IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,

v.

JAWON WATSON

 Defendant.

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I.D. No. 2007011656

Submitted: January 7, 2021

Decided: January 28, 2021

ORDER

Upon Review of the Motion to Dismiss

DENIED

Defendant Jawon Watson (“Defendant”) has filed a motion under Superior 

Court Criminal Rule 48(b) (“Rule 48(b)”) to dismiss the above-captioned matter, 

arguing that the State of Delaware (the “State”) has unnecessarily delayed the 

presentation of his case to the grand jury. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s 

motion is DENIED.

On July 24, 2020, Defendant, along with two co-defendants, was arrested and 

charged with Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony; four 

counts of Possession/Purchase/Own or Control of a Firearm or Ammunition by a 

Person Prohibited; Manufacture/Deliver/Possession with Intent to Deliver a 

Controlled Substance; Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon; two counts of 

Possession/Purchase/Own or Control a Deadly Weapon, a Semi-Automatic or 

Automatic by Person Prohibited who also Possesses a Controlled Substance; Illegal 

Gang Participation; Possession/Consumption of Marijuana Other Than a Personal 

Use Quantity; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Defendant has been 
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incarcerated without an indictment, and has been held on cash bond in the amount 

of $64,500, since July 24, 2020. 

Defendant had the right to a preliminary hearing on August 14, 2020, but 

waived that right. On August 25, 2020, the police conducted an intake interview 

with Defendant, and his case was assigned to a Deputy Attorney General on 

September 25, 2020. His co-defendants did not waive their right to a preliminary 

hearing, and their hearings were scheduled for October 30, 2020.

Defendant argues that his prolonged incarceration warrants dismissal of his

case under Rule 48(b). That rule “is a ‘codification of the inherent power of a court 

to dismiss a case for want of prosecution.’”1 Rule 48(b) provides as follows:

If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or 

in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to 

answer in Superior Court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a 

defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or 

complaint.2

The State argues that Defendant’s case should not be dismissed because the 

Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, by judicial emergency order, tolled 

all time requirements under the Speedy Trial Guidelines during the period of the 

judicial emergency. Furthermore, the State contends that dismissal is unwarranted 

because any delay is attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and the corresponding 

cancellation of grand jury proceedings, not to prosecutorial manipulation.

This Court has the discretion to dismiss charges against a defendant if there is 

“unnecessary delay” in seeking an indictment.

3

 The Delaware Supreme Court has 

1

State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1989) (quoting State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417, 418–

19 n.3 (Del. 1971) (quoting 8A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 48.03-48.05 (2d ed.))).

2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(b). 

3

Id.
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stated that Rule 48(b)’s requirement of “unnecessary delay” means “delay 

attributable to the State as prosecutor.”4 According to the Supreme Court, 

. . . for a criminal indictment to be dismissed under Rule 48(b) for 

“unnecessary delay,” the delay . . . must, as a general rule, first be 

attributable to the prosecution and second, such delay must be 

established to have had “a prejudicial effect upon defendant” beyond 

that normally associated with a criminal justice system necessarily 

strained by a burgeoning case load.5

Dismissal is unwarranted in this case. On March 13, 2020, due to the COVID19 pandemic, the Supreme Court issued an Order Declaring a Judicial Emergency.6

 

That order specifically tolled the time requirements of the Speedy Trial Guidelines.7 

The Supreme Court has issued subsequent administrative orders extending the 

judicial emergency to the present day.8 The most recent judicial emergency order of 

December 30, 2020, reiterated that “[d]uring the period of judicial emergency, all 

time requirements under the Speedy Trial Guidelines are tolled.”9 Moreover, while 

the grand jury convened in the summer and early fall of 2020, no grand jury 

proceedings have been held since the beginning of November 2020 as a result of the 

pandemic. 

A dismissal under Rule 48(b) is unwarranted in the present case because the 

delay has been caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, not by prosecutorial 

4 McElroy, 561 A.2d at 156.

5

Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).

6 Order Declaring a Judicial Emergency (Del. Mar. 13, 2020) (ORDER).

7

Id. at 3.

8 COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. Apr. 14, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary 

Measures (Del. May 14, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. June 5, 2020) 

(ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. July 6, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 

Precautionary Measures (Del. Aug. 5, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. 

Sept. 4, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. Nov. 2, 2020) (ORDER); 

COVID-19 Precautionary Measures (Del. Dec. 2, 2020) (ORDER); COVID-19 Precautionary 

Measures (Del. Dec. 30, 2020) (ORDER).

9 COVID-19 Precautionary Measures, at 3 (Del. Dec. 30, 2020) (ORDER).
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misconduct or some other action or omission on the part of the State. The earliest 

possible date that Defendant could have been indicted was November 2020. 

However, as mentioned supra, grand jury proceedings have been suspended as a 

result of the pandemic since the beginning of November—all grand jury proceedings 

for December and January were cancelled. Moreover, even if the State could have 

presented Defendant’s case for indictment, and Defendant had been indicted, his 

case could not have been tried, as the Court is not currently scheduling jury trials 

due to the COVID-19 pandemic.10 Defendant has not argued that he has experienced 

any prejudice beyond that normally associated with the criminal justice system.11 

Unfortunately, all criminal defendants have been affected as a result of the COVID19 pandemic and the delay it has caused for certain court proceedings. 

This finding is consistent with this Court’s previous holding in State v. 

Johnson,

12 where the Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that, 

although the criminal process leading to the defendant’s trial had been delayed for 

18 and one-half months due primarily to the unavailability of the complaining 

witness, a Rule 48(b) dismissal was unwarranted because the delay, “while rather 

lengthy, was not unnecessary,” and because “[a]ny prejudice encountered by the 

defendant due to his incarceration and any attending anxiety, stress and concern as 

a result thereof is no different than that which would normally be expected from one 

charged with serious offenses.”13 Here, Defendant has only been incarcerated for 

approximately six months and has not alleged any prejudice different from that of 

other defendants.

10 Id.

11 McElroy, 561 A.2d at 156.

12 State v. Johnson, 564 A.2d 364 (Del. Super. 1989).

13 Id. at 371.
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WHEREFORE, given Defendant’s failure to show how he has been 

prejudiced, together with the fact that the delay has resulted from the COVID-19 

pandemic and not from any improper or unjustifiable action of the State, the Court

finds that Defendant’s request for dismissal of his case is unwarranted. Defendant’s 

motion is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____________________________

 Judge Noel Eason Primos

NEP/wjs

Via Email

oc: Prothonotary

Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Esquire

Adam D. Windett, Esquire