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39–806 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–93]

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN AND

IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

OCTOBER 4, 2007

(II)

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JEFF MILLER, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

SUZANNE MCKENNA, Professional Staff Member

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member

SASHA ROGERS, Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, October 4, 2007, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, October 4, 2007 ...................................................................................... 33

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVINCIAL

RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 2

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight

and Investigations Subcommittee ....................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Baker, Col. Ralph O., Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East),

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 9

Kimmitt, Brig. Gen. Mark T., (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Middle East) ........................................................................................................ 8

Shivers, Mitchell E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia .. 3

Wilkes, Maj. Gen. Bobby J., Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs (Asia),

U.S. Air Force ....................................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 39

Baker, Col. Ralph O. ........................................................................................ 55

Kimmitt, Brig. Gen. Mark T., (Ret.) ............................................................... 52

Shivers, Mitchell E. .......................................................................................... 42

Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................................................... 37

Wilkes, Maj. Gen. Bobby J. .............................................................................. 46

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 63

(1)

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

AND IRAQ

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 4, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:06 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. Good morning. Good

work there, Dr. Gingrey, Mr. Conaway.

Good morning. We appreciate you all being here with us. This is

the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation. We are continuing our look at the Department of Defense’s role in the provincial

reconstruction teams (PRT) both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Several departments and agencies are involved in the PRT program besides Department of Defense (DOD), including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture.

While we may choose to examine the role of the other departments and agencies at a later hearing, our witnesses today are

DOD witnesses.

By the PRT’s very nature, DOD plays a unique and critical role.

Until PRTs work themselves out of a job, that is, until the security

situation permits the replacement of the PRTs with more traditional diplomatic and developmental assistance efforts, DOD will

be at the forefront of this effort.

While every PRT is unique, depending on the security situation

on the ground and the maturity of developmental needs of the

province in which they operate, there are three basic kinds of

PRTs—the Afghanistan PRTs and, in Iraq, the primary PRTs and

the embedded PRTs, and I would ask that our witnesses take advantage of any opportunities to amplify on the differences between

these kinds of PRTs and the pros and cons of the various models

that have been used.

We are also interested in learning how the PRTs are affected

when security responsibility is transitioned to the host governments or when we are planning on that transition when forward

operating bases are closed or when maneuver troops are withdrawn

from the area.

2

This subcommittee has heard testimony that in Iraq, where provinces have transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, PRTs have been

unable to operate.

We chose the PRT topic both because PRTs are critical to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and because we think they represent

a case study on how the interagency process works or doesn’t work

in Washington and in the field.

And we are joined today by a good panel of witnesses. Mr. Mitchell Shivers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia

Affairs; Major General Bobby Wilkes, United States Air Force, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs-Asia, Strategic Plans and Policy, with the Joint Staff; Mr. Mark Kimmitt, Brigadier General (Retired), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern and

South Asian Affairs; and, Colonel Ralph Baker, Deputy Director of

the Politico-Military Affairs-Middle East, Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff.

We appreciate you all being here.

Before we begin with your testimony, we will hear from Mr. Akin

for any statement he wants to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning and thank

you all for joining us here this morning.

Today’s hearing is this subcommittee’s second public hearing on

the role of Department of Defense in provincial reconstruction

teams in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

A lot of people around here think that problems in Iraq need to

be solved in Baghdad or in Washington, D.C. My view is that the

solution rests in the local provinces, with local people putting the

solutions together and solving their problems.

If we take a look at how America was built, it is clear that it

wasn’t built by starting in Washington, D.C. Our country was built

by little towns and communities coming together, 13 states in all.

So I am not surprised that it appears our greatest successes are

happening at the local level in Iraq.

As I previously stated, PRTs and the subject of stabilization operations generally is critical to transforming a local area from a combat zone to a business development zone or a quiet residential

neighborhood.

In my view, sufficient troop strength combined with increasing

the number of PRTs has had a significant positive effect on building local communities.

Another aspect of the PRTs which I am interested in is the interagency composition of the teams. We often hear that Operation

Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom require all elements of national power, though I think it has been the exception

and not the rule when this has happened.

We have heard from former PRT members and how PRTs operate on the ground and how interagency issues are resolved in theater. I am curious how the interagency in Washington works to supVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:17 Sep 04, 2008 Jkt 039806 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-93\277160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
3

port the PRTs. In particular, I would like our witnesses to comment on the department’s role in shaping PRT policy and resolving

PRT issues in the daily Afghanistan operations group meetings and

in the weekly Iraq steering group meetings.

Finally, I would like to understand how the department’s implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05, military support for stability,

security transition and reconciliation operations, is informed by

DOD’s work on PRTs.

It seems to me that PRTs are the best tangible example of stabilization operation that the SSTR directive contemplates. I would

like our witnesses to explain how the department’s policy arm is

connecting the directive to the PRTs.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here and I know all

of us look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

Gentlemen, your written statements will be made a part of the

record, but we want you to take as much time as you need to talk

with us this morning.

We will put the five-minute clock on for you, but when it goes

to red, if you need to talk more, you talk more. That is more just

to give you an idea where time is at.

For the committee members’ information, we will follow our fiveminute rule reasonably strictly here this morning. That means we

will probably get around the group of us more than once.

You all might be interested to know, and you may already know

this, but both the staff and the members have met in private briefings in this room with members of PRTs that have come back both

from Afghanistan and from Iraq.

We have also met with DOD civilians, not necessarily PRT members, but DOD civilians who have had problems after they were

wounded from combat injuries because of their civilian status rather than military status.

So there is a series of issue we are looking at. Primarily, this

morning, we are interested in this issue of interagency, how it

works or doesn’t work, but any comments that you might want to

make on how you think—if you see any problems or are aware of

any problems with how our civilian component is treated under our

laws and regulations as members of these PRTs compared to our

military folks, as far as benefits or incentives or if they are wounded. Any thoughts you might have about that, we would be glad to

hear of, also.

Let’s start with you, Mr. Shivers, and then we will just go right

down to General Wilkes, Mr. Kimmitt and Colonel Baker.

Mr. Shivers.

STATEMENT OF MITCHELL E. SHIVERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CENTRAL ASIA

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, good morning. Chairman Snyder, Ranking

Member Akin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Defense’s role in provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs, in Afghanistan.

4

PRTs have matured since November 2002 from a single U.S.-led

pilot project in Gardez to a fully international effort involving 25

teams in the majority of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.

PRTs now represent a major element of the mission to expand

the reach of the Afghan government throughout the country. While

the effectiveness of individual PRTs is sometimes uneven, the overall PRT effort is achieving noteworthy results and requires sustained support.

The role of PRTs was formally agreed to on January 27, 2005 by

the PRT executive steering committee, the international politicalmilitary body responsible for PRT direction and guidance, and the

following mission statement.

Provincial reconstruction teams will assist the Islamic Republic

of Afghanistan to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment and enable security

sector reform and reconstruction efforts.

Of the 25 existing PRTs, 12 are led by the United States. The

military component of a U.S. PRT is commanded by a uniformed

officer is task organized to accomplish the following functions: operations, administration, logistics, security and a variety of enabling

roles, including civil affairs and engineering.

Each U.S.-led PRT has approximately 100 military personnel,

though this number varies considerably.

The PRT commander coordinates PRT activities with representatives from other parts of the U.S. interagency. In most instances,

this includes representatives from the Department of State, the

U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of

Agriculture.

In addition to the resources and expertise leveraged by the interagency PRT members, the PRT commander has at his or her disposal Commander’s Emergency Response Program, (CERP), funds,

which are used to address urgent humanitarian and reconstruction

needs.

CERP remains one of our commander’s most effective tools in

helping ordinary Afghans seek positive changes in their daily lives.

PRTs in Afghanistan all fall under the broad authority of the

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), although several other organizations have been established to help

ensure unity of effort among various stakeholders.

The most important example, the PRT executive steering committee, provides high level policy direction and includes the Afghan

minister of interior, the ISAF commander, the United Nations special representative of the secretary general, NATO senior civilian

representative, the EU special representative, and ambassadors of

all PRT troop-contributing nations.

NATO reports that as of July 2007, PRTs have completed over

9,000 projects in all development sectors. While this achievement

is notable, it is more useful to focus on less quantifiable aspects of

what PRTs do.

First, PRTs act as small embassies for the various reconstruction

efforts being undertaken by the Afghan government, military

forces, aid agencies and nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan. They also provide a mechanism for mentoring officials of Afghanistan’s ministries at the provincial level.

5

Further, PRTs serve as a vehicle for aligning the priorities set

out in the Afghanistan national development strategy, the ANDS,

the overarching strategic document for long-term development in

Afghanistan.

Importantly, PRTs reinforce the international community’s commitment to the people of Afghanistan. Although the overall PRT

construct is an effective and necessary component of the mission in

Afghanistan, the PRT effort faces many challenges. By nature,

PRTs are civil-military entities and, therefore, demand close coordination between the various interagency contributors.

As such, PRTs are highly dependent on the leadership skills and

teamwork abilities of the PRT commander and his or her interagency colleagues.

Additionally, because PRTs fall under NATO direction, extensive

coordination and consensus between allies is required to foster

unity of effort. Last, different countries inherently have different

capabilities and resources at their disposal and some must rely on

other more capable allies for assistance in establishing and operating PRTs.

In considering the role of PRTs in Afghanistan, it is necessary to

place them in the appropriate context. The international community, in partnership with the Afghan government, is undertaking

one of the most ambitious stabilization and reconstruction efforts

in history. PRTs play a crucial role in that effort.

We jointly are extending the reach of a government and a nation

that has endured decades of war and nearly complete destruction

of its infrastructure, economy and political institutions.

We are making progress, but ultimate success will take many

years and will demand sustained interest and commitment of the

United States and the international community.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shivers can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Shivers.

General Wilkes.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. BOBBY J. WILKES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (ASIA), U.S. AIR FORCE

General WILKES. Good morning, sir. Chairman Snyder, Ranking

Member Akin and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the

invitation to testify this morning on the military role of the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. General Wilkes, if you would just hold for a minute.

For the members, we received General Wilkes’ statement this

morning. So you may not have gotten it in your office, but it is in

your packet.

Go ahead, General Wilkes.

General WILKES. In order to accelerate development of Afghanistan, the U.S. military, in 2002, created provincial reconstruction

teams to integrate U.S. military, U.S. interagency and host nation

government officials.

Initially, the U.S. Government listed three goals for the PRTs—

establish security, extend the reach of the Afghan government into

the provinces, and assist reconstruction.

6

The number of teams expanded from three in 2003 to 25 today.

The United States military leads 12, and coalition nations lead 13.

PRTs are increasingly more important and contribute significantly to Afghanistan’s progress. For the international security and

assistance force, the PRT is now the principal vehicle to leverage

the international community in Afghan government reconstruction

and development programs.

The recent U.S. strategic review of Afghanistan recognized the

need to increase the resiliency of the Afghan government against

the insurgency, strengthen the U.S. Government counterinsurgency

efforts, and speed up development.

Many counterinsurgency experts agree that effective interagency

cooperation establishes the conditions for successful prosecution of

a counterinsurgency. The PRT serves as the principal vehicle for

coordinating the U.S. and Afghan efforts to securing common goals

in Afghanistan.

The American-led PRTs fall under the command of Combined

Joint Task Force 82 (JTF–82) as overall national command element

lead for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.

CJTF–82 coordinates PRT operations with International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters and the U.S. embassy for

policy guidance. All efforts are in support of the Afghan national

development strategy.

PRT projects are funded with commanders’ emergency response

program funds and with U.S. Agency for International Development funds and execution is synchronized at subordinate CJTF–82

command levels.

A U.S.-led PRT consists of approximately 85 American military

members, three American civilians and five Afghans. The commanding officer of a PRT and his interagency team are responsible

for advising local Afghan government officials, coordinating international community reconstruction efforts, and facilitating local

government efforts.

Two civil affairs teams and an engineer advisory team coordinate

development and capacity-building activities directly with local officials, tribal elders, private contractors, United States Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organization (NGOs).

A military police team coordinates the training and actions of the

Afghan national police. The military component also includes a system operations (SYOPS) unit, bomb disposal team, intelligence

team, medics, an administration and support section, and a force

protection platoon to facilitate freedom of movement throughout

their area of responsibility.

Normally located with the PRTs are three U.S. civilian personnel

from State Department, USAID and the Department of Agriculture, and one Afghan government official from the ministry of

interior.

The State Department’s foreign service officer serves as a political advisor to the PRT commander and the Afghan provincial governor. The USAID field program officer advises on development

work. The Department of Agriculture employee advises the PRT on

agricultural development issues and the Afghan ministry of interior

7

official provides advice on local political dynamics and facilitates

intelligence collection.

PRT is trained as a team at Fort Bragg, North Carolina before

they deploy. The training includes the participation of U.S. Government officials from the State Department, AID and USDA.

The most recent training in the winter of 2006 included participation by Afghans. This invaluable team training includes weapons

handling, convoy operations, cultural awareness and theater immersion.

In addition to supporting the Afghan national development strategy, PRTs are a key enabler of the counterinsurgency strategy, that

is, separating the enemy from the populous, connecting the government with the people, and transforming the environment at the

sub-national level.

The U.S. PRT in the Panjshir Valley is an excellent example of

success. Strong cooperation between ground forces, the local government and the local populous enabled the completion of approximately 90 projects.

Coordinating additional road construction and a wind farm, coupled with other USAID projects, resulted in a district center with

electricity and many market opportunities.

The activities of the PRT are setting the conditions that bring

more local support to the central government, further separating

the local population from the insurgency and continuing to transform the lives of the Afghan people.

The PRT is the entity to facilitate progress and ensure both the

counterinsurgency and national development efforts are complementary and ultimately successful.

Our goal for the future is for the reach of the Afghan central government to expand into the provinces and districts. With improved

security conditions and an increasing local government capacity,

the PRT role and functions will reflect the changing environment

and accommodate increasing Afghan government capability.

As we look to the future, perhaps the biggest challenge in fielding PRTs will be finding well qualified, experienced people to serve

as team members. Although PRTs are not exclusively a military

project or program, the initial reliance on DOD personnel to staff

PRTs is not surprising.

DOD is the only department of government that currently has

the capacity to surge. The State Department and other agencies

can hire additional personnel over time and are doing so. However,

the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well, is that our nation will

be well served if there exists a surge capacity in the nonmilitary

skill sets that are so important in the kinds of conflicts we have

been engaged in since the early 1990’s.

We must build additional civilian capacity to participate in these

efforts. It is vitally important that we increase the capabilities

within civilian agencies, a reserve of civilian experts, civil engineers, retired local government officials, business executives, water

and sewer managers, comptrollers, public health administrators

and the like to provide a rapid response capability the Nation lacks

today.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

8

[The prepared statement of General Wilkes can be found in the

Appendix on page 46.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Wilkes.

General Kimmitt.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MARK T. KIMMITT, (RET.), DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MIDDLE EAST)

General KIMMITT. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin,

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk

with you today on the subject of provincial reconstruction teams in

Iraq.

They are different than the provincial reconstruction teams in

Afghanistan, have a different function, have a different role, and

are achieving effects.

Their mission is to assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments

with developing a transparence and sustained capability to govern

by promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political

and economic development, and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

PRTs do this, in large part, by establishing and strengthening relationships with local leaders and local governments, business community and elected officials. They are improving governance capabilities by teaching technical, managerial and fiscal skills that enable local government officials to provide essential services and

other key development projects to the Iraqi people.

The result is a growing self-reliance at the local and provincial

government levels. You have heard the term ‘‘bottom-up progress.’’

In fact, PRTs are at the forefront of this.

As you know, the State Department has the lead for PRTs in

Iraq, but they truly are an interagency effort and we see a significant DOD responsibility for their success.

We have State Department foreign service officers, Department

of Defense civil affairs officers, engineer officers, USAID project

leaders, Department of Justice rule of law experts Department of

Agriculture development specialists, working together alongside

military units to achieve results in those communities.

As you know, there are ten pre-surge PRTs, 15 embedded PRTs,

and five provincial support teams on the ground in Iraq and we can

clarify the difference between each of those in the question-and-answer period.

The original five PRTs were established in 2005 and 2006 and

focused primarily on the provincial government level. Seven of the

ten are led by the United States, while three are led by our coalition partners from Great Britain, Italy and Korea.

As part of the President’s 2000 new way forward strategy, we

were directed to increase the number of PRTs. These 15 additional

PRTs, embedded PRTs, work side by side, embedded into our brigade combat teams and focus on district and local level governance.

The five provincial support teams, comprised of one or two members, serve in areas where there is not a major presence of U.S.

forces.

Although the Department of State has the lead for PRTs, DOD,

due to its surge capability, provided personnel on an interim basis

to expedite standing up what we call the new way forward EPRTs.

9

Our experience in this demonstrates the need for civilian reserve

capability, as it is important we increase these capabilities, as was

noted by General Wilkes, within civilian agencies, to create and

fund a civilian reserve to rapidly deploy and draw on outside experts in types of contingency operations when needed.

As to the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (EPRTs),

they have only been in place for a few months, but early signs are

highly encouraging and we are seeing extremely positive results.

Over time, we hope to see increased capabilities from the Iraqis to

govern themselves, because at the end of the day, the purpose of

the PRTs are to put themselves out of business and hand this responsibility over to the people of Iraq.

Frankly, we see the EPRTs and all the PRTs inside of Iraq as

a success story and that success was created by individuals from

different agencies on the ground every day.

Mr. Akin’s point we can discuss a little bit later in terms of

whether this is better managed through better control from Washington, D.C. or if we should continue to allow these to evolve on

the ground as we develop our doctrine.

With that, let me pass it over to Colonel Baker and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kimmitt can be found in the

Appendix on page 52.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Kimmitt.

Colonel Baker.

STATEMENT OF COL. RALPH O. BAKER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST), U.S. ARMY

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin, members of

the committee, thank you for your interest in our nation’s security

and the honor of testifying before you this morning.

I appreciate your support of the men and women of our armed

forces who, around the world, often in very difficult and challenging environments, and far from home and family, are making a difference.

Our goal remains an Iraqi government that transitions to self-reliance, where all Iraqis unite against violence and perceive the government of Iraq as the legitimate authority to provide security, law

and order, and basic services.

Provincial reconstruction teams are the front line civilian-military operators who serve a vital role in the campaign to stabilize

Iraq with our coalition partners. They serve as the primary interface between U.S. and coalition partners and provincial and local

governments throughout Iraq.

As part of the President’s January new way forward strategy, the

interagency, led by the Department of Defense and the Department

of State, partnered in order to double the ten paired PRTs, so

named because of their specific alignment with geographic provinces and whose principal focus is a provincial government.

The ten additional PRTs, integral to the President’s new way forward, are embedded. Referred to as EPRTs, the principal focus is

on district and local governments. These EPRTs work hand-inglove with brigade combat teams or their Marine counterparts, regimental combat teams.

10

At the request of Secretary Rice, DOD agreed to provide some

DOD personnel to expedite the standing up of the ten new way forward EPRTs and over the summer these teams were formed by

personnel provided by DOD, State, USAID, Department of Justice,

and the Department of Agriculture.

These teams have already begun to make a positive impact. For

example, PRTs have been instrumental in developing local capacity

to prioritize funds and manage projects. As a result of PRT technical assistance, provinces have obligated over $1 billion worth of

Iraqi-funded reconstruction projects, a significant achievement in a

country with a history of central control.

Iraq now has provincial counsels, sitting together, debating the

merits of various projects, developing budgets and letting contracts.

This effort not only helps build local capacity for budget execution,

but improves the democratic process as desperate interests compete

for resources and parties negotiate to bargain to resolve complex

problems.

Concurrent with the standup of ten EPRTs over the spring and

summer, manning was authorized for the formation of an additional four new EPRTs at the request of General Odierno.

A fifth new EPRT team is also being assembled from manpower

within theater. These five EPRTs are currently forming and will

begin to function by the end of October, bringing the total of PRT/

EPRTs to 25, ten paired and 15 EPRTs.

Throughout these processes, DOD has coordinated closely with

the State Department and, in November, State will begin a phased

replacement of the interim DOD personnel for the ten new way forward EPRTs, completely replacing them by March of 2008.

We attribute a large part of the success of PRTs to the versatility

and skill sets tailored to the specific and unique challenges in their

local environments. Additionally, embedded PRTs provide a unique

benefit as a result of their integration with their host combat

teams.

What we have learned is that the fusion of the PRT with the

combat team helps coordinate and achieve objectives.

The strategic situation in Iraq will ultimately be solved by political means. To that end, PRTs play an integral role in advancing

the political process from the local district and provincial level.

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you this morning. I

look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Baker can be found in the

Appendix on page 55.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

Two members of this committee, Jeff Davis from Kentucky is not

with us, and Susan Davis from California, are the head of a caucus

here. What is the formal name, the interagency reform?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Working group.

Dr. SNYDER. It is a working group and it is probably more group

than working right now. There is a lot of interest on this committee

on the whole issue of interagency interactions and the impacts on

both Afghanistan and Iraq.

If there is no objection, Mr. Akin, I am going to have Mrs. Davis

take the first five minutes. Then we will go to you and then come

back to me.

11

So, Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, because I am going to have to leave in a few minutes

and hopefully come back.

But I appreciate very much you all being here. You are all individuals that we hope to look to and secure your brains, your experience, to understand this better. And our goal really is to educate

the members, to have us be in a better position to really evaluate

these issues and understand the extent to which the role that Congress can play a role or the extent to which we ought to just stay

out of it. So that is really what we are trying to look at.

I have basically three questions and perhaps if you could, in

some way, flesh these out quickly.

One is, how do we evaluate the PRTs? You mentioned the completion of projects. I guess I would look to the number of people in

the area that are employed that weren’t employed before the PRT

gets there.

Are there some standardized ways that you can begin to evaluate

that? Access to local power. How many people are involved after

the PRTs have been in effect?

Then I guess the other real question is, how do we evaluate when

they have been successful and when they should phase out? Are

you establishing some—I don’t want to use the word, ‘‘benchmarks’’

here, but are you establishing some guides for how we really truly

evaluate that and how you can determine that, for one reason or

another, they are really not being effective and what is it that is

making them less effective than something else?

We know personalities play a role, a lot of dynamics environmentally within, one size doesn’t fit all. We know that. But are we

developing some real guidelines for looking at that?

How do you surge? How are you thinking about potential surge?

How does this fit into overall national security plans as we are

planning not just for tomorrow, but really 10 years out, 15 years

out? What kind of training, what kind of mechanism needs to be

in place?

And, finally, I think, Mr. Kimmitt, in talking briefly earlier, how

do we reward the people who are part of this particularly in the

services, in the military? How do you reward them for that time

that they have spent and the experiences they have gained and impact that they have had in changing dynamics and how do we

begin to really establish that so that that experience is as important as some other experience in promoting career opportunities?

Thank you.

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say that there isn’t a one-size-fits-all standard series of metrics at this point for PRTs in Afghanistan.

There is a growing appreciation of the types of things that work

and those things that don’t work and there is certainly a lot of effort underway in terms of communicating lessons learned and creating standard organizations and things like that and opportunities

for PRTs to communicate amongst each other the lessons that they

are gaining as they operate.

Obviously, as you point out, Ma’am, there are a complex series

of environmental factors to do with geography, to do with security

12

environment of the 25 PRTs in Afghanistan. There is a wide range

of conditions that they operate within.

So I can assure you that local commanders, those that are responsible for the PRTs, have a series of metrics that they measure

their staff against and in the reporting line, they do, as well, and

there is a sincere attempt to get more faithful reporting of what is

being achieved with this.

After all, these are quite expensive organizations to run and we

have great hopes for their ability to achieve positive results on the

ground.

So I think the standardized set of metrics is still somewhat elusive, but there is certainly an attempt to measure more faithfully

and with greater fidelity what we are achieving there.

When you talk about rewards, I was heartened to see that a

number of previous witness before this committee indicated that

they did feel that their own particular personal service was rewarded thereafter and I know there is some effort both in the military and in the civilian sectors to recognize people that have served

in Iraq and Afghanistan and create career opportunities for them

that demonstrate the country’s appreciation for their service.

How systematic that is, again, I can’t testify to that, but I know

that is an important element and, indeed, when we are looking at

employing people at OSD, we, for instance, heavily weight those

people, give advantage to those people that have served in Iraq and

Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. Any other members, go ahead and respond.

General WILKES. If I may, from a personal perspective of how we

take care of our people, I know that when we select the individuals

to go on these PRTs, particularly in the command side of the house,

they go through a screening process, just like we do our commanders at any other units.

And so there is only about 50 percent that really get through the

command screening and are then selected. So, therefore, they are

set up in the promotion process having already been recognized

and screened as a commander.

And so when they come out of the other end, like Mr. Shivers

said, they have that commander’s stamp on their record and they

are being reviewed for the next level of opportunity. And the personal rewards of being a part of that and serving in Afghanistan

and Iraq I think are significant to folks and we do look on the

staffs here to hire those kinds of people that have that experience.

So we are institutionalizing that, I think, as part of our promotion systems.

How to evaluate the PRTs and their effectiveness is a difficult

issue. We don’t have a standard set of metrics yet. They vary by

each of the provinces and the regions that these PRTs operate in

and it depends upon the needs of that region and the

counterinsurgency that is being faced in that region.

In places where you have more stability and you go to less conflict, you can do more things in a little bit different fashion. Where

you have an educated populous that is willing to take on some of

the roles of government, it moves a whole lot faster and we see the

varying differences just from border to border within the specific

13

regions within Afghanistan today, where we are more effective in

different regions.

Where the insurgency progresses, it is a little bit harder for us,

but over time, I would suggest that the measure is going to be

where commerce and the freedom of the people rule and the government is able to take over and to maintain that territory with

their given Afghanistan police forces.

We are seeing an effective use of our PRTs and, at that point in

time, I think we can probably back out at least into the background

and let the Afghan government start working it.

So that is kind of the measurement we are looking at.

General KIMMITT. Again, this partially goes to the question of the

differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. We used to joke about

Afghanistan being a 14th century economy rushing headlong into

the 15th.

And what the PRTs, I would suggest, in Afghanistan are doing

are trying to build something that was never there, road networks,

so on and so forth. By contrast, in Iraq, I went to our PRT handbook, which differentiates requirements, and it says, ‘‘There is a

stronger emphasis in Iraq on capacity-building rather than reconstruction. Capacity is defined as coaching, mentoring and training

in good governance and economics.’’

So to the extent that the PRTs in Iraq are measured by the success of the local government to be able to do their job, the ultimate

effect that we are seeking is to put them out of a job.

We do not have PRTs in every province in Iraq. Two in particular, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah, are considered to have sufficient

governance capability themselves that doesn’t require U.S. insertion or coalition insertion into those provinces.

So going to the question, Ms. Davis, in regards of how are you

going to know you are ultimately successful, it is when we close

that PRT, PST or EPRT down, because the local people are doing

the job for themselves.

Some of the metrics that can be used, I would suggest, would include their ability to get funds and obligate funds given to them

from the Iraqi ministry of finance, their ability to run their own

provincial health systems, their own provincial education systems.

And that is why each of the PRTs has a different focus, because

as you might imagine, in each of those provinces, there is a different capacity already existing on the ground.

Some of the provinces have very developed health systems, particularly in the south. Others in the west don’t necessarily have

that. So that is where we put more emphasis.

But to your point on the metric, the ultimate metric is when

there is no longer a need for that PRT.

Colonel BAKER. I would like to add just one final comment,

ma’am, to your question and perhaps bring it down to more of a

local level at the EPRT/Bridge Combat Team (BCT) level.

There are local metrics that commanders and team leaders use

and some of them are as simple as numbers and types of projects

that they contract, that they complete. Some are becoming more

complex in terms of assessing budget execution, which Mr. Kimmitt

was just alluding to.

14

But ultimately, we are trying to understand the effect that the

PRT activities are having on the citizens in the province and many

times it is difficult to be that objective.

You have to really be more subjective in your metrics. And so we

found that certain things, like the reduction in levels of violence,

were directly proportional many times to the process in terms of reconstruction and building, a targeting of improving essential services that the PRTs were instrumental in, so that you could graph

and track that at the local level.

The number of unsolicited tips that the local citizens begin to

provide the security forces begins to raise and many times that is

because they—it is a quid pro quo society. They don’t have anything to give back for what you do for them except information and

that is really where the PRT and the counterinsurgency components begin to interact at the local level.

One of the things I talk about to groups is the wave factor. I

don’t know if you have ever heard of that. But when I was driving

through a neighborhood and nobody waved at me, not a child, not

a woman, not a man, I knew that there were some very serious and

fundamental problems in that particular neighborhood.

When I drove through a neighborhood and the children waved,

but the adults did not, things weren’t rock bottom, but they weren’t

good either. And when you are driving through a neighborhood

where everybody is waving to you, it tells you that you have begun

to have an effect on that population. You have reduced the levels

of violence.

They are sharing information with you. You have created some

trust and confidence between you and the citizens and, probably

more importantly, hope and expectations that these small accomplishments that we make in the local areas will allow the larger

national accomplishments to take root over the long term and that

gives us that space and that time we need to build that bridge from

the bottom up and the top down for local and national accommodation and reconciliation.

So I hope that answers it somewhat.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick questions

here.

The first thing, and maybe this is two separate answers relative

to Afghanistan and Iraq, but let’s say you have got a local military

commander that has some money in his pocket so he can fix somebody’s sewer or a pothole or whatever it happens to be, which we

found to be very effective.

Now, who coordinates between the local military commander in

an area and the PRTs what project is going to be done and how

do you work that through? I assume it may be different in both.

Just a quick answer, because I have got a couple of other tougher

questions. But just how does that work?

Mr. SHIVERS. Are you asking about the specific approval process?

Mr. AKIN. Yes, that cycle. Let’s say that there is a water line out

between here and there and the military commander in the area

thinks, ‘‘Boy, we could build a lot of brownie points if we fix the

water line’’ or something.

15

How do you work between the government, the PRT—I mean,

the Afghan government, the PRT and the military commander in

charge? What is that coordination process on various things that

you are working on?

Mr. SHIVERS. Again, sir, it would depend on the operating environment that you find yourself in. If you are cooperating closely

with Afghanistan government officials, that is, that they have a

good functioning local government, then you would look for—depending upon where the recommendation came from, it could have

come from a village elder, a local mullah, you would coordinate

that with the mechanism at the PRT for liaison with the Afghan

government, the local district or provincial government, village government.

There is a relatively formal system of approvals, as you might expect, because it is U.S. taxpayer money that is being expended and

strict documentation that is attached to it, but it is applied fairly

flexibly.

Anecdotally, I have never done a survey of the entire thing, but

I do question returning officers, people who have been in command

of PRTs, to ask them how flexible the system is and how quick they

can get.

So there are a variety of different points of approval, but a lot

of delegated approval, as well. So PRTs, for instance, have——

Mr. AKIN. Who makes the decision, though, the final decision of

whether you are going to do something or does it depend?

General WILKES. There is kind of a hierarchy. Obviously, the development plan for Afghanistan is the lead list of directions. That

goes into an embassy with the ambassador and a group of all the

interagency, including the U.S. forces piece of it, that ties together

with all the NATO pieces, and they look at the larger project lists

of things.

Anything that is over about $1 million or something or other is

approved at that level. As you get down into the CJTF–82, anything below $1 million, they would be the decision authority in

that.

Mr. AKIN. Who would be the decision authority?

General WILKES. The CJTF commander. And as you get down

into the brigade combat team, the commander there has the authority. And I am not talking that these guys are going to unilaterally be the final say on everything. They work with the interagency

team.

They have project lists between that and about 50. When you get

down to the 50,000 and below, your PRT commander has authority

on those kinds of dollars and with his team there, he would execute

that money.

General KIMMITT. A great question and that is exactly why we

formed the EPRTs to put the brigade commander and the Department of State under the same tent, working together, both looking

at the same campaign plan, both looking at the effects in their

neighborhood to make this as simple as possible.

I will Ralph pass on the details of that.

Colonel BAKER. Sir, there are really two cases here. One is where

you have an emergency essential service that you need to remedy

16

and then there is also the long-term project list that you want to

plan over time to improve the quality of life.

What you will typically find is that, ultimately, the PRT team

leader has responsibility for prioritizing and making the final call

on those elements in the economic and the rebuilding area that

have to be repaired.

However, it is a collaborative effort between the brigade commander and that team leader. They both have moneys. The commander has his CERP fund and the team leader has his quick reaction funds that can both be targeted at the same infrastructure requirements.

An so typically what you will find is the brigade combat team

and the team will form their own committee that will essentially

determine in their work plan all the different projects that they

have to work on and what priority they have to work on them.

If they are smart, and many of them are, they will try to spend

other people’s money before they spend their own.

Mr. AKIN. Most of them are.

Colonel BAKER. For example, we used to take everything in our

area that needed to be repaired, fixed or built and prioritize it and

then we would bring in NGOs, we would bring in the Army Corps

of Engineers, we would bring external contractors in and try to get

them to take on those projects in our area so that we didn’t have

to spend and commit our moneys to those projects.

Then after we had bid everything out that we could, we would

then focus our funds on those areas that we thought gave the citizens the most benefit and also benefited us from a coin standpoint.

General KIMMITT. But I think it is also important to note that

by putting people in the same Foreign Operating Base (FOB),

working side by side every day, living together, working together,

eating together, talking together, you do get that synchronized

view inside these embedded PRTs where it is not, ‘‘Well, we need

to go over to Bavil to talk to the PRT. We are over here in Wasit.’’

Putting them together in this embedded, it is starting to become

very, very apparent to us the wisdom of that decision for them to

have the same common situational awareness and the same desire

to achieve the same effects in the same location, whether you are

State Department, USAID or military, and things get worked out

on the ground in a remarkable way that don’t often do it when you

have a lot of wiring diagrams and disparate locations.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. I am out of time.

What I was going to ask, and maybe come back around later, so

don’t answer this question, but you can think about it, is who is

going to run basically—what we are seeing in this kind of a conflict, there is a need for whether it is a PRT or whatever you want

to call it, but there is need for those kinds of teams.

I guess my question, and I think it is a question of other people

on the committee maybe, is who ultimately should be running

those things? Should that be something that is considered a DOD

thing and we are actually going to budget for that and we are going

to have a structure in the way that we do that?

Is that a State thing or how does that work? So that might be

a politically dangerous question to answer, but we would be curious

about your opinion on it.

17

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, if you want to respond to that, any comments that come to mind, if any of you want to respond to Mr.

Akin.

General Wilkes.

Mr. Kimmitt.

General KIMMITT. To our view, it is pretty well laid out in

NSPD–44, as well as DOD 3000.05, that there is an understanding

that this is an interagency effort.

Where the rubber meets the road, of course, is in funding. The

Department of Defense budget is roughly 20 to 25 times that of the

Department of State. And so we always have to work our way

through that.

But in many ways, we have the directive from the NSPD and,

internal to our own department, DOD 3000.05 that talks about

these types of stabilization.

We have a deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. She is responsible for putting together the policy within

DOD for how we work with the State Department and other agencies.

I think that there is a significant desire on the part of all the

agencies, the interagency, to come together to try to put into policy

what we are finding is working so effectively in practice on the

ground.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

I will take my five minutes now.

We met with, as I mentioned, both civilian and military members

of the PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq and really came away

with a sense of just really some remarkable people who care a

great deal about what they do and felt like that their superiors

cared a great deal about what they do.

I think one of them told us that before he went over, CNO, I

think, the Chief of Naval Operations got them all together and

said, here is the CNO saying, ‘‘What you are about to embark on

is very, very important to this country,’’ and that kind of thing

sticks with you.

But I think they are a remarkable group of people. The question

that we all have been wrestling with, and I mentioned to Jeff Davis

before he came in, with this interagency stuff, do we have some inherent obstacles in the way things are set up that may interfere

with that.

Mr. Kimmitt, let me just ask you one quick question before I get

to my questions for today.

We heard testimony, as I am now going back to your former role

in Iraq, but we had testimony a couple weeks ago from a representative of the Department of Labor, in public testimony, and I presented a scenario.

I said if I had a DOD civilian, of which you are now one, and

he was assigned to Iraq and volunteered to go to Iraq or ended up

there as an emergency essential in Iraq and had an hour off during

some week, took some free time, went outside in his cutoffs, had

a basketball, there was a hoop, put on his music, clearly not doing

work-related activity, and mortar came in and he was wounded.

18

Would he be considered covered by worker’s comp because of his

war wound? And I thought that was a no-brainer and the Department of Labor guy said, ‘‘We will need to get back you on that’’ and

we have not yet received an answer in two weeks that a civilian

DOD employee who received a mortar wound, clearly doing something recreational, but that somehow they were applying civilian

standards here in D.C., ‘‘Well, that was recreational. You are at the

bar for happy hour or something,’’ that wouldn’t work.

I mean, does that surprise you that we actually still have this

uncertainty from Department of Labor about that? Because it impacts—I think it is one of the questions that civilians will ask

themselves, ‘‘Do I really want to be a civilian in that environment?’’

Does that surprise you we have not gotten that?

General KIMMITT. Chairman, it does surprise me, and I think the

answer is self-evident.

Going back to my uniform days, we had very clear regulations in

terms of what injuries incurred in the line of duty and non-line of

duty. Obviously, if that was a soldier playing basketball and——

Dr. SNYDER. Was mortared.

General KIMMITT [continuing]. Was mortared, there would be no

question about that, or even back here in the states, if that happened while he was on a weekend and incurred a significant injury

like that.

Now, there is a term called ‘‘thrill seeking’’ that they are not indemnified against. So if somebody is out there——

Dr. SNYDER. Bungee jumping while drunk without a rope.

General KIMMITT. Then they are not covered. That would be considered non-line of duty.

It does surprise me and I think all of us would advocate that

those same rules apply to anybody that is in the combat zone serving our nation.

Dr. SNYDER. That was our concern, too.

One of the things that came out when, I think, we met with our

representatives from Iraq, our PRT members, several of whom

were still in the military, and one of them made a comment—

maybe other members can correct me—but said, ‘‘You know, we actually wish that they weren’t called the same thing,’’ that the function of the PRTs in Iraq is so different from the PRTs in Afghanistan.

It is different functions. I think he said that, ‘‘We don’t think we

ought to have the term ‘reconstruction.’ We really are like an advisory group, a capacity-building for how the political process works.’’

And I suspect if we went around to most Members of Congress

and said true or false, the PRT function in Afghanistan and Iraq

is about the same, they would all say, ‘‘Oh, yes, it is about the

same.’’

Is it that dramatic a difference—it sounds like it is—between the

PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq that we really need, as Members of

Congress and policy-makers, to be looking on it as a different function?

Colonel Baker and General Kimmitt, maybe I will ask for your

response, since it is primarily about Iraq now.

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, we have had this discussion before about the manning of the different PRTs in Afghanistan and

19

Iraq and I agree with what Mark Kimmitt read to you earlier in

the handbook, that they do serve distinctly fundamentally different

purposes in each of the two countries.

And clearly what the focus of the Iraq PRTs is is on—it does do

some reconstruction, but its primary focus is on capacity-building.

And I appreciate your comments that it can be misleading and perhaps may, in fact, cause those to be misinformed about what they

do and their intent to support what they do.

But, yes, there is a difference between the two teams and capacity and reconstruction I think is the easiest way to visualize that.

Dr. SNYDER. The one aspect of that when I thought, well, maybe

it was a good thing, is if you are an Iraqi and you are coming to

be visited by somebody from the provincial reconstruction team,

you may be more inclined to go to the meeting if you think this

might mean I can get my bridge built, and you are not prepared

for a lecture on, ‘‘Well, now you have got to go out there and raise

the money and come up with a tax system.’’

I mean, maybe that is not what you are expecting, but maybe it

gets more people to your meeting.

Let’s see. Who is next here on our list?

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Jalalabad two weeks ago meeting with the PRT team

there and got a great brief.

The conversation for about an hour and a half sounded a lot

more like a chamber of commerce in Small Town, USA. The thing

that I couldn’t—I asked them a little bit about this, but it seemed

to be missing, was the link between what the Afghanis want and

what we think they want.

The State Department guy walked us through a planning process

that they had gone through with the team and all the good stuff,

but there didn’t seem to be any link with the local populous, local

leadership in Jalalabad as to what they thought and how they

wanted.

Can you talk to us a little bit of how you make sure that we are

not doing or coming up with great ideas on behalf of people that

may not link up with what they think are great ideas?

Mr. SHIVERS. It is absolutely essential that the PRTs be aligned

with the local populous. A key role that they are playing is contributing to stabilization efforts in their area of responsibility through

aligning themselves with the local populous as a key tool against

counterinsurgents.

So if there is a disconnect, it needs to be corrected.

My own experience in Jalalabad, sir, I was there probably about

four months ago, at the PRT, was that there was a great sensitivity

on the part of the leadership with that subject and, indeed, I think

we use Jalalabad PRT as a fine example of outreach at a wide variety of levels, not only from the center locale of the PRT, but the

satellite, smaller PRTs that they have populated Nangarhar Province with.

So I am hoping that that is an impression, sir, rather than reality. I know there is great sensitivity, especially at that PRT,

about that need.

20

I would also say, just going back to Congressman Akin’s point,

that PRTs, by their nature, are interim organizations. They are not

meant to be permanent. And the biggest component of decisions

about standing down a PRT in a place like Afghanistan will be

based upon security environments.

So I am imagining that for decades, the need for reconstruction,

development and everything will continue and that outreach to

those local officials will be absolutely essential.

Mr. CONAWAY. I didn’t mean to disparage those guys in

Jalalabad, because I thought they were doing a terrific job.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Everything was on the list that they wanted to do

were things that I would have lined up, as well.

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, there will always be tension between principals and advisors. So to the extent that our PRT members are attempting to convince local officials of paths ahead that will bear

fruit for them in terms of establishing good practices and procedures, that will be useful, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. The interesting thing was that some of those guys

that were at our chamber of commerce meeting had been in a fourhour gunfight the morning before.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. So there is an incredible disconnect to have them

standing there talking about roads, canals and funding and all the

kinds of things that every chamber of commerce in the United

States does, to know that the morning before, they were wearing

a much different hat. I was very proud of our group.

General WILKES. Sir, if I could make a comment on that. That

is the key piece there, that you have got a pretty strong

counterinsurgency and a lot of the projects that you want done and

that the local community would want accomplished can’t be defended.

So to expend that money on it at that point in time may not be

the right decision.

Additionally, the way we tie that together from a national level

down is we are looking at a ministry of interior representative at

the PRTs, BCT level, so that we can integrate all of that activity

up and down the chain here and make sure that the Afghans have

a voice in what we are doing.

Mr. CONAWAY. One other quick one. We talked about

incentivizing folks to take on these roles.

On the military side, who evaluates them? Who gives the performance reports and all those kinds of things on the folks that are

serving? Those obviously follow on their entire career. How does

that work on an individual basis?

General WILKES. When we go through the selection process,

these PRTs are selected. The commander is screened. They have a

two-month training program before they go over there.

The team is formed with about 85 or so folks. Largely, I would

say 70–80 percent of it is National Guard-reserve component type

folks with expertise in that particular area. They volunteer for this

mission. They will go over for the full year.

And based upon their backgrounds, the expertise in whatever

area, we fit that into the PRT. The normal report systems, OPRs,

21

EPRs, et cetera, are written at the end of their period and all of

that is documented for their records.

Mr. CONAWAY. And who evaluates the commander?

General WILKES. The PRT commander is just like a battalion

commander within a brigade combat team over there that works

for CJTF–82, with the CJTF–82 two-star being the final authority.

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me make one other comment, if I could.

There was apparently an attempt to put together a National

Guard group of farmers, by trade, to come over and specifically

work in Nangarhar. They got waylaid somewhere, General Fallon

or somebody, and the folks on the ground really wanted farmers to

come work with—it is an agricultural issue there in Nangarhar, obviously.

So they were very disappointed that——

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I spoke personally with Admiral Fallon about

that issue yesterday and he is looking into it.

Mr. CONAWAY. It is interesting. The State Department or USAID

guy was not at the table. He was sitting on the back bench and

the guys were talking about the need for agricultural expertise, not

just the guys that knew how to grow stuff, but the process, the Ag

industry to allow the local economy to grow and they needed all

this help.

And then the USAID guy, when he got up, when it was his turn

to talk, said, ‘‘We don’t need anymore Ag guys over here. We have

got all the Ag expertise we need.’’ The 06 turned around and said,

‘‘I couldn’t disagree with you more. What I need are farmers who

actually run plows and tractors and understand exactly how that

works.’’

Mr. SHIVERS. As you know, sir, agriculture employs about 80 percent of the Afghan population, directly or indirectly. So it is hard

to imagine that we would have too much expertise in the country.

Mr. CONAWAY. I think the issue was they didn’t want academic

guys—what the colonel wanted was those who really make their

own living doing that.

Mr. SHIVERS. As I understand the proposal, sir, it is an attempt

to identify within the reserve ranks farmers and practitioners of

agriculture, a variety of things, not only the farming itself, but all

the vertically integrated industries associated with agriculture.

So my office considers it a very worthwhile effort and we are

championing it.

General WILKES. Sir, I think what you are seeing is you have intervened a little bit into our staffing process and this is the normal

discussion that goes on.

Our Joint Plans Officer (J–5) is out in Iraq and Afghanistan this

week and that will be one of the topics that he is talking with

CJTF–82 and all of the PRTs and Admiral Fallon is certainly reengaging.

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, appreciate your leniency.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen,

thank you for being here today.

I guess, for many of us, to see some success in Afghanistan and

Iraq and particularly with the PRTs is certainly encouraging.

22

I wanted to go back to last week we had a State Department,

and I know there were two colonels, a lieutenant colonel and a full

bird colonel, and I think this is the point that Mr. Akin made or

maybe Mr. Snyder.

The interesting that I observed about the lieutenant colonel—

and, Mr. Chairman, you or Mr. Akin can correct me, and Mr.

Conaway, but it seemed that the lieutenant colonel felt that if they

had the authority and they were working as ones, that the program

would be even more successful.

So I guess my point is, as this is evolving and, again, there are,

I am sure, many, many frustrations which we have heard about

and many successes, that it does have the potential to hopefully

bring some peace to that area over the years.

The funding—I want to make sure I understand this. Mr. Shivers, the funding for the PRT program as it relates to the Department of Defense, what does that come out of and how much would

that be?

Mr. SHIVERS. A key amount of it is CERP funds, commander’s

emergency reconstruction program.

Mr. JONES. What is that budget, do you know, approximately?

General WILKES. In fiscal year 2007, it was $120 million.

Mr. JONES. And, Mr. Kimmitt, State’s budget?

General KIMMITT. The gentlemen were referring to the numbers

for Afghanistan. The numbers in Iraq are substantially higher due

to the—we had $800 million in 2006, roughly $950 million in 2007,

and we have gone forward to OMB with a consolidated request for

Afghanistan and Iraq of $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2008.

It has not yet been parsed how much to Afghanistan and how

much to Iraq. The State Department budget, I think, is roughly

$50 million this year for the QRF for Iraq.

So it gives a sense of the difference between the budget for the

Department of Defense and Department of State with regards to

the money that we give the team leaders on the ground to obligate

and to execute.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Shivers, I think you made in your comments—

and I fully understood the 14th century commerce of Afghanistan

and I think this is what Mrs. Davis and Mr. Davis both were trying

to get to, and she articulated her question very well about the

American people beginning to see the successes.

And I know that you mentioned, one of you gentlemen, that we

have to have standards and metrics and that has to be developed.

You can’t have it today, but maybe it will becoming tomorrow.

At what point do you think, in the next year or two—Mr.

Kimmitt, maybe you should be the one to answer this—that this

Congress would be able to say to the American people, ‘‘This is the

standard. This is the success.’’

General KIMMITT. Congressman, I believe you can tell the American people now that the PRT programs in both Afghanistan and

Iraq are a success. They are a success for a number of reasons.

First of all, in the case of Iraq, we have taken a program which

was nonexistent, there was no doctrinal basis for this prior to these

operations. We talk about their new counterinsurgency strategy

that we have developed, but, in fact, it was built on old

counterinsurgency strategy.

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What General McNeil developed in 2002 in Afghanistan, which

migrated over to Iraq, is quite revolutionary in terms of doing this

in war, developing this type of doctrine, developing these kind of

policies in a very, very short time and to see the results that these

PRTs are having on the day-to-day lives and the provincial councils

inside of Iraq, in a very short period of time.

Let’s put it in perspective. It has only been two, two and a half

years since these have been done. And that these brave young men

and women from the State Department, from our other agencies,

from the Department of Defense have achieved the results that

they have achieved to date, I think we can all stand in great appreciation and with legitimate comments about the success that has

been made to this point.

I think you just have to go to a PRT to see what they are doing,

whether it is in Panjshir, Nangarhar, Jalalabad, Bavil, anywhere

and you will see it.

And I think all of us recognize there is still much work to be

done in terms of developing the long-term doctrine for the next conflict, for the next operation, but so much has already been done to

this point that we ought to stand in gratitude for what has been

accomplished up to this point.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Shivers, do you want to finish?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. I mentioned before that the PRT, by its

nature, is an interim organization. It is also a joint organization,

as we well know. It is military and civilian. And the key metric in

Afghanistan is really the security environment that the PRT operates in, because that will allow it to stand down.

As security is increased and it becomes a permissive environment, then the activities that are conducted by the Department of

State, the USAID and Department of Agriculture and any other civilian experts, engineers, will migrate over into more traditional

forms.

So I believe that the security environment is the key metric for

PRTs and proving them successful. That is why the military has

such a prominent role, because they are so critical to the environment needed to transition to normal forms.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. We will go to a second round. We will begin with

Mr. Akin and then to myself, and then Mr. Conaway and Mr.

Jones, if anyone has additional questions.

Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Just a thought. First of all, as you talk about PRTs,

it seems to me, if you have got a bunch of special operators sitting

somewhere and they have got a mission, they take off of a shelf the

different equipment that they need and they select the people they

want to do a particular mission, it would seem to me that PRTs

could be—you know, we could build on what we have done in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

Obviously, you shape it depending on your mission and the nature of where you are working. If it is something where you need

tremendous military security as opposed to you need a whole lot of

farmers, you pick the tools that you need you put the team together and make it work.

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It seemed to me that, at least on the surface, particularly when

there is a military component, that maybe that could be a part of

something the military does. You have people already identified,

that if we get into this kind of thing, we are going to pull these

people, just like the special forces guy pulls a parachute if he is

going to jump out of a plane or whatever.

I guess the other question that we have been thinking about was

taking what is going on in the local community, on the ground, and

taking it much more to the macro level when you first go into a

place like Afghanistan, into Iraq.

As we look back and kind of think what happened, a lot of us

have a sense that the military was doing a good enough job maybe,

but that there wasn’t—that the State piece wasn’t coordinated that

well with the military.

All of a sudden, Bremer says, ‘‘If you are a member of the original leadership, they are all going to be disbanded.’’ We didn’t get

the sense that—and the military had a plan that said, ‘‘Well, we

are going to use middle management to stand up an army over

there and the State Department has just said the army has just

been dismissed.’’

So it didn’t seem like the right hand knew what the left hand

was doing at the sort of higher level.

Now, that may be a totally different situation and requiring

jointness in terms of how we manage those operations from a PRT,

but it seems like kind of similar to a PRT, just at a higher kind

of level.

Do you want to comment on that? And do you see a parallelism

or do you think a PRT is just sort of a totally separate entity and

could be treated differently?

General KIMMITT. Well, sir, in the case of Iraq, I think you bring

up a very good point, which is this notion of working as an interagency team can’t simply be done at a PRT. It has to be part of

the entire campaign.

And when one pulls back and talks to our coalition partners,

they are in awe of the way that our interagency works, whether it

is here in Washington, D.C., whether it is in the joint interagency

coordination groups that we are developing in our component commands, or whether it is the great coordination that we see right

now between Ambassador Haliza and between Ambassador Crocker

and General Petraeus.

And that notion that this fight that we are in in Iraq is far more

than simply a military operation, I mean, we have all watched Ken

Burns over the last couple of days, and the war was seen to be—

I am not sure I saw a civilian in that entire series.

It was all about military bringing force of arms to defeat two dictatorships, but that is not what we are seeing on the ground and

many would say that the wave of the future is we must have a capacity to address not simply the military, but the nonmilitary aspects of what is going on.

We used to talk about the war on terrorism being about 90 percent nonmilitary, 10 percent military, and I think there is certainly

a generation of young foreign service officers, lieutenants, young

captains on the ground now that see this as a way of life.

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They have not fought a war where they have not had a State Department person by their side, and that is going to continue to

work itself up as they become older and take on more and more

prominence.

So at least I think on this side of the table, and I would be surprised if it was not throughout the table, all of us understand that

particularly in the types of operations that we see in Afghanistan

and Iraq, but have also seen in Kosovo and Bosnia, that most of

the tasks that need to be done on a day-to-day basis are what we

call non-kinetic, nonmilitary, and all of us, I believe, are certainly

in this direction.

As Ms. Davis talked about earlier, in the wake of GoldwaterNichols, resulting from some of the interagency problems and the

inter-service problems that we had during Grenada, in this discussion, in many ways, you are preaching at the converted.

Mr. AKIN. So you are saying it is a continuous fabric from the

top levels down just to the local guys and the PRT on the street,

that it has to be a coordinated kind of effort.

General KIMMITT. Well, I suspect there is some old irredentists

out there that believe that you don’t need the State Department

when you go into these types of operations or you don’t need the

military, but the ranks of those irredentists I think are getting

smaller and smaller every day.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, Mr. Kimmitt, I hate to take part of my five

minutes, but I don’t know what the word ‘‘irredentist’’ means nor

how to spell it.

General KIMMITT. What it means, Mr. Chairman, is somebody

who doesn’t sort of want to look to the future. They want to hold

onto old concepts that don’t square with the reality on the ground.

Dr. SNYDER. Traditions.

General KIMMITT. Many cases.

Dr. SNYDER. Traditions that no longer work.

I wanted to ask—by the way, I will put in a plug. I float this idea

out there about once every six months, but it relates to some of the

things you are saying, Mr. Kimmitt, in terms of how war has

changed and contrasting with what has been going on, the focus on

World War II through the Ken Burns’ films.

But we may be better ahead as a country if we made foreign language training part of boot camp and assigned a foreign language

to every person that comes in the military to say, ‘‘You are going

to be the Farsi guy, you are going to be the Arabic guy,’’ just do

it by platoon.

So just from the very get-go, people would recognize that they

are going to have more expected of them than just the ability to

fire weapons or do air traffic control or something.

I wanted to ask, in terms of—because we are looking ahead in

terms of a security transfer. The violence seems to be coming down

somewhat in Iraq and sometime, six months, eight months, 12

months, you are going to have areas that you are going to want to

transfer security over to Iraqi control.

What happens to the American-led PRTs in that situation? Are

we still going to have military units going in with our Ag advisors

and our foreign service officers?

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Do you have a plan on how that is going to work? Colonel Baker

or Mr. Kimmitt?

General KIMMITT. Yes, sir. General Odierno was back here the

last few days and that point was brought up, as well. As part of

the testimony from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus,

there were orders given down through the chain of command to reform their campaign plan.

This is one of those issues that they are grappling with. But

there is a model already on the ground and that is what has happened in the south and what the British have done with their provinces is they have handed three of the four provinces over to provincial Iraqi control.

That is where we have the PSTs or what some would call the

satellite PRTs. For example, in Muthanna, the PRT run by an

Italian, Anna Prouse, out of Tallil, their satellite PSTs will go out

to Muthanna and continue to work with them.

The security conditions are such that depending on the level of

threat, that team will either have contractor support, perhaps Iraqi

security force support, but as long as there is a need in that province for additional support with governance, then it is my estimate

that the commanders will come back and say, ‘‘Even though we

have handed over security control for the region, there is still need

for more good governance procedures.’’ So we are going to continue

to support either through a satellite PST or various other ways.

Dr. SNYDER. So, Mr. Shivers, in Afghanistan, you said the basic

component of a PRT there was 85 military, three American civilians, 85 American military and five Afghans, that you could envision 18 months from now having an area of Afghanistan where security is maintained by the Afghan national army, but there would

still be a contingent of 85 U.S. military and three U.S. civilians and

five Afghans going out as a unit in that area to provide security

for that group.

Is that a fair statement or do you think that would be a work

in progress that will evolve?

Mr. SHIVERS. Of course, we are looking forward to the day, sir,

when we can stand down some PRTs. So depending upon the actual security conditions on the ground, we maybe able to do that

and we may be able to turn it over to ANSF forces and have a permissive environment where U.S. military presence isn’t needed in

that particular location.

Let me stress that I suspect that the civilian components of that

PRT would then go over into more traditional avenues of assistance

delivery.

So that we will continue probably to have officials in Afghanistan’s provinces for many years to come, from the State Department, USDA, AID.

Dr. SNYDER. Then as Mr. Kimmitt said, may have contract security or some security would be just part of the function that you

all would work out, depending on the area.

Colonel Baker has something he wanted to say.

Colonel BAKER. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that as part of

the POTUS’ direction to Ambassador Crocker and General

Petraeus to revise the campaign plan, that issue, among others, are

being looked at and they are looking at PRT team locations, they

27

are looking at size of PRT teams, will they need to grow larger in

terms of their skill sets and components.

I think it is fair to say that the mission of the PRT team, although it is designed as a temporary organization, in a perfect

world, they will do less and less every day because the capacity will

improve in the provinces to govern themselves, that their mission

will endure longer than the security mission, if trends continue to

stay as they are and levels of violence go down.

But it will be a joint decision between embassy and MNFI in

terms of the level and duration and sizes of the security component

that has to accompany the PRTs. Until such time the environment

is semi-permissive or permissive, you are going to still see MNFI

maintain responsibilities to ensure that those teams can conduct

those important missions they do.

But we have to wait to see how they—what the decisions are

based on their analysis that they are going through right now.

We talk about this fairly often in our Iraq steering group that

Mr. Kimmitt and I attend with our interagency colleagues and are

very well aware of the USAID and State concerns and have been

working with MNFI on this issue preceding the President’s guidance to re-look at the campaign plan.

Dr. SNYDER. One of the frustrations expressed by several of the

members of the PRTs we met with privately were that they got

frustrated early on that security was not available. They did not

have the ability to move around. They can’t do anything without

moving around their area geographically and they mean going out

on roads and going to meet with people.

So as violence comes down, we know it will at some point, we

want to be sure that they wouldn’t go through that same frustration again of the security not being available if they still thought

they had things to do.

Mr. AKIN. Just piggybacking on what you said, the one thing

that one of the PRT teams said, they said you have died and gone

to heaven is what it feels like when you have got dedicated people

that are there to move you around.

When they had dedicated——

Dr. SNYDER. Uniformed military people.

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Uniformed people, that that was their sole

mission was to help the PRT teams, they said that was when, ‘‘Boy,

we really could get some stuff done when that was dedicated, that

resource was dedicated.’’

Dr. SNYDER. I think they were saying as opposed to early on,

some in the military thought they were kind of like an afterthought

mission, but once they all got on the same page, like the CNO saying, ‘‘What you all are doing is really important’’ and word gets

around, then they say things really started to click for them.

General KIMMITT. Chairman, if I could, that was one of the major

elements of the embedded PRTs. We have a signed memorandum

of agreement between our deputy secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of state that laid out in these new EPRTs those specific issues, which is the value of embedding them into military

units and be seen.

I would suspect that the PRTs you are referring to are the older

PRTs that were separate from the military units. What we have

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learned is exactly as you have said—more work can be done, collocated, living, eating, working together, and that is one of the lessons that we are learning as we are developing the doctrine, the

emerging doctrine for PRTs, which will probably be with us in

many ways, perhaps in different forms, from these point forward

in operations that we will be conducting.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway, we haven’t forgotten about you. The

technician accidentally pulled the plug here on the light. That is

why it went out.

So Mr. Conaway, for five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes, last thing. Are there any legislative issues

that need to be addressed that can make these things work better,

barriers, laws or things that we can start chewing on that would,

if implemented or gotten out of your way, make this initiative more

successful?

Dr. SNYDER. Why don’t we go right down the line? I would like

to hear from each person. I had that question on my list, too.

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. I am not aware of any required legislative

remedies.

General WILKES. No, sir, I am not either.

General KIMMITT. There has been a desire, and I believe there

has been some proposed legislation on this notion of a civilian reserve corps.

One of the hard parts for DOD or the military to understand is

that the State Department does not have courses in waiting. It is

easy for us to—not easy, but the military has been designed so that

there are forces standing by ready to deploy when the Nation calls.

If one takes a look at the State Department, it is a zero sum

game. They don’t have State Department officials sitting at Fort

Bragg, North Carolina and training at Peason Ridge in Louisiana,

just waiting for when the Nation calls.

But this notion that there be a civilian reserve capacity, whether

in being or in reserve, to draw upon I know would be something

that our policy people, such as our stability operations and some

of the people over at the State Department, would be advocating

for, to develop capacity so that it is not a zero sum game within

the State Department to double the size of the Iraqi embassy in

times of crisis or a future embassy in times of crisis has to be taken

away from another organization, because those other organizations

suffer as a result.

So to develop that type of capacity and, frankly, a State Department budget that reflects how important the State Department role

is in the conduct of conflict in the future I think would be the two

areas that we would ask the committee to consider.

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I would echo what Mr. Kimmitt

just said about the reserve civilian corps. The joint staff thinks that

is a very important capacity that we think State Department

needs.

We all realize that this is not an aberration. This is really an insight into what the future is going to look like in terms of how we

pursue national security interests around the world.

I would just like to say that continued funding for the CERP programs and for the QRF, the new QRF program that the PRT teams

29

use now to support their activities is important and we would ask

that you continue to support that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Quick response fund.

Colonel BAKER. Quick response fund, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. We sometime use the same acronyms.

Colonel BAKER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. The quick response fund is very

similar to the CERP program. It is refreshingly known as State

CERP.

Dr. SNYDER. Anything else, Mr. Conaway?

I wanted to ask, Mr. Kimmitt, you mentioned the adequate funding for the State Department, which I think has been a concern for

some time. But some of us met privately with a foreign service officer within the last couple of days who took great offense at some

of what he thought were misunderstandings and misdepictions in

the press that somehow the State Department had fallen down.

And he felt that of the foreign service officer slots that were

needed on the PRTs, that 100 percent had been filled appropriately, that, in fact, it was other agencies.

Now, we got into some disputes about that and discussions

about, yes, but the State Department is supposed to take the lead

in getting these other civilian slots.

You talk about adequate funding for the State Department,

which I agree with you on. There probably needs to be some redundancy built into the system so that you could pull—we need to pull

one or two veterinarians from Africa or China, wherever, but have

some redundancy built in so the whole operation doesn’t fall apart.

But that is going to have to be—veterinarians are probably not

State Department employees. They are probably Department of Ag

employees or USAID employees. You have got certainly Department of Justice issues——

We are going to need to look at redundancy and adequate funding all across the spectrum of government services, are we not?

General KIMMITT. I couldn’t agree more, Mr. Chairman. Department of Treasury, for example, the work that they are doing with

regards to setting up the system inside the treasury system and

the distribution of funds inside of Iraq.

Department of Justice, the Rule of Law Task Force, the significant amount of work that is being done with the Rule of Law Task

Force, whether the entire spectrum of legal issues that involve

these types of operations.

Dr. SNYDER. All the agencies that are involved in these. As you

said, we are gaining experience with these PRTs, what functions

are there, that we may need to build some redundancy in the civilian side of government to deal with these international events and

have that be part of somebody’s job description.

You are going to be assigned to Washington, D.C., but you may

be called to Bosnia or Afghanistan.

General KIMMITT. I am hard pressed to think of any agency in

the Federal Government that couldn’t add value to the types of operations we are seeing in Iraq and I suspect in Afghanistan, as

well.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, a couple of you, in your written statements,

and you mentioned just a minute ago, Mr. Kimmitt, mentioned the

idea of civilian reserve.

30

I don’t have a sense of how that would work beyond the two

words put together in your statements. Are you talking about this

being something totally new? Are you talking about this being as

part of a National Guard function or U.S. Army Reserve function,

like civil affairs?

When you say that, what are you saying exactly?

General KIMMITT. Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps it would be helpful at a separate time, when we could have the experts on this

come and give you a briefing on the notion of the civilian reserve

corps, because it would be—it is our view that it would be truly

that, a civilian reserve corps, not one to be—some people may also

be in the National Guard, some people also may be working for the

Department of Defense.

But it is a very exciting policy proposal that is germinating from

both State Department and from the Department of Defense.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is a fair statement. I have seen more of

the concept I guess than anything that has really been hammered

out.

We had experiences in Arkansas when the 39th was activated—

well, different guard units have been activated where—I remember

one of those lieutenant colonels in charge of one of the units was

also a city mayor.

Well, his mayoral experience was probably as important as his

military experience.

We had a police chief that was activated and that ability to organize a police department became important, too.

Laura, did any of the staff have any questions that you all think

we didn’t get to? Everybody okay?

Mr. Akin, do you have any further questions?

Mr. AKIN. No, I don’t, but I very much appreciate your thoughts

and it seems to me one of the most exciting positive developments

of this last number of years.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, did you have any further questions?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I am sure that you covered all the

ground. But maybe just really quickly, what do you see as the

greatest obstacle to saying that we are in a very different place five

years from now in terms of the way we look at this interagency

work that is being done through PRTs and just generally?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think it is very easy to underestimate the difficulty of trying to create the conditions conducive to stability in a

country like Afghanistan. It is really a place that was, as you well

know, totally devastated by decades of destruction and mayhem.

And it requires an expeditionary nature on our part. It requires

a tremendous amount of coordination with allies. In a place like Afghanistan, we have 72 nations and international official institutions operating.

And in Afghanistan, we pursue PRT initiatives through ISAF,

through a NATO command. So we have our own PRTs, but importantly, we have those of the allied command structure.

So I think we have underestimated the complexity. It requires a

total government effort and a total mobilization to be successful

and even at that, it will take many more years than we would care.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are you optimistic that we have the

wherewithal to do this?

31

Mr. SHIVERS. I am optimistic in the outcome, I really am. I think

the issue for us is whether we are going to go through more pain

than we need to and whether it will take a prolonged period of time

to achieve that success.

But I am absolutely—I believe the Afghan cause is worthy and

the people deserve our support. I think they are rooting for us,

which is an important element. They would really like to see the

international coalition succeed.

So I am optimistic, but I think it is a long, hard slog out there.

General WILKES. I would say that keeping our will and focus on

this is going to be the key issue that we have got to face. It is definitely a worthy goal. I think the Afghanistan want us to succeed.

They are putting their backbone into it. We are developing people skills, lawyers from the get-go, justice systems from the get-go,

commerce, roads and things like that. It is a very tough thing. It

is a long process.

So to keep our will and focus is going to be hard.

General KIMMITT. Congresswoman, I think your question also

asked the future of interagency coordination.

I remain enormously optimistic primarily because of the goodwill

that I see not only at the highest level, but the goodwill that is

amongst the individuals working together in some very, very difficult situations.

They understand what they are doing on the ground. These PRTs

see the effects of what they produce and they also understand the

risks that are involved, but yet they still continue to volunteer and

they still continue to do brilliantly on the battlefield.

Along with the points that were made here, I think one of the

major obstacles, to no one’s surprise, will be that of resourcing over

time and making sure that not simply the Department of Defense

has a robust budget, but also the other agencies have the resources, whether it is in terms of the size of their organizations,

the resources that they are given by the taxpayers of the United

States, and, to some extent, the legislative capability so that they

can go out and participate in these operations side by side and understand that they are able to do their job, whether they are Department of State, Treasury, Labor, Agriculture, with the same authorities, capabilities and resources that are given to the troops on

the ground, as well.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it fair to look to the military to try

and make the argument that those agencies should be funded, certainly not equally, but that they should be funded better?

Is there a way that you think that it is appropriate to do that?

General KIMMITT. My secretary has sat in front of committees

and has made that argument and I think we will all continue to

make that argument that the best probability of success in interagency operations will come about when all the agencies that are

participating in the operations have the people, the funding and

the authorities they need to cooperate and synchronize operations

on the ground, along with the Department of Defense.

I certainly know that that is the administration position and I

certainly know that that is the Department of Defense position.

Dr. SNYDER. General Wilkes, your comment about focus and will,

I think that is an important statement. Focus and will are measVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:17 Sep 04, 2008 Jkt 039806 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-93\277160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ured by resources and I am not sure that we are adequately

resourcing the Afghan campaign the way we ought to and the responsibility of this committee.

I am pointing the finger not at you, but at us.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want you all to feel free,

if anything comes to mind, that you want to amplify on any answer, feel free to submit any kind of answers or written statements. We will pass it out to committee members and append to

the record.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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OCTOBER 4, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Now, a couple of you, in your written statements, and you mentioned

just a minute ago, Mr. Kimmitt, mentioned the idea of civilian reserve.

I don’t have a sense of how that would work beyond the two words put together

in your statements. Are you talking about this being something totally new? Are you

talking about this being as part of a National Guard function or U.S. Army Reserve

function, like civil affairs?

When you say that, what are you saying exactly?

General KIMMITT. Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, and Ms. Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities briefed the committee on

October 18, 2007.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall

strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) support most of the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the overarching strategic guidance document for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. PRTs

operationalize the ANDS, assisting the Afghan government extend its authority to

the regions. This helps facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT acts

as a focal point for coordinating much of the reconstruction efforts in the provinces,

provide training and mentoring to Afghan officials, and help execute projects so that

Afghan people are able to see positive developments in their lives, thereby increasing their confidence and trust in the government. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under whose direction all PRTs fall, has published

data (attached) that offers an overview of the scope and type of reconstruction and

development work that PRTs have accomplished. While the ISAF data remains an

evolving product, it has captured a significant portion of the impact PRTs have

made in the country.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs?

How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and

overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the

work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment

of their work plans?

Mr. SHIVERS. Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) 82, Major General Rodriguez,

commands the 12 U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.

Individual PRTs are under the command of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander, who in turn reports to CJTF–82. The BCT commander approves PRT plans

and is responsible for the execution of counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts in his area

of responsibility. CJTF–82 operates under the direction of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). CJTF–82, ISAF, and the U.S. Embassy

in Kabul work closely on PRT planning in order to ensure synchronization of efforts.

Finally, the Afghan government and the international community meet regularly in

two forums in Kabul—the PRT Executive Steering Committee and the PRT Working

Group—to further coordinate PRT efforts and apply lessons learned.

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time.

What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies,

guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and

PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on

coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these

policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi

people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. PRTs do not require new force structure but they do require additional

64

training and education of the PRT units and members to inform them of the environment in which they are to operate.

DoD is granted statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. 1508(a), to designate positions

that meet the following three criteria as ‘‘Emergency Essential’’. The following criteria apply to all DoD appropriated and non-appropriated fund positions, whether

they are general schedule (GS) or working grade (WG).

1. The duties of the position provide immediate and continuing support for combat

operations or are to support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of

the armed forces;

2. The employee must perform those duties in a combat zone after the evacuation

of non-essential personnel (including any dependents of members of the armed

forces) from the combat zone in connection with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, or the commencement of combat operations of

the armed forces in the zone; and

3. It is impracticable to convert the employee’s position to a position authorized

to be filled by a member of the armed forces because of a necessity for that duty

to be performed without interruption.

DoD Directive 1404.10 (‘‘Emergency Essential (E–E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian

Employees’’) requires positions that meet the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1580 to be designated as emergency essential, and requires documentation of the designation within the position descriptions for the positions. The directive further requires emergency essential positions to be coded in automated civilian personnel records and

reported quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The authority provided under 10 U.S.C. 1580 and the DoD implementing policy

under DoD 1404.10 accounts for deployment of civilian employees to combat zones.

However, the Department deploys DoD civilians to support combat, contingency and

emergency operations throughout the world, whether or not their positions are designated as emergency essential. Such employees generally are employee volunteers

and typically serve in a temporary duty (TDY) status.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Afghanistan informing DOD’s work in

developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, ‘‘Military

Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction,’’ which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq

are a key civil-military adaptation the Department is examining in its implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and its support to the State Department-led effort to

implement National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–44, ‘‘Management of

Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization’’, across the U.S.

Government.

Both DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD–44 focus on improving civil-military integration.

PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many U.S. agencies

and working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity. DoD aims to take the lessons learned from PRTs in order to build even more

effective civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the

future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles

for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. DoD has found that the available pool of capable, experienced civilians

from which to draw has been very limited. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with a support role in mind while recognizing that the military may be required to perform certain missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the

State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD–P), the Deputy

Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Manning and Personnel Directorate (J1), and the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) are the main offices that coordinate policy,

training and manning issues for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) within

DoD.

PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan embody very different operational constructs and

missions, therefore an overall lead within the policy offices (OSD Policy and J5) depend on the region. The principal coordinator for PRTs in Afghanistan is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PDASD) for Asian and Pacific Security

Affairs (APSA). PCC meetings on PRTs in Afghanistan are attended by the Deputy

65

Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Central Asian Affairs, who reports to the

PDASD (APSA).

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities leads the development of future PRT-like concepts of civil-military teaming.

This arrangement allows different offices to apply their given expertise (countryspecific, future concepts, training and manning) for PRTs.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

Mr. SHIVERS. Most U.S. Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

are staffed with two (2) Civil Affairs teams, consisting of approximately eight (8)

personnel. The missions and operations of these Civil Affairs teams should not be

viewed as distinct from the broader missions and operations of the PRT. Instead,

Civil Affairs teams are enablers for PRTs: they focus on military planning, execution, and resource allocation in support of civil actions tailored to the counter-insurgency environment, as delineated by the PRT’s integrated command group (PRT

Commander, and the State, USAID, and USDA representatives).

Dr. SNYDER. We have been hearing a lot about how PRTs are attempting to improve the security situation on the ground, and that in Afghanistan, security is the

key metric of success for PRTs, but what about the reconstruction aspect of PRTs?

It seems some PRTs are not engaged in much—if any—reconstruction, but are rather being used as an extension of U.S. military operations separate from the ISAF

effort. How much of the PRTs work is focused on actual reconstruction?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) play an important role in

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The attached data, made available by NATO

ISAF, demonstrates the scope of reconstruction and development activities undertaken by PRTs.

A critical component of the Department of Defense efforts in Afghanistan reconstruction is made possible through the Commanders Emergency Response Program

(CERP). Targeted at quick response humanitarian needs, CERP funds enable local

commanders to execute projects that can directly impact the lives of local Afghans.

In FY 2006 and FY 2007, DoD obligated approximately $200 million per year in

CERP funds within Afghanistan. PRTs have become recognized sources for coordinating high payback CERP projects. The theater standard operating procedures recognizes the benefits of a joint U.S. effort. Working with the PRTs, local commanders

have been able to focus CERP projects to complement PRT projects in addressing

humanitarian needs in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall

strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

General WILKES. The PRTs in Afghanistan are focused on facilitating the Afghan

Government’s ability to realize the goals and objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and defeating the insurgency. The ANDS is the Afghan

master plan for security, governance, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It

was developed by the Afghan government in close coordination with the international community to drive governance reform, development, and bring security to

the people of Afghanistan. Officials in the PRTs help the provinces support this national plan through coordination, mentoring provincial officials, facilitating the processes to support the strategy (working with Provincial Councils to develop Provincial

Development Plans), and allocating funding/projects to support ANDS-supported

programs. All PRTs fall under ISAF and are managed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) for policy and coordinated actions. The PRTs are vehicle for

sub-national deployment of counter-insurgency initiatives and actions for ISAF.

Their primary counter-insurgency role is to connect the Government of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to the people and transform the environment. US

PRTs support US policy guidance by operating under the command and control of

CJTF–82, the US ISAF command, and in close coordination with Embassy Kabul

through the Dept. of State and USAID reps.

Measurable Gains

In 2001, 8 percent of Afghans had access to some form of healthcare; now with

over 670 hospitals and clinics built and outfitted, more than 80 percent of the population has access to medical care. Almost 11,000 doctors, midwives, and nurses have

been trained. In 2001, when we went into Afghanistan and liberated it from the

Taliban and al Qaeda, only some 900,000 children were enrolled in school. Today

there are more than 5 million students in that country. More than 1.5 million of

them are girls. We know the exact number of girls were in school in 2001 because

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that number was Zero. PRTs built and/or coordinated the construction for many of

these clinics, schools, and supporting facilities.

Since 2001, there’s been a 24 percent decline in mortality rates for infants and

children under 5, saving 85,000 young lives every year; More than 70 percent of the

population—including 7 million children—have been inoculated against polio as opposed to just 35 percent 2 years ago. PRTs coordinate this type of activity at the

Provincial level.

And the progress we have made cuts across all fields. In 2001, there was no formal banking system. Today there is a functioning Central Bank with more than 30

regional branches and a single, internationally traded currency. Afghan economic

growth hovers between 12 and 14 percent per year, outstripping even India. The

PRTs helped fuel the growth in the Afghan services industry. Before, the dominate

source of income was agriculture. The service industry now accounts for 42% of the

licit GDP. Income per capita has nearly doubled to $355, compared to $180 three

years ago.

And modernity, absent for decades, is returning to Afghanistan. There are now

three mobile telephone companies serving over 3.5 million subscribers—almost 11

percent of the population. The PRTs facilitated the infrastructure development to

support this Telecom boom.

In 2001, there were 50 kilometers of paved roadway; now, more than 7,400 kilometers of roads have been built and paved, with 1600 more kilometers due to be

completed this year. A new bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan opened recently, creating new opportunities for regional trade and commerce. PRTs coordinated the execution of the US-led national roads program at the provincial level,

and continue to develop the provincial and district roads that flow from the national

road program development.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs?

How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and

overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the

work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment

of their work plans?

General WILKES. In Afghanistan the 12 US PRTs are under the command of

CJTF–82, commanded by Major General Rodriguez. Each of the PRTs falls under

the direct command, control and supervision of a BCT commander (O–6 level command). The BCT has a civil-military planning cell on the staff that communicates

with the CJTF–82 civil-military staff section, the CJ9. The CJ9 works in close coordination with the ISAF CJ9 and the US Embassy Country team to leverage the

interagency expertise and synchronize the US Government and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan. This ensures the governance and development lines of operation are coordinated, properly resourced, and support US policy. The security line of operation

for the PRT is also synchronized, coordinated and resourced first at the BCT-level.

The BCT supports the plans and directives of CJTF–82, and CJTF–82 operates

under the direction of COM ISAF.

Execution and implementation are measured and overseen by the same command

and control structure responsible for planning. The PRT’s work plans are approved

and monitored by the BCT Commanders. The BCT commanders are responsible for

the success and failures of the counter-insurgency efforts in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The PRT is one of the BCT CDR’s subordinate units, and the primary

tool for synchronizing and enabling the development and governance lines of operation in the BCT’s area of operations (AOR).

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time.

What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies,

guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and

PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on

coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these

policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

General WILKES. The DOD military sourcing policy for filling the PRT manpower

requirements is based on the Joint Request For Forces (RFF) process. The manpower requirements and skill sets for the PRTs were previously validated by the

Commander of Central Command and passed to the Joint Staff for action. The Joint

Staff passes the requirements to Joint Forces Command to fill the personnel billets

through a sourcing process where requirements are filled based upon Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) by each of the services. In the PRT the major functions

are command, logistics, administration, security, and enablers. The command slots

are filled by leaders hand-picked by the services for their leadership skills and past

performance. The administrative, logistics, and security functions are filled by available units and personnel from the services who are specifically trained to perform

these functional duties. The enabler requirements are filled by the services with

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specific, low-density skills such as engineers, civil affairs, military police/police

trainers, and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs). The requirement for the PRTs in

Afghanistan is a ‘‘standing RFF’’ with specific skill set requirements that match

military occupation specialties. The requirement for these specific skill sets drive

the military force development process to ensure the services can meet the current

and future needs of the CENTCOM Commander.

Currently no DOD civilians are deployed with the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Afghanistan informing DOD’s work in

developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, ‘‘Military

Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction,’’ which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

General WILKES. The PRT experience informs DOD’s work on developing stability

operations capabilities through studies and products from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). CALL produced the PRT Playbook, the most recent comprehensive product that captures the lessons learned from PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Periodically the CALL conducts on-site visits to capture lessons

learned for their quarterly reports. This information is routinely shared with the

Joint Center for Operational Lessons Learned and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC).

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the

State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

General WILKES. The principal DOD coordinator for PRTs in Afghanistan is the

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia Pacific and Security Affairs (APSA). There is no overall PRT coordinator within DOD-however; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC) has the overall lead on policy matters related to the future of PRTs and PRT-like concepts. PCC meetings on PRTs in Afghanistan are attended by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for

Central Asian Affairs, who reports to the PDASD (APSA).

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

General WILKES. PRTs in Afghanistan are currently manned with the appropriate

number of civil affairs teams (2 per PRT). More civil affairs teams on a PRT would

require a larger security contingent. The current Afghan PRT security force structure supports the mission requirements for two civil affairs teams and the command

group (PRT commander, USAID rep, USDA rep, and DOS rep).

Civil affairs is one of the enabling components of the PRT mission. The other enabling components are military police/police trainers, engineers, and PSYOPs. The

civil affairs teams in the Afghan PRTs execute and implement the actions that are

planned and coordinated by the PRT command group, the Brigade Combat Team

Commander, and support CJTF–82’s Operational Plan and the directives of the commander. Civil affairs missions focus military planning, coordination and expenditure

of resources to facilitate civil actions to support the military mission; in the case

of Afghanistan it is to support a counter-insurgency.

Dr. SNYDER. We have been hearing a lot about how PRTs are attempting to improve the security situation on the ground, and that in Afghanistan, security is the

key metric of success for PRTs, but what about the reconstruction aspect of PRTs?

It seems some PRTs are not engaged in much—if any—reconstruction, but are rather being used as an extension of U.S. military operations separate from the ISAF

effort. How much of the PRTs work is focused on actual reconstruction?

General WILKES. A lack of adequate security is a symptom of the problem that

drives an insurgency; it is not the root cause. The PRT improves the security of a

particular area by enabling the government to connect with the people and eventually transform the environment. The PRTs help the Afghan government connect

with the populace by building capacity in the Provincial and District governments

to meet the needs of their constituents, providing limited security and mobility as

necessary to government officials to gain access to the people and meet with local

leaders (tribal elders), and in many cases improving the government-provided services such as roads, bridges, humanitarian aid distribution, and education. The PRTs

also assist the sub-national Afghan government in the transformation of the environment by facilitating the planning, coordination, and resourcing of reconstruction

and development in Provinces and Districts. By executing these tasks the PRTs improve the security of the situation on the ground.

US military forces in Afghanistan obligated more than $80 million in FY 2006 in

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding for Afghan capacity

building and reconstruction and development. In FY 2007 the US military obligated

$120 million for the same purposes. PRTs dispersed more than 80% of this funding.

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PRTs operate under the command and control of ISAF, and all actions are managed

through CJTF–82 (an ISAF command). PRTs are fully engaged in the coordination

and execution of reconstruction. Their contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan dwarfs that of all other entities from the international community except for USAID. Depending on the particular Province roughly 75% of

PRT work is in reconstruction and development, 15% in capacity building and governance, and 10% in security.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Iraq support larger campaign

plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

Colonel BAKER. The work of PRTs in Iraq supports the Joint Campaign Plan

(JCP), written in concert by MNF–I and the US Embassy, and the New Way Forward Strategy. The essence of the PRT mission is to coach, train and mentor provincial, district and municipal governments to increase their capacity to govern and deliver essential services and to assist in developing local economies. This effort supports the JCP and its strategic objectives.

One key area where PRTs have focused their efforts to fulfilling the broader strategy in Iraq is budget development and execution. Effective budget development and

execution helps increase the ability of local governments to provide services for their

citizens, increases coordination and interaction between central and local governments, and builds management, planning, and leadership skills for government officials.

Through the Local Governance Program, PRTs have trained 2,000 council members, 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general and key staff in 380

departments to manage and execute budgets. In turn, Provincial Councils are improving their ability to plan and execute budgets. For example, by the end of 2006,

provinces had committed only 49% of their budget funds. To date, according to PRT

data, provinces have already committed 60% of their 2007 budget funds.

Provincial Councils are also increasing their ability to conduct long term planning

and development and incorporate this into their budgets. For example, on October

10, 2007 the Baghdad Provincial Council’s strategic planning committee completed

its Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) and presented it to the Ministry of Planning. By coordinating how provincial and national governments create and spend

their budgets over the coming years, the PDS is described by provincial officials as

the most important mechanism connecting these governance entities. This was the

result of a one-year-plus effort by provincial officials, working closely with PRT and

USAID staff, who provided capacity development and technical assistance.

As provincial councils become more effective at budget execution, the central government has increased the amount of money in their budgets. For example, on September 30the Provincial Council of Babil was rewarded for its effective budget execution with an additional $40 million in its 2007 capital expenditures budget. The

Provincial Council of Anbar was rewarded with a 70 percent increase in its 2007

provincial capital budget. The amount of the GOI capital budget that goes directly

to the 18 provinces is expected to increase next year, and PRTs will continue to coordinate with Provincial Councils in the planning and execution of their budgets.

PRTs have also worked with and coordinated ethnic and political reconciliation

initiatives in Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala, Wasit, and Karbala. PRTs brought tribal leaders and government officials to work in concert on stemming the influence of militias and terrorist organizations and improving border security. As we have seen in

Anbar, and are starting to see elsewhere, these initiatives are making demonstrable

contributions to local political reconciliation and the restoration of a secure environment, which helps facilitate improved economic development and governance.

Dr. SNYDER. Who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How

is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work

plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of

their work plans?

Colonel BAKER. OSD-Policy, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, MNF–I, MNC–I, and its

subordinate units down to the BCT/RCT level, are involved in the PRT planning

process. BCT Commanders co-author civil-military plans with their ePRTs that are

approved my MNC–I. In its campaign planning and execution, MNF–I works with

the Embassy Team and the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) on PRT planning.

OSD–P and Joint Staff J1 and J5 action officers attend regular working group and

sub-working group meetings in Washington D.C. on PRTs.

OSD-Policy, Joint Staff/J1 and J5 and Navy worked together with the State Department to plan and oversee the surge ePRT manning process when the President

announced the New Way Forward Strategy in January 2007. This effort culminated

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in a memorandum of agreement between the departments on ePRT manning and

backfill.

On behalf of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA)

at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad approves PRT work plans and monitors progress

against the work plans. Through a steering group, OPA consults closely with the

Iraq Transition Assistance Office, USAID, the rule of law working group, the Political, Political/Military and Economic sections, and with MNF–I and MNC–I on work

plans, their progress, and planning for the future of PRTs.

OPA holds PRTs and their members accountable through regular performance reviews of personnel, by reviewing work plans in progress, and through activity reports submitted by the PRTs. OPA initiated an interagency working group to establish performance indicators for PRTs and for assessing progress of provincial governments. Baseline assessment of the provinces will be completed by the end of November 2007 and work plans will be adjusted accordingly.

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time.

What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies,

guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and

PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on

coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these

policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

Colonel BAKER. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi

people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. The mission is specifically tailored for Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers along with

Reserve and National Guard Soldiers who bring their civilian skills and knowledge

to the reconstruction effort. PRTs do not require new force structure but do require

additional training and education of the CA units and attached members to inform

them of the environment in which they operate.

DoD is granted statutory authority under section 1580 of title 5, United States

Code, to designate positions that meet the following three criteria as ‘‘Emergency

Essential’’. The following criteria apply to all DoD appropriated and non-appropriated fund positions, whether they are GS or WG:

1. The duties of the position provide immediate and continuing support for combat

operations or are to support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of

the armed forces;

2. The employee must perform those duties in a combat zone after the evacuation

of non-essential personnel (including any dependents of members of the armed

forces) from the combat zone in connection with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, or the commencement of combat operations of

the armed forces in the zone; and

3. It is impracticable to convert the employee’s position to a position authorized

to be filled by a member of the armed forces because of a necessity for that duty

to be performed without interruption.

DoD Directive 1404.10 (‘‘Emergency Essential (E–E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian

Employees’’) requires positions that meet the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 1580 to be designated as emergency essential, and requires documentation of the designation within the position descriptions for the positions. The directive further requires emergency essential positions to be coded in automated civilian personnel records and

reported quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The authority provided under 5 U.S.C. 1580 and the DoD implementing policy

under DoD 1404.10 accounts for deployment to combat zones. However, the Department deploys DoD civilians to support combat, contingency and emergency operations throughout the world, whether or not their positions are designated as emergency essential. Such employees generally are employee volunteers and typically

serve in a temporary duty (TDY) status.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Iraq informing DOD’s work in developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, ‘‘Military Support

for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction,’’ which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

Colonel BAKER. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq

are a key civil-military adaptation the Department is examining in its implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and its support to the State Department-led effort to

implement NSPD–44 ‘‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization’’ across the U.S. Government.

Both DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD–44 focus on improving civil-military integration.

PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many agencies and

70

working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity.

DoD aims to take the best from that tool set in order to build even more effective

civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles

for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the

military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with that supporting role in mind while recognizing the military may be required to perform certain

missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. You stated that the ePRTs are successful. Do the Departments of Defense and State have a plan to convert the initial 10 PRTs to ePRTs?

Colonel BAKER. PRT operations are dynamic and adjustments are continually

being made to adapt to conditions on the ground. We are also applying lessons

learned to ensure PRTs are serving our strategic objectives. At present, there is no

plan to restructure existing PRTs into ePRTs. In fact, we are bolstering PRT capabilities by increasing staffing and augmenting subject matter experts to address

local requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. Please describe a PST and explain how it operates in provinces that

have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). How large is a PST? What

skill-sets are represented on PSTs? Who is in command or in the lead of the PST?

Colonel BAKER. A PST is a small team of advisors who provide advice to provincial officials but for security and logistical reasons are not based in the province

with which they work. PSTs that cover Karbala and Najaf operate from Al-Hillah,

PSTs for Maysan and Muthana operate from Tallil in Dhi Qar province, and PSTs

for Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah operate from Erbil. We are examining converting as

many PSTs to PRTs as possible.

PSTs that operate in provinces that have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) have had no major change in their operations. PSTs are smaller than a

PRT by design, and six of seven PSTs already operate in provinces that have PIC’d

because these provinces are doing relatively well in governing capacity and economic

development.

The number of people in a PST varies from one to nine people, depending on conditions and the scope of the PST’s responsibilities.

The skill sets on PSTs are tailored to meet local needs. Like PRTs, PSTs may include specialists in public diplomacy, governance, agriculture, public health, city

management, urban planning, cultural heritage, rule of law, economic development,

public finance, business development, industrial management, and budget planning

and execution.

Like PRTs, PSTs are led by Foreign Service Officers.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the

State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

Colonel BAKER. There is no overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with

the State Department and other agencies. Rather, the Under Secretary of Defense

for Policy (USD–P), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Personnel

and Readiness (P&R), the Joint Staff (JS) Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)

and Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and the Navy N3/5 are the main

offices that coordinate policy, training and manning issues for PRTs within DoD.

More specifically, the USD–(P) is assisted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA) through its Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East (ME)/Iraq office on day to day issues

in Iraq and by the ASD for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)

DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities on the future of PRT like concepts. Both

offices work closely with the DUSD (P&R) and the JS/J1 and J5. This arrangement

allows different offices to apply their given expertise (country specific, future concepts, training and manning) for PRTs in Iraq.

The DOD representatives that attend the PCC meetings on PRTs for Iraq are

from the offices of the ASD (ISA)/DASD—ME/Iraq and the JCS/J5.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

Colonel BAKER. DOD is planning to increase the number of civil affairs (CA)

teams. The CA force in the U.S. Army Reserves is programmed to grow from 64 CA

companies in FY07 to a total of 112 CA companies in FY11. The active component

CA force will concurrently grow from 6 CA companies in FY06 to 16 CA companies

in FY09. Further, the U.S. Army is currently investigating whether additional CA

force structure is required.

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PRTs work closely with host-nation government agencies, external government

agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Depending on the needs of the individual province, the teams may be manned by personnel from the Department of

State, U.S. Agency for International Development, MNF–I, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps

of Engineers, and representatives from Coalition partners.

Compared to traditional CA units, PRT’s often have a higher level of expertise

from a variety of sources led by civilian officers. CA units are designated to support

a military combat formation and CA units often focus their efforts at a lower level

of government than does a PRT. Additionally, CA units will often work in areas

deemed too dangerous for a PRT to freely operate.

Dr. SNYDER. What happens to the PRTs when a province goes to Provincial Iraqi

Control? What happens to PRTs when U.S. combat forces transition to tactical

overwatch? Operational overwatch? Strategic overwatch?

Colonel BAKER. Currently, two PRTs are serving in provinces that have experienced Provincial Iraq Control—those in Dhi Qar and Irbil. In both cases, the PRTs

have continued to provide the same level of service to their provincial councils that

they provided before PIC. PRTs are not permanent structures. As key legislation,

such as the provincial powers law, is passed and provinces hold local elections, the

provinces capacity to govern will grow. As this occurs, it is envisioned that the PRTs

will, over time, be no longer needed in Iraq.

The issue of what will happen to PRTs in provinces when U.S. forces transition

is currently under assessment by MNF–I. As directed by the President, MNF–I is

currently revising the Joint Campaign Plan. This document will reflect comprehensive operational adjustments to keep in step with the drawdown of U.S. forces from

20 to 15 Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams (BCT/RCT) that begins in December 2007.

Until the revised Campaign Plan is approved and published, it would be premature to accurately answer the remaining questions about overwatch.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Iraq support larger campaign

plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

General KIMMITT. The work of PRTs in Iraq supports the New Way Forward

Strategy and the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP), written in concert by MNF–I and the

US Embassy. The essence of the PRT mission is to coach, train and mentor provincial, district and municipal governments to increase their capacity to govern and deliver essential services and to assist in developing local economies. This effort supports the JCP and its strategic objectives.

One key area where PRTs have focused their efforts to fulfill the broader strategy

in Iraq is budget development and execution. Effective budget development and execution helps increase the ability of local governments to provide services for their

citizens, increases coordination and interaction between central and local governments, and builds management, planning, and leadership skills for government officials.

Through the Local Governance Program, PRTs have trained 2,000 council members, 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general and key staff in 380

departments to manage and execute budgets throughout Iraqi provincial ministries.

In turn, Provincial Councils are improving their ability to plan and execute budgets.

For example, by the end of 2006, provinces had committed only 49% of their calendar year budget funds. To date, according to PRT data, provinces have already

committed 60% of their 2007 budget funds.

Provincial Councils are also increasing their ability to conduct long term planning

and development and incorporate this into their budgets. For example, on October

10, 2007 the Baghdad Provincial Council’s strategic planning committee completed

its Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) and presented it to the Ministry of Planning. By coordinating how provincial and national governments create and spend

their budgets over the coming years, the PDS is described by provincial officials as

the most important mechanism connecting these governance entities. This was the

result of a one-year-plus effort by provincial officials, working closely with PRT and

USAID staff, who provided capacity development and technical assistance.

As provincial councils become more effective at budget execution, the central government has increased the amount of money in their budgets. For example, on September 30, the Provincial Council of Babil was rewarded for its effective budget execution with an additional $40 million in its 2007 capital expenditures budget. The

Provincial Council of Anbar was rewarded with a 70 percent increase in its 2007

provincial capital budget. The amount of the GOI capital budget that goes directly

to the 18 provinces is expected to increase next year, and PRTs will continue to coordinate with Provincial Councils in the planning and execution of their budgets.

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PRTs have also worked with and coordinated ethnic and political reconciliation

initiatives in Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala, Wasit, and Karbala. PRTs brought tribal leaders and government officials to work in concert on stemming the influence of militias and terrorist organizations and improving border security. As we have seen in

Anbar, and are starting to see elsewhere, these initiatives are making demonstrable

contributions to local political reconciliation and the restoration of a secure environment, which helps facilitate improved economic development and governance.

Dr. SNYDER. Who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How

is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work

plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of

their work plans?

General KIMMITT. OSD-Policy, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, MNF–I, MNC–I, and

its subordinate units down to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)/Regimental Combat

Team (RCT) level, are involved in the PRT planning process. BCT Commanders coauthor civil-military plans with their ePRTs that are approved by MNC–I. In its

campaign planning and execution, MNF–I works with the Embassy Team and the

Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) on PRT planning. OSD–P and Joint Staff J1 and

J5 action officers attend regular working group and sub-working group meetings in

Washington D.C. on PRTs.

OSD-Policy, Joint Staff J1 and J5 and Navy worked together with the State Department to plan and oversee the surge ePRT manning process when the President

announced the New Way Forward Strategy in January 2007. This effort culminated

in a memorandum of agreement between the departments on ePRT manning and

backfill.

On behalf of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, OPA approves PRT work plans and

monitors progress against the work plans. Through a steering group, OPA consults

closely with the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO), USAID, the interagency

Rule of Law working group, the embassy’s Political, Political/Military and Economic

sections, and with MNF–I and MNC–I on work plans, their progress, and planning

for the future of PRTs.

OPA holds PRTs and their members accountable through regular performance reviews of personnel, by reviewing work plans in progress, and through activity reports submitted by the PRTs. OPA initiated an interagency working group to establish performance indicators for PRTs and for assessing progress of provincial governments. Baseline assessment of the provinces will be completed by the end of November 2007 and work plans will be adjusted accordingly.

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time.

What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies,

guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and

PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on

coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these

policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

General KIMMITT. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a

result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi

people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. Per Joint Staff (J1) the mission is specifically tailored for Civil Affairs (CA)

along with Reserve and National Guard personnel who bring their civilian skills and

knowledge to the reconstruction effort. PRTs do not require new force structure but

do require additional training and education of the CA units and attached members

to inform them of the environment in which they operate.

DoD is granted statutory authority under section 1580 of title 5, United States

Code, to designate positions that meet the following three criteria as ‘‘Emergency

Essential’’. DoD’s civilian personnel policy applies the following criteria to all DoD

appropriated and non-appropriated fund positions, whether they are GS or WG:

1. The duties of the position provide immediate and continuing support for combat

operations or are to support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of

the armed forces;

2. The employee must perform those duties in a combat zone after the evacuation

of non-essential personnel (including any dependents of members of the armed

forces) from the combat zone in connection with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, or the commencement of combat operations of

the armed forces in the zone; and

3. It is impracticable to convert the employee’s position to a position authorized

to be filled by a member of the armed forces because of a necessity for that duty

to be performed without interruption.

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DoD Directive 1404.10 (‘‘Emergency Essential (E–E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian

Employees’’) requires positions that meet the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 1580 to be designated as emergency essential, and requires documentation of the designation within the position descriptions for the positions. The directive further requires emergency essential positions to be coded in automated civilian personnel records and

reported quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The authority provided under 5 U.S.C. 1580 and the DoD implementing policy

under DoD 1404.10 accounts for deployment to combat zones. However, the Department deploys DoD civilians to support combat, contingency and emergency operations throughout the world, whether or not their positions are designated as emergency essential. Such employees generally are employee volunteers and typically

serve in a temporary duty (TDY) status.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Iraq informing DOD’s work in developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, ‘‘Military Support

for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction,’’ which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

General KIMMITT. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and

Iraq are a key civil-military adaptation the Department is examining in its implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and its support to the State Department-led effort to implement NSPD–44 ‘‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization’’ across the U.S. Government.

Both DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD–44 focus on improving civil-military integration.

PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many agencies and

working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity.

DoD aims to take the best from that tool set in order to build even more effective

civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles

for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the

military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with that supporting role in mind while recognizing the military may be required to perform certain

missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. You stated that the ePRTs are successful. Do the Departments of Defense and State have a plan to convert the initial 10 PRTs to ePRTs?

General KIMMITT. At present, there is no plan to restructure existing PRTs into

ePRTs. We are bolstering PRT capabilities by increasing staffing and augmenting

subject matter experts to address local requirements. PRTs work closely with the

Multi-National Divisions (MNDs), Multi-National Force-West (MNF–W) and the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)/Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) in the provinces where

they operate.

PRT operations are dynamic. Adjustments are continually being made to adapt to

conditions on the ground. We have an active program to apply lessons learned to

ensure PRTs are serving our strategic objectives.

Dr. SNYDER. Please describe a PST and explain how it operates in provinces that

have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). How large is a PST? What

skill-sets are represented on PSTs? Who is in command or in the lead of the PST?

General KIMMITT. A Provincial Support Team (PST) is a small team of advisors

who provide advice to provincial officials but for security and logistical reasons are

not based in the province with which they work. PSTs that cover Karbala and Najaf

operate from Al-Hillah, PSTs for Maysan and Muthana operate from Tallil in Dhi

Qar province, and PSTs for Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah operate from Erbil. We are

examining converting as many PSTs to PRTs as possible.

PSTs that operate in provinces that have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) have had no major change in their operations. PSTs are smaller than a

PRT by design, and six of seven PSTs already operate in provinces that have PIC’d

because these provinces are doing relatively well in governing capacity and economic

development.

The number of people in a PST varies from one to nine people, depending on conditions and the scope of the PST’s responsibilities.

The skill sets on PSTs are tailored to meet local needs. Like PRTs, PSTs may include specialists in public diplomacy, governance, agriculture, public health, city

management, urban planning, cultural heritage, rule of law, economic development,

public finance, business development, industrial management, and budget planning

and execution.

Like PRTs, PSTs are led by Foreign Service Officers.

74

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the

State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

General KIMMITT. There is no overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface

with the State Department and other agencies. Rather, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), the Joint Staff (JS) Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1) and Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and the Navy N3/5 are

the main offices that coordinate policy, training and manning issues for PRTs within

DoD.

More specifically, the USD(P) is assisted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA) through its Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East (ME) office on day to day issues in

Iraq and by the ASD for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) DASD

for Stability Operations Capabilities on the future of PRT like concepts. Both offices

work closely with the DUSD(P&R) and the JS J1 and J5. This arrangement allows

different offices to apply their given expertise (country specific, future concepts,

training and manning) for PRTs in Iraq.

The DOD representatives that attend the PCC meetings on PRTs for Iraq are

from the offices of the ASD(ISA)/DASD(ME) and the JS J5.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

General KIMMITT. DoD is planning to increase the number of civil affairs (CA)

teams. The CA force in the U.S. Army Reserves is programmed to grow from 64 CA

companies in FY07 to a total of 112 CA companies in FY11. The active component

CA force will concurrently grow from 6 CA companies in FY07 to 16 CA companies

in FY09. Further, the U.S. Army is currently reviewing whether additional CA force

structure is required.

PRTs work closely with host-nation government agencies, external government

agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Depending on the needs of the individual province, the teams may be manned by personnel from the Department of

State, U.S. Agency for International Development, MNF–I, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps

of Engineers, and representatives from Coalition partners.

Compared to traditional CA units, PRTs often have a higher level of expertise

from a variety of sources led by civilian officers. CA units are designated to support

a military combat formation and CA units often focus their efforts at a lower level

of government than does a PRT. Additionally, CA units will often work in areas

deemed too dangerous for a PRT to freely operate.

Dr. SNYDER. What happens to the PRTs when a province goes to Provincial Iraqi

Control? What happens to PRTs when U.S. combat forces transition to tactical

overwatch? Operational overwatch? Strategic overwatch?

General KIMMITT. Currently, two PRTs are serving in provinces that have

transitioned to Provincial Iraq Control—those in Dhi Qar and Irbil. In both cases,

the PRTs have continued to provide the same level of service to their provincial

councils that they provided before PIC. PRTs are not permanent structures. As key

legislation, such as the provincial powers law, is passed and provinces hold local

elections, the provinces’ capacity to govern will grow. As this occurs, it is envisioned

that the PRTs will, over time, be no longer needed in Iraq.

The issue of what will happen to PRTs in provinces when U.S. forces transition

is currently under assessment by MNF–I. As directed by the President, MNF–I is

currently revising the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). This document will reflect comprehensive operational adjustments to keep in step with the drawdown of U.S.

forces from 20 to 15 Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams (BCT/RCT) that begins

in December 2007.

Until the revised JCP is approved and published, it would be premature to answer the remaining questions on overwatch.

Æ