DEFENDING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 

1993-2003 

by 

Randall J. Larsen 

Patrick D. Ellis 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 20 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Defending the American Homeland 

1993-2003 

Randall J. Larsen 

Patrick D. Ellis 

November 2003 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 20 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 20 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i

The Authors ............................................................................................... iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Homeland Security in the 1990s.........................................................5 

III. The Role of the Commissions.............................................................9 

IV. An Analytic Framework for Homeland Security..............................15 

V. “Weapons of Mass Destruction:” Description or Distraction...........21 

VI. The 2001 Attacks on the American Homeland.................................23 

VII. The Office of Homeland Security.....................................................29 

VIII. A Homeland Security Strategy .........................................................31 

IX. The Department of Homeland Security............................................33 

X. Key Issues.........................................................................................35 

XI. Summary...........................................................................................39 

Notes..........................................................................................................41 

i 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

iii 

The Authors 

Randy J. Larsen is the Director of the Institute for Homeland Security as 

well as a Vice President for ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. He 

has a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from the Naval 

Post Graduate School. He is a member of the Defense Science Board, and 

serves on the editorial board for Johns Hopkins University’s quarterly 

journal, Bioterrorism and Biosecurity: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and 

Science. Since 9-11, numerous senior government officials, including 

Vice President Cheney and Governor Ridge, have sought his advice and 

counsel. He has served as an expert witness in hearings held by the Senate 

and the House of Representatives and provided informational briefings to 

numerous Members of Congress, the military, the Intelligence 

Community, and business audiences. He is a co-author of The Executive’s 

Desk Book on Corporate Risks and Response for Homeland Security, 

published in March 2003. He develops and teaches graduate courses in 

homeland security at George Washington University, Johns Hopkins 

University, and the National War College. During the past eight years, he 

has written and lectured extensively on the subjects of asymmetric and 

biological warfare and the 21st-century challenges of homeland security. 

He has a co-developer of the nationally acclaimed DARK WINTER 

exercise. In June 2000, Colonel Larsen retired following 32-years of 

military service in the Army and Air Force. 

Patrick D. Ellis, WMD/Homeland Security Analyst to the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, specializes in WMD Terrorism, Homeland 

Security, and Disaster/Emergency Management issues. He has lived, 

traveled, and worked extensively in the United States, Europe and Asia. 

He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Maryland in Asian 

Studies/Government and Politics and a Master of Public Administration 

degree from the University of Oklahoma. He completed specialized 

courses at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, U.S. Army Chemical 

School, and USAF Special Operations School. His non-military WMD 

experience includes Department of Justice sponsored training from 

Louisiana State University, Texas A&M, the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Center for Domestic Preparedness, and Bechtel Nevada’s 
iv 

Counter Terrorism Operations Support. Other education and training 

accomplishments include a University of Maryland Certificate in Korean 

Studies; the Air University’s Academic Instructor School; and the College 

of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education’s Contingency Wartime 

Planners and Information Warfare Applications Courses. Mr. Ellis 

participated in WMD exercises such as Consequence Island 2001 (Puerto 

Rico), Consequence Management 2000, and Launch Relief 2000. In 

addition, he planned and participated in various field study trips to 

Federal, State and local Counterproliferation and WMD response 

organizations. Mr. Ellis developed and taught WMD- related lessons for 

the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Air War College, and the Ira C. 

Eaker College for Professional Development’s USAF On-Scene 

Commanders course. He is currently working on a monograph addressing 

Response to CBRNE Terrorism issues. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 1 

Defending the American Homeland 

1993-2003 

Randall J. Larsen 

Patrick D. Ellis 

I. Introduction 

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and 

fundamental commitment of the Federal government. 

Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the 

past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities 

to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of 

individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our 

shores for less than it costs to purchase a tank. Terrorists 

are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the 

power of modern technologies against us. 

President George W. Bush 

The National Security Strategy of the United States 

September 20, 2002 

On September 20, 2001, the developers of the nationally acclaimed 

DARK WINTER exercise met with Vice President Cheney and his staff to 

discuss the lessons learned from this simulated smallpox attack on 

America.1

 The Vice President asked, “What does a biological weapon 

look like?” One of the briefers reached into his pocket and pulled out a 

small test tube filled with a white powder. “Sir,” he said as he eyed the 

two Secret Service agents standing by the door, “It looks like this...and by 

the way...I did just carry this into your office.” 

The powder was weaponized Bacillus globigii. Genetically, it is 

nearly identical to Bacillus anthracis—the bacteria that causes anthrax. 

However, Bacillus globigii is frequently used as a simulant. Most nations 

that have weaponized anthrax, including the United States, the Soviet 
2 . . . Defending the American Homeland

Union, and Iraq, first weaponized Bacillus globigii to test their production 

and delivery processes. Being weaponized means it has been produced at 

the three to five micron size, perfect for release in the air (a human hair is 

about 100-microns wide). 

“Three decades ago,” the briefer continued, “only large industrial 

nations had the technical capability to produce such a weapon. However, 

due to the revolution in biotechnology, this sample was produced with 

equipment bought on the Internet for less than $250,000.” 2

Three-weeks following this conversation, Robert Stevens, a 

photojournalist for American Media, Inc., in Boca Raton, Florida, died 

from inhalational anthrax. Other U.S. deaths from anthrax-laced mail 

followed. During the next several weeks, citizens across the nation began 

to question their security. Major newspapers stopped accepting letters to 

the editor, farmers in Iowa wondered if it was safe to open their mail, and 

most Americans began to appreciate how technology had changed the 

international security equation. 

In 1828, a young Abraham Lincoln said, “No European or Asian 

power, even with a Bonaparte in command, could march across this 

continent and take a drink of water from the Ohio or make a track on the 

Appalachian Trail.”3

 This is still true, but today it is irrelevant. America’s 

enemies no longer need to put an army on our soil or missiles in our skies 

to threaten our homeland. A secure homeland is no longer an American 

birthright. It now must be earned, and it is a challenge that will neither be 

cheap nor easy. 

Homeland security is the most complex endeavor this nation has ever 

faced. Some see this new mission as just an evolutionary step in the 

national security process. This is not the case—it is a change in kind, not 

degree. For most of our history, national security took place in 

Washington, D.C. and overseas. The key players were all in the federal 

government, most notably, the Departments of Defense, State, and the 

Intelligence Community. 

Today there are 57 federal agencies, 50 states, 8 territories, and 3,066 

counties involved in U.S. homeland security. In fact, there are 87,000 

different governmental jurisdictions that will play roles in homeland 

security.4

 Furthermore, the private sector will play a major role in 

homeland security, and this role will not be limited to logistical support. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 3 

Corporate America will be required to play a major operational role in 

homeland security. 

The changes that have and will continue to occur make it difficult to 

even decide which questions to ask, much less, how to answer them. 

Perhaps the first step will be to change how we think about security in the 

twenty-first century. 

A young reporter once asked Albert Einstein what his theory of 

relativity had changed. He thought about it for a moment and then said, 

“Everything...everything except the way people think.” If we are to 

secure the American homeland from 21st century threats, we must learn to 

do something that is very difficult...we must change the way we think. 

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to help the readers change the way 

they think about homeland security, no easy task. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 5 

II. Homeland Security in the 1990s 

The current concepts of homeland security, protecting the homeland 

from large-scale attacks where small nation states or well-financed 

terrorists organizations would use weapons of mass destruction, began in 

late 1990 as America began preparing for a war with Iraq. This was the 

first war in at least 50 years where America seriously considered the 

possibilities of attacks on the homeland. New security procedures were 

introduced at airports, increased surveillance was conducted at border 

crossing points, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) monitored 

the activities of Iraqis in the United States. 

For most Americans, homeland security entered the common lexicon 

on September 11, 2001. However, American historians will likely say the 

modern era of homeland security began in 1993. Throughout the later half 

of the 20th century, terrorists had used small-scale attacks to bring 

attention to their causes. Some have described this as, “blow up 

something to get a seat at the table.” In the 1990s, a new age of terrorism 

began to emerge. The attackers chose to remain anonymous, they had no 

specific demands, and their primary goal appeared to be the killing of 

large numbers of people. Some terrorists no longer wanted a seat at the 

table; they just wanted to “blow up the table.” This new style of terrorism 

came to the American homeland on February 26, 1993. 

World Trade Center Bombing 1993 

On February 26, at 12:18 p.m., a large explosion ripped through the 

B-2 level of the basement under the World Trade Center, creating an Lshaped crater measuring 130 by 150 feet across and approximately seven 

stories deep. Almost unbelievably, the blast and subsequent debris killed 

only 6, but injured more than 1,000 people. The explosion created acrid 

smoke, which rose up to the 46th floor. The bomb, 1,200 pounds of nitrourea supplemented by hydrogen cylinders, created over 6,000 tons of 

rubble. Total property damaged was estimated at $300 million.5

 Four 

men led by Ramzi Yousef planned this operation some two months before 

the actual attack. The plan was to topple both of the twin towers. 
6 . . . Defending the American Homeland

Tokyo Subway 1995 

For the next two years, the world was quiet in respect to major 

terrorist events. Then, on June 27, 1994, several terrorists released sarin 

nerve gas in an apartment complex in Matsumoto, Japan killing seven and 

sending over 200 residents to the hospital.6 This was an indicator of 

things to come. A few months later, during the morning rush hour on 

March 20, 1995, this same Japanese domestic terrorist organization, Aum 

Shinryko (Aum Supreme Truth) released a crude form of sarin gas (GB) in 

the Tokyo subway. 

The sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system killed twelve, injured 

several hundred, and traumatized thousands. The residents of Tokyo were 

fortunate the numbers were not higher. Aum’s chemical team had been 

testing several chemical agents at a large ranch they owned in Australia. 

The quality of the sarin used in this attack was very poor because it came 

from a batch that had been hastily prepared the weekend before, after 

senior leaders in the Aum received a tip that their headquarters was going 

to be raided the next Monday by Tokyo police. Furthermore, the delivery 

system was primitive. Plastic bags filled with the poor quality sarin were 

placed on subway cars and punctured with umbrella tips. Had this been a 

high quality sarin delivered in a more sophisticated manner, casualties 

could have been in the hundreds or even thousands. 

This attack initially appeared to be the first terrorist use of a weapon 

of mass destruction. However, documents presented during the criminal 

trials of senior Aum leaders painted a completely different picture. 

Between 1990 and 1995, the cult conducted at least 20 attacks using 

biological and chemical agents, 10 with chemicals and 10 with biological.7

 

The cult had been experimenting with chemical nerve agents such as sarin, 

tabun, soman, VX, and other agents such as hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, 

and mustard blister agents. Their interest in biological agents included 

such agents as anthrax, Q fever, and hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola. In 

the end, none of their biological attacks were effective, but they did have 

limited success in their chemical program. The Cult also had shopped for 

nuclear weapons components in the former Soviet Union, although little 

progress was made toward acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Aum’s subway attack released a floodgate of information on the 

Aum’s extensive chemical and biological weapons development 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 7

programs—all undetected by the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities. It sent shock waves through the law enforcement, 

intelligence, and domestic and international law enforcement, intelligence, 

and first-responder communities, which first were shocked to realize the 

types of weapons that were being prepared and second, were surprised to 

discover the stated purpose of such attacks—the creation of mass casualty 

events for the purpose of toppling the government. 

Despite the obvious differences between Aum Shinryko and AlQaeda in terms of culture, religion, and organization, their goals are 

nevertheless similar: to completely upset political and social order 

through the use of massively destructive weapons. 

Murrah Federal Office Building, 1995 

It has been said that whatever was left of America’s innocence, in 

reference to terrorism, was lost on April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a.m. For the 

senior leadership in the Clinton Administration and Congress, the first 

responder community, and virtually all Americans who stared at TV 

screens that day, the nightmare had become reality. Catastrophic terrorism 

had come to the American heartland. 

Initially, many assumed the attack came from Islamic 

fundamentalists, but in less than 24 hours an even more disturbing story 

emerged. Just like the Japanese had difficulty believing that some of their 

“own” could launch such a murderous attack on the Japanese homeland, 

Americans now had to deal with the cognitive dissonance of a homegrown 

catastrophic terrorist—a Gulf War veteran who intentionally parked a 

large truck bomb in front of a childcare center. Shock, horror, grief, and 

anger were the emotions of the day. 

Timothy McVeigh and his accomplice Terry Nichols had built a 

4,000-pound ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) bomb and placed it into a 

Ryder rental truck. McVeigh then drove it to the Murrah Federal Office 

Building. The front of the building was destroyed leaving 167 people 

dead and more than 500 injured. The eventual crime scene stretched over 

some 200-city blocks and the sheer magnitude of response agencies 

overwhelmed existing communications systems. Besides high physical 

and personal costs, mental health costs were $4.1 million during the 

following year and continues yet today. 
8 . . . Defending the American Homeland

While there are few similarities between the Al-Qaeda terrorist 

atrocities and Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing, one 

commonality is apparent. None of the instigators had any hesitation 

or regret at killing innocents. 

Nothing is more disturbing than to hear pundits and apologists for 

terrorists say, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” 

There is a major difference between attacks on child-care centers, pizza 

parlors or high-rise office buildings and legitimate military targets. When 

the Marine barracks in Beirut was attacked with a truck bomb—some 

called it terrorism. It was not. A U.S. Navy battleship was sitting off the 

coast firing 1600-pound shells at military targets in Beirut. In response, an 

attack was launched on a U.S. military unit. Call it asymmetric warfare or 

guerilla warfare, but do not confuse it with those who intentionally bomb 

office buildings in New York City, subways in Tokyo, and childcare 

centers in Oklahoma. 

Some looked at the 1993 attack on the WTC, the 1995 attacks on the 

Tokyo subway and the Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City as 

random events. Others realized that a new international security 

environment was about to emerge. One of those individuals representative 

of this new environment was arrested in Pakistan and returned to the 

United States for trial. His name was Ramzi Yousef. 

The head of the FBI in New York, Bill Gavin, was escorting Yousef 

to New York City for arraignment. As the FBI helicopter flew up the 

Hudson River, Gavin eased the blindfold from Yousef’s eyes, “Look down 

there,’ ...gesturing toward the twin towers. ‘They’re still standing.’ 

Yousef squinted and looked out of the window. ‘They wouldn’t be, if I 

had had enough money and explosives,’ he replied defiantly.”8
Defending the American Homeland . . . 9 

III. The Role of the Commissions 

The terrorist attacks in New York City, Tokyo, and Oklahoma City led 

to the appointment of several high-level commissions that would examine 

both the threat and America’s state of readiness for this new type of 

catastrophic terrorism. 

The first mention of the term homeland security, in a post Cold War 

government report, appeared in Report of the National Defense Panel

(NDP) in December 1997. (Actually, it used the term homeland defense

which was used interchangeably with homeland security for several years.) 

The NDP Report contained one paragraph on homeland defense: 

Protecting the territory of the United States and its citizens from “all 

enemies both foreign and domestic” is the principal task of government. 

The primary reason for the increased emphasis on homeland defense is the 

change, both in type and degree, in the threats to the United States. Besides 

the enduring need to deter a strategic nuclear attack, the United States must 

defend against terrorism, information warfare, weapons of mass destruction, 

ballistic and cruise missiles, and other transnational threats to the sovereign 

territory of the nation. In many of these mission areas, the military will 

necessarily play the leading role; however, many other threats exist which 

will require Defense to support local law enforcement agencies, as well as a 

host of other federal, state, and local entities. 

President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 establishing 

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). 

The report was released in October 1997. This was the first of several key 

commissions that laid the groundwork for how we understand homeland 

security today. 

The initial charter of the commission was to look at all aspects of 

critical infrastructure protection, but the final report was almost exclusively 

focused on the cyber threat to infrastructure. According to Phil Lacombe, 

the Executive Director of The President’s Commission on Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, the commission narrowed its focus because 

considerable work had already been accomplished on the physical 

vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure, but little had been done on the cyber 

threats. Four key infrastructures were initially identified: information and 

communications, banking and finance, energy (including electrical power, 
10 . . . Defending the American Homeland

oil and gas) physical distribution, and vital human services. The one 

element these infrastructures had in common was that they were each highly 

vulnerable to cyber attacks. In demonstration after demonstration, the 

commissioners were shocked to learn how easy it was to hack into systems. 

The report noted, “A personal computer and a simple telephone connection 

to an Internet Service Provider anywhere in the world are enough to cause a 

great deal of harm.” 

Highlights of the report included: 

• Deregulation in the energy industry had driven corporations to look 

for ways to trim costs. This meant less redundancy. Energy 

systems were operating at near maximum capacity, so that even a 

minor event could cause a cascading effect. The report noted, 

“Because of the complexity, some of these dependencies may be 

unrecognized until a major failure occurs.” 

• The threats examined ranged from natural events and accidents to 

disgruntled employees, recreational hackers, criminal activity, and 

terrorism. The commission noted that most things entering the U.S. 

must go through some sort of screening: the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) screened people, the Postal Service 

examined the mail, airplanes pass through an air defense 

identification zone, trucks and containers are checked by border 

patrol and customs, food stuffs are inspected by Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) and United States Department of Agriculture 

(USDA), but electrons, coming on the Internet enter this country 

every moment of every day, and nobody was checking. 

• The commission also highlighted how outdated America’s concepts 

of defense and prevention had become. They asked, “Who would 

be responsible for investigating a cyber attack?” According to the 

commission report, “With the existing rules, you may have to solve 

the crime before you can decide who has the authority to 

investigate.” 

The commission’s number one recommendation (a recommendation 

that should be a top priority for all homeland security issues) was to develop 

a program of awareness and education. Additionally, they recommended a 

partnership with industry including the creation of the Infrastructure Sharing 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 11 

and Analysis Centers (ISACs). ISACs would allow industry and 

government to share critical security information in an environment that 

would protect the proprietary interests of industry and the government from 

the Federal Advisory Commission Act restrictions.9

 Eight ISACs would 

eventually be created to bring together industry and government. 

The National Commission on Terrorism was created by the 105th 

Congress and led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III.10 The commission 

report, released in June 2000, concluded that international terrorists would 

impose an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to the American 

homeland. The commission said that today’s terrorists seek to inflict mass 

casualties, are less dependent on state sponsorship, and are forming loose 

transnational affiliations, making terrorists attacks more difficult to detect 

and prevent. They stated that this new type of threat would require 

significantly enhanced efforts by the U.S. Government. 

The commission provided several recommendations; three of these 

would receive considerable attention after September 11th: (1) increased 

integration of law enforcement and intelligence communities, (2) creation 

of a cadre of FBI officers who would distill and disseminate terrorists 

information once it is collected, and (3) ensure that the U.S. firmly target 

intelligence collection on all states that support terrorists. 

The commission also noted that terrorist attacks involving a biological 

agent or nuclear material, even if only partially successful, can profoundly 

affect the entire nation. Many in the press misinterpreted one 

recommendation. The report stated, “the Department of Defense must have 

detailed plans for its role in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack, 

including criterion for transfer of command authority to DoD in 

extraordinary circumstances.” Several major newspapers interpreted this to 

mean that DoD should have the lead role in consequence management. 

That was neither the intention of the commission, nor what the report said. 

Had the reporters read more than the executive summary they would have 

understood that this statement referred to a situation in which state and local 

authorities were completely overwhelmed and unable to respond to an 

incident, which was considered to be the extreme exception, not the rule. 

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the 

Gilmore Commission, named after its chairman, Governor James Gilmore 
12 . . . Defending the American Homeland

III of Virginia. This commission released its first report in December 1999, 

and issued its fifth and final report on December 15, 2003.11

The legislation creating this commission directed them to assess 

Federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness and highlight deficiencies 

in federal programs for response to terrorist incidents using weapons of 

mass destruction. The first report introduced the debate: whether to focus 

on preventing and dealing with high probability/low consequence versus 

low probability/high consequence scenarios. The initial report from the 

Gilmore Commission acknowledged that the low probability/high 

consequence could happen, but chose to focus on high probability/low 

consequence. The report stated, 

Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the 

terrorists, will likely remain the weapon of choice in near 

term as well...increasing attention must now also be paid to 

the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser 

consequence attack, especially in terms of policy 

implications for budget priorities or allocation of other 

resources, to optimize local response capabilities. 

The report went to great length describing the current difficulties in 

acquiring and developing mass casualty weapons. They used the example 

of Aum Shinryko, a terrorist organization with several hundred million 

dollars in assets and “highly-educated scientists,” who failed after numerous 

attempts to produce a successful biological weapons program. Information 

that was not available to the commission at that time, later explained why 

the Aum’s biowarfare program failed. Court testimony revealed that the 

graduate student, who was directed to acquire the sample of Bacillus 

anthracis (anthrax) from a laboratory, got cold feet and instead provided a 

sample of anthrax vaccine.12 Fortunately, it was the non-lethal vaccine 

strain that was mass-produced and released in 10 different attacks in Japan 

rather than lethal strains. The Gilmore report also stated many well-trained 

scientists worked on this program, when in fact, it was mainly chemists and 

physicians working on the bioweapons program. Not a single PhD level 

microbiologist participated in the program. 

Nevertheless, the Gilmore Commission did provide several useful 

recommendations, primarily emphasizing the need for better cooperation 

and coordination of federal, state, and local governments, and a 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 13 

reorganization of Congress to insure proper policies and funding were 

coordinated for homeland security. The commission also stated that more 

cooperation was needed to obtain and share information on terrorist threats 

at all levels of government. 

Later Gilmore commission reports, released after the September 11th 

attacks, had a significantly changed attitude about weapons of mass 

destruction and became more in line with the recommendations of the 

initial Hart-Rudman report of September 1999. 

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, also 

known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its co-chairmen, Senators 

Gary Hart and Warren Rudman concluded that America will become 

increasingly vulnerable to hostile attacks, and that Americas will die in 

their homeland, perhaps in large numbers.13 The two new threats they 

were most concerned about were the result of rapid advances in 

information and biotechnology. They said that terrorist organizations 

would attack not only humans but also the economic infrastructure of 

nations. They expressed concern about the porous nature of borders and 

also addressed numerous other challenges America will face in the 21st 

century not directly associated with homeland security, such as education 

and problems with the civil service system. 

One of the most notable features of the third Hart-Rudman Report, 

released in February 2001, was the recommendation calling for the 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The vast majority of 

organizations consolidated into the new Department of Homeland 

Security in March 2003, were the same ones recommended two years 

earlier in the release of this report. In the summer of 2001, 

Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX) used the commission report as 

the basis for the bill he introduced in the House of Representatives. This 

bill served as the blueprint for the legislation that eventually created the 

new department. 

All high level commissions that studied the issue of homeland 

security came to similar recommendations, some more prescient than 

others. These commission reports, combined with the open testimony of 

the director of the CIA, George Tenet forewarned America of what was to 

come on 9-11. These reports were produced in a bipartisan manner by 

some of the most experienced national security leaders in the nation. 

Sadly, very few Americans listened. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 15 

IV. An Analytic Framework for Homeland Security 

Homeland security in the 21st century presents America with an 

incredibly complex challenge. Despite the fact that a few high-level 

commissions, think tanks, and military schools had been examining the 

concept of homeland security since 1997, the vast majority of Americans 

first heard the term only after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Following these attacks, a wide range of journal articles, congressional 

hearings and press reports began to examine this new security challenge. 

Traditional national security scholars and pundits soon learned that the 

analytical frameworks of the Cold War were inadequate for examining 

homeland security. 

While some elements of the Cold War model remain relevant, such as 

deterrence, prevention, and retaliation, new elements such as crisis 

management, consequence management, attribution, and prosecution 

emerged. Furthermore, the national security framework of the Cold War 

was exclusively focused on activities of the federal government, primarily 

the Departments of State and Defense and the Intelligence Community. 

However, a complete analytic model of homeland security must be suitable 

for use by federal, state, and local government organizations, (ranging from 

defense and law enforcement, to public health, food security, immigration, 

and border control), plus the private sector. 

The following framework was originally developed for a homeland 

security course at the National War College, and has evolved through 

several iterations during the past four years.14 The most recent model, 

which is also known as the Strategic Cycle of Homeland Security, consists 

of six elements: deterrence, prevention, preemption, incident management, 

attribution, and response. 

Deterrence must be a central element of any homeland security 

framework. The consequences of attacks on the homeland made possible 

with 21st century technology can be devastating. In some cases, modern 

technology could enable a small nation, or perhaps even a well-financed 

terrorist organization to bring a superpower to its knees. Therefore, our 

nation must have policies and postures that deter our enemies from 

attacking our homeland. 
16 . . . Defending the American Homeland

Classical deterrence is based on two elements: punishment and denial. 

The threat from both nation-state and non-state actors, who might employ 

nuclear and bio-weapons, demand a shift in how we practice deterrence. 

Throughout the Cold War, deterrence was based on mutual assured 

destruction—the ability to deliver incalculable punishment under any 

circumstance. Given the nature of modern homeland security threats, we 

must increase our ability to deter enemies by denying them the effects they 

seek. In some cases, this will be accomplished through methods, 

institutions, and programs that have not been considered elements of 

deterrence. In the past for example, a robust public health system that 

would significantly mitigate the effects of a biological attack, may act as a 

deterrent to biological terrorism. Would a nation-state or terrorist 

organization risk massive retaliation if it knew that America had the 

unquestioned ability to identify the perpetrator and significantly mitigate the 

affects of a biological attack? In the Cold War, civil defense was not a 

deterrent factor. This is not the case in the 21st century. Resource 

allocation should reflect this new reality. There will be times when our 

deterrence efforts fail, perhaps if only for the fact that some of our enemies 

may be undetterable. In those cases, the United States will have to rely on 

prevention capabilities. 

Prevention incorporates a wide group of active and passive measures 

that can stop an attack. Our nation’s prevention activities are defensive in 

nature and range from arms control treaties to aerospace, maritime, and land 

defenses to border control and other law enforcement measures. A former 

speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that foreign aid such as 

“a Marshall plan for the Arab world” could help prevent terrorism.15 Others 

say that searches for “root causes” are exactly the wrong strategy when 

responding to terrorist acts because it serves to legitimize the acts.16 

Because some modern attacks could take our nation beyond the point of 

recovery, our nation must also possess the capabilities and associated 

policies that allow us to preempt attacks on our homeland. 

Preemption is the policy that is fraught with political and military 

risks. In the Cold War, preemption would have meant first use of nuclear 

weapons, possibly resulting in a global nuclear war. Further, aggressors 

have frequently cloaked their initiation of war with claims that they were 

only preempting an attack on their homeland. Preemption in the homeland 

security context does not have to call for the initiation of nuclear war or 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 17

occupation of another nation’s territory. It will require the selective use of 

all elements of national power, to include military force and law 

enforcement to preempt terrorists before they launch their attacks. 

Preemption options can span the range from a precision-guided 2,000-

pound bomb delivered by a B-2 bomber to an arrest by a U.S. law 

enforcement official working with allies in overseas nations. 

Incident management combines two concepts that initially began in 

the Clinton administration under Presidential Decision Directive 39. PDD39 coined the terms crisis management and consequence management. 

Crisis management begins the moment that intelligence information 

suggested an attack might occur and then until an actual attack occurred. 

The FBI was the lead agency for crisis management. In PDD-39, 

consequence management was defined as the effort to provide emergency 

services to government, business, and individuals to restore public health, 

safety, and the economy after an attack. For example, the direct economic 

impact of the 9-11 attacks on New York City was still clearly visible in the 

spring of 2003. According to the New York Times, more than 12,000 

restaurant workers had been laid off due to a major downturn in tourism. 

Economic analysts have linked this to public concern over future terrorist 

attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was the 

lead federal agency for consequence management. 

There are several reasons the Bush administration chose to combine 

these two elements (crisis and consequence management) and refer to it as 

incident management. This aligns the terminology used by the President 

with the terminology that has been used many years by state and local first 

responders. These two elements also were combined because in some 

attacks, such as biological and cyber, there is significant overlap between 

the crisis and consequence management phases. 

Attribution occupies a critical place in the homeland security strategic 

cycle. Our nation’s enemies are likely to disguise their identity to avoid 

retaliation. The 1990’s witnessed a new trend in terrorist activities. These 

were attacks wherein the attacker chose to remain anonymous, i.e., the Pan 

Am 103 bombing, World Trade Center bombing in 1993, bombing of the 

Khobar towers in 1996, the USS Cole in 2000, and the anthrax letters of 

2001. Improving our nation’s attribution capabilities will demand more 

creative scientific methods and technologies as well as greater integration of 

the relevant law enforcement and intelligence efforts. The responsibility for 
18 . . . Defending the American Homeland

attribution clearly resides with the Department of Justice; however, the 

Department of Justice has neither the scientific capability nor the budget to 

successfully complete this mission. The Department of Health and Human 

Services and the Department of Defense laboratories, as well as the private 

sector will be required to play significant roles in attribution. Without 

attribution, there can be no response. 

Response has two roles in the homeland security cycle. The first is to 

eliminate the capability of the attacker to cause further harm. This might be 

achieved through arrest and prosecution, the use of military force, or covert 

actions. Certainly, the nature of response would depend on a range of 

factors, not the least being whether the attacker is a domestic or 

international actor. The Bush administration’s actions after 9-11 illustrate 

the potential range of response options. Second, the ultimate goal of any 

response must be the reestablishment of deterrence. For America, the 

purpose of war is to establish a “better peace.” In the homeland security 

strategic cycle, the purpose of response is to eliminate the attacker’s 

offensive capability and to reestablish deterrence by sending a very clear 

message to all who wish America harm. Both elements of response were 

transmitted loud and clear in Afghanistan following the 9-11 attacks. The 

regime that supported Al-Qaeda was removed from power, and Al-Qaeda’s 

command and control, logistical, financial, and training functions were 

severely disrupted. Additionally, terrorists and tyrants across the globe took 

notice of America’s decisive action and global reach. As the President said, 

“Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, 

justice will be done.”17

There are, of course, cases in which there is overlap within this 

framework, and at times, certain actions could fit in more than one category. 

Following the attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 

cruise missile attacks on Al-Qaeda were called preemptive by the Clinton 

Administration, but one could also argue they were a response. 

All models have limitations. In fact, there is an old saying in the 

Defense community that all models are wrong, but some are useful. Many 

within the homeland security community find this model useful. In fact, 

many have endorsed it because it provides an intellectual framework for 

short-term plans, long-range strategies, policies, and resource allocations. 

The Bush Administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 19 

Destruction, released in December 2002, used the Homeland Security 

Strategic Framework, nearly verbatim. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 21 

V. “Weapons of Mass Destruction:” Description or Distraction? 

The term, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one of the most 

misunderstood concepts in the homeland security and national security 

lexicons. Some have suggested that the best description of WMD is 

“worthless meaningless description.”18 According to the Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint chief of Staff 

(JCS Pub 1-02), WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 

However, according to U.S. Code Title 18 (the Federal Criminal Statues), it 

includes all of the DoD mentioned weapons, but can also include explosives 

even as small as one quarter stick of dynamite. This is typical of 

definitional problems within the interagency and intergovernmental 

communities. 

A far better term, and one that has gained widespread acceptance 

within the homeland security community is CBRNE, which stands for, 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced conventional 

explosions (such as delivering 30,000 gallons of jet fuel to the 80th floor of 

a skyscraper). For the most part, each of these weapons are different in how 

they are produced, delivered, create damage and destruction, and the type of 

response and recovery required. A chemical attack is psychologically 

terrifying, but in most instances, will only affect a relatively small area. A 

biological attack, using a contagious pathogen, such as smallpox could 

quickly spread across an entire nation. A radiological dispersal device, also 

known as a “dirty bomb,” would cause little destruction and casualties (only 

the blast from the conventional weapon) but could pose enormous cleanup 

problems and may even require the destruction of contaminated buildings. 

JCS Pub 1-02 states, “Do not use the term total war.” This is because it 

is too abstract. Does it mean one fights to an unconditional surrender as the 

U.S. did against Japan and Germany in World War II? Does it mean the 

war ends like the Third Punic War when the Romans completely ended the 

Carthaginian civilization? Or does it mean an entire nation is mobilized in 

the fight? Nobody knows. Which is why PCS Pub 1-02 says, “Not to be 

used.”19 Likewise, one should avoid the use of the term weapons of mass 

destruction and instead use the term that has gained widespread recognition 

within the homeland security community, CBRNE. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 23 

VI. The 2001 Attacks on the American Homeland

If...on the morning of September 11, 2001,...the U.S. 

government had a fully integrated intelligence and law 

enforcement organization...equipped with state-of-the-art 

data mining capabilities...law enforcement officials would 

have been notified that Mohamed Atta and his roommate 

(both on terrorist watch lists) had just checked in for flights 

at Boston Logan Airport. Seconds later they would have 

detected that four other passengers checking in for other 

flights had listed the same home address as Atta, that three 

others checking in for flights had made numerous calls 

during the past month to a telephone at that same address, 

and two others checking in for flights had used Atta’s 

frequent flier number just one month earlier.20

It is impossible to say if such a system could have prevented the 

attacks of September 11th. What is clear is that there was little or no 

chance of preventing the attacks with the system that existed in 2001. 

Laws, regulations, policies, cultural barriers, and bureaucratic stovepipes 

were ill suited for the security challenges of the 21st century. Al-Qaeda 

had studied their enemy well. Like a great quarterback, it knew how to 

find the seams in our defense. 

In his book, On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao Zedong states, “many people 

think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear. 

Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should 

exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to 

water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.”21 Mao may have been 

talking about the ability of guerrillas to operate in 1940s occupied China, 

but the 9-11 hijackers followed the same concept in their ability to move 

freely inside and outside the United States unnoticed. They wore no 

beards or Muslim clothing and did nothing to draw attention to 

themselves. Only in hindsight did the abnormalities become obvious. As 

the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller likes to say, “They lived among 

us...they shopped at Wal-Mart, ate at Pizza Hut, and bought their 

command and control system from our convenience stores.”22 The 19 
24 . . . Defending the American Homeland

hijackers primarily used high tech “cyber cafes” and cell phones to 

coordinate their plans formulated by their leader, Osama bin Laden. 

Bin Laden’s role in the attacks was revealed in a series of videotapes 

captured in Afghanistan. The videos were made in mid-November 2001. 

No doubt as Bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaeda leaders were watching 

CNN or other international coverage of the unfolding attacks, they must 

have been ecstatic to learn that the attacks were more successful than they 

had anticipated. 

“We calculated in advance the number of casualties from 

the enemy who would be killed based on the position of the 

tower...We calculated that the floors it would hit would be 

three or four floors. I was most optimistic of them 

all...[D]ue to my experience in this field, I was thinking 

that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron 

structure of the building and collapse the area where the 

plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all that we 

had hoped for.”23

The tapes also revealed information on Al-Qaeda’s operations and 

communications security procedures. Bin Laden commented on those 

who conducted the operations: “All they knew was that they have a 

martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America, but 

they didn’t know anything about the operation, not even one letter.”24 

These were not amateurs, like Ramzi Yousef’s assistant who tried to get 

back his deposit on the rental truck after bombing the World Trade Center 

in 1993. These were seasoned professionals. 

Their planning was extensive, spanning two years and several 

continents. To ensure the attacks were successful, Mohamed Atta selected 

airline flights carrying large quantities of fuel. They made test flights on 

those routes to study the patterns of flight attendants, pilots, and other 

airline personnel. By September 11, 2001, they were ready. 

American Airlines Flight 11 took off at 7:45 a.m. from Boston Logan 

Airport for a long flight to Los Angeles’ LAX Airport. On board were 

Mohamed Atta and the four other men. With box cutters and knives in 

hand they commandeered the big Boeing 767 and flew towards New York 

City. One hour later, the aircraft crashed into the North Tower (WTC 1) 

of World Trade Center complex between the 80th and 90th floor. The 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 25 

resulting fire burned between 1500–2000 degrees Fahrenheit and burned 

for some 102 minutes. Due to the impact and extreme heat produced by 

burning aviation fuel, the top thirty floors collapsed onto the eighty floors 

below, bringing down the entire structure. 

United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767, also took off from Boston 

Logan airport roughly 13 minutes after AA Flight 11 at 7:58 a.m. with a 

long morning flight to Los Angeles. On board at the planned time, five 

hijackers took over the flight. As flight 175 approached New York City, 

the Al-Qaeda pilots could have surely seen the smoke coming from the 

North tower. At 9:05 a.m., as the world was watching, UA Flight 175 

slammed into the South Tower (WTC 2), above the 90th floor, on one side 

with a brilliant, almost unbelievable flame coming out of the other. For 

the millions who watched this scene live on TV, it seemed more like 

something from Hollywood. The fire burned for 56 minutes before the top 

20 floors would collapse on the remaining 90 below in 8 seconds.25 The 

great buildings that Minoru Yamasaki had designed and that had taken 

seven years to build, collapsed in seconds.26

It is estimated that each jet carried approximately 60,000 pounds of 

jet fuel and was traveling in excess of 300 miles per hour when they 

crashed into each building.27 Both towers were the first super-tall 

buildings designed without any masonry, with a uniquely designed central 

core and elevator system that allowed for more space on each floor. While 

originally designed to withstand an impact of a Boeing 707, the much 

larger 767s provided significantly more kinetic energy and fuel. The 

initial impact of the planes appeared to have created a lot of damage, but 

not enough to cause the building to collapse; however, the intense fires 

from the burning aircraft fuel combined with the damage began to weaken 

the undamaged metal support structures. Once the upper floors began to 

collapse, the downward momentum could not be stopped.28

World Trade Center towers 1, 2, and 7 collapsed, leaving more than 

one million tons of debris at what became known as Ground Zero. About 

400 structures across a 16-acre area were damaged.29 Over 13,000 

customers lost electrical power.30 In a matter of minutes, 2,752 people 

were killed.31 Before the day was over, 440 first responders were killed 

(23 New York Police Department (NYPD), 343 Fire Department of New 

York (FDNY), and 74 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 
26 . . . Defending the American Homeland

Over 320 other emergency responders were treated for injuries or 

illnesses.32

On that same morning, United Airlines Flight 93 took off at 8:01 a.m. 

from Newark for a long flight to San Francisco. As the plane was being 

commandeered and flown back towards the East Coast, cell phone calls 

informed passengers onboard of what had happened at the World Trade 

Center. Taking the initiative into their hands with the words “let’s roll,” 

passengers engaged the hijackers, causing the plane to crash in a field near 

Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. All 45 people onboard were killed, 

leaving the intended target a mystery. 

American Airline flight 77, a Boeing 757, took off at 8:10 a.m. from 

Washington Dulles Airport to Los Angeles. Along the route, five 

hijackers took over the plane and flew it towards the Potomac River. At 

9:40 a.m., the plane slammed into the newly renovated and empty section 

of the Pentagon killing 189 people (125 people on the ground, and 64 on 

the aircraft). The crash damaged or destroyed three of the five interior 

concentric “rings” of the Pentagon building.33

By the time most Americans went to bed that night, they realized the 

world had forever changed. If there were any doubters left, the first two 

weeks of October 2001 likely changed their minds. 

On October 1, 2001, Robert Stevens, an employee of American Media 

(AMI), was admitted to a Boca Raton, Florida hospital in a near death 

condition. Five days later he was dead. Within a few days, anthrax had 

become a 24/7 news event. 

On the day Stevens died, letters claiming to contain anthrax were 

received at the New York Times and St. Petersburg Times, both later 

turned out to be hoaxes. On the next day, anthrax spores were found on 

another AMI employee, a mailroom worker, and on Stevens’ computer. 

Later, this second worker was confirmed to have inhalation anthrax. On 

October 10, a third AMI mailroom worker tested positive for anthrax, and 

led FBI investigators to suspect that anthrax was being disseminated 

through letters in the postal system. 

On October 12, one of Tom Brokaw’s assistants at NBC reported a 

case of cutaneous anthrax. Five days later an envelope containing anthrax 

powder was opened in Senator Tom Daschle’s office. Until this point, 

there was no evidence as to the quality of the pathogen, but tests of the 

material from Senator Daschle’s office proved most disturbing. The fine 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 27

powder was some of the best quality ever seen by U.S. military personnel. 

America was under attack with a sophisticated pathogen. 

Many now refer to the second attack of 2001 as 5-11...5 deaths due to 

inhalation anthrax and 11 infected with inhalation anthrax. In many 

respects, the 5-11 had far more ramifications than did the attacks of 9-11. 

These five deaths and the botched response by federal, state, and local 

officials demonstrated that America was woefully unprepared to respond 

to even a small-scale biological attack. In response, billion dollar 

programs in research and development and public health would soon 

receive funding from Congress. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 29 

VII. The Office of Homeland Security 

On September 12, 2001, the former coach of the Georgetown 

University basketball team, John Thompson, was preparing for his 

afternoon radio talk show. He knew that his audience would not be 

interested in hearing about sports, so he asked the Director of the ANSER 

Institute for Homeland Security to be his guest. His first question was 

straight to the point, “Is America ready for homeland security?” 

Considering the audience, the Director responded with a sports 

analogy, “We don’t have a coach, we don’t have a game plan, and we 

aren’t practicing. How do you think we will do in a big game?”34

On October 8, 2001, President Bush gave the nation a coach, 

Governor Tom Ridge. Some in Congress were calling for the creation of a 

new department, but the President chose to create a new office within the 

White House, the Office of Homeland Security. The critics complained 

that Governor Ridge had neither operational nor budgetary authority in 

this position. His staff was only 35 with another 150 detailed from other 

agencies scheduled to come onboard. How could a leader without 

authority and with such a tiny staff handle what many were calling the 

most difficult and complex security challenge America had ever faced? 

What the critics failed to realize was that the Office of Homeland 

Security was just the first step of a much larger plan. Following the 

attacks of 9-11, the President had to take action to better prepare the 

nation, but there was great concern that creating a new department 

overnight would have been a “bridge too far.” The Bush Administration 

found wise counsel in the first rule of medicine, “First, do no harm.” 

The Office of Homeland Security was the first step in a long-term 

plan. It provided the team that would develop the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security (a game plan) and draft the legislative proposal for the 

creation of a new department. This proposal was based on commission 

recommendations, particularly Hart-Rudman, and other bills introduced in 

the House and Senate, but had several unique elements, such as the 

inclusion of the Secret Service and elements of the Departments of 

Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the DOE National Labs. 

Defending the American Homeland . . . 31 

VIII. A Homeland Security Strategy 

On July 15, 2002, President George W. Bush released the first 

National Strategy for Homeland Security. Despite the name, the 

document did not provide a strategy, but did provide the first national plan 

for homeland security. The plan explained how the nation will reduce its 

vulnerabilities and marshal its resources, but not how they will be applied 

against any specific enemy.35

As recommended in the first Gilmore commission report, this 

document provided standard definitions for the nation. 

Terrorism – any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human 

life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate civilian 

populations or government. 

Homeland Security – a concerted national effort to prevent 

terrorist acts within the U.S., reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 

do occur. 

Critical Infrastructure – the assets, systems, and functions vital to 

our national security, governance, public health and safety, the 

economy, and national moral. 

There were four key themes emphasized in the national strategy 

document.36 The first was federalism, “the idea that the federal 

government shares authority, responsibility, the mandate for action and the 

struggle for resources with states, local governments and private actors.”37 

Whereas national security had primarily been the realm of the 

executive branch of the federal government, specifically the Department 

of Defense, State and the Intelligence Community, homeland security 

involves more than 87,000 governmental jurisdictions. Furthermore, as 

was highlighted in the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (PCCIP) report, 85 percent of critical infrastructure is owned by 

the private sector. In many scenarios, the federal and state executives will 

not own the assets needed for response. This has been demonstrated in 

many exercises, but none better than DARK WINTER. The primary 

response capability to a large-scale biological attack resides in the private 

sector – medical care facilities and personnel. 
32 . . . Defending the American Homeland

The second theme was accountability. “The path to homeland 

security requires clear organizations, consolidation of authority, and then 

holding some responsible for performance.”38 Nowhere was the theme 

better demonstrated than at the U.S. borders. In the past, when a large 

ship came to a U.S. port, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration, 

and (if agricultural products were on board) the Department of Agriculture 

met the ship. In other words, representatives from four different 

organizations, under four different Department Secretaries with differing 

priorities met the ship. Following the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security on March 1, 2003, all four of these organizations now 

work for a single department secretary, and all have the same top priority, 

defending America. 

The third theme was fiscal responsibility. In other words, “We have 

to accept some level of terrorist risk as a permanent condition.”39 If we do 

not, then the greatest threat to American security will be uncontrolled 

spending. The third theme is closely linked to the last one, prioritization. 

During his first month in office as the Director of the Office of 

Homeland Security, Governor Ridge identified four priorities: (1) first 

responders, (2) borders, (3) bio-terrorism, and (4) improved intelligence 

and information flow.40 These priorities have remained and are clearly 

stated throughout the strategy document and spending programs. 

The strategy also identifies six “critical mission areas:” (1) Intelligence 

and warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) domestic 

counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, (5) 

defending against catastrophic threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and 

response. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 33 

IX. The Department of Homeland Security 

On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security became the 

federal government’s third largest bureaucracy. Secretary Tom Ridge 

assumed control of a new department consisting of 22 agencies, 170,000 

plus employees, and a budget of $37.4 billion dollars. It was the largest 

reorganization of the federal government since 1947. 

Prior to this reorganization, a think tank had produced a chart that 

attempted to demonstrate the complex organizational structure of homeland 

security organizations within the federal government. One observer 

commented that it looked like a combination of a plate of spaghetti and an 

eye chart. (Of course, a complete diagram would have been far more 

complex, and confusing, since it would have required federal, state, and 

local government entities plus many private sector organizations.) 

To resolve this, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 on November 25, 2002, in effect creating the Department of 

Homeland Security. Two months later on January 24, 2003, the new 

Department became part of the U.S. government. By March 1, 2003, all 

the component parts moved to the new Department. The idea was not to 

create new organizations on top of the existing structure, but to take 

existing independent agencies and realign them under one chain-ofcommand and department, thus streamlining and removing 

interdepartmental fighting over the sparse monetary “rice bowls” and 

personnel. Its major goal was to “transform and realign the current 

confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department.”41 

President Bush assigned the new Department three missions: 

• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 

• Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and 

• Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist 

attacks that do occur within the United States.42

One only needs to look at the new directorates to understand the depth 

of 9-11’s impact on the United States government. The removal of 

agencies or functions from other departments, once unthinkable, was now 

fact. DHS organized into five major divisions or “Directorates.” One 

directorate is purely for management of the department. However, the 
34 . . . Defending the American Homeland

other four are the key parts to making DHS a success. The Secret Service 

and the Coast Guard remains intact and reports directly to the DHS 

secretary. 

The Border and Transportation Security Directorate, by far the 

largest, consists of the U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, the Federal Protection Service, the Transportation 

Security Administration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and 

other agencies. Many of these have been moved from the Departments of 

Justice, Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation. 

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate prepares 

the nation for terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and the ability to 

recover from such events. The directorate oversees domestic preparedness 

training and coordinates government disaster response. It consists of the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic National Stockpile and 

the National Disaster Medical System, Nuclear Incident Response Team, 

Domestic Emergency Support Teams, and the National Domestic 

Preparedness Office. These agencies moved from the Department’s of 

Justice, Health and Human Services, Energy, and the FBI. 

The Science and Technology Directorate takes advantage of all 

emerging technologies and science to secure the homeland. Merged into 

this high tech directorate will be DoD’s National Biological Warfare (BW) 

Defense Analysis Center; and the Agriculture Department’s Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center; and two programs from the Department of Energy: 

CBRN Countermeasures Programs, and Environmental Laboratory. 

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

Directorate will “analyze intelligence and information from other agencies 

(including the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA) involving threats to homeland 

security and evaluate vulnerabilities in the nation’s infrastructure.”43 

Originally, this directorate was considered to be the leading candidate to 

house a national law enforcement and intelligence fusion center. However, 

the creation of the Terrorism Threat Intelligence Center (under control of 

the CIA) was announced in the President’s State of the Union address. 

Many ask how long it will take for the new department to become 

effective. Defining “effective” is a challenge, but when one considers that 

it took the Department of Defense 40-years to “get it right” (GoldwaterNichols Act of 1987), one hopes success in the Department of Homeland 

Security will come much quicker. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 35 

X. Key Issues 

Despite the complaints of political pundits that it took 18 long months 

to create the Department of Homeland Security, it should be noted that 

this is the most significant reorganization of the federal government since 

1947 – no small feat. On the other hand, many critical issues remain to be 

debated by the Administration, the Congress, the courts and the American 

people. 

Intelligence and Law Enforcement Integration. When President 

Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, he made it 

abundantly clear that it would serve as a foreign intelligence service, not a 

Gestapo-like organization that would infringe on the civil liberties of 

American citizens. Ultra-secret government organizations seem almost an 

anathema to many Americans, yet the threat of international communism 

made it a necessary element in America’s Cold War defenses. The 

excesses of covert actions abroad in the 1950s, and domestic spying here 

at home in the 1960s, resulted in a two-decade long backlash that 

prohibited the Intelligence Community from operations inside U.S. 

borders and even limited capabilities overseas. 

The failure to prevent the attacks of 9-11, even though significant 

amounts of information was available, but not properly collected and 

analyzed, led many to call for the creation of a domestic intelligence 

service, similar perhaps to the United Kingdom’s MI-5.44 The firewall 

that had been constructed between law enforcement and intelligence 

prevented the collection of certain information and the sharing of 

considerable critical information. For instance, in August 2001, the FBI 

began a frantic search for two terrorists believed to be inside the U.S. and 

planning a major attack. The FBI readily admits it faced a near impossible 

challenge of finding them, even though these two individuals used credit 

cards to purchase their 9-11 airline tickets. These cards had exactly the 

same names as was on the watch lists, but the FBI was prohibited from 

accessing this data base—a data base that corporations and private citizens 

can access for a small fee. 

In response to the 9-11 attacks, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT 

Act. Some new authorities granted to the Department of Justice and FBI 

in this act were clearly needed. Many of the procedures for gathering 
36 . . . Defending the American Homeland

evidence and information were of the pre-Internet and pre-digital era. On 

the other hand, this 342-page bill, which changed seventeen laws, was 

passed by Congress in just two weeks. One wonders how many of the 535 

members actually read this legislation. Clearly, the debate over domestic 

intelligence has yet to begin. It is one of the most important issues yet to 

be resolved. It is one of the key issues examined by the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 

Commission).45

Role of the Department of Defense and U.S. Northern Command.

While there will be considerable debate on this subject, one thing is clear. 

In the vast majority of cases DoD will not be in charge, but will merely 

provide support to the lead Federal agency which could be the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services or 

the Department of Agriculture, depending on the nature of the crisis. 

DoD has divided homeland security into two general categories: 

homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense includes 

aerospace and maritime missions plus the protection of key DoD facilities 

and infrastructures. Civil support includes missions ranging from 

traditional domestic support roles of disaster relief and counter drug 

operations to specialized technical support that would be required 

following an attack using CBRNE weapons. Specialized National Guard 

units, called Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (initially 

called RAID Teams) are currently operational in more than 30 states. 

Eventually, each state will have at least one of these teams that are 

organized, trained, and equipped to be DoD’s first responders to a CBRNE 

incident. 

Additionally, DoD has identified three types of homeland security 

missions: extraordinary, emergency, and limited scope and duration. 

Extraordinary are those missions when DoD would likely be the lead 

federal agency: aerospace defense, maritime defense and when normal 

measures are insufficient to carry out federal functions (as was mentioned 

in the Bremer Commission Report). Emergency missions are those 

carried out in response to natural or man-made disasters. Limited scope 

and duration missions were conducted in support of the 2002 Olympics 

and the 2002 Super Bowl. In both emergency and limited scope and 

duration missions, DoD provides support to the lead federal agency. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 37

Posse Comitatus. This 19th century, one-sentence law, is one of the 

most misunderstood issues in homeland security. Many military officers, 

including some very senior officers do not understand posse comitatus. 

First of all, there is no Constitutional prohibition against military 

personnel enforcing civil law. Posse comitatus is Latin for, “power of the 

county.” This legislation was passed after the American Civil War and 

during the Reconstruction to prevent southern sheriffs from deputizing 

Federal troops. No one has ever been successfully prosecuted under this 

law. At one time there was a significant difference in the ability of National 

Guard troops to conduct law enforcement activities, when operating under 

U.S. Code Title 32 (under the command of state governors), and Federal 

troops who always operate under U.S. Code Title 10. National Guard 

troops operating in Title 10 status (federalized) lose their Title 32 status and 

come under the same restrictions as federal troops—unless a Presidentially 

declared state of emergency exists. 

However, Congress has passed considerable legislation in the past 10-

years that has significantly blurred this distinction.46 Because it is often 

misinterpreted and much of it is without legal precedence, posse comitatus

is long due for legal reform. 

Today, posse comitatus is used by DoD officials to avoid missions 

they do not want to do. Federal troops are not organized, trained, and 

equipped or funded for law enforcement activities. Furthermore, despite 

the change in the letter of the law, there remains a significant cultural 

prohibition against such activities. The requirement and likelihood of 

Federal troops (or National Guard troops operating under Title 10) 

providing law enforcement is limited and unlikely. There are, of course, 

exceptions, such as the Rodney King riots in 1992, when President George 

H. W. Bush invoked the Insurrection Act and deployed troops from the 7th 

Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, to quell the riots in Los 

Angeles.47

Unfortunately, several key senior DoD leaders did not fully 

comprehend the full meaning of this Constitutional mission. All military 

officers and senior NCOs should receive appropriate education on posse 

comitatus so they are prepared to respond in a domestic crisis if required.48 

Integration of Federal, state, and local government efforts. Few 

challenges of homeland security will pose more difficulty than the 
38 . . . Defending the American Homeland

integration of efforts of 87,000 different government entities. Nowhere is 

this better demonstrated than in the public health sector. 

One of the greatest threats America will face in the coming decades is a 

sophisticated attack with biological pathogens. America is not prepared to 

respond to such an attack today. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that 

can be solved by just “throwing money at it.” America’s public health 

system is in such a state of disrepair that money alone will not lead to better 

preparedness. 

The problem is one of organization or lack thereof. To best understand 

the problem, imagine if America’s military was not a centralized 

organization. Imagine a military where each county had a tank, a platoon 

and an airplane. Imagine a military where promotion was not based on 

competency, but political connections. Imagine a military where there was 

little or no standardization. Imagine a military where some funding came 

from the federal level and some from state and local and few of the funding 

programs were coordinated. Sound ridiculous? Well...that is pretty much 

an accurate description of America’s public health infrastructure today. 

Prior to the 1960s, environmental issues were seen primarily as a state 

and local issue. Eventually, the nation learned that environmental policy 

would only be effective if coordinated at a national level. The same will be 

true for public health. At some point in the future, America’s public health 

system will require a national organization, not more than 3,000 

independent, uncoordinated departments. For example, the state of New 

Jersey alone has 116 independent public health departments.49

General Eisenhower said, “The right organization will not guarantee 

success, but the wrong organization will guarantee failure.”50

Not all elements of the federal, state, and local government teams will 

require such radical changes. Many improvements can be made with 

enhanced planning efforts and exercise programs. This will avoid the 

situation we have seen many times in the past, where the first step in 

responding to a crisis was “exchanging business cards.” 

Furthermore, the most cost-effective means of preparing for incident 

management is to do it on a regional basis. Not every community needs to 

have every piece of equipment and every specialty. Regional capabilities 

and integrated Federal, state, and local teams will make homeland security 

affordable. Otherwise, the greatest threat to America will be uncontrolled 

spending. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 39 

XI. Summary 

Just prior to his retirement from active military service, General Colin 

Powell stated that it would take a decade to figure out the international 

security environment that was replacing the Cold War. Some began to 

recognize this new environment by the mid 1990s. For most Americans it 

began on a Tuesday morning in September of 2001. 

Scholars are still searching for the correct name for this new national 

security era, but they understand the elements: international terrorism, 

asymmetric warfare made possible through the technological revolution, and 

homeland security. This new era will not end with the death of Osama bin 

Laden or Saddam Hussein. In fact, a world that is fueled with centuries-old 

hatred and armed with 21st century technology is here to stay. Perhaps 

historians will say that what followed the Cold War was the War on 

Terrorism—an era that could last far longer than the Cold War. 

Two wide oceans and two friendly neighbors have little meaning in the 

21st century security. Today, a cell phone bought in a convenience store can 

serve as a global command and control system. A terrorist can sit in an 

outdoor café in Paris and launch a cyber attack on the Pentagon and Wall 

Street, and a test tube can hold a weapon that could threaten an entire nation. 

The good news is that much has been accomplished since September 

11th. Today, America has a coach, a game plan, and we are practicing. 

Secretary Ridge is the coach, and he is implementing the President’s game 

plan, the Homeland Security Strategy. In May of 2003, the second of two 

national-level homeland security exercises (TOPOFF II) was completed. 

Additionally, hundreds of other exercises at the state and local level have 

been and will be conducted. A database from these exercises is being 

developed to identify “best practices” and leverage the investment and 

success.51

Of all the threats America faces, none will be of greater threat than 

uncontrolled spending. We cannot defend against all threats. We cannot 

deter, prevent, or preempt every truck bomber or sniper. We cannot provide 

every fire, police, and emergency services department in the country with 

every piece of emergency equipment on their wish list. We must establish 

priorities. 
40 . . . Defending the American Homeland

This will require continuation of a comprehensive and aggressive 

counterproliferation program. We must focus our efforts on deterring, 

preventing and preempting the high consequence events, and we must realize 

that they will not always be successful in these endeavors. Therefore, they 

must take actions to mitigate the effects of these high consequence events, 

determine the identity of the perpetrators, have the capability to respond in a 

manner that will eliminate the attackers offensive capability, and send a clear 

signal to all terrorists and tyrants that will re-establish deterrence. 

Our leaders must learn to say, “No.” We cannot afford every “good 

idea.” Some are calling for vast amounts of spending to secure our borders. 

This may very well provide nothing more than a 21st century Maginot 

Line – and just like the French discovered in 1941, it provided no security. 

Ramzi Yousef and Timothy McVeigh built their bombs inside the United 

States. Radiological dispersal devices, chemical weapons and highly 

sophisticated biological weapons could just as easily be built within our 

borders. 

Our enemies will continue to use America’s strengths against us. 

Americans greatly value privacy, protection of individual liberties and 

rights of the accused, freedom of movement and access, and open borders. 

Americans see these values as strengths. The enemy sees them as seams in 

our defense, just as a National Football League quarterback exploits the 

seams in a zone defense. Defending the American homeland in the 21st 

century will be the most difficult challenge this nation has ever faced. It will 

likely cause us to reexamine how we think about the military, the 

intelligence community, privacy, civil liberties, federalism, immigration, 

international commerce, borders, and the role of corporate America. 

A wrongly conceived counter-terrorist program could create a 

dilemma – forcing a society to choose between freedom and security. This 

fight will be neither cheap nor easy, but if we respond wisely, we will make 

this a false dilemma, and with wisdom and a strong effort, America will 

remain free and secure. We should not have to choose between freedom and 

security. Americans demand both. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 41 

Notes 

1. DARK WINTER was an effort led by Dr. John Hamre at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Dr. Tara O’Toole and Dr. Tom Ingelsby of the Johns Hopkins 

Center developed the executive simulation for Civilian Biodefense Strategies and Col 

Randy Larsen, USAF (Ret), and Mark DeMier of the ANSER Institute for Homeland 

Security. The McCormick-Tribune Foundation and the Oklahoma City Memorial 

Institute provided funding for the Prevention of Terrorism. Senior national security 

leaders, including Senator Sam Nunn, former CIA Director Jim Woolsey, former FBI 

Director William Session, Governor Frank Keating (R-OK), and David Gergen 

participated in this two-day event. 

2. Comments made to Vice President Cheney by Col Randall Larsen on September 

20, 2001. 

3. Lincoln, Abraham, “Perpetuation of our Political Institutions: Address Before 

the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois,” January 27, 1838. 

4. National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 15, 2002. 

5. Parachini, John V. “The World Trade Center Bombers,” (1993), Chapter 11, page 

191. From the book Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 

Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker, Editor, Monterey Institute, MIT Press, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts, 2000.

6. David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult From The End of the World (New 

York: Crown Publishers), 1996, 140-146. 

7. For a detailed description of this event and other Aum activities, see: Kaplan, 

David E. and Marshall, Andrew, The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story 

of the Aum Doomsday Cult, New York, Crown, 1996.

8. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 

109; and Murray Weiss, The man who warned America: the life and death of John 

O’Neill, (New York: Regan Books, 2003), 89. 

9. FACA, sometimes referred to as the Sunshine Law requires that meetings 

between federal government officials and private industry must be open to the public and 

press. Both public and private officials have expressed concerns that information 

regarding industry vulnerabilities could provide targeting information to terrorists. 

Legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security has allowed for some 

exceptions to FACA. 
42 . . . Defending the American Homeland

10. “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,” National 

Commission on Terrorism, 7 June 2000, 64, on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, 

available from http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/. 

11. All Gilmore Commission reports can be viewed on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/charter.html, current as of 17 November 2003. 

12. Onion, Amanda, “A Lesson in Biology,” ABC News.com, on-line, Internet, 5 

October 2003, available from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/wtc_ 

biologylesson011001.html. 

13. “New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Major Themes and 

Implications.” The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. (The Phase I 

Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment), 15 September 1999, 8, on-line, 

Internet, 17 November 2003, available from http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/NWC.pdf. 4. All 

the reports are available from http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.htm. 

14. Colonel Randall Larsen, the Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy 

and Operations at the National War College originally designed the model in October 

1999. It consisted of: deterrence, prevention, preemption, crisis management, 

consequence management, and retaliation. In January 2000, attribution was added at the 

suggestion of Dr. Ruth David, the former Deputy Director of Science and Technology at 

CIA. In the spring of 2001, retaliation was replaced with response. Response includes 

both prosecution and retaliation. In April of 2003, crisis management and consequence 

management (terms from PDD-39 in the Clinton Administration) were replaced with 

incident management to align with the policies of the Bush Administration. 

15. Discussion between Col. Randall Larsen and former Representative and Speaker 

of the House Tom Foley, October 2001. 

16. Dershowitz, Alan, Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, 2002. 

17. President Bush’s Address to Congress and the American People; Thursday, 

September 20, 2001. On-line, Internet, available from http://www.newsmax.com/ 

archives/articles/2001/9/21/02114.shtml. 

18. Dr. Ruth David, President and CEO of ANSER uses this term frequently. 

19. JCS Pub 1-02, 460. 

20. Testimony of Randall Larsen, 9-11 Commission, New York City, April 1, 2003. 

21. Mao, Tse-Tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. University of Illinois Press: Urbana 

and Chicago, 1961, First Illinois paperback 2000, 92-93. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 43 

22. Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI in a Speech to the National Legal Center, 

Department of Justice, Washington DC, November 19, 2002. 

23. Garamone, Jim. Defense Link, American Forces Information Service, News 

Article. “Tape Proves Bin Laden’s Complicity in September 11 Attacks,” Washington 

D.C., 13 December 2001, on-line, Internet, available from http://www.defenselink. 

mil/news/Dec2001/n12132001_200112134.html. 

24. Ibid. 

25. Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn, ret. “Why the World Trade Center Buildings 

Collapsed: A Fire Chief’s Assessment,” 19 April 2003. n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 April 

2002, available from http://vincentdunn.com/wtc.html. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Department of State. 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 3. 

28. The University of Sydney. “World Trade Center – Some Engineering Aspects,” 

Department of Civil Engineering, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, available 

from http://www.civil.usyd.edu.au/latest/wtc.php#system. 

29. United States General Accounting Office (GAO). Potential Terrorist Attacks: 

Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants, 

GAO-03-414. GAO. February 2003, 9. 

30. Ibid., 9. 

31. Associated Press, “Official WTC death toll is 2,752,” The Salt Lake Tribune, 30 

October 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, available from 

http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Oct/10302003/nation_w/106763.asp. 

32. Jackson, Brian A., Peterson, D.J., and others, Protecting Emergency 

Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks. RAND Science and Technology 

Policy Institute, Conference Proceedings, 2002, 6. 

33. Garamone, Jim. Defense Link, American Forces Information Service, News 

Articles. “Tape Proves Bin Laden’s Complicity in September 11 Attacks.” Washington 

D.C., 13 December 2001; on-line, Internet, available from http//www.defenselink.mil/ 

news/Dec2001/n12132001_200112134.html. 

34. Randall Larsen, Director ANSER Institute for Homeland Security in radio 

interview with John Thompson, September 12, 2001. 
44 . . . Defending the American Homeland

35. Dr. David McIntyre, “Understanding the New National Security Strategy of the 

United States,” ANSER Institute for HOMELAND Security, (Institute Analysis 009), 

September 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, available from 

www.homelandsecurity.org/hlsanalysis/hlsstrategyanalysis.htm. 

36. These themes are found in Dave McIntyre’s Commentary “The National Strategy 

for Homeland Security: Finding the Path Among the Trees.” 

37. David McIntyre, “The National Strategy for Homeland Security: Finding the 

Path Among the Trees,” ANSER Institute for HOMELAND Security, 23 July 2002, 12, 

on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, available from http://www.homelandsecurity.org 

/HLSAnalysis/20020723.htm, 3. 

38. Ibid., 4. 

39. Ibid., 5. Also found in Office of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, July 2002, p. 2. 

40. Ibid., 6. 

41. “What is the Mission of the New Department of Homeland Security?” 

Department of Homeland Security Website, (DHS Organization Section), n.p., on-line, 

Internet, 17 November 2003, available from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 

display?theme=10&content=429. 

42. “Homeland Security Act of 2002,” The Whitehouse Website, 17 November 2003; online, Internet, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title1.html or 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/hsl-bill.pdf. 

43. “Who Will Be Part of the New Department?” Department of Homeland 

Security Website, (DHS Organization Section), n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, 

available from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=13. 

44. Senator John Edwards, “Senator Edwards Proposes Homeland Intelligence 

Agency,” News from Senator John Edwards North Carolina for Immediate Release-Press 

Website, 13 February 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 November 2003, available from 

http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/0213-pr.html#. 

45. From the oral statement by Randall Larsen to The National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission) in New York City on April 

1, 2003. 

46. For more information on posse comitatus go to the following websites (current 

as of 17 November 2003): http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.fact 

sheets&factsheet=5, or http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle. 
Defending the American Homeland . . . 45 

asp?article=11, or http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.asp? 

article=30. 

47. The Insurrection Act (Title 10 USC Sections 331-334). This act allows the 

President to use U.S. military personnel at the request of the State Legislature or 

Governor to suppress insurrections. It also allows the President to use federal troops to 

enforce federal laws when rebellion against the authority of the United States makes it 

impracticable to enforce the laws of the U.S. 

48. Because if it is required, it means that a serious breach in security has occurred, 

and DoD must not fail in its mission. 

49. Interview with Dr. Elin Gursky, former Deputy Health Commissioner for the 

State of New Jersey, May 30, 2003. 

50. This quote is found in Senator Graham’s statement during the proceedings: “I 

conclude by reading a quote from Dwight David Eisenhower. I think it is very 

appropriate as we debate the Homeland Security Department and its structure. Ike said: 

‘the right organization will not guarantee success, but the wrong organization will 

guarantee failure.’” U.S. Senate Proceedings, “091902 Homeland Security.txt, 

Homeland Security Act of 2002,” United States Coast Guard Legal Website, (Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 - Legislative History & Documents- Text Files Listing), 19 

September 2002, on-line, Internet, 18 November 2003, available on 

http://www.uscg.mil/legal/Homeland_legislation/text/091902%20homeland%20security.t

xt, or http://www.uscg.mil /legal/Homeland_legislation/Text/, page S8882. 

51. More information is available at the National Memorial Institute for the 

Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) website’s Library and MIPT Databases, available from 

http://www.mipt.org/MIPT-Databases.asp. Current as of 17 November 2003. 
46 . . . Defending the American Homeland

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to 

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the 

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by 

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction. 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil 

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil 

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538)