# Zambia - United States Department of State

- Zambia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Zambia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zambia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Zambia during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence and threats of violence against journalists, censorship, and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; and laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced.The government took credible steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were several reports that police committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year. The country’s Human Rights Commission (HRC) reported police committed “acts of torture” that resulted in the death of detained suspects. For example, in April police reportedly tortured Captain Phiri while he was in detention at Chilenje police station. Phiri later died of injuries caused by this alleged police abuse. Following a statement by the Law Association of Zambia expressing concern regarding Phiri’s death, along with the earlier death in custody of Justin Kolo at Kansenshi police station, Police Deputy Public Relations Officer Danny Mwale told news media that no suspects had died in police custody. In June, police at Lusaka central police station reportedly tortured Maxwell Mwila, a suspect accused of stealing a mobile phone. Mwila subsequently died on July 1 in custody at Matero police station due to injuries arising from the alleged torture. Court hearings on both cases were still pending as of mid-December.The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Zambian Civil Liberties Union (ZCLU) called upon police to clearly explain the circumstances that led to the death of Mwila and other inmates in custody. ZCLU Deputy Executive Director Maurice Makalu urged the government to prosecute police officers involved in the torture and warned that his organization would compile a list of officers involved, gather evidence against them, and submit torture dockets to the International Criminal Court for possible prosecution.Despite these deaths, the number of extrajudicial killings during the year dropped compared to 2022, the HRC reported. In 2021, the HRC received and dealt with nine cases of extrajudicial killings and in 2022 received and dealt with 26 cases of extrajudicial killings. As of November 1, for the year the Commission received and recorded three cases of extrajudicial killings, all of which the HRC was investigating.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them. According to the HRC, torture remained prevalent, and police reportedly tortured suspects in detention facilities, sometimes resulting in death (see section 1.a.). There were also reports that police at Lusaka Central Police Station and Lilayi Police Station tortured detainees.Police and other law enforcement officers perpetrated acts of gender-based violence. For example, in June, a police officer in Kaputa District allegedly pointed a gun at and “defiled” (raped) a girl, age 14, who was stopped while on her way home. The police officer involved was arrested, charged, and was awaiting trial by year’s end.While there were no specific reports of impunity, police and other law enforcement agencies were quick to reject claims of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and extrajudicial killings (see section 1.a.). The forces most identified with the existence of impunity included police and the Zambia National Service. The government launched investigations into alleged torture, inhuman treatment, or extrajudicial killings, but as of mid-December no officers were charged or prosecuted for their involvement in such violations, except for the case of defilement referenced above. While the law specifically prohibited corporal punishment (including torture) of a child, corporal punishment was still widely practiced in the country’s prisons, and law enforcement officers usually did so with impunity, including on child prisoners.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Physical conditions in prisons and detention centers remained harsh and life threatening due to severe overcrowding, frequent outbreaks of disease, food and potable water shortages, poor sanitation, and inadequate medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding in prisons and other detention facilities remained a problem. The prison population in the country’s correctional facilities stood at 26,066 as of October 23, against a holding capacity of 10,650. The HRC reported a lack of adequate detention infrastructure including limited bed space and mattresses, inadequate nutrition, and unsanitary facilities contributed to the degrading treatment of detainees.Administration: The HRC and the Office of the Public Protector (ombudsperson) investigated allegations of prisoner mistreatment, while the Correctional Service dealt with the discipline of correctional officers.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted prison monitoring by the HRC, independent local and international NGOs, and religious institutions.Improvements: During the year, the government increased funding to improve conditions in prisons and enhance the welfare of inmates, the HRC reported.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention. It also provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The constitution and law required authorities to obtain a warrant before arresting a person for most offenses. Police officers did not need a warrant, however, if they suspected a person had committed offenses such as treason, sedition, or unlawful assembly.Although the law required detainees to appear before a court within 24 to 48 hours of arrest and be informed of the charges against them, the HRC reported authorities routinely held detainees for as long as six months before trial. The HRC noted this abuse remained particularly common in rural districts where subordinate courts operated in circuits and detainees could be tried only when a circuit court judge was in the district. In August, Attorney General Mulilo Kabesha claimed that the law allowed authorities to detain a suspect for as long as investigations remained inconclusive and stated that detained individuals only had to be presented before court 48 hours after conclusion of the investigation, rather than after arrest.Based on a constitutional presumption of innocence, the law provided for bail in most cases. Bail was not granted for persons charged with murder, aggravated robbery, narcotics violations, espionage, or treason. Before granting bail, courts often required at least one employed person, usually a government employee, to vouch for the detainee. There were also reports of police denying or delaying the granting of bail in cases related to opposition political party members or perceived members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) community.Detainees generally did not have prompt access to a lawyer. Although the law obligated the government to provide an attorney to indigent persons who faced serious charges, many defendants were unaware of this right. The government’s Legal Aid Board provided legal services to some indigent arrestees but did not have the resources to meet demand fully.Arbitrary Arrest: The HRC noted that there were fewer reports during the year of arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions and excessive use of force by police, including in civil disputes, than in previous years, but human rights groups and media reports indicated that arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention remained a problem. Police arrested and detained some suspects for questioning without promptly charging them. For example, on June 17, police detained Patriotic Front member Emmanuel Mwamba for more than two days before charging him with forgery and releasing him. In other cases, however, police arrested, promptly charged, and released individuals within the period required by law.Pretrial Detention: According to the NGO Alliance for Community Action, lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. On average, detainees spent an estimated six months in pretrial detention, which often exceeded the maximum length of the prison sentence for the detainee’s alleged crime. Contributing factors included inability to meet bail requirements, nonbailable offenses, trial delays, judges working on a circuit-court basis, and trial continuances due to absent prosecutors and witnesses.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary. While the government largely refrained from direct interference, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning’s control of the judiciary’s budget continued to limit judicial independence. In most cases authorities respected court orders.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. While the law provided the right to a presumption of innocence, to be informed promptly of charges, and to be present at a fair and timely trial, these rights were not consistently protected. There were reports of lengthy detentions without trial and defendants who were not informed promptly of charges against them, and the overburdened and insufficiently resourced judicial system led to lengthy and delayed trial procedures. Courts rarely provided indigent defendants with an attorney at state expense despite a legal requirement to do so. Interpretation services in local languages were available in most cases.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Although the constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, they permitted restrictions of these fundamental rights and freedoms in certain circumstances. In particular, the law allowed restrictions on freedom of expression in the interests of national defense, public safety, public order, and public health, or for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights, and freedoms of others and maintaining the authority and independence of the courts.Freedom of Expression: The government showed sensitivity to criticism, particularly from political opposition figures, and restricted the ability of individuals to criticize it freely or discuss matters of public interest. Following a Hot FM radio program on October 11, when Sishuwa Sishuwa, a Zambian history professor based at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa, criticized President Hichilema, the Independent Broadcasting Association sent Hot FM radio’s Chief Executive Officer Oscar Chavula a letter expressing its concerns and instructing the station to improve its moderation of speakers.Violence and Harassment: While the government broadly tolerated critical articles in newspapers and magazines, there were reports that ruling party supporters and government officials harassed journalists and used threats to intimidate them. For example, on December 12, United Party for National Development (UPND) cadres reportedly stormed Kokoliko FM Radio station in Chingola and disrupted a live radio program featuring opposition Economic and Equity Party leader Chilufya Tayali, and in the process assaulted Eunice Phiri, the station manager. The following day, the cadres lined up around Mafukeni Radio station in Mufulira to block Tayali from entering the station for another radio program. In January, police warned and cautioned two of the UPND supporters involved, Billy Mwape and Mutuna Chifunda, for the offense of “conduct likely to cause the breach of peace.”On December 12, armed police officers in Kitwe reportedly harassed journalists covering a press briefing by opposition Economic Freedom Fighters leader Kasonde Mwenda and confiscated their cameras and other equipment on the basis that the briefing was illegal, as Mwenda had not notified police. Media Institute for Southern Africa Zambia Chapter Chairperson Lorraine Mwanza Chisanga condemned the act and urged police to stop censuring and harassing the media. Police Spokesperson Rae Hamoonga explained that police gave all the confiscated equipment back to the journalists “after the screening.”Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: In June, the Zambian Daily Mail fired a photojournalist purportedly due to government pressure for photographing individuals standing in line for food in Ndola. On September 21, UPND Deputy Chairman Trevor Mwinde stormed the 5FM radio station that had featured opposition Patriotic Front Deputy Mobilization Chairperson Bowman Lusambo. Mwinde, accompanied by UPND cadres, intimidated radio staff and threatened to instruct the government to close the radio station. The Independent Broadcasting Association was accused of partisan and biased treatment of licensing, undermining freedom of expression.Libel/Slander Laws: In late 2022, the government repealed a colonial-era law on the defamation of the president, which had previously been used to arrest numerous individuals who criticized the government in a manner deemed derogatory. Authorities, however, continued to use existing libel and criminal defamation laws. For example, in March police arrested independent parliamentarian Munir Zulu and charged him with three counts of criminal libel for alleging two government ministers illegally received approximately five million kwacha ($250,000) from an undisclosed company and engaged in other corrupt practices. His case remained pending at year’s end.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content. Amendment of the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act, however, intended to improve privacy and strengthen key democratic safeguards for the public, continued to be delayed. Civil society organizations contended that while the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act, which was originally passed by the Lungu administration, contained some useful provisions, such as those that strengthened the protection of children in cyberspace, other provisions violated the right to privacy of members of the public through communication interception.In 2022 the government indicated it would amend the law to strengthen provisions against the abuse of cyberspace. Nevertheless, following a lawsuit brought against the government by the NGO Chapter One Foundation challenging the constitutionality of some of the provisions in the existing law, the government in January announced that it could not proceed with amendments until the case was concluded.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										Numerous civil society organizations (CSOs) reported that the government regularly restricted the rights of peaceful assembly and association, particularly by political opposition members. Speaking on behalf of other CSOs on October 26, Chapter One Foundation Executive Director Linda Kasonde urged the government to quickly enact the Access to Information and Public Gathering Bills into law to protect the right to freedom of expression and assembly.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution provided for the right of peaceful assembly; however, the government restricted this right. The law did not require protesters to have a permit, but it obliged them to notify police of any planned protest or assembly, and police could stop a peaceful protest when they were not notified. On March 8, the women’s rights organization Sistah Sistah Foundation held a march to protest gender-based violence. While the march was allowed to proceed without interruption, following the march police arrested the organizers, alleging they had held an illegal pro-LGBTQI+ rights protest. Civil society representatives suggested this arrest could have a chilling effect on future peaceful assembly. On March 10, 23 persons – including members of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party – were detained for unlawful assembly while protesting the Ndola-Lusaka dual carriageway tender. Police stated the organizations had not informed police of the route they were to take for the protest.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for freedom of association. While the government generally respected the right to freedom of association, it retained some limits on this right through various mechanisms. The law required all organizations to apply for registration with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and comply with other requirements, such as the filing of annual returns and disclosure of funding sources, but the law was loosely enforced. The registration process was stringent and lengthy and gave the ministry considerable discretion. The law placed restrictions on funding from foreign sources. For this reason, donors, including some UN agencies, required all organizations to register before receiving funding.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. One notable exception was the government’s prohibition in September of former President Edgar Lungu leaving the country without prior notification, including his removal by immigration officials from an airplane he had already boarded en route to the Republic of Korea, allegedly because he had not first sought permission to travel internationally.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										Through the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees, the government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government established a system for providing protection to refugees. The law gave the minister of home affairs and internal security wide discretion to deport refugees without appeal or to deny asylum to applicants having asylum status in other countries; however, there were no reported cases during the year of asylum denial to applicants having asylum status in other countries or of refugee deportation.Freedom of Movement: The country maintained a formal encampment policy but allowed asylum seekers, refugees, and other persons of concern to move freely within the country. The government continued to issue conventional travel documents to refugees for purposes of traveling outside the country or to enable them to return to their country of residence. The Angolan and Zambian governments agreed, according to the UNHCR, that Angola would provide national identity documents and passports to former Angolan refugees living in Zambia, a prerequisite for a obtaining residency permit. The government requirement for all applicants to get official national identification documents from their countries of origin, however, made it difficult for Rwandan applicants to obtain residency. According to UNHCR officials, Rwandan refugees or former refugees were afraid of applying for passports from their embassy because they were fearful of engaging their government, which insisted all Rwandan refugees could return home safely and urged governments in the region to help them return to Rwanda.Employment: There were credible reports the government imposed restrictions on refugees’ ability to work after their status as refugees was official. The law required refugees to obtain work permits before they could engage in employment, including self-employment activities. Issuance of employment permits was subject to normal immigration procedures, including a government policy that required the immigration department to ascertain that there was no qualified and available citizen to perform the job.Access to Basic Services: The government provided basic social services including education and health care to refugees without discrimination. The government provided primary and secondary education in refugee settlements, and secondary school for refugees living in urban areas, but it required a student permit and the payment of school fees.Durable Solutions: The government promoted safe voluntary return, third-country resettlement, and local integration of refugees. In conjunction with UNHCR and authorities from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the government assisted in the voluntary return of approximately 4,500 Congolese refugees from Mantapala Refugee Settlement in Nchelenge District to Pweto District in the DRC. As of year’s end, the government assisted 10,851 refugees to return home voluntarily. The government further facilitated the repatriation of Angolan and Somali nationals to their countries of origin under a voluntary repatriation program. There was no substantial progress in efforts to integrate former refugee populations locally.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to individuals and asylum seekers who did not qualify as refugees. For example, as of year’s end, the government had granted protection to 42 asylees from Angola, the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees reported.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections, held most recently in 2021 to mark the country’s third peaceful transition of power since the 1991 reintroduction of multiparty politics, were widely reported to be marred by abuses and irregularities.Observers noted pre-election abuse of incumbency; restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and movement; and partisan intolerance resulting in sporadic violence across the country. Although the results were deemed a credible reflection of votes cast, media coverage, police actions, and legal restrictions heavily favored the Patriotic Front (the ruling party at the time of the 2021 elections) and prevented the election from being genuinely free and fair. Notable problems included burdensome national voter registration time limitations and lack of transparency in procedures, including poor access for observers; opaque and inconsistent application of the electoral law; and late changes to accreditation procedures, including new requirements imposed without prior consultation, which election experts and civil society observers assessed did not meet international standards for electoral process management.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Observers reported traditional and cultural factors prevented women from participating in political life on the same basis as men. The constitutional requirement of a high school education to qualify as a candidate for election to public office had the effect of disqualifying many women candidates because they often were unable to complete secondary school due to traditional or cultural factors such as early marriage. Additional factors noted by observers and researchers included online and offline hate and harassment of women political candidates as well as perceptions of “electability” of women candidates, which affected primary nomination processes.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government expressed some political will to follow the law, although implementation often fell short. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: The most serious allegations were related to ownership of properties reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, and public procurement fraud among former senior government officials. There were also reports of corruption in the sitting administration. For example, in March the Anti-Corruption Commission arrested Auditor General Dick Sichembe for corrupt practices involving more than 1 million kwacha ($50,000) following a whistleblower disclosure. The charges related to Sichembe’s alleged theft of public funds while he served as accountant general at the Ministry of Finance. In July, the commission arrested Ministry of Finance and National Planning Permanent Secretary Mukuli Chikuba for theft of public funds, and police arrested Luapula Province Minister Derricky Chilundika and 18 others, including senior police officers and ruling provincial party officials, for the illegal mining of mineral ore. President Hichilema fired both Chilundika and Chikuba.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Government Human Rights Bodies: The HRC was an independent body established by the constitution to promote and protect human rights in the country, investigate human rights violations and abuses, and provide recommendations for remedial interventions. Human rights groups, however, stated that the HRC lacked autonomy and was understaffed. Nevertheless, most human rights groups assessed that despite these limitations, it was considered effective. The HRC monitored human rights conditions, interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed the government denied, and spoke on behalf of detainees and prisoners.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of women and men, and courts had discretion to sentence convicted rapists to life imprisonment with hard labor. The law did not include provisions for spousal rape. The law criminalized domestic violence between spouses and among family members living in the same home. The law provided for prosecution of most crimes of gender-based violence (GBV), and penalties for conviction ranged from a fine to 25 years’ imprisonment, depending on the severity of injury and whether a weapon was used. The law provided for protection orders for survivors of domestic violence and gender-based violence, and such orders were issued and enforced. Despite this legal framework, rape and domestic violence remained widespread. Although the law criminalized rape and domestic violence, the government did not consistently enforce the law. To ensure medical evidence was correctly obtained within the provisions of the law, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) supported the government in revising and implementing medical report procedures used by medical personnel when a survivor visited or was taken to a medical facility. These procedures were being implemented during the year at post-violence health facilities in the country.To address gender-based violence, the government engaged traditional marriage counselors on gender-based violence and women’s rights in collaboration with NGOs. The government and local and international organizations worked to address these problems through community sensitization campaigns, shelters, toll-free lines, and one-stop centers where survivors accessed counseling and legal support services. Trained police officers in the Zambia Police Victim Support Unit (VSU) supplemented these efforts. Other efforts to combat and reduce gender-based violence included curriculum development for police training, roadshows to sensitize the public concerning gender-based violence, and instruction on how to file complaints and present evidence against perpetrators.A gender-based violence information management system in the police VSU strengthened monitoring and reporting of cases of gender-based violence. The system, which allowed for effective and comprehensive reporting of gender-based violence and improved support, including legal services, social, economic, and overall national planning, increased the number of reported cases. In the first three quarters of the year, the Zambia Police Service reported a total of 31,219 cases of GBV, which represented a 31.61 percent increase in the second quarter compared to 2022 and a 15.9 percent increase in the third quarter. Additionally, health facilities across the country reported 50,483 girls and women reporting and receiving care for GBV from October 2022, through September 30. An estimated one-third of the women in the country experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime, and among girls under the age of 18 who reported having had sexual intercourse, one in four reported their first sexual intercourse as forced.Police and other law enforcement officers perpetrated acts of gender-based violence (see section 1.c.).Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law prohibited FGM/C for women and girls. The NGO Women and Law in Southern Africa and other human rights-focused NGOs reported that labia elongation (the practice of pulling the labia to effect elongation) was widely practiced. There were indications the incidence rate was declining, especially in urban areas.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: According to the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), gender-based violence, including sexual violence against children, remained a problem due to lack of effective law enforcement. Although the law contained provisions under which some forms of sexual harassment of women could be prosecuted, the provisions were inadequate to protect women effectively from sexual harassment. According to the YWCA, enforcement of the law against rape, sexual harassment, sexual violence, and other forms of gender-based violence by mandated institutions remained a problem.Discrimination: In contrast to customary law, the constitution and other laws provided for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including under family, labor, property, and nationality laws. Customary land tenure and patriarchal systems continued to discriminate against women seeking to own land, thus restricting women’s access to credit, as they lacked the collateral that land ownership provided. Local human rights-focused NGOs, such as the YWCA, observed that the country’s dual system of customary and statutory law made it difficult to combat and deter injustices against women.The employment code prohibited employment discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, color, sex, ethnicity, disability, age, or refugee status. Although the code provided for maternity leave, it required a worker to be continuously employed for two years before being eligible for such leave. Some NGOs warned the code was likely to have a negative impact on women because potential employers would see hiring them as a financial risk, since the increased maternity leave allowance provided for up to 14 weeks with full pay. The law prohibited termination or imposition of any penalty or disadvantage to an employee due to pregnancy, and the government enforced the law.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Many women lacked access to contraception and skilled attendance during childbirth, including essential prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum care, due to several barriers to accessing reproductive health services. These included misinformation and misconceptions regarding contraceptive use as well as inadequate reproductive health infrastructure, including insufficient skilled health-care providers, communication, transport to service delivery points, and referral systems. According to the UNFPA, some survivors of rape became pregnant and contracted HIV because they could not reach health facilities in time. The UNFPA further reported that although there was no discrimination in terms of service provision, government policy restricted access to reproductive rights to persons above the age of 16 without parental consent. Most parents were hesitant to provide consent, but in cases of rape and GBV, they usually provided it to prevent pregnancy.The government continued to provide survivors of sexual violence access to sexual and reproductive health services and permitted the use of emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis under the clinical management of rape. As part of the World Health Organization’s minimum package of clinical post GBV care, emergency contraception was available at certain health facilities. Nevertheless, while emergency contraception was permitted at some clinics, government service delivery points often did not stock it due to funding gaps in the procurement process and the stigma associated with getting the product in public health centers. Emergency contraception was only available after incidents of sexual violence, the UNFPA reported.The maternal mortality ratio was 278 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2018. The three major causes of maternal mortality were postpartum hemorrhage, hypertensive disorders, and septicemia. According to the Zambia 2018 Demographic and Health Survey, the latest information available, 80 percent of childbirths were assisted by a skilled provider, the pregnancy rate for girls and women between ages 15 and 19 was 29 percent, and the median age of having the first child was 19, indicating limited contraceptive use among teenagers, which was mainly due to government policy that did not allow adolescents aged 16 and below to access family planning services without parental consent. Additionally, the law was silent regarding those adolescents who were married.Access to menstrual health and hygiene remained limited due to inadequate knowledge and poverty resulting in inadequate funds to purchase menstrual hygiene products. Teen pregnancy also remained a barrier to education, but, under the government’s re-entry policy, girls who dropped out of school due to pregnancy were readmitted into school after delivery (see section 6, Children, Education).																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited any form of discrimination including based on ethnicity, and there were no reports of violence or discrimination based on ethnicity. The government generally permitted local traditional communities and ethnic minority groups to practice their traditional way of life.																																				Children										Education: Although the law provided for free and compulsory education for children of “school-going age,” it neither set a specific age nor defined what was meant by “school-going age.” These omissions left children particularly vulnerable to child labor (see section 7.b.). The numbers of girls and boys in primary school were approximately equal, but only 32 percent of children who completed secondary school were girls (see also section 6, Women, Reproductive Rights).Child Abuse: The punishment for conviction of causing bodily harm to a child was five to 10 years’ imprisonment, and the law was generally enforced. A 2022 law introduced measures to prevent and enable early responses to any form of violence against children. The law mandated all organizations directly interacting with children without parental presence to implement policies safeguarding children.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law prohibited child marriages (those contracted by children under age 18) and practices that undermined a child’s development, such as female genital mutilation. The government generally enforced various provisions of the law to prevent child marriage. It further introduced child protection procedures for all services and organizations working with children to ensure that children had channels to report cases of abuses, such as child, early, or forced marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The minimum age for consensual sexual relations was 16. The law provided penalties of up to life imprisonment for conviction of statutory rape or defilement, which the law defined as the unlawful carnal knowledge of a child younger than age 16. The minimum penalty for a conviction of defilement was 15 years’ imprisonment. The law criminalized sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of children, child sex trafficking, and exposing children to obscene or pornographic material.The law criminalized child sex trafficking and child pornography and provided for penalties of up to life imprisonment for convicted perpetrators. The government enforced the law effectively. In November 2022, the government enacted amendments to the antitrafficking law that removed the requirement of a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, thereby bringing the definition of trafficking in line with the international law definition. The law required prosecution of perpetrators, and referral to care for survivors of sex trafficking.According to UNICEF, transactional sexual exploitation, defined as engaging in sexual activity in exchange for basic needs such as food, clothes, or shelter, remained prevalent among extremely vulnerable girls. According to Zambia Police statistics released in November, the country recorded a total of 735 cases of defilement of children. Media reports and data from credible sources suggested that the actual number could be significantly higher.																																				Antisemitism										There were fewer than 500 persons in the Jewish community, and there were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct, and penalties for engaging in “acts against the order of nature” were 15 years’ to life imprisonment. Conviction of the lesser charge of “gross indecency” carried a penalty of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. According to human rights groups, the government did not proactively enforce the law criminalizing consensual same-sex conduct between adults during the year, but the existence of the law deterred most LGBTQI+ persons from being open regarding their orientation in public. There were no credible efforts to rescind discriminatory laws that targeted LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment: There were reports that police and members of the public incited, perpetrated, condoned, or tolerated violence against LGBTQI+ persons, those reporting such abuses, or those accused of or perceived to be LGBTQI+ persons. According to the NGO Panos Institute Southern Africa, members of the LGBTQI+ community and their families experienced cyber bullying and violence. Politicians, media figures, and religious leaders also used inflammatory public rhetoric to express opposition to basic protections and human rights for LGBTQI+ persons and to marriage equality, resulting in hate speech, threats, and assaults by members of the public.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. There were reports that health-care providers in public health institutions discriminated against LGBTQI+ persons. External support for the rollout of sexual diversity awareness training of health-care workers in some facilities helped the LGBTQI+ community access nondiscriminatory health services. On September 28, the Ministry of Health issued a directive to all provincial health directors and cooperating partners prohibiting use of the term “sexual and reproductive health and rights” in public discourse on the basis that the inclusion of the words “sexual” and “rights” in the same phrase connoted the inclusion or support for LGBTQI+ rights. Instead, the ministry mandated that the phrase “reproductive health and rights” be used instead. In September, Chief Justice Mumba Malila came under intense criticism for his remarks clarifying that while the law prohibited same-sex sexual conduct, it also provided equal freedoms and rights to all persons, including those who were LGBTQI+. While Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Executive Director Andrew Mwenda described Malila’s remarks as “unconstitutional,” 18 human rights lawyers, all reportedly experts in the field, defended Malila’s remarks.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available, and there were no reports that the government allowed individuals to change their gender identity marker on legal and identifying documents to bring them into alignment with their gender identity.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: While there were no reports that medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries were performed on children or on nonconsenting adult intersex persons, the United Nations Development Program issued a legal and policy report on intersex issues in June, providing anecdotal evidence that medical professionals performed cosmetic normalization surgeries on intersex children.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Although there was no specific law restricting freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly for members of the LGBTQI+ community, police disrupted attempts by LGBTQI+ persons (or those perceived to be LGBTQI+) to hold public meetings (see section 2.b).																																				Persons with Disabilities										The Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities (ZAPD) reported that persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others and that the government did not provide information and communication on disability concerns in accessible formats. Lack of accessibility in public transportation and infrastructure and information access remained a problem. According to the ZAPD, public buildings, including schools, prisons, and hospitals, rarely had facilities to accommodate persons with disabilities and therefore remained largely inaccessible. By law, the government was required to provide reasonable accommodations for all persons with disabilities seeking education, and to ensure that “any physical facility at any public educational institution be accessible.” Persons with disabilities, however, had limited access to education and correspondingly low literacy levels. Only five schools were designated for children with disabilities nationwide. Since 2022, the number of children with physical disabilities attending mainstream schools steadily increased. This increase was mainly at the elementary school level, the ZAPD reported.The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities in employment, education, transportation, access to health care, and the provision of other government services. According to the ZAPD, the government did not effectively enforce the law. Persons with disabilities also faced significant societal discrimination in employment. The government developed and promoted employment recruitment strategies for persons with disabilities seeking to enter the civil service and offered a university student loan program to students with disabilities.The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services oversaw the government’s implementation of policies that addressed the needs of persons with disabilities in education, health care, building access, and electoral participation. A lack of consolidated and disaggregated data remained a major impediment to the inclusion of persons with disabilities in government programming and policy.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The government actively discouraged discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS. Most employers adopted nondiscriminatory HIV and AIDS workplace policies. Training the public sector, including the judiciary, on the rights of persons with HIV and AIDS increased public awareness and acceptance, but societal and employment discrimination against such individuals persisted. The government continued to make slow progress in changing entrenched attitudes of discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of most workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, bargain collectively, and seek election for any leadership position or appointment as an officer in trade unions. Statutory restrictions regulated these rights. The government had discretionary power to exclude certain categories of workers from unionizing, including prison staff, judges, court registrars, magistrates, and local court justices. The law also required the registration of a trade union with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which could take up to six months. The law afforded the ministry the power to deny official registration and applications on arbitrary or ambiguous grounds. The law provided the labor commissioner with authority to deny registration of a trade union if it was determined to be prejudicial to national security interests, or if the trade union’s objectives contradicted the purpose for which it was formed. The law prescribed stringent fines for trade union officers who engaged in union activities before a trade union was fully registered.Trade union membership was limited to individuals within the sector in which the union was registered. The labor commissioner, who was part of the Ministry of Labor and reported to the permanent secretary, had authority to monitor the accounts of trade unions and recommend dissolution of trade union boards if the union violated the law or was dormant. The law provided the labor commissioner with authority to appoint an interim committee to oversee the operations of a trade union. If trade union registration was canceled or denied, the law limited officers of that union from holding a union position, unless cleared by the labor commissioner. The law set requirements for collecting union membership fees and obligated trade unions to notify the labor commissioner in case they received any material, technical, or financial assistance from outside sources. Managerial and supervisory staff were prohibited from joining trade unions.No organization could be registered as a trade union unless its application was signed by at least 50 employees, or a lesser number as could be prescribed by the minister of labor and social security. With some exceptions, a trade union could not be registered if it claimed to represent a class of employees already represented by an existing trade union. Unions could be deregistered under certain circumstances, but the law provided for notice, reconsideration, and right of appeal to an industrial relations court.The government, through the Ministry of Labor, brokered labor disputes between employers and employees. Both casualization and unjustified termination of employment contracts were illegal. The law defined casualization as work that was not permanent in nature and was capable of being performed in less than six months. A casual employee was defined as a person employed to perform “casual work” whose terms of employment provided for payment at an hourly rate, payable at the end of each day, and was not engaged for a period exceeding 24 hours at a time.In cases involving the unjustified dismissal of employees, the Ministry of Labor settled disputes through social dialogue, and any unresolved cases were sent to the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court. The law also provided a platform for employers, workers, and government to discuss matters of mutual interest through the Tripartite Consultative Labor Council.The law provided for collective bargaining. In certain cases, however, either party could refer a labor dispute to a court or for arbitration. The law also imposed a three-month time frame for concluding a collective bargaining agreement, which was counted from the start of negotiations, failure of which resulted in fines against the trade union officers involved in the negotiations. The law obligated employers to bargain in good faith, but also provided employers with the option of referring disputes to court for binding determination. The law provided the labor minister with authority to approve collective bargaining agreements before they became binding. The law excluded managerial and supervisory personnel from being represented in collective bargaining agreements. The International Labor Organization raised concerns the law did not require the consent of both parties involved in the dispute for arbitration. The law also allowed for a maximum period of one year for a court to consider the complaint and issue a ruling. The parties to the collective agreement were required to conclude negotiations within three months or face fines. Collective bargaining agreements had to be filed with the commissioner and approved by the minister before becoming binding on the signatory parties.Except for workers engaged in a broadly defined range of essential services, the law provided for the right to strike once all legal options were exhausted. The law defined essential services as fire departments, the mining sector, sewage removal, and any activity relating to the generation, supply, or distribution of electricity and water. Employees in the defense force and judiciary as well as police, prison, and intelligence service personnel were considered essential. Essential employees did not have the right to strike; disputes involving workers engaged in essential services were referred directly to the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court. The process of exhausting the legal alternatives to a strike was lengthy. The law also required a union to notify employers 10 days in advance of strike action and limited the maximum duration of a strike to 14 days. According to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), this process was “too lengthy, required declaration of a dispute, mediation, litigation, and finally, members needed to take a vote on whether or not to strike.” This made it “almost impossible” to have a legal strike in the country, the ZCTU reported.If a dispute remained unresolved, it was referred to the court. The government could stop a strike if the court found it was not “in the public interest.” Workers who engaged in illegal strikes could be dismissed by employers. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions, and it provided for reinstatement and other remedies for workers fired for union activity. Except for workers in “essential services,” no other groups of workers were excluded from relevant legal protections.According to labor experts, the government did not effectively enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers, partly because trade unions were no longer providing effective checks and balances to the government and holding it accountable to improve workers’ rights. Penalties for employers were not commensurate with those for similar violations. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. According to the ZCTU, there were noticeable abuses targeting union leaders and members.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law allowed the Ministry of Labor to set minimum wages by sector; the category of employment determined the minimum wage and conditions of employment. Except for an updated minimum wage order for truck and bus drivers, minimum wages were last revised in 2019 and were at the official poverty income level. Before an employee started working, or when the nature of employment changed, an employer was required to explain employee conditions of employment, including wages. For unionized workers, wage scales and maximum workweek hours were established through collective bargaining and regulation. Almost all unionized workers received salaries considerably higher than the minimum wage.The law provided for a workweek of no more than 48 hours. The standard workweek was 40 hours for office workers and 45 hours for factory workers. There were limits on excessive compulsory overtime, depending on the category of work. The law required that workers earn two days of annual leave per month with no balance accrual.Occupational Safety and Health: The law regulated minimum occupational safety and health (OSH) standards in industry but the government did not effectively enforce these regulations. The Ministry of Labor’s Department of Occupational Safety and Health had the mandate to enforce OSH laws. According to the Workers Compensation Fund Control Board and the Ministry of Labor, government OSH standards were appropriate for the main industries in the country. The law placed the duty on both workers and experts to identify unsafe situations in a work environment, and workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health and safety without jeopardy to their employment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: Penalties for violations of wage and hour laws were commensurate with those for similar violations. The government sometimes applied penalties against violators. Labor inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. The government effectively enforced minimum wage and overtime laws through contracts attestation and labor dispute resolutions. Penalties for OSH violations were commensurate with crimes such as negligence. The government, however, rarely applied penalties against violators. The insufficient number of labor inspectors and alleged corruption, coupled with inadequate resources, an insufficient budget, limited office space, inadequate training, and a lack of transportation and fuel prevented inspectors from adequately conducting inspections and enforcing compliance nationwide.According to the government, most informal-sector workers, who accounted for 70 percent of the total workforce of three million persons, worked in agriculture, forestry, mining, wholesale and retail trade, and motor vehicle repair. Labor laws applied to the informal sector but were seldom enforced. Informal-sector workers were excluded from the social insurance system unless they previously held mandatory coverage for at least 60 months. For example, in 2022 according to the National Pension Scheme Authority only 40,000 of an estimated two million informal-sector workers were covered under the scheme.SENSITIVE BUT U																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											The Bahamas											Tonga											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Zambia
- PEPFAR Launches Nursing Leadership Initiative Across Seven African Countries Office of the SpokespersonOn March 25, Ambassador Dr. John Nkengasong – U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Senior Bureau Official for Global Health Security and Diplomacy, overseeing the Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy – will launch the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Nursing Leadership Initiative to sustain gains and accelerate progress toward ending HIV/AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. Under the initiative, PEPFAR is providing $8 million in 2024 to support nurses at the forefront of the HIV/AIDS response in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Eswatini, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia.In these seven partner countries, the initiative invests in activities that will:Enhance nurses’ skillsets to lead planning and delivery of HIV/AIDS services to curb disruptions in access to essential HIV services;Help nurses to identify, advocate for, and leverage innovative digital solutions to enhance quality HIV service delivery;Protect nurses by enhancing their infection prevention and control skills, providing supportive work environments, and supporting mental health needs;Invest in the development, retention, and equitable distribution of the nursing workforce, aligned with each country’s national priorities, to ensure long-term sustainability of HIV service delivery; andEnhance nurses’ communication and leadership skillsets.PEPFAR implementing partners will also support partner nursing organizations in the seven initiative countries to undertake a needs assessment to guide initiative activities.For media inquiries, please contact GHSD_publicaffairs@state.gov.
- FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs Benefiting Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Zambia and South Africa Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration													HomeBureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs Benefiting Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Zambia and South Africa				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs Benefiting Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Zambia and South Africa																																		Funding Opportunity Announcement																														March 6, 2024																																							Funding Opportunity Number: DFOP0009165&nbsp;Assistance Listings (CFDA) number: 19.517 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for Africa&nbsp;Announcement issuance date: Monday, March 4, 2024&nbsp;Announcement type: Cooperative Agreement&nbsp;Proposal application submission deadline: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 at 11:59:59 p.m. (11:59:59) EDT. Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.&nbsp;																											                        Download Announcement							 [426 KB]																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																																Refugees																															South Africa																								Zambia
- U.S., Zambia, AFC Host PGI Forum to Strengthen Investment in Lobito Corridor Office of the SpokespersonHis Excellency Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, Amos Hochstein, Senior Advisor to President Biden, and Samaila Zubairu, President and CEO of the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) convened the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) Lobito Corridor Private Sector Investor Forum in Lusaka today. This is the first PGI Investor Forum outside the United States, bringing together over 250 business and government leaders from Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the European Union, the United States, and Zambia, as well as international investors and industry leaders. The Forum will accelerate private sector investment in the Lobito Corridor, which will connect the DRC and Zambia with global markets through Angola.The Lobito Corridor is the first strategic PGI economic corridor launched by President Biden at the G7 Summit in Japan in May 2023 under the flagship G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment initiative. The corridor will integrate the African continent and enhance connections with global markets by expanding export possibilities, boosting regional trade, and growing key market segments, all while creating decent jobs and improving lives.PGI’s efforts to upgrade and build new railway will result in the first trans-African rail line, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. A U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) $250 million investment, currently in due diligence, would support the Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR) consortium that is upgrading and operating the 1,300 km Benguela rail line across Angola with advisory support from the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC).  The LAR upgrade will dramatically reduce transport time, better connect critical mineral-rich regions in the DRC with global markets and lower the carbon emissions footprint of goods currently moved by road. By lowering costs for businesses along the corridor, it will also open new markets, including agribusiness.The Investor Forum follows the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in October 2023 in which the African Development Bank, the AFC, the governments of Angola, DRC, Zambia and the United States, and the European Commission underscored their shared commitment to developing the Lobito Corridor.  The MOU named AFC as lead developer on the new Zambia-Lobito rail line extending from the Benguela line into northwest Zambia.  In addition to rail, PGI is investing catalytic public funds alongside G7 and African partners in various sectors, demonstrating a new model of holistic private-sector led infrastructure development while maintaining strong labor and environmental standards, and promoting trade and investment on the African continent.The PGI Forum marks the partners coming together to further mobilize private sector investment across the Lobito Corridor and unlock the enormous potential of this region. During the forum in Lusaka, the U.S. Government and partners announced additional commitments to the corridor:DFC announced that its Board of Directors approved a new $250 million debt facility to the AFC that would support their efforts to develop high-quality and high-standards infrastructure across the continent. That potential project is now pending congressional review. DFC also marked its commitment to provide a $10 million loan to Seba Foods Zambia, the first U.S. food and agriculture investment along the Lobito Corridor.Additionally, the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) announced a feasibility study grant to REV-UP Solar Ventures Zambia to develop an estimated 200-megawatt solar power plant and battery energy storage system in Solwezi, Zambia.  The project will supply clean, stable electricity to Zambian industry and households and has the potential to provide power for two critical mineral mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This week LAR announced a six-year export shipment term-sheet with Canadian mining company Ivanhoe that will advance the rail line’s ambitions to become the leading rail transport link in sub-Saharan Africa and support clean energy supply chain diversification.Supporting efforts to unlock the potential of the Copperbelt region, AFC has entered into an MOU with Congolese commodity trading and mining company La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) to undertake the development of critical minerals in the DRC.AFC has also signed an expression of interest with Kobaloni Energy to provide $100 million in financing for a cobalt refinery in Chingola, Zambia, with the objective of building the first electric vehicle battery grade cobalt sulphate plant on the African continent.These announcements build on the more than $1 billion of U.S. government investments made in Angola in the past year. This includes an Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) authorization of a more than $900 million loan supporting construction of two solar energy power plants that will generate over 500 megawatts of renewable energy, and an additional $363 million EXIM loan guarantee to support financing and construction of over 180 bridges connecting rural Angolan communities. Further, two USAID grants are enabling Africell’s recent mobile money launch to reach more underserved populations, and to expand an existing program supporting women farmers to communities around the Lobito Atlantic rail line.Today’s milestone underlines the importance of the Lobito Corridor initiative. The corridor is a vital logistics hub that connects the region to international markets while demonstrating that strategic public infrastructure investment can mobilize private investment across multiple sectors to promote economic growth that transforms the region.
- Joint Statement on the Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Marrakesh Co-Chairs’ Summary Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the United States of America on the occasion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach event.Begin text:The Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America co-hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Africa Political Meeting and Outreach Event in Marrakesh, Morocco on January 31 &#8211; February 2, 2024. This meeting was co-chaired by the Director of the United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Redouane Houssaini, and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins.This meeting fulfilled a commitment made by Morocco at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting (HLPM) held in Jeju, Republic of Korea on May 30, 2023.The Marrakesh event featured senior representatives of 35 countries from the international community, including 25 African States and 10 countries from the PSI Operational Experts Group.Opening remarks were addressed by His Excellency Mr. Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, highlighting the pivotal role of the African dimension in international cooperation efforts to face the challenges posed by global security which should be given significant consideration within the framework of the PSI vision and commitment of Morocco to continue its support to the PSI and cooperate with the U.S. to encourage more African states to endorse this initiative.Under Secretary Jenkins also addressed the changing international security environment and new challenges to counterproliferation norms and activities.This event presented an opportunity for the PSI-endorsing states to reiterate their commitment to countering of the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials, and to commit to further working together within the PSI in order to effectively address these issues.A large number of participants from African countries welcomed the meeting and showed interest in the Initiative and committed to report back and assess with all national stakeholders to consider endorsing the PSI.One of the primary objectives of the event was to underscore the significance of South-South cooperation as a focal point, showcasing how nations within this framework can leverage their unique strengths and resources to address common challenges.This meeting represented another opportunity to highlight the close strategic partnership between the United States and Morocco, within the strategic dialogue initiated in 2013, and accentuate the depth of this historic long-standing friendship while exploring ways to broaden its horizons towards a triangular cooperation, involving Africa, in matters of security.The PSI-endorsing states and participating states:Highlighted the benefits of PSI endorsement and provided an understanding of PSI frameworks and Critical Capabilities and Practices.Acknowledged the security challenges inherent in the current context, encompassing both Africa and the global landscape.Provided an overview of proliferation threats and trends, both globally and within Africa through briefings and panel presentations received by the attendees.Acknowledged the importance of the PSI as a voluntary mechanism and flexible framework, compliant with international law and mechanisms, to effectively address this threat.Explored the paramount significance of national capacity building and interdepartmental coordination in addressing complex challenges related to the detection and interception of nuclear and radiological materials.The new endorsers of the PSI:  Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia, announced their formal endorsement of the PSI and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.Recognizing the gravity of the global security landscape, underscored the imperative for collaborative efforts on an international scale.Demonstrated a shared commitment to fostering alliances, information-sharing, and coordinated actions to effectively address the complex challenges posed by the spread of WMDs.Next Steps:States that endorsed the PSI statement of Interdiction Principles at this meeting showed interest in participating in follow-up regional and sub-regional African events for new endorsers at a date and location to be determined.The co-chairs suggested establishing a plan of action (workshops, training, operational cooperation) that will allow the new endorsing countries to reinforce their national capabilities to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. PSI-endorsing states committed to assisting new endorsers with additional training, education, and sharing best practices.Morocco and the United States will continue to work closely with participating states to promote PSI in Africa.
- Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event Office of the SpokespersonThe United States and Morocco co-hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) African Political Meeting and Outreach Event from January 31-February 2, 2024, in Marrakesh, Morocco.  The event realizes commitments both countries made at the PSI 20th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting in May 2023 in Jeju, Republic of Korea to expand PSI outreach to non-endorsing countries, especially in Africa.At the meeting – the largest PSI event ever held on the African Continent – the United States, Morocco, and 11 other PSI-endorsing countries engaged 22 African countries that had not yet endorsed the PSI to explain the purpose and importance of the Initiative in countering the threats from the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related items in the region.  Over three days, more than 150 civilian and military leaders from 35 governments examined modern WMD proliferation pathways, improved understanding of WMD interdiction obligations, explored legal frameworks and the best practices of partners, and enhanced the growth and connectivity of the counterproliferation community in Africa.At the meeting’s conclusion, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia had announced their endorsement of the PSI, bringing the total number of worldwide endorsers to 111.  Several other states declared their intention to endorse in the near future. The United States and Morocco encourage all states in the African region and beyond to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and participate in future PSI-related events.The now 111 states that have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles have committed to take effective measures to interdict WMD-related transfers consistent with national law and international obligations, adopt streamlined procedures for rapid information exchange, and strengthen relevant national and international laws and frameworks.The PSI was established in 2003 to stop or impede transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
- Improving Patient Antiretroviral Therapy Retention through Community Adherence Groups in Zambia WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM?Antiretroviral therapy (ART) is frequently distributed via health facilities and their pharmacies. An increased volume of medically-stable patients at facilities reduces the time clinicians can spend with those who require acute care and also discourages patients from attaining care, due to long wait times.  For medically-stable patients, going to a health facility for monthly refill pickup reduces the likelihood of retention on treatment for a variety of factors, including the transportation costs and financial losses of time missed at work incurred by a trip to the health facility . Importantly, retention on ART is vital to the health of HIV-positive individuals, but also to the well-being of the communities in which they live. Achieving higher rates of retention among HIV-positive patients, then, is crucial.FULL SOLUTIONWHAT IS THE SOLUTION?“This is a fantastic and innovative model! It should be duplicated among many similar facilities. For people facing long journeys and long waiting times to get ART this could make a huge difference.The PEPFAR-supported Centers for Infectious Disease Research in Zambia (CIDRZ) has developed and is implementing Community-based Adherence Groups (CAGs). CAGs provide routine ART management to patients, decongest high-volume facilities, and minimize difficulties in accessing ART sites. Groups are self-forming and patients are allowed to join the groups they are comfortable with. The groups develop and maintain a feedback system with the health facility through community health workers. Patients must also follow an agreed code of conduct. Members take turns visiting the health facility to collect a three-month supply of medications for all group members. They also complete a routine clinical exam during the visit.Currently, CIDRZ runs 856 CAGs at 21 facilities across 5 Districts in the Lusaka, Eastern, and Southern Provinces of Zambia.WHAT WAS THE IMPACT?CAGs show high linkage to treatment: through CAGs, 4,375 people were tested for HIV via index testing in fiscal year (FY) 2016. Of those, 540 (12%) tested positive. All of these clients were linked to treatment. CIDRZ will restart index testing and partner notification through CAGs in FY 2018. Given the larger scale, CIDRZ will aim to link at least 90 percent of all clients who test positive to treatment. Linkage to care and treatment is easier through CAGs, as clients have established relationships with volunteers and it is easier to follow up with HIV-positive clients.Clients who participate in CAGs are also more likely to stay on treatment. ART retention is 97% for patients participating in CAGs compared to 76% amongst patients within the standard care model at health facilities. Additionally, local medication collection at a time convenient to the patients has resulted in high patient satisfaction.Service providers and clients at health facilities also see benefits through reduced waiting times and lowered congestion at ART clinics. Providers perceived a decrease in burden of care and are advocating for wider use of differentiated care programs, such as CAGs.HOW DOES IT WORK?STARTING A COMMUNITY-BASED ADHERENCE GROUP (CAG)At health facilities, all patients receive health education as they wait to see clinicians for routine visits. Those willing to join a CAG are screened for eligibility during their appointment. Stable patients who have been on ART for at least 6 months may participate in the program. They should not have any active opportunistic infections (OIs), and should have a CD4 of &gt;200 and viral load of &lt;1000. They should be ≥ 15 years of age. Clinicians then refer eligible patients to community health workers (CHWs) who explain the model in detail. CHWs help patients identify other potential group members to screen for eligibility.Once an individual group has been formed, the CAG is assigned a community health worker (CHW) who sets up a meeting at the facility to define group norms, review the Code of Conduct, sign consent forms, and share contact information. CAGs may be formed for specific population groups, such as adolescents, couples, or any other demographics that patients may be comfortable with. Those who do not know other potential group members are grouped with patients from the same catchment area.At one of the original pilot sites, Chilenje First Level Hospital in Lusaka, some CAGs included unstable clients. Stable clients may provide psychosocial support to unstable clients, resulting in improved adherence. Unstable clients also receive support from a dedicated, multidisciplinary clinical team at the facility who is trained to work with patients with complicated diseases. Viral load tests are given every 3 months to look for improved viral load suppression in unstable clients.MAKING TREATMENT MORE ACCESSIBLEThe Ministry of Health is engaged in selecting sites and actively involved in the roll-out plan of CAGs. Patients participating in CAGs meet routinely in the community to discuss adherence issues and to offer each other psychosocial support.Being a CAG member has helped me not to miss school and build relationships with the staff at the clinic. It also reinforces positive adherence behaviors amongst us members.CIDRZ provides multiple-months drug dispensing for every patient participating in the CAGs. Each CAG has six patients who take turns visiting the ART clinic for consultations and antiretroviral (ARV) drug collection. During the clinic visit, the patient will receive the scheduled clinical consultation and collect a 3-month supply of ARVs for each of the CAG members.  When they get back, the patient gives the rest of the CAG members their ARVs at a CAG meeting. Each patient has two clinical visits a year and goes to the clinic for the appointment, even if it is not their turn to collect medications.Each CAG is assigned a CHW who provides basic psychosocial and clinical support to the CAG members. CHWs interact with patients during routine clinical visits and during each CAG meeting. If a CAG member is unwell and needs clinical attention, they either self-refer or are referred back to the clinic by the CHW. The CAG members also provide peer support to each other. Due to the psychosocial and peer support, member satisfaction has been very high.In addition to ARV drug dispensing, adherence and psychosocial support, CAGs are also used as entry points for index testing. Through partner notification and index testing, children, spouses, and other sexual partners of CAG members are tested for HIV and linked to treatment if positive.When a CAG is first formed, group members will receive one month’s supply of ARVs. Groups must be monitored to ensure each member collects the ARVs when required, and that there are no conflicts or any issues between members that will affect participation in the CAG. Once the group is stable, they graduate to multi-month dispensing.INCREASING HEALTH SYSTEMS EFFICIENCYCIDRZ worked closely with the Ministry of Health to ensure the various concepts of the innovation were understood before implementation and scale-up. CIDRZ targeted high-volume sites and oriented facility staff on how to use the model. Ongoing mentorship and support is offered routinely to implementing facilities to ensure success. This innovation must not be seen as an implementing partner initiative, but as a Ministry of Health initiative that will result in better retention amongst clients and decongestion of health facilities, leading to improved quality of care.Reducing the burden on already saturated health systems is an ever-increasing challenge in resource limited settings. Stable patient, will need limited interaction with their health facilities if they are to continue with new ART initiations. So, monitoring and adherence support in the community is critical and CAGs have helped in achieving this.CAGs not only reduce the burden placed on clinics, but also improve retention and medication adherence. Also, CAGs reduce drug resistance cases, as patients are better able to fit the management of HIV around their home and work lives. Additionally, HIV-related stigma and discrimination can be reduced with CAGs, as people living with HIV (PLHIV) are no longer only considered as ill patients.The CAG model reduces the workload of the health staff, freeing up more time to attend to complicated cases. Also, the CAG model decongests the clinic since more clients are accessing treatment outside of the facility. Clinicians have better access to patients’ information regarding pill adherence, wellbeing, and treatment outcomes through a direct feedback loop between group members and healthcare workersDiscussions are underway with the Ministry of Health for adoption of the CAG model as standard of care. It is hoped that this innovation will be treated as one of the models of care with financial allocation from the Ministry of Health to support implementation nationally.IDENTIFYING AND WORKING WITH ADVOCATESCAGs enable patients to be more involved in the management of their health through active participation and access to ART treatment. In rural areas, traditional leadership had supported the initiative. Through Senior Community Advisors, meetings have been held with chiefs and headmen who provide support of the initiative, ensuring members of the community buy into the intervention and participate fully.The lay counsellors’ teachings on sexual reproductive health programs in the CAGs ensures us, the young people living with HIV, to have the knowledge, skills and confidence to make good decisions and we are linked to care including STI and family planning services. I want to learn life skills and how to improve my health. I am going to be a leader. In some rural areas, villages can be up to 60 kilometers from health facilities. CAGs have lessened the number of times participants have to travel to health facilities, thereby improving patients’ satisfaction and adherence to treatment. CAGs also reduce patients’ travel costs to access treatment. In urban areas, this required advocacy from Neighborhood Health Committees that, have considerable influence in communities on city outskirts. Additionally, advocacy and support by facility staff and volunteers was needed to drive the intervention at the facility-level.The Ministry of Health is critical to establishing support at the national level. A focal point person focusing on differentiated service delivery (DSD) is now in place at the Ministry of Health and the 2018 National Guidelines have been revised to include DSD interventions.WHAT’S NEXT?In the 2018 Zambia Ministry of Health Consolidated ART Guidelines, differentiated models of care have been included as an approach for service delivery. Successful pilot implementation of DSD models has enabled stakeholders to advocate for scale-up in other facilities, especially at high-volume sites. The CAG model is seen as an avenue for reaching out to untested PLHIV by involving patients in the groups as indexes and role models.Currently, there is a DSD Task Force, which is led by the Ministry of Health through a DSD Focal Point Person. This Task Force develops policy, as well as guidelines on DSD, and provides oversight for implementation at the Ministry of Health level.The pilot phase of the model commenced in April 2016 and approval to implement at-scale was granted by the Ministry of Health in March 2017.  CIDRZ is scaling up the model in all Lusaka high volume sites in Quarter 1 of FY 2018 (October to December 2017) and to high volume sites in Western, Southern and Eastern Provinces in Quarter 2 of FY 2018 (January to March 2018).Revised by the PEPFAR Solutions Team, May 2018&nbsp;
- Improving Patient Antiretroviral Therapy Retention through Community Adherence Groups in Zambia WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM?Antiretroviral therapy (ART) is frequently distributed via health facilities and their pharmacies. An increased volume of medically-stable patients at facilities reduces the time clinicians can spend with those who require acute care and also discourages patients from attaining care, due to long wait times.  For medically-stable patients, going to a health facility for monthly refill pickup reduces the likelihood of retention on treatment for a variety of factors, including the transportation costs and financial losses of time missed at work incurred by a trip to the health facility. Importantly, retention on ART is vital to the health of HIV-positive individuals, but also to the well-being of the communities in which they live. Achieving higher rates of retention among HIV-positive patients, then, is crucial.WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?This is a fantastic and innovative model! It should be duplicated among many similar facilities. For people facing long journeys and long waiting times to get ART this could make a huge difference.The PEPFAR-supported Centers for Infectious Disease Research in Zambia (CIDRZ) has developed and is implementing Community-based Adherence Groups (CAGs). CAGs provide routine ART management to patients, decongest high-volume facilities, and minimize difficulties in accessing ART sites. Groups are self-forming and patients are allowed to join the groups they are comfortable with. The groups develop and maintain a feedback system with the health facility through community health workers. Patients must also follow an agreed code of conduct. Members take turns visiting the health facility to collect a three-month supply of medications for all group members. They also complete a routine clinical exam during the visit.Currently, CIDRZ runs 856 CAGs at 21 facilities across 5 Districts in the Lusaka, Eastern, and Southern Provinces of Zambia.WHAT WAS THE IMPACT?CAGs show high linkage to treatment: through CAGs, 4,375 people were tested for HIV via index testing in fiscal year (FY) 2016. Of those, 540 (12%) tested positive. All of these clients were linked to treatment. CIDRZ will restart index testing and partner notification through CAGs in FY 2018. Given the larger scale, CIDRZ will aim to link at least 90 percent of all clients who test positive to treatment. Linkage to care and treatment is easier through CAGs, as clients have established relationships with volunteers and it is easier to follow up with HIV-positive clients.Clients who participate in CAGs are also more likely to stay on treatment. ART retention is 97% for patients participating in CAGs compared to 76% amongst patients within the standard care model at health facilities. Additionally, local medication collection at a time convenient to the patients has resulted in high patient satisfaction.Service providers and clients at health facilities also see benefits through reduced waiting times and lowered congestion at ART clinics. Providers perceived a decrease in burden of care and are advocating for wider use of differentiated care programs, such as CAGs.HOW DOES IT WORK?STARTING A COMMUNITY-BASED ADHERENCE GROUP (CAG)At health facilities, all patients receive health education as they wait to see clinicians for routine visits. Those willing to join a CAG are screened for eligibility during their appointment. Stable patients who have been on ART for at least 6 months may participate in the program. They should not have any active opportunistic infections (OIs), and should have a CD4 of &gt;200 and viral load of &lt;1000. They should be ≥ 15 years of age. Clinicians then refer eligible patients to community health workers (CHWs) who explain the model in detail. CHWs help patients identify other potential group members to screen for eligibility.Once an individual group has been formed, the CAG is assigned a community health worker (CHW) who sets up a meeting at the facility to define group norms, review the Code of Conduct, sign consent forms, and share contact information. CAGs may be formed for specific population groups, such as adolescents, couples, or any other demographics that patients may be comfortable with. Those who do not know other potential group members are grouped with patients from the same catchment area.At one of the original pilot sites, Chilenje First Level Hospital in Lusaka, some CAGs included unstable clients. Stable clients may provide psychosocial support to unstable clients, resulting in improved adherence. Unstable clients also receive support from a dedicated, multidisciplinary clinical team at the facility who is trained to work with patients with complicated diseases. Viral load tests are given every 3 months to look for improved viral load suppression in unstable clients.MAKING TREATMENT MORE ACCESSIBLEBeing a CAG member has helped me not to miss school and build relationships with the staff at the clinic. It also reinforces positive adherence behaviors amongst us members.The Ministry of Health is engaged in selecting sites and actively involved in the roll-out plan of CAGs. Patients participating in CAGs meet routinely in the community to discuss adherence issues and to offer each other psychosocial support.CIDRZ provides multiple-months drug dispensing for every patient participating in the CAGs. Each CAG has six patients who take turns visiting the ART clinic for consultations and antiretroviral (ARV) drug collection. During the clinic visit, the patient will receive the scheduled clinical consultation and collect a 3-month supply of ARVs for each of the CAG members.  When they get back, the patient gives the rest of the CAG members their ARVs at a CAG meeting. Each patient has two clinical visits a year and goes to the clinic for the appointment, even if it is not their turn to collect medications.Each CAG is assigned a CHW who provides basic psychosocial and clinical support to the CAG members. CHWs interact with patients during routine clinical visits and during each CAG meeting. If a CAG member is unwell and needs clinical attention, they either self-refer or are referred back to the clinic by the CHW. The CAG members also provide peer support to each other. Due to the psychosocial and peer support, member satisfaction has been very high.In addition to ARV drug dispensing, adherence and psychosocial support, CAGs are also used as entry points for index testing. Through partner notification and index testing, children, spouses, and other sexual partners of CAG members are tested for HIV and linked to treatment if positive.When a CAG is first formed, group members will receive one month’s supply of ARVs. Groups must be monitored to ensure each member collects the ARVs when required, and that there are no conflicts or any issues between members that will affect participation in the CAG. Once the group is stable, they graduate to multi-month dispensing.INCREASING HEALTH SYSTEMS EFFICIENCYReducing the burden on already saturated health systems is an ever-increasing challenge in resource limited settings. Stable patient, will need limited interaction with their health facilities if they are to continue with new ART initiations. So, monitoring and adherence support in the community is critical and CAGs have helped in achieving this.CIDRZ worked closely with the Ministry of Health to ensure the various concepts of the innovation were understood before implementation and scale-up. CIDRZ targeted high-volume sites and oriented facility staff on how to use the model. Ongoing mentorship and support is offered routinely to implementing facilities to ensure success. This innovation must not be seen as an implementing partner initiative, but as a Ministry of Health initiative that will result in better retention amongst clients and decongestion of health facilities, leading to improved quality of care.CAGs not only reduce the burden placed on clinics, but also improve retention and medication adherence. Also, CAGs reduce drug resistance cases, as patients are better able to fit the management of HIV around their home and work lives. Additionally, HIV-related stigma and discrimination can be reduced with CAGs, as people living with HIV (PLHIV) are no longer only considered as ill patients.The CAG model reduces the workload of the health staff, freeing up more time to attend to complicated cases. Also, the CAG model decongests the clinic since more clients are accessing treatment outside of the facility. Clinicians have better access to patients’ information regarding pill adherence, wellbeing, and treatment outcomes through a direct feedback loop between group members and healthcare workersDiscussions are underway with the Ministry of Health for adoption of the CAG model as standard of care. It is hoped that this innovation will be treated as one of the models of care with financial allocation from the Ministry of Health to support implementation nationally.IDENTIFYING AND WORKING WITH ADVOCATESCAGs enable patients to be more involved in the management of their health through active participation and access to ART treatment. In rural areas, traditional leadership had supported the initiative. Through Senior Community Advisors, meetings have been held with chiefs and headmen who provide support of the initiative, ensuring members of the community buy into the intervention and participate fully.In some rural areas, villages can be up to 60 kilometers from health facilities. CAGs have lessened the number of times participants have to travel to health facilities, thereby improving patients’ satisfaction and adherence to treatment. CAGs also reduce patients’ travel costs to access treatment. In urban areas, this required advocacy from Neighborhood Health Committees that, have considerable influence in communities on city outskirts. Additionally, advocacy and support by facility staff and volunteers was needed to drive the intervention at the facility-level.The Ministry of Health is critical to establishing support at the national level. A focal point person focusing on differentiated service delivery (DSD) is now in place at the Ministry of Health and the 2018 National Guidelines have been revised to include DSD interventions.WHAT’S NEXT?In the 2018 Zambia Ministry of Health Consolidated ART Guidelines, differentiated models of care have been included as an approach for service delivery. Successful pilot implementation of DSD models has enabled stakeholders to advocate for scale-up in other facilities, especially at high-volume sites. The CAG model is seen as an avenue for reaching out to untested PLHIV by involving patients in the groups as indexes and role models.Currently, there is a DSD Task Force, which is led by the Ministry of Health through a DSD Focal Point Person. This Task Force develops policy, as well as guidelines on DSD, and provides oversight for implementation at the Ministry of Health level.The pilot phase of the model commenced in April 2016 and approval to implement at-scale was granted by the Ministry of Health in March 2017.  CIDRZ is scaling up the model in all Lusaka high volume sites in Quarter 1 of FY 2018 (October to December 2017) and to high volume sites in Western, Southern and Eastern Provinces in Quarter 2 of FY 2018 (January to March 2018).Check out the full solution here 
- Digital Press Briefing on Lobito Corridor MoU Signing Helaina R. Matza, Acting Special CoordinatorOffice of the U.S. Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment&nbsp;MODERATOR:  Okay.  Good afternoon, everyone, from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants today logging in from across the continent and around the world.  Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership on the Global Infrastructure Investment Helaina Matza.  Special Coordinator Matza will discuss the recently signed memorandum of understanding on the development of the Lobito Corridor and the Zambia Lobito rail line by the African Development Bank, the Africa Finance Corporation, the United States, the European Union, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia.  So Special Coordinator Matza joins us from Washington, D.C., where she’s just back from Europe from the signing of the MoU.  So, as usual, Special Coordinator Matza will deliver some openings remarks and then we’ll turn to your questions.  So today’s call is on the record, and with that, I’d like to turn it over to Acting Special Coordinator Helaina Matza.   MS MATZA:  Thank you so much, and I’m delighted to be here today.  I apologize in advance – as you might be able to notice, I’m a little under the weather, but I didn’t want to miss the opportunity to chat with you all on this really timely development on this project that I know so many of you have been tracking over the last 18 months or so.  So maybe I’ll just do a little bit of a topper, a little bit about what we think is exciting about this next phase of the project, and then just try to be as conversational as possible.  And I definitely recommend don’t be on the road for three weeks in one go if you want to come back in one piece.  But all kidding aside, as I’ve mentioned before to this group and others, the work that we’re doing in the Lobito Corridor really is, to our President, the flagship contribution that we’re bringing to PGI, which isn’t just a U.S. initiative but a shared G7 initiative together that we are working on to deploy over $600 billion by 2027 to close the infrastructure gap around the world.  This is a really high target; this is a really complicated effort.  And what really the aim of how the U.S. is taking on this mandate, is to really focus on being able to deploy and de-risk investments in physical infrastructure.  So all the great capacity development work we do, that’s all incredibly important, but our President has tasked us to really focus on these important economic corridors that promote connectivity, that allow us to layer investments across the telecoms space, the energy space, and then of course supporting the development of rail and ports.   So you can imagine, when we found the opportunity to support the work that the DRC Government, the Angolan Government, and the Zambian Government have already decided they wanted to do in their tripartite agreement, which they very serendipitously signed on our Fourth of July this year, we wanted to make sure we are doing everything we can to help with those efforts.  And we had some early PGI success in Angola, where over the course of the last year this initiative has been in motion for a little over a year and a half; our implementation team at State has been around for about nine months, and now we have a full team on the U.S. side doing this work.   And our, really, first set of projects kind of explains that ethos, right?  So in Angola, we’re in the process of closing financing from DFC to help finance the rail refurbishment from the Port of Lobito all the way to the DRC border.  We’ve been working very closely with Africell, a U.S./UK operator, as they’re working to develop new offerings in Luanda and beyond for 4 and, ultimately, 5G access.  Our USAID has put forward programs to help provide grants for mobile money, bringing regular consumers and entrepreneurs into the day-to-day mix of being able to leverage that additional connectivity.  And then a project that I think you heard many from our administration mention, but almost a billion-dollar investment in a large-scale solar project, which we think will be followed by some additional investments in microgrids.   So this formula is exactly what we’re trying to translate to the rest of the corridor.  And we knew that as we were starting to build the team, we had to make sure we were formalizing and creating success all along the way.  So going into the G20 this year, which is probably the last time I left this group, we were delighted to bring on the European Union alongside us, and they have committed to work with us to help finance the feasibility study work, which is really important, and we plan to get started before the end of this year.  So we’re really not only trying to demonstrate that these – this ecosystem of investment is aligned with our values, with the values of the countries we’re working in, but that we can do it.   And so in the two months – because there’s only been two months since that announcement – we’ve been hard at work making sure that we are developing the actual team that can do this.  And that’s where AFDB and AFC come in.  Obviously, partners with extreme amount of expertise working on the continent, AFDB being able to do kind of large-scale funding and support, and AFC as a private developer – a good anchor for all of our concessional finance, all of the work that the host governments want to get done, designing a project that really is privately operated, which is exactly what our partners in Zambia, Angola, and DRC want.   They wanted to demonstrate collectively, together, that you can invest, and you can invest in large-scale infrastructure.  And this rail element of what we were able to bring into our MoU with this grouping and this consortium is a great example of that.  It’s 800 kilometers of new greenfield rail cutting between Angola and Zambia.  It involves a large contribution from AFDB that they’re sorting out the parameters.  And collectively, all funding partners put together around $10 million to start the feasibility study, as I mentioned, before the end of this year.   Every one of our systems are already hard at work, and in fact we’re getting pictures since we’ve been on the plane just a couple of days ago from our embassies and teams and AFC and AFDB reps hard at work figuring out what these additional additive investments can be as we start designing the scope for this rail.  So we thought it was really, really important to codify that project developer group.  We thought it was really, really important that that group didn’t just have public participants but that it had private participants from the front end.  And it’s just a very atypical way that the U.S. has done business, and we’re really delighted to start working this way and replicating it where on the front end, we work with our partners on a vision, we figure out the structure to implement it, and we commit every step of the way. And so for the last two weeks, my colleague Danae, who’s really the brainchild behind the work we’re doing in Lobito and is on this call with us today, the two of us spent a lot of time with our Angolan partners, with our partners from the DRC, with our partners in Zambia not just working on getting this MoU ready – because an agreement’s an agreement – but working on all the other contours that we really care about.  We’ve had really meaningful conversations in what we can do in Angola to support their port development as they have a new operator coming to the table very shortly.   We spent a lot of time in both Angola and Zambia talking to the agribusiness sectors to see what we can do in the near term to support additional development that ultimately can leverage this more efficient transport route, which we know will make it a lot easier to be able to do cold-storage shipping and give that sector a boost.  We talked to clean energy providers in all those countries as well, and in DRC spent a long time out – spent really being out there in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi, understanding the challenges of the sector, working closely with many private stakeholders but also the state-owned mining company to get a sense of how they’re trying to structure deals and how we can help continue to support bringing Western capital. So I know this is a very, very longwinded introduction, but I would just be remiss if I didn’t share that the rail is huge and the MoU definitely commits us to that, but the visionary, aspirational message that all partners agreed to, that’s all happening today and we’re all committed to not letting those other elements slide.  And then obviously at the end of that trip, we were delighted to have all of our African ministers that we spent the first two weeks with meet us in Brussels to have the signing ceremony on the margins of the Global Gateway conference.  We are so delighted that the Europeans really joined this model with the U.S. on how to implement PGI projects and elevated it as really one of their top areas of progress in the – since the beginning of Global Gateway. So we’re really – we’re excited.  We took one day to celebrate, and now we’re fast at work making sure that we’re doing everything to get us to the next phase – namely, starting that feasibility work and then ensuring that we’re looking and helping rack and stack some of these additional projects. So with that, let me pause and take any questions.  MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much, Special Coordinator Matza.  And we’ll now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  We are welcoming questions for the special coordinator and hope that some of our attendees will use that “raise hand” button.  I already see one up, and we’ve got a couple of questions that were submitted in advance.  So please, everyone, let us know what questions you might have for Special Coordinator Matza. So let me first go to a question which was submitted by Ms. Kemi Osukoya from Africa Bazaar Magazine, and the question is:  “Given that we have seen similar infrastructure projects built by other foreign governments in Africa, with some of those projects now in bad shape due to lack of maintenance, how does the U.S. Government plan to maintain this project long term, engage local stakeholders as well as foreign investors to ensure the project benefits Africa long term?”   Special Coordinator.   MS MATZA:  That’s an excellent question.  Yes, thank you.  It’s such an important question, and that’s why I tried to take so much time on the front end to kind of walk you through the way that we’re trying to structure this opportunity.  And it’s not all concessional financing going directly to governments.  We do have a private partner on the front end, AFC, who will be helping build the physical consortium that will have responsibilities not just for construction of the rail, but putting forward a plan for operation and maintenance and putting forward a plan around capacity development to ensure that for the sectors that are already there, whether the Zambia rail lines or equivalent workers that take part on the Angolan management, that there’s a home and space for them. But we know and I think we’ve learned from mistakes and projects that over the years, frankly, we’ve helped bail out because they needed refurbishment a little too quickly, that that combination of balancing this investment for the people of the country, making sure they’re working, they’re employed, that it serves them needs to be met with us bringing in opportunities for professional management and training.   And so that was a big reason why instead of an MoU that was kind of outlining this big, big glorious vision, we said we’re going to tell you who our project team is, and that’s the team that we will keep adding additional private support and expertise to.  That will do a couple things.  One, it’ll endure – it’ll ensure the infrastructure endures.  But two, it’ll demonstrate that we are able to get to close to near commercial financing opportunities on the continent, which is ultimately the win, right?  We want to be able to demonstrate together that these projects can be designed, even if a little bit creatively, to be able to be built on commercial terms and ultimately run on commercial terms. So I’m not trying to be too overly enthusiastic, but I think that combination of guardrails is what we’re using to get started, and then this is a long and big project; we will iterate as we go and continue to learn and calibrate.   MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  So once again, we are welcoming questions from all of our journalists, so please don’t be shy – send us your questions, raise your hand.  There’s one hand raised that’s Kate Bartlett of VOA.  Kate, if you’d like to ask your question live, we’ll open your mike for you.  QUESTION:  Great, thank you very much.  I wanted to ask, how does this rail line or how will this rail line compare to those built on the continent by the Chinese?  And will it connect with the Chinese ones at any point?  And just a second point, who will be working on it?  Will it be locals?  Will there be a trickle-down effect for local people in these three countries?  Thank you. MS MATZA:  Yeah, so our ethos for any sort of infrastructure we invest in is that the project is transparent.  I mean, you can see on the internet – if not today, very soon – the contours of the MoU and what we agreed to, and that it’s open access.  And so it’s very important to us that we design and we work with our host governments to ensure that they’re requesting the same type of support from all partners that these rail projects or ports, you name it, are able to be utilized and driven by trade and commerce that’s happening on the country.   So while too soon to say which exactly rail line or project that that – this particular connection will connect to, because there’s a lot of work happening, there’s maybe a Tazara refurbishment, there’s a lot of talks about an additional rail line that can continue south and maybe out through Mozambique, we’re taking this on one piece at a time knowing what we can finance, support, and help design.  But ultimately, all of these routes should be operating in a way that they are able to be leveraged and used by all participants on the ground.  And so to us, that’s really our core ethos and how we want to demonstrate that there’s a way to attract that type of investment and that that can really benefit the people of the country.  To your second point, yes, and if I’m not making it clear enough, I think we’re looking at this in two folds.  One is building a rail by itself is great, but it’s just the trade route; you have to invest in the actual ecosystem that makes that trade route successful.  And you can’t do that without the people who live in those countries that are taking part in the development of the commerce, right?  So it’s not just about getting outputs out and getting inputs in; it’s about evaluating with our country partners what does this do to be able to incentivize businesses that have been really important for those governments to have boosted up?  And agribusiness really comes to mind.  There’s a huge, healthy sector in Zambia.  There’s a growing sector in Angola.  And all of these projects are owned, managed, run for the most part by people who live in those countries.   And so when we talk about trying to electrify communities, where we’re trying to improve electricity, it’s not just for the operation of, like, this rail really working; it’s for the effort to make the rails like this that the whole corridor is successful and that people who live along that corridor can participate not only in commerce but in other activities that really benefit the economic development of themselves and their countries.   And as we start developing this process, I think there’s going to be a huge push and desire on both sides to ensure that we have Angolan and Zambian partners at the table with us on the front end, whether that’s businesses that are operating there or workers that are seeking to be employed on the construction side.  But construction only lasts for a couple of years, so we have to think a little more creatively about how we’re able to work together to incentivize those longer-term jobs and opportunities.   And so these are all really essential layers to what we’re doing, and that’s why we need to get this feasibility study done.  We need to know how much this project costs.  We need to understand the connection point to some of the other farm blocs and other areas that we’ve been working with both those governments to help develop, get a deeper understanding on how we can help support the border crossings and the feeder roads and all things that we have tools for, like our MCC compact in Zambia, but others have tools for as well to ensure that we’re really maximalizing the benefit of this corridor coming to fruition. MODERATOR:  Right, thank you very much, Special Coordinator.  We have another question which was submitted from Mr. Kabanda Chulu of the Zambia Daily Mail.  The question is:  “Are the promoters of the project going to consider collaborating with North West Railways Limited, a Zambian entity that has already conducted feasibility studies for the development of the railway project from Chingola passing through Solwezi, Lumwana, up to Kalumbila on the border with Angola?” MS MATZA:  So I can say for sure that all the partners, including the private developers but also the governments, have been working together to unearth all the feasibilities, pre-feasibility studies that have been done, and gain a deeper understanding about what we know and understand about the route and then what else we need to solve for as well.  So I think there’s a real desire to be inclusive, to not reinvent the wheel, but also understand that ultimately how you do your feasibility is related to how you finance a project, so you have to do some of that work as the project developer no matter how good the work is that’s out there already.  But my understanding is that connections like that are being made every day by the project teams. MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  So we have one more question submitted live by Francis, Govima.  Francis, let’s see if we can open your mic if you would like to ask your question live.  If not – if you don’t want to ask your question live, I can read what you’ve submitted in the Q&amp;A. QUESTION:  Good afternoon, everyone. MODERATOR:  Good afternoon. QUESTION:  All right, thank you.  My name is Francis.  I write for Govima, Govima Media.  So I was trying to ask a question about the strategies – I have three questions, actually; please forgive me.  What strategies are in place to ensure this rail project is environmentally and socially sustainable?  We have certain issues as regards this in – I’m in Nigeria, Lagos State precisely.  We have some people unbundling, certain power inclined to power the rails, the Blue Line rails.  We have what are called Blue Line rails in Lagos, Nigeria here, and before you say Jack Robinson, we have certain people unbundling them and giving – and the projects, if not the government quickly stepped into action, were to be bastardized.  I was wondering the environmental conduciveness of this rail project.  That’s my number one question, please. Then the other one is the security measures which will be put in place by the United States of America to ensure that this project is being safeguard given its cross-border nature. Then thirdly, please, these countries – we all know they have some – certain peculiarities that regards intra-security situations.  So to make it sustainable, what is the plan of the United States Government in partner with beneficiary countries, they understand the metrics of their security in their home countries, to ensure that they carry the local – maybe local government, kings and chiefs and all that along to be able to enlighten their people that it’s for our local development and national development so they are able to protect it?  Thank you. MS MATZA:  Yeah, really great questions, and this is going to be an incredibly important element of our feasibility.  So let me share kind of two thoughts now, and then I think this is a question you guys should keep coming back to on us as we get further along, because they’re absolutely essential to get right. So in the case of the environmental – well, let me take a step back.  On the side of Zambia’s portion of the rail, most of the proposed project does coincide with an existing road or parts of roads that connect with each other.  So there are a couple elements that we know have been partially solved for but not totally, like community connections and where and how some of the concerns around relocation would need to be addressed, but you have to dive into those in the context of rail.  You can take what you learn from roads but understand that it’s not totally translatable – same with gradation and all of the elements that require a rail to be designed in a way that’s safe and environmentally sound.  So we know that we have something to pull from but that we have a lot more work to do. Similar, on the Angolan side, where there are some connective tissue, a portion of the rail is very greenfield.  So all of these elements will be a huge part of the initial feasibility and design, and part of the reason why we are ensuring that we have partners like AFDB, partners like us in the U.S. who will be using our own financing agencies, and then, of course, the Europeans, is because we have what we think are very high-standard tours around environmental stewardship, protection, quality, and that that all needs to be factored into how we design and price and finance this project.   And so part of this as a first line of defense gets addressed by how funders are willing to finance projects, and I think that’s been a part of the desire for many of our partner countries, our host countries, to start continuing to diversify Western investment into their countries to be able to help manage some of those issues and create the competition that they deserve in their countries.  And so while I don’t have a very strong answer because we haven’t done the review yet, I can say with a good degree of certainty that the companies that we bring in are often large-scale companies with shareholders.  They’re beholden to many people, not just one, in ensuring that that environmental stewardship is incredibly important, and same for our own financing agencies that have very, very clear guidelines and requirements to participating and supporting efforts to uphold the highest international standards. The other piece on security – this is something that we are working closely with our government partners to identify some of – as you mentioned, they’re aware of their security concerns, so helping us outline and more deeply understand the type of challenges they already face on existing rail projects, how they have mitigated – because in the case of Angola and DRC, they already have a cross-border rail – and all of that needs to get factored into our understanding of, ultimately, what that’s going to make the project cost and the type of way that you would want to design the operation team to be able to monitor those efforts.   And so these are all incredibly important conversations that I think our approach to them will get more granular once we have not only that information from our host countries but a deeper understanding of what we learn from conducting the feasibility. MODERATOR:  All right, very good.  I think we might have time for one more question, and we did get a question submitted in the Q&amp;A from Matt Hill of Bloomberg.  The question is:  “How long will it take to complete the feasibility study?  Previous cost estimates are that the 800 kilometers new line linking Chingola to Luau would cost about a billion dollars to build.  Is that still a reasonable estimate?” MS MATZA:  Yeah, so it’s quite hard to comment on the total cost and value of the line, because we’ve heard so much disparity in, like, how that’s been valued.  It’s always over a billion dollars, but we are preparing ourselves that it could be quite a bit more expensive, especially when you think over the crossover element.  So we’ve got ourselves an incredibly expedited timeline.  We want this rail to be built within five years.  That’s complicated for any large-scale rail project, let alone in one that’s crossing multiple jurisdictions, and so we’ve been really working backwards.   We know we need to bring – begin the feasibility this year, and we know that it shouldn’t take more than six months.  We of course are facing all sorts of very practical challenges that we’ll have to pay attention to, like rainy season in Zambia, where it’ll be a little trickier to be on the roads, but the goal is really to stay as close to that timeline as possible, not only for our partners but for us also, right – we are actively trying to fundraise and design and ensure that we can invest in these additional projects around the rail, so it’s quite important for us to move as fast as we can. I think that we’ll have much better answers for the rest.  If the feasibility comes back as we anticipate, I think we feel confident our timeline will hold, but we may be learning something wonderful or something that makes it a little bit more complicated.  But this is really the kind of glide path we gave ourselves together to get started. MODERATOR:  Okay, thanks very much.  That wraps up the questions.  I want to thank Special Coordinator for the Partnership on Global Infrastructure and Investment Helaina Matza for joining us, and thanks to all the journalists as well.  As usual, a recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing or if you’d just like to stay in touch with us, please contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  And please also follow us on Twitter at our handle AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you to everybody and have a good day. MS MATZA:  Thank you. # # # 
- Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of the Lobito Corridor and the Zambia-Lobito Rail Line Office of the SpokespersonToday the African Development Bank and Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) join the United States and the European Union in support of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia to develop the Lobito Corridor and the new Zambia-Lobito rail line by signing a seven-side Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), on the margins of the Global Gateway Forum in Brussels, Belgium.The MoU outlines the intentions of the signatories to collaborate across multiple sectors to realize the full economic potential of the Corridor, building on the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency agreement signed by the three African governments in January and anchored by historic, envisioned investment in developing the Zambia-Lobito greenfield rail line. The new rail line, connecting northwest Zambia to the Lobito Atlantic Railway and the port of Lobito, represents the most significant transport infrastructure that the United States has helped develop on the African continent in a generation and will enhance regional trade and growth as well as advance the shared vision of connected, open-access rail from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean.Demonstrating the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) in action and leveraging both Western and African capital, this strategic transport infrastructure unlocks regional trade and enables additional investments in digital connectivity, agriculture value chains, green energy supply chains and rural health center electrification, among other transformative economic imperatives.At the signing, the United States was represented by Deputy Assistant to the President for Energy and Investment Amos Hochstein, the European Union was represented by Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen, Angola was represented by Minister of State for Economic Coordination José de Lima Massano, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was represented by Prime Minister Jean-Michel Lukonde, Zambia was represented by Minister of Finance and National Planning Situmbeko Musokotwane, the African Development Bank was represented by Vice President Solomon Quaynor, and the Africa Finance Corporation was represented by Board Member and Head of Financial Services Sanjeev Gupta.As a signature initiative of President Biden, PGI aims to offer a credible alternative to low- and middle-income countries around the world to help meet their infrastructure needs. Developing a significant new multi-country transport infrastructure project that follows the highest international standards regarding labor, environment and quality is the centerpiece of PGI’s flagship economic development corridor. Following the MoU, AFC will work with the parties to launch the feasibility and preparatory studies necessary to further prepare this extensive infrastructure project—a critical concrete action step aimed to begin before the end of the year.&nbsp;