer, t he Extension Motion also requested a stay of remand. The bankruptcy court found that excusable neglect justified a late n otice of a ppeal , but it said nothing about a stay of
the remand. Appellant then alleged a violat ion of t he order based on the state
court defendant ’ s post

- remand actions in the state court and filed a motion again seeking sanctions

. The bankruptcy court denied th is motion , stating

“ the court is not persuaded that there are any me ritorious groun ds for discerning contempt .” Appellant appealed

. We AFFIRM.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 101

- 1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Ban kruptcy Pro cedu re, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure

.3 F ACTS 2 A. Appellant ’s chapter 7 case and post

- petition litigation with SPS Appellant filed her chapter 7 petition and received her discharge in
2010

. 3 T he case closed in due cou rse

. In 2018, A ppellant filed a complaint against Select Portfolio Servic ing, Inc. ( “ SPS ” ) in the Superior Court for Sacramento County and assert ed
causes of action based on alleged violation s of her rights under Keep Your
Home California (the “State Cour t Action”). Afte r almost two years of litigation , the state court granted SPS ’s m otion for s ummary j udgment. Immediately there after , Appellant removed the S tate C ourt Action to the bankruptcy court. SPS promptly sought remand ; it relied on Rule 9027(a) (3) and argued that the removal was untimely. The bankruptcy

court agreed and remanded the case. B

. The Discharge Contempt Motion During the period of temporary removal, Appellant filed a motion for contempt against SPS

. She alleged that SPS had violated bo th the
automatic s t ay and her d ischarge injunction by trying to collect a “void

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the adversary proceeding, C ase No. 2:20

- ap
- 02166

. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan M ortg . Co. (In re Atwood) , 293 B.R. 227 , 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 20 03).

3 Case No. 10

- 41906 was filed under her name at the time, Latasha Denell Mitchell.4 loan

. ” 4 The bankruptcy court denied th is motion (“Discharge Contempt Order”)

. A ppellant faile d to timely a ppeal the Discharge Contempt Order , but
she promptly filed the Extension Motion captione d as a Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal, For Leave of Court to File Notice of Appeal, and to Stay Remand

. ” In this document , she moved for

an o rder extending the time to appeal the Discharge C ontempt Order; the bankruptcy court granted this request

. 5 The separately filed notice of the Extension Motion included the phrase “and to stay remand on the grounds of excusable neglect pursuant
to Rule 800 2(d)(1)(B).” And t he Extension M otion ’ s prayer st ate d , “Plaintiff
further moves this Court t o stay the Remand Order issued January 15,
2021 , pending outcome of the Court’s decision on this motion.” There is
otherwise no discussion of the stay re quest in Ap pellant ’ s documents. Appellant identified n eith er facts nor legal theory nor authority justi f ying such a stay. Further, t here was no discussion of the stay request at the hearing on the Extension M otion ; t he bankruptcy court focused solely on the request f or an extension of time

. The order that followe d (the

4 Appellant asserted the debt was “void” because the loan was discharged , ignori ng that it wa s secured b y he r home.

5 Appellant then proceeded with the appeal , the BAP subsequently affirmed , and the matter is now before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 “ Extension Order ” ) stated: “the motion is granted based on the findings
stated on the record.”
C

. The Stay Contempt Motion While the Extension Motion was pending , remand hav ing been granted, Appellant dismiss ed the S tate C ourt Ac tion

. SPS responded with a
motion to vacate the dismis s al and for a judgment

. Notwithstanding Appellant ’ s own post

- remand activity in the state court, Appellant asserted
that the state cour t could not act because the bankruptcy court st ay ed
remand. T he state court disagreed, set aside the dismissal , and enter e d judgment in favor of SPS

. Appellant then filed her “Verified Motion for Indicative Ruling on an Order to Show Cause Why Douglas C. S traus, Tiffany F. Ng and Defendant
Should not b e Held in Contempt of Court and Sanctioned for Failing to Comply with a Co u rt Order ” ( “Stay Contempt Motion” )

. It sought $100
million in sanctions and a lleged contempt because SPS took po st

- remand
actions in the state court

. The Stay Co ntempt M otion provided no new analysis or argument related to the stay of remand request. At t h e hearing o n the Stay Contempt Motion , t he bankruptcy court
made no comments and took the matter under submission. I ts subsequent
order denied the contempt request , spar s ely s tating that : “ Upon consideration of the record, the court is not persuaded that t here are an y meritorious grounds for discerning contempt

. ” Appellant timely appealed.6 JURISDICTION The bankruptcy c ou rt had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)( A ). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 to hear an appeal
from the order o n the Stay Contempt Motion

. See Humphreys v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (In re Mack) , BAP No s. CC

- 06

- 1123

- MoDK, CC

- 06

- 1242

- Mo DK , 2007 WL 7545163, at *3 (9th Cir. BAP Mar. 28, 2007) (“[W]here a contempt order disposes of the only matter before the court, the order is appealable as a final judgment.”).
ISS UE
Whether the bankruptcy court erred in de nying the Stay Contempt
Motion.
S TA NDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court’s decision whether to hold a party in civil contempt is review ed for abuse of discretion

. Knupfer v. Lin dblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its di scretion, we conduct a two

- step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court ’ s application of the legal standa rd was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn
from the facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).7 DISCUSSION
A. The bankruptcy court di d not abuse its discretion when it denied the Stay Contempt Motion. Bankruptcy courts have enormous discretion in deciding whether sanctions are appropriate. “ Because of thei r very pote ncy, inherent powers
must be exercised with restraint and discretion

. ” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). “ The standard for finding a party in civil contempt is
well settled: t he moving party has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and def inite order of the court. ” In re Dyer, 322 F.3d a t 1190

- 1191 (citation omitted)

. Here no specific and definite order stay ed the remand. In fact, the
Extension O rder says nothing more than “ the motion” is granted for the
reasons stated orally on the r ecord , and no discussion s or findings on the
record re l ating to t he requested stay exist

. Thus, the record supports that

t he bankruptcy court exercised its discretion appropriately : there was no clear and c onvincing evidence that SP S violated its order. In deed, there is no clear and convincing evidence that t h e bankruptcy court granted a stay. Appellant attempts to stretch the bankruptcy court’s simple order
into the entry of a specific and defini te order st aying the already accomplished remand. But t he ban kruptcy court entered the Extension
Order and knew wha t it intended. Further, a court may amend or clarify its

o rder at a later time, on its own motion and even without notice, pursuant8 to Civil Rule 60(a )

. 6 When the bankruptcy court ruled that there were no

“ meritoriou s grounds for discerning contempt ,” it clarified , to the extent
necessary , that it had not stay ed remand

. W e find no abuse of discretion in this determination and any implicit clari fication

. B

. The re w as no legal basis to enter a stay

. The only legal basi s cited by Appellant as authority for the entr y of a stay of remand was the reference to Rule 8002(d)(1)(B) in the notice of the Extension Motion . But t hat Rule only allows the bankr uptcy court to
exten d tim e to file a n otice of a ppeal

. So , App el lant articulates no legal basis for her remand stay request, and we know of none.
Removal is instantaneous. Sec. Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124 F.3d 9 99 , 1010 (9 th Cir. 1997) ( Upon removal, the state court proce edi ng has been extinguished.) Remand operates in the same fashion

. The Supreme Court noted in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano , 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020 ) , that after the notice of removal was filed, “ the case remained in fe deral court until that court

. . . reached a decision about the motion to remand that was pending before it.
The [state court’s] actions in the interim

. . . are void. ” Id. at 701

. Similarly ,

6 Rule 9024 makes Civil Rule 60(a) applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. It states:

“ The cou rt may corr ect a

. . . mistake arisi ng from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice

. ”9 entry of t h e order remanding the State Court Action extinguis hed the post

removal bankruptcy court proceeding and any bankruptcy court jurisdiction

. Remand could not be stayed by the bankruptcy court after the
remand order became final

. And what effect did the stay h ave when it was supposedly entered?
The remand ord er had been entered nearly a month earlier. Appellant ’s own post

- remand activity acknowledged that the litigation was pending in

state court and not at the bankruptcy court. Appella nt has offered no

a rgumen t th at the bankruptcy court had the legal ability to st ay prosecution of a case that was no longer before it.
C. If the bankruptcy court grant ed the stay of remand as requested, the stay ended when the bankruptcy court ruled on the Extension M ot ion

. Appell an t ’s Extension M otion prayed for a stay “ pending outcome of
th e Cou rt’s decision on this motion.” She argues that this request was granted by implication when the bankruptcy court r uled that “the motion is granted.” But limiting the effect of s uch an orde r is the eph emeral nature of the requested stay. If granted as reque sted, it would exist only until the bankruptcy court made its decision on the Extension Motion. Thus, the requested stay would arise and terminate simultaneously

. It could not b e violat ed

.10 D

. Even a ssuming a stay, denial of contempt w as not an abuse of discre tion. Given the above, t he bankruptcy court’s decision to deny the Stay Contempt Motion could not be an abuse of discretion

. “ [A] person should not be held in contempt if hi s actio n ‘ a ppea rs to be based on a good faith
and reasonab le int erpretation of the [ court ’ s order]. ’” Go

- Video, Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass ’ n of Am. ( In re Dual

- Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig. ) , 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993). To argue that the Extensi on O rder unambiguously stayed remand or the S ta te Cou rt Action is frivolous.
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.