NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY ANDREW KRZNARICH, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0034 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-460304-001 

The Honorable Richard L. Nothwehr, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Jillian Francis 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Peter C. Rosales 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

T H U M M A, Judge: 

¶1 Anthony Andrew Krznarich appeals his conviction for 

possession or use of methamphetamine and resulting probation grant. 

Krznarich argues the superior court improperly allowed testimony 

regarding his “possession” of methamphetamine that lacked foundation 

and violated his right to confront witnesses. Because he has shown no 

reversible error, Krznarich’s conviction and probation grant are affirmed. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 In December 2013, Krznarich (who was not a probationer at 

that time) drove a probationer friend to a probation office in Scottsdale so 

his friend could meet with his probation officer. Individuals who enter the 

probation office must undergo a security screening, akin to one at a 

courthouse or airport, including a requirement that wallets be searched. 

¶3 A security officer, who did not testify at trial, contacted adult 

probation supervisor Dana Shepherd and asked her to come to the security 

area. When she arrived, Officer Shepherd met an individual she later 

learned was Krznarich, who was seated in the lobby. Officer Shepherd saw 

a container with an open wallet; on top of the open wallet was a small 

plastic baggy containing a white crystalline substance. Given a concern 

about the baggy, Officer Shepherd then contacted Scottsdale Police, and 

officers promptly arrived at the probation office. 

¶4 Officer Shepherd met with the police officers, explained the 

situation and directed them to the security area. She observed court security 

bring the container containing the wallet and baggy to the police officers. 

Officer Matthew detained Krznarich and took him and the container with 

the wallet and baggy into an interview room and read Krznarich his rights 

 

1 This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

conviction and resolves all reasonable inferences against the defendant. 

State v. Karr, 221 Ariz. 319, 320 ¶ 2 (App. 2008). 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

3

pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Krznarich agreed to 

answer questions and, in his presence, Officer Matthew removed and 

inspected the contents of the wallet. Among other things, the wallet 

contained Krznarich’s driver’s license and social security card. Officer 

Matthew asked Krznarich questions related to the wallet and baggy and 

described Krznarich as acting “somewhat dejected.” Officer Matthew 

recounted:

When I asked him about the substance or the 

baggy and asked him what it was, he looked 

down at the ground and said, “It’s meth.”

And I asked him for clarification. I said, “I’m 

sorry. I didn’t hear you.” And he looked up and 

said, “It’s meth, man.”

Officer Matthew testified that Krznarich did not express surprise, or offer 

any explanation for the methamphetamine or claim that someone else had 

placed the baggy in the wallet. Officer Matthew then arrested Krznarich. 

After he was arrested, Krznarich admitted to using methamphetamine with 

his probationer friend just before arriving at the probation office. 

¶5 After he was arrested, an inventory search of Krznarich’s car 

revealed a scale, a pipe and two pill bottles. One pill bottle had Krznarich’s 

name on it and contained a baggy of marijuana. The pipe contained burnt 

residue identified as the result of smoking marijuana. The other pill bottle 

had the probationer’s name on it and contained methamphetamine. Testing 

on the powder in the baggy showed the white substance was 

methamphetamine. Krznarich was charged with possession or use of 

methamphetamine, a dangerous drug, a Class 4 felony, possession or use 

of marijuana, a Class 6 felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 

Class 6 felony. 

¶6 As noted above, the security officer who first encountered 

Krznarich did not testify at trial. As relevant to this appeal, Krznarich 

claims the superior court twice allowed testimony from witnesses who 

lacked proper foundation. First, on direct examination, the State asked 

Officer Shepherd about her interaction with the police officers: 

Q. And do you recall what you told 

[police]? 

A. Our normal procedure is I meet them in 

the back of the building. We don’t like to have 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

4

police cars in the front. So I met them in the 

back, explained to them that the defendant in 

this matter had brought in another probationer. 

While he was going through security, security 

had located a substance --

[Krznarich’s counsel]: Objection. Foundation. 

THE WITNESS: -- a baggy of question. 

[Krznarich’s counsel]: Objection. Foundation. 

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You 

can go ahead. 

THE WITNESS: They located that and that I 

needed that to be looked at by a police officer 

and that we were also going to be taking the 

probationer into custody as well. 

Second, on direct examination, the State asked Officer Matthew about 

questions he asked Krznarich: 

Q. What did you ask [Krznarich]? 

A. After the defendant was brought back to 

the back, he was detained, again, for officer 

safety reasons. I believe the court security or the 

security personnel there brought back a box 

with a wallet that had a small plastic baggy 

containing a white crystalline substance in it. I 

removed the wallet. There was also a driver's 

license and a social security card with Anthony 

Krznarich’s name and information on it, if you 

will. Based on that, Mr. Krznarich had already 

been read Miranda rights. I made sure he was 

still aware he was under Miranda rights, and I 

asked him questions related to his wallet and 

the small baggy with white crystalline 

substance found within. 

[Krznarich’s counsel]: Objection as to the 

substance found in it, in the wallet. Foundation. 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

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THE COURT: Overruled. 

On cross-examination, both witnesses conceded that they had not 

personally seen Krznarich in possession of the wallet or the baggy. 

¶7 The superior court denied Krznarich’s motion for judgment 

of acquittal after the conclusion of the State’s case and, at the conclusion of 

trial, the jury deliberated and found Krznarich guilty on all three counts. 

The superior court suspended sentence and placed Krznarich on intensive 

probation for three years.2 This court has jurisdiction over Krznarich’s 

timely appeal pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -

4033 (2016).3

DISCUSSION 

I. The Superior Court Properly Overruled Krznarich’s Foundation 

Objections.

¶8 Krznarich argues the superior court should have sustained 

his foundation objections to the testimony by Officers Shepherd and 

Matthew quoted above because they lacked personal knowledge. See Ariz. 

R. Evid. 602. As applicable here, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if 

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 

personal knowledge of the matter.” Id. This court reviews the superior 

court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion and will affirm “absent a clear 

abuse or legal error and resulting prejudice.” Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 

57, 60 ¶ 6 (App. 2006). “[A]n abuse of discretion ‘is discretion manifestly 

unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable 

reasons.’” Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 83 ¶ 19 (App. 

2005) (quoting Quigly v. Tucson City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (1982)). Prejudice 

results and the conviction will be reversed if there is “a reasonable 

probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not 

been admitted.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 143 ¶ 57 (2000) (citation 

omitted). With these standards in mind, the court addresses Krznarich’s 

arguments on appeal in turn. 

 

2 In this appeal, Krznarich does not challenge his conviction for possession 

or use of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia and resulting 

probation grants. 

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

6

¶9 Officer Shepherd was asked during direct “do you recall what 

you told [police?]” Krznarich’s counsel did not object to the question when 

asked. After Officer Shepherd had described in several sentences what she 

told police (including that Krznarich and his friend had come to the 

probation office), she continued with a sentence stating: “While he was 

going through security, security had located a substance . . .” At that point, 

Krznarich’s counsel objected “Foundation,” Officer Shepherd continued “a 

baggy of question,” Krznarich objected again “Foundation” and the court 

overruled the objection. Krznarich has not shown Officer Shepherd lacked 

foundation to provide this testimony. The question (to which no objection 

was made originally) called for what she recalled telling the police, 

information over which Officer Shepherd had personal knowledge and the 

appropriate foundation to provide. Similarly, Krznarich does not dispute 

that “a baggy of question” was located by security or that Krznarich was 

going through security at that same time, which is what prompted the call 

to Officer Shepherd in the first instance. Accordingly, Krznarich has not 

shown the superior court allowed the evidence on untenable grounds. See 

Lashonda M., 210 Ariz. at 83 ¶ 19. 

¶10 Similar to Officer Shepherd, Officer Matthew was asked 

during direct “[w]hat did you ask [Krznarich]?” Again, Krznarich’s counsel 

did not object to the question when asked. After Officer Matthew had 

described in several sentences their discussion, he continued “I asked him 

questions related to his wallet and the small baggy with white crystalline 

substance found within.” At that point, Krznarich’s counsel objected: 

“Objection as to the substance found in it, in the wallet. Foundation.” The 

superior court then overruled that objection. The testimony Krznarich 

objected to, however, was ambiguous in that it either could be construed as 

referring to the baggy being found within the wallet (a topic on which this 

witness likely did not have personal knowledge) or that the white 

crystalline substance was found within the baggy (a topic on which the 

witness did have personal knowledge). Given that ambiguity, Krznarich 

has not shown the superior court abused its discretion in denying the 

objection. Moreover, two questions later, Officer Matthew testified without 

objection to the following: “Q. What did you see generally inside that 

baggy? A. Again, there was a white, crystalline white substance contained 

within the plastic baggy that was inside the wallet.” This evidence, to which 

Krznarich did not object, resolved any ambiguity in the earlier questioning. 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

7

II. The Confrontation Clause.

¶11 Krznarich argues for the first time on appeal that his right to 

confront his accusers was violated because the security officer did not 

testify at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution prohibits the admission of testimonial 

statements at a criminal trial unless the declarant is available at trial for 

cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 68 (2004). The 

Confrontation Clause, however, “does not bar the use of testimonial 

statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 

asserted.” Id. at 59 n.9; accord Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c). Because Krznarich did 

not raise the issue in the superior court, this court will review for 

fundamental error. See State v Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 333, ¶ 31 (2008). 

“Accordingly, [Krznarich] ‘bears the burden to establish that “(1) error 

exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused him 

prejudice.”’” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493 ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citations 

omitted). Krznarich has the burden of showing prejudice. State v Henderson, 

210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19 (2005). 

¶12 As explained above, the statements Krznarich challenges on 

appeal were made by witnesses who testified and were extensively crossexamined by Krznarich. No hearsay objection was made to the two 

questions challenged on appeal. Officer Shepherd was asked what she told 

the police to explain why they had been called, information offered to 

describe the investigation. Officer Matthew was asked what he personally 

asked Krznarich during an interrogation. Those statements were 

information necessary to place the Krznarich statements in context; 

Krznarich’s answers were admissible as statements of an opposing party. 

Such evidence is not hearsay and is not subject to Confrontation Clause 

analysis. United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that Confrontation Clause does not apply to defendant’s own 

statements).

¶13 Even if the statements had violated Krznarich’s Confrontation 

Clause rights, he has not shown resulting prejudice. In this case, there was 

substantial additional evidence tying Krznarich to the baggy. When the 

baggy was given to police, it was on top of a wallet that contained two forms 

of Krznarich’s identification, and Krznarich did not deny ownership or 

possession of either the wallet or baggy. Additionally, when asked about 

the baggy, and without any need to associate the baggy with the wallet, 

Krznarich immediately identified the contents of the baggy as 

methamphetamine. Krznarich also went beyond simply identifying what 

was in the baggy to admitting having used methamphetamine shortly 
STATE v. KRZNARICH 

Decision of the Court 

8

before arriving at the probation office. Krznarich has not shown the 

admission of these statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights, let 

alone that such an error was fundamental and resulted in prejudice. See 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶¶ 19-20; James, 231 Ariz. at 493 ¶ 11. 

CONCLUSION 

¶14 Krznarich’s conviction for possession or use of 

methamphetamine and resulting probation grant are affirmed.