United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-10467

Summary Calendar

John David Kennemer, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Parker County, Texas; La Salle Southwest 

Corrections; Larry Fowler, Sheriff of Parker County; 

Jack County, Texas; Tom Spurlock, Sheriff of Jack 

County; Jay Eason; FNU Garcia, Correctional Officer; 

Warden John Doe; Corporal John Doe; James Robinson; 

FNU Coffee; John Does 1-7; Officer Jane Doe, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:20-CV-56

Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Appellant John Kennemer brought the instant case, proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges constitutional and 

statutory violations promulgated by the above-captioned individuals, 

municipalities, and municipal entities while Kennemer was detained at 

county jails in Parker County, Texas, and Jack County, Texas. Because 

Kennemer proceeded against “a governmental entity or officer or employee 

of a governmental entity,” the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 

required the district court to review the complaint and dismiss it if it was 

“frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1). Kennemer’s in forma pauperis 

status also subjected him to sua sponte dismissal if his case was “frivolous or 

malicious”; “fail[ed] to state a claim on which relief may be granted”; or 

sought “monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Applying these standards, the district court dismissed several of 

Kennemer’s claims and entered a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b) as to those claims such that we have jurisdiction over 

Kennemer’s timely interlocutory appeal as to those claims. We conclude no 

error as to this judgment. 

First, as to the municipalities and municipal entities—Parker County, 

Jack County, and La Salle Southwest Corrections1

—Kennemer failed to 

properly allege municipal liability as required by Monell v. Department of 

Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). “To establish municipal 

liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy 

1 Even though LaSalle is a private corporation, it is subject to the same rules as 

municipalities because private prisons engage in “a fundamentally governmental 

function.” Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam). 

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(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force 

behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 

332, 344 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But, 

as the district court pointed out, Kennemer’s pleadings “never recite[] a 

particular policy, practice, or custom of any of these entities implemented by 

a policy maker that caused him to sustain injury.” 

Second, as to the defendants who were supervisors of those 

municipalities and municipal entities—Parker County Sherriff Larry Fowler, 

Jack County Sherriff Tom Spurlock, and La Salle Director of Operations Jay 

Eason—Kennemer failed to show that these individuals had any personal 

involvement in the incidents he complains of. Supervisors cannot be liable 

for the actions of others and must be deliberately indifferent to violations of 

a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Alton v. Tex. A&M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 

200 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Only the direct acts or omissions of government 

officials, not the acts of subordinates, will give rise to individual liability under 

§ 1983.”). Kennemer does not plead deliberate indifference. Cf. Brown v. 

Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Proof of deliberate indifference 

normally requires a plaintiff to show a pattern of violations and that the 

inadequate training or supervision is obvious and obviously likely to result in 

a constitutional violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Third, Kennemer claims that the officers that transported him 

between the facilities he was held at—Officers Garcia, Robinson, and various 

unnamed officers—did so under unsafe conditions. For episodic acts, such 

as those that occurred to Kennemer, this court has adopted a subjective 

deliberate indifference standard. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 

(5th Cir. 1996). Again, Kennemer failed to adequately plead subjective 

deliberate indifference. 

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Fourth, because the Americans with Disabilities Act does not permit 

individual liability, the district court properly dismissed those claims. Cf.

Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 610 (5th Cir. 1999) (in the context of the 

Rehabilitation Act).

Fifth, because Kennemer is no longer at either the Parker County or 

Jack County facilities, his claims for injunctive relief are moot. Cf. Herman 

v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] transfer from the 

ECDC to the Dixon Correctional Institute in Jackson, Louisiana, rendered 

his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot.”). 

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.2

2

 The case is remanded only because there are pending claims that were not part 

of this appeal.

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