# Cyprus - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – April 23, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024																																																					April 23, 2024																																																								1:23 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. As you can see, we have some special guests with us today. I want to introduce Ambassador David Satterfield, our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues and Sonali Korde, Assistant to the Administrator of USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Satterfield will make some comments at the top, and then they’ll be on hand for some questions. And then I will continue on with the normal daily press briefing, so Ambassador Satterfield, over to you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks. Immediately after Hamas launched its attack on October 7th, President Biden stood strongly with the nation of Israel. As the President has said many times, Israel has a right and a duty to defend itself against Hamas.Hamas committed a massacre. They used rape, sexual violence to terrorize Israeli women. They continue to hold hostages – 133 Americans, women, elderly, injured – and they hide in tunnels they purposely built over the last 16 years under civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals.We remain committed to supporting Israel in its fight against Hamas because we cannot expect Israel to accept a situation we would not – no one would – in which their citizens continue to live under active threat.But at the same time, President Biden, starting on his visit to Israel October 18, was clear – he was clear privately and publicly with the prime minister, with the war cabinet, and then in his comments – that Israel must do more to protect civilians, to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to enable its safe and unhindered distribution inside of Gaza. This is both the morally right thing to do, and it is strategically absolutely necessary.Now, the risk of famine throughout Gaza is very high, especially in the north. We’ve been very clear: Israel must do everything possible to facilitate efforts to avert famine in Gaza. Now, the President has made this point clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu during his April 4th call, and he also made clear that U.S. policy with respect to Gaza will be determined by our assessment of Israel’s actions – immediate actions – to protect innocent civilians and ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as to increase the amount of assistance reaching those in need in Gaza.Far too many Palestinian civilians have been killed and injured. As Secretary Blinken has said, even one innocent casualty is one too many. This conflict has been one of the worst in recent memory in terms of how many humanitarian workers – nearly 250 – have been killed since October. Humanitarians should never be a target.Now, since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. has been leading efforts to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza to alleviate the suffering of innocent Palestinians who have nothing to do with – indeed, are victims themselves – of Hamas and its brutal rule. Let’s recall before the President’s engagement, there was no food, no water, no medicine getting into Gaza. We are the largest provider of aid to the Gaza response. This is and will continue to be a top priority for the President, for the Secretary, for the United States.Now, over the six months past, as a result of our efforts, we have secured the opening of multiple land border crossings, and the volume of assistance entering into and, most importantly, distributed within Gaza has increased significantly. But we know much more aid is needed, and that more aid needs to be done, needs to get out to reach the most vulnerable in Gaza, especially in the north.As their military operations continue – give me a moment – Israel must take all steps to minimize civilian casualties. Protecting civilians is not just a moral obligation – it is that – but it’s a strategic imperative. We’re coordinating closely with Jordan, Egypt, the United Nations, and various international partners to ensure that these measures translate into real, sustained long-term relief for the people of Gaza. It is crucial that Israel sees these commitments through, not just today, but every day.Now, to truly address the urgent needs of the civilian population in Gaza and to enable humanitarian partners to safely distribute life-saving aid throughout Gaza at the scale needed, it’s essential to see a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal in Gaza. The path ahead there is straightforward.There could be a six-week ceasefire today, if Hamas would agree to the terms of a deal on the table. It would help bring immediate relief to the people of Gaza. It would also create the conditions needed to enable the urgent humanitarian work that must be done. Hamas, and Hamas alone, is responsible for the failure to return hostages and implement a ceasefire.Now, we’re going to continue to work, as we have, to pursue peace, to ensure assistance reaches the most vulnerable, and to make sure that humanitarians delivering assistance are protected from harm. Israelis and Palestinians, like all people, deserve to live in peace. They deserve to experience “the quiet miracle of a normal life,” which this and previous U.S. administrations have spoken of as our goal. We’ll do all we can to be part of the work to make that possible.But I know for all of you the question exists. We have commitments. The President has spoken. The prime minister has offered assurances. But where are we? What is, in fact, being done on the ground. As I noted, the volume of assistance has increased dramatically over the course of the last several months. Over 200 trucks of assistance per day average – and the numbers on individual days have topped 400 – have entered into Gaza.Now, those numbers are important, but even more important than the number of trucks dropping their loads inside Rafah or Kerem Shalom into Gaza is the ability of the humanitarian community, primarily the UN, to distribute assistance within Gaza, to pick it up, take it from warehouses, take it from storage yards, and get it to people in need throughout south, central, and northern Gaza. There, too, the numbers have increased significantly to an average of 200 or 200-plus trucks a day in south and central Gaza, where the bulk of the population – 1.8, 1.9 million people – live.More must be done though to ensure that assistance is effectively and efficiently moved, not just in the south and the center, but in the north. The population in the north is in particular threat of malnutrition, wasting, famine. And there all too little aid had come in, until the last several weeks. Aid has been moving now to the north through land corridors from outside Gaza in and from within Gaza north. Nearly 100 trucks a day have been moving to the north over the course of the last several weeks.It is essential that the needs of the people living there be addressed, be assessed accurately. That process will be taking place later this week by the UN, and so we can move beyond counting trucks to focusing – and Sonali can comment on this in detail – on what specific kinds of assistance – specialized feeding, the treatments needed to deal with wasting, to deal with infant, newborn mortality and morbidity, that those can be provided to people in need. Our first priority was, because it had to be, adverting famine. But we now need to move on beyond that goal to addressing the true needs – sanitization, availability of medicine, availability of potable water, the specialized care required for these vulnerable populations. That has to be the ongoing focus.Now, Israel has taken significant steps in these last two, two and a half, weeks. Erez and an additional northern crossing are in the process of being made accessible for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. That was at our request. The so-called gate 96 crossing into the center of Gaza has been open now for several weeks and is being utilized by the UN to move assistance into Gaza. The Jordan channel as we refer to it – Jordanian trucks carrying assistance from the humanitarian hub near Amman directly into Gaza – has also been flowing, for now, through Kerem Shalom into Gaza but in the near future directly from Jordan across the river, in via Israel to northern crossings and into Gaza for distribution.The JLOTS, the U.S. maritime corridor, which Sonali has been working on so hard over these last few weeks – that will also begin operation in early May. We have a significant volume today of assistance moving in by land. We’re going to have an increased volume within the predictable next few weeks moving in from land and sea.And that flooding, that additional assistance has brought with it its own logistical challenges. The problem is not getting assistance into Gaza; it’s getting it distributed within Gaza. And there the logistical constraints are the lack of sufficient trucks in possession of the UN, something that the UN and we have been working on assiduously over these last weeks, to enable a greater logistical capacity to distribute, pick up aid, and move it.And secondly, there are two crossing points, two checkpoints, to and from north Gaza. Those two checkpoints – one on the coastal road, one on an inland road called Salah al-Din &#8212; are now heavily congested with truck movements. That wasn’t a problem before. It’s a problem now, and it needs to be sorted out so assistance can be moved safely and efficiently up, empty trucks brought south, so the cycle can begin again. We’re in close touch with the Government of Israel, with Israeli authorities on how best to expediate, along with the UN, these movements.So, these challenges still exist. There is still considerable work to be done, but progress has been made.And a final note on something that all of you have heard us speak to and you have asked about – deconfliction and coordination. Too many humanitarian workers have been killed. Too many humanitarian movements have not been able to move effectively and efficiently to their destinations. And so we have worked intensively – and the President discussed this with the prime minister – on setting up a mechanism that works in real time between humanitarian actors on the ground, between IDF personnel at checkpoints, at contact points on the ground, and appropriate levels within the IDF structure to enable that efficient, effective, and safe movement of humanitarians, their staff, and the convoys containing assistance. Progress is being made, but more progress still needs to be done to assure that this is in train. To make it work, humanitarian actors need effective communications. They need to be able to talk – talk to the IDF on the ground, talk to command levels of the IDF and vice versa. We’re pleased that progress has been made on availability of appropriate communications systems for humanitarian workers.Lost in the things that need to be done – because those needs are significant – is the fact that we have seen meaningful progress. That progress needs to be sustained, needs to be continued, but the situation has improved, particularly in these last two to three weeks, from where we would be were I briefing at beginning of April or in the latter part of March. But more needs; more has to be done to meet those needs; it has to be sustained.And I’ll leave here with one final comment, which is, if you will, editorial. I have been working Arab-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli issues for over 40 years. For the past 30 years, since September 13th, 1993, the Oslo Agreement, Hamas has had a choice. The choice is to accept what we refer to as the Oslo principles, then the Quartet principles; to eschew the use of violence; to accept a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the Palestinian-Israel issue. Hamas has made a choice, but it was not one in favor of a peaceful resolution. Hamas, for its own ideological and political reasons, has chosen in favor of violence, threat, to pursue its ambitions. The greatest victims of this have been Palestinians themselves, not just the Israelis who were massacred on October 7th in that paroxysm of bestial violence.Hamas still has a choice. The fighting in Gaza, the suffering of the Palestinian people, could end tonight if Hamas chose to accept the deal for release of hostages and the establishment of a ceasefire, and that ceasefire could with further releases be sustained. But as in the past, Hamas has taken a different course. Let us not lose sight in our correct focus on the requirements incumbent upon Israel to assure all of those humanitarian steps I’ve just spoken to that the fundamental actor responsible for the suffering here is a terrorist group, Hamas. Thank you.MR PATEL: Ellen, you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. I don’t really get a sense exactly of the precise details about how close Israel’s compliance has come to the level that President Biden said he wanted to see when he said policy would be shaped by it allowing humanitarian aid. You talk about 200 trucks a day, but aid groups have said the minimum is 500 trucks a day. And there’s – you mentioned communication systems to help with deconfliction. I mean, there was communication systems, if you’re talking about actual – the comms. Those were &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Is there a question?QUESTION: Yeah. Those were there with the World Central Kitchen. And you talked about negotiations on the comms – those are two crucial themes. How – it sounds like there’s actually – it’s actually pretty far from meeting the level that’s needed, and how long is Israel going to have until – to meet that standard?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Ellen, we work closely with Israel on the commitments made by the prime minister to the President. I have outlined many of the steps that have contributed to progress, meaningful progress that has been made. The volume of assistance moving into Gaza is significantly greater over these last weeks than the volume in the months that preceded. The volume of assistance on a daily basis being distributed within Gaza, which is the more important number – that is also, on an average, at a higher level than in the previous months. More needs to be done.The north has seen for the first time in all of these six months significant levels of assistance moving in on a daily basis. Is it enough? No, it is not enough, but it is progress. Northern crossings have been opened and are being prepared for opening, in the case of Erez and another northern crossing. Ashdod Port – the President said we need to see Ashdod Port open for humanitarian goods, not just flour. Ashdod Port has been opened. That step has been taken.We’ll get now into important but, if you will, secondary details. Comms equipment – World Central Kitchen did not have the types of communications systems that could have provided redundancy during that terrible event. It is essential those redundant systems with different technical operating parameters be provided. That is what Israel has now approved. So, there is a change that’s been made there.Water – President said water has got to be turned back on. There are three Mekorot national carrier pipelines into Gaza. The southernmost one has been operating. The second one has been intermittently operating; it has been under active repair. Because the network from delivery into Gaza through Gaza has been disrupted, the repairs are ongoing. The northern pipeline, which was turned off since October 7th, has been repaired and is functioning now.All of this reflects progress. Northern crossings, Ashdod Port open, the Jordan channel – it is essential for us that Jordan be able to deliver trucks on a daily basis directly into Gaza. Right now, they are doing so through Kerem Shalom as an interim measure. When the northern crossings are repaired and functional, which we expect will be in the next very few weeks, possibly shorter in the case of Erez, Jordanian trucks will be able to enter there. But they’re already moving. And the JLOTS is in final stages of preparation.All of this represents progress. Is there more to do? Yes. But this is a very different picture I am presenting to you than the one we would have had just three weeks ago on the eve of the President’s call to Netanyahu.MR PATEL: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for being here. Just to put a fine point on my colleagues’ questions, three weeks later, are you – can you say you’re satisfied with the steps that Israel has taken so far? Has the deconfliction mechanism that you talked about, you said there is progress – is that in place now and is working?And the final thing is about the pier. We’re being told U.S. will rely on Israel for security. Can you elaborate on that? Is it going to be security of U.S. troops provided by Israel? Who will distribute the aid inside Gaza? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll take your last part and turn to Sonali for that, but I am not going to give you – and I’ll spare the rest of your colleagues – I’m not going to give you a grade. “Did they get an A+, an A, or a B?” We are in the constant process of monitoring, assessing, facilitating, supporting progress towards the goals the President set. This is not a “gotcha” test. “At 2:00 p.m. on the 7th of May, will Israel pass or not?” This is a set of requirements to help the people of Gaza and the humanitarian workers whose role is vital in facilitating assistance. Progress is being made, but I am not going to stand here and give you a grade on that. More needs to be done.Sonali, do you want to talk about JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So just on your question on JLOTS, we’re working – from USAID working very closely with CENTCOM to put together the JLOTS and the pier. We’re working very closely with the UN to handle the distribution mechanism into Gaza. I’ll also say that we are taking a lot of care to respect the UN’s neutrality and independence in terms of distribution.Just on your question on security, I think that’s best placed to DOD, but suffice it to say that IDF is providing some security and force protection measures to U.S. assets that will be offshore. And I’ll have you ask my DOD colleagues further questions on that. Over.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks, Sonali.MR PATEL: Gillian, go ahead.QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, can you talk a little bit more broadly about how you see – since October 7th in particular – the – Israel’s – the Israeli Government’s conduct of humanitarian affairs versus Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs, broadly speaking?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Excuse me? Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs? What do you mean?QUESTION: Well, for an example, yesterday the State Department released the annual Human Rights Report, and featured Israel alongside Hamas in the first page.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to comment on the Human Rights Report or any aspect &#8212;QUESTION: Right, so that’s why I’m asking you about the humanitarian conduct of those governments &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hamas has &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; as they were presented side by side.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah, I’ll comment on Hamas. Hamas has spent 17 years in expending every resource provided for the people of Gaza for its own purposes in constructing a network of military facilities, tunnels, embedded in, under, around humanitarian facilities as a deliberate act of preservation and advancement of their interests. Hamas has sacrificed those thousands of innocent Gazans who had been lost after their brutal massacre on October 7th. Again, inconvenient truth – I’m going to keep reminding of that – something happened on the 7th of October which precipitated all of this.Hamas’s humanitarian policy is the opposite of humanitarian. It is to use innocent civilians as shields, as presumed protection for their own facilities, for their own terrorist military forces, and for the plotting and planning which first and foremost victimizes Palestinians and their future. And how there can be any other consideration of Hamas other than as a terrorist group who has proclaimed – I’ll remind – they’ll do it again and again and again, if given the opportunity. That’s Hamas. That’s why they’re an FTO.Now, with respect to Israel, we require from Israel – because it is the right and moral thing to do – a very different standard of conduct. And as I noted in my remarks, the President made clear on his visit to Israel, shortly after October 7th, it’s not just strategically important for you to do this. It’s the morally right thing to do. It is the reflection of what Israel is – a democracy with values. Does more need to be done? Yes. Could more have been done sooner? Yes, of course. But the point is, over time, progress has been made. With all of the distance that remains to fully meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Gaza – those needs are considerable – progress has been made.QUESTION: Are you – may I follow up with that real quickly?MR PATEL: We’re going to try and get through as many questions as we can. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Anne Flaherty with ABC News. Can we – can you first of all clarify that you have not put a timeline on Israel to take certain steps forward when you talked about potable water, more UN trucks? It sounds like it’s more of just a constant discussion that you’re having with Israel. Also, has Israel provided assurances that JLOTS will not be in lieu of these land corridors, that they will both remain open?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll start with your last one first. We have made clear, and Israel has affirmed to us that the JLOTS, the maritime corridor, whoever operates it – military or, ultimately, anyone else – is an adjunct to, it’s additive to, supplemental to land corridors. There is no question that the most efficient and effective way to deliver assistance is via as many land corridors as possible, which is why the increase in the operation in Kerem Shalom; the opening of the gate 96 corridor into the center of Gaza; the preparation for opening of the two new northern crossings; Ashdod Port, which is a perfectly functional port with immediate access directly into Gaza – all of those are critical. So yes, it’s additive to, it is not a replacement for in any sense of the word.With respect to timing, I think you all know the President must make a determination by May 8th on the NSM-20 issue. I’m not going to get into that question here. But I will say our work is focused every day, every hour, on seeing continuous progress made. We are not doing this because there’s a deadline on May 8th or any other date certain. We’re doing it because every day there are people in need. Every day those needs need to be met.MR PATEL: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Good to see you again, Mr. Ambassador.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hi, Said.QUESTION: I have two quick questions. Would you say that famine that was looming a couple of weeks ago, three weeks ago, has now been averted? That’s one. And second, I mean, this insistence on the six-week ceasefire – why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Because the implicit message for the Palestinians is that after six weeks Israel can resume its bombing of Gaza and bombing civilian targets and so on. So why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to get into the details, Said. I hope you will understand – of the hostage deal which is presented and not accepted by Hamas, the terms of that deal. This administration has always insisted that a ceasefire is conditioned upon, part and parcel of not just a hostage release, but hostage releases. Hamas has it in its hands not just to effect a first-phase release, but further releases which would extend the ceasefire beyond that point. Beyond that, I’m not going to comment on famine. I’ll turn to Sonali.QUESTION: All right, thank you.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Hi, thanks for that question. So, we don’t know. Assessments on famine are based on a very rigorous methodology that is undertaken by the IPC, the Integrated Phase Classification, which is the expert body that both collects and reviews data. So, we will wait for their determination. What I will say is that in order to address this, we not only need to get trucks in, but we need to get nutritional therapies, we need to reach the moms and kids that are most at risk, especially in northern Gaza. We need to get them clean water. We need to get them health care.I will say that with 29 percent of children under two showing signs of acute malnutrition in northern Gaza – this is what was reported in the IPC – it takes time to reverse that trend. It takes at least six weeks to get a child who is suffering the effects of malnutrition back on track. So, I don’t know that we’ve averted it. We’re certainly trying, but we’ll wait for the data and the experts to tell us what they see.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: John Hendren with Al Jazeera English. To what extent will an operation in Rafah affect your ability to get this aid in there? Will it not certainly push back that effort and make things more difficult?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: John, you know the position which the White House, State have expressed; Secretary Austin as well. We could not support a Rafah ground operation without an appropriate, credible, executable humanitarian plan precisely because of the complications for delivery of assistance; and then on top of that, the consequences of displacement of the hundreds of thousands of Rafahns already multiply displaced. Where do they go? How will their needs be met: shelter, medicine, water, sanitation?Rafah itself today poses significant challenges in all of these areas. The compression of population, whatever the number may today be – 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 million – poses enormous challenges: shelter, sanitation, water. To move them again under kinetic circumstances would complicate that enormously. It’s for all of these reasons that we have been as clear as we have been with the Government of Israel. And that’s not just a past-tense discussion; it is a current tense. We continue discussions with Israel on what we believe are alternate ways of addressing a challenge which we recognize, which is Hamas military present in Rafah. We get it, we understand it, but we think there are other ways to deal with this. And if there is not a credible, executable humanitarian plan, then we cannot support a ground operation.QUESTION: But fair to say that Israel views that differently up till now?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: That’s our position.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Elizabeth, and then these guys have got to wrap.QUESTION: I want to follow up on the pier. How will the U.S. ensure the safety of aid workers who are concerned over the Israeli military’s presence in the area and role securing it given the past failures in deconfliction? And also, will Israel’s so-called dual-use restrictions be applied to goods entering the pier?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So, what I can say is that there are conversations happening every single day between our humanitarian assistance team, the DART, in Jerusalem, CENTCOM on the ground, and our UN partners on the ground. The safety and security of our humanitarian partners is the most important thing; it’s absolutely vital. They need to feel safe and secure.I’m not going to get into specific security measures on what’s being discussed for obvious reasons, but just to say that those are happening, and we’re very cognizant, again, as I said earlier, that the UN needs to maintain its principles of neutrality and independence and access throughout Gaza. So, we are trying to abide by those principles and make sure that everyone involved has the safety and security that they need.QUESTION: And the dual-use goods?MR PATEL: (Off-mike.)ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’ll defer to Ambassador Satterfield on dual use. Oh, I can take dual use. So again, we – so the goods will be inspected in Cyprus by Israelis, but also by a team which will include the UN, our colleagues in Cyprus. The dual-use concerns are being discussed. There should be a consistency on what goes in, so we’re not trying to create, like, an exception for Cyprus – just to say that we continue to have conversations with our Israeli colleagues to streamline the process for inspecting and approving goods that are sensitive or on the dual-use list.MR PATEL: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Mr. Ambassador, I have two questions. First, did the U.S. ask Qatar to expel Hamas leaders from there? Second, are you preparing for humanitarian emergencies in case a full war – a full-scale war breaks between Hizballah and Israel?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Easiest ones yet. First answer is no. The second is, in the great tradition of those standing at this podium, I don’t comment on hypotheticals.MR PATEL: Laura, you had your hand up in the back. Yes, you, Laura Rozen.QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: Did you not have your hand up?QUESTION: No.MR PATEL: Oh, okay. All right. Go ahead, Doc.QUESTION: Okay, yeah. I wanted to know about Egypt’s role in – about giving relief for the Gazans to be able to go into Egypt. Is Egypt open to taking a lot of the people – to – Gaza to go out through that into a safe area, so that Israel can deal with the Hamas battalions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll comment first, and this is longstanding commentary: We believe the future of the Palestinian people of Gaza lies in Gaza, not anywhere else. Egypt has made very clear – preceding October 7th – that they also believe the future for Palestinians lies in Gaza, not in Egypt. We understand that point; we respect it. So does the Government of Israel.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Are you in touch with the organization – the Palestinian organizations like the Red Crescent as far as with these updated comms? And – because we’ve seen medics, for example, attacked as well by the Israelis. So &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: There’s a humanitarian hub at al-Arish in which UN, UN agencies are represented, and of course the Egyptian Red Crescent runs that hub in close coordination for delivery of bilateral assistance, non-UN assistance, through the PRCS. And so, with respect to our focus on comms, that has been directed primarily at the UN, the UN family of agencies, rather than at Palestine Red Crescent Society.But Sonali, any further comment on that?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: No, I think you’ve got it.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah.QUESTION: And one more question. We haven’t seen too many briefings with you. Should we expect more opportunities to ask you some questions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: You haven’t seen them because I have been all but about 25 days of the last six and a half months in the region working the actual issues. So, I can’t promise for the future, but thank you.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR PATEL: Final question, go ahead.QUESTION: Regarding the maritime corridor from the Republic of Cyprus, do you have any updates about any possible logistical challenges or how we move forward with that plan?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’m sorry, I think I lost that second word – about any logistics?QUESTION: The maritime corridor from Cyprus, or the Republic of Cyprus, to Gaza to provide humanitarian aid.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Yeah, so the update that I can give you is that we are proceeding apace and on schedule, working very closely with CENTCOM. We have colleagues in Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus. We have a coalition of partners working around this: the EU, the UK. And then we’re also working with CENTCOM and Israeli colleagues to set up the assistance and the beach landing spot in Gaza, and critically, we’re working with UN partners to handle the distribution of assistance going into Gaza. Again, this is a humanitarian initiative. We’re keeping it in line with humanitarian principles, and we hope to have more updates for you on this soon.QUESTION: Can I ask one question about JLOTS? We haven’t had a chance to ask anything in the – previously.MR PATEL: If you want to ask one more question about JLOTS, then these guys have got to go.QUESTION: Sure, thank you, thank you. Can you – can you tell me, is – are things still in discussion or is there an agreement that the WFP will actually handle the distribution part of it? Is there an agreement on the rules of engagement with the IDF? And is there – is the deconfliction aspect handled to your satisfaction so that you’re confident that the aid workers will actually be protected as they work with the people with JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: So – so yes. We have an agreement with the UN and WFP to work on the logistics. As I said, this is – we’re working out a lot of details on how this is going to work. The partners are working on the security aspects of it. As you mentioned, again, I don’t want to comment on that here just for very obvious reasons, to protect their security.So, all of these issues are being worked through. Again, I’ll re-emphasize that the key principle for the UN’s engagement here is to protect their independence and neutrality and ability to access vulnerable populations throughout Gaza. We are working to make sure that they feel comfortable in upholding those principles. I think the conversations are going ahead really well.Just again, on specific issues around deconfliction and protection, I will ask that you defer those conversations for our DOD colleagues. Deconfliction is an issue for all humanitarian workers working in Gaza. It’s not just a JLOTS issue. As Ambassador Satterfield said, some steps have been made to improve the system, which obviously had some failures given the World Central Kitchen attack, but also we have lost over 200 humanitarian workers through the course of this war. We need to see those steps be implemented and the humanitarian community and IDF continue to talk and engage and iterate and improve the system, so that everyone feels safe and secure in this very difficult operating environment.QUESTION: Okay, thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks, everybody.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks so much. Ambassador Satterfield, Administrator Korde, thank you so much for joining us today.QUESTION: We can do Zoom press conferences if you’re out in the region. (Laughter.) This was very helpful. Thanks.MR PATEL: All right, okay. Give me two seconds, guys. All right. Well, that was – I’m very glad we were able to have them join us today. Ellen, you want to kick us back off?QUESTION: What to ask?MR PATEL: We can also stop. If that was – (laughter). If that really – if that quenched your thirst, I’m happy to go &#8212;QUESTION: No, if I could.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: I guess the – as you – obviously, there’s been lots of anticipation about the Leahy Law decisions that are expected. Can – there’s been reporting that there were recommendations for some IDF units to be identified as in violation of the Leahy Amendments, but that the Secretary opted not to take staff’s recommendation for several of the units. Can you – can you comment on that?MR PATEL: So, I think I’m going to echo what you saw Matt and the Secretary address as it relates to this question beginning in Capri on Friday, which is I’m just not going to get ahead of this process. What I will say is that we take the Leahy Law incredibly seriously. It is also the standards of it we apply consistently across the board with all countries in which we have security relationships with. That should be no surprise to anybody. But I am not going to get ahead of the process, and I am sure we’ll have more to say in the time forthcoming.Humeyra.QUESTION: Yesterday I think Matt said on UNRWA you guys haven’t had a chance to review it, you were still reviewing it. Do you have, like, an assessment on the Colonna report’s findings?MR PATEL: So, as it relates to the report that foreign – former French Foreign Minister Colonna took the – led on, we first – to take a step back, we welcome and strongly support the recommendations of the independent review of UNRWA mechanisms and procedures related to neutrality. This was released yesterday.We continue to look closely at the report and are assessing how we can continue to work with partners in the region, host authorities in the Government of Israel, to implement some of these recommendations. We, of course, continue to support UNRWA’s important work. It must continue. But at the same time, we continue to advocate for reforms. And we welcome what the former French foreign minister laid out.QUESTION: So, given the language the – the language in the supplemental that’s about to pass and how it prohibits the resumption of U.S. funding, is it fair to say until at least, like, 2025 there is no chance that U.S. would be able to resume funding for UNRWA?MR PATEL: You’ve heard me say this before. We assume this supplemental passes when the – when it passes the Senate. We will be an administration that complies with the law, and the law is very clearly laid out in that national security supplemental as it relates to what kind of relationship the United States can have with UNRWA. We’re continuing to engage with partners in the region, with UN agencies, and other humanitarian organizations about the important work when it comes to humanitarian aid. It’s also really important to note that there is a significant amount of monies for humanitarian aid in the supplemental, including humanitarian aid into Gaza. And so we’ll continue to pursue those lines of effort.QUESTION: And the report also found that Israel was yet to present any evidence for the accusation that hundreds of UNRWA staff were members of terrorist groups. Is the U.S. going to be encouraging Israel to provide that evidence? Are you going to do anything towards that end?MR PATEL: So, the – our understanding is that the United Nations is continuing to pursue an investigation as it relates to &#8212;QUESTION: Separate one.MR PATEL: That’s separate – that relates to the individuals alleged to have participated in the October 7th terrorist attacks. And so, I will – I’m not going to get ahead of that process.QUESTION: Okay. And the final thing is you must have seen the reports about mass graves containing hundreds of bodies around al-Shifa. UN chief said he was horrified by these reports. I’m wondering if U.S. has a comment on this and whether you guys have raised this with the Israeli Government.MR PATEL: We have seen the – those reports, and the reports are incredibly troubling. And we’re inquiring on this with Government of Israel. I don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Specifically on the &#8212;MR PATEL: Correct. I don’t have any specific information to offer – insight into what this is or isn’t. I don’t have a sense of that from up here, but we are inquiring about this with the Government of Israel.QUESTION: Do you know who reached out to who? Is it the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to speak to the specifics, but it should be no surprise to you that we engage with the Government of Israel at all levels often many times, multiple times a day, at all hours.Anne, go ahead.QUESTION: So, Ambassador Satterfield seemed pretty pleased with how Israel is progressing. Has the U.S. shared with Israel what would happen, if Israel takes its foot off the pedal with regards to humanitarian aid? And then also a question on Ukraine. UK has already beat – beaten us to the punch – biggest military package ever. Can you characterize if the U.S. package to Ukraine is going to look to be – is it shaping up to be the biggest ever?MR PATEL: Let me take that in two parts. First, I’m not sure pleased is the appropriate adjective that I would use. I think Ambassador Satterfield was pretty clear that there have been – there’s been some clear metrics for progress that have been over the past number of weeks. Those are welcome steps, and they are things that we are very happy to see. However, he was also explicitly clear that there continue to be areas – specifically, distribution of aid within Gaza, some of the telecommunication measures that he mentioned, sanitation and others areas, deconfliction – those are areas that we want to and need to continue to see sustained progress, including the sustained progress on the steps that have been made in the right direction. And as it relates to a deadline or anything like that, you &#8212;QUESTION: But is there a consequence?MR PATEL: The Secretary and the President were incredibly clear that these are kinds of steps that we absolutely need to see, or it will have a determining factor as it relates to the kinds of policy we pursue as it relates to Gaza. There has not been a change in that assessment. We expect that these kinds of efforts to be continued and sustained. This situation is still dire. Both things can be true, which is something that we’ve kind of been pretty clear about for quite some time now. We can see steps being taken that we think are beneficial to the overall humanitarian aid ecosystem – stuff like the Ashdod Port opening, some of these northern crossings being opened. These are all good, welcome, positive steps in the right direction. Simultaneously, there continues to be a lot of work that needs to be done. On Ukraine, look, first let me just say as it relates to our partners in the United Kingdom, we welcome any country taking additional steps to support our Ukrainian partners and bolster the transatlantic Alliance. My understanding is that this was an announcement not just about support for Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom committing to contribute 2.5 percent of their GDP towards the defense space by 2030 – again, a step that we think is in line with NATO commitments but also, again, something that bolsters the transatlantic Alliance. So very – very glad and happy to see that news.When it comes to the United States, we have not been shy about the fact that one of the key reasons we need this national security supplemental passed is because we need to continue to support our Ukrainian partners. We are going to wait for, I’m sure, final passage before previewing or talking about any additional next steps when it comes to how we might be supporting our Ukrainian partners.Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to Humeyra’s question, just to follow up &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; on that, now it seems that more than 300 bodies have been found. The United Nations is asking or calling for an independent investigation. Would you support such an independent investigation for this matter?MR PATEL: Right now, Said, we are asking for more information.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: That is where – that is squarely where we are leaving the conversation.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: I don’t have any details to match, confirm, or offer as it relates to that. We’re aware of those reports, and we have asked the Government of Israel for additional clarity and information. And that’s where I’m at for today.QUESTION: I understand. If the – if Secretary-General Guterres asked for your support in this effort, would the United States support him in the pursuit of &#8212;MR PATEL: You are asking to – you’re asking about a hypothetical, Said &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: &#8212; which, again, I’m not going to get ahead of until we have greater fidelity on information as to what this is. And we’re hoping to get that from the Government of Israel as soon as possible.QUESTION: All right. Now on – Israel is said to be expanding the so-called safe zone in Gaza as it prepares to invade Rafah. I wonder if you’ve seen the report, and if you have any comment on that.MR PATEL: I’ve not – I’ve not seen that report, Said. But look, any kind of action that would be inconsistent with what we’d consider the forced relocation or the forced movement or eviction of Palestinians from their homes in Gaza is something that is inconsistent with the principles that Secretary Blinken laid out in Tokyo last December, and a key tenet of that continues to be that there can be no forced relocation.Ellen, you had your hand up? That &#8212;QUESTION: No, I was just going to say on the issue of investigating or finding out the truth of the allegations of the mass grave, your – the State Department’s Human Rights Report yesterday said along the lines that it knew of no instances where Israeli officials had brought accountability basically for crimes alleged in Gaza. In those circumstances, I mean, with that kind of determination by the State Department itself, is waiting for Israel to investigate it the appropriate course of action?MR PATEL: So that’s not a – first, I think we should clarify what the Human Rights Report is and isn’t. It isn’t a determination or an assessment by the State Department. What it is, is a compilation of submitted violations of human rights all around the world that are done in close coordination with our embassies and consulates in all the places that we have them, with civil society organizations, with media organizations. That’s how that report is compiled. I will also note that it is not an exhaustive or a list of every single human rights violation in the world. It is a compilation.But you saw the Secretary speak to this a little bit yesterday. First, as it relates to our own system when it comes to violations of human rights, there are processes and protocols and procedures in place for the United States to assess what is happening on the ground. These are thorough, deliberate, detail-oriented processes that can take time. Those processes are ongoing, and we’ll continue that work, as we continue that work in any conflict zone around the world.Simultaneously, I am sure our partners in Israel can speak to any procedures and parameters they have in place in their own system as it relates to things that would be viewed as violations. And I will let them speak to that.Alex, on the region, or something else?QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Please come back.MR PATEL: Let me stay a little bit on the region; I’ll come back to you.Michel, you had your hand up.QUESTION: On Iran. Al-Jarida newspaper, a Kuwaiti newspaper, has quoted a high-level source in the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, saying that Iran received an American letter offering to resume negotiations to resume the nuclear agreement after reaching security understandings. And the source added that the offer includes promises to cancel a large portion of economic and non-economic sanctions if Tehran cooperates in restricting its atomic activity and regional pacification. Can you confirm this report?MR PATEL: So, Michel, I’m not going to comment on our ways of communicating with Iran except to say we are not in direct talks with Iran on the JCPOA, either in New York or anywhere else.QUESTION: Indirect talks?MR PATEL: What’s that?QUESTION: Are you in indirect talks with Iran?MR PATEL: I just said that we are not in direct talks with Iran.QUESTION: Indirect, indirect – not direct.MR PATEL: I am not going to speak to any of our communicating – ways of communicating with Iran.QUESTION: And one on Israel-Lebanon. War is escalating between Hizballah and Israel on the border. Do you expect a full-scale war between the two sides? And what can you say about the U.S. efforts to find a diplomatic solution for this crisis?MR PATEL: We are continuing to engage in direct conversations with our partners in Israel and other regional partners to avoid any kind of massive, dire escalation. As we know, Israel is – has this challenge of defeating Hamas in Gaza, but simultaneously is dealing with the threat from Hizballah in the north, and Israel of course has every right to defend itself and right to its security, but we have been clear with everyone that we possibly can that it – from the United States point of view, we’re not interested in seeing this escalate. But I don’t have any other thing to offer on the process there.On the Middle East, or anything &#8212;QUESTION: On the region, on Iran. (Inaudible.)MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: So yesterday the special report about human rights indicated that the Iranian regime had terrorist activities and also put pressure on Iran International journalists, my colleagues. So, in one occasion, they had to move their office from London to Washington, D.C. So, do you have any comment on that? Because this is a serious attack on journalists who are working in the United States and also in the UK.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: And – they are my colleagues, and they are concerned about it.MR PATEL: So first let me just say I’m not going to comment on any particular report or any particular anecdote laid out in the Human Rights Report. But it should be no surprise to anybody that Iran continues to be one of the largest exporters of terrorism and has been so since 1979. Simultaneously, it is also a regime that has showed blatant disregard to a free and open press and media environment. I mean, you have seen over the course of the past three years alone a serious crackdown within Iran on civil society, on media organizations, on human rights. We will continue to take steps to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its human rights violations, for other malign activities, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And one – sorry, one follow-up, sir.MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room. I’m going to work the room. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: According to Jewish Press and Middle East Forum reports, the U.S. State Department has announced that it will take legal steps against the Israeli army’s unit known as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion based on reports that the U.S. gets from Dawn, which is a &#8212;MR PATEL: We have spoken to this pretty regularly since Friday, and your colleague just asked about it at the beginning of the press briefing, so I would ask you pay attention. But I will just reiterate what I said, which is that we’re not going to get ahead of our determinative or deliberative processes here. We take our role and responsibility as it relates to implementation of the Leahy Law quite seriously. It is – its standards are applied consistently to all countries who we have security relationships with, but I don’t have any announcement to make.QUESTION: But this is a follow-up to this. According to U.S. State Department website report, the U.S. has declared that it will “take action against those who undermine peace, security, and stability in the West Bank, which undermine the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution.” So does that mean that the U.S. will take action against Arabs who raise millions to support any Arab who murders a Jew, or take action against the Palestinian Authority for the pay for slay – for the pay a salary for life to any Arab who murders a Jew, and finally take action against the Palestinian ministry of education, whose new curriculum indoctrinates Palestinian Arabs to destroy Israel?MR PATEL: So, I see you’re trying to connect a couple different threads there. First, the sentence that you quote from, you’re talking about actions that the United States took in response to violence, extremism that we are seeing in the West Bank, and yes, that absolutely is a detractor from peace and stability in the region. It’s a detractor from Israel’s own security, takes us further away from a two-state solution, and as you saw, we won’t hesitate to take appropriate actions to actors who partake in that kind of activity.Simultaneously, when it comes to the PA, which is what I think you’re referring to, issues like the so-called martyr payments are something that we have raised regularly in our engagements with the PA. It is a tenet of the kinds of reform that we are continuing to insist the Palestinian Authority undertake, and we’ll continue to have those kinds of conversations.In the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: So, on the reforms, today the new Palestinian prime minister announced a new package of reforms designed to strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and it seems like largely these were – these reforms were the same as promised by the previous prime minister. Have they – has the United States, has the State Department been in touch with the Palestinian Authority in – about these reforms that were announced &#8212;MR PATEL: We have conversations with appropriate members of the PA regularly. I don’t have any conversations to read out, but broadly, reform is something that we have stressed and made clear to them as part of the broader conversations we continue to have for peace and stability in the region. But I’m happy to check if we have had any more specific engagements on this news.QUESTION: You – are you familiar with the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’ve seen the reports. I’ve not – I think it broke right before I came out, so I haven’t had an opportunity to look into it, but we’re happy to check with the team.Go ahead. Yes, you.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Regarding the recent sanctions by United States on Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to see if there’s anything else on the Middle East before we come to any other topics.QUESTION: Okay. So, regarding the recent diplomatic push by the United States towards Saudi Arabia and Israel about normalizing ties – so do you think – so with the ongoing circumstances, what is the line of action you have, as Netanyahu is not even bothering United States regarding the aid, (inaudible) regarding the ceasefire, regarding the hostages, even. Meanwhile, you have many Israeli politicians you hosted here just for another attempt just to – a possible house change in the Israeli Knesset. So, what is the line of action you have?MR PATEL: We’ve been pretty clear that we think further integration of Israel into the Middle East region is in better – it’s in better interest of Israel’s security, it’s in better interest for the United States, and it is a further way for us to push back against Iran’s malign and destabilizing behavior. Of course, there is important work that still needs to be done as it relates to that integration, including, of course, ensuring that we can get to a place for a negotiated two-state solution, and those conversations continue to be ongoing.Anything else on the Middle East before I close out?QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Let me – I’ll come – Gaza. I’ll come to you after. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Yesterday Secretary Blinken released the Human Rights Reports, and he said in his speech that, in quote, “We repeatedly have pressed concerns about Palestinian civilians’ access to humanitarian assistance, displacements of the majority of the population in Gaza, and unprecedented number of journalists killed,” end quote. So, actually, one of the journalists killed in Gaza was one of our colleagues, working for Anadolu Agency of Türkiye. His name is Mustafa Alkharouf, and I want to ask a journalist – I mean, what would be your message to Israeli Government, Israeli military to protect the journalists working in Gaza?MR PATEL: Our message to the Government of Israel is the same message it is to any government on the face of this planet, which is that journalists need to be protected. They do important work; they do especially important work in conflict zones, where they shed light on what is happening on the ground, often in circumstances where it is not easy for public to get their information or get a sense of what is happening. And somewhere like Gaza, they do critical, critical work of informing people about what’s going on. And so, our message everywhere is journalists, media organizations, absolutely need to be protected.You had your hand up in the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: I did. Thanks, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I just wanted to circle back to what one of our colleagues asked, which was in relation to the mass graves story, my colleague referred to calls for an independent investigation, and you said that you were asking for more information from the Government of Israel, and that is squarely where we’re leaving the conversation. Why is there resistance to support an independent investigation into how 300 people ended up in a mass grave?MR PATEL: It’s not about resistance to this particular situation. It is me not wanting to speak in detail about something which Said posed as a hypothetical question, when from the United States perspective, I don&#8217;t have any additional information on this – aside from the public reporting that Humeyra and Said and others have asked about, which is a fair question. But what I am saying, from the United States perspective, is that we’ve seen those reports, and we are asking the Government of Israel for more details and more information.QUESTION: And do you believe that the Government of Israel is a credible source in enlightening you in that regards?MR PATEL: We do. We do. We do.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. Regarding the Human Rights Report from yesterday, particularly the chapter of Colombia, Section 4, corruption in government – you made references specifically to an episode or an issue and is the investigations from the attorney’s office in Colombia towards President Gustavo Petro’s son and his brother because of irregular payments that allegedly entered his presidential campaign. Why did you make reference or relate to corruption this issue that hasn’t been solved yet by the Colombian authorities, and taking into account that it’s so sensitive because it targets directly Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: So again, I – in the context of the Middle East, I will apply the same context here. I’m not going to speak to specific entries in the Human Rights Report. I will just say, again, that this is a compilation of various human rights violations that we’ve seen that are input by our embassies and consulates, that are input by civil society and nonprofit organizations and media organizations.QUESTION: Yes.MR PATEL: And I will just leave it at that. And I’m happy to check more on the specifics of this, but I don&#8217;t have anything more –QUESTION: Just to follow up, but do you have any credible – I don&#8217;t know – reasons to believe that there are irregular payments that enter into the Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: What I can say about the entries of the Human Rights Report is that we find them to be credible, which is why we have included them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: United States imposes sanctions on suppliers to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. What was the real reason for these sanctions?MR PATEL: The sanctions were made because these were entities that were proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. These were entities based in the PRC, in Belarus, and that we have witnessed to have supplied equipment and other applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. They are following our October 23rd designation of other – three PRC entities who’ve worked to supply Pakistan’s missile program. We’re going to continue to disrupt and take actions against proliferation networks and concerning weapons of mass destruction procurement activities wherever they may occur.QUESTION: Sir, Iranian president was in Pakistan and during his visit, Pakistan and Iran signed eight MOUs and also agreed to push bilateral trade to $10 billion. A Pakistani Government spokesperson also said that it does not need a waiver from U.S. sanctions to build its portion of a Pak-Iran gas pipeline. How does United States view these agreements and statements?MR PATEL: So first, just let me say broadly we advise anyone considering business deals with Iran to be aware of the potential risk of sanctions. But ultimately, the Government of Pakistan can speak to their own foreign policy pursuits.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: But do you have &#8212;QUESTION: Does the State Department &#8212;QUESTION: On Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a little bit. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much. If you could – quick answer for me. Let me get your reaction to today’s Moscow court hearing on Evan Gershkovich, where he’s appeal has been rejected. Do you have anything to say?MR PATEL: We, of course, are incredibly disappointed that Evan has been in pretrial detention for over a year without any clear justification from Russian authorities. Members of the embassy team in Moscow attended Evan’s appeal hearing today. Candidly though, Alex, Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips. Evan and Paul should be released immediately.QUESTION: Thank you. On Georgia, I wonder if you’re able to keep your eyes on the ball, given the recent developments – three of the nine states – of the protests. We also see that ruling party has announced its own counterprotest, and they also arrested a protestor from last week. They are flirting with a pro-Russian CPAC kind of group. Do you see any happy ending there?MR PATEL: So look, Alex, as it relates to protests, we certainly support what in the United States would be an expression of the people’s rights under the First Amendment to peacefully protest and demonstrate. Our call and our push, of course, continues to be that they be peaceful and certainly would condemn any steps that are taken for these kinds of protests to become violent.But Alex, I think this goes back to the draft law that you and I have been speaking about for a number of weeks now. We continue to find that this kind of legislative activity to be deeply problematic and inconsistent with – what would one would think – EU aspirations. You have to remember we’re talking about something that cracks down on media organizations, civil society organizations, and other things.And I see so many people leaving the room. I’m going to go ahead and call it, today. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 2:23 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Belarus																								China																								Colombia																								Cyprus																								Egypt																								Georgia																								Iran																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								United Kingdom
- Cyprus HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Cyprus				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cyprus																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Note: The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized government on the island, but since 1974 the northern third of Cyprus has been administered by Turkish Cypriots. This area proclaimed itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983. The United States does not recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; Turkey (Türkiye) is the only country that does. A substantial number of Turkish troops remain on the island. A buffer zone, or “Green Line,” patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force, separates the two areas. This report outlines developments in both communities.There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Republic of Cyprus or the area administered by Turkish Cypriots during the year.Significant human rights issues in the Republic of Cyprus included credible reports of: substantial interference with freedom of association of nongovernmental organizations; refoulement of asylum seekers to a country where they would face torture or persecution; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national or ethnic minority groups, including foreign asylum seekers.The Republic of Cyprus government took steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses, although there were limited cases of impunity.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, significant human rights issues included: harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including for nongovernmental organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a “state” and on the right to leave the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots; refoulement of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they would face torture or persecution, including serious harms; serious “government” corruption; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national or ethnic minority groups, including foreign asylum seekers; and trafficking in persons, including forced labor.“Authorities” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots took limited credible steps to identify and punish “officials” who may have committed human rights abuses. There was evidence, however, of widespread impunity.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										On November 28, a trial began of three prison guards and four inmates charged in the premeditated murder of prisoner Tansu Cidan in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) central prison in October 2022.There were no reports the “government” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of the ROC government, and the same was reported for the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and laws of the ROC prohibited such practices, but there were reports government officials employed them during the year.The ROC commissioner for administration (ombudsman), who also acted as the country’s national preventive mechanism under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, reported the commission investigated citizen complaints of verbal and degrading treatment by the Cyprus National Police (CNP). During the year, the ombudsman launched an investigation into a complaint the CNP subjected a person to degrading treatment on the basis of the person’s gender identity.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” did not refer explicitly to torture, but it prohibited “police” mistreatment of detainees under the section of the “criminal code” covering assault, violence, and battery. There were reports “police” abused detainees.Turkish Cypriot nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that a lack of security cameras at detention centers and the old and new “central prisons” allowed “police” officers and prison guards to abuse detainees with impunity. NGOs further reported security cameras at the old “central prison” did not feed directly to the “ministry of interior,” allowing the possibility of potential abuse because camera footage could be revised on site or interrupted.In contrast with 2022, the “attorney general’s office” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots reported no battery or excessive use of force by “police” during the year. It also reported completing investigations into three complaints from 2022 of “police” battery and use of excessive force. One complaint was determined to be baseless, and the other two investigations concluded there was no “police” battery.A Turkish Cypriot NGO reported that in June, a detainee in a custody cell at the Kyrenia “police station” reported being exposed to “police” violence after insisting on seeing a doctor. The NGO reported widespread examples of “police” mistreatment of detainees that were not reported by “officials.”A Turkish Cypriot NGO reported it received a complaint from a political party that it was contacted by family members of six different inmates who alleged they were subjected to or witnessed mistreatment, violence, and torture in August. The families refused to give their names or the names of the inmates for fear of reprisal. The NGO also reported the investigation showed reasonable suspicion the head of the “prison administration” ordered prison “officers” to raid cells to “conduct inspections” while wearing camouflage and masks. The NGO claimed some of the assaulted inmates were younger than 18. The NGO collaborated with the Turkish Cypriot Bar Association and the Union of Doctors to request “authorities” investigate the matter and comply with the requirements of the Istanbul Protocol. The NGO reported no investigation was conducted.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						NGOs reported some prison and detention centers in the ROC were grossly overcrowded.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, prisons and detention centers, inmates faced gross overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, poor heating, and inadequate access to food or water.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding, combined with old and antiquated facilities, were the main problems faced by the ROC’s Central Prisons Department. The prison’s capacity was 620; the maximum number of inmates held during the year was 1,030. Most doors opened only manually, which presented potentially life-threatening risks in the event of an emergency. Many cells lacked sanitary facilities, and access to toilets was difficult at night. As a result, prisoners sometimes used plastic containers to urinate.On May 5, officers from the ROC’s Office of the Ombudsman conducted an unannounced visit to the ROC Central Prison following receipt of a complaint from the Cypriot-Kurdish Solidarity Association that they were not able to communicate with Kenan Ayaz, detained pending the outcome of his appeal against extradition to Germany. According to the ombudsman’s report, Ayaz was confined in his cell on May 4 after he informed prison management in writing he would go on a hunger strike for reasons related to his court case, not his detention conditions. The ombudsman concluded that although prisons regulations required the prisoner’s confinement for preventive reasons and protection of his interests, the prisoner should have been allowed to communicate with relatives (not only his lawyer) and should have had at least one hour of outdoor exercise, as per relevant European Prison Rules.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, NGOs and media reported overcrowding was a problem throughout detention facilities. An NGO reported receiving complaints regarding “police” mistreatment of detainees in “police” detention centers. Most of the complaints alleged inhuman conditions in the detention centers and that “police” officers verbally abused detainees.An NGO that visited prisons and detention centers reported conditions were deplorable and asylum seekers complained regarding inadequate sleeping area, poor hygiene conditions, insect infestations, poor ventilation, lack of heating and cooling systems, lack of access to shower facilities, and inadequate food. In July the Turkish Cypriot Public Sector Workers’ Union (KTAMS) held a press conference to call attention to the severe shortage of guards, technical and mechanical personnel, and social services providers at the “central prison.”Sanitation was a significant problem in the old and new “central prisons,” according to NGOs, with inadequate access to water and plumbing problems. NGOs claimed prison health care was inadequate, lacking sufficient medical supplies and a full-time doctor, and they reported that testing for contagious diseases at the old “central prison” was haphazard and inconsistent.A Turkish Cypriot NGO reported receiving complaints that Nicosia “police” held transgender individuals in the “police” station detention center during the entirety of investigative processes, which by law could last up to three months. Cells in the detention could be smaller than 140 square feet without ventilation, fresh air, or windows, and detainees slept on pieces of hardwood with a blanket. Detainees claimed to have no access to showers; however, “authorities” disputed this claim.In an interview with the press in March, the head of the Human Rights Committee at the Turkish Cypriot Bar Association, Asli Murat, stated that according to information obtained from bar association clients, detainees at “police” detention centers were overcrowded in concrete cells with unwashed blankets and no access to showers.In February local Turkish Cypriot press reported four inmates at the “central prison” were charged with the battery and rape of a pretrial detainee. The press reported that on the next day, two of the four suspects raped the detainee again. According to doctors at the Nicosia “State” Hospital, the detainee suffered bodily harm.In June KTAMS complained there were shortages of prison guards and that the sole contracted psychologist and sole dentist only visited the prison irregularly. KTAMS also reported there was insufficient water and electricity at the central prison in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. In June a Turkish Cypriot NGO received two complaints from detainees that they were refused access to health care and medication.Administration: ROC authorities generally conducted investigations into credible allegations of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring: The ROC government permitted visits to prison and detention centers by independent human rights observers, and unrestricted and unannounced visits occurred during the year.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, there were no reports “authorities” allowed independent prison monitoring. “Authorities” reportedly permitted representatives from diplomatic missions in Cyprus to visit inmates holding their countries’ citizenship and permitted lawyers and “members of parliament” to visit the “central prison” on September 5, although lawyers were only able to observe the lawyers’ visiting room. NGOs reported not being allowed to carry out inspections in the “central prison” despite making numerous requests to the “ministry of interior affairs.”Improvements: To address overcrowding in the central prison, the ROC added Block 10A, used during the COVID-19 pandemic to quarantine newcomers, to the main prison facilities.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										ROC law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements. The same was reported for the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						ROC law required court warrants, and authorities respected this requirement. Authorities could not detain a person for more than one day unless a court granted an extension. Most periods of investigative detention did not exceed 10 days before the filing of formal charges. Authorities promptly informed detainees of the charges against them in a language they could understand.There was a functioning system of bail. In general, detainees had access to an attorney. The law permitted detainees to speak to their attorney at any time, including before and during interrogation by police.In criminal cases the state provided an attorney to indigent detainees who had court confirmation of their financial need. The ROC Bar Association provided pro bono legal services to financially stressed populations.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “police” could keep detainees in custody for up to three months, but a “judge” needed to review the detention after the third day and every eight days thereafter. Turkish Cypriot “authorities” generally respected this right and usually informed detainees promptly of charges against them, although they often held individuals believed to have committed a violent offense for longer periods without charge.Bail could be granted by the “courts” and was routinely used, but “courts” confiscated detainees’ passports pending trial. According to an NGO and a human rights attorney, during the detention review process, “officials” pressured detainees to sign confessions to be released on bail. The human rights attorney cited situations in which “police” used the threat of prolonged detention to induce detainees to plead guilty.According to the “constitution,” indicted detainees and prisoners had the right to access legal representation. Turkish Cypriot “authorities” usually allowed detainees prompt access to family members and a lawyer of their choice, but NGOs reported cases in which “authorities” prevented detainees from seeing a lawyer. Turkish Cypriot “authorities” provided lawyers to the indigent in cases involving violent offenses. According to NGOs and human rights attorneys, “police” sometimes did not observe required legal protections, particularly at the time of arrest. Suspects who demanded the presence of a lawyer were sometimes physically intimidated or threatened with stiffer charges.A lawyer reported a Turkish Cypriot “central prison” regulation prohibited sentenced individuals in solitary confinement from meeting with a lawyer without permission from the “prison director,” who was authorized to deny the visit without providing justification. “Authorities” reported inmates and detainees in solitary confinement cells were allowed one meeting with their lawyer, with the knowledge of the “prison director,” during their time in the cell.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										ROC law and its constitution provided for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. The same was reported in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.																Trial Procedures						ROC law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. The ROC Bar Association reported chronic court delays, particularly in civil trials, impaired the right to a fair trial. Trial delays were common and partially caused by lengthy legal procedures, which created a larger workload for the courts.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and independent judicial “authorities” generally enforced this right.Human rights observers and one NGO reported translators were not available for non-Turkish speakers, forcing defense attorneys or NGOs to provide a translator. There was insufficient free interpretation for some languages and insufficient professional translation in “courts.” Lawyers and NGOs claimed “authorities” haphazardly recruited nonprofessional translators who did not translate everything said during proceedings. Inadequate translation delayed hearings and prolonged defendants’ detentions.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees in the ROC or in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										According to ROC law, the minister of interior was the guardian of properties of Turkish Cypriots who had not had permanent residence in the government-controlled area since 1974. Ownership remained with the original owner, and the sale or transfer of Turkish Cypriot property under the guardianship of the minister required approval of the government. The minister was authorized to return properties to Turkish Cypriot applicants after examining the circumstances of each case. Owners could appeal the minister’s decisions to the Administrative Court.During the year, the Administrative Court issued judgments in three cases relating to Turkish Cypriot properties under the guardianship of the minister of interior. On January 18, the Administrative Court rejected a request by a Turkish Cypriot seeking to reclaim his property. The court found the applicant’s request to present additional evidence he was not in possession of Greek Cypriot property in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration, a precondition for eligibility to reclaim property in the government-controlled area, was vaguely and inadequately drafted. The applicant appealed the decision. On February 7, the Administrative Court rejected an appeal against the expropriation of part of a Turkish Cypriot property because the applicant failed to challenge within the specified time limit. On February 14, the court dismissed, on grounds of admissibility, an appeal filed by a British citizen who acquired the property from his Turkish Cypriot wife.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, a property commission handled claims by Greek Cypriots. As of December, the commission paid more than £421 million ($524 million) in compensation to applicants during the year.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										ROC law and its constitution prohibited such actions, but there were reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.On September 19, Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism monitoring and responding to violations of press and media freedom, published an open letter expressing concern regarding the alleged surveillance and intimidation of investigative journalist Makarios Drousiotis and the failure of ROC authorities to conduct a prompt and adequate investigation of the allegations. The MFRR called on the attorney general, minister of justice, and chief of the CNP to ensure those responsible for wrongdoing were investigated and prosecuted. Drousiotis claimed that following the publication of a series of books he authored exposing corruption in the highest echelons of government, ROC authorities illegally monitored his communications and installed spyware in his computer to gain access to information identifying his sources. Drousiotis said he reported interference with his mobile phone and computer to police in 2020, but police made no progress in the investigation.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” prohibited such actions. There were reports “police” subjected Greek Cypriots and Maronites (an ethnoreligious group) living in areas administered by the Turkish Cypriots to physical surveillance and monitoring, including “police” patrols and questioning. Greek Cypriot and Maronite residents reported “police” required them to report their location when they expected visitors. A Maronite representative asserted Turkish armed forces continued to occupy 18 houses in the Maronite village of Karpasia.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										ROC law provided for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. An independent media, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but “authorities” did not respect this right.Freedom of Expression: ROC law criminalized incitement of hatred and violence based on race, color, religion, genealogical origin, national or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation. Such acts were punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, it was a criminal offense to insult the Turkish Cypriot “government” and “officials,” as well as the Turkish government and its officials. While individuals were sometimes able to criticize “authorities” publicly without reprisal, human rights defenders, NGOs, and press reported a marked increase in harassment and threats against critics of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [(“TRNC”)] president,” “TRNC government,” Turkish military, Turkish interference into Turkish Cypriot affairs, and Turkish President Erdoğan.In June, Serhat Incirli, journalist for the periodical Yeniduzen, announced he was removed from the “presidential palace” during Erdoğan’s visit, despite being credentialed to enter the palace. Yeniduzen reported this was an abuse of freedom of the press. Opposition parties, the Journalist Association, and the Press Workers Union condemned the “presidency,” which claimed Incirli did not present credentials before the event and accused him of provocation.Violence and Harassment: In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “authorities” usually respected press and media freedom; however, at times they harassed, intimidated, or arrested journalists or otherwise obstructed their reporting. According to NGOs, journalists, and human rights defenders, Turkish Cypriot “authorities” advised some journalists not to criticize the Turkish president or the Turkish government. An NGO reported that due to perceived pressure and potential reaction from Turkey, some journalists did not express critical opinions and preferred to remain silent.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: ROC law penalized use of geographical names and toponyms other than those included in A Complete Gazetteer of Cyprus of 1987. Violations were punishable by up to three years in prison, a fine, or both.According to a human rights NGO, “authorities” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots investigated several cases against journalists accused of writing with “malicious intent” and spreading “fear and concern,” among other charges.In February Turkish Cypriot leader and “president” Ersin Tatar opened a libel and slander lawsuit against journalist Serhat Incirli for allegedly insulting Tatar in 2022 in articles in Yeniduzen. Tatar demanded Yeniduzen pay compensation or punitive damages. He also called for the removal of the articles from all electronic platforms and demanded Yeniduzen be banned from making similar publications on its social media account and website. The Turkish Cypriot Press Workers Union criticized Tatar for attempting to silence freedom of speech and freedom of the press by not showing tolerance towards criticism and called for solidarity.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, journalists could not interview or report on persons under control of the “armed forces.” In August the “attorney general’s office” filed a “court” case against Ali Kismir for “humiliating the Turkish military.” Kismir was charged with “insulting and defaming the morality of the ‘TRNC’ security forces command” in an article he wrote in 2020 and faced 10 years in prison. The hearing began in October.Libel/Slander Laws: In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” criminalized libel and blasphemy. “Authorities” regularly used these “laws” to justify suppression of free speech.In June press reported Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar withdrew a defamation case against Turkish Cypriot Sabit Parsel, who was charged with “insulting the president” by posting on Facebook in 2022, in reference to Tatar, “Continuing on the path to be the laughingstock of the island, the clown of Turkey. This island is ashamed of you.” Parsel rejected the “court’s” request to furnish his identification card and was arrested and detained for seven days. Parsel said he was notified in February that Tatar withdrew the case and charges were dropped.In August, Yudum Mison appeared in “court” on charges of insulting Tatar in a social media post by sharing a photograph of Tatar laughing before he visited a wildfire area. According to a human rights organization, “police” confiscated Mison’s mobile phone and confirmed with university language experts Mison’s post contained language insulting to Tatar. The “judge” moved the case to trial, and at year’s end Mison was free on bail.																Internet Freedom						The ROC government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.ROC law criminalized the use of computer systems to incite and promote racism, xenophobia, prejudice, racial discrimination, hate speech, and violence. Such acts were punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “authorities” did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.According to a 2020 cybercrime “law,” a verbal attack made with deliberate intent to harm individuals, institutions, or organizations over the internet was considered a crime punishable by substantial fines and from one to 10 years’ imprisonment. Activists expressed concern the “law” could be used to suppress free speech.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The ROC constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government limited freedom of association.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the “government” regularly limited freedom of peaceful assembly.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, a labor union reported “police” sometimes interfered in demonstrations and at times used force against peaceful demonstrators. Other NGOs reported “police” used obscure regulations and requirements for permits to interrupt protests. “Authorities” at times used threats of legal action or expanded “police” presence to discourage protests.Throughout the year, some union representatives reported “police” obstructed unions and civil society organizations from demonstrating in front of “parliament” and marching and opening banners in front of the Turkish “embassy” during demonstrations and protests.In August, Turkish Cypriot “police” filed cases against 22 members of teachers unions for allegedly “preventing the ‘police’ from doing their job” in front of the “ministry of education.” Teachers denied the accusations, stating they were engaging in peaceful demonstrations. The first hearing, scheduled to begin November 24, was postponed to January 2024.						Freedom of Association						The ROC government continued to block the bank accounts of the NGO Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism (KISA) following a 2020 Ministry of Interior decision to deregister the NGO because KISA did not comply in a timely manner with an amendment to the law governing NGOs. KISA filed an appeal with the Administrative Court against the deregistration, but the government’s block of KISA’s assets continued, pending adjudication of the appeal, which limited KISA’s capacity to operate.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										ROC law provided for freedom of internal movement within government-controlled areas, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and “authorities” generally respected these rights.In-country Movement: NGOs reported the ROC government prohibited recognized non-Cypriot refugees with temporary residence status and asylum seekers from crossing to the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, asserting it could not assure their safety in an area not under its control.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations reported difficulty in cooperating with the ROC government to provide protection and assistance to refugees and asylum seekers.Turkish Cypriot “authorities” at times cooperated with the Refugee Rights Association, the NGO implementing partner of UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. Access to the area administered by Turkish Cypriots was not ensured for persons seeking international protection who arrived regularly at the airport or ports if authorities believed their intention was to seek asylum.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, there was no specific domestic asylum “legislation”; however, “authorities” unilaterally adopted various international human rights conventions through domestic “legislation.” Access was not ensured for persons who arrived regularly at seaports or the airport in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and expressed their intention to seek asylum. Asylum-seeking persons who arrived irregularly were arrested, detained, and sentenced. Furthermore, asylum seekers were subject to arrest, prosecution, and deportation when caught attempting to cross the “Green Line” irregularly to access the available asylum mechanism in the ROC. Some persons who arrived “regularly” but with a fear of persecution applied for a UNHCR “Person of Concern Certificate,” allowing them to remain and entitling them to basic rights in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots.Access to Asylum: ROC law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees.During the first eight months of the year, the number of asylum applications was half that of 2022. The ROC, UNHCR, and NGOs reported an accelerated pace in the examination of applications, but the backlog from previous years was high. During the same period, the government doubled the number of assisted voluntary returns and deportations of asylum seekers whose applications were rejected. An NGO reported forced and voluntary returns were not independently monitored and reported receiving some complaints from returnees regarding payment of their cash incentive.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and “authorities” did not have a system for providing protection to refugees. Instead, according to an NGO, asylum seekers arriving at legal entry points were detained and deported to Turkey. The NGO also reported asylum seekers arriving irregularly were considered prohibited migrants by Turkish Cypriot “authorities” and were placed in detention facilities to await deportation.Refoulement: Media outlets, NGOs, and UNHCR reported that in July and August, ROC authorities pushed back three boats to Lebanon carrying irregular migrants, including potential asylum seekers. UNHCR and NGOs reported many of these individuals faced “chain” refoulement, as they were subsequently deported from Lebanon back to Syria. Of the 109 passengers forcibly returned to Lebanon, at least 12 were unaccompanied children, according to UNHCR.UNHCR observers reported deportations from the area administered by Turkish Cypriots occurred via Turkey. Those without legal residence status faced onward refoulement, particularly non-Syrians, as Turkish Cypriot “authorities” deported individuals they claimed entered illegally before they were granted refugee status determination interviews by migration “authorities.”In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “authorities” did not provide protection against the expulsion or return of asylum seekers or refugees to countries where their lives or freedom could be threatened. According to NGOs, “authorities” at ports often denied entry and extradited to Turkey asylum seekers, including several persons designated by the Turkish government as alleged members of the Gulen movement. Some observers considered these deportations refoulement.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Incidents of violence against refugees and asylum seekers increased during the year. In August and September, antimigrant demonstrations in Paphos and Limassol turned violent and resulted in some injuries and extensive damage to refugee and asylum seekers’ property. ROC authorities acknowledged police response was slow and inadequate and failed to prevent the escalation of violence. UNHCR and NGOs reported public sentiment against migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, was on the rise. NGOs reported an increase in attacks against asylum seekers, particularly against delivery drivers.In September, NGOs and UNHCR reported overcrowding at the Pournara Reception Center, which served as the ROC’s center to initiate asylum applications, was reduced substantially. Pournara residents were relocated to prefabricated housing units rather than being placed in tents.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, NGOs reported refugees faced racism, exploitation, and impediments to achieving self-sufficiency and integration within society. According to an NGO, there were long detention periods for asylum seekers pending deportation or prosecution; Syrians arriving irregularly were detained an average of 31 days prior to deportation. Syrians smuggled into the “TRNC” were, however, detained as long as six months in crude jails below “police” stations. “Authorities” attributed the long detention period as necessary in case charges were filed against the Syrians’ smuggler and the Syrians would need to serve as witnesses.An NGO reported that at year’s end, more than 22 asylum seekers interviewed at places of detention complained regarding physical violence they received from “police” in the places of detention and during arrest.Freedom of Movement: The ROC government restricted the departure of asylum seekers from the Pournara Migrant Reception Center in Kokkinotrimithia unless they had a residential address. UNHCR and NGOs reported, however, asylum seekers faced great difficulties finding accommodation without being allowed to exit the center.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, if asylum seekers traveled abroad, they would be unable to return due to their lack of “legal” status.Employment: In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, under the “law,” persons holding UNHCR protection papers received the same access to the labor market as third-country nationals. NGOs, however, reported “authorities” refused to issue work permits to some individuals with UNHCR protection papers.Durable Solutions: The ROC offered recognized refugee status to asylum seekers residing in the country.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, persons who arrived “regularly” but expressed a fear of persecution could obtain a UNHCR Person of Concern Certificate, which allowed them to remain and entitled them to basic rights.Temporary Protection: The ROC government provided temporary protection, called subsidiary protection, to 743 individuals who may not qualify as refugees.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the Refugee Rights Association secured certification of 128 “persons of concern,” a designation that conveyed some protections in the absence of asylum procedures.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										The ROC considered Greek Cypriots displaced because of the 1974 division of the island to be refugees, although they fell under the UN definition of IDPs. As of October, there were 281,094 such individuals and their descendants.Turkish Cypriots considered those displaced because of the island’s 1974 division to be refugees, although they also fell under the UN definition of IDPs. At the time of the division, the number of IDPs in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots was approximately 60,000.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						ROC law and the constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided Turkish Cypriots the ability to choose their “government” in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: In the ROC, national elections in February were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, elections were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses or irregularities; however, a May report by German think tank Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung reflected that most respondents to its survey of businesspersons believed vote buying and offering special favors in election periods were common.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “authorities” did not permit Greek Cypriots or Maronites to participate in elections.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						ROC law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided criminal penalties for corruption by “officials.” “Authorities,” however, did not implement the “law” effectively, and “officials” sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of “government” corruption.Corruption: Several investigations and prosecutions were underway in the ROC against public officials and private entities suspected of assisting individuals with criminal backgrounds to acquire citizenship or bypass antimoney-laundering safeguards. In May the government hired two British anti-corruption experts to assist with an investigation involving former and sitting high-ranking government officials because local experts were reluctant to participate. Investigative journalist Makarios Drousiotis reported ROC authorities monitored his communications and employed intimidating tactics after he published a series of books exposing corruption in the government.In the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, observers generally perceived corruption, cronyism, and lack of transparency to be serious problems in the “legislative” and “executive” branches. In May the Center for Migration and Rights Studies published the results of a survey citing corruption as the biggest problem within the Turkish Cypriot community and noting complaints of unfairness, partisanship, corruption, and bribery.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights groups in the ROC generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. NGOs reported government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views.KISA, a Cypriot NGO deregistered in 2020 for failure to submit required documentation in a timely manner, was unable to complete previously awarded EU-funded projects due to its inability to access its bank account, and it was unable to apply for new EU-funded projects. Citing KISA’s deregistration, the Asylum Service denied KISA permission to visit migrant reception centers.NGOs reported a limited number of domestic human rights organizations operated in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, and “authorities” were rarely cooperative or responsive to their views and requests.Government Human Rights Bodies: There was a legislative Committee on Human Rights and an ROC government ombudsman, whose portfolio included human rights. The ombudsman was considered independent and effective.During independent investigations, the ombudsman generally enjoyed good cooperation with other government bodies. NGOs complained, however, the Office of the Ombudsman routinely refused to investigate their complaints on the grounds that similar complaints had been investigated in the past.The legislative Committee on Human Rights, which most local NGOs considered effective, consisted of nine members of the House of Representatives elected to five-year terms. The executive branch did not exercise control over the committee.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “ombudsman’s” portfolio included issues related to human rights. The “ombudsman” was not considered independent and was not always effective due to the lack of an enforcement mechanism.The “ombudsman” investigated and reported on institutions exercising administrative and “executive” powers and ensured “legislation” and “court” decisions were properly implemented. The “ombudsman” could initiate investigations in response to media reports or complaints from individuals and organizations or on their own initiative.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: ROC law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal and domestic or intimate partner rape and other forms of domestic and sexual violence, with a maximum sentence of life in prison. The law also criminalized domestic violence, with a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. The government generally enforced the law effectively, although many cases went unreported.In May the Larnaca District Court found former Metropolitan Bishop of Kition (Larnaca District) Chrysostomos guilty of indecently assaulting a girl, age 16, in 1981 when he served as bishop. Chrysostomos was sentenced to 12 months in prison, but the sentence was suspended for three years.The law established clear mechanisms for reporting and prosecuting domestic violence within the family. Courts could issue same-day restraining orders against suspected or convicted domestic violence offenders. The NGO Association for the Prevention and Handling of Violence in the Family (SPAVO) stated domestic violence survivors often faced significant family and social pressure not to report abuse and to withdraw complaints filed with police. Media outlets and NGOs criticized the Social Welfare Services for providing insufficient support to survivors of domestic violence.There were three shelters for survivors of domestic violence, each funded primarily by the government and operated by SPAVO. The government also funded the SPAVO-operated Women’s Home, a one-stop facility in Nicosia where women survivors of gender-based violence, including sexual assault, and their children were provided with medical, legal, and psychological services, while also having the opportunity to provide testimony to police.Police conducted detailed educational programs for officers on the proper handling of domestic violence, including training focused on child abuse. NGOs reported, however, some police officers dismissed claims of domestic abuse by foreign women and children.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal rape, and provided for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. “Authorities” and “police” did not enforce the “law” effectively. The “law” prohibited domestic violence under various assault and violence or battery clauses, with a maximum sentence of four years’ imprisonment, but no “laws” specifically addressed domestic violence.Gender-based violence, including spousal abuse, was a major problem. The Nicosia Turkish Municipality operated a shelter for survivors of domestic violence, and local NGOs supported rape and domestic violence survivors. Turkish Cypriot “authorities” established gender focal points at relevant “ministries” to respond to complaints of violence against women.Shelters operated by the Nicosia Turkish Municipality provided temporary housing and support for survivors of domestic violence and their children, as well as victims of human trafficking.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: ROC law prohibited sexual harassment in the workplace with a maximum penalty of three years in prison, a fine, or both. A code of conduct outlined the prevention and handling of sexual harassment and harassment in the public service.NGOs and foreign domestic worker associations reported authorities did not adequately investigate sexual harassment complaints submitted by foreign domestic workers. Officials and NGOs reported sexual harassment of foreign women domestic workers was a widespread but underreported problem. NGOs reported permissive social attitudes, fear of reprisals, and lack of family support for survivors discouraged the reporting of sexual harassment. The ombudsman received one complaint of sexual harassment in the workplace and several complaints of gender-based harassment at the workplace. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Academy of Public Administration delivered training and seminars on sexual harassment and gender mainstreaming for the public sector during the year.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “criminal code” prohibited sexual harassment and considered it a misdemeanor punishable by up to 12 months’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. According to NGOs, sexual harassment went largely unreported. The NGO Voice of International Students in Cyprus reported widespread sexual harassment of women international students and noted “police” routinely dismissed complaints.Discrimination: ROC law provided the same legal status and rights for women as for men, and those laws were generally respected. Women were legally prohibited from working in underground mines. ROC law required all men ages 18-50 to complete 14 months of service in the Cypriot National Guard, but there was no service requirement for women.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” provided the same “legal” status and rights for women as for men, but “authorities” did not enforce the “law” effectively. Women experienced discrimination in such areas as employment, credit, owning or managing a business, education, and housing. For example, women teachers were reportedly instructed to time their pregnancies so delivery would occur during summer break, and women teachers working at private schools were dismissed from their duties for pregnancy.NGOs reported women in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) community faced discrimination in education, housing, and employment in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of ROC government authorities. An NGO reported doctors in the private and public sectors required married women to have their husband’s consent to proceed with sterilization, although the law did not require such consent. An NGO reported police and the Social Welfare Services did not respond to their calls to investigate suspicious cases of persons with intellectual disabilities being subjected to abortions while living in homes for persons with disabilities.The government funded an NGO that provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence. Emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis were available as part of clinical management of rape.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, there were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization by Turkish Cypriot “authorities.” Some doctors required women to have their husband’s consent to proceed with sterilization, although the “law” did not require such consent. According to the Association of Women to Support Living, women did not have free access to contraception, and one of every four women was under pressure from their spouse not to use contraception.For survivors of sexual violence, “authorities” did not provide access to sexual and reproductive health services, and there were no publicly funded services. Emergency contraception was not available as part of clinical management of rape.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										ROC law protected members of racial or ethnic groups from violence and discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, and religion. The Office of the Ombudsman, acting as the Equality Authority and Antidiscrimination Body, had jurisdiction to investigate discrimination complaints. The government generally enforced the law, but according to NGOs, many incidents of discrimination against members of racial, national, or ethnic minority groups were not reported to authorities.A March report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance concluded the ROC had made progress and developed good practices since the commission’s previous evaluation in 2016. There were concerns, however, regarding the lack of sufficient protections for irregular migrants and the lack of a comprehensive system to monitor hate speech, which the report found was widespread in public discourse.During the year, there was an increase in incidents of violence and discrimination against members of racial or ethnic groups. On August 27, after a rally by residents of Chlorakasto to protest the presence of high numbers of predominantly Syrian migrants and refugees in the area, 250 mostly hooded and masked individuals physically attacked migrants and refugees in the streets and in their homes, including women and children, causing extensive damage to their properties. Police charged 21 individuals involved in the incident.There were several incidents throughout the year of physical attacks by local young men against migrants and asylum seekers working in the food delivery business. In March the Larnaca District Court found a local man guilty of the July 2022 assault of a Congolese woman seeking asylum, while she held her baby, age 11 months. The man was charged with 10 offenses under racism and xenophobia laws, as well as violence against women, aggravated assault, use of profanity in public, and threat of violence, and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment.The 2023 European Commission Roma Civil Monitor Civil society monitoring report concluded Cypriot Roma faced discrimination in housing, employment, education, access to public services and health care, and social protection.The ombudsman received complaints the government delayed or denied approval of citizenship for children of Turkish Cypriots married to Turkish citizens who resided in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. The government reported granting citizenship to two such children during the year.The ROC Ministry of Education upheld a code of conduct against racism that provided schools and teachers with a detailed plan on handling, preventing, and reporting racist incidents. The “constitution” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots prohibited discrimination and stated, “No privileges shall be granted to any individual, family, group, or class.”In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” prohibited discrimination, and the 1975 Vienna III Agreement was the legal source of authority regarding treatment of the 310 Greek Cypriot and 62 Maronite residents in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.Despite the “law,” “authorities” rarely acted on incidents regarding racial or ethnic discrimination. According to human rights observers, most incidents went unreported in part because victims did not expect “authorities” to open an investigation. One NGO reported that when members of minority communities reported discrimination or filed complaints, “police” told them to return to their country of origin instead of opening an investigation.There was discrimination against Maronites, who maintained possession of property in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots but were unable to bequeath the property to heirs residing in the ROC. Maronites could use their property in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots only if it was not under the control of the Turkish military or otherwise allocated to Turkish Cypriots.Foreign domestic workers and international students faced discrimination and, at times, violence. Some African students studying at universities in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots reported racial discrimination in housing, employment, and interactions with “authorities.”																																				Children										Education: In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, NGOs reported discrimination in the way education was provided to certain groups through the secondary level, including on the basis of sex, gender, and ethnicity. According to the NGOs, the Turkish “embassy” provided funding and contributions to the Religious Public School, and teachers’ unions and human rights groups complained the funding was for Quran courses at mosques the children could attend during the three-month summer break.Child Abuse: ROC law criminalized child abuse, and the government enforced the law effectively. The maximum penalty for child abuse was one year in prison, a fine, or both.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” did not explicitly prohibit child abuse, but it prohibited sexual abuse of children, which carried a penalty of up to six years’ imprisonment. There were reports of child abuse, and “authorities” enforced the “law” effectively. As with domestic violence, there were social and cultural disincentives to seeking legal remedies for such problems.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of marriage was 18 in the ROC, and the government effectively enforced the law. Persons ages 16 and 17 could marry, provided there were serious reasons justifying the marriage and with written consent from their legal guardians. A district court could also allow the marriage of persons ages 16 and 17 if the parents unjustifiably refused consent or in the absence of legal guardians.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the minimum age of marriage was 18, and “authorities” effectively enforced the “law.” A “court” could allow marriages of persons ages 16 or 17 if they received parental consent.Sexual Exploitation of Children: ROC law prohibited the sale, grooming or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, child pornography, offering or using a child for commercial sexual exploitation, and engaging in or promoting a child in any form of sexual activity. The maximum penalty for sexual abuse and exploitation of a child between ages 13 and 17 was 25 years in prison. The maximum penalty for sexual abuse and exploitation of a child younger than 13 was life in prison. Possession of child pornography was a criminal offense punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment. Authorities enforced these laws. The minimum age for consensual sex was 17.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” prohibited the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, and “authorities” generally enforced the law. The minimum age for consensual sex was 16. Statutory rape or attempted statutory rape of a person younger than 16 was a felony with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. If the offender was younger than 18 and less than two years apart in age from the survivor, the crime was a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years in prison, a fine, or both. Possession or production of child pornography was punishable by up to 15 years in prison.																																				Antisemitism										There were approximately 11,000 persons in the ROC’s Jewish community, which consisted of a small number of native Jewish Cypriots and a greater number of expatriate Jews, primarily from Israel, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Due to the conflict in Israel, Jewish community representatives reported an estimated 5,000 Jewish persons temporarily relocated to the ROC. Jewish community representatives provided multiple reports of antisemitic incidents against members of the Jewish community in the ROC. Compared with 2022, there were more antisemitic attacks during the year.Representatives from the Jewish Community Center reported a dramatic increase in antisemitic attacks in the weeks following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel. On October 21, Israeli and Jewish community members were attacked while circulating posters featuring images of Israelis taken hostage by Hamas on October 7. Youths attacked the group by throwing rocks and chanting antisemitic slurs at the group. Police were called to investigate, and a small police contingent was posted 24/7 outside the Israeli embassy in Cyprus in the weeks following the beginning of hostilities in Israel.In an October 19 social media post, National Unity Party “member of parliament” Yasemin Ozturk called for the immediate closure of the Jewish center in Kyrenia – Chabad Lubovitch of Northern Cyprus – and the deportation of Rabbi Chaim Hillel Azimov. Ozturk accused the center of “being behind the Israeli attacks on Gaza” and claimed the Israeli president was a member of the organization. Ozturk’s post on social media continued to receive “likes” and generate antisemitic comments from the Turkish Cypriot online community. In December, Ozturk created on her social media account a public, open invitation to join her for a demonstration in front of the Jewish center. Ozturk said she would give a statement at the demonstration “in front of the extortionist, child murderer Chabad organization’s House in our country.” Some right-wing journalists supported Ozturk.For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No ROC laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, no “laws” criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors.Violence and Harassment: LGBTQI+ individuals faced significant societal discrimination, including potential violence, in the ROC, particularly in rural areas. As a result, many LGBTQI+ persons did not disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity, and they generally did not report homophobic violence or discrimination. The NGO Accept LGBTI Cyprus reported improved police response to incidents and complaints of violence, harassment, and hate speech against LGBTQI+ individuals. In October the CNP instructed all police personnel to show zero tolerance of any actions constituting discrimination based on sexual orientation and to effectively investigate such instances. On February 22, approximately 10 hooded individuals stormed a student-organized discussion on sexual orientation at the Cyprus University of Technology. The attackers assaulted participants and discharged a fire extinguisher at them. Police arrested five individuals in connection with the incident.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, a human rights NGO reported online hate speech towards LGBTQI+ individuals was increasingly common, especially during Pride parades. Despite filing hundreds of complaints with “police” of online statements by “officials,” “politicians,” and businessmen that constituted hate speech under the “law,” the NGO reported “police” declined to investigate based on a “lack of expertise.”In March, Queer Cyprus Association reported a man in military clothes attacked another man in Famagusta with a bucket full of sewage water in what the organization stated was a homophobic incident.Discrimination: ROC law prohibited discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics in employment, social protection, social insurance, social benefits, health care, education, participation in unions and professional organizations, and access to goods and services. The law also criminalized incitement to hatred or violence based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The government did not always enforce these laws. Couples entering a civil partnership, the only legally recognized form of union for same-sex couples, were not allowed to adopt children. There were reports of employment discrimination against LGBTQI+ applicants.Representatives of the NGO Accept LGBTI Cyprus reported transgender persons undergoing hormone replacement therapy experienced difficulty accessing health care.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” prohibited discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons based on sexual orientation or gender identity in housing, employment, nationality laws, and access to “government” services. According to the “criminal code,” it was a minor offense for a civil servant to discriminate against any person based on sexual orientation or gender identity. “Authorities” did not effectively enforce the “law.”There were reports of official and societal discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in employment, housing, and access to education or health care. Community members noted an overwhelming majority of LGBTQI+ persons concealed their sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid potential discrimination. The Queer Cyprus Association reported LGBTQI+ persons often could not access legal remedies to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity because “authorities” declined to enforce them.Registered partnership was not authorized for same-sex partners. NGOs reported school curricula excluded any acknowledgement of LGBTQI+ identities.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Individuals 18 or older could change their gender identity marker on ROC legal and identifying documents by submitting a written application to the District Administration Office for approval. Submission of medical certificates was not mandatory. Gender identity changes could only be requested twice.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, according to NGOs, legal gender recognition was available only after surgery and sterilization. Gender-affirming health-care services were not accessible for LGBTQI+ individuals.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: In May the ROC House of Representatives approved a law criminalizing so-called conversion therapies. The prescribed penalty for practicing such therapies was a maximum of two years’ imprisonment if the victim was an adult, three years’ imprisonment if the victim was a child, and a fine.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, an NGO reported that due to societal expectations, intersex newborns underwent sex assignment surgeries without consent from the parents. There were no measures to prevent unnecessary medical interventions.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no restrictions in the ROC on those speaking out or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations, or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events. The same was true in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.																																				Persons with Disabilities										ROC law protected the rights of persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities and prohibited discrimination against them. The government generally enforced these provisions.Children with disabilities attended mainstream schools. The ROC government provided a personal assistant to children with disabilities attending public schools. Parents and NGOs reported some school buses lacked accessibility features and did not have sufficient wheelchair securement areas. On one occasion, a student in a wheelchair had to be tied with a rope to the bus seat for safety, and in another, a student with disabilities fell off a bus. The ombudsman received complaints related to the inaccessibility of school buses.Problems facing persons with disabilities included limited access to their places of employment and to natural and constructed environments, transportation, information, and communications. During the year, the ombudsman examined complaints concerning accessibility of persons with disabilities to services and health-care providers offered by the General Health System. It also issued binding recommendations to relevant authorities to draw up accessibility criteria and standards and make them mandatory for all health-care providers contracted by the General Health System. The Cyprus Paraplegics Organization and the Cyprus Confederation of Organizations for the Disabled reported many open public spaces, including paved areas and cultural sites, bus stops, and several public buildings, were not accessible to wheelchair users. The Pancyprian Organization for the Blind reported Nicosia did not make provisions to enable visually impaired persons to access many public places in the center of Nicosia.State broadcaster Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation translated into sign language all emergency events and announcements, and provided sign language interpretation for all main news bulletins and other daily news programs. The Cyprus Confederation of Organizations for the Disabled reported the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation did not provide audio-video description for visually impaired persons.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” protected the rights of persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, including their access to social benefits, and prohibited discrimination against them. “Authorities” did not effectively enforce all parts of the “law.”Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, or transportation on an equal basis with others. For example, advocates and the Turkish Cypriot Orthopedic Disabled Persons Association complained of the absence of accessible infrastructure in public areas, including lack of and blocked sidewalks, and that bathrooms and public transportation were inaccessible to persons with disabilities. In August the association stated there had been no employment of persons with disabilities in the public sector since 2006.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Persons with HIV faced discrimination in employment, housing, education, and health care in the ROC and faced social stigma and exclusion from society and their own families. Activists complained that raising public awareness of the problem was not a government priority and reported medical staff at hospitals were prejudiced and reluctant to examine persons with HIV. The president of HIV/AIDS Support Center, Stella Michaelidou, reported a Limassol clinic contracted with the General Health System refused to offer emergency treatment to a patient with HIV and asked her instead to seek treatment at a Larnaca hospital. The ombudsman received a complaint that applicants for a visitors’ permit to enter the ROC were required by the Ministry of Interior to present medical reports certifying they did not suffer from infectious diseases, including HIV and AIDS.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, “officials” deported foreign nationals with HIV.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										ROC law provided for workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. Both antiunion discrimination and dismissal for union activity were illegal.The law required labor unions to register with the registrar of labor unions within 30 days of their establishment. An agreement among the government, labor unions, and employers’ organizations established the procedure for dispute resolution for essential services personnel.The government generally enforced applicable labor laws, and investigations were adequate in the formal sector. Penalties for violations, which occurred primarily in the informal sector, were less than those for other similar civil rights violations. Violations rarely occurred in the formal sector, and penalties were regularly applied against violators.The ROC government generally protected the right of unions to conduct their activities without interference, and employers generally respected the right of workers to form and join independent unions and to bargain collectively. Although collective agreements were not legally binding, they were governed by a voluntary agreement between the government and employer organizations. Unions, employers, and employees effectively observed the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Workers covered by such agreements were employed predominantly in larger sectors of the economy, including construction, tourism, health care, and manufacturing.There were isolated reports private-sector employers discouraged union activity due to the ROC’s sporadic enforcement of labor regulations prohibiting antiunion discrimination and employers’ implicit threat of arbitrary dismissal for union activities.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” protected the rights of workers, except members of the “police” and other Turkish Cypriot security forces, to form and join independent unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. The “law” allowed unions to conduct activities without interference and provided for the right to strike, with the provision a union notified “authorities” in writing when members planned to strike for longer than 24 hours. The “law” did not permit “judges,” members of the “police” force, or other Turkish Cypriot “security forces” to strike. The “council of ministers” could prohibit a strike in any individual sector two times per year for up to 60 days if the strike affected the general health, security, or public order or prevented the provision of essential services. There was no list of what constituted essential services.The “law” provided for collective bargaining. The “ministry of labor” reported employers could not condition employment on membership or lack of membership in a union or participation in strikes. The “law” did not provide for reinstatement of workers fired for union activities. The “government” did not effectively enforce applicable “laws.”Despite freedom of association and the right to engage in collective bargaining, very few private-sector workplaces were unionized, according to labor union representatives, who also stated employers would likely dismiss private-sector workers if they affected business operations while exercising their rights. Some companies pressured workers to join unions led or approved by the company. Officials of independent unions claimed “authorities” created public-sector unions as rivals to compete with and weaken independent unions.Labor “authorities” did not effectively enforce labor “laws.” Penalties were sometimes applied against violators. Penalties for employers convicted of violating labor “laws” were less than those for violating other “laws” involving the denial of civil rights and were sporadically enforced.Union members reported “police” sometimes maintained a heavy presence and took measures at demonstration areas to deter union members from engaging in union activity and peaceful protests. Union members also reported “police” habitually arrested some union members during peaceful demonstrations to intimidate other demonstrators. Some union members were charged with “preventing the ‘police’ from doing their job” or “causing damage to public property” because of a confrontation with “police.”																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at:  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										ROC law prohibited all of the worst forms of child labor. The law prohibited employment of children, defined as persons younger than 15, except in specified circumstances, such as combined work and training programs for children who were at least age 14 or employment in cultural, artistic, sports, or advertising activities, subject to rules limiting work hours. The law prohibited night work and street trading by children.ROC law permitted employment of adolescents, defined as persons ages 15-17, subject to rules limiting hours of employment and prohibiting work deemed harmful or dangerous. The law also prohibited employment of adolescents between midnight and 4 a.m. The minimum age for employment in industrial work was 16. Unaccompanied children and children of migrants were especially vulnerable to forced labor. Romani children were also vulnerable to forced begging. The government effectively enforced the law, and penalties for violations were commensurate with those for other serious crimes. Penalties were regularly applied against violators when such crimes were perpetrated.Ministry of Labor inspectors were responsible for enforcing child labor laws and did so effectively. Social Welfare Services and the Committee for the Rights of the Child had investigative authority for suspected cases of exploitation of children at work. There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “law” prohibited all of the worst forms of child labor. The minimum age for employment was 15, the last year at which education was compulsory. Employers could hire students ages 15-17 in apprentice positions under the supervision of the “ministry of education” and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Small Shopkeepers and Artisans. Children ages 15-17 were restricted to no more than six hours of work per day and 30 hours per week. The “law” prohibited children ages 15-17 from working during mealtimes, at night, in heavy physical labor, and under dangerous conditions. The “law” also stipulated employers needed to update every six months written medical certification that the physical work done by children was suitable for children. Written parental consent was also required, and children were entitled to the hourly wage of a full-time employee.“Authorities” did not report receiving complaints to the child labor hotline.The “ministry of labor” was responsible for child labor “laws” and policies. Inspections were not sufficient, and penalties for violations were less than those for other serious crimes. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.“Authorities” did not always effectively enforce the “laws,” and NGOs reported children of Turkish immigrants often worked alongside their families in the agricultural, manufacturing, automotive, and construction sectors. NGOs reported some children worked in dangerous conditions, such as on construction sites, and were subjected to heavy physical work despite “legal” prohibitions.Child labor in the Turkish Cypriot urban informal economy was also a problem, but to a lesser extent than in agriculture and manufacturing. In family-run businesses, it was common for children to work after school in shops and for young children to work on family farms.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: On January 1, the ROC government introduced for the first time a national minimum wage. The minimum wage was more than the official estimate for the poverty income level. The new national minimum wage did not apply to foreign domestic workers, workers in agriculture and animal farming, and seamen. The Ministry of Interior established a minimum wage for domestic workers that was less than the national minimum wage. Collective bargaining agreements covered workers in most occupations, including unskilled labor, and wages set in these agreements were significantly higher than the poverty level.The legal maximum workweek was 48 hours, including overtime. The law did not require premium pay for overtime or mandatory rest periods. The law stipulated equal treatment for foreign and local workers. The law protected foreign domestic workers who filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor from deportation until their cases were adjudicated.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the minimum monthly wage according to labor unions was below the poverty line. There was premium pay for overtime in the public sector; premium pay for overtime was required in the private sector but not frequently paid. The “law” prohibited compulsory overtime and provided for paid annual holidays.The legal maximum workweek for both the public and private sectors was 40 hours, and the “law” provided for premium pay for overtime work in the public sector. There were limits to overtime in the health sector. Private-sector labor “laws” were not enforced, and almost all private-sector employees worked beyond 40 hours per week without overtime pay or compensation.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards in the ROC were appropriate for the main industries, and safety and health experts were responsible for identifying unsafe situations. Workers had the right to remove themselves from situations endangering health or safety without jeopardizing their employment, but authorities did not provide adequate protections for employees in these situations. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions in most industries but were not allowed to inspect the working conditions of domestic workers in private households without a court warrant.The government proactively identified unsafe conditions and responded to workers’ OSH complaints. For hazardous sectors that posed increased safety and health risks, the government conducted targeted inspections at workplaces and took enforcement action, including criminal prosecutions, against employers that failed to comply with OSH legislation.NGOs reported the lack of social protections raised serious questions concerning the potential deterioration of working conditions, particularly in hazardous sectors and for vulnerable groups.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, OSH standards were not appropriate for the main industries, and implementation of a 2008 “Occupational Work and Safety Law” was insufficient. Multinational companies, however, reportedly met OSH standards. Workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardizing their employment. Accommodations for migrant workers were substandard. “Authorities” did not proactively identify unsafe conditions and rarely responded to workers’ OSH complaints.During the year, several instances of illness and injury highlighted the vulnerability of foreign workers to OSH hazards. In August, two foreign workers died after inhaling gas during waste cleaning work in İskele.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The ROC Department of Labor Relations within the Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. The penalties for violating wage and hour laws were commensurate with those for similar crimes, and penalties were sometimes applied against violators. Labor unions reported enforcement problems in sectors not covered by collective agreements, such as small businesses and foreign domestic workers. They also reported certain employers, mainly in construction and agriculture, exploited undocumented foreign workers by paying them very low wages.The government enforced OSH laws satisfactorily in the formal sector. The Ministry of Labor, however, did not have sufficient inspectors to effectively enforce labor laws in the agricultural sector and in the informal economy, in which most employees were migrant or undocumented workers. The penalties for failing to comply with OSH laws were commensurate with those of other similar crimes, such as fraud and negligence. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. From January to July, the government prosecuted 11 employers for OSH violations.The ombudsman maintained oversight of cases submitted to the Department of Labor by foreign workers concerning the conditions of their employment. The ombudsman reported receiving some complaints by domestic workers related to their requests to change employer and their living and working conditions.NGOs noted that during the year, fewer foreign domestic workers reported contract violations by their employers due to labor shortages and a higher demand for domestic workers.The informal sector in the ROC included approximately 6 percent of the workforce, including migrant and undocumented workers. Authorities did not enforce labor laws effectively for informal-sector workers.In the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, the “ministry of labor” was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH standards, but it did not do so effectively. “Authorities” could conduct unannounced inspections or initiate sanctions, but according to unions and associations, inspections were not adequately or routinely carried out.The number of inspectors in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots was not sufficient for enforcement, and penalties for noncompliance were less than those for other similar crimes. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators. “Authorities” commonly deported migrant workers who reported violations. “Authorities” did not penalize violators, and inspections were not adequate to protect worker rights.While OSH standards applied to all working conditions, “authorities” in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots did not provide social protections for workers in the informal economy. Economists estimated the size of the informal sector was 30-45 percent.																																				    							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Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Cyprus
- Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Bitter Travels to Nicosia, Frankfurt, Bucharest, and Sofia Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Rena Bitter will travel April 11-19 to Nicosia, Cyprus; Frankfurt, Germany; Bucharest, Romania; and Sofia, Bulgaria.  In Nicosia, Bucharest, and Sofia, Assistant Secretary Bitter will meet with host government officials to discuss further facilitating travel between our countries and other consular issues of mutual interest.  In all four cities, she will engage with embassy and consulate staff and observe consular operations.  The trip underscores our deep and sustained commitment to the protection of U.S. citizens overseas and the facilitation of legitimate travel and immigration to the United States.For updates on Assistant Secretary Bitter’s travel, follow @TravelGov on social media.
- Designating Transnational Network Supporting al-Shabaab Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is designating sixteen entities and individuals in a transnational network that spans the Horn of Africa, United Arab Emirates, and Cyprus, for facilitating financing and money laundering for the al-Shabaab terrorist organization.The threat posed by al-Shabaab is not limited to Somalia.  Al-Shabaab’s revenues are disbursed to other al-Qa&#8217;ida-linked groups worldwide and help fund al-Qa’ida’s global ambitions to commit acts of terrorism and undermine good governance.Today’s action reflects the United States’ counterterrorism priorities in Somalia and supports the dynamic relationship we have established with the Somali government to counter the terrorist threats endangering the Somali people and undermining their communities.  The United States also remains focused on disrupting al-Qa&#8217;i&#8217;da’s access to the international financial system.The Department of the Treasury actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended.  For more information on today’s action, see Treasury’s press release.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																																Counterterrorism																															Cyprus																								Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Sanctions																															Somalia																								United Arab Emirates
- The Appointment of Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar as the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy on Cyprus Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States of America welcomes UN Secretary-General Guterres’ appointment of Ms. Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar as his Personal Envoy on Cyprus. Ms. Holguin brings considerable foreign policy expertise to this role, and the United States looks forward to engaging with her as she undertakes her efforts to search for common ground on the way forward toward a peaceful and prosperous future for the people of Cyprus. This appointment comes at a critical juncture in which direct and sustained engagement is essential, recognizing the future of all Cypriots will be impacted by these efforts.  The United States reiterates its support for the UN Security Council framework for Cyprus.						Tags																					Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Cyprus																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Cyprus HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Cyprus				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Cyprus																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Cyprus																																												Cyprus				Overview:  The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) collaborated closely with the United States, the European Union, and others –— bilaterally and multilaterally – in international counterterrorism efforts in 2022.  Since 1974, the island of Cyprus has been de facto divided into the ROC government-controlled area in the southern two thirds of the island and the northern third administered by Turkish Cypriots.  A UN peacekeeping force patrols a Buffer Zone, also called the Green Line, that separates the two sides.  The Buffer Zone is largely open to civilian traffic and remains a significant route for the illicit transit of people, narcotics, and other contraband.  The division of the island has impeded counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities and between the ROC and Türkiye, which do not maintain diplomatic relations.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no reported terrorist incidents Cyprus in 2022.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  Since 2020 there have been no changes to the ROC’s legal system pertaining to counterterrorism.  ROC authorities arrested six individuals suspected of planning an attack on a prominent businessman residing in Cyprus.  The individuals were charged with terrorism and are awaiting trial.  The U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program funded the construction of a $7 million regional security training center, the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS) in Larnaca.  The facility became operational in March.  Since then, the center has hosted 400 training participants from nine different nations.  The center strengthens regional border security, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation efforts, including customs and export controls, port and maritime security, counter-IED training, and cybersecurity.  Training has been provided on various counterterrorism-related topics, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction investigations; prevention, detection, and investigation of chemical and biological weapon threats; and WMD incident response and countering WMD-enabled drones.In January 2021, the Cypriot National Police executed a search warrant and arrested a Syrian national based on his violation of ROC terrorism laws and for providing material support to ISIS.  The Ministry of Justice prosecuted the individual in 2022, resulting in a conviction under article 9 of the National Law 75(1)/2019 for providing material support with the intention to commit or to contribute to the commission of a terrorist offense.  This case was the first ISIS-related counterterrorism conviction in Cyprus.The ROC participated in an Embassy Nicosia-facilitated, National Counterterrorism Center-led International Counterterrorism Exercise in September.  The exercise provided all key ROC ministries and responders with an opportunity to discuss their current state of readiness for a mass-casualty terror event response.  Separately, EXBS has trained 40 ROC government personnel to serve as trainers at CYCLOPS and to develop their own capabilities.  The main ROC partners for this training are Port and Maritime Police, Customs, Civil Defense, the National Guard, and the Digital Security Agency.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  The ROC is a member of MONEYVAL (the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism). Its FIU, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering, is a member of the Egmont Group.  There were no significant changes in 2022.For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.Countering Violent Extremism:  There were no significant changes in Cyprus’s CVE efforts in 2022.International and Regional Cooperation:  The ROC participates in regional and multinational counterterrorism exercises with partners including Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.																												    							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- Department Press Briefing – November 14, 2023 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWashington, D.C.													HomeDepartment Press Briefing – November 14, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – November 14, 2023																																																					November 14, 2023																																																								1:25 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: I don’t have anything to kick us off, so Matt?QUESTION: Yeah, I actually – I mean, I have a lot, but nothing really to kind of start off with a bang, as it were. So I’ll defer.MR MILLER: Okay, who else wants to go?QUESTION: Any update on hostages, movement, ongoing negotiations, anything?MR MILLER: I don’t have an update on hostage negotiations. I think as you know, I’ve been reluctant to talk about the status of negotiations from this podium because we’ve – it has been our position that anything that we say about hostage negotiations can jeopardize our work to try to secure the release of hostages. So I don’t have anything to say other than that it continues to be a top priority for everyone in this administration. The Secretary has had a number of calls about this very matter with his foreign counterparts in the last few days. And of course, it was a subject that he worked on a great deal during his recent travel to the region, but I don’t want to discuss any details.QUESTION: Any word on the sanctions waiver expiring today for Iran?MR MILLER: So I don’t have a comment to give on the expiration of the waiver at this time. But I would remind you of a few things with respect to these waivers in general, and that is that, number one, there are 20 waivers that have been issued for the payment from Iraq for Iranian electricity imports. They go back to 2018; they started during the Trump administration.All – in each of these waivers, it has been the case that none of this money goes to Iran. It is held in accounts that are restricted where they can only be used to pay for food, medicine, humanitarian purposes, and other non-sanctionable activities. And it has been consistent with several policies that we have – one, to try to reduce Iran’s leverage over Iraq, and two, to try to wean Iraq from Iranian energy independence. We’ve had a number of policies we’ve worked with to try to ensure their energy independence, but in the meantime, they continue to buy Iranian electricity. And so we have in the past, as has the Trump administration, issued waivers to allow these funds to move to restricted accounts, or as I said, that can be used for humanitarian and other non-sanctionable purposes.QUESTION: Is there any concern about the potential optics of, I guess, extending a sanctions waiver while Iranian proxy groups are attacking U.S. assets in the Middle East?MR MILLER: We don’t worry about optics; we worry about reality. And the reality is that these funds, as I said, can only be used for humanitarian and other non-sanctionable purposes.And when it comes to holding Iran accountable for its destabilizing activities, I would remind you that we have imposed more than 400 sanctions on Iran since the outset of this administration. In the past few weeks, we have taken a number of actions to ensure deterrence and to – the Pentagon has conducted strikes against Iranian-backed militias. And we will continue to hold accountable – Iran accountable for its destabilizing behavior in a number of manners.QUESTION: Sorry.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: You don’t worry about optics, you worry about reality? Aren’t optics reality?MR MILLER: No. No.QUESTION: They’re not?MR MILLER: I mean, we’re going to get into a bit of a metaphysical debate.QUESTION: Well &#8212;MR MILLER: But I would say I’m not – we’re &#8212;QUESTION: No, I want to get to a specific question about this.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: But what you see is what you get. That’s reality, right?MR MILLER: I would say what’s – what you see is what you get – what – the optics, in the term I mean the optics &#8212;QUESTION: The optics are &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; is people taking this and misinterpreting it and saying it’s something that it’s not, which is what’s happened in the past when it’s – when it comes to these waivers. And I’m making very clear that these waivers &#8212;QUESTION: Okay, well what &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; are something that has – that have dated back to the Trump administration.QUESTION: But what is it – what is it that it is not? What are you saying it isn’t?MR MILLER: I will say what it is, and I will let the – those who tend to talk about these waivers over and over again, they have – they can speak for themselves.QUESTION: Well, okay. Are you saying that this is an absolute straight-up renewal of what has been done in the past and there are no changes to it? It doesn’t allow the Iranians to convert money from Iraqi dinars into Euros?MR MILLER: So I am not going to speak to a new waiver; one has not been issued at this point. I’m speaking – so if we get to the point where we can talk about a new waiver, I’ll be happy to come in and talk about the specifics. But all of our waivers in the past have made very clear that the funds are held in accounts not in Iran and available only for humanitarian and non-sanctionable purposes.QUESTION: Yeah. But &#8212; and you’re saying that should there be a waiver this afternoon, it will be exactly the same and it won’t change anything?MR MILLER: I am not going to talk about – I’m not going to talk about things that have not happened. I will be happy to – I won’t be here tomorrow; I’ll be here Thursday – be happy to talk about – if something has happened by the next time I’m at this podium, I will happy – be happy to talk about it.QUESTION: All right. And then what about the fungibility argument that you heard a lot with the money from South Korea for the hostages? Why is that – why is that argument wrong?MR MILLER: So I will say we have heard this a lot; I’ve addressed it a lot. So with respect to the Iranian regime, it has always funded destabilizing activities. It has done that first and foremost; it’s one of its top priorities. It does that whether it receives – whether its people receive humanitarian benefits or not. To the extent that the Iranian people have greater access to food or medicine as a result of money covered by this waiver, that’s food or medicine that otherwise would not have been available to them.And I would say, again, this is a policy that goes back to the previous administration. The previous administration apparently decided that it was worthwhile to have this money spent for the benefit of the Iranian people, with whom we have no quarrel. Our quarrel is with the Iranian regime and its destabilizing activities. And so our – what we see is an Iranian regime that – whether these waivers are issued or not, whether their people benefit from these monies or not – continues to fund hostile activities. That has not changed; it has not changed going back years.QUESTION: Well, whether or not they benefit from this money, isn’t that the whole point? The whole point is that they’re supposed to. But the problem is and the argument against this is that the Iranians are going to spend the same amount of money on their people as they did before, but now they’ve got another $10 billion or so to use &#8212;MR MILLER: So – so – I – I don’t accept that argument. I – what we believe –QUESTION: You don’t? So you’re inside the &#8212;MR MILLER: No.QUESTION: You know what the Iranians are doing?MR MILLER: No. What we believe is the Iranian regime is going to spend the same amount of money on destabilizing activities because it always has, and we will take actions to hold them accountable for those destabilizing activities &#8212;QUESTION: How do you know they’re not going to spend more?MR MILLER: &#8212; as we have from the beginning of this administration. What we have seen is that when these waivers have been issued, that money has been used for the benefit of the Iranian people, period.QUESTION: Yeah. And then the money that they had inside of Iran that would have spent on this is then – is then freed up for &#8212;MR MILLER: You are making an assumption that the Iranian Government &#8212;QUESTION: You’re making an assumption that they’re not doing it.MR MILLER: No, no – well, let me just – Matt, let me finish. You are making an assumption when you say that that the Iranian Government is choosing the benefit of its people over funding terrorism and funding other destabilizing actions.QUESTION: No, I’m not making that assumption.MR MILLER: That’s not what we’ve seen. We’ve seen them – we’ve seen &#8212;QUESTION: You’re making that assumption. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: No, no, I’m not. I’ve seen them as a first priority fund destabilizing activities. We think increasing the amount of money that flows for the benefit of the Iranian people is something that’s worthwhile. And again, this is money that was – that Iraq owes to Iran for electricity that Iran delivered.QUESTION: Yeah, but I – you’re twisting it 180 degrees, the opposite of what – I’m not saying that they’re not going to spend any of this money on food and medicine and other humanitarian &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s all this money can be spent on.QUESTION: Yeah, but that means that they have X amount of dollars more &#8212;MR MILLER: You – only &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in their own treasury that they can spend on destabilizing activities.MR MILLER: Only if you &#8212;QUESTION: And you guys –MR MILLER: Only if you assume they were going to fund food and medicine and other activities. And I’m saying that’s not a necessarily correct assumption.QUESTION: But you – no, you said that they &#8212;MR MILLER: They could make the choice to &#8212;QUESTION: You said that they were, and you said also that even &#8212;MR MILLER: No, that’s &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; if they are spending that money, that they are going to still fund destabilizing activities.MR MILLER: I said their first priority is to fund destabilizing activities. That is the &#8212;QUESTION: So then why would you – why would you give them – or not &#8212;MR MILLER: Because this money will not &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; not give them money, but why would you do this &#8212;MR MILLER: I feel like we’re arguing in circles here a little bit, not for the first time.QUESTION: No, it’s not, and this has gone back for several administrations now, because I don’t understand your argument that you can be so sure that none of this money is going to increase the amount of cash that Iran spends to destabilize the region.MR MILLER: Because Iran does not – when – what we see is, when making its choices for how to spend its money, Iran – the Iranian regime does not choose to feed its people first.QUESTION: Exactly.MR MILLER: They choose to fund destabilizing activities first. They always have; as far as we can tell, they always will. So when it – looking at this money, we see the benefit to allowing these funds to move again to restricted accounts where they can only benefit the Iranian people.QUESTION: But they – all right.QUESTION: Can I just (inaudible) &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead, Jen &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)QUESTION: I – I just don’t understand how you can’t see that – how you can’t see the problem with (inaudible) &#8212;MR MILLER: And I don’t – I don’t understand how you can’t – what – well, I – we don’t understand each other, I think.QUESTION: I guess so.MR MILLER: Go ahead, Jen. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Going back to the hostages &#8212;QUESTION: But we’ll get a divorce.MR MILLER: Oh, I don’t think we’re allowed to. (Laughter.) I think we’re stuck with each other. Go ahead.QUESTION: I have a quick question.MR MILLER: No, no, let me – go – I’ll come to you. Go ahead.QUESTION: On Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: No, no, Jen had her hand up. I’ll –QUESTION: Going back &#8212;MR MILLER: I will come to – I will come &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Going back to the hostages, though, the President gave some indication of optimism that a deal is going to be done. What is underpinning that optimism right now?MR MILLER: Look, because we continue to work for it, we are always hopeful that we will be able to secure the release of not just the – first and foremost the American citizens, but all of the hostages that are held, certainly all the civilian hostages, the women and children who have been now prisoners for more than a month. So as long as there is a possibility to bring them home, we will work to do it. I just don’t want to talk about the underlying details that leads us to believe there is still a possibility to return them home.QUESTION: But can you say there – if there has been any concrete movement towards that end, towards an agreement?MR MILLER: There are ongoing discussions. I don’t want to characterize where those discussions are.QUESTION: And can you say whether any sort of iteration of a deal would include all 10 Americans who are believed to &#8212;MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to talk about what the contours of a deal might be before we’ve even reached an agreement.QUESTION: Can I follow up on this &#8212;QUESTION: And then on &#8212;MR MILLER: Guys, guys. I will – I will –QUESTION: On that point &#8212;MR MILLER: I will – let Jen finish. I will come.QUESTION: Is it still the case that there is not a formal assessment being done by the U.S. Government into whether Israel is adhering to international humanitarian law?MR MILLER: As I said yesterday, we monitor the use of our weapons. We monitor all the actions that Israel takes, as we monitor actions in any conflict. But I’m not going to speak to internal deliberations.QUESTION: But there is no formal assessment?MR MILLER: I’m just not – there’s not a formal assessment that’s been made, and I’m not going to speak to internal deliberations inside the department.All right. Now, Said.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thank you for your patience, such as it is.QUESTION: Thank you. Yeah – oh, no, I can wait all day; no problem. A Hamas spokesman suggested that they will release 70 hostages for a five-day pause. Would that be acceptable to the United States?MR MILLER: I think you’ll understand I’m not going to negotiate in public about such a sensitive matter.QUESTION: But this – I mean, on principle &#8212;MR MILLER: You can ask it a bunch of different ways. I am just not going to take a negotiation question from the podium.QUESTION: All right. Well, I tell you what: Can you update us on the status of the pauses? We have had had a pause or two. Is that ongoing, or did that stop? What’s going on? I mean, if – what – from what we see and read and so on, there are no pauses taking place.MR MILLER: There are pauses that are taking place. So the Secretary – this is something the Secretary pushed for when we were in Israel. He had very direct conversations with the prime minister about it. You saw him come out and talk about those conversations afterwards, and then over the week – 10 days – after we left Israel, you saw Israel begin to implement pauses, and every day they announce pauses in areas to allow the evacuation of – let me – the evacuation of civilians along humanitarian corridors. We’ve said before we think the pauses ought to be longer. We will continue to engage in conversations with that – about that with the Government of Israel.QUESTION: And one more thing. I mean, since Sunday morning there, Saturday night here, we have not seen any figures released from Shifa Hospital because it’s completely out of service. The last count was like 11 – 80 – 11,087 or something like this. Do you have any way of keeping track of the number of Palestinians killed?MR MILLER: We don’t. We don’t have an accurate assessment or an assessment that we know to be accurate about the number of Palestinians who have been killed, but as the Secretary said last week, we know that far too many innocent Palestinian civilians have been killed.QUESTION: I understand, but with the hospitals out of service, is there – are we likely to know what’s going on and how many people have died?MR MILLER: I don’t know how I could speak to that from here.QUESTION: I want to talk about – I want to ask about the West Bank, but I can wait.MR MILLER: Go ahead. No, go.QUESTION: Okay, on the West Bank very quickly, there’s a rampage going on by the army, by the settlers and so on. Last night they went into Tulkarm, Jenin, and so on. They killed 12 Palestinians or 10 Palestinians; the number has exceeded 200 since the beginning – since October 7 and so on. I mean, just total – are you guys concerned? Are you doing anything to make sure that things don’t really blow out of &#8212;MR MILLER: We are – we are very concerned about this issue. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this. He spoke to it when we were in Israel, in fact. The Secretary has made very clear that we condemn extremist violence and harassment against Palestinians. He had a very direct conversation with the prime minister about it. What he said to the prime minister and other members of the Israeli war cabinet is that the extremist violence against settlers is unacceptable, that we think the government needs to do more to rein it in, and they need to do more to hold people accountable, and we will be watching to see what steps they take.QUESTION: Okay, but it has accelerated since this conversation.MR MILLER: I’m telling you we expect them to take action and we will be watching to see that they do.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Can we go back to Gaza, please?MR MILLER: I told Olivia I’d come to her next.QUESTION: (Inaudible) on Shifa Hospital, I know you and the – and others in the administration have spoken generally about information you have about hospitals and Hamas operating under them. Is the U.S. taking any steps to declassify, to share more information about what it has specifically regarding Shifa?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to talk about what we may or may not declassify before we take any action, just as I don’t really want to talk about intelligence matters from the podium. As I said yesterday, as you heard the National Security Advisor say over the weekend, and as the Secretary has spoken to, we do know that Hamas has used hospitals as command centers and has buried its tunnels under command centers.And I want to say something about hospitals, that number one, we want hospitals to be protected. We don’t want to see any civilians – and certainly not babies in incubators or other vulnerable populations – caught in a crossfire. We want Hamas to stop using hospitals as command posts. That would be the easiest way to solve this problem, if they would stop using the civilians that are in hospitals as humanitarian shields.But then I would also say that we want there to be safe evacuation for patients at hospitals so they can get out of harm’s way. We would support an independent third party, a respected third party, to conduct those evacuations. We know the Government of Israel would support such a step as well. They have said that they would support such a step. The question is will Hamas allow patients to be evacuated from hospitals or will they continue to use them as human shields. We think an appropriate step would be to support those evacuations so babies and other vulnerable populations are not in harm’s way.QUESTION: Well, on that front – so, one, has a third-party candidate been identified to effectuate those kind of evacuations? And then, on the Hamas front, has the U.S. made an appeal through the Qataris or anyone else to do exactly what you just said?MR MILLER: So we are in a number – we are in conversations with a number of humanitarian organizations and third parties about this very topic. I don’t want to speak to those issues in detail, but it is very much something that we would support. And I will just say generally we have sent messages through the Qataris and through other counterparts in the region to Hamas that, of course, just as we’ve said they should release the hospitals, that they should allow evacuation of wounded civilians and stop them using them as human shields.QUESTION: Specifically on the babies, just given the urgency and the fragility of the lives at stake there, I mean, conversations are one thing, but are you really pushing the gas pedal here?MR MILLER: We could not agree more. Look, we – to state matters lightly, we do not control what Hamas does. We would like Hamas to just move out of the hospitals. As I said, that would be the easiest way to solve this issue, but absent that, if they refuse to remove their command centers from hospitals, as they seem likely to do – they’ve been burying their command centers under hospitals for years – the step that we think would be appropriate for them to take would be to allow evacuation. And yes, we would very much encourage them to. Will they do it? We have seen them – one of their prime strategies has been to use civilians as human shields, not just in hospitals but in other civilian infrastructure throughout Gaza. So we would certainly hope that they would, and if they don’t, I think it speaks to their true motivations here.QUESTION: I have another question that’s in the region but sort of ancillary to everything that’s going on, so I can pose it or you can come back to me.MR MILLER: We’ll come back.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Thank you. On the hostages, I know you don’t want to talk about details, but some of the information that was leaked out that basically they will release 80 women and children in return for women and Palestinian children who are in the Israeli jails. Can you take this question if you don’t know the answer, please? No, can you please tell us if Israel – if you are aware of Israel holding Palestinian children in jail? Just take the question and you can verify it.MR MILLER: So I am just not going to speak to hostage negotiations. With respect to that factual question, that’s a question for the Government of Israel. But as it relates to hostage negotiations, I’m not going to speak to that at all.QUESTION: Okay. The Israeli foreign minister said that the secretary-general, Mr. Antonio Guterres, is not qualified to lead the UN or the world. Do you agree with him? And how do you differentiate between somebody who is obviously being critical of Israel and people who going to be labeled as antisemitic? How can we have this debate where there is legitimate criticism of Israel and not be put in the category that people are antisemitic?MR MILLER: So with respect to the first one, I will let the foreign minister speak to his own comments, but I’ll say we support the work that the UN has done to get humanitarian relief into Israel. We’ll continue to work with the UN and its various agencies to try to get relief into Israel, and that includes with, of course, the secretary-general.And with respect to the first question, of course legitimate criticism of Israel is appropriate, just as criticism of any government is appropriate. We welcome criticism of our government. I won’t speak for other governments; obviously, many governments don’t welcome such criticism around the world. But that’s a different matter than antisemitism, which we very much abhor and condemn.QUESTION: And finally, there’s a lawsuit – I don’t know if you’re aware of it – against the Secretary of State, the President, and the Defense Secretary in New York. It was filed yesterday in a federal court, and they’re saying basically that they failed to prevent and aid in genocide in Gaza. Are you aware of this – of this &#8212;MR MILLER: I’ve seen the – I’ve seen the litigation but we don’t – I won’t comment on litigation. I’ll refer that to the Justice Department for comment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: The House looks set to vote on a budget today without any aid for Israel or Ukraine. How concerned are you about that, and when does this become critical?MR MILLER: So we are at a critical point with respect to aid to Ukraine. The Pentagon has said publicly that they have exhausted somewhere around 95 percent of their funds to provide security assistance to Ukraine – security assistance that’s very important. We think it’s urgent that the House pass the supplemental requests that we made not just to fund security assistance to Ukraine, not just to fund security assistance to Israel, but also to fund the humanitarian assistance that we have requested for the people of Gaza, which we think is critically important both for their safety and well-being and for Israel’s long-term security interests.Yeah.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Assistant Secretary Barbara Leaf is headed back to the region. Any particular message she is carrying on behalf of the Secretary?MR MILLER: I think you’ll see her continue the work that the Secretary launched in his two trips to the region, trying to achieve many of the same objectives: one, to ensure that Israel is able to defend itself against terrorism while respecting humanitarian law, that we are trying to secure the release of hostages, that we are trying to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Rafah and facilitate the departure of American citizens from Rafah. There are now over 600 American citizens and lawful permanent residents and their family members who have departed Gaza through Rafah gate. There are somewhere – there are a little under a thousand that we know of that are left now we hope – whose departure we hope to facilitate over the coming days should they wish to depart. And of course, you – we’ll continue to work to try to prevent the conflict from spreading, which has been one of our top objectives from the outset.QUESTION: Thank you. And back to Iran, I want to bring up, too, a quote from the Secretary this morning. He said in a statement that, “Iran’s support, primarily through , enables Hamas and PIJ’s terrorist activities, including through the transfer of funds ... and operational training.” I assume you still stand by this statement. And if that’s &#8212;MR MILLER: Absolutely, and I think you’re referring to a statement he made imposing sanctions on Hamas to prevent it from accessing the financial system, which is the exact kind of sanctions we have imposed on Iran over 400 times in this administration to prevent them from conducting these destabilizing activities.QUESTION: But the argument is aren’t we deluding ourselves when expecting that a regime – a terrorist regime, I should say – of that nature then gets its hands on 10 additional billion dollars will act differently?MR MILLER: So I think you are mistaking – you are misstating several facts. They get their hands on zero additional dollars as a result of these waivers. Again, none of these funds are sent to Iran. They are held in third-party accounts outside Iran, and can be used only for not – for humanitarian and other non-sanctionable purposes for the benefits of the Iranian people.QUESTION: But there is no concern whatsoever on your end that Iran might get emboldened by this action?MR MILLER: You think Iran is going to get more emboldened than it is already because of this action?QUESTION: Well, do you think &#8212;MR MILLER: These are sanctions that have been going – these are waivers that have been issued going back to 2018. We have seen Iran continue its destabilizing activities throughout that time, just as they did before the Trump administration issued the first of these waivers in 2018, which is why we have held them accountable through strikes against their proxy militias in the region and through the sanctions I just referred to, as well as a number of other measures.QUESTION: Okay. Please come back to me on Russia later.QUESTION: (Inaudible) thing again (inaudible).MR MILLER: I think you’re about to. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Well, no, I’m not going to, but I just – I just do not understand why you – why it is that you’re so single-mindedly refusing to understand at least the argument that &#8212;MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; this money – this money is going to be able to be used by Iran, and that when they do use it and they use $1 million to buy medicine from – of this money, that that frees up another million dollars that they would have spent – they would have had to spend on this – without the sanctions waiver.MR MILLER: I – I &#8212;QUESTION: And they can use that – they can use it to do whatever they want with it.MR MILLER: So I understand the argument. I don’t agree with it, and here’s why. If they were sitting on that $1 million, they would use it for their destabilizing activities, to fund terrorism, and deny medicine to their people. That’s the point I’m making. And so to approve $1 million of, say, medical transactions to the benefit of the Iranian people, we believe those are benefits to the Iranian people that they would not have otherwise gotten.QUESTION: So it’s just a lost cause, then? You’re just saying that they’re going to – they’re going to fund destabilizing activities regardless of whether you give them the waiver or not?MR MILLER: I think that – I think they are going – they have shown that they are going to conduct destabilizing activities. They were doing it before 2018 when the Trump administration gave them their first waiver.QUESTION: Exactly. That’s the entire point.MR MILLER: Which is why – but which is why we have an entire set of policies to hold them accountable for their destabilizing activities. And part of our policy has always been not to penalize the Iranian people. There is no country in the world where we deny access to food and medicine and where our sanctions target food and medicine and other humanitarian goods to the people. That’s true with respect to Russia. It’s true with respect to Iran. It’s true with respect to every country in the world, and it always has been. That is the policy of the United States.QUESTION: Matt, on this, what about the timing – the waiver’s timing? And second, did Iran help in preventing Hizballah from launching a full war against Israel? And third, did Iran receive the $6 billion that South Korea transferred to it through Qatar?MR MILLER: So three things. Again, on the timing, a waiver hasn’t been issued at this point. I’ll be happy to talk more about a waiver if and when it has been issued. But the timing is that the waiver, the previous waiver, expires today. So that’s the – with respect to timing.With respect to Hizballah, I will just – I won’t speak for what actions Iran has taken. I will speak for the United States, and we have sent very loud and clear messages that we think that any party hostile to Israel should not enter this conflict. We have sent public messages to that effect. You’ve seen the President speak to it. And we have sent private messages to that effect, and we hope that they will be received. And if they’re not, we will be prepared to take action.And with respect to the third question, it’s my understanding that none of that money has yet to be spent.QUESTION: And did you ask Iran to ask Hizballah not to launch a war, a full war, on Israel?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to talk about messages other than to say that we have made very clear publicly and through private channels that no party should escalate this conflict.Simon, go ahead.QUESTION: A different subject, if it’s all right.MR MILLER: No. No, no. We need to do more. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Can we talk – just get an update on the Russian-American journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Alsu Kurmasheva? Her husband is calling for her to be designated as wrongfully detained. Can we expect such a designation? In the case of Evan Gershkovich, also detained in Russia, it happened within, I think, 10 or 11 days. What’s the holdup of getting a determination in this case?MR MILLER: So I don’t have any update. We continue to request consular access for her, and it has not yet been granted. And I would just say with respect to wrongful detainees, every circumstance is different. We look at each of these and try to make a determination as quickly as we can, but we have to gather all the appropriate facts before making a determination. And I don’t think anyone should read into the amount of time it takes in one case versus the amount of time it takes in another case of what our determination is going to be or what our priority is going to be. It’s just that every circumstance is different.QUESTION: But is it – just to confirm, there is a process underway to determine yes or no?MR MILLER: We always – I don’t want to speak to a formal process, but we always look at these cases overseas and determine whether we should make such a – look at whether we should make such a determination or not.QUESTION: And you haven’t had any consular access?MR MILLER: We have not.QUESTION: Haven’t been formally informed of her detention?MR MILLER: As far as I’m aware. It’s possible the embassy’s had something today that I’m not aware of, but as far as I’m aware, we have not, no.Go ahead.QUESTION: In a similar vein, is the department offering any guidance on the situation of Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Princeton researcher? A video of her surfaced yesterday. Has the U.S. authenticated that video in any way?MR MILLER: So we’ve seen the video. I don’t think we have any way to authenticate it, but we strongly condemn her abduction, as we have before. We know she was conducting research in Baghdad at the time of her abduction. She is affiliated with a higher education institution in the United States. And I would just say, as is always the case when you have hostage videos or videos of people that are – have been abducted, you should not take the claims made in those videos at face value, and you have to consider the source of those videos and understand that their captors may have ulterior motives, to say the least.All right, go ahead.QUESTION: So a big part of this war is misinformation, which is spreading widely across social media. Yesterday, the IDF posted – the IDF spokesman posted a video in the basement of Rantisi Children’s Hospital pointing to a random calendar, and he said that this is evidence of hostage keepers and terrorists’ names. And it was debunked and showed that it was like a regular calendar. More of these are being spread, like a nurse being said that she was in the hospital and it was later debunked to be like an Israeli actress.Does this administration examine misinformation widely spread, especially from the Israeli part? Because we heard – we heard here on this podium repeatedly you saying that the number of killed was 1,400 when it was 1,200. Do you ask – do you ask and look into these information and evidence, or do you believe them blindly?MR MILLER: So we look at a number of different claims. I don’t know if that information about the calendar has been debunked. I read in a prominent American newspaper today that, in fact, it showed on that calendar – used the name for October 7th that Hamas uses. I have no way to &#8212;QUESTION: It’s in Arabic.MR MILLER: Hold on, let me just &#8212;QUESTION: It’s an Arabic date.MR MILLER: Let me just finish. I have &#8212;QUESTION: Like Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.QUESTION: It’s all &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me – let me make my point. I have no way of either verifying or debunking that information. And it goes to the point &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, but now they’re &#8212;MR MILLER: Please. I did not interrupt you when you were asking a question.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: There’s plenty of time for people to ask questions.It goes to the point I was making yesterday, that in the fog of war, from thousands of miles away at the podium, I have no way to independently adjudicate the various claims that are being made. I will come back to the core principles that we state, which is that we expect Israel to – that we expect Israel to operate with respect to humanitarian law. And I do want to restate the broader point with respect to hospitals that I said earlier, which is Hamas has long – has long used hospitals as command centers. I can’t speak to every individual claim, I’m not going to speak to intelligence that we have, and I can’t adjudicate the various pieces of information from here when I’m thousands of miles away.But I think it’s fairly well known – and if not accepted, I would hope it would be – that Hamas uses civilians as – or uses civilians as human shields. And I’m a little surprised that there are people that continue to challenge that claim despite the evidence going back years from well before October 7th that Hamas has used mosques and schools and other civilian infrastructure as – as infrastructure for its own terrorist purposes.QUESTION: Yeah, but my question is about misinformation. Like, we heard a lot of – like recordings that you can see the accent, it’s not like a proper Arabic accent. We’ve seen the calendar &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that is, like, so easy to know that it’s dates. It’s days. It’s not anything. There’s nothing on it. This is my question.MR MILLER: I am just not able to speak to individual claims. Of course, we monitor all this and we try to reach our own factual determinations, as we do in any conflict.QUESTION: Okay. And on Lebanon, yesterday, a group of media journalists was the target to an Israeli airstrike on the southern borders of Lebanon. A month ago – a month ago today, like, also an Israeli airstrike killed a Reuters correspondent. So do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: We mourn the loss of every civilian life in this conflict, whether they be Israeli, whether they be Palestinian, Lebanese, or citizens of any other country. And I’ve spoken to this before. We know that journalists put themselves in harm’s way to bring the truth to people around the world and we commend them for that activity. It’s one of the bravest acts you can ask anyone to do. And of course, when a journalist loses their life, we are deeply sorry for that – for that having occurred.QUESTION: And just to come back to that &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; misinformation question, you say that you can’t adjudicate every example. This is very similar to a discussion we had about civilian losses in airstrikes as well, but just to point out that the department has the Global Engagement Center that is constantly putting out material about governments around the world doing disinformation, misinformation.MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: Is that something that you would look at in – there’s some examples there. There are other &#8212;MR MILLER: If we &#8212;QUESTION: There are other examples that have come out of the Israeli Government that – sure, Hamas as well, but is there something that you would &#8212;MR MILLER: If we saw examples of disinformation, of course, it’s something we would look at and call out. But you do have to remember the fog of war, and that in the fog of war, everyone makes mistakes. I’m not saying that’s what happened here. As I said, I have no way to independently determine myself, but there is a difference between governments or individuals that make mistakes or that make claims that they then later have to update when new facts become available and intentional, deliberate misinformation over a sustained period of time.QUESTION: I guess people might say you have these parts of the department that call out governments for misinformation, but it tends to be governments that you are – that are your adversaries, right? So I guess you could show some willingness to make those same judgments when it comes to your friends like Israel.MR MILLER: So if we saw a sustained, deliberate misinformation campaign by Israel or any other government, of course, we would call it out. I will say it tends to be not democracies with whom we are allies and partners that conduct misinformation campaigns, but authoritarian regimes, so I think it’s natural that you will see us calling it out more in those circumstances – authoritarian regimes that don’t have a free press – to challenge the information being put out by the government. But if we see any kind of deliberate misinformation campaign, of course, we would call it out with – if it had – no matter who it was.Okay. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks very much. I have two questions. Yesterday, I asked you about a Russian delegation – a particular Russian deputy prime minister who will be present at the summit – at the leaders’ summit in San Francisco. Turns out it is Aleksey Overchuk, who got sanctioned by the EU last December for Russia’s brutal actions in Ukraine.Do you have any issue with the fact that a EU-sanctioned Russian official will be in the same room with the President and &#8212;MR MILLER: So I will let the EU speak to their sanctions. I will say that as the host of APEC, we have a responsibility – we – or I will say we take our host obligation responsibility – and that includes hosting officials from all the members of APEC, but we do it consistent with U.S. sanctions policy and rules and regulations.QUESTION: But you don’t consider this as a violation of EU sanctions, the invite?MR MILLER: I’m not going to get into technical sanctions questions. I will say we have an obligation as the host. There are a lot – we go – we attend – one of the things about diplomacy is you attend a lot of meetings with people whose policies you object to, and sometimes you object to things that they’ve done, but we have a responsibility to conduct diplomacy on behalf of the United States.QUESTION: Thank you, and my second question on Karabakh. Ahead of tomorrow’s congressional hearing, I’m just wondering if you have any preview of what you guys are going to say in terms of the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. You have Azerbaijan on one hand celebrating the victory surrounded – in a town surrounded by Russian army. You have Armenia is being bullied by Russia every single day saying that won’t go anywhere, I’m not going to go anywhere.So is there any happy ending there, in your opinion?MR MILLER: I will just say what I’ve said before. I don’t want to speak to the meeting that’s going to happen tomorrow, but I’ll say that we continue to believe that people who have left Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to come home if they wish to do so, and that’s a right that should be upheld.Let me go – go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. Matt, I asked Vedant the other day when you were in Asia, then I asked the European desk, and I want to ask you too: Do you consider the occupation of Cyprus by your allies the Turks an occupation or something else? I’m sure you know the answer they gave me. They said to me: We believe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries should be respected and protected. But they don’t say if there is – if the occupation of Cyprus is an occupation. What is your position?MR MILLER: So we believe that – we support Cypriot-led, UN-facilitated efforts to reunify the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality to benefit all Cypriots, as outlined in relevant UN Security Council resolutions. That has been the longstanding policy of the United States going back years.QUESTION: But – but there is an occupation, you know that?MR MILLER: Again, this is an issue we think that needs to be resolved through UN-facilitated efforts to reunify the island.QUESTION: Thank you so much.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. I have two questions. 2+2 ministerial meeting in India. After that, Vinay Kwatra, Indian foreign ministry official, restated of stable Bangladesh for the Indian subcontinent and raised concern over rising extremism with third-country intervention. What will be really danger for India – yeah, as well as for U.S.A.? Will you differ from such Indian stance on Bangladesh?MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that.QUESTION: And I have – the second one. While U.S. envoy repeatedly calling for dialogue between parties, ignoring the street violence between BNP-Jamaat-led blockade, can the U.S. guarantee the end of such – yeah, violence by BNP-Jamaat given past record of such violence by same group in Bangladesh?MR MILLER: So we have consistently said that we believe elections in Bangladesh should take – should be free and fair and open, and they should take place free of violence.QUESTION: Thank you so much.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, I have a follow-up &#8212;MR MILLER: No, no, no, no – go – behind you.QUESTION: Thank you. The Biden administration has been very clear about their China strategy and the hope to stabilize relations and reopen regular lines of communication in the near term. Can you speak more to what the goal and hope of this administration is for the U.S.-China relationship in the longer term?MR MILLER: So we have – you’re right, we have – the short-term project, which we started in June, really, when Secretary Blinken traveled to Beijing, was to re-establish the ability to have conversations, but that was not a goal in itself. It was a goal so we could, number one, manage big geostrategic issues and make sure that, when conflicts do arise, that we can talk to each other and make sure that we are both – both avoid miscalculation. But it’s – also was to make tangible progress on bilateral issues between the two countries.You saw the Secretary when he was in Beijing – and then with his meetings with Wang Yi in Jakarta and his meetings with Wang Yi here just afterwards – press on several tangible issues. Making progress on fentanyl is one, to stop the export of precursor chemicals from China that are turned into fentanyl and have killed millions and millions of Americans. Re-establishing military-to-military ties is another. The Secretary has pressed very hard for both of those. And it is that exact type of bilateral issue that we are looking to make progress on, as well as an ability to work together to reduce tensions on larger strategic global issues.Go ahead. No – behind – go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Me?MR MILLER: No. Behind you.QUESTION: I have question on Russia – two questions. First, if there are any contacts planned between the U.S. delegation to APEC and the Russian delegation.And another question: One – the recent interview by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, who said that while Russia doesn’t intend to push relations between Washington and Moscow into a peace, it doesn’t rule out that Washington can either lower diplomatic level or break the relations. Your comment?MR MILLER: I don’t understand. What do you mean lower the – what do you mean lower the diplomatic level or &#8212;QUESTION: Maybe pull out ambassador or &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh. I don’t want to speak – I don’t want to speak to that. I will say with respect to the first question, there are no – I am not aware of any meetings scheduled between us and the Russian Government at APEC.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Speaking about preventing destabilizing activities, 45 members of Congress have sent a letter to Secretary Blinken asking him to put pressure to Türkiye about stopping facilitating Hamas. We know your position that you have expressed to the allies that you don’t want them to support Hamas.My question is: Have you taken any action to ensure that a NATO member like Türkiye will not support the terrorist organization that at the very right moment is attacking a major ally like Israel?MR MILLER: Let me say two things. Number one, we have made very clear our position that there can be no more business as usual with Hamas since October 7th. We have long designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. There are other countries that continue to conduct conversations with them and have relationships with them. And we have made clear the position of the United States, which is that there shouldn’t be such business as usual moving forward.At the same time, we have recognized that Hamas continues to hold American citizens and citizens of Israel and citizens of Thailand and citizens of other countries as hostages. And it’s useful for countries that have relationships with Hamas now to use those relationships to try to get hostages released, just as it’s useful to use those relationships to try to get Rafah gate reopened, which we have done to get humanitarian assistance in, and to flowing – to get American citizens and others the ability to leave. But long term, our position is very clear that there can be no going back to the days before October 7th.And – Jen, and then we’ll close out.QUESTION: A very different topic. We were told there were migration talks between the U.S. and Cuba here this week. Is there anything you can share on that?MR MILLER: I’ll have to take that back. I’m not aware.QUESTION: Wait, Matt, before you go &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; two widely divergent things. One, just on the whole dissent issue, the Secretary’s department-wide note sent yesterday. Was that written or sent out of concern that things are kind of spiraling out of control? Or was it simply because it was the first workday since he got back from the trip and &#8212;MR MILLER: It was &#8212;QUESTION: What is the concern?MR MILLER: It was sent because it was – it’s the second of two emails. The first one was sent after his first trip to the region when he came back and updated the workforce on the work that he was doing and what our policies are and what we were trying to achieve and what he was trying to achieve through his travel through the region. And because this is such an important piece of diplomatic work to the department that touches not just one bureau in the department but multiple bureaus, he thought it was appropriate after the first trip to send an update, and thought it was appropriate after the second trip to do the same.And of course, he did address in that email the – all the issues underlying our policy and made clear people understood what our policy is, just as he has done in meetings he’s had with a number of employees in the department.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: No, no, no, just &#8212;QUESTION: So there isn’t – so there’s not a particular concern that the unity, cohesiveness of the building is being shredded?MR MILLER: No. As I said yesterday, we think that the diversity inside the department is actually a strength, not a weakness.QUESTION: Okay. And it’s still your understanding that there’s only one person who has resigned as a result of the – in protest over the &#8212;MR MILLER: As far as I’m aware, the one resignation that’s been very public is the only one that I am at least aware of or that – with respect to our policy.QUESTION: Okay. And then, on a completely different subject, today in San Francisco – and I think it might’ve already happened – the Secretary was meeting with the Japanese and the South Korean &#8212;MR MILLER: I think it hasn’t happened. I think it’s later today.QUESTION: Oh, okay. Well, I’m just curious as to – I mean, is that just because they’re there? Because he just met with them.MR MILLER: This is to conduct a trilateral. But he met &#8212;QUESTION: He met with them last week.MR MILLER: He met with them separately last week. This is to conduct a trilateral meeting as a follow-on to the summit that the President held at Camp David in August.QUESTION: And are you expecting anything to come from this, or is it just kind of like a signals check?MR MILLER: I think we’ll talk about a number of issues that are important in the relationship. We may have some announcements coming out of it. Stay tuned.QUESTION: You may have?MR MILLER: Yeah, just stay tuned. All right, thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:09 p.m.)# # #1. 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- Republic of Cyprus National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I send our best wishes to the people of the Republic of Cyprus as you celebrate the 63rd anniversary of your nation’s independence.The Republic of Cyprus and the United States are partners in pursuit of a more peaceful and prosperous world and share a commitment to democracy, freedom, and human dignity. The bonds between our nations have never been stronger, and we look forward to further deepening the full range of our government-to-government and people-to-people ties in the coming year.I am inspired by the possibilities that a reunified Cyprus could open for all its people and the Eastern Mediterranean region. We remain fully committed to a Cypriot-led, UN-facilitated comprehensive settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation, with political equality for all Cypriots.The United States believes in the strength and resilience of the Cypriot people and will remain your steadfast partner. I extend my warmest regards and best wishes for another year of continued friendship and deepening cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus.
- Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2024 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonSecretary Blinken determined and certified to Congress that the Republic of Cyprus has met the necessary conditions under applicable legislation to allow the Department to approve exports, re-exports, and transfers of defense articles to the Republic of Cyprus for fiscal year (FY) 2024.  Compliance with the conditions is assessed on an annual basis.  As a result of this determination and certification, the Secretary lifted the defense trade restrictions for the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2024.  The International Traffic in Arms Regulations will be amended to reflect the new policy, effective October 1, 2023.  This determination does not represent a change; rather, it is re-certification of the FY 2023 determination.The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020 require that the policy of denial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles on the United States Munitions List to the Republic of Cyprus remain in place unless the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees not less than annually that— A) the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is continuing to cooperate with the United States Government in efforts to implement reforms on anti-money laundering regulations and financial regulatory oversight, and B) the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has made and is continuing to take the steps necessary to deny Russian military vessels access to ports for refueling and servicing.  In accordance with both Acts, the Department reviews compliance with the Acts annually.
- Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Kombos Office of the SpokespersonThe following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos today via phone.  The two discussed durable transatlantic unity in opposing Russia’s unjustified war in Ukraine, and Cyprus’ commitment to advancing peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.  The Secretary underscored U.S. commitment to continued investment in the U.S.-Republic of Cyprus bilateral relationship and U.S. readiness to support Cypriot-led efforts to reunify the island.