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- Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 30, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024																																																					April 30, 2024																																																								1:17 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Let’s see. I have – I don’t have anything off the top, so Daphne, do you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yes, thank you so much.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Prime Minister Netanyahu said today that Israel will carry out an operation against Hamas in Rafah regardless of whether or not &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: (Laughter.) Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, regardless of whether or not a ceasefire and hostage release deal is reached. Is it still the case that the U.S. hasn’t seen a credible plan for entering Rafah? And what will you do if they go ahead, as Netanyahu is warning?MR PATEL: That is correct. We – it continues to be the case that we have not seen a credible plan that would address the varying areas of concerns that you’ve heard me talk about a number of times from up here and others, primarily the ability to address the serious humanitarian concerns surrounding – again, Rafah is a region with more than 1 million people seeking refuge, so that an area that continues to be an important conduit for humanitarian aid as well as the safe departure of foreign nationals. And so any kind of operation that’s – that does not address some of these key concerns would certainly be opposed by us.I’m not going to get into any hypotheticals, but this is something we’re continuing to engage with our partners in Israel. Conversations continue to be happening at all levels, and we continue to press forward on those conversations and asking for what their plans may or may not be as it pertains to Rafah.QUESTION: And are you concerned that this warning that they would go ahead with whether or not a ceasefire and hostage deal is reached could derail hostage talks?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speculate on that. What I can say, Daphne, is that we remain committed to reaching a deal for the immediate – for an immediate ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and allows for additional steps to be taken in terms of surging humanitarian aid, and something that we hope will help bolster the protection of civilians as well.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?QUESTION: A follow-up on that?MR PATEL: Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Israel’s track record in heeding to the U.S. statements or calls could be arguably not great. What gives you confidence or what makes you think that Israel would, in fact, listen and hear your calls not to go into Rafah?MR PATEL: I’d dispute, though, the premise of that a little bit, Leon. Over the course of this conflict, there have been a number of endeavors in which the United States has pressed for that we have seen our partners in Israel undertake, dating back to the beginning of this conflict even in the early days of this conversation that we were having around humanitarian aid. We also continue to see steps being taken as it relates to their cooperation on a number of other lines of effort in the humanitarian aid space.But both – look, when it comes to humanitarian aid, when it comes to the protection of civilians, and when it comes to a potential operation in Rafah, our answer continues to be we need to see more, we need to see more steps being taken. And as it relates to an operation in Rafah, we have yet to see a credible plan that would address the underlying concerns that I laid out to Daphne.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?MR PATEL: Olivia, go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Just because the Secretary was also asked about this not long ago. He said that the U.S. views on this were well known. But he didn’t address part of the question that – whether Israel had in fact committed to present a military and humanitarian plan. So absent the plans themselves, has there been a formal commitment from the Israeli Government to present those plans before launching any – an invasion?MR PATEL: I am not going to be a spokesperson for the Government of Israel. Through the Strategic Consultative Group that you have seen National Security Advisor Sullivan and Secretary Blinken undertake their consultations with counterparts in Israel, discussions at those levels and through other interlocutors as part of those engagements, those conversations are ongoing. As the Secretary said, the United States position on this could not be clearer. For how long we’ve been talking about this, we have expressed our serious concern about any kind of operation that does not address some of these key pieces, and we’ll continue to stress and raise these very important issues.QUESTION: Thank you. I mean, I totally appreciate not asking you for the Israeli perspective on this, only whether the U.S. has actually received a commitment from the government to have formal plans presented prior to any invasion.MR PATEL: I am just not going to speak to further specificity about this process.QUESTION: Okay. Two others on the region, if that’s okay.MR PATEL: Mind if I jump to Gillian?QUESTION: Sure.MR PATEL: And then we can – we’ll – I’m sure we’ll get to everybody. Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, thanks. I’m just wondering if State has any comment or any information, anything today on the anti-Israel protests across the nation now, really going from California all the way to New York. A lot of these student protesters are accusing the Biden administration of being complicit in genocide. Wondering if you – if diplomatically &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; foreign-policy-wise, you guys have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, so I’ve spent a number of the last few daily press briefings talking about this, and I’m happy to reiterate what I said before. First, I will echo what the Secretary said in talking to one of your colleagues on the margins of his trip to Beijing. Demonstrating – demonstrations, I should say, expressing your opinion about any kind of government action, expressing your opinion about foreign policy, exercising your First Amendment right – none of those things are problematic or antisemitic or Islamophobic, in their own right. It is when those things are coupled with the use of certain language, and rhetoric, and insults that we have seen and have been part of some of these demonstrations.Beyond that, those kinds of things of course we would condemn and take issue with. But we believe that every American has every right to express their points of view, to exercise their First Amendment right. When it comes to policies that are – that as it relate to any particular campus, those campus officials are better suited to speak to those policies that they have in place both in terms of dealing with expressions of First Amendment rights or otherwise. I am not in a space to speak to that.But of course, everyone has every right to make their point of view heard, and from our perspective across this administration we’ve made clear that we insist that these happen in a peaceful, nonviolent manner. And any kinds of these demonstrations, when they are paired with or coupled with rhetoric, language that is antisemitic, Islamophobic, essentially insults or target someone for just who they are, that’s deeply problematic.QUESTION: A quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: One thing that’s kind of new as far as I’m aware is you’re seeing regimes now like the Iranian regime, China has started to weigh in – the government, and criticize the Biden administration’s response to these protests. We saw overnight the Chinese saying that the way the U.S. Government is responding is violating these students’ rights. Do you have a comment on these adversaries kind of using it as an opportunity to criticize?MR PATEL: Look, the policies and procedures as it relates to demonstrations, protesting, things like that that may or may not exist on a particular college campus, or may or may not exist in a particular town, city, or municipality, it is certainly not in the remit of the State Department so I am not going to even delve into that.QUESTION: Isn’t it hypocritical though &#8212;MR PATEL: There’s other agencies that are better suited to speak to that. But what I can say broadly, we of course support anybody to be able to express themselves and to exercise their First Amendments rights. They should not and cannot become violent, not peaceful. And in those particular circumstances, we believe it is the right of the appropriate law enforcement and – enforcement and security officials to take appropriate actions consistent with the policies of that jurisdiction. Again, we are delving far away from foreign policy and into law enforcement, which is not the remit of this – of this department.QUESTION: No, because what I’m asking really is: Is it not from a foreign policy, foreign relations, diplomacy perspective, isn’t it, I mean, hypocritical of the Chinese and the Iranians, some of the worst human rights violators in the world, to be criticizing the Biden administration’s policy response to America?MR PATEL: I don’t think anybody in this administration is interested in taking a human rights lesson from the Iranian regime, or the People’s Republic of China for that matter. And both of those regimes’ crackdowns on self-expression, on free and fair press, on basic human rights, is clear.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving &#8212;QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up on a couple of things.MR PATEL: Hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving of the United States with the protesters being arrested is not necessarily the one you would want to have.MR PATEL: Leon, there are laws in this country. Again, we are delving away from the topics that are discussed in this department. But if laws are being broken on certain college campuses, in certain municipalities, in certain towns, in certain cities, in certain counties, it is will within the right for the officials of those jurisdictions to enforce whatever laws that are so appropriate as it relates to that region. Beyond that, we fully support anybody’s ability to exercise their First Amendment right and make their opinions as it relates to any action or policy the government may or may not be taking and making their points of view heard.QUESTION: Vedant &#8212;MR PATEL: Said.QUESTION: Thank you, I just have quick follow-ups and then I have a couple questions of my own.Now, in response to Gillian, you said there are certain things that are being said in these protests that you have issue with. Could you share some of those with us?MR PATEL: I’m not going to repeat them from up here, Said, but &#8212;QUESTION: But you made an assertion that you are obviously in command of. What are these statements?MR PATEL: Said, there have been a number of these demonstrations in which the imagery, in which the language that has been written on some of the poster material, has either been akin to what I would believe to be antisemitism. But we’ve also seen expressions, rhetoric, signage that is akin to Islamophobia and the targeting of Arab Americans and Palestinian Americans, as well. Of course any kind of language or rhetoric in that space is concerning, troubling, and unacceptable. But again, we fully support people’s ability to peacefully make their – express their First Amendment rights.QUESTION: Now on the statement by the Israeli prime minister on Rafah, I mean, he is saying very plainly that whether there is a deal or there is no deal, I am going storm Rafah. And you don’t have a position on this? I mean, he’s not waiting for a deal to be arrived at.MR PATEL: I think our position on Rafah – I really don’t appreciate you, Said, twisting my words or the words &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not.MR PATEL: &#8212; of the Secretary or other officials up here. We have made our point of view &#8212;QUESTION: I am quoting what the prime minister of Israel said. I’m not &#8212;MR PATEL: I understand. I understand your question. And in response to your question, and Daphne’s question, and the number of times that we have asked – been asked about a potential operation into Rafah from up here, we have been unambiguous about the concerns that we have when it comes to the more than a million people seeking refuge in that region, when it comes to this region in particular in Gaza being an important conduit for the delivery of humanitarian aid, it being a region in which foreign nationals at least at the beginning of this conflict were able to use, are able to use consistently for safe departure.So any kind of operation that does not address these concerns would be a non-starter for us. And you’ve heard me say this. You’ve heard the Secretary say this. You’ve heard Matt say this; you’ve heard Admiral Kirby, Karine, the President. We have been consistent on this.QUESTION: Yeah. So would it be appropriate for the United States of America to say, whether there is a deal or not a deal, we find that the storming of Rafah is unacceptable?MR PATEL: I – we have been pretty clear about that, Said.QUESTION: Very clear?MR PATEL: We have been very clear that many – any kind of military operation into Rafah that does not address these concerns would be unacceptable to the United States.QUESTION: Right. Now I have a question on the humanitarian situation. Officials at the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, leaked a – they leaked a document that says that the Israeli Government intently sort of put obstacles in the way of these humanitarian aid convoys or whatever, getting food to Gaza. Now are you aware of that report?MR PATEL: So I’m just not going to comment on leaked documents, Said.QUESTION: Why won’t you comment on this document?MR PATEL: I’m not going to comment on leaked documents, on things that continue to exist under a deliberative process. I will just say that the Secretary and the leaders of this administration, they hear a diverse range of views from across this department, from across the interagency. When it comes to processes that are within the deliberative process, we take those points of view into consideration, but beyond that, I am just not going to speak to purportedly leaked documents.QUESTION: Okay. Would you agree that there is a – almost a common opinion among professionals and experts and so on that Israel is in fact – and the prime minister of Israel are in fact – take measures day after day to sort of make these humanitarian aids, including American – large portions of American aid &#8212;MR PATEL: I would disagree with your characterization.Julia.QUESTION: Thank you. I know the State Department and Secretary Blinken have made clear that the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction in your view over the Palestinian conflict. But I wanted to get your response to remarks from Netanyahu just today, especially in context of the conversation we just had about the campus protests. He said, “Branding Israel’s leaders and soldiers as war criminals will pour jet fuel on the fires of antisemitism, those fires that are already raging on the campuses of America and across capitals around the world.”Do you agree with that assessment that it’s antisemitic for the ICC to pursue Netanyahu? And what do you make of him connecting this to the campus protests?MR PATEL: So fundamentally, at the heart of this, Julia, we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction over this issue, and that’s the crux here. Beyond that, I’d let the prime minister and officials within the Israeli Government clarify or offer any commentary on his comments.But at the crux of this for the United States is that we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction on this. That being said, we work closely with the ICC on a number of key areas. We think that they do important work – important work as it relates to Ukraine, Darfur, Sudan. But again, on this particular incident – instance – in this particular instance, I’m sorry, they just do not have jurisdiction.QUESTION: If I may, another on Saudi Arabia.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: There have been reports that Saudi Arabia has decided to normalize relations with Israel but is waiting to determine when they do that based on the U.S. election and the results of the election. What do you make of Saudi Arabia potentially weighing this presidential election so much, when the urgency is now?MR PATEL: So I would – I’d defer to officials in the Saudi Government to speak to their position. I’m not a spokesperson for them. What I can say from the United States is that we also have been unambiguous about how we feel that a greater – a more integrated Middle East region is better for not just the interests of the United States, but it is better for peace and stability in the Middle East region. It is also something that we believe other officials across the Middle East region and Arab world view this as well.We are continuing to work this. We think that Israel’s further integration in the Middle East region can unlock additional benefits. It can offer greater security, which is in the interests of the United States. It’s in the interest of the people of Israel, and it’s also in the interest of other partners as well.But of course, we also are continuing to stress and underline the importance of doing everything we can to reaching a deal for an immediate ceasefire – one that releases the hostages, one that allows a surge of humanitarian aid into the region as well.Go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: I don’t know if somebody asked you about this or not, but I want to ask you about the Amnesty International report.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. So basically, Amnesty just published its report. I don’t know if you’ve seen it in details. But they say there is a reasonable evidence that Israel has committed war crimes, a gross violation of international – of human rights and violation of international humanitarian law. I’m just wondering – I mean, with something as serious as this from a very reputable organization, that normally use it to talk about rogue states, et cetera, when they finding and they publish their reports – why the State Department still now has not published anything to either contradict or to support other human rights organizations been talking about what’s happening in Gaza? Basically &#8212;MR PATEL: So first, I’ve not seen that specific report, Nadia. But I think you were in the briefing room just about a week and a half ago in which we – when we unveiled the 2024 Human Rights Report, in which there was, in fact, a section outlining Israel and the Palestinian territories.When it comes to the current conflict in Gaza – and I have spent a number of days talking about this – we are continuing to assess what is happening on the ground. We have a number of tools at our disposal to look into what is happening on the ground and, if required, hold appropriate and relevant parties accountable. You’ve heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about Leahy. You have heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about the CHIRG process. We continue to have those options as well as other avenues under the Foreign Assistance Act to look into these things. And as in any conflict zone, Nadia, this work is ongoing and we are feeding into that process in close coordination with not just our embassies and consulates, but also civil society, independent media reporting of such things, and, of course, NGOs as well.QUESTION: Can you just assure us that, actually, you treat Israel the same way as you treat any other country that found in violation of international law? Because what we hear from you is all the statements and some actions, like we see with the settlers, but many believe that when the prime minister of Israel pick up the phone, call the White House, the finding is changed and delayed and pushed, just like we heard about – even the Secretary, we were together in Italy when he assured us that we’re going to hear about this report – about the Leahy report and the violation of using U.S. weapons. But we haven’t heard about it. So I just wanted an assurance from you that actually you’re taking these things seriously.MR PATEL: Well, I spent about 50 percent of the daily press briefing yesterday talking about it, so I would take issue with how you laid that out. There are absolutely – we hold Israel to the same standard that we hold any country with, and that is with – in Gaza, outside of Gaza, anywhere. International law, international humanitarian law needs to be followed, and it needs to be abided by. And when we find violations or when we find issues that are concerning, not only do we raise them with the Israeli Government, we will take appropriate actions consistent with the systems and tools that we have in the United States to take appropriate actions.I spent a great deal of yesterday talking about the Leahy process in which we found five violations of – gross violations of human rights. So when we see issues, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action. There is no different standard or different set of rules when it comes to any country on which we have a relationship with.QUESTION: Okay. Just one final clarification.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary said that the offer they gave to Hamas is generous. Who decide what is generosity? Is it the United States and Israel? What is it – is it Arab partners in the Saudi summit that they decided it was generous? I mean, I guess my question: How do you define what is generous and what is (inaudible)?MR PATEL: So Nadia, over the course of this conflict, we have seen Hamas move the goal post, renege on agreements that they have made as it – as relates to part of this deal. And so the Secretary was simply underlining the fact that we are in this position in which Hamas has a generous offer on the table, and it’s imperative for them to move and to act on it as swiftly as possible.Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Just one point of clarification on Leahy, which I know you amply addressed yesterday, but you mentioned yesterday that the process was open-ended, right? It was subject to the MOU that exists between the Israeli Government and the United States. This new information that Israel has provided with regard to the fifth unit, is – can it continuously supply new information with regard to that unit until the U.S. sort of adjudicates in a particular direction? Or is this a finite set of information on whose basis the U.S. will decide whether to take punitive action?MR PATEL: I would say the information is definitive and it is more that, consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have, we are bound by that to consult and engage with officials in Israel on the process, on steps that they may or may not be taking, and we are assessing all of those things to ensure that they are in standard with what is laid out in the Leahy Law. And if not, as I said yesterday, there will, of course, be a resistance of applicable – a restriction on applicable U.S. assistance.QUESTION: Okay. And then a separate question on aid.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary from Jordan earlier mentioned the opening of new crossings into northern Gaza. I was hoping you could just update us on the overall metrics, on the volume of aid that’s going in, and how that compares to what the U.S. believes is necessary.MR PATEL: So look, we are still very much in the same place that we were when David Satterfield came and talked to you all. We have seen some measurable steps in the right direction. Northern crossings including Erez and Zikim are preparing to reopen. We are seeing that routes from Jordan and Ashdod are showing progress, but not fully yet realized. And southern crossings, specifically Kerem Shalom and Rafah, have seen some fluctuating numbers of trucks, but trending in the right direction.This is all to say that we still need to see more. And some metrics that I can offer is that April – on April 25th, approximately 303 trucks entered Gaza according to the UN; 282 trucks via Kerem Shalom, and 21 trucks via Rafah. That is not nearly enough, but it is a step in the right direction. We want to continue to see more. And I know also we spend a lot of time up here talking about trucks and their inflows and outflows, possibly because it might be the most digestible metric out there when talking about this issue.But ultimately, when we talk about humanitarian aid, it is great to see trucks enter Gaza; it is even better when the humanitarian aid that enters Gaza is getting to the Palestinian people, to Palestinian civilians who need it. And we will continue to work closely with the Government of Egypt, Government of Jordan, Government of Israel, and relevant NGO partners, including the United Nations, to ensure that that final step is happening and it’s getting to the places it needs to go.Go ahead.QUESTION: I’ve asked several times about the right to defend one’s self for Palestinians, and out of this room we’ve heard that the U.S. does not exhibit any double – double standards. And today in the West Bank there – the Israelis’ occupation forces chased, beat, and threw off a roof a 32-year-old man – Palestinian man, Hassan Mansiya, near – in the Hebron district. Also, the Israeli forces attacked at least two schools with tear gas, two – inside and outside schools in the Hebron and Jenin districts, where students were, and teachers, and some of them experienced some suffocation. Since October 7th, we’ve – I mean, we’ve had, like, what is it, 95 minors that have been killed in the West Bank. I asked before: Do Palestinians have a right to defend themselves? I’m not talking about rogue individuals. I’m talking about as far as a legal authority to defend Palestinians. Do they – does the State Department view that Palestinians have a right and duty to defend themselves?MR PATEL: So look, I have not seen those reports that you outlined. I’m happy to look into them, and I have no doubt our partners in the IDF may be able to share more. What I can say is that actions like these, if true, they are destabilizing. They contribute to a deteriorating security situation, and they are not in the interest of Israel’s own security. And when we have seen actions like this, when we see actions from – we believe quite strongly that these kinds of activities take us away from a two-state solution, and they feed into further instability.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: That &#8212;QUESTION: But does – does the Palestinian Authority have the right to defend its citizens?MR PATEL: Absolutely it does. Absolutely it does.QUESTION: It does? Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up on the campus protests.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have a question. The U.S. Government, everybody from President Biden on down to here at the podium has been quick to call out antisemitism at these protests, but there’s also been an enormous number of examples of Islamophobia and racism from counterprotesters. Why doesn’t the administration denounce that as well, and would you do that here?MR PATEL: I did. You can check the transcript. I did.QUESTION: Well, and let me ask you about Netanyahu’s – the news on Netanyahu today &#8212;MR PATEL: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: &#8212; where he said that even if there’s a hostage deal, they’re still going into Rafah.MR PATEL: Ryan, you’ve got to be on time. You’ve got to come to the briefing on time.QUESTION: Did you get asked about that this morning?MR PATEL: I spoke to that too. Come on, man.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: All right.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Today photos of pier in Gaza were published. My question: Will the Palestinian Authority, PA, be the one who will control this pier?MR PATEL: Sorry, you &#8212;QUESTION: The port.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: Today I – there is photos of this port published. I wonder if the PA, the Palestinian Authority, will control this port in Gaza.MR PATEL: I do not believe that the Palestinian Authority has a role in the maritime corridor, but I am happy to defer you to my colleagues at the Defense Department and USAID to speak to this process in a little bit more specificity.QUESTION: Don’t – just one – don’t you think this port will build over the Palestinian territories, and should Palestinian people have the authority over this port?MR PATEL: So broadly, when we are talking about the future of Gaza and the future of a two-state solution and ensuring that Gaza is no longer a launch pad for terrorism against the Israeli people, part of that for us, of course, includes a Gaza that is reunited under the Palestinian Authority. But as it relates to this maritime corridor, I do not believe that they have a specific role. But that being said, my colleagues at the Pentagon and USAID may be in a better place to speak to some of the more logistical components of this.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. I just wanted to ask about the Erez border crossing.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: It’s also reopening in the north weeks after POTUS’s call with Netanyahu. What should we read into the timing of this opening considering that Blinken is now there to request more aid, and also this ceasefire deal hangs in the balance?MR PATEL: I would not read anything into the timing of this beyond us just stressing, again, that all of these things need to happen as swiftly as possible. But we also fully understand that there may be steps that need to be taken in when factoring in vetting, safety, other things as it relates to crossings that are used for the inflow of aid. We are not naive to the fact that this is a process, but look, we have been clear that we need this to happen as swiftly as possible.QUESTION: And I just want to touch on some of the other questions as well.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Was it the U.S.’s aim to try to beat the clock on a Rafah invasion by getting the ceasefire deal in place beforehand? And if so, have Netanyahu’s comments this morning altered that at all?MR PATEL: It’s not about beating any clock. We – if you go back and look at the history and trajectory of this conflict, there have been a number of instances in which we have been hoping, encouraging, working tirelessly for a deal that would release the hostages that we hope would be partnered with some kind of ceasefire. That has been our position for quite some time. And simultaneously, as it relates to Rafah, it has also been our position for quite some time that any kind of operation that does not address the sort of various components of humanitarian concern that we have would be unacceptable to us.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah. Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Any comment on John Bass’ trip to Doha and Islamabad? Was the meeting with Taliban official in his schedule?MR PATEL: So, as you so noted, acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass is on travel to Doha and Islamabad. In Doha he’ll meet with senior Qatari officials and other diplomatic missions to discuss support for Afghanistan and other shared security interests in the region, and in Islamabad we expect him to meet with senior Pakistani officials and discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues as well.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR PATEL: Go ahead next. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know the State Department already talked about the Kurdistan Region’s local elections &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; some time ago, as it has been scheduled for June 10th. So now there’s a discussion that should be postponed for at least three months, so what’s your comment?MR PATEL: So we understand that President Barzani and various Iraqi authorities and other political parties are actively considering next steps. From our point of view, we would encourage them to schedule free, fair, and timely elections, and we hope that process takes place, but I don’t have anything to offer beyond that.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have two questions on two separate topics.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: At the White House Correspondents Dinner on Saturday, the President called on Putin to release RFE/RL journalist Alsu Kurmasheva. I was wondering if the State Department is following up her case into seeing whether she’s been – she can be identified as wrongfully detained.MR PATEL: So first, let me just say we have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas, and in the case of Alsu Kurmasheva, we remain deeply concerned about her detention in Russia. And to echo the President, we believe she should be released, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists and other civil society actors.In terms of a wrongful detention designation, I’m just not going to get ahead of our process. There is a deliberative and fact-driven process underway. That process continues to be ongoing, and we constantly review circumstances surrounding detentions of U.S. nationals, so I don’t have anything to offer there.QUESTION: How often – can you tell us how often you may review cases?MR PATEL: I – we – I am not going to speak to the specifics of this process.QUESTION: Okay, another one on Burkina Faso.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Voice of America and BBC have been banned there. I was wondering if the State Department is doing anything in that regard.MR PATEL: So we are very alarmed that Burkina Faso’s Superior Council of Communication has suspended multiple independent outlets, including Voice of America and BBC, for covering the Human Rights Watch report about some recent massacres. You’ve heard the Secretary say, and including from this very podium, that far too many governments use repression to silence free expression, particularly against journalists and media organizations, for simply doing their jobs. Freedom of expression, particularly for media, is critical for accountable and transparent governance.Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: You should allow more journalists as well, Mr. Vedant.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: I mean, one is – when you talk about free journalism, are you going to give a chance (inaudible) &#8212;MR PATEL: You’re interrupting your colleague, Jalil.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: This is my third time and you have not given me a chance. Is this free journalism?MR PATEL: You’re – I’m happy to come to you – I’m happy to come to you after.QUESTION: Please.MR PATEL: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much, Vedant. Can you please clear up – either validate or keep alive – some of the reports claiming that the U.S. has eased some of the sanctions on Russian banks, including central bank, to allow some energy-related operations? Why?MR PATEL: I’m not sure what reports you’re referring to, Alex. What I can just say broadly, though, is that when it comes to our efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its infringement on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our Ukrainian partners, we have not taken our foot off the gas, going back to February of 2022 since this invasion occurred. And we will continue to take steps both to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, but also through sanctions, export controls, and other measures hold the Russian Federation accountable.QUESTION: So there is no shift at all in that policy?MR PATEL: There is no policy shift at all.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On Poland, Poland today handed official request to United States to host nuclear weapons in Poland. Do you have any reaction?MR PATEL: I don’t have any comment for you on that. I’m sure my colleagues at the Pentagon can speak to that greater.QUESTION: Sure, thank you. And final topic on Armenia-Azerbaijan. The Secretary spoke with both leaders over the weekend. Any reason to why he called this – any, like, intel or any concern did he want to convey? And separately on Azerbaijan and human rights, a portion of the discussion was about human rights, but hours after that call Azerbaijan arrested another civil society leader. So how much is it the reflection of functional relationship?MR PATEL: So first let me just say, Alex, it should come to no surprise to you that this is an area of the world that the Secretary himself is personally deeply engaged on. And over the course of his time as Secretary, he has had regular engagements at regular intervals with both of these countries. And our engagements with both of them are ongoing, and we continue to believe that a peace and – is possible here. And that’s something that we’re going to continue to work towards.On the second question that you raised, we are deeply troubled by the continuing arrests of members of Azerbaijani civil society, most recently Anar Mammadli. And we urge the Azerbaijani Government to immediately release all individuals who are unjustly detained.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Vedant, and thank you very much, State Department, for bearing with me these nine years. Just one question, and then if you’ll allow me, I’ll ask another question.How do you feel – when journalists here are friends with the same podium people from the U.S. since last two decades, and you guys – this administration since last two years – if a journalist doesn’t agree – agree with you, you just ignore them. I mean, this is the beauty of this newsroom. This is the beauty of this press room. Why you guys like – you guys not feel bad to be treating somebody like this? Like, what’s the reason?MR PATEL: I’m sorry. Who are we treating in what way?QUESTION: I’m talking about this gentleman right here. Since last two years &#8212;MR PATEL: Did something happen to you?QUESTION: Sir, I feel very ignored. I ask one question, and you pass me, you are &#8212;MR PATEL: First of all, it is never a guarantee that everyone gets a question every day. We try our best to get to everybody, but sometimes we’re dealing with the confines of time. And I will just say, Jalil, in my time up here and Matt’s time and Ned’s time, we have taken questions from you pretty regularly.QUESTION: I don’t agree. But anyway, thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: I just have a question about &#8212;MR PATEL: You just used your one question, so I’m going to move – I’m going to move on now. Go ahead.QUESTION: Sir, I had a follow-up question on Kabul expansionism.MR PATEL: That’s fine.QUESTION: Under secretary is going there. The region has terrorism going on.MR PATEL: Then you should ask that question, Jalil.QUESTION: Half of the country is &#8212;MR PATEL: Then you should &#8212;QUESTION: Half of Afghanistan is under no education for girls. The under secretary is going. How do you feel talking to a nation where terrorism is once again growing up? Today in Kabul, six people were killed. Every week there is terrorism. Why is the under secretary holdings talks with the Taliban if the girls do not have education and what’s your interest there?MR PATEL: So let me just say a couple things. First, I will just – since you’ve gotten us way off topic, if you have a question, you should ask a question, not waste your colleagues’ time about other things.Secondly, I’m not aware of any travel to Afghanistan by any undersecretary, but let me just say that when it comes to our engagements with the Taliban, we engage when it is in the United States interest to do so. This is the best way to not just protect U.S. national interests but also support the Afghan people. Engagement allows us to speak directly with the Taliban, and it’s an opportunity for us to continue to press for the immediate and unconditional release of U.S. nationals in Afghanistan including those who we have determined to be wrongfully detained. We’ll also use those opportunities to directly talk about the Taliban’s commitments to counterterrorism, and of course, as always, human rights is also on the agenda.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much.QUESTION: A quick one: Do you have anything on the talks between Türkiye and the U.S. – U.S. energy firm ExxonMobil? A Turkish energy minister said that they are interested in diversifying Türkiye’s national gas supplies. What is your comment on this? And was this a topic of discussion between the two countries?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any more specifics to offer as it relates to the Secretary’s engagement with Foreign Minister Fidan, but let me just say I’ve seen those public reports, and I’m not going to offer anything additional on potential commercial negotiations, but from our vantage point we would encourage any country to diversify its energy supply and curb dependence on Russian energy. And to just broaden the aperture a little bit, Türkiye has played a very important role as the host of the Southern Gas Corridor in helping diversify European energy supplies and European gas supplies away from dependence on Russia, and as the host of multiple LNG liquification facilities which have received a lot of American LNG since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine.QUESTION: Can I have a quick one on Middle East?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Hamas and Fatah leaders meeting in Beijing at the invitation of China? What is your comment on dialogue between Hamas and Fatah?MR PATEL: So our message on this has been what it was since October 7th. If any country purports to have influence or relationships with Hamas, the message is quite clear: release every single hostage and it can no longer be business as usual. They should call on Hamas to lay down their arms, and that is the best and fastest way to get us where we need to be.Taka, go ahead.QUESTION: So the family of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea met State official this morning. Do you have any detail about the meeting? Who met the families? How do you describe the meeting?MR PATEL: So I’m happy to check if there’s any specific officials that we can share, but the U.S. stands with the long-suffering relatives of Japanese abductees, and we continue to urge the DPRK to right this historic wrong and provide full accounting of those that remain missing. And we don’t have any other meetings on this to announce at this time.QUESTION: Details?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check some more specifics but I don’t have anything for you at the – go ahead, Diyar.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You talked about the Kurdistan Region’s election &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but I need a clarification on that. What do you mean when you say that you encourage them to schedule a free and fair election? Because it’s already been scheduled for June 10. Does the U.S. support rescheduling that election?MR PATEL: Our understanding is that President Barzani and various other authorities are actively considering next steps, and we will let that process play out before commenting further.QUESTION: Do you support rescheduling this election?MR PATEL: That’s not for us to decide. What we would encourage is for these elections to be scheduled and for them to be free, fair, and credible. But beyond that, our understanding is that President Barzani and various other entities are actively discussing additional next steps.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Pakistani ambassador in Washington, D.C., (inaudible) Masood Khan, recently talked about the importance of Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation and the need to bolster Pakistan’s defense capabilities due to regional challenges. Do you have any – something to tell us, what kind of strategy or initiative both of our countries are working on to enhance security cooperation?MR PATEL: Yeah. So the United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in combating threats to regional security. And we support Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and ensure the safety and security of its citizens in a manner that promotes the rule of law and protection of human rights. Our partnership with Pakistan on security issues includes, of course, a high-level counterterrorism dialogue, funding robust counterterrorism capacity, and building programs and supporting a series of U.S. and Pakistan military-to-military engagements.QUESTION: Sir, The Washington Post’s latest article revealed that Indian Prime Minister Modi inner circle, including spy chief Samant Goel and even the national security advisor, were aware of the assassination plot on a Sikh activist in New York. So how concerning is this for you?MR PATEL: So we continue to expect accountability from the Government of India based on the results of the Indian inquiry committee’s work, and we are regularly working with them and enquiring for additional updates. We’ll also continue to raise our concerns directly with the Indian Government at senior levels, but beyond that I’m not going to parse into this further and will defer to the Department of Justice.Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On Sudan, I had a follow-up on &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; the UN Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield’s comments calling it a – the potential for a large-scale massacre. And she also said that the U.S. is appealing to countries, including the UAE, to stop support for the warring parties. Has any progress been made with the UAE and other countries, and what is the U.S. doing to try to prevent this catastrophe?MR PATEL: So to put it bluntly, as Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said yesterday, this – we certainly do not view this as conjecture, and we are seeing the possibility of history repeating itself in Darfur in the worst possible way. There are credible reports that the RSF and its allied militias have razed multiple villages west of El Fasher and are planning an imminent attack on El Fasher, putting 500,000 internally-displaced persons at risk on top of the 2 million Sudanese who call El Fasher home. We also know, as the ambassador said, that both sides are receiving weapons and other support to fuel their efforts. And we’ve directly raised our concerns about reports of UAE support to the RSF with our Emirati partners, and we have made clear that the provision of arms to either side only deepens and prolongs the conflict.Go ahead, Daphne, and then we’re going to wrap.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: You said all – you said you’d take everybody’s questions.MR PATEL: That’s not what I said. I said I would get to as many people as I &#8212;QUESTION: You didn’t even &#8212;MR PATEL: I said I’d get to as many as I can.QUESTION: That’s not what you said.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Daphne.QUESTION: The Philippines today said a coast guard ship and a fisheries vessel were damaged by water cannons used by Chinese coast guard ships. This comes right after Blinken’s trip to China. Do you have any comment on this, concerns?MR PATEL: So the repeated harassment of Philippine vessels near Scarborough Reef is detrimental to regional peace and stability, and our belief is that the Chinese coast guard installation of these barriers also endangers Philippine fisherfolk’s livelihoods and prevents them from exercising their legal rights to fish in those waters. These are rights that were set out in 2016 in a final and legally binding judgment in the Philippines-China arbitration brought to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and consistently – and this is something that the Secretary made clear on his travels as well – is that we urge the PRC to respect the navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all states under international law.All right. Thanks, everybody.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Burkina Faso																								China																								India																								Iraq																								Israel																								Japan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Qatar																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								Sudan																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan Office of the SpokespersonThe following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum.&nbsp;&nbsp;Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Fidan discussed efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages and help alleviate the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. The Secretary emphasized that it is Hamas’s refusal to accept a deal that is responsible for the conflict continuing, and urged that all efforts be brought to bear to convince Hamas to accept the immediate ceasefire proposal that is on the table. The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed ongoing efforts to secure a durable and lasting peace in the region, including through a pathway to a Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel. Secretary Blinken emphasized the importance of avoiding an escalation of conflict in the Middle East.						Tags																					Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																																Israel-Hamas Conflict																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Secretary Trip																															The Secretary of State																								Turkey
- Department Press Briefing – April 23, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; April 23, 2024																																																					April 23, 2024																																																								1:23 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. As you can see, we have some special guests with us today. I want to introduce Ambassador David Satterfield, our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues and Sonali Korde, Assistant to the Administrator of USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Satterfield will make some comments at the top, and then they’ll be on hand for some questions. And then I will continue on with the normal daily press briefing, so Ambassador Satterfield, over to you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks. Immediately after Hamas launched its attack on October 7th, President Biden stood strongly with the nation of Israel. As the President has said many times, Israel has a right and a duty to defend itself against Hamas.Hamas committed a massacre. They used rape, sexual violence to terrorize Israeli women. They continue to hold hostages – 133 Americans, women, elderly, injured – and they hide in tunnels they purposely built over the last 16 years under civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals.We remain committed to supporting Israel in its fight against Hamas because we cannot expect Israel to accept a situation we would not – no one would – in which their citizens continue to live under active threat.But at the same time, President Biden, starting on his visit to Israel October 18, was clear – he was clear privately and publicly with the prime minister, with the war cabinet, and then in his comments – that Israel must do more to protect civilians, to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to enable its safe and unhindered distribution inside of Gaza. This is both the morally right thing to do, and it is strategically absolutely necessary.Now, the risk of famine throughout Gaza is very high, especially in the north. We’ve been very clear: Israel must do everything possible to facilitate efforts to avert famine in Gaza. Now, the President has made this point clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu during his April 4th call, and he also made clear that U.S. policy with respect to Gaza will be determined by our assessment of Israel’s actions – immediate actions – to protect innocent civilians and ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as to increase the amount of assistance reaching those in need in Gaza.Far too many Palestinian civilians have been killed and injured. As Secretary Blinken has said, even one innocent casualty is one too many. This conflict has been one of the worst in recent memory in terms of how many humanitarian workers – nearly 250 – have been killed since October. Humanitarians should never be a target.Now, since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. has been leading efforts to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza to alleviate the suffering of innocent Palestinians who have nothing to do with – indeed, are victims themselves – of Hamas and its brutal rule. Let’s recall before the President’s engagement, there was no food, no water, no medicine getting into Gaza. We are the largest provider of aid to the Gaza response. This is and will continue to be a top priority for the President, for the Secretary, for the United States.Now, over the six months past, as a result of our efforts, we have secured the opening of multiple land border crossings, and the volume of assistance entering into and, most importantly, distributed within Gaza has increased significantly. But we know much more aid is needed, and that more aid needs to be done, needs to get out to reach the most vulnerable in Gaza, especially in the north.As their military operations continue – give me a moment – Israel must take all steps to minimize civilian casualties. Protecting civilians is not just a moral obligation – it is that – but it’s a strategic imperative. We’re coordinating closely with Jordan, Egypt, the United Nations, and various international partners to ensure that these measures translate into real, sustained long-term relief for the people of Gaza. It is crucial that Israel sees these commitments through, not just today, but every day.Now, to truly address the urgent needs of the civilian population in Gaza and to enable humanitarian partners to safely distribute life-saving aid throughout Gaza at the scale needed, it’s essential to see a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal in Gaza. The path ahead there is straightforward.There could be a six-week ceasefire today, if Hamas would agree to the terms of a deal on the table. It would help bring immediate relief to the people of Gaza. It would also create the conditions needed to enable the urgent humanitarian work that must be done. Hamas, and Hamas alone, is responsible for the failure to return hostages and implement a ceasefire.Now, we’re going to continue to work, as we have, to pursue peace, to ensure assistance reaches the most vulnerable, and to make sure that humanitarians delivering assistance are protected from harm. Israelis and Palestinians, like all people, deserve to live in peace. They deserve to experience “the quiet miracle of a normal life,” which this and previous U.S. administrations have spoken of as our goal. We’ll do all we can to be part of the work to make that possible.But I know for all of you the question exists. We have commitments. The President has spoken. The prime minister has offered assurances. But where are we? What is, in fact, being done on the ground. As I noted, the volume of assistance has increased dramatically over the course of the last several months. Over 200 trucks of assistance per day average – and the numbers on individual days have topped 400 – have entered into Gaza.Now, those numbers are important, but even more important than the number of trucks dropping their loads inside Rafah or Kerem Shalom into Gaza is the ability of the humanitarian community, primarily the UN, to distribute assistance within Gaza, to pick it up, take it from warehouses, take it from storage yards, and get it to people in need throughout south, central, and northern Gaza. There, too, the numbers have increased significantly to an average of 200 or 200-plus trucks a day in south and central Gaza, where the bulk of the population – 1.8, 1.9 million people – live.More must be done though to ensure that assistance is effectively and efficiently moved, not just in the south and the center, but in the north. The population in the north is in particular threat of malnutrition, wasting, famine. And there all too little aid had come in, until the last several weeks. Aid has been moving now to the north through land corridors from outside Gaza in and from within Gaza north. Nearly 100 trucks a day have been moving to the north over the course of the last several weeks.It is essential that the needs of the people living there be addressed, be assessed accurately. That process will be taking place later this week by the UN, and so we can move beyond counting trucks to focusing – and Sonali can comment on this in detail – on what specific kinds of assistance – specialized feeding, the treatments needed to deal with wasting, to deal with infant, newborn mortality and morbidity, that those can be provided to people in need. Our first priority was, because it had to be, adverting famine. But we now need to move on beyond that goal to addressing the true needs – sanitization, availability of medicine, availability of potable water, the specialized care required for these vulnerable populations. That has to be the ongoing focus.Now, Israel has taken significant steps in these last two, two and a half, weeks. Erez and an additional northern crossing are in the process of being made accessible for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. That was at our request. The so-called gate 96 crossing into the center of Gaza has been open now for several weeks and is being utilized by the UN to move assistance into Gaza. The Jordan channel as we refer to it – Jordanian trucks carrying assistance from the humanitarian hub near Amman directly into Gaza – has also been flowing, for now, through Kerem Shalom into Gaza but in the near future directly from Jordan across the river, in via Israel to northern crossings and into Gaza for distribution.The JLOTS, the U.S. maritime corridor, which Sonali has been working on so hard over these last few weeks – that will also begin operation in early May. We have a significant volume today of assistance moving in by land. We’re going to have an increased volume within the predictable next few weeks moving in from land and sea.And that flooding, that additional assistance has brought with it its own logistical challenges. The problem is not getting assistance into Gaza; it’s getting it distributed within Gaza. And there the logistical constraints are the lack of sufficient trucks in possession of the UN, something that the UN and we have been working on assiduously over these last weeks, to enable a greater logistical capacity to distribute, pick up aid, and move it.And secondly, there are two crossing points, two checkpoints, to and from north Gaza. Those two checkpoints – one on the coastal road, one on an inland road called Salah al-Din &#8212; are now heavily congested with truck movements. That wasn’t a problem before. It’s a problem now, and it needs to be sorted out so assistance can be moved safely and efficiently up, empty trucks brought south, so the cycle can begin again. We’re in close touch with the Government of Israel, with Israeli authorities on how best to expediate, along with the UN, these movements.So, these challenges still exist. There is still considerable work to be done, but progress has been made.And a final note on something that all of you have heard us speak to and you have asked about – deconfliction and coordination. Too many humanitarian workers have been killed. Too many humanitarian movements have not been able to move effectively and efficiently to their destinations. And so we have worked intensively – and the President discussed this with the prime minister – on setting up a mechanism that works in real time between humanitarian actors on the ground, between IDF personnel at checkpoints, at contact points on the ground, and appropriate levels within the IDF structure to enable that efficient, effective, and safe movement of humanitarians, their staff, and the convoys containing assistance. Progress is being made, but more progress still needs to be done to assure that this is in train. To make it work, humanitarian actors need effective communications. They need to be able to talk – talk to the IDF on the ground, talk to command levels of the IDF and vice versa. We’re pleased that progress has been made on availability of appropriate communications systems for humanitarian workers.Lost in the things that need to be done – because those needs are significant – is the fact that we have seen meaningful progress. That progress needs to be sustained, needs to be continued, but the situation has improved, particularly in these last two to three weeks, from where we would be were I briefing at beginning of April or in the latter part of March. But more needs; more has to be done to meet those needs; it has to be sustained.And I’ll leave here with one final comment, which is, if you will, editorial. I have been working Arab-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli issues for over 40 years. For the past 30 years, since September 13th, 1993, the Oslo Agreement, Hamas has had a choice. The choice is to accept what we refer to as the Oslo principles, then the Quartet principles; to eschew the use of violence; to accept a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the Palestinian-Israel issue. Hamas has made a choice, but it was not one in favor of a peaceful resolution. Hamas, for its own ideological and political reasons, has chosen in favor of violence, threat, to pursue its ambitions. The greatest victims of this have been Palestinians themselves, not just the Israelis who were massacred on October 7th in that paroxysm of bestial violence.Hamas still has a choice. The fighting in Gaza, the suffering of the Palestinian people, could end tonight if Hamas chose to accept the deal for release of hostages and the establishment of a ceasefire, and that ceasefire could with further releases be sustained. But as in the past, Hamas has taken a different course. Let us not lose sight in our correct focus on the requirements incumbent upon Israel to assure all of those humanitarian steps I’ve just spoken to that the fundamental actor responsible for the suffering here is a terrorist group, Hamas. Thank you.MR PATEL: Ellen, you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. I don’t really get a sense exactly of the precise details about how close Israel’s compliance has come to the level that President Biden said he wanted to see when he said policy would be shaped by it allowing humanitarian aid. You talk about 200 trucks a day, but aid groups have said the minimum is 500 trucks a day. And there’s – you mentioned communication systems to help with deconfliction. I mean, there was communication systems, if you’re talking about actual – the comms. Those were &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Is there a question?QUESTION: Yeah. Those were there with the World Central Kitchen. And you talked about negotiations on the comms – those are two crucial themes. How – it sounds like there’s actually – it’s actually pretty far from meeting the level that’s needed, and how long is Israel going to have until – to meet that standard?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Ellen, we work closely with Israel on the commitments made by the prime minister to the President. I have outlined many of the steps that have contributed to progress, meaningful progress that has been made. The volume of assistance moving into Gaza is significantly greater over these last weeks than the volume in the months that preceded. The volume of assistance on a daily basis being distributed within Gaza, which is the more important number – that is also, on an average, at a higher level than in the previous months. More needs to be done.The north has seen for the first time in all of these six months significant levels of assistance moving in on a daily basis. Is it enough? No, it is not enough, but it is progress. Northern crossings have been opened and are being prepared for opening, in the case of Erez and another northern crossing. Ashdod Port – the President said we need to see Ashdod Port open for humanitarian goods, not just flour. Ashdod Port has been opened. That step has been taken.We’ll get now into important but, if you will, secondary details. Comms equipment – World Central Kitchen did not have the types of communications systems that could have provided redundancy during that terrible event. It is essential those redundant systems with different technical operating parameters be provided. That is what Israel has now approved. So, there is a change that’s been made there.Water – President said water has got to be turned back on. There are three Mekorot national carrier pipelines into Gaza. The southernmost one has been operating. The second one has been intermittently operating; it has been under active repair. Because the network from delivery into Gaza through Gaza has been disrupted, the repairs are ongoing. The northern pipeline, which was turned off since October 7th, has been repaired and is functioning now.All of this reflects progress. Northern crossings, Ashdod Port open, the Jordan channel – it is essential for us that Jordan be able to deliver trucks on a daily basis directly into Gaza. Right now, they are doing so through Kerem Shalom as an interim measure. When the northern crossings are repaired and functional, which we expect will be in the next very few weeks, possibly shorter in the case of Erez, Jordanian trucks will be able to enter there. But they’re already moving. And the JLOTS is in final stages of preparation.All of this represents progress. Is there more to do? Yes. But this is a very different picture I am presenting to you than the one we would have had just three weeks ago on the eve of the President’s call to Netanyahu.MR PATEL: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for being here. Just to put a fine point on my colleagues’ questions, three weeks later, are you – can you say you’re satisfied with the steps that Israel has taken so far? Has the deconfliction mechanism that you talked about, you said there is progress – is that in place now and is working?And the final thing is about the pier. We’re being told U.S. will rely on Israel for security. Can you elaborate on that? Is it going to be security of U.S. troops provided by Israel? Who will distribute the aid inside Gaza? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll take your last part and turn to Sonali for that, but I am not going to give you – and I’ll spare the rest of your colleagues – I’m not going to give you a grade. “Did they get an A+, an A, or a B?” We are in the constant process of monitoring, assessing, facilitating, supporting progress towards the goals the President set. This is not a “gotcha” test. “At 2:00 p.m. on the 7th of May, will Israel pass or not?” This is a set of requirements to help the people of Gaza and the humanitarian workers whose role is vital in facilitating assistance. Progress is being made, but I am not going to stand here and give you a grade on that. More needs to be done.Sonali, do you want to talk about JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So just on your question on JLOTS, we’re working – from USAID working very closely with CENTCOM to put together the JLOTS and the pier. We’re working very closely with the UN to handle the distribution mechanism into Gaza. I’ll also say that we are taking a lot of care to respect the UN’s neutrality and independence in terms of distribution.Just on your question on security, I think that’s best placed to DOD, but suffice it to say that IDF is providing some security and force protection measures to U.S. assets that will be offshore. And I’ll have you ask my DOD colleagues further questions on that. Over.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks, Sonali.MR PATEL: Gillian, go ahead.QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, can you talk a little bit more broadly about how you see – since October 7th in particular – the – Israel’s – the Israeli Government’s conduct of humanitarian affairs versus Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs, broadly speaking?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Excuse me? Hamas’s conduct of humanitarian affairs? What do you mean?QUESTION: Well, for an example, yesterday the State Department released the annual Human Rights Report, and featured Israel alongside Hamas in the first page.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to comment on the Human Rights Report or any aspect &#8212;QUESTION: Right, so that’s why I’m asking you about the humanitarian conduct of those governments &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hamas has &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; as they were presented side by side.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah, I’ll comment on Hamas. Hamas has spent 17 years in expending every resource provided for the people of Gaza for its own purposes in constructing a network of military facilities, tunnels, embedded in, under, around humanitarian facilities as a deliberate act of preservation and advancement of their interests. Hamas has sacrificed those thousands of innocent Gazans who had been lost after their brutal massacre on October 7th. Again, inconvenient truth – I’m going to keep reminding of that – something happened on the 7th of October which precipitated all of this.Hamas’s humanitarian policy is the opposite of humanitarian. It is to use innocent civilians as shields, as presumed protection for their own facilities, for their own terrorist military forces, and for the plotting and planning which first and foremost victimizes Palestinians and their future. And how there can be any other consideration of Hamas other than as a terrorist group who has proclaimed – I’ll remind – they’ll do it again and again and again, if given the opportunity. That’s Hamas. That’s why they’re an FTO.Now, with respect to Israel, we require from Israel – because it is the right and moral thing to do – a very different standard of conduct. And as I noted in my remarks, the President made clear on his visit to Israel, shortly after October 7th, it’s not just strategically important for you to do this. It’s the morally right thing to do. It is the reflection of what Israel is – a democracy with values. Does more need to be done? Yes. Could more have been done sooner? Yes, of course. But the point is, over time, progress has been made. With all of the distance that remains to fully meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Gaza – those needs are considerable – progress has been made.QUESTION: Are you – may I follow up with that real quickly?MR PATEL: We’re going to try and get through as many questions as we can. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Anne Flaherty with ABC News. Can we – can you first of all clarify that you have not put a timeline on Israel to take certain steps forward when you talked about potable water, more UN trucks? It sounds like it’s more of just a constant discussion that you’re having with Israel. Also, has Israel provided assurances that JLOTS will not be in lieu of these land corridors, that they will both remain open?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll start with your last one first. We have made clear, and Israel has affirmed to us that the JLOTS, the maritime corridor, whoever operates it – military or, ultimately, anyone else – is an adjunct to, it’s additive to, supplemental to land corridors. There is no question that the most efficient and effective way to deliver assistance is via as many land corridors as possible, which is why the increase in the operation in Kerem Shalom; the opening of the gate 96 corridor into the center of Gaza; the preparation for opening of the two new northern crossings; Ashdod Port, which is a perfectly functional port with immediate access directly into Gaza – all of those are critical. So yes, it’s additive to, it is not a replacement for in any sense of the word.With respect to timing, I think you all know the President must make a determination by May 8th on the NSM-20 issue. I’m not going to get into that question here. But I will say our work is focused every day, every hour, on seeing continuous progress made. We are not doing this because there’s a deadline on May 8th or any other date certain. We’re doing it because every day there are people in need. Every day those needs need to be met.MR PATEL: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Good to see you again, Mr. Ambassador.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Hi, Said.QUESTION: I have two quick questions. Would you say that famine that was looming a couple of weeks ago, three weeks ago, has now been averted? That’s one. And second, I mean, this insistence on the six-week ceasefire – why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Because the implicit message for the Palestinians is that after six weeks Israel can resume its bombing of Gaza and bombing civilian targets and so on. So why can’t we have a permanent ceasefire? Thank you.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’m not going to get into the details, Said. I hope you will understand – of the hostage deal which is presented and not accepted by Hamas, the terms of that deal. This administration has always insisted that a ceasefire is conditioned upon, part and parcel of not just a hostage release, but hostage releases. Hamas has it in its hands not just to effect a first-phase release, but further releases which would extend the ceasefire beyond that point. Beyond that, I’m not going to comment on famine. I’ll turn to Sonali.QUESTION: All right, thank you.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Hi, thanks for that question. So, we don’t know. Assessments on famine are based on a very rigorous methodology that is undertaken by the IPC, the Integrated Phase Classification, which is the expert body that both collects and reviews data. So, we will wait for their determination. What I will say is that in order to address this, we not only need to get trucks in, but we need to get nutritional therapies, we need to reach the moms and kids that are most at risk, especially in northern Gaza. We need to get them clean water. We need to get them health care.I will say that with 29 percent of children under two showing signs of acute malnutrition in northern Gaza – this is what was reported in the IPC – it takes time to reverse that trend. It takes at least six weeks to get a child who is suffering the effects of malnutrition back on track. So, I don’t know that we’ve averted it. We’re certainly trying, but we’ll wait for the data and the experts to tell us what they see.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: John Hendren with Al Jazeera English. To what extent will an operation in Rafah affect your ability to get this aid in there? Will it not certainly push back that effort and make things more difficult?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: John, you know the position which the White House, State have expressed; Secretary Austin as well. We could not support a Rafah ground operation without an appropriate, credible, executable humanitarian plan precisely because of the complications for delivery of assistance; and then on top of that, the consequences of displacement of the hundreds of thousands of Rafahns already multiply displaced. Where do they go? How will their needs be met: shelter, medicine, water, sanitation?Rafah itself today poses significant challenges in all of these areas. The compression of population, whatever the number may today be – 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 million – poses enormous challenges: shelter, sanitation, water. To move them again under kinetic circumstances would complicate that enormously. It’s for all of these reasons that we have been as clear as we have been with the Government of Israel. And that’s not just a past-tense discussion; it is a current tense. We continue discussions with Israel on what we believe are alternate ways of addressing a challenge which we recognize, which is Hamas military present in Rafah. We get it, we understand it, but we think there are other ways to deal with this. And if there is not a credible, executable humanitarian plan, then we cannot support a ground operation.QUESTION: But fair to say that Israel views that differently up till now?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: That’s our position.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Elizabeth, and then these guys have got to wrap.QUESTION: I want to follow up on the pier. How will the U.S. ensure the safety of aid workers who are concerned over the Israeli military’s presence in the area and role securing it given the past failures in deconfliction? And also, will Israel’s so-called dual-use restrictions be applied to goods entering the pier?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Sure. So, what I can say is that there are conversations happening every single day between our humanitarian assistance team, the DART, in Jerusalem, CENTCOM on the ground, and our UN partners on the ground. The safety and security of our humanitarian partners is the most important thing; it’s absolutely vital. They need to feel safe and secure.I’m not going to get into specific security measures on what’s being discussed for obvious reasons, but just to say that those are happening, and we’re very cognizant, again, as I said earlier, that the UN needs to maintain its principles of neutrality and independence and access throughout Gaza. So, we are trying to abide by those principles and make sure that everyone involved has the safety and security that they need.QUESTION: And the dual-use goods?MR PATEL: (Off-mike.)ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’ll defer to Ambassador Satterfield on dual use. Oh, I can take dual use. So again, we – so the goods will be inspected in Cyprus by Israelis, but also by a team which will include the UN, our colleagues in Cyprus. The dual-use concerns are being discussed. There should be a consistency on what goes in, so we’re not trying to create, like, an exception for Cyprus – just to say that we continue to have conversations with our Israeli colleagues to streamline the process for inspecting and approving goods that are sensitive or on the dual-use list.MR PATEL: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, Mr. Ambassador, I have two questions. First, did the U.S. ask Qatar to expel Hamas leaders from there? Second, are you preparing for humanitarian emergencies in case a full war – a full-scale war breaks between Hizballah and Israel?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Easiest ones yet. First answer is no. The second is, in the great tradition of those standing at this podium, I don’t comment on hypotheticals.MR PATEL: Laura, you had your hand up in the back. Yes, you, Laura Rozen.QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: Did you not have your hand up?QUESTION: No.MR PATEL: Oh, okay. All right. Go ahead, Doc.QUESTION: Okay, yeah. I wanted to know about Egypt’s role in – about giving relief for the Gazans to be able to go into Egypt. Is Egypt open to taking a lot of the people – to – Gaza to go out through that into a safe area, so that Israel can deal with the Hamas battalions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I’ll comment first, and this is longstanding commentary: We believe the future of the Palestinian people of Gaza lies in Gaza, not anywhere else. Egypt has made very clear – preceding October 7th – that they also believe the future for Palestinians lies in Gaza, not in Egypt. We understand that point; we respect it. So does the Government of Israel.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Are you in touch with the organization – the Palestinian organizations like the Red Crescent as far as with these updated comms? And – because we’ve seen medics, for example, attacked as well by the Israelis. So &#8212;AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: There’s a humanitarian hub at al-Arish in which UN, UN agencies are represented, and of course the Egyptian Red Crescent runs that hub in close coordination for delivery of bilateral assistance, non-UN assistance, through the PRCS. And so, with respect to our focus on comms, that has been directed primarily at the UN, the UN family of agencies, rather than at Palestine Red Crescent Society.But Sonali, any further comment on that?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: No, I think you’ve got it.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yeah.QUESTION: And one more question. We haven’t seen too many briefings with you. Should we expect more opportunities to ask you some questions?AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: You haven’t seen them because I have been all but about 25 days of the last six and a half months in the region working the actual issues. So, I can’t promise for the future, but thank you.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR PATEL: Final question, go ahead.QUESTION: Regarding the maritime corridor from the Republic of Cyprus, do you have any updates about any possible logistical challenges or how we move forward with that plan?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: I’m sorry, I think I lost that second word – about any logistics?QUESTION: The maritime corridor from Cyprus, or the Republic of Cyprus, to Gaza to provide humanitarian aid.ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: Yeah, so the update that I can give you is that we are proceeding apace and on schedule, working very closely with CENTCOM. We have colleagues in Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus. We have a coalition of partners working around this: the EU, the UK. And then we’re also working with CENTCOM and Israeli colleagues to set up the assistance and the beach landing spot in Gaza, and critically, we’re working with UN partners to handle the distribution of assistance going into Gaza. Again, this is a humanitarian initiative. We’re keeping it in line with humanitarian principles, and we hope to have more updates for you on this soon.QUESTION: Can I ask one question about JLOTS? We haven’t had a chance to ask anything in the – previously.MR PATEL: If you want to ask one more question about JLOTS, then these guys have got to go.QUESTION: Sure, thank you, thank you. Can you – can you tell me, is – are things still in discussion or is there an agreement that the WFP will actually handle the distribution part of it? Is there an agreement on the rules of engagement with the IDF? And is there – is the deconfliction aspect handled to your satisfaction so that you’re confident that the aid workers will actually be protected as they work with the people with JLOTS?ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KORDE: So – so yes. We have an agreement with the UN and WFP to work on the logistics. As I said, this is – we’re working out a lot of details on how this is going to work. The partners are working on the security aspects of it. As you mentioned, again, I don’t want to comment on that here just for very obvious reasons, to protect their security.So, all of these issues are being worked through. Again, I’ll re-emphasize that the key principle for the UN’s engagement here is to protect their independence and neutrality and ability to access vulnerable populations throughout Gaza. We are working to make sure that they feel comfortable in upholding those principles. I think the conversations are going ahead really well.Just again, on specific issues around deconfliction and protection, I will ask that you defer those conversations for our DOD colleagues. Deconfliction is an issue for all humanitarian workers working in Gaza. It’s not just a JLOTS issue. As Ambassador Satterfield said, some steps have been made to improve the system, which obviously had some failures given the World Central Kitchen attack, but also we have lost over 200 humanitarian workers through the course of this war. We need to see those steps be implemented and the humanitarian community and IDF continue to talk and engage and iterate and improve the system, so that everyone feels safe and secure in this very difficult operating environment.QUESTION: Okay, thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks, everybody.AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you.MR PATEL: Thanks so much. Ambassador Satterfield, Administrator Korde, thank you so much for joining us today.QUESTION: We can do Zoom press conferences if you’re out in the region. (Laughter.) This was very helpful. Thanks.MR PATEL: All right, okay. Give me two seconds, guys. All right. Well, that was – I’m very glad we were able to have them join us today. Ellen, you want to kick us back off?QUESTION: What to ask?MR PATEL: We can also stop. If that was – (laughter). If that really – if that quenched your thirst, I’m happy to go &#8212;QUESTION: No, if I could.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: I guess the – as you – obviously, there’s been lots of anticipation about the Leahy Law decisions that are expected. Can – there’s been reporting that there were recommendations for some IDF units to be identified as in violation of the Leahy Amendments, but that the Secretary opted not to take staff’s recommendation for several of the units. Can you – can you comment on that?MR PATEL: So, I think I’m going to echo what you saw Matt and the Secretary address as it relates to this question beginning in Capri on Friday, which is I’m just not going to get ahead of this process. What I will say is that we take the Leahy Law incredibly seriously. It is also the standards of it we apply consistently across the board with all countries in which we have security relationships with. That should be no surprise to anybody. But I am not going to get ahead of the process, and I am sure we’ll have more to say in the time forthcoming.Humeyra.QUESTION: Yesterday I think Matt said on UNRWA you guys haven’t had a chance to review it, you were still reviewing it. Do you have, like, an assessment on the Colonna report’s findings?MR PATEL: So, as it relates to the report that foreign – former French Foreign Minister Colonna took the – led on, we first – to take a step back, we welcome and strongly support the recommendations of the independent review of UNRWA mechanisms and procedures related to neutrality. This was released yesterday.We continue to look closely at the report and are assessing how we can continue to work with partners in the region, host authorities in the Government of Israel, to implement some of these recommendations. We, of course, continue to support UNRWA’s important work. It must continue. But at the same time, we continue to advocate for reforms. And we welcome what the former French foreign minister laid out.QUESTION: So, given the language the – the language in the supplemental that’s about to pass and how it prohibits the resumption of U.S. funding, is it fair to say until at least, like, 2025 there is no chance that U.S. would be able to resume funding for UNRWA?MR PATEL: You’ve heard me say this before. We assume this supplemental passes when the – when it passes the Senate. We will be an administration that complies with the law, and the law is very clearly laid out in that national security supplemental as it relates to what kind of relationship the United States can have with UNRWA. We’re continuing to engage with partners in the region, with UN agencies, and other humanitarian organizations about the important work when it comes to humanitarian aid. It’s also really important to note that there is a significant amount of monies for humanitarian aid in the supplemental, including humanitarian aid into Gaza. And so we’ll continue to pursue those lines of effort.QUESTION: And the report also found that Israel was yet to present any evidence for the accusation that hundreds of UNRWA staff were members of terrorist groups. Is the U.S. going to be encouraging Israel to provide that evidence? Are you going to do anything towards that end?MR PATEL: So, the – our understanding is that the United Nations is continuing to pursue an investigation as it relates to &#8212;QUESTION: Separate one.MR PATEL: That’s separate – that relates to the individuals alleged to have participated in the October 7th terrorist attacks. And so, I will – I’m not going to get ahead of that process.QUESTION: Okay. And the final thing is you must have seen the reports about mass graves containing hundreds of bodies around al-Shifa. UN chief said he was horrified by these reports. I’m wondering if U.S. has a comment on this and whether you guys have raised this with the Israeli Government.MR PATEL: We have seen the – those reports, and the reports are incredibly troubling. And we’re inquiring on this with Government of Israel. I don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Specifically on the &#8212;MR PATEL: Correct. I don’t have any specific information to offer – insight into what this is or isn’t. I don’t have a sense of that from up here, but we are inquiring about this with the Government of Israel.QUESTION: Do you know who reached out to who? Is it the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to speak to the specifics, but it should be no surprise to you that we engage with the Government of Israel at all levels often many times, multiple times a day, at all hours.Anne, go ahead.QUESTION: So, Ambassador Satterfield seemed pretty pleased with how Israel is progressing. Has the U.S. shared with Israel what would happen, if Israel takes its foot off the pedal with regards to humanitarian aid? And then also a question on Ukraine. UK has already beat – beaten us to the punch – biggest military package ever. Can you characterize if the U.S. package to Ukraine is going to look to be – is it shaping up to be the biggest ever?MR PATEL: Let me take that in two parts. First, I’m not sure pleased is the appropriate adjective that I would use. I think Ambassador Satterfield was pretty clear that there have been – there’s been some clear metrics for progress that have been over the past number of weeks. Those are welcome steps, and they are things that we are very happy to see. However, he was also explicitly clear that there continue to be areas – specifically, distribution of aid within Gaza, some of the telecommunication measures that he mentioned, sanitation and others areas, deconfliction – those are areas that we want to and need to continue to see sustained progress, including the sustained progress on the steps that have been made in the right direction. And as it relates to a deadline or anything like that, you &#8212;QUESTION: But is there a consequence?MR PATEL: The Secretary and the President were incredibly clear that these are kinds of steps that we absolutely need to see, or it will have a determining factor as it relates to the kinds of policy we pursue as it relates to Gaza. There has not been a change in that assessment. We expect that these kinds of efforts to be continued and sustained. This situation is still dire. Both things can be true, which is something that we’ve kind of been pretty clear about for quite some time now. We can see steps being taken that we think are beneficial to the overall humanitarian aid ecosystem – stuff like the Ashdod Port opening, some of these northern crossings being opened. These are all good, welcome, positive steps in the right direction. Simultaneously, there continues to be a lot of work that needs to be done. On Ukraine, look, first let me just say as it relates to our partners in the United Kingdom, we welcome any country taking additional steps to support our Ukrainian partners and bolster the transatlantic Alliance. My understanding is that this was an announcement not just about support for Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom committing to contribute 2.5 percent of their GDP towards the defense space by 2030 – again, a step that we think is in line with NATO commitments but also, again, something that bolsters the transatlantic Alliance. So very – very glad and happy to see that news.When it comes to the United States, we have not been shy about the fact that one of the key reasons we need this national security supplemental passed is because we need to continue to support our Ukrainian partners. We are going to wait for, I’m sure, final passage before previewing or talking about any additional next steps when it comes to how we might be supporting our Ukrainian partners.Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to Humeyra’s question, just to follow up &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; on that, now it seems that more than 300 bodies have been found. The United Nations is asking or calling for an independent investigation. Would you support such an independent investigation for this matter?MR PATEL: Right now, Said, we are asking for more information.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: That is where – that is squarely where we are leaving the conversation.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: I don’t have any details to match, confirm, or offer as it relates to that. We’re aware of those reports, and we have asked the Government of Israel for additional clarity and information. And that’s where I’m at for today.QUESTION: I understand. If the – if Secretary-General Guterres asked for your support in this effort, would the United States support him in the pursuit of &#8212;MR PATEL: You are asking to – you’re asking about a hypothetical, Said &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: &#8212; which, again, I’m not going to get ahead of until we have greater fidelity on information as to what this is. And we’re hoping to get that from the Government of Israel as soon as possible.QUESTION: All right. Now on – Israel is said to be expanding the so-called safe zone in Gaza as it prepares to invade Rafah. I wonder if you’ve seen the report, and if you have any comment on that.MR PATEL: I’ve not – I’ve not seen that report, Said. But look, any kind of action that would be inconsistent with what we’d consider the forced relocation or the forced movement or eviction of Palestinians from their homes in Gaza is something that is inconsistent with the principles that Secretary Blinken laid out in Tokyo last December, and a key tenet of that continues to be that there can be no forced relocation.Ellen, you had your hand up? That &#8212;QUESTION: No, I was just going to say on the issue of investigating or finding out the truth of the allegations of the mass grave, your – the State Department’s Human Rights Report yesterday said along the lines that it knew of no instances where Israeli officials had brought accountability basically for crimes alleged in Gaza. In those circumstances, I mean, with that kind of determination by the State Department itself, is waiting for Israel to investigate it the appropriate course of action?MR PATEL: So that’s not a – first, I think we should clarify what the Human Rights Report is and isn’t. It isn’t a determination or an assessment by the State Department. What it is, is a compilation of submitted violations of human rights all around the world that are done in close coordination with our embassies and consulates in all the places that we have them, with civil society organizations, with media organizations. That’s how that report is compiled. I will also note that it is not an exhaustive or a list of every single human rights violation in the world. It is a compilation.But you saw the Secretary speak to this a little bit yesterday. First, as it relates to our own system when it comes to violations of human rights, there are processes and protocols and procedures in place for the United States to assess what is happening on the ground. These are thorough, deliberate, detail-oriented processes that can take time. Those processes are ongoing, and we’ll continue that work, as we continue that work in any conflict zone around the world.Simultaneously, I am sure our partners in Israel can speak to any procedures and parameters they have in place in their own system as it relates to things that would be viewed as violations. And I will let them speak to that.Alex, on the region, or something else?QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Please come back.MR PATEL: Let me stay a little bit on the region; I’ll come back to you.Michel, you had your hand up.QUESTION: On Iran. Al-Jarida newspaper, a Kuwaiti newspaper, has quoted a high-level source in the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, saying that Iran received an American letter offering to resume negotiations to resume the nuclear agreement after reaching security understandings. And the source added that the offer includes promises to cancel a large portion of economic and non-economic sanctions if Tehran cooperates in restricting its atomic activity and regional pacification. Can you confirm this report?MR PATEL: So, Michel, I’m not going to comment on our ways of communicating with Iran except to say we are not in direct talks with Iran on the JCPOA, either in New York or anywhere else.QUESTION: Indirect talks?MR PATEL: What’s that?QUESTION: Are you in indirect talks with Iran?MR PATEL: I just said that we are not in direct talks with Iran.QUESTION: Indirect, indirect – not direct.MR PATEL: I am not going to speak to any of our communicating – ways of communicating with Iran.QUESTION: And one on Israel-Lebanon. War is escalating between Hizballah and Israel on the border. Do you expect a full-scale war between the two sides? And what can you say about the U.S. efforts to find a diplomatic solution for this crisis?MR PATEL: We are continuing to engage in direct conversations with our partners in Israel and other regional partners to avoid any kind of massive, dire escalation. As we know, Israel is – has this challenge of defeating Hamas in Gaza, but simultaneously is dealing with the threat from Hizballah in the north, and Israel of course has every right to defend itself and right to its security, but we have been clear with everyone that we possibly can that it – from the United States point of view, we’re not interested in seeing this escalate. But I don’t have any other thing to offer on the process there.On the Middle East, or anything &#8212;QUESTION: On the region, on Iran. (Inaudible.)MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: So yesterday the special report about human rights indicated that the Iranian regime had terrorist activities and also put pressure on Iran International journalists, my colleagues. So, in one occasion, they had to move their office from London to Washington, D.C. So, do you have any comment on that? Because this is a serious attack on journalists who are working in the United States and also in the UK.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: And – they are my colleagues, and they are concerned about it.MR PATEL: So first let me just say I’m not going to comment on any particular report or any particular anecdote laid out in the Human Rights Report. But it should be no surprise to anybody that Iran continues to be one of the largest exporters of terrorism and has been so since 1979. Simultaneously, it is also a regime that has showed blatant disregard to a free and open press and media environment. I mean, you have seen over the course of the past three years alone a serious crackdown within Iran on civil society, on media organizations, on human rights. We will continue to take steps to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its human rights violations, for other malign activities, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And one – sorry, one follow-up, sir.MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room. I’m going to work the room. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: According to Jewish Press and Middle East Forum reports, the U.S. State Department has announced that it will take legal steps against the Israeli army’s unit known as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion based on reports that the U.S. gets from Dawn, which is a &#8212;MR PATEL: We have spoken to this pretty regularly since Friday, and your colleague just asked about it at the beginning of the press briefing, so I would ask you pay attention. But I will just reiterate what I said, which is that we’re not going to get ahead of our determinative or deliberative processes here. We take our role and responsibility as it relates to implementation of the Leahy Law quite seriously. It is – its standards are applied consistently to all countries who we have security relationships with, but I don’t have any announcement to make.QUESTION: But this is a follow-up to this. According to U.S. State Department website report, the U.S. has declared that it will “take action against those who undermine peace, security, and stability in the West Bank, which undermine the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution.” So does that mean that the U.S. will take action against Arabs who raise millions to support any Arab who murders a Jew, or take action against the Palestinian Authority for the pay for slay – for the pay a salary for life to any Arab who murders a Jew, and finally take action against the Palestinian ministry of education, whose new curriculum indoctrinates Palestinian Arabs to destroy Israel?MR PATEL: So, I see you’re trying to connect a couple different threads there. First, the sentence that you quote from, you’re talking about actions that the United States took in response to violence, extremism that we are seeing in the West Bank, and yes, that absolutely is a detractor from peace and stability in the region. It’s a detractor from Israel’s own security, takes us further away from a two-state solution, and as you saw, we won’t hesitate to take appropriate actions to actors who partake in that kind of activity.Simultaneously, when it comes to the PA, which is what I think you’re referring to, issues like the so-called martyr payments are something that we have raised regularly in our engagements with the PA. It is a tenet of the kinds of reform that we are continuing to insist the Palestinian Authority undertake, and we’ll continue to have those kinds of conversations.In the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: So, on the reforms, today the new Palestinian prime minister announced a new package of reforms designed to strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and it seems like largely these were – these reforms were the same as promised by the previous prime minister. Have they – has the United States, has the State Department been in touch with the Palestinian Authority in – about these reforms that were announced &#8212;MR PATEL: We have conversations with appropriate members of the PA regularly. I don’t have any conversations to read out, but broadly, reform is something that we have stressed and made clear to them as part of the broader conversations we continue to have for peace and stability in the region. But I’m happy to check if we have had any more specific engagements on this news.QUESTION: You – are you familiar with the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’ve seen the reports. I’ve not – I think it broke right before I came out, so I haven’t had an opportunity to look into it, but we’re happy to check with the team.Go ahead. Yes, you.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Regarding the recent sanctions by United States on Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to see if there’s anything else on the Middle East before we come to any other topics.QUESTION: Okay. So, regarding the recent diplomatic push by the United States towards Saudi Arabia and Israel about normalizing ties – so do you think – so with the ongoing circumstances, what is the line of action you have, as Netanyahu is not even bothering United States regarding the aid, (inaudible) regarding the ceasefire, regarding the hostages, even. Meanwhile, you have many Israeli politicians you hosted here just for another attempt just to – a possible house change in the Israeli Knesset. So, what is the line of action you have?MR PATEL: We’ve been pretty clear that we think further integration of Israel into the Middle East region is in better – it’s in better interest of Israel’s security, it’s in better interest for the United States, and it is a further way for us to push back against Iran’s malign and destabilizing behavior. Of course, there is important work that still needs to be done as it relates to that integration, including, of course, ensuring that we can get to a place for a negotiated two-state solution, and those conversations continue to be ongoing.Anything else on the Middle East before I close out?QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Let me – I’ll come – Gaza. I’ll come to you after. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Yesterday Secretary Blinken released the Human Rights Reports, and he said in his speech that, in quote, “We repeatedly have pressed concerns about Palestinian civilians’ access to humanitarian assistance, displacements of the majority of the population in Gaza, and unprecedented number of journalists killed,” end quote. So, actually, one of the journalists killed in Gaza was one of our colleagues, working for Anadolu Agency of Türkiye. His name is Mustafa Alkharouf, and I want to ask a journalist – I mean, what would be your message to Israeli Government, Israeli military to protect the journalists working in Gaza?MR PATEL: Our message to the Government of Israel is the same message it is to any government on the face of this planet, which is that journalists need to be protected. They do important work; they do especially important work in conflict zones, where they shed light on what is happening on the ground, often in circumstances where it is not easy for public to get their information or get a sense of what is happening. And somewhere like Gaza, they do critical, critical work of informing people about what’s going on. And so, our message everywhere is journalists, media organizations, absolutely need to be protected.You had your hand up in the back. Go ahead.QUESTION: I did. Thanks, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I just wanted to circle back to what one of our colleagues asked, which was in relation to the mass graves story, my colleague referred to calls for an independent investigation, and you said that you were asking for more information from the Government of Israel, and that is squarely where we’re leaving the conversation. Why is there resistance to support an independent investigation into how 300 people ended up in a mass grave?MR PATEL: It’s not about resistance to this particular situation. It is me not wanting to speak in detail about something which Said posed as a hypothetical question, when from the United States perspective, I don&#8217;t have any additional information on this – aside from the public reporting that Humeyra and Said and others have asked about, which is a fair question. But what I am saying, from the United States perspective, is that we’ve seen those reports, and we are asking the Government of Israel for more details and more information.QUESTION: And do you believe that the Government of Israel is a credible source in enlightening you in that regards?MR PATEL: We do. We do. We do.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. Regarding the Human Rights Report from yesterday, particularly the chapter of Colombia, Section 4, corruption in government – you made references specifically to an episode or an issue and is the investigations from the attorney’s office in Colombia towards President Gustavo Petro’s son and his brother because of irregular payments that allegedly entered his presidential campaign. Why did you make reference or relate to corruption this issue that hasn’t been solved yet by the Colombian authorities, and taking into account that it’s so sensitive because it targets directly Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: So again, I – in the context of the Middle East, I will apply the same context here. I’m not going to speak to specific entries in the Human Rights Report. I will just say, again, that this is a compilation of various human rights violations that we’ve seen that are input by our embassies and consulates, that are input by civil society and nonprofit organizations and media organizations.QUESTION: Yes.MR PATEL: And I will just leave it at that. And I’m happy to check more on the specifics of this, but I don&#8217;t have anything more –QUESTION: Just to follow up, but do you have any credible – I don&#8217;t know – reasons to believe that there are irregular payments that enter into the Petro’s campaign?MR PATEL: What I can say about the entries of the Human Rights Report is that we find them to be credible, which is why we have included them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: United States imposes sanctions on suppliers to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. What was the real reason for these sanctions?MR PATEL: The sanctions were made because these were entities that were proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. These were entities based in the PRC, in Belarus, and that we have witnessed to have supplied equipment and other applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. They are following our October 23rd designation of other – three PRC entities who’ve worked to supply Pakistan’s missile program. We’re going to continue to disrupt and take actions against proliferation networks and concerning weapons of mass destruction procurement activities wherever they may occur.QUESTION: Sir, Iranian president was in Pakistan and during his visit, Pakistan and Iran signed eight MOUs and also agreed to push bilateral trade to $10 billion. A Pakistani Government spokesperson also said that it does not need a waiver from U.S. sanctions to build its portion of a Pak-Iran gas pipeline. How does United States view these agreements and statements?MR PATEL: So first, just let me say broadly we advise anyone considering business deals with Iran to be aware of the potential risk of sanctions. But ultimately, the Government of Pakistan can speak to their own foreign policy pursuits.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: But do you have &#8212;QUESTION: Does the State Department &#8212;QUESTION: On Pakistan &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a little bit. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much. If you could – quick answer for me. Let me get your reaction to today’s Moscow court hearing on Evan Gershkovich, where he’s appeal has been rejected. Do you have anything to say?MR PATEL: We, of course, are incredibly disappointed that Evan has been in pretrial detention for over a year without any clear justification from Russian authorities. Members of the embassy team in Moscow attended Evan’s appeal hearing today. Candidly though, Alex, Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips. Evan and Paul should be released immediately.QUESTION: Thank you. On Georgia, I wonder if you’re able to keep your eyes on the ball, given the recent developments – three of the nine states – of the protests. We also see that ruling party has announced its own counterprotest, and they also arrested a protestor from last week. They are flirting with a pro-Russian CPAC kind of group. Do you see any happy ending there?MR PATEL: So look, Alex, as it relates to protests, we certainly support what in the United States would be an expression of the people’s rights under the First Amendment to peacefully protest and demonstrate. Our call and our push, of course, continues to be that they be peaceful and certainly would condemn any steps that are taken for these kinds of protests to become violent.But Alex, I think this goes back to the draft law that you and I have been speaking about for a number of weeks now. We continue to find that this kind of legislative activity to be deeply problematic and inconsistent with – what would one would think – EU aspirations. You have to remember we’re talking about something that cracks down on media organizations, civil society organizations, and other things.And I see so many people leaving the room. I’m going to go ahead and call it, today. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 2:23 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Belarus																								China																								Colombia																								Cyprus																								Egypt																								Georgia																								Iran																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								United Kingdom
- Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Elizabeth Richard Travel to Türkiye Office of the SpokespersonDepartment of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Elizabeth Richard will visit Ankara, Türkiye, April 22 for the U.S.-Türkiye Counterterrorism Consultation. The United States and Türkiye relaunched their counterterrorism consultations at the Strategic Mechanism meetings in Washington D.C. in March 2024.Ambassador Richard and Turkish government counterparts will broaden and strengthen U.S.-Türkiye counterterrorism cooperation to thwart terrorist travel; combat terrorism-related networks engaged in organized crime; ensure the defeat of terrorist organizations such as PKK, DHKP-C, and ISIS in Syria and Iraq; and cooperate to counter the threat of ISIS and al-Qa&#8217;ida affiliates present in Africa and South and Central Asia. Ambassador Richard will also engage Turkish officials on ways to further combat exploitation of global finance channels by terrorist organizations.
- Turkey (Türkiye) HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Turkey (Türkiye)				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey (Türkiye)																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, and expression prior to the May presidential and parliamentary elections were a significant development during the year that negatively affected the state of human rights in Turkey. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers reported citizens were able to express their right to vote freely among genuine political alternatives but expressed concerns regarding media bias and restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, and expression, which created an uneven playing field and contributed to an unfair advantage for the incumbent.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government or on behalf of the government; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence and threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecution of journalists, censorship, or enforcement or of threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; refoulement of refugees to a country where they would face torture or persecution, including serious harms such as a threat to life or freedom or other mistreatment that would constitute a separate human rights abuse; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, femicide, and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national/racial/ethnic groups such as refugees and Kurdish minorities; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.The government took limited steps to identify and punish some officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Clashes between security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party terrorist organization and its affiliates continued and resulted in the injury or death of security forces, terrorists, and civilians. The government did not release information on efforts to investigate or prosecute personnel for wrongful or inadvertent deaths of civilians linked to counterterrorism operations.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were credible reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year. Deaths at the hands of security forces, police, and prison guards were reported. Civilian deaths occurred in connection with the government’s fight against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) organization in the southeast. Kurdish individuals were disproportionately impacted. The PKK continued to target civilians in its attacks; the government continued to work to block such attacks.Human Rights Watch reported Ahmet Guresci, age 27, died in custody after he and his brother were detained and beaten by police in Antakya for allegedly being involved in looting and “other crimes” following earthquakes in February.																																				b. Disappearance										There were unconfirmed reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but domestic and international rights groups reported some police officers, prison authorities, and military and intelligence units employed these practices. Domestic human rights organizations, bar associations, political opposition figures, international human rights groups, and others reported government agents engaged in threats and mistreatment of persons while in custody. Individuals with alleged affiliation with the PKK or the Gulen movement were more likely to be subjected to mistreatment or abuse.Anecdotal reports from human rights groups indicated police abused detainees outside police station premises, and mistreatment and alleged police abuse and mistreatment were more prevalent in some police facilities in parts of the southeast.On March 22, five Turkish police officers allegedly abducted a boy, age 14, from the Kurdish-majority district of Lice and later dumped him in a remote area with his hands and feet bound. The Diyarbakir Prosecutor General’s Office announced it had opened an investigation and charged the police officers with “illegally detaining” the victim and of “damage to property” to his cell phone, but the Bar Association of Diyarbakir demanded the officers be prosecuted under stronger charges.On April 11, the Constitutional Court ruled Dilan Alp’s rights were violated when he was severely injured by a tear-gas canister fired by police and that the police intervention during 2013 demonstrations in Istanbul was unlawful. At the time then-Istanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu referred to Alp, then age 17, as “marginal, a member of a terrorist organization.”																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention centers were overcrowded. Prisoners often suffered from the consequences of overcrowded facilities, poor sanitary conditions, and a lack of adequate medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross prison overcrowding was a significant problem. According to the Ministry of Justice, the country’s penal system had 405 institutions and as of October was over capacity by an estimated 44,000 prisoners. The Civil Society in the Penal System Association reported the government released many prisoners via amnesty to combat overcrowding throughout the year.Human rights organizations and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) reported prisoners sometimes lacked adequate access to potable water, proper heating, ventilation, lighting, food, and health services. Human rights organizations also noted prison overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions exacerbated health risks.Human rights associations expressed serious concern regarding the inadequate provision of health care to prisoners, particularly the insufficient number of prison doctors. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported prison wardens rather than health-care officials often decided whether to allow a prisoner’s transfer to a hospital. Reports by human rights organizations suggested some doctors refused to issue medical reports alleging abuse due to fear of reprisal. As a result, victims were often unable to get medical documentation of their abuse.NGOs and opposition politicians reported prison administrators used strip searches punitively against prisoners and visitors, particularly in cases involving prisoners convicted on terrorism charges. Some human rights activists and lawyers reported prisoners and detainees were sometimes arbitrarily denied access to family members and lawyers.Administration: Authorities at times investigated credible allegations of abuse and mistreatment but generally did not document the results of such investigations in a publicly accessible manner or disclose publicly whether actions were taken to hold perpetrators accountable.Independent Monitoring: The government allowed prison monitoring by some independent observers, including parliamentarians. By law prisons were monitored by domestic government entities including the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey and the Parliamentary Commission for Investigating Human Rights. The CPT, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention were also granted access to monitor prisons.The government did not allow independent NGOs to monitor prisons. NGOs such as the Human Rights Association (HRA) and Civil Society in the Penal System published periodic reports on prison conditions based on information provided by parliamentarians, correspondence with inmates, lawyers, inmates’ family members, and press reports.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of arrest or detention in court, but numerous credible reports indicated the government did not always observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Persons were not detained without judicial authorization. The law required prosecutors to issue warrants for arrests unless the suspect was detained while committing a crime. The law also required suspects be brought promptly before a judicial officer and charged with a crime. The period for arraignment could be extended for up to four days. These rights were generally respected. Formal arrest, separate from detention, provided for a suspect to be held in jail until court-ordered release. For crimes that carried potential prison sentences of less than three years’ imprisonment, a judge could release the accused after arraignment upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as bail. For more serious crimes, the judge could either release the defendant on their own recognizance or hold the defendant in custody (arrest) prior to trial if there were specific facts indicating the suspect might flee, attempt to destroy evidence, or attempt to pressure or tamper with witnesses or victims.While the law generally provided detainees the right to immediate access to an attorney of their choice, it allowed judges to deny such access for up to 24 hours. In criminal cases the law also required the government to provide indigent detainees with a public attorney if they requested one. In cases involving a potential prison sentence for conviction of more than five years’ imprisonment or in which the defendant was a child or a person with disabilities, a defense attorney was appointed, even absent a request from the defendant. Human rights observers noted that in most cases authorities provided an attorney if a defendant could not afford one.The government could detain without charge (or appearance before a judge) a suspect under suspicion of terror-related crimes for 48 hours for “individual” offenses and 96 hours for “collective” offenses. These periods could be extended twice with the approval of a judge, amounting to six days for “individual” and 12 days for “collective” offenses.The law gave prosecutors the right to suspend lawyer-client privilege and to observe and record conversations between accused persons and their legal counsel. Some lawyers defending persons accused of terrorism faced criminal charges themselves. On May 21, then Minister of Interior Soylu stated, “whenever PKK’s lawyers are locked up, then there will be no PKK in Turkey. They are the target ... PKK is poisoning Turkey via lawyers.”Media and human rights organizations reported Turkish National Police on April 25 raided several Diyarbakir-based bar associations, NGOs, news agencies, and homes in what was characterized as a counter-PKK operation. Police detained more than 110 individuals in Diyarbakir and other southeastern cities on suspicion of providing financial aid and legal assistance to the PKK, recruiting for the PKK, spreading PKK propaganda, and “organizing more than 60 demonstrations.” Diyarbakir Bar Association Vice President Mehdi Ozdemir told press that nearly 150 individuals, including 25 attorneys, as well as journalists, and rights advocates had been detained. The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) party executives and media outlet Mezopotamya Agency’s editor Abdurrahman Gok were reportedly among the detainees.Arbitrary Arrest: Although the law prohibited holding a suspect arbitrarily or secretly, there were numerous reports the government did not observe these prohibitions. Human rights groups alleged that in areas under curfew or in “special security zones,” security forces detained citizens without official record, leaving detainees at greater risk of arbitrary abuse.Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem, particularly in politically motivated cases. The maximum time an arrestee could be held pending trial for certain crimes after an indictment was seven years, including for offenses against the security of the state, national defense, constitutional order, state secrets and espionage, organized crime, and terrorism-related offenses. Pretrial detention during the investigation phase of a case (before an indictment) was limited to six months for cases that did not fall under the purview of the heavy criminal court, referred to by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as the central criminal court, and one year for cases that fell under the heavy criminal court. The length of pretrial detention sometimes exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crimes. For other major criminal offenses tried by high criminal courts, the maximum detention period after indictment remained two years with the possibility of three one-year extensions, for a total of five years. For terrorism-related cases, the maximum period of pretrial detention during the investigation phase was 18 months, with the possibility of a six-month extension.Rule of law advocates asserted broad use of pretrial detention had become a form of summary punishment, particularly in cases that involved politically motivated terrorism charges. Chief prosecutors had discretion, particularly under the wide-ranging counterterrorism law, to keep individuals they deemed dangerous to public security in pretrial detention.According to statistics from the Ministry of Justice, as of October 39,772 persons were held in pretrial detention, accounting for approximately 15 percent of the overall prison population.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary remained subject to influence, particularly from the executive branch.The executive branch exerted strong influence over the Board of Judges and Prosecutors, the judicial body that assigned and reassigned judges and prosecutors to the country’s courts nationwide and was responsible for their discipline. Out of 13 total judges on the board, the president directly appointed six: the executive branch and parliament appointed 11 members (seven by parliament and four by the president) every four years; the other two members were the presidentially appointed justice minister and deputy justice minister. Although the constitution provided tenure for judges, the Board of Judges and Prosecutors controlled the careers of judges and prosecutors through appointments, transfers, promotions, expulsions, and reprimands. Broad leeway granted to prosecutors and judges undermined the requirement to remain impartial, and judges’ inclination to give precedence to the state’s interests contributed to inconsistent application of laws. Bar associations, lawyers, and scholars expressed concern regarding application procedures for prosecutors and judges described as highly subjective, which they warned opened the door to political litmus tests in the hiring process. They expressed doubt a newly introduced training system, which required hires be trained under more senior figures for three years, would prevent politicization.The judiciary faced several problems that limited judicial independence, including intimidation and reassignment of judges and allegations of interference by the executive branch. More than a third of the country’s prosecutors and judges had less than six years of legal experience.Observers raised concerns the outcome of some trials appeared predetermined or pointed to judicial interference. Human rights groups and trial monitoring organizations reported that in politically sensitive cases, judges sometimes barred journalists and observers from the courtroom, interrupted defendants’ statements, did not allow them to speak, rejected defense requests without explanation, and handed down decisions without listening to the defendant’s statement, among other procedural irregularities.In September the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction of Osman Kavala, a prominent philanthropist and businessman, and his codefendants for their alleged role in the 2016 coup attempt and the 2013 Gezi Park protests, disregarding two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that ordered Kavala’s release. The ECtHR concluded he had not received a fair public trial and that the charges against him were politically motivated. In April 2022 Kavala was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted on charges of “attempting to overthrow the government.” At year’s end Kavala remained in prison.On August 25, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the country’s top judicial body, removed the chair and another member of the three-judge appeals panel responsible for hearing the appeal of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s criminal conviction for allegedly “insulting the members of the Supreme Election Council.” In December 2022 Imamoglu was sentenced to two years and seven months in prison and banned from participating in politics. At year’s end Imamoglu remained in office pending the appeals process.The system for educating and assigning judges and prosecutors fostered close connections between the two groups that some legal experts claimed encouraged impropriety and unfairness in criminal cases.Lower courts at times ignored or significantly delayed implementation of decisions reached by the Constitutional Court. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers reported most ECtHR decisions regarding freedom of thought, expression, and press freedom were not implemented.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair public trial, although bar associations and rights groups asserted executive interference with the judiciary and actions taken by the government jeopardized this right.The law provided defendants a presumption of innocence and the right to be present at their trials. In several high-profile cases, defendants appeared via video link from prison, rather than in person. Judges could restrict defense lawyers’ access to their clients’ court files for specific categories of crimes (including crimes against state security, organized crime, and sexual assault against children) until the client was indicted.A single judge or a panel of judges decided all cases. Courtroom proceedings were generally public except for cases involving children as defendants. The state increasingly used a clause allowing closed courtrooms for hearings and trials related to security matters, such as those related to “crimes against the state.” Court files, which contained indictments, case summaries, judgments, and other court pleadings, were closed except to the parties to a case, making it difficult for the public, including journalists and watchdog groups, to obtain information on the progress or results of a case. In some politically sensitive cases, judges restricted access to Turkish lawyers only, limiting the ability of domestic or international groups to observe some trials.Defendants had the right to be present at trial and to consult an attorney of their choice in a timely manner, although legal advocates asserted the government coerced defendants to choose government-appointed lawyers. Observers and human rights groups noted that in some high-profile cases, these rights were not afforded to defendants. Individuals from the southeast of the country were increasingly held in prisons or detention centers far from the location of the alleged crime and often appeared at their hearing via video link systems. Some human rights organizations reported hearings would at times continue in the defendant’s absence or while the defendant’s voice was inaudible when connectivity failed.Defendants or their attorneys could question witnesses for the prosecution, although questions were usually presented to the judges, who were expected to ask the questions on behalf of counsel. The law provided for court-provided language interpretation when needed, although human rights groups alleged interpretation was not always provided free of charge, leaving some non-Turkish-speaking defendants with limited economic resources disadvantaged by the need to pay for interpretation.The trial system did not provide for a speedy trial, and trial hearings were often several months apart, despite provisions in the code of criminal procedure for continuous trial. Trials sometimes began years after indictment, and appeals could take years more to reach conclusion.Observers noted prosecutors and courts often failed to establish sufficient evidence to sustain indictments and convictions in cases related to supporting terrorism, and highlighted concerns regarding respect for due process and adherence to credible evidentiary thresholds. In numerous cases authorities used secret evidence or witnesses that defense attorneys and the accused had no access or ability to cross-examine and challenge in court, particularly in cases related to national security. The government occasionally refused to acknowledge the use of evidence from, release testimony of, or allow defendants or their attorneys to hear the testimony of secret witnesses during court proceedings.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						The exact number of political prisoners was a subject of debate in the country. The Ministry of Justice announced 15,539 detainees remained in prisons on grounds of their alleged affiliation with the Gulen movement in July. NGOs estimated approximately 8,500 individuals were held in pretrial detention or were imprisoned following conviction specifically for alleged links with the PKK. Observers asserted a significant number of the individuals detained for journalistic work, human rights advocacy, or on terrorism or other charges, were political prisoners. The government disputed these allegations.Political prisoners were generally provided the same protections as other detainees but were sometimes subjected to significantly different prison conditions than the general population. Human rights organizations reported political prisoners were more often subjected to solitary confinement and excluded from government initiatives to lower the prison population through amnesties and early releases. The Civil Society in the Penal System Association reported oversight boards in prison administrations were more likely to deny the release of prisoners on their parole date on the grounds of “lack of good conduct” although their court-imposed conditional release dates had passed. The government did not permit access to political prisoners by human rights or humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.According to defense lawyers and opposition groups, there was a trend of prosecutors using what appeared to be legally questionable evidence to file criminal charges against and prosecute a broad range of individuals, including media workers, human rights activists, opposition politicians (primarily of the HDP), and others critical of the government. NGOs and human rights activists asserted the country’s antiterrorism law allowed an overly broad interpretation of the term “terrorism,” leading to the selective prosecution of journalists, activists, and others.There were credible reports authorities subjected political prisoners to abuses, including long solitary confinement, unnecessary strip and cavity searches, severe limitations on outdoor exercise and out-of-cell activity, denial of access to prison library and media, slow medical attention, and in some cases the denial of medical treatment. Reports also alleged authorities subjected visitors of political prisoners to abuse, including limiting access to family and degrading treatment by prison guards, including strip searches.On May 14, Can Atalay was elected as a member of parliament from the small leftist Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) while in prison. In April 2022 Atalay was among seven defendants who were sentenced to 18 years in prison in relation to Gezi Park protests on conviction of “assisting the attempted abolishment of the government.” His supporters argued his election should have automatically granted him immunity from prosecution and resulted in his release. On July 13, however, the Third Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest appellate court, unanimously ruled Atalay was not eligible for parliamentary immunity, assessing parliamentary immunity did not cover the type of crime for which he was convicted. In response to the ruling, TIP posted on social media, “We will not bow to the [presidential] palace and the judiciary working with its instruction.” On October 25, Turkey’s Constitutional Court ruled Atalay’s “right to vote and be elected” and the “right to personal liberty and security” had been violated, and he should be released from prison. Atalay continued to be held in prison as year’s end.																										f. Transnational Repression										The government engaged in a worldwide effort to apprehend suspected members of the Gulen movement. There were credible reports the government exerted bilateral pressure on other countries to take adverse action against specific individuals, at times without due process.Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence: There were credible allegations Turkish intelligence forces kidnapped alleged members of the Gulen movement in foreign countries and returned them to Turkey to stand trial. There were unconfirmed allegations Turkish authorities deported some Iranian political activists, including those with international protection status, at the request of Iran.On October 24, Turkish police arrested Iranian international protection seeker Shilan Mirzaee. Her lawyer told media police took her to a deportation center in Bandirma and did not provide documents explaining the reason for the arrest. Mirzaee said Turkish authorities stated her presence in the country was a national security risk and requested she leave. She further stated Turkish police told her the Iranian government had demanded her return and it was going to hand her over to them.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: Relatives of individuals who fled from the country due to fear of politically motivated abuse reported security forces used threats and intimidation to pressure them to reveal the individual’s location or encourage those who had fled to return to the country.Misuse of International Law Enforcement Tools: There were credible reports the government attempted to use INTERPOL red notices to target specific individuals located outside the country, alleging ties to terrorism based on little evidence. Freedom House reported that following the 2016 coup attempt, the country uploaded tens of thousands of requests in INTERPOL for persons the government designated as affiliated with the Gulen movement. There were also reports individuals faced complications related to erroneous lost or stolen passport reports the government filed against suspected Gulen movement supporters in the years directly following the coup attempt. Targeted individuals often had no clearly identified role in the attempted coup but were associated with the Gulen movement or had spoken in favor of it. The reports to INTERPOL led to individuals’ detention or prevented them from traveling.Efforts to Control Mobility: There were reports the government attempted to control mobility to exact reprisal against citizens abroad by refusing to renew the passports of some citizens with temporary residency permits in other countries, on political grounds. The government often claimed such citizens were members of the Gulen movement organizations; these individuals were frequently unable to travel outside their countries of residence.Bilateral Pressure: There was evidence the government applied bilateral pressure on other governments to secure their assistance with renditions without full due process and couched such requests as cooperation on countering terrorism.In July an official in Kosovo was found guilty and sentenced to prison for “abuse of official position or authority” for the deportation of six Turkish nationals in 2018 alleged by Turkish authorities to be followers of the Gulen movement. Upon their arrival in Turkey, the six individuals, including five who worked at Gulen affiliated educational institutions in Kosovo, were arrested and four were charged with “membership in a terrorist organization” and sentenced to between seven and nine years in prison, and the fifth was charged with “leading an armed terrorist organization” and sentenced to 15 years in prison.Human rights organizations and Turkish government supported news sites reported Koray Vural, a member of the Gulen movement, was “captured” by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) on September 16 in Tajikistan and transferred to Turkey to be tried for “membership in a terrorist organization.”																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										There were no reports the government evicted persons from their place of residence without due process. There were reports, however, the government seized property, including computers, camera equipment, cell phones, and case files of journalists and lawyers during their arrests without due process or adequate restitution. In multiple parts of the southeast, many citizens continued efforts to appeal the government’s 2016 seizures of properties to reconstruct areas damaged in government-PKK fighting.Some affected residents filed court challenges seeking permission to remain on seized land and receive compensation; many of these cases remained pending at year’s end. In certain cases, courts awarded compensation to aggrieved residents, although the latter complained awards were insufficient. As of July, 6.47 billion Turkish lira ($229.1 million) had been paid out to applicants. In Diyarbakir’s old city Sur District, the government had not completed repairs on many of the seized properties, with residents complaining stop-and-go efforts left many partially reconstructed buildings uninhabitable.The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in July 2020, can be found on the Department’s website:  https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress/.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution provided for the “secrecy of private life” and stated individuals had the right to demand protection and correction of their personal information and data. The law provided the MIT with the authority to collect information and limited the ability of the public or journalists to expose abuses. Oversight of the MIT fell within the purview of the presidency and checks on MIT authorities were limited. The MIT could collect information from any entity without a warrant or other judicial process for approval. At the same time, the law established criminal penalties for interfering with MIT activities and included data collection or obtaining or publishing information concerning the agency. The law allowed the president to grant the MIT and its employees immunity from prosecution.Police possessed broad powers for personal search and seizure. Senior police officials could authorize search warrants, with judicial permission required to follow within 24 hours. Individuals subjected to such searches had the right to file complaints; however, judicial permission occurring after a search had already taken place failed to serve as a check against abuse. Security forces could conduct wiretaps for up to 48 hours without a judge’s approval. As a check against potential abuse of this power, the State Inspection Board could conduct annual inspections and present its reports for review to parliament’s Security and Intelligence Commission.There were reports government authorities arbitrarily, or without appropriate legal authority, accessed, collected, or monitored private communications. The Ministry of Interior’s General Security Directorate monitored social media users’ posts. Authorities routinely blocked access to news sites, articles, websites, and social media posts. Human rights groups noted wiretapping without a court order circumvented judicial control and potentially limited citizens’ right to privacy. Some citizens asserted authorities tapped their telephones and accessed their email or social media accounts.On the evening of February 8, during rescue efforts following the two February 6 earthquakes, the government throttled bandwidth, or purposely slowed down internet users’ data transmission, on Twitter by an estimated 90 percent due to what the government deemed to be insufficient steps to remove content related to the earthquake that allegedly violated national security law. Critics claimed the action was to limit negative public reaction to the government’s slow initial response to the earthquake. Media reported the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) restricted the social media platform for several hours. Politicians and other prominent persons across the political spectrum criticized the censorship and demanded the government lift the ban immediately, and asserted survivors and rescuers alike were using social media to share vital information.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Occasional clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK and its affiliates in the country continued throughout the year and resulted in the injury or deaths of security forces, PKK terrorists, and civilians. Human rights organizations and media claimed Turkish airstrikes reportedly aimed at the PKK in Syria and Iraq resulted in civilian casualties. Humanitarian sources reported Turkish airstrikes October 5-8 across northeast Syria damaged critical infrastructure, killed 17 civilians, and seriously injured 11. The government continued security operations against the PKK and its affiliates in various areas of the east and southeast of the country. Authorities issued curfews of varying duration in certain urban and rural areas and decreed “special security zones” in some areas to facilitate counter-PKK operations, which restricted access of visitors and, in some cases, residents. Portions of Hakkari Province and rural portions of Tunceli Province remained “special security zones.” The PKK engaged in kidnappings and carried out attacks that claimed the lives of civilians. Residents of these areas reported they occasionally had very little time to leave their homes prior to the launch of counter-PKK security operations.NGOs reported Turkish-supported Syrian armed opposition groups (TSOs) in northern Syria committed human rights abuses, reportedly targeting Kurdish and Yezidi residents and other civilians, including extrajudicial killings, the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of civilians, torture, sexual violence, forced evacuations from homes, looting and seizure of private property, transfer of detained civilians across the border into Turkey, recruitment or use of child soldiers, and the looting and desecration of religious sites. Turkish think tank Center for Middle Eastern Studies in coordination with Syrian opposition delivered a four-day International Humanitarian Law Training Program inside Syria to SNA commanders on July 25-28, 2022. (For more information, see the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Syria).Killings: PKK tactics included targeted killings and assault with conventional weapons, vehicle-borne bombs, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At times IEDs and unexploded ordnance, usually attributed to the PKK, killed or maimed civilians and security forces. In Syria TSO clashes with groups the Turkish government considered to be affiliated with the PKK resulted in civilian deaths.Abductions: The PKK regularly abducted or attempted to abduct civilians. (see Child Soldiers, below).The NGO Syrians for Truth and Justice reported TSOs detained and unlawfully transferred Syrian nationals through Turkey.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: The February 13 report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic noted the presence of Turkish officials in TSO detention facilities, including in interrogation sessions where torture was used.Human rights groups alleged police, other government security forces, and the PKK abused some civilian residents of the southeast. There was little accountability for mistreatment by government authorities.Child Soldiers: The Secretary of State determined the government-supported armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March2023. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, within certain limits, and freedom of the press. The government restricted freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media. Multiple articles in the penal code directly restricted freedom of the press and other media platforms and free speech through broad provisions that prohibited praising a crime or criminals or inciting the population to enmity, hatred, or denigration, as well as provisions that purported to protect public order and criminalized insulting the state, the president, or government officials. The law also limited free expression online through a law that criminalized “disseminating false information” without establishing clear guidelines.The government prosecuted journalists from major opposition and independent newspapers and jailed journalists, hindering freedom of expression in the country. Media professionals reported self-censorship was widespread amid fear that criticizing the government could prompt reprisals, both economically and through selective prosecution.Freedom of Expression: Individuals in many cases could not criticize the state or government publicly without risk of civil or criminal suits or investigation, and the government restricted expression by individuals sympathetic to some religious, political, or cultural viewpoints. Those who wrote or spoke on sensitive topics or in ways critical of the government risked job loss, abuse by officials in the justice system, fines, and imprisonment. The government convicted and sentenced hundreds of individuals for exercising their freedom of expression. The government frequently responded to expression critical of it by filing criminal charges alleging affiliation with terrorist groups, terrorism, or otherwise endangering the state, citing national security grounds. The application of insult laws was also used to limit freedom of expression.The law provided for punishment of up to three years in prison for conviction of “hate speech” or injurious acts related to language, race, nationality, color, gender, disability, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, or sectarian differences. Human rights groups noted the law was used primarily to restrict freedom of expression rather than to protect members of minority groups.Under the rules of procedure, members of parliament could be reprimanded or temporarily expelled from the assembly due to the usage of the word “Kurdistan” or other sensitive terms on the floor of the parliament. Authorities did not uniformly implement this procedure.Rights groups and free speech advocates reported intensifying government pressure that in certain cases resulted in journalists exercising enhanced caution in their public reporting. As of October, between 21 and 44 journalists were imprisoned in the country. The Media Freedom Rapid Response documented a record number of violations of press and media freedom in the country encompassing 136 incidents involving 172 individuals or media organizations as of October.Violence and Harassment: Government and political leaders and their supporters used a variety of means to intimidate and pressure journalists, including through lawsuits, threats, and, in some cases, physical attacks. There was violence against journalists perpetrated by individuals affiliated with far-right groups and with alleged ties to political parties. Journalists alleged such groups were involved in the systematic intimidation of critical, left-leaning opinion. In October the Committee to Protect Journalists asserted attacks on journalists were rarely prosecuted. Victims publicly expressed a belief law that enforcement agencies were not interested in prosecuting the crimes.The government routinely filed terrorism-related charges against individuals or publications in response to reporting on sensitive topics, particularly government efforts against PKK terrorism and the Gulen movement. Human rights groups and journalists asserted the government did this to target and intimidate journalists and the public for speech perceived as critical of the state.Journalists affiliated or formerly affiliated with pro-Kurdish outlets faced significant government pressure, including incarceration. The government routinely denied press accreditation to Turkish citizens working for international outlets for any association (including volunteer work) with private Kurdish-language outlets.On February 21, a trial against journalist Mansur Celik began for “targeting individuals involved in counter-terrorism efforts,” for a 2020 report he wrote on the noncompliance of the Istanbul 14th High Criminal Court’s ruling with the Constitutional Court’s decision regarding member of parliament Enis Berberoglu. The case continued at year’s end.On June 26, police detained journalist Merdan Yanardag on charges of “making propaganda for a terrorist organization” for questioning the prison conditions and solitary confinement of Abdullah Ocalan, the convicted leader of the PKK.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Government and political leaders maintained direct and indirect censorship of media and books. Mainstream print media and television stations were largely controlled by progovernment holding companies heavily influenced by the ruling party. Only a small fraction of the holding companies’ profits came from media revenue, and their other commercial interests impeded media independence, encouraged a climate of self-censorship, and limited the scope of public debate.A study published in July by the European Federation of Journalists asserted low wages, long working hours, mobbing, and censorship plagued journalism in the country. Fifty percent of journalists surveyed identified political pressure as a major obstacle to their work and 43 percent experienced some form of censorship.Government prosecution of journalists limited media freedom throughout the year. Authorities subjected some writers and publishers to prosecution on grounds of defamation, denigration, obscenity, separatism, terrorism, subversion, fundamentalism, or insulting religious values. Authorities investigated or continued court cases against a myriad of publications and publishers on these grounds. Authorities also exercised censorship over online media (see Internet Freedom). In several cases the government barred journalists under judicial controls from traveling outside the country, including by using electronic monitoring. Authorities also targeted foreign journalists.While the law did not prohibit specific books or publications, court decisions resulted in bans for distribution or sale of certain books and periodicals. The Press Advertisement Board, which had the authority to impose advertising bans, included provisions referencing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, intersex, and other sexual minority (LGBTQI+) community, forbidding publications that “disrupt the family structure” and “weaken the common national and moral values of Turkish society.” The board extended press ethics obligations to websites and social media accounts of newspapers. Bookstores did not carry books by some opposition political figures.Publishers often exercised self-censorship, avoiding works with controversial content (including government criticism, erotic content, or pro-Kurdish content) that might draw legal action. Publishers faced publication bans and heavy fines if they failed to comply in cases in which a court ordered the correction of offensive content. Authorities also subjected publishers to book promotion restrictions. In some cases, prosecutors considered the possession of some Kurdish-language, pro-Kurdish, or Gulen movement books to be credible evidence of membership in a terror organization.Some journalists reported their employers asked them to censor their reporting if it appeared critical of the government or jeopardized other business interests and fired them if they failed to comply. Journalist organizations also reported that due to a fear of government backlash, companies were unwilling to purchase ads for critical or opposition outlets. These pressures contributed to an atmosphere of self-censorship in which media reporting became increasingly standardized along progovernment lines.On July 26, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) imposed fines on several television streaming service companies for “violating the principles of protecting the family” and “obscenity.” The fines were reportedly imposed at the upper limits for productions, including Netflix’s Dutch drama television series Anne+ and Spanish teen drama Elite, for violating national and moral values, general morality, and the principle of protecting the family; for Disney+’s series Love, Victor, for “disturbing and morally objectionable behaviors;” and for Modern Love, which aired on Amazon Prime, for “containing dialogues contrary to the moral values of society and the principles of protecting the family.” Additionally, RTUK requested the removal of certain films from streaming. Other streaming services including MUBI, Virgin Radio, and BluTV, were also penalized for similar violations.Libel/Slander Laws: Libel, slander, and blasphemy were criminal offenses, but legal provisions were selectively enforced. The law provided for a prison term of up to four years for persons convicted of insulting the president of the republic. The sentence could be increased by one-sixth if committed publicly and by one-third if committed by media outlets. Observers reported government officials used libel and slander laws, also known as defamation laws, to stop political opponents, journalists, and ordinary citizens from voicing criticism.The government opened investigations into thousands of individuals, including politicians and journalists based on allegations of insulting President Erdogan. Authorities selectively charged citizens, including teenagers and children, with insulting the country’s leaders and denigrating “Turkishness.” Free-speech advocates pointed out that, while leaders and deputies from opposition political parties regularly faced multiple insult charges, the government did not apply the law equally and Justice and Development Party members and government officials were rarely prosecuted. In April human rights organizations reported a total of 16,573 persons were tried in 2022 for charges related to “insult” and “incitement of public hatred or enmity.”The government increasingly enforced blasphemy laws that prohibited insulting religious values. In May a court convicted popstar Gulsen Colakoglu on charges of “inciting hatred and enmity” for a video in which she joked regarding religious Imam Hatip schools. She received a suspended sentence of 10 months so she would not serve any jail time so long as she did not face additional charges. Her arrest sparked widespread outrage on social media, with critics pointing to the incident as the latest example of political pressure on the judiciary.On June 1, an Istanbul court acquitted lawyer Efkan Bolaç of charges for “insulting the President” regarding two cartoons that he shared on Instagram in 2014. The related cartoons were those of Carlos Latuff, a cartoonist from Brazil. One of the cartoons was concerning Berkin Elvan, who died at age 15 after being hit in the head by a tear gas capsule thrown by a police officer during Gezi Park protests in 2013; the other was concerning the 301 miners who died in the Soma Mine Disaster in 2014, the worst mining disaster in the country’s history. The cartoon concerning Berkin Elvan was published by several media outlets, including progovernment daily Hurriyet.National Security: Authorities regularly used the counterterrorism law and the penal code to limit free expression on grounds of national security. Organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists and Freedom House, reported authorities used the counterterrorism law and criminal code to prosecute journalists, writers, editors, publishers, filmmakers, translators, rights activists, lawyers, elected officials, and students accused of supporting a terrorist organization, often either the PKK or the Gulen movement.On January 11, Turkish Medical Association Chairwoman Sebnem Korur Fincanci was sentenced to two years, eight months, and 15 days in prison on conviction of “disseminating terrorist propaganda” for suggesting authorities should investigate the possible use of chemical weapons against Kurdish militants in Iraq. Fincanci was released pending appeal.On September 9, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation in response to comments made by member of parliament Sezgin Tanrikulu on September 8, during a live broadcast on the pro-opposition TV100 channel. He was investigated for “insulting the Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye, and State Institutions and Bodies,” and “inciting the public to hatred and hostility or contempt.”Nongovernmental Impact: The PKK used intimidation to limit freedom of expression and other constitutional rights in the southeast of the country. Some journalists, political party representatives, and residents reported pressure, intimidation, and threats if they spoke out against the PKK or praised government security forces.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted access to the internet and blocked selected online content. The government at times blocked access to cloud-based services and permanently blocked access to many virtual private networks. There was credible evidence the government monitored private online communications. The government had authority to restrict internet freedom with limited parliamentary and judicial oversight. The law provided for government authorities to access internet users’ records to “protect national security, public order, health, and decency” or to prevent crime. The judicial system was responsible for informing content providers or ordered blocks.The BTK was empowered, as were government ministers, to demand internet service providers (ISPs) remove content or block websites with four hours’ notice. The regulatory body was required to refer the matter within 24 hours to a judge, who typically ruled on the matter within 48 hours. If it was not technically possible to remove individual content within the specified time, the entire website could be blocked. ISP administrators could face a penalty of six months to two years in prison or fines ranging from 50,000 to 500,000 Turkish lira ($1,800 to $18,000) for conviction of failing to comply with a judicial order. The president appointed the BTK president, vice president, and members of the agency. The government required ISPs, including internet cafes, to use BTK-approved filtering tools that blocked specific content. Additional internet restrictions were in place in government and university buildings. According to EngelliWeb, the government had blocked 712,558 domain names as of October.The government criminalized “disseminating false information” with a penalty for conviction of up to three years in prison, creating an environment of self-censorship and fear. The law allowed the government to block a website or remove content if there was sufficient suspicion the site was committing any number of crimes, including insulting the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, or insulting the president. The government could also block sites to protect national security and public order. At times authorities blocked some news and information sites that had content criticizing government policies. The law also allowed persons who believed a website violated their personal rights to ask the regulatory body to order ISPs to remove offensive content. Government leaders, including the president, reportedly employed staff to monitor the internet and initiate charges against individuals perceived as insulting them.On February 28, press reported prominent geologist Ovgun Ahmet Ercan was detained on charges of “spreading obviously false information to the public” in the eastern province of Elazig in relation to his earthquake-related social media posts on the same date. Ercan posted that several women had reportedly been raped after the earthquakes because soldiers had not been stationed in the earthquake zone. He was later released on judicial control with an international travel ban.On February 28, journalist Sinan Aygul was convicted on charges of “spreading false information” based on the controversial “disinformation” law. Aygul, who served as chairman of the local area’s journalists association, posted on social media that a girl, age 14, had been sexually abused by police officers and soldiers in Bitlis Province. After speaking with the local governor, Aygul retracted the story and deleted the post, saying it was possible the information he received was incorrect or incomplete and he had not confirmed the story before publication. Aygul’s conviction was the first case to be tried and convicted under the disinformation law. Following the hearing, Aygul reported he told the panel the law was antidemocratic and refused to legitimize the law by defending himself and remained silent throughout the trial. Aygul was expected to further appeal the decision.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Although the constitution provided for freedom of assembly, the law specified several grounds for the government to limit that right. The law stipulated penalties for protesters convicted of carrying items that might be construed as weapons, prohibited the use of symbols linked to illegal organizations (including chanting slogans), and criminalized covering one’s face while protesting. The law permitted police to use tinted water in water cannons, potentially to tag protesters for later identification and prosecution. The law also allowed police to take persons into “protective custody” without a prosecutor’s authorization if there was reasonable suspicion that they were a threat to themselves or to public order. The antiterror law gave provincial governors enhanced authority to ban protests and public gatherings, a ban some governors enacted broadly.The government treated many demonstrations as security threats to the state and deployed large numbers of riot police to control crowds, frequently using excessive force, resulting in injuries, detentions, and arrests. At times the government used its authority to detain persons before protests were held on the premise that they might cause civil disruption. The government generally did not investigate security forces’ actions. Human rights NGOs asserted the government’s failure to delineate clearly in the law the circumstances that justified the use of force contributed to disproportionate use of force during protests. Authorities restricted the rights of assembly of LGBTQI+ individuals and allies throughout the year.In March, during the 21st Feminist Night March to commemorate International Women’s Day, riot police prevented crowds from reaching Istanbul’s Taksim Square in the city center but allowed them to carry on with their march for a while before later using tear gas to disperse them. Police detained 32 persons, mostly women. In May police detained 59 protesters who tried to break through the barricades and enter Taksim Square to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Gezi Park protests.On August 12, police detained 39 demonstrators at a protest organized by the Adana branch of the HRA, citing disruption of public order. The protest, titled “Galatasaray is Ours,” was organized in support of The Saturday Mothers at Inonu Park – a 28-year effort to uncover the fate of those who disappeared while in police custody. Since May 1995, the Saturday Mothers had gathered at Galatasaray Square to hold vigil. After multiple instances of police interventions, the gatherings were intermittently halted in 1999 for a decade. They resumed in 2009, however following police attacks and detentions at the group’s 2018 Galatasaray Square sit-in, demonstrations were once again only held intermittently. In November the Ministry of Interior allowed the group to continue its vigil.						Freedom of Association						While the law provided for freedom of association, the government restricted this right. The government used provisions of the antiterror law to prevent associations and foundations it had previously closed due to alleged threats to national security from reopening. Bar association and other civil society organization representatives reported police sometimes attended organizational meetings and recorded them, which the representatives interpreted as an effort to intimidate them.By law persons organizing an association did not need to notify authorities beforehand, but an association was required to provide notification before interacting with international organizations or receiving financial support from abroad and was required to provide detailed documents on such activities. Representatives of associations stated this requirement placed an undue burden on their operations. Human rights and civil society organizations, groups promoting respect for the rights of LGBTQI+ persons, and women’s groups asserted the government used regular and detailed audits to create administrative burdens and to intimidate them by threatening large fines.Human rights groups reported the counterterrorist financing law was used to justify onerous government audits of organizations and associations focused on human rights or topics otherwise sensitive to the ruling party. The law granted the Ministry of Interior powers to audit, suspend staff and governing board members, and temporarily shut down operations of NGOs without judicial review. Civil society organizations noted an increase in the number of audits and fines levied on organizations.On September 13, an Istanbul court rejected the closure case against the We Will Stop Femicide organization on charges of “activity against law and morals.” The NGO campaigned for the ending of femicide in the country and frequently criticized the government for what it considered to be inadequate laws to combat violence against women.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government limited these rights. The government restricted foreign travel for some citizens accused of terrorism, or links to the Gulen movement or the failed 2016 coup attempt. Media workers, human rights defenders and others facing politically motivated charges were often placed under “judicial control” pending the outcome of their trial, which frequently included a ban on international travel that prevented them from leaving the country. Curfews and bans on public gatherings imposed by local authorities in response to counter-PKK operations and the country’s military operation in northern Syria also restricted freedom of movement and expression.In-country Movement: The constitution provided that only a judge could limit citizens’ freedom to travel and only in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution. Antiterror laws allowed serious restrictions to be imposed on freedom of movement, and granted governors the power to limit individuals’ movement, including entering or leaving provinces, for up to 15 days.The lack of freedom of movement was a problem in parts of the east and southeast of the country, where countering PKK activity led authorities to block roads and set up checkpoints, temporarily restricting movement at times. The government instituted special security zones, restricting the access of civilians, and established curfews in parts of several provinces in response to PKK terrorist attacks or activity.Conditional refugees and Syrians under temporary protection also experienced some restrictions on their freedom of movement requiring travel permits to travel to cities other than those in the province in which they were registered. In response to severe earthquakes in February that affected an estimated 1.7 million refugees, approximately half of the country’s refugee population, the government issued travel permit exemptions to allow refugees to leave their cities of registration in earthquake-impacted areas, but some refugees reported they were unable to renew these permits after they expired, requiring them to return to earthquake impacted regions.Foreign Travel: The government placed restrictions on foreign travel for tens of thousands of citizens accused of terrorism due to alleged links to the Gulen movement or the failed coup attempt, as well as on their extended family members. Authorities restricted some foreign citizens with dual Turkish citizenship from leaving the country. The government maintained the travel restrictions were due to terrorism concerns or were necessary to preserve security.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to international protection applicants and status holders and temporary protection beneficiaries, stateless persons, and returning refugees.The government continued to host approximately 3.7 million refugees and asylum seekers in the country, 3.3 million of whom were Syrians. Case overload created a number of economic, political, and social challenges. In response to increasing antirefugee sentiments throughout the country, the government prioritized irregular migration management – both inside and at its borders. This included increasing crackdown operations on irregular migration and deportations, preventing irregular entry at its borders without consideration for asylum claims, enforcing address verifications to ensure refugees were living at their assigned provinces, and encouraging the voluntary return of one million Syrians to Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria.Following elections in May, the government intensified combating irregular migration as part of its efforts to demonstrate it had control over its borders. From May to June, migration authorities released data indicating a 40 percent increase in arrests of undocumented migrants. On July 9, the minister of interior pledged to “visibly curb undocumented migrants” through increased identity checks and crackdowns. In the weeks and months following the announcement, there were widespread allegations of police misconduct, including entering individual’s homes without permission to check documentation, stopping persons on the street who were perceived to look foreign in order to check their identification documents, and police arresting individuals and sending them to removal centers without due process.Access to Asylum: The law provided for standard treatment of asylum seekers countrywide and established a system of providing protection to asylum seekers and refugees, but it limited rights granted in the 1951 Refugee Convention to refugees from Europe and established restrictions on movement of persons under temporary or conditional status.The law provided regulatory guidelines for foreigners’ entry into, presence in, and exit from the country, and provided for the protection of asylum seekers. The law did not impose a strict time limit to apply for asylum and required only that asylum seekers did so “within a reasonable time” after arrival. The law also did not require asylum seekers to present a valid identity document to apply for status.UNHCR had regular access to removal centers where foreigners, including persons under temporary and international protection, were detained. There were reports from refugee-rights NGOs and bar associations that authorities prevented them from accessing clients and asylum seekers at risk of deportation. UNHCR worked with the government to provide access to asylum procedures for persons in need of protection, including through access to information, interpretation, and legal aid.UNHCR, Ukrainian associations, and refugee-rights NGOs estimated more than 825,000 displaced Ukrainians entered the country following Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. Many were on extended tourist visas or short-term residency permits with limited access to public services. There were reports some authorities discouraged Ukrainian nationals from applying for international protection status and encouraged them instead to seek residency permits that did not afford them refugee protection and access to public services.Refoulement: Authorities generally offered protection against refoulement to all asylum seekers who met the definition of a refugee under the country’s domestic legislation on asylum protection, although there were some confirmed cases of refoulement. The government increased efforts to deport those it claimed entered the country illegally, particularly non-Syrians, as well as those it deemed to pose security threats before they were granted status determination interviews by migration authorities.Some NGOs alleged clients were taken into custody when applying for asylum and then deported without being provided access to a lawyer. There were also reports some Afghans and Syrians were coerced into providing a fingerprint signature on “voluntary” repatriation forms in removal centers through physical force or terrible conditions that induced them to “sign.” Following the government’s July 9 announcement to “visibly curb undocumented migrants,” there were increased reports of a government crackdown on irregular migration that included forced returns and deportations to Syria and Afghanistan. Many asylum seekers claimed they were not provided an opportunity to file for asylum protection, prevented from accessing legal aid support, or both.In incidents of administrative detention of which UNHCR was made aware, the reasons for detention primarily related to violations of provisions of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (including but not limited to irregular presence in the country, irregular entry to or departure from the country, or alleged involvements in criminal acts or disturbing the public order). In cases of alleged forced return or risk of forced return, UNHCR shared its concern with the relevant authorities.UNHCR typically intervened in incidents of detention when it was known a person needed international protection, or detained individuals expressed interest in seeking asylum. There were press reports alleging refugees were returned involuntarily to Syria after being rounded up in crackdown operations, including in August two Moroccans mistakenly deported to Syria. There were reports of provincial Presidency for Migration Management authorities denying refugee status and issuing deportation orders to individuals who had fled countries where they faced persecution for their religious beliefs. Many such cases involved Iranians, including Baha’is, Christian converts, and atheists. While evidence of systematic discrimination against non-Muslims or religious minorities was not available, there were allegations some individual migration officials and judges made comments that indicated general ignorance of religious minorities and sometimes individual bias.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Authorities engaged in pushbacks of asylum seekers at the country’s borders and there were multiple reports by international media of alleged violence and forced returns to Iran of Afghans, to Syria of Syrians, and of other asylum seekers attempting to enter the country. Migrants and asylum seekers reported severe mistreatment when attempting to cross the borders with Greece and Bulgaria. International media and UN agencies also documented similar mistreatment of migrants and asylum seekers in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey. Greek officials claimed Turkish forces escorted boats containing migrants and asylum seekers into Greek territorial waters.Ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections in May and following the February earthquakes, some political parties and far-right groups used antirefugee rhetoric and circulated reportedly faked videos to stir public sentiments. NGOs reported the continued increase in negative rhetoric concerning refugees in media impacted refugees’ daily lives directly and indirectly, with some stating they felt increasingly unsafe, tended to keep quiet and out of the public eye, and preferred not to report problems to authorities due to fear of potential deportation. Workplace exploitation, child labor, and forced early marriage were significant problems among refugees and worsened as a result of the declining economic conditions in the country as well as following the February earthquakes. Human rights groups alleged conditions in detention and removal centers sometimes limited rights of asylum seekers to communicate with family members, interpreters, and lawyers.UN agencies reported there were LGBTQI+ asylum seekers and conditional refugees in the country – most from Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq – and LGBTQI+ individuals from Syria under temporary protection status. According to human rights groups, these individuals faced discrimination and hostility from both authorities and the local population. Many experienced gender-based violence. Commercial sexual exploitation was a significant problem among LGBTQI+ refugees, particularly for but not limited to transgender persons.On January 5, local and international press reported two soldiers in the eastern Van Province were arrested for raping an Afghan woman when a group of 16 asylum seekers were being processed for deportation to Iran. In June the two soldiers were convicted of rape and received maximum sentences of 32 years and 37 years in prison.Freedom of Movement: Undue and arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement for refugees and asylum seekers occurred. Authorities assigned non-Syrians to one of 62 “satellite cities,” where they received services from local authorities under the responsibility of provincial governorates. Refugees, asylum seekers and status holders were required to check in with local migration authorities on a weekly or biweekly basis and needed permission from local authorities to travel to cities other than their assigned city, including for meetings with UNHCR or resettlement country representatives. Syrians under temporary protection and international protection applicants and status holders continued to be restricted from traveling without permission outside provinces listed on their registration cards, although authorities made exemptions for those affected by the February earthquakes. Refugees reported difficulties in obtaining these permissions, even for doctor’s appointments. Some provinces would not accept travel permission requests or transfer of residency registration.Syrians under temporary protection risked the loss of temporary protection status if they traveled to a third country or returned temporarily to Syria without government permission. The government sometimes denied exit permission to Syrians under temporary protection for reasons that were unclear. In response to the February earthquakes, the government allowed an estimated 70,000 Syrians under temporary protection to temporarily exit the country for Syria for up to six months; according to UNHCR, as of the end August, close to 63,000 had returned, most without any problems.Employment: The law allowed both international protection applicants and status holders (mostly non-Syrians) and temporary protection beneficiaries (mostly Syrians) the right to work, provided they were registered for six months in the province where they wished to work, although some flexibilities were granted. Applying for a work permit was the responsibility of the employer; some complained the government procedure was burdensome and permit fees expensive. Some refugees, asylum seekers, and status holders opted not to work formally with work permits because they would potentially lose cash assistance support from social programs and were unaware of the advantages of formal employment. Most international protection applicants and status holders and temporary protection beneficiaries remained without legal employment options, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation, including wages under minimum wage, withholding of wages, and exposure to unsafe work conditions.Access to Basic Services: Provincial and municipal governments, working with local NGOs, were responsible for meeting the basic needs of refugees, international protection applicants and status holders, and temporary protection beneficiaries present in their districts. Basic services were dependent on local officials’ interpretation of the law and their resources. Governors had significant discretion in working with asylum seekers and NGOs, and the assistance provided by local officials to vulnerable persons varied widely. Following the February earthquakes there were some reports of local government officials denying public services and access to shelter for refugees.NGO staff members reported individual cases of refugees being refused health-care services. International protection applicants and status holders lost access to subsidized health care after one year of registration in the country or if their application was rejected. Individuals meeting certain conditions, such as documented chronic conditions, disabilities, or those older than a specific age, could apply for an exemption to continue receiving subsidized health-care coverage. The implementation of these exemptions by local migration authorities, however, was inconsistent and without clear criteria. Some international protection applicants and status holders displaced by earthquakes faced difficulties reactivating their health coverage despite internal guidelines from migration authorities providing this exception. Temporary protection beneficiaries received free access to the public-health system, although some services such as medicines and advanced medical procedures were not always covered.Registered school-age refugee children had access to education, although many encountered challenges overcoming the language barrier, meeting transportation or other costs, and facing bullying in school both from school officials and other students. NGOs reported the government did not accept school enrollment by refugee students if they were residing outside their registered provinces, resulting in more children out of school. Some NGOs succeeded in getting court orders to enroll the students, but the process was legally burdensome and required many appeals. NGOs and UN agencies reported increasing numbers of children were out of school following the February earthquakes, with many at risk of exploitation, engaging in child labor, and early forced marriage.Durable Solutions: The law did not provide for naturalization or resettlement within the country for international protection applicants and status holders or temporary protection beneficiaries, but it allowed them to stay until resettled to a foreign country or able to return to their country of origin. Temporary protection beneficiaries or international protection status holders could access naturalization only through marriage to a Turkish citizen or through an exceptional circumstances allowance.UNHCR worked closely with Turkish authorities as well as resettlement countries to identify, assess, and process refugees for resettlement considerations.Temporary Protection: While non-European asylum seekers were not considered refugees by domestic law, the government granted temporary protection status to nearly 3.3 million Syrians and provided international protection to more than 330,000 asylum seekers of other nationalities. Individuals recognized by the government for temporary protection (Syrians) or international protection (all other non-Europeans, for example, Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, and Somalis) were permitted to reside in the country temporarily until they could obtain third-country resettlement.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										As a result of February earthquakes, 3.6 million persons resided in medium, heavy, or totally damaged dwellings and were left without safe homes according to government damage assessments. While some individuals relocated to other parts of the country or to secondary homes, as of October 790,000 still resided in temporary settlements.Prior to the earthquakes, close to 505,000 Syrians under Temporary Protection and International Protection status holders or applicants lived in the four most heavily earthquake affected provinces as well as Nurdagi and Islahiye District in Gaziantep. As of year’s end, there were approximately 435,000 registered refugees in these most heavily affected locations, of whom around 100,000 lived in formal container and tent sites as well as temporary accommodation centers. In addition, there also were displaced refugees living in informal sites.For further information regarding IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org/ .																																				g. Stateless Persons										The government did not keep figures for stateless persons. The government provided documentation for children born to international protection applicants and status holders and temporary protection beneficiaries, although statelessness remained an increasing concern for these children, some of whom could receive neither Turkish citizenship nor documentation from their parents’ home country. Children born to refugee parents lacking a legal marriage or legal registration documents faced difficulty getting birth registration documents, increasing their risk of statelessness. There were reports of children encountering difficulties regarding parental custody or guardians during the earthquakes.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Although the constitution and law provided citizens the ability to change their government through free and fair elections based on universal and equal suffrage conducted by secret ballot, the government restricted equal competition and placed restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression. The government restricted the activities of opposition political parties, leaders, and officials, including through police detention. Several parliamentarians were at risk of prosecution after parliament lifted their immunity.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: In May the country held early parliamentary and presidential elections. The elections were the first to take place under the presidential system adopted after the 2017 national referendum took effect. The observation mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe noted the elections were held in an environment tilted in favor of the president and the ruling party, stating, “biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.”Radio and television broadcast outlets did not provide equal access to candidates from the country’s major political parties. Critics charged media generally favored the ruling Justice and Development Party. According to RTUK member Ilhan Tasci from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the television channel TRT Haber covered President Erdogan for more than 48 hours, or 90 times more airtime than Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the CHP and the joint presidential candidate of the Nation Alliance, who received only 32 minutes of coverage in total.Assailants carried out multiple attacks on political party offices, rallies, and party members during the period between the announcement in March of early elections and the vote. Opposition party members faced frequent accusations from the highest levels of government of alleged terrorism-related crimes. Several opposition candidates for parliament faced legal charges in connection with these or other claims.There were isolated allegations of electoral irregularities primarily in the east of the country, which no party claimed affected the overall election result.Political Parties and Political Participation: In parliament, 14 political parties held seats before the May elections; 16 political parties held seats following the elections, and other parties were able to participate in elections. Some parties enjoyed greater advantages than others. Media influence favored the ruling party and its alliance partner, the Nationalist Movement Party. Representatives expressing views critical of the government or President Erdogan have faced criminal or civil charges. The government used opposition leaders’ social media postings to file criminal and civil complaints against them, alleging the defendants insulted the president and spread terrorist propaganda.In Istanbul, both opposition CHP Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and CHP Provincial Party then-Chair Canan Kaftancioglu were the subjects of investigations and judicial proceedings that human rights organizations widely viewed as politically motivated. In December 2022 Imamoglu was found guilty of “insulting” government officials for his 2019 remarks allegedly insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council. Kaftancioglu also faced investigations related to comments deemed insulting to President Erdogan and other senior government officials.HDP representatives faced significant legal challenges to their ability to campaign, express opinions, and retain their mandate. The party faced a closure suit brought by the government. Restrictive government regulations constrained the ability of many in the opposition to conduct political activities such as organizing protests or political campaign events and sharing critical messages on social media. In April amendments to the electoral law that democracy advocates claimed were designed to limit the political participation of opposition parties and diminish stakeholder trust in the electoral process took effect. The government routinely suspended democratically elected mayors in multiple cities and municipalities. Since 2016, the government had removed 88 percent of elected HDP officials with mayorships still run by government-appointed trustees. Former HDP cochairs Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag remained in prison.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for conviction of official corruption. Government mechanisms to investigate and punish alleged abuse and corruption by state officials remained inadequate, and impunity was a problem. The judiciary was subjected to government interference, including with respect to the investigation and prosecution of major corruption cases. The government did not implement the law effectively, and some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were isolated reports of government corruption.Corruption: The government continued efforts to crack down on high-level corruption. Investigative journalists and NGOs reported cases of well-connected businesspersons siphoning state finances in previous years through tax fraud, manipulated public procurements, or frauds related to agricultural subsidies. These investigations sometimes resulted in prosecutions. Parliament entrusted the Court of Accounts, the country’s supreme audit institution, with accountability related to revenues and expenditures of government departments. Outside this audit system, there was no dedicated regulator with the exclusive responsibility for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases and there were concerns regarding the impartiality of the judiciary in the handling of corruption cases.While opposition politicians frequently accused the ruling party of corruption, there were only isolated journalistic or official investigations of government corruption. Journalists and civil society organizations revealed they feared retribution for reporting on corruption. Authorities continued to pursue criminal and civil charges against journalists reporting on corruption allegations. Courts and RTUK regularly blocked access to press reports regarding corruption.There were some credible press allegations of corruption throughout the year. Following the February 6 earthquakes, press reported on increasing levels of public frustration and anger regarding allegations of government corruption within the construction sector, correlating faulty construction and the cutting of corners as well as the government’s granting of building amnesties to the high level of destruction and rate of collapse of buildings throughout the country’s southeast.On June 16, law enforcement officials in Hakkari Province carried out a series of raids to apprehend 31 individuals including customs officers, police officers, and civilians and seized substantial amounts of foreign currency, Turkish lira, and jewelry believed to have been acquired through corrupt practices.In October police detained 60 active and former local government employees in raids in Seyhan and Cukurova Municipalities on charges of corruption and bribery related to city zoning matters. Detainees included former Cukurova Municipality Deputy Mayor Ali Arslanlioglu, former zoning manager Hasan Uzun, an unnamed Seyhan deputy mayor, multiple zoning managers, and dozens of others. One zoning director allegedly illegally appropriated land belonging to a local university in order to turn it into a residential area so as to accrue 150 million Turkish lira ($5.5 million). Authorities subsequently released one suspect and arrested 13. Three other suspects were placed under house arrest while 17 persons were released under “judicial supervision.”For additional information regarding corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A limited number of domestic and international human rights groups operated throughout the country, although many faced serious government harassment. Government officials were rarely cooperative and were not responsive to the views of these groups. Some had difficulty registering as legal entities with the Ministry of Interior. Others faced government obstruction and restrictive laws regarding their operations. Human rights groups reported the government was often unresponsive to their requests for meetings and did not include their input in policy formation. Human rights organizations and monitors as well as lawyers and doctors involved in documenting human rights abuses faced detention, prosecution, intimidation, and harassment, and their organizations faced closure orders for their activities.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: The HRA asserted its members collectively faced more than 5,000 legal suits since the group’s establishment, of which more than 129 were active at year’s end. These cases were mostly related to terror and insult charges. Four HRA executives and members were in prison. HRA asserted Co-chair Eren Kesken had over 150 court cases pending against her. On February 23, Kesken again faced trial on charges of “insulting a public official” and “targeting those who took part in the fight against terrorism” in Izmir. In April she was also detained at an Istanbul airport allegedly due to her social media posts. Others faced continued threats of police detention and arrest. The harassment, detention, and arrest of many leaders and members of human rights organizations resulted in some organizations closing offices and curtailing activities and some human rights defenders self-censoring.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Ombudsman Institution and the National Human Rights and Equality Institution were the government’s human rights monitoring bodies. The Ombudsman Institution operated under parliament as a mechanism for citizens to file complaints and request investigations into government practices and actions, particularly concerning human rights problems and personnel matters. The Ombudsman Institution’s mandate extended only to complaints related to public administration. Dismissals under the 2016-2018 state of emergency decrees did not fall within its purview. The National Human Rights and Equality Institution reviewed cases outside the Ombudsman Institution’s mandate. Independent observers assessed both institutions were not financially nor operationally independent.The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures was established in 2017 to review cases and appeals related to purges and closures during the state of emergency. In January the Commission concluded examining all applications.The Ministry of Justice’s Human Rights Department was the ministry’s lead entity on human rights matters and coordinated its work with the ministry’s Victims’ Rights Department.Parliament’s Human Rights Commission functioned as a national monitoring mechanism. Commission members maintained a dialogue with NGOs on human rights problems and conducted some prison visits, although activists asserted the commission’s ability to influence government action was limited.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized gender-based violence and sexual assault, including rape of a person, and spousal and domestic or intimate partner rape, with penalties of two to 10 years’ imprisonment for conviction of attempted sexual violation and at least 12 years’ imprisonment for conviction of rape or sexual violation. Other forms of domestic and sexual violence, including so-called corrective rape of LGBTQI+ persons, were criminalized.The law required police and local authorities to grant various levels of protection and support services to survivors of violence or those at risk of violence. It also mandated government services, such as shelter and temporary financial support, for survivors and provided for family courts to impose sanctions on perpetrators. The law provided for the establishment of violence prevention and monitoring centers to offer economic, psychological, legal, and social assistance. The government did not effectively or fully enforce these laws.Courts regularly issued restraining orders to protect survivors, but human rights organizations reported police rarely enforced them effectively. Women’s associations also stated government counselors and police sometimes encouraged women to remain in abusive marriages at their own personal risk rather than break up families. Courts in some cases gave reduced sentences to men found guilty of committing gender-based violence, citing good behavior during the trial or “unjustifiable provocation” by women as an extenuating circumstance of the crime. The criminal code allowed defendants to receive a reduced sentence if the offense was committed “in a state of anger or severe distress caused by an unjust act.”Gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence, remained a serious and widespread problem both in rural and urban areas. Women’s rights advocates asserted there were not enough shelters to meet the demand for assistance and shelter staff did not provide adequate care and services, particularly in the southeast of the country. Lack of services was more acute for elderly women and LGBTQI+ women as well as for women with older children.The government operated a nationwide domestic violence hotline and a web application called the Women Emergency Assistance Notification System that provided women with a means to report domestic violence. NGOs asserted the quality of services provided in response to calls was inadequate for survivors of domestic violence and that women were at times directed to mediation centers or told to reconcile with their husbands.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: There were occasional reports of so-called honor killings of women, mainly in the southeast of the country. The criminal code prescribed life imprisonment for killings perpetrated with the motive of “custom,” but NGOs reported courts often reduced actual sentences due to mitigating factors, including “unjustifiable provocation.” Human rights groups reported that as of September men had killed 247 women. In September alone at least 32 women were reportedly killed, 14 of whom were killed by their husbands, former husbands, or boyfriends.In January, Necati Akpinar, who had been imprisoned for conviction of the murder of his two previous wives in 1983 and again in 2003, was charged with killing his third wife, Mutlu Menekse, in Manisa. He had been released from prison on parole in 2020 under a law to reduce jail populations during the Covid-19 pandemic. In October an indictment was prepared requesting an aggravated life sentence for the murder of his third wife.Discrimination: Women enjoyed the same rights as men by law, although inequities remained. Societal and official discrimination were widespread. Legal restrictions existed on women’s right to remarry, requiring a 300-day waiting period following the dissolution of a marriage before remarrying (giving birth also ended the waiting period), and on the ability to work in mining and water industries. The law provided the same legal status and rights for women in property, inheritance, and owning and managing a business. No legal prohibition against gender-based discrimination in access to credit existed. Women faced discrimination in employment. According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, in 2022 women’s employment was at 30 percent compared with men’s employment at 65 percent.The constitution permitted measures to advance gender equality. To encourage the hiring of women, the state paid social services insurance premiums on behalf of employers for several months for any woman employee older than 18. Laws provided for maternity leave, breastfeeding time during work hours, flexibility in work hours, and required childcare by large employers.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. Women generally had access to at least one family planning method, and women could access contraceptive methods for free in government funded primary health-care units and hospitals or pharmacies and private practitioners for a fee. Abortion was legal upon request to all women up to the 10th week of pregnancy, and up to the 20th week for medical reasons, and according to the law was provided in public hospitals for free. Women’s rights organizations reported it was becoming increasingly difficult to find public hospitals that would perform abortions, leading many women to seek help from private clinics.The health infrastructure in the earthquake-affected provinces was severely damaged and a significant number of health staff were also victims of the earthquake. As a result, some health facilities stopped operating or had a decreased capacity that also negatively impacted the provision of sexual and reproductive health services. According to a report published by the Association of Public Health Specialists, overall reproductive health services, including sexual and reproductive health counseling and family planning, were mostly focused on pregnancy care and childbirth. In addition, access to sexual reproductive health services particularly deteriorated for the most vulnerable groups (such as refugee women and girls, and women and girls living in the rural areas) after the earthquakes.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence. Emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis were available as part of clinical management of rape.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution provided a single nationality designation for all citizens and did not expressly recognize national, racial, or ethnic minorities except for three non-Muslim minorities: Armenian Apostolic Christians, Jews, and Greek Orthodox Christians. Other national, religious, or ethnic minorities, including Assyrians, Jaferis, Yezidis, Kurds, Arabs, Roma, Circassians, and Laz, were not permitted to fully exercise their linguistic, religious, and cultural rights. The constitution prohibited discrimination based on language, race, or color and provided for equality in the eyes of the law, but authorities did not consistently enforce these provisions.The law allowed citizens to open private institutions to provide education in languages and dialects traditionally used in their daily lives, on the condition that schools were subjected to the law and inspected by the Ministry of National Education. Some universities offered elective Kurdish-language courses, and five universities had Kurdish-language departments. The law allowed reinstatement of former non-Turkish names of villages and neighborhoods and provided political parties and their members the right to campaign and use promotional material in any language, but this right was not protected. The law restricted the use of languages other than Turkish in government and public services.Romani communities reported discrimination and lack of access to education, housing, health care, and employment. Community members recounted that a majority of Roma did not complete formal education and as a result were unable to secure employment. Romani advocates asserted there was little concrete advancement for Roma. They also noted Romani communities were particularly hard hit by the economic situation in the country, and alleged the national government did little to provide economic assistance to the communities.Armenian minority groups reported hate speech and coded language directed against the Armenian community, including from high-level government officials.More than 15 million citizens were estimated to be of Kurdish origin and spoke Kurdish dialects. Security force efforts against the PKK disproportionately affected Kurdish communities. Some predominantly Kurdish communities experienced government-imposed curfews, generally in connection with government security operations aimed at clearing areas of PKK terrorists. There were several attacks against ethnic Kurds that human rights organizations alleged were racially motivated. Kurdish and pro-Kurdish civil society organizations and political parties continued to experience problems exercising freedoms of assembly and association.On March 19, police detained 224 persons following a public celebration of Nowruz, the new year of Kurds, Alevis, and Shi’a Muslims, in Istanbul’s Yenikapi Square. As the gathering concluded police reportedly prevented crowds from departing and detained participants. Police allegedly did not allow photos of imprisoned opposition leader Selahattin Demirtas and barred participants from wearing clothing in traditional Kurdish red, yellow, and green colors. The Istanbul Governor’s office asserted the 224 detainees used “illegal” banners and slogans.																																				Children										Education: There was some discrimination in the way education was provided to certain groups through the secondary level. Although the government officially allowed the use of Kurdish in private education and in public discourse, it did not extend permission for Kurdish-language instruction to public education. The constitution prohibited any language other than Turkish to be taught “as a mother tongue.”Human rights NGOs and others expressed concern that despite the law on compulsory education, some families kept girls home from school, particularly in religiously conservative rural areas, where girls often dropped out of school after completing their mandatory primary education.Child Abuse: There were laws against child abuse and the government enforced the laws effectively. By law if the victim of abuse was between ages 12 and 18, conviction for molestation resulted in a sentence of three to eight years in prison, conviction for sexual abuse in a sentence of eight to 15 years’ imprisonment, and conviction for rape in a sentence of at least 16 years’ imprisonment. If the victim was younger than 12, conviction of molestation resulted in a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, conviction of sexual abuse a minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment, and conviction of rape a minimum of 18 years’ imprisonment.The law authorized police and local officials to grant various levels of protection and support services to children who were victims of violence or to those at risk of violence. Nevertheless, children’s rights advocates reported inconsistent implementation and called for expansion of support for victims. The law required the government to provide services to victims, such as shelter and temporary financial support, and empowered family courts to impose sanctions on those responsible for the violence.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law defined 18 as the minimum legal age for marriage, although children could marry at 17 with parental permission and at 16 with court approval. The law was effectively enforced by the government. The law acknowledged civil and religious marriages, but the latter were not always registered with the state.NGOs reported children as young as age 12 were sometimes married in unofficial religious ceremonies, particularly in poor and rural regions and in the Syrian community in the country. Women’s rights groups stated there were instances of forced marriages and bride kidnapping, particularly in rural areas in the southeast of the country, although the practices were not widespread. Local NGOs worked to educate and raise awareness among individuals in the Turkish and Syrian populations in southeastern provinces.In October an Istanbul court sentenced the parents of a victim of forced marriage, age six, along with the person to whom the child was married, to a total of 66 years in prison for the forced “religious marriage” of a child.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The constitution required the state to take measures to protect children from exploitation. The law prohibited the sale or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. Authorities enforced these laws. The law mandated a minimum sentence of eight years in prison. The penalty for conviction of encouraging or facilitating child commercial sexual exploitation was up to 10 years’ imprisonment; if violence or pressure was involved, a judge could double the sentence.The age of consent for sex was 18. The law prohibited producing or disseminating child pornography or other forms of online child sexual exploitation and abuse and stipulated a prison sentence of up to two years for conviction and fines. The government enforced the law effectively and brought prosecutions under crimes against “public morals” and “obscenity.” The law provided prison sentences of up to five years for conviction of incest.Displaced women, including refugees and asylum seekers were particularly vulnerable to being exploited by criminal organizations and pressured into commercial sex, and this practice was particularly prevalent among adolescent girls.																																				Antisemitism										Approximately 12,000 to 16,000 Jews were estimated to live in the country. Some members of the community continued to emigrate or seek to obtain citizenship in a second country, in part due to concerns regarding antisemitism. Jewish citizens also expressed concern regarding security threats. Antisemitic rhetoric continued in print media and on social media throughout the year.Harassment increased after Hamas attacked Israel in October. The pro-government daily newspaper Yeni Akit targeted Jewish Turks with a front-page headline “Strip Zionist Servants of Citizenship.” On October 27, an Izmir synagogue and community center was vandalized with red spray-painted graffiti saying “Killer Israel” in Turkish. The perpetrator was caught on camera and was detained and remanded to the prosecutor’s office. The investigation continued at year’s end. In January the government commemorated International Holocaust Remembrance Day, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement. In February, for the eighth year in a row, the government commemorated the nearly 800 Jewish refugees who died aboard the Struma, a ship that sank off the coast of Istanbul in 1942. The deputy governor of Istanbul, Chief Rabbi Haleva, other members of the Jewish community, the deputy foreign minister, and members of the diplomatic community attended the commemoration. President Erdogan issued public messages in celebration of the Jewish holidays of Passover, Rosh Hashanah, and Hanukkah.For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: Same-sex sexual conduct, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors were not explicitly outlawed or criminalized; however, provisions of the law concerning “offenses against public morality,” “protection of the family,” and “unnatural sexual behavior” sometimes served as a basis for abuse by police, discrimination by employers, and the banning of public gatherings.Violence and Harassment: LGBTQI+ individuals experienced discrimination, intimidation, and violent crimes. Human rights groups reported police and prosecutors frequently failed to pursue cases of violence against LGBTQI+ persons or accepted justification for perpetrators’ actions. Human rights defenders reported specific members of the police force repeatedly attempted to instigate violence at peaceful demonstrations to justify police violence against, and detention of, the demonstrators. In June several human rights organizations reported police allegedly abused and mistreated demonstrators and attorneys detained in connection with Pride demonstrations. Some LGBTQI+ persons reported reluctance to wear rainbow colors in public, citing fears of police harassment. When arrests were made of alleged perpetrators accused of committing crimes against LGBTQI+ persons, defendants had the option to claim “unjustifiable provocation” under the penal code and request a reduced sentence. Judges routinely applied this provision to reduce the sentences of persons who killed or assaulted LGBTQI+ individuals. Courts of appeal routinely upheld these verdicts based in part on the “immoral nature” of the victim. Although work in commercial sex was legal in Turkey, LGBTQI+ advocates reported police arbitrarily detained transgender individuals engaged in commercial sex and courts, as well as prosecutors, created an environment of impunity for attacks on transgender persons involved in commercial sex.Human rights activists attributed what they assessed to be increased public anti-LGBTQI+ sentiment and incidence of violence against LGBTQI+ individuals to an uptick in anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric by high-level government officials. In the lead-up to the May elections, anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric was amplified through progovernment media. President Erdogan frequently likened respecting the rights of LGBTQI+ persons to terrorism and referred to the “deviancy called LGBT.” In a May 28 election night impromptu victory speech in Istanbul’s Uskudar neighborhood, Erdogan alleged the opposition was unduly influenced by the LGBTQI+ community.Discrimination: The criminal code did not include protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. The law did not explicitly recognize LGBTQI+ couples and their families and did not grant them rights equal to rights of other persons. The law allowed for up to three years in prison for conviction of hate speech or injurious acts related to language, race, nationality, color, gender, disability, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, or sectarian differences. Human rights defenders asserted such protections were more frequently applied against LGBTQI+ persons. Human rights groups criticized the law’s failure to include protections based on gender identity. LGBTQI+ definitions were not included in the law, but authorities maintained that the general “gender” concept in the constitution provided for protections for LGBTQI+ individuals.Human rights organizations reported some LGBTQI+ individuals were unable to access health services or faced discrimination when trying to do so. Some LGBTQI+ individuals reported they believed it necessary to hide their identities, faced mistreatment by health-care service providers (in many cases preferring not to request any service), and asserted prejudice against HIV-positive individuals negatively affected perceptions of LGBTQI+ persons. Multiple sources reported discrimination in housing as landlords sometimes refused to rent to LGBTQI+ individuals or charged them significantly higher prices.LGBTQI+ individuals in particular faced discrimination in employment. Employment laws allowed the dismissal of public-sector employees found “to act in a shameful and embarrassing way unfit for the position of a civil servant,” while some statutes criminalized the vague practice of “unchastity.” Human rights organizations noted some employers used these provisions to discriminate against LGBTQI+ individuals in the labor market. Some labor unions created commissions to strengthen efforts to combat discrimination.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Individuals could legally change the gender marker on an identity card if gender-affirming surgery was conducted at a state hospital; this surgery was available in major cities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Antalya. The minimum age required to get gender affirming surgery was 18. Those who suffered complications following a procedure had no legal recourse against the doctor in question.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: LGBTQI+ NGOs reported that so-called conversion therapy practices to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression rarely occurred and were not widely practiced. The NGOs stated they reported any health professionals identified with such practices to the medical associations that license medical professionals. NGOs reported surgeries were sometimes performed on intersex children at the discretion of parents and doctors.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Numerous LGBTQI+ organizations reported a sense of vulnerability as restrictions on their freedom of speech, assembly, and association continued. NGOs reported police targeted LGBTQI+ individuals using disproportionate force while intervening in demonstrations. LGBTQI+ organizations reported government rhetoric increasingly equated LGBTQI+ topics with terrorism.LGBTQI+ organizations alleged the government used regular and detailed audits against them to create administrative burdens and threaten the possibility of large fines. Such audits were at times conducted under the basis of purported antiterrorist financing legislation or compliance with foreign funding regulations. LGBTQI+ NGOs reported authorities audited LGBTQI+ organizations more frequently than NGOs focused on other matters. This created the possibility smaller organizations would not be able to continue operations because they had less capacity to manage such audits or to pay fines. University officials limited LGBTQI+ students’ ability to organize and stage Pride events.On June 8, Ankara’s Middle East Technical University rectorate banned the 11th student organized LGBTQI+ Pride March planned for June 9 and reportedly asked police to intervene. Police blockaded the campus early on June 9, cordoned off large sections of the campus, positioned riot police, and dispersed any students who entered the designated protest area. Fifteen students were detained but released later that night.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, but the government did not implement or enforce the law effectively and access in many parts of the country remained restricted. Government guidelines required official information materials to be provided in accessible formats.The law required all governmental institutions and businesses to provide persons with disabilities access to public areas and public transportation and allowed for the establishment of review commissions and fines for noncompliance. The law required public transportation be provided free of charge to persons with disabilities.The law required equal access to health care, and the government generally enforced the law effectively. The Ministry of Family and Social Services was responsible for protecting persons with disabilities. The ministry maintained social service centers assisting marginalized individuals, including persons with disabilities.The law required equal access to education for persons with disabilities. Most children with disabilities were enrolled in mainstream public schools; others attended special education centers. The law required all public schools to accommodate students with disabilities, although activists reported instances of students being refused admission or encouraged to drop out of school. According to disability activists, a large number of school-age children with disabilities did not receive adequate access to education.Some NGOs representing persons with disabilities reported delays in appointment of candidates with disabilities to government positions.For companies with more than 50 workers, the law required at least 3 percent of the workforce consist of persons with disabilities while in the public sector the requirement was 4 percent. Despite government efforts, NGOs reported discrimination in employment of persons with disabilities occurred.Institutionalized Children: A Ministry of Family and Social Services program provided for children with autism or other mental disabilities to stay in government-run houses and offered state resources to families who were unable to attend to the needs of their autistic children.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Alevis and Christians, including Armenian Apostolic Christians, remained the subject of hate speech and discrimination.International protection status holders and temporary protection beneficiaries also faced societal discrimination and violence.Many persons with HIV and AIDS reported discrimination in access to employment, housing, public services, education, and health-care benefits. Rights organizations noted the country lacked sufficient laws protecting persons with HIV and AIDS from discrimination and that there were legal obstacles to anonymous HIV testing. Due to pervasive social stigma against persons with HIV and AIDS, many individuals avoided testing for HIV due to fear the results would be used against them. Human rights advocates reported some employers required HIV and AIDS testing prior to employment to screen positive applicants. HIV-positive individuals also reported difficulties in receiving exemption from compulsory military service.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes, but it placed significant restrictions on these rights. Some public-sector employees, such as senior officials, magistrates, members of the armed forces, and police, could not form or join unions. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and discouraged employers from terminating workers involved in union activities. In particular the law required employers to either reinstate a worker fired for participating in union activity or to pay enhanced compensation of at least one year of the affected worker’s salary if a court found the worker was unfairly terminated for participating in union activities. If the employer opted not to reinstate the worker to their former role, the law required the employer to pay union compensation and an additional fine of four to eight months’ wages. The law provided some workers the right to strike. The government effectively enforced laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers. Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike were not commensurate with or less than those for analogous crimes such as civil rights violations and penalties were rarely applied against violators.A 2014 Constitutional Court ruling that bankers and municipal transport workers had the right to strike remained in force. Public-sector workers who were responsible for safeguarding life and property as well as workers in the essential areas (coal mining and petroleum industries, hospitals and funeral industries, urban transportation, energy and sanitation services, national defense, banking, and education) did not have the right to strike.While the law allowed some essential workers to bargain collectively, it required workers to resolve disputes through binding arbitration rather than strikes. The law further allowed the government to deny the right to strike in any situation that represented a threat to public health or national security.The government also maintained restrictions on the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The law required labor unions to notify government officials prior to meetings or rallies, which were required to take place in officially designated areas. The law allowed government representatives to attend their conventions and record the proceedings.The law required a minimum of seven workers to establish a union without prior approval. To become a bargaining agent, a union was required to represent 40 percent of worksite employees and 1 percent of all workers in their industry. The law prohibited union leaders from becoming officers of or otherwise performing duties for political parties. The law also prohibited union leaders from working for or being involved in the operation of any profit-making enterprise. Migrant workers and domestic servants without valid work permits were prohibited from joining unions and nonunionized workers were not covered by collective bargaining laws.Labor courts functioned effectively and relatively efficiently, although as with other courts, the appeals process could often last for years. The 19 unions and confederations shut down under the 2016-2018 state of emergency, some due to alleged affiliations with the Gulen movement, remained closed.The government and employers interfered with freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Government restrictions and interference limited the ability of some unions to conduct public and other activities. Police frequently attended union meetings and conventions. In addition, some unions reported local authorities prohibited public activities, such as marches and press conferences.Employers used threats, violence, and layoffs in unionized workplaces. Unions stated antiunion discrimination occurred regularly across sectors. Manufacturing and service-sector union organizers reported private-sector employers sometimes ignored the law and dismissed workers to discourage union activity. Many employers hired workers on revolving contracts of less than a year’s duration, making them ineligible for equal benefits or bargaining rights.In July the Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security released data that revealed a slight increase in union membership nationwide and that 2.4 million of the country’s 16.4 million workers belonged to a union.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										 See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The national minimum wage was lower than the estimated national poverty level.The law established a 45-hour workweek with a weekly rest day. Overtime was limited to three hours per day and 270 hours a year. The law mandated paid holiday and leave and premium pay for overtime but allowed for employers and employees to agree to a flexible time schedule.Workers in nonunionized sectors had difficulty receiving overtime pay they were entitled to by law. The law prohibited excessive compulsory overtime.Occupational Safety and Health: Government occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were not always up to date or appropriate for specific industries. The government did not engage in proactive efforts to identify unsafe conditions, and generally only responded to workers’ OSH complaints. OSH violations were particularly common in the construction and mining industries, where accidents were frequent and regulations inconsistently enforced. In many sectors, including mining, workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment, and authorities did not effectively protect vulnerable employees. The Workers’ Health and Work Safety Assembly reported at least 1,409 workers died in the first nine months of the year, with the highest number of deaths occurring in the construction sector followed by the agriculture and forestry, transportation, and housing sectors.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s Labor Inspectorate was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. The government effectively enforced wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service, and government sectors but not in other sectors. The government did not effectively enforce OSH laws in all sectors. Penalties for violations were commensurate with than those for similar crimes such as fraud or negligence but were rarely applied against violators. The number of labor inspectors remained insufficient to enforce compliance with labor laws across the country. Labor inspectors had the authority to and conducted scheduled and unannounced inspections and had the authority to initiate sanctions, but inspections were mainly used to follow up on complaints.According to World Economics 2023 statistics Turkey’s informal economy represented 31 percent of GDP, and the government rarely enforced labor laws in this sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Turkey
- Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan regarding yesterday’s blatant and unprecedented attack by Iran and its proxies on Israel.  Secretary Blinken thanked Foreign Minister Fidan for his ongoing engagement to prevent further escalation in the region.  The Secretary reaffirmed America’s ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and highlighted that we remain vigilant to all threats and will not hesitate to take all necessary action to protect our people.
- Under Secretary of State Bass’ Travel to Türkiye and Italy Office of the SpokespersonUnder Secretary of State John Bass will travel to Ankara, Türkiye, April 15-16 and to Capri, Italy, April 17-19 to attend the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting with Secretary Blinken.  While in Ankara, Under Secretary Bass will meet with senior Turkish government officials to build on the momentum of the successful March 7-8 meeting of the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism in Washington, led by Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Fidan, and continue cooperation on key bilateral and global issues, including the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Ukraine, and preparations for the NATO Summit in Washington this summer.  The Under Secretary will also discuss opportunities to expand the trade and investment ties that connect and benefit the people of both of our countries.
- Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Lewis Travels to Türkiye and Greece Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Jessica Lewis travels to Türkiye and Greece, April 4-9, 2024, where she will meet with senior civilian and military officials to discuss security cooperation, defense trade, and shared regional security challenges with two key NATO Allies.In Ankara and Istanbul April 4-6, Assistant Secretary Lewis will meet with senior officials to build on the recent U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism ─ a results-oriented, forward-looking, positive bilateral agenda that advances shared objectives and addresses emerging global challenges. Assistant Secretary Lewis will also tour a Turkish munitions plant and meet with international defense industry representatives to stress the urgent need for enhancing the Alliance’s defense capabilities.In Athens April 6-9, Assistant Secretary Lewis will hold consultations with senior defense and foreign ministry officials. Assistant Secretary Lewis will discuss cooperation on Greece’s military modernization priorities including Greece’s purchases of U.S. defense articles. She will also discuss U.S.-Greek cooperation on security issues such as assistance to Ukraine as well as maritime cooperation such as counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts.For further information, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at PM-CPA@state.gov and follow @StateDeptPM on Twitter.
- Department Press Briefing – April 1, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 1, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 1, 2024																																																					April 1, 2024																																																								1:19 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Hello everyone. Good afternoon. I don’t have anything to start with, so – Matt, welcome back.QUESTION: Well – well.MR MILLER: Welcome back for a short period. I know you’re traveling with the Secretary.QUESTION: Well –MR MILLER: Happy to have you today.QUESTION: I’m sure you are. I won’t – never mind. Let’s just start with Gaza. Two things. One, in terms of the Secretary’s involvement or the State Department’s involvement with this meeting, virtual meeting today, can you tell us – with the Israelis about Rafah?MR MILLER: So the Secretary is at the White House right now participating in the meeting with representatives of the Israeli Government to lay out an alternative approach to dealing with the remaining Hamas battalions in Rafah. When I walked out, the meeting had not yet broken, or at least I’m not aware of it yet having broken, and expect a statement from the White House at its – upon its conclusion.QUESTION: Okay. Well, was there anything specifically that the State Department wanted to convey, to get across to the Israelis in this meeting?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to speak too specifically about the meeting that is, as far as I’m aware, ongoing. We’ll have a statement afterwards. But the Secretary would, I expect, reiterate the concerns that he expressed when he was in Israel some 10 days ago now about the dramatic humanitarian impact of a full-scale ground invasion in Rafah.QUESTION: Okay. And then secondly, I presume that you have seen some of the images, video and still photos, plus witness accounts and written witness accounts of what happened at the Shifa Hospital. Do you have anything to say about that?MR MILLER: Yeah. So I have seen a few things – one, the accounts in the media from inside Gaza, and I of course have seen what the IDF has said about the operations that it has conducted, where it has said it has killed a number of members of Hamas and detained I think several hundred additional members of Hamas. We, as often is the case, don’t have any – the ability to get full ground truth, because we don’t have anyone on the ground in Gaza.I will say from our perspective, the things that you have heard us say before, of course, remain true. It’s we generally don’t want to see Israel operating inside hospitals in Gaza. We want to see hospitals be protected sites. But it is concerning that after Israel had conducted an operation earlier in this campaign to clear al-Shifa, that al-Shifa again was apparently infiltrated by Hamas fighters.And so two things about that: One, look, obviously, we – it would be great if Hamas would stop hiding behind civilians and stop hiding inside civilian infrastructure, including hospitals; but two, it points out what we have been saying all along, which is the need for Israel to have a sustainable, long-term strategy when it comes to Gaza, that it’s not enough to just clear certain neighborhoods or hospitals or any other geographic areas or buildings of Hamas. They need to have a long-term, sustainable strategy that is not just a security strategy but also a political strategy if they really want to secure the future of Israel against the terrorist threat that has to date emanated from Gaza.QUESTION: Okay. And so you don’t have any comment on what you’ve seen from the aftermath of the two-week operation against the hospital?MR MILLER: Not beyond what I just outlined.QUESTION: All right. And then when you say – and this will be it for me. Then when you say Israel needs a sustainable, long-term strategy for Gaza, have you seen one yet from them?MR MILLER: We have not yet seen one, no. And that’s what we have been in conversation with them about, that what they &#8212;QUESTION: But presumably the meeting today is just about Rafah, right? It’s not &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s just about – it’s just about Rafah.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: And the point I mean – a sustainable, long-term strategy means something beyond a military strategy. It means &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, but &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; a political path as well.QUESTION: So a political path to two states, right, from your &#8212;MR MILLER: That is our preferred – that is our preferred policy. But you need a political path of some sort for it.QUESTION: But have you seen –MR MILLER: No. No.QUESTION: But have you seen one from the Israelis that is even – that is even short of two states?MR MILLER: At this point we have not, no.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, just to follow up on al-Shifa, Israel has given some numbers: 200 militants have been killed; 900 suspected militants detained, of whom some 500 have been identified as Hamas. Does the United States have any assessment that these numbers are correct?MR MILLER: We don’t have an independent assessment, no.QUESTION: Do you have an assessment on how many civilians around that operation have been killed?MR MILLER: We do not.QUESTION: Okay. Moving on to this strike, the suspected Israeli strike in Damascus, do you have anything to say on this (inaudible)?MR MILLER: I don’t. Obviously, it just happened in the hour or two before I came out here. We are in conversations with partners in the region, gathering more information, but at this point don’t have confirmation either of the target or the responsible party.QUESTION: Do you know if the United States was given a heads-up by Israel about this?MR MILLER: Again, we are gathering information. I don’t have anything about the strike right now. I don’t have anything beyond that to offer.QUESTION: Okay. Do you have any concerns that this might sort of escalate tensions, which are already high &#8212;MR MILLER: So I don’t –QUESTION: &#8212; and it would endanger the hostage talks in any way?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – before we have gathered information about what exactly this was, I don’t want to speak to it specifically. But of course, we are always concerned about anything that would be escalatory or cause an increase in conflict in the region. It has been one of the goals of this administration since October 7th to keep the conflict from spreading, recognizing that Israel has a – the right to defend itself from adversaries that are sworn to its destruction.But with respect to the hostage talks, there is no reason why this incident should have any impact on the hostage talks. We have long believed it is in the interest of everyone to see these hostage talks succeed because you would not just see a relief to the civilian population in Gaza that desperately needs it; it would enable the increase in humanitarian assistance into Gaza and of course it would get the hostages out. So no, I don’t – no, I don’t believe it should have any impact on it.QUESTION: Can you say how those talks are going as far as &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any new assessment to offer today.QUESTION: Okay, two final things. This is about last – this is from last week about these authorizations of these bombs to Israel. They have been approved a long time ago by Congress, but it looks like the State Department has decided to do the transfers last week, the week before. Why was that decision taken, like, recently?MR MILLER: So let me – I think it would be helpful to step back and put this in a little context, and the context is that we – the United States has a decades-long commitment to Israel’s security. Israel is surrounded by entities that are sworn to its destruction – not just Hamas but Iran and proxy groups that Iran sponsors, Hizballah among them, who have repeatedly talked about their desire for the destruction of Israel.We believe Israel has every right to defend itself against those opponents, and we to that end have a longstanding security relationship with them where we provide them more than $3 billion annually in security assistance. Now, the way that that works – and I know you prefaced this in your question, but just for the benefit of everyone else – the way that that works is we provide them with $3.3 billion a year in security assistance. They don’t always draw all of that down in any given year, but they come to the United States, request certain defense articles. We make assessments about whether those are appropriate or not. We notify them to Congress in the regular course of business.And oftentimes what happens – let’s say just as an example, this is a fictional example; let’s say they requested a hundred planes – we make a decision, we notify Congress. That doesn’t mean that they take a hundred planes tomorrow once that notification has been given and once the approval has been given. They draw those down over time, and sometimes it takes years to fulfill those requests.And so those are the types of things that – I see you wanting to go. Bear with me. I know – I know this is long, and then you’ll have the opportunity for a follow-up. Those are the types of things that often take years to fulfill, and they were happening before October 7th and they have continued after October 7th.So what these are about in many cases are about self-defense, but also deterrence and replenishment. And so we make these in the regular course of business, and what I can tell you about them is that we follow the same procedures with respect to everyone that we do for every other country in the world, which is that we notify Congress. And in fact, since October 7th we have gone above and beyond to notify Congress about these transfers. There is a statutory threshold where we are required to notify them of transfers. We have been regularly briefing the committees to let – to make them aware of every transfer that we are making.QUESTION: So I’m going to have to combine my questions now that you’ve taken up so much time to answer. I understand &#8212;MR MILLER: I would apologize, but I don’t think you’d believe it.QUESTION: Oh no, I’m just joking. Of course take your time. I understand the fulfilling can take years, but are you basically saying that the authorization of the transfer coming in these recent weeks was a coincidence?MR MILLER: So I’m not saying it’s a coincidence. Israel has been engaged in a military conflict, and of course when you are engaged in a military conflict you deplete your military stocks and you need to &#8212;QUESTION: So there was a request in recent weeks &#8212;MR MILLER: And you need to see those – I’m not going to &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; for the – for the additional fulfilled – for the fulfillment of these particular &#8212;MR MILLER: So I’m not going to get into &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; weapons.MR MILLER: As is always the case, I’m not going to get into the timings of exact requests from here.QUESTION: Okay. My final &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me just – I’ll be quick. That’s a – but this is a process that we keep Congress fully apprised of, our relevant committees.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: But when you see these types of requests and when they get publicly reported – and you have to remember that Israel is in an armed conflict and is expending a great deal of defense materiel, and some of that needs to be replenished for Israel’s long-term security.QUESTION: Right. And my final thing on this is, like, the Secretary and a lot of senior officials from this administration basically said far too many Palestinians have been killed. But when you go and make the – and we know that the administration’s policy hasn’t changed; it is not conditioning weapons to Israel. But when you go and make such an authorization of the transfer in recent weeks, even if the actual weapons transfer has been approved years ago, don’t you think that is going to damage the weight of your word, your credibility, and basically your sincerity in saying that far too many Palestinians have been killed?MR MILLER: So I do not agree with that at all. We have been very clear that we want to see Israel do everything it can to minimize civilian casualties. We have made clear that they need to do every – that they need to operate at all times in full compliance with international humanitarian law. At the same time, we are committed to Israel’s right to self-defense, and this is a long-term commitment the United States has made, that it made before October 7th and that continues – it continues since October 7th.So obviously the fight in Gaza is connected to Israel’s long-term security in very substantial ways. I got into some of that with response to Matt’s question. But Israel still faces – in addition to the security challenge posed with – in Gaza, it still faces an Iran that is hostile to Israel. It still faces Hizballah on its northern border that is hostile to Israel and says it is committed to the destruction of Israel. And so we are going to continue to support Israel’s ability to defend itself against those sworn enemies that want to see it end as a modern state, or a state at all.Yeah.QUESTION: Just to follow up, a 2,000-pound bomb is self-defensive, in your opinion?MR MILLER: It is a – so they need to have the ability to defend themself against a very well-armed adversary – like I said, Iran; Hizballah, which has thousands and thousands of fighters and quite sophisticated materiel and quite sophisticated weaponry, as we’ve seen them deploy – excuse me – against Israel in the last few days. So yes, they do need the modern military equipment to defend themselves against those adversaries.QUESTION: Yeah, but that was in Gaza, or beginning in Gaza.MR MILLER: And we have made clear to them that when – that whatever weapon they use in Gaza, be it a bomb, be it a tank round, be it anything, that we expect them to use those weapons in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and we have said it – we have had very frank conversations with them about the fact that far too many civilians have died through their operations and that they need to do better in taking into account the need to minimize civilian harm. And we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: And just a – on that point – okay. So the requests were done years ago, what have you, but this time around you were suspiciously very careful not to publicize it. Usually we do the notifications to Congress, and we do a statement that had a – but this time, I understand you didn’t need to do it because of this, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Do we – so I’ll just say we did notify Congress. We did – we followed – we followed the &#8212;QUESTION: I know, but you didn’t publicize it.MR MILLER: So it is not &#8212;QUESTION: It’s what you do on arms sales and all that; you publicize it.MR MILLER: So that’s not true with regard to most arms sales around the world. I know people have gotten used to our – the tempo of arms sales with respect to Ukraine. But that is a very different situation than our arms sales to Israel or any other country with which we have a security relationship because we stood it up from nowhere right before an active war, where most of our security relationships we don’t publicize our ongoing sales. What we do is we notify Congress about those sales, and we have done that with respect to these sales to Israel, as we do with respect to sales anywhere in the world.QUESTION: Okay. Just to – last question on – back on – okay, I understand it’s a bit early, but obviously you don’t deny there was a strike by Israel on the consulate in – like I said, in the embassy of Iran in Damascus.MR MILLER: So we’ve seen the strike. But again, I want to let the consultations that we have ongoing with partners in the region take place, allow – before we can – before I comment any further.QUESTION: But it’s definitely escalatory.MR MILLER: That’s not what I said, either. I said &#8212;QUESTION: No, I’m saying that.MR MILLER: You’re saying that. I thought it was a question.QUESTION: I’m asking you to react.MR MILLER: So Humeyra kind of – that’s good. Humeyra kind of did speak to this. I’m not going to comment with respect to this particular strike because, again, we just need to know more information about it before we do. And that includes drawing any conclusions from it. As a general principle, of course we are worried about escalation. We are worried about anything that would cause the conflict to expand or widen in any way.QUESTION: I have one on Havana, a couple on this.MR MILLER: Let me come back – let me back to you so the room doesn’t go into an uproar. Said, go ahead. But I will definitely come back.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Now, you said that Hamas returned to al-Shifa Hospital. There are some 800 fighters and so on and all these things. Now, is that your – you are citing the Israeli narrative, or you have your own independent information?MR MILLER: We don’t have our own independent assessment. But you have seen Israel produce the names – hold on – the names and photographs of known Hamas fighters who it has killed or captured.QUESTION: How many? I mean, they showed names and Hamas fighters in al-Shifa Hospital?MR MILLER: I have – I have seen the information they have publicly released. Said – hold up, Said, just let – I know you get – let me just finish.QUESTION: No, no. I &#8212;MR MILLER: I know. But let me – said, just &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not interrupting. I’m trying to understand what you’re saying.MR MILLER: Good. So we have seen them release – I don’t think there’s anyone who has cause to dispute that yes, they have – there were Hamas fighters hiding in al-Shifa Hospital – again, not for the first time.QUESTION: Okay. So you are certain that the reason that Israel went into al-Shifa Hospital one more time is because Hamas fighters were there, and not hundreds of civilians that are taking refuge there?MR MILLER: So I think it is certainly a fair conclusion, given what has been their goal since the outset of this campaign – to take the fight to Hamas – that is exactly what they were doing, yes.QUESTION: And you believe that Israel has achieved that goal now by eliminating Hamas, or would you like to see them go back to al-Shifa Hospital again?MR MILLER: So that is – I answered that question somewhat in response to Matt. I think there is a concern that you saw Hamas back inside hospitals.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: I don’t know why I don’t hear more people calling on Hamas to stop going into hospitals. You shouldn’t have to clear Hamas from a hospital once, let alone twice.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: But yes, we do have the concern that Hamas has been able to re-establish itself in a hospital that Israel had already cleared, and that points to an ongoing challenge for Israel in the way it conducts its operations.QUESTION: Right, yeah. Just bear with me. A couple more questions. So, but why do you think – in your opinion, what value is there strategically for Israel to burn all the building, destroy all the equipment, destroy every last X-ray machine and everything in the hospital and not keep it? If their fight &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; is with the fighters, why must you destroy – and they left. There were – there was no fighting when they left – just to burn the buildings and burn the things and destroy everything.MR MILLER: So let me just say this gets &#8212;QUESTION: Why is that okay?MR MILLER: Let me just say this gets into where – I’m often asked to comment on – to questions where there are conflicting accounts.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: And Israel has said that is not what they did, and we don’t have ground truth on that question. Israel has said what they tried to do is protect patients and not operate in places when there are patients, to evacuate people from the hospital, and only operate in a way that would impact the Hamas fighters that were there. Obviously, it’s an incredibly difficult situation. There shouldn’t be terrorists in a hospital at all. And so it is incredibly difficult to operate there and achieve a legitimate counterterrorism goal in a way that minimizes harm to patients, which goes back to my first point, which is Hamas shouldn’t be in a hospital at all.QUESTION: Well, Hamas shouldn’t be – as far as Israel and the United States is concerned should not be there, period. But &#8212;MR MILLER: I would think, Said, everyone could conclude – I would think, including you, I would think everyone could conclude that Hamas should not be inside a hospital.QUESTION: Well, honestly &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t think – I don’t think – I hope, anyway, that that’s not a controversial opinion.QUESTION: Well, okay. But that’s a different issue altogether.MR MILLER: Not really.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Not really. No, it’s kind of the core of what we’re talking about.QUESTION: Okay. Let me ask you something. You talked about the 2,000-pound bombs and so on. You think that it is really wise to send it at this time when this far, in this battle or this war, it has only been used in Gaza? I mean, I know you say that Israel is surrounded by people that wish it (inaudible) and so on. But in fact, it’s surrounded by Egypt, with very good relations with Israel; it’s surrounded by Jordan, with good relations with Israel; it’s surrounded by Syria, that is obviously embroiled in its own civil war and can’t even defend itself against attacks, as we have seen today. So quite the contrary, it’s – Israel is surrounding Hamas, and it’s using these weapons to do that. And in fact, I mean, the F-35, to the best of my knowledge – I could be wrong – has only been used in combat against the people of Gaza.So how could you justify sending all these weapons when you have the most hapless people probably on Earth, destroyed moving from one place to another and so on, and you send these weapons to sort of just finish the job or continue the job? I don’t know.MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: What logic is there in sending in sending those weapons?MR MILLER: So the logic is exactly what I outlined a moment ago. Despite the fact that Israel has a – has diplomatic relations with Egypt and Jordan, it does not change the fact that Hizballah is parked on its northern border and is sworn to the destruction of Israel. It does not change the fact that Iran – no, not exactly, not right on its border, but well within striking distance – is committed to the destruction of Israel and continues to fund proxies committed to the destruction of Israel.So yes, Israel faces incredibly serious threats not just from Hamas – although Hamas is clearly one, as we saw on October 7th – but from other adversaries that it needs our assistance to continue to defend itself against.QUESTION: Lastly, please.MR MILLER: Go ahead, let me – one more, Said.QUESTION: Just one last one, if I may. Are you aware of a report made or a conversation that Israeli officers made with – to – or an interview with Haaretz where they say that Israel established some sort of – an illusionary kill zone line and so on? Are you aware of that?MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: And they actually kill whoever walks or moves about in that area?MR MILLER: I read that article and I noted at the end that the IDF says that that, of course, is not what they have established. There are, of course, areas of significant combat where any civilian could wander in and be the – unfortunately be killed, either by fire from Israel or by fire from Hamas. If you walk into an active conflict zone, that’s a possibility. But I have noted that the IDF said they have not, of course, established kill zones. It would be incredibly inappropriate for anything like that to be established, and we’ve not seen evidence at this point that they have.Go ahead, and I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Thanks. There’s reporting that Israel submitted a plan to the UN that would essentially dismantle UNRWA, transferring staff and funds to World Food and some other organizations. Have you seen that plan? Do you support it?MR MILLER: I have not seen that plan. I can’t speak to whether somebody inside the United States Government has. We continue to support the work that UNRWA does both in Gaza and in the broader region. We think that they play a critical role in delivering humanitarian assistance to people who need it. Now, the United States cannot fund UNRWA by statute now, given the recent action by Congress. So we are exploring ways that we can direct the humanitarian assistance we are committed to providing the Palestinian people through other organizations, and we look forward to identifying ways to do that and continuing to support humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians. But that does not mean that we do not also support UNRWA’s work; we want to see it continue.Go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, today the Knesset passed a law, 70 to 10, voting to pave the way for the closure of all Al Jazeera offices inside Israel. I am just wondering if you have a comment on that.MR MILLER: So we support the independent free press anywhere in the world, and we think the work that the independent free press does is important everywhere in the world, and much of what we know about what has happened in Gaza is because of reporters who are there doing their jobs, including reporters from Al Jazeera. I’ll say, just with respect to Al Jazeera, obviously we – I think it’s well known that we’ve not always agreed with all of Al Jazeera’s coverage, but it’s a media organization that we engage with. I’ve done interviews with Al Jazeera. Other people from the department have done interviews with Al Jazeera.So what we will continue to make clear is that we support the work that the free press does.QUESTION: Our assessment with that passage of this law and previous incidents with our crew in Gaza, that this, like, enhanced our suspicion from the beginning that our crews were actually targets, not by mistake or by – did you – does this trouble you that a media organization becomes the target of the Israel and become part of the targets in this war?MR MILLER: So with respect to targeting – and I mean targeting in a sense not through a law passed by the Knesset but I think with respect to potential military targeting – Israel has said very clearly that that’s not what they have done. Obviously, that would be incredibly inappropriate. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this, that it is tragic how many journalists have lost their life in this war, because, as I just spoke to a minute ago, they go – they put their own lives at risk in bringing us information about what’s happening inside Gaza, and it’s important that we continue to get that information. And so we support the work that journalists do in Gaza; we support the work that they do around the world.Tom, go ahead.QUESTION: The – just to go back to the meeting between U.S. and Israeli officials, why is this happening virtually?MR MILLER: I will leave it to the White House, which is the primary – White House took the lead in organizing this meeting, so I’ll leave it to them to speak to that.QUESTION: But, I mean, there’s an important diplomatic element, because we know – I mean, Benjamin Netanyahu said in press conference yesterday that he pulled the delegation traveling to send a message because of the UN Security Council vote. So it will worry people that on such an important issue – and it’s not a long flight from Tel Aviv – that this meeting is not happening in person. I mean, what does that say about your ability to persuade the Israelis on the issue of an invasion of Rafah when you haven’t been able to persuade them even to fly to Washington?MR MILLER: So I’m in a little bit of a box here because I can’t talk about the outcome of the meeting, because it’s still – maybe it’s broken now since I’ve been at the podium. We will have more to say about the meeting later today. But I’ll just say I would not expect this to be our final engagement on this issue.QUESTION: Do you think you can persuade them? I mean, this – so far, this doesn’t feel like a huge success of your argument, because you’ve been saying for weeks you don’t support a ground invasion of Rafah. The Israeli prime minister has been saying for weeks they will go in.MR MILLER: So we will continue to make what we believe is the best case to Israel about actions that it should take in Rafah that won’t just minimize civilian harm and prevent an unnecessary loss of life in a place where you have somewhere around 1.4 million civilians living today, but also would be in Israel’s long-term security interests. And I think that’s an important point that we don’t – the case that we are making to Rafah is not just about the interests of the Palestinian people. It’s also about Israel’s long-term security interests, and you heard the Secretary speak to this some in Tel Aviv – I know you were there – about the toll that this has taken on – this campaign has taken on Israel’s standing in the world and its ability to influence countries around the world. And we think that a full-scale of invasion of Rafah would only further that impact to Israel’s standing. So we’re going to make that case to them. Ultimately, they’re a sovereign country and will make their own decisions. But we’re going to make the – we will lay out to them the way we see it.QUESTION: Can I just follow up on (inaudible)?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: And will this conversation also make clear what the U.S. will do if they go ahead with a full-scale invasion in response? Or is this just laying out alternatives?MR MILLER: So two things about that. One, with respect to the broader question, not tied directly to this meeting, I’ve gotten that before and I’m just not going to speak to hypotheticals. We’re going to take it one step at a time and not make any predictions about what will happen.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, but what will – and then with respect to the meeting itself, again, I’m not going to speak in detail about a meeting that was still ongoing when I walked out here. We’ll have more to say about it once – we’ll have more to say about once it’s concluded – at a very high level.QUESTION: Okay, and just one more question on Israel.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I understand the regular course of business when it comes to arms sales, of course, Israel, any other country. But I’m just trying to understand if – if you’re saying that these weapons were promised, they were approved, the process went through, and now they’re going forward, is that regular process being examined at all given what’s going on in the Israel-Hamas war or not at all?MR MILLER: So that process is a process that applies not just to Israel but to every country that – with whom we have a security relationship. So it is one that is longstanding, and again, there are dozens if not hundreds of open orders for Israel that go back years under which they receive defense articles from the United States. So no, that is not a – it is not a new process and it’s not one just with respect to Israel, and no, we’re not re-examining the entire process. But obviously we always look at – we always look at requests that come from any country in light of their current needs and in light of our ability to supply them. But again, I think it’s important to remember that these are requests that were made and approved in many cases years ago – not just months ago, not just before October 7th, but years ago – and were approved years ago.QUESTION: So all of those orders that have been approved will go forward?MR MILLER: So I can’t say all of them – that will go forward, because Israel may come back and not want some of them. You’re talking about orders that are – orders that &#8212;QUESTION: If Israel wants them, they’ll go forward?MR MILLER: &#8212; that – years old. I cannot speak with respect to every request. And as I said, there are dozens of open requests that date back years. But when a country comes and makes a request and the United States does its due diligence and goes through the formal process of notifying Congress and then delivers those arms to a country – if a – if a country has ordered, like I said, 100 planes and they’ve taken 20, they still have the ability to come back and ask for the other 80 with which we’ve committed to provide them.Anything else on Israel before I go? Let me – go ahead, Guita, and then I’ll come to Humeyra next.QUESTION: Thank you. You referenced Iran a couple of times just in the past 10, 15 minutes. It seems like the – their proxy groups in Iraq have attacked – conducted an attack against Eilat in Israel, so despite everything that the U.S. is trying to do to contain the war to just the Gaza Strip, it’s – Iran is doing the opposite. Now, what options are you –could there be besides diplomatic options that are really not going anywhere?MR MILLER: So two things on that. One, we have – or I should say one, I think it reinforces the point I was just making about the Iranian-supported proxy groups who are committed to the destruction of Israel – not just Hizballah, not just Hamas, but proxy groups that exist in Iraq and did attempt to launch an attack against Israel over the weekend. But two, we will continue to make clear to those groups and to Iran that it is not in their interest to take strikes against Israel, it is not in the interest to take strikes against the United States, as we have done for some time.QUESTION: How much confidence do you have in the Iraqi Government to contain them? Because the foreign minister was here, the prime minister is supposed to be coming, and there hasn’t – the government hasn’t really been able to deliver.MR MILLER: So I would say that that is an ongoing conversation we have with our Iraqi counterparts about the need to take action against proxy groups that launch attacks from within Iraqi – inside Iraq. You have seen, obviously, a dramatic decrease in the number of those attacks over the past month or six weeks, but it is something that we continue to engage with the Iraqi Government about.Any more on – Humeyra. Humeyra, and then we’ll come here.QUESTION: Just one thing. In your answer, Matt, to me and a few others on the weapons thing, you mentioned the threat from Hizballah, like on Israel and all that. So were you trying to suggest that in the course of this latest authorization for the transfer, did you get any assurances from Israel that it’s not going to use these, like, in its offensive in Gaza, but it’s only going to use these against Hizballah?MR MILLER: So no, that’s not what I said at all. I think you’re reading quite a bit into &#8212;QUESTION: Okay, no, I just want to make sure that &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold – quite a bit into my answer, but again, the recent authorizations that you’re talking about were in many cases made years ago.QUESTION: Right, but – but just &#8212;MR MILLER: Right, years ago. Before October 7th.QUESTION: Yeah. But just to be sure, there has been no assurances – United States has not sought any assurances from Israel just in the wake of this or just before this transfer? Like, you can use it in this place and you can’t use it in that place – there’s been no such conversation &#8212;MR MILLER: So I’m not – I am not going to get into the private conversations we have with any country &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: Hold on, hold on – any country in the world, but that is not to read into – you should not read into that that we are imposing some kind of conditions. The – what we expect with respect to the defense articles that we supply to Israel and other countries are that they operate in compliance with international humanitarian law.Now, with respect to a campaign against Hizballah or a potential campaign against Hizballah, we have seen – we want to see that issue resolved diplomatically. We want to see Israeli citizens able to return to their homes in northern Israel, we want to see Lebanese civilians able to return to their home in southern Lebanon, but that’s a path we’re pursuing diplomatically.QUESTION: And just by law, you had the authority not to make the transfer, right? Like even if Congress had approved this years ago, even if the fulfillment takes years, United States Government certainly had the – has the authority not to fulfill it today, right?MR MILLER: So whether we have the authority or not is one question. There are always ramifications if you have committed to supply a country with something and you don’t. This gets very technical and &#8212;QUESTION: Matt, I’m just wondering if you had the option.MR MILLER: And – but again, we are committed to the defense of Israel. I know people want me to say some kind of different answer, but we are committed to Israel’s long-term security, and again, this is something that predates October 7th and will continue to be the policy of the United States, and we – and we will, in keeping with that commitment, continue to be very direct and candid with Israel about how it is in their interest to use the articles of defense that we provide them, as well as weapons that they manufacture themself, in full compliance with international humanitarian law and in a way that minimizes civilian harm.QUESTION: Final thing, I promise: Are you expecting today’s talk to feature at all the humanitarian plan that Israel is supposed to present to you?MR MILLER: Why don’t we just wait – let’s – I think I’ve probably talked enough about these ongoing talks. Let’s wait for what we’ll have to say about them at the conclusion.Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Just to follow up on this question &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; especially on Lebanon – you have been saying you are trying to resolve the issue on the northern borders diplomatically. You’ve been successful so far, but are you concerned that now it’s been escalating for the last two weeks? Are – is the risk higher now?MR MILLER: I don’t want to assess a relative level of risk. Our concern about escalation is high, it has been high since October 7th, and that is why we have engaged in a diplomatic process to try to resolve the very real security challenges that Israel faces without further conflict, and what’s – what we’re going to continue to pursue.QUESTION: One more question. During the Secretary visit to the region, can you confirm the reports that the Arab ministers gave him an Arab proposal on how – on the day after and on the establishment of a Palestinian state within three years?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to confirm that report, but the path forward for Gaza and the West Bank and the Palestinian people is something that we have been engaged with with partners in the region. As you may recall, when the Secretary traveled – and I should back up; it’s really been something that we have been engaged with partners since the immediate aftermath of October 7th, but it’s a process that intensified when he traveled to the region in early January and started direct coordination with Arab partners about how to rebuild Gaza, establish security inside Gaza, and ultimately provide a political path forward for the Palestinian people. And that’s something that we continue to engage with our Palestinian – or I’m sorry, our Arab partners about, but I don’t want to get into specifics of those conversations.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Matthew?MR MILLER: All right. One more and then we’ll – and then we’ll – I’ll take some others.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. One question on the Kurdistan region election. As you know that this election has been scheduled for June 10th, and it’s supposed to be further delayed, especially the KDP, the ruling party, is refusing to participate in that election. In the past few days, the U.S. ambassador met the KDP leader twice. So do you have any concern that the election, the KRI election, will not happen in the scheduled time? And then how are you going to encourage the KDP and other political parties to overcome the disputes and having election either on June 10th or any other day this year?MR MILLER: So we understand the IKR president and various Iraqi authorities and political parties are actively considering next steps. We encourage efforts to schedule free, fair, and credible elections in the IKR.And I realize I forgot to come back to you about &#8212;QUESTION: You don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, I – we could do – it seems like we could do the whole briefing on it, so let me – we’ll move on for now and then come back if there’s more time.Go ahead. I promised.QUESTION: Thank you. Per the CBS 60 Minutes reporting that aired on Sunday, a first incident of Havana syndrome took place in Frankfurt with an employee of the U.S. consulate. This happened two years before the already known cases that occurred in Havana in 2016. Can you confirm there was an incident in 2014, at least one incident in Frankfurt, that led to apparent Havana syndrome symptoms?MR MILLER: So we have made it a practice to not confirm or comment on specific reports in this regard. What I will say is what we have done for affected employees, and that is we have implemented the HAVANA Act passed by Congress that has allowed us to provide additional support to those affected employees, including reimbursement for medical care, including free care at military hospitals and other military treatment facilities; it includes help with their careers if they have been affected by, say, a prolonged absence from work. The safety and security of our personnel remains the top priority of the Secretary, and we are doing everything possible to help those affected.QUESTION: A couple more on Havana still. Does the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research have confidence that – in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s assessment that it is unlikely that a foreign adversary is causing Havana syndrome?MR MILLER: So we do. It has been the broad conclusion of the Intelligence Community since March 2023 that it is unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible for these anomalous health incidents. It’s something that the Intelligence Community has investigated extensively and continues to look at. We will look at new information as it comes in and make assessments inside the State Department and with our Intelligence Community counterparts.QUESTION: But you can’t confirm whether INR agrees with that in this building?MR MILLER: No, I said we do – they do share that.QUESTION: You do? You do. Okay.MR MILLER: They do share that assessment.QUESTION: And I don’t know if you’ve seen the report that aired on Sunday, but will any State Department employees who believe they are victims of Havana face consequences for publicly questioning the intel community’s assessment?MR MILLER: No. Of course not.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.MR MILLER: And let me – I said – let me just come back and say of course not and in no case would we in any way hold employees – I guess “accountable” is not even the right word. In no case would we discipline employees for speaking their mind. They have the ability to do that. We encourage it. But that doesn’t change our assessment. And I say the – I should say our – the Intelligence Community’s broad assessment that a foreign adversary is unlikely to be responsible for these incidents.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Russia, North Korea, and China. Russia opposes extending the term of UN Security Council’s panel of experts on sanctions against North Korea. How concerned is the United States about this?MR MILLER: Incredibly concerned. I spoke to this at detail – in detail last week. It’s unfortunate that Russia and China decided to exercise their veto. This is a panel that has – whose work has previously been extended unanimously, and I think it’s clear what happened here is that Russia made a bargain with the DPRK in return for the DPRK arming it in its war against Ukraine. And now we’re seeing Russia deliver on its end of the bargain.QUESTION: So how will violations of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests be sanctioned in the future?MR MILLER: So we still have a full range of sanctions on North Korea, and we will continue to enforce those.QUESTION: On China, President Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin will hold a summit meeting in China next month. What do you think about the solidarity between Russia and China?MR MILLER: So we have made clear that we have concerns with the, I think, full-scale partnership – I’m going to get the words exactly wrong – that we have seen between Russia and China. We have made very clear that we don’t want to see China do anything to help support Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and we will continue to make that clear.QUESTION: Follow-up?QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two separate topics. Let me start with the latest extension of RFE/RL reporter Alsu Kurmasheva’s pre-trial detention today. What was your reaction to the court decision? And with the American embassy officials being present for the first time, what can you tell us about her condition?MR MILLER: So we are deeply concerned about the – about her detention in Russia. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists and civil society voices. The charges against Ms. Kurmasheva are just another sign of the weakness of Putin’s regime. And with respect to her condition, I would refer you to the embassy officials who were there at her hearing.QUESTION: She happened to speak about that, from the court hearing. She said is in poor condition, she doesn’t feel very well, there is no minimum conditions for her. I know you are in the middle of fact gathering when it comes to designating her arrest as wrongful, but how much of what we have heard publicly from her today will help you expedite the process?MR MILLER: So we look at a broad range of information when it comes to making those determinations. Some of that information is public; some of it is not public. Some of it is information that’s available to the United States Government, and we’ll continue to collect information in this case, as we do in all potential wrongful determination cases.QUESTION: Thank you. I’m going to Armenia-Azerbaijan.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Over the weekend we saw the Azeri side was trying to push a narrative that the Armenian side was trying to escalate, and something that the EU monitoring mission didn’t confirm. What – how much do you know what’s going on? And how concerned are you about potential escalation? And what kind of reaction will that invite, if that happens, presumably this week basically?MR MILLER: So we saw the statement from the Government of Azerbaijan over the weekend. I would note that the EU monitoring mission said yesterday that the Armenia-Azerbaijan border was calm and quiet, with no unusual military troop or artillery movements, despite those statements. We caution and will continue to caution against escalating rhetoric or hostilities along the border. We continue to encourage the creation of conditions for a just and dignified peace in the region, where the rights of all are respected. And as you’ve heard me say from this podium many times, the only way to ensure a sustainable peace is at the negotiating table.QUESTION: I know the Secretary has an engagement this week with the Armenian side. Is there anything you’re going to do in terms of like reaching out to Azeris to prevent escalation?MR MILLER: So we will continue to make clear to both Armenia and Azerbaijan that escalation is in no one’s interest. I don’t have any diplomatic conversations to preview.QUESTION: Have the Azeris been even invited to the meeting that will happen this week, or &#8212;MR MILLER: So I think, again, this meeting, remember, is about Armenia’s reforms and its democracy, economy, and resilience. The peace process is not the focus of this meeting; it’s a meeting between the U.S., EU, and Armenia to discuss economic diversification, humanitarian assistance, support for refugees, and supporting Armenia’s political reforms in areas such as democracy and the rule of law. It is not a regionally focused meeting.QUESTION: And final one from me, if I may, on the 60 Minutes investigation. There are reports about – that Americans living in Tbilisi also talked about them being impacted. How concerned are you about Russian operations in the region, in Georgia (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So again, I’m not going to comment on specific reports – as I said, we make it a practice not to do. But we obviously are concerned with the destabilizing act – actions of Russia all around the region.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Follow-up on that.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: So this is on the meeting between U.S., South Korea, and Japan on Friday to counter North Korea’s cyber threats. What are some of the things that came out of that meeting that the U.S. is doing to counter these cyber threats, and how big of a problem is it for the U.S.?MR MILLER: Let me take that back and get you an answer.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. Can you confirm that next week an Israeli delegation is going to come to Washington in person? Will Secretary Blinken participate in that?MR MILLER: No, I cannot confirm that. As I said, I would not expect that the conversation today will be our last one, but I don’t have anything else to offer.QUESTION: And regarding the likely shuttering of Al Jazeera in Israel, the – what the Israeli Government said over the years is that the channel has been known to instigate violence and is just – obviously, it’s a propaganda arm of Qatar. What do you make of those pushbacks?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything to add to what I said a moment ago, which is obviously we – we have made clear we don’t agree with everything that Al Jazeera airs. But at the same time, we support the free, independent press anywhere in the world.Michel.QUESTION: But it’s not independent.MR MILLER: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: It’s owned by Qatar.MR MILLER: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. Are you concerned about the security situation in Jordan, especially that there are reports stating that the regime is under threat from Iran and its proxies?MR MILLER: No. I – we have a close working relationship with the Government of Jordan, and I don’t – I don’t share that assessment.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Go ahead. Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. Thank you. One’s I want to follow up on Said’s question about the reports of kill zones in Gaza. You said that you haven’t seen evidence of such a thing. But we’ve seen, for instance, the two Palestinians who are waving white flags killed just days ago. We’ve seen repeated reports of Israeli snipers killing people outside of hospitals, people afraid to even walk into the streets to save people who are bleeding out. So it seems understandable to say we’ve seen reports, Israel denied it, we’ll look into it. But I wouldn’t say there’s not evidence of Israel establishing some form of this kind of practice. Does that seem preliminary, to say that kind of thing?MR MILLER: No, we have not seen evidence of what was – what was reported in this article. Now, have we seen a number of incidents of civilian harm? Of course we have. We have seen those, and that happens in every war, and I can tell you what we have said before, which is we take those incredibly seriously. We have engaged with the Government of Israel to make clear that those accounts need to be investigated, and if soldiers are found to have operated in violation of either the IDF code of conduct or international humanitarian law, they need to be disciplined.QUESTION: And then on al-Shifa Hospital, I know you’ve talked at some length about it, but I am just wondering, we’ve gone from months ago the idea of Israeli forces targeting hospitals to being outlandish, to now they’ve done this attack on al-Shifa, and statedly and ostensibly they say that they’ve killed Hamas terrorists. Nevertheless, we’ve seen reports of kids, women found gruesomely killed, executed, reportedly even a surgeon who was there for 172 days treating patients killed. And some victims we can’t even confirm their – the identity because of the state of their bodies.So I’m wondering, given this attack, given the evident lack of care for civilians, given that we can’t an update on investigations into, for instance, the now two-month killing of Hind, the medics sent to save her, how can the U.S. approve any action into Rafah, a slice of land where 1.1 million Palestinians are seeking refuge? If a targeted attack on a hospital looks like this &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, so &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; what would an attack in any form on Rafah look like?MR MILLER: So again, do not believe that this attack was on the hospital. The attack was on the Hamas fighters that are hiding inside a hospital.QUESTION: Still – still to my point &#8212;MR MILLER: Some – hold on. Some place that they should never be. But it makes – you make a good point with respect to Rafah, which is why we have made clear we don’t want to see a full-scale military operation. But I think the premise of the – I shouldn’t say the premise of the question because I don’t want to attribute this to you, but the other alternative is that Israel does nothing about the Hamas fighters that continue to exist in Rafah, and we don’t think that’s an acceptable alternative either. So what we have said is there needs to be a targeted military operation in Rafah that targets the Hamas fighters in a way that minimizes civilian harm and not a full-scale operation. That’s been what we have been making clear to them.QUESTION: Just one small follow-up on that, if you’ll allow. I guess this just gets to a broader question about – what does the U.S. see as sort of the path out of here? Like is it political? Because what does it mean for Israel to defend itself ongoingly? Like is it a matter of eradicating everyone who is associated with Hamas? Because that &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah &#8212;QUESTION: I don’t know. It doesn’t necessarily seem like a goal that has led to the protection of civilians up to this point.MR MILLER: So there needs – they – there need to be battlefield successes and there needs to be a political path forward, and that is what we have been engaged with partners in the region to develop and ultimately to present to Israel. Because as you have heard the Secretary say, without a political path forward for the Palestinian people, Israel and the Palestinians are going to be stuck in this same cycle of violence that they have been stuck in for decades. And that’s not in the Palestinian people’s interest, as we have seen over the past nearly six months. It is not in Israel’s interest, as we saw very clearly on October 7th.And so that is the work that we are doing inside the United States Government to try to develop that political path forward that we think ultimately is in the best interests of the Palestinian people, the Israeli people, and the broader region at large.And go ahead (inaudible).QUESTION: Yesterday Türkiye held local elections. I know it’s the local elections, but it has a significant outcome. So do you have any comment or statement about these elections, the process of these elections, or the results?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on that. We typically don’t comment or take a position on elections anywhere in the world.QUESTION: And the elections are over. Do you have any updates about President Erdogan’s visit to Washington?MR MILLER: I do not.Go ahead, and then we’ll wrap for &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt.MR MILLER: Or come to Guita.QUESTION: I have some good news about one of the U.S. detainee in Afghanistan, Mr. Ryan (inaudible). I spoke to the – a senior Taliban official. They said that he’s in good health and he speaks to his family. Another detainee before him was Joshua (inaudible), who also contacted me after he was released from the Taliban. I had requested the Taliban that these detainees should be released immediately without any conditions in the Holy Month of Ramadan. They said we will definitely do it if you give us commitment that the U.S. will release our detainees and – and not a media group so big as Al Jazeera, and it’s a small-town niche media group. Is there anything I can convey that, like, these detainees should be, I mean, given back to each other, or it’s too much out of my &#8212;MR MILLER: I – with all due respect, I think I will decline to conduct diplomacy via you through this podium.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: But I will say two things. One, we are concerned despite those assurances – well-meaning as they may be – we are concerned about the well-being of Americans detained in Afghanistan. And number two, we are actively working for their release and will continue to do so.QUESTION: All right. My second question is – are drones have been reported flying in different parts of Afghanistan. Any things you can share that at least &#8212;MR MILLER: No. No, I don’t have any comment on that at all.QUESTION: Just last – last &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me go to Guita because we have to wrap.QUESTION: Just one more.MR MILLER: That was – that was two. Guita.QUESTION: I have five, six questions. I don’t even get three.MR MILLER: And – Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Matt, Human Rights Watch has issued a report on the situation of the Baha’is in Iran. It said that the Iranians’ persecution of this religious minority is tantamount to crimes against humanity. I was wondering, since the State Department has been following their situation – this situation of the Baha’is in Iran, if you would have the same assessment as Human Rights Watch.MR MILLER: Let me take that back and get you an assessment. I haven’t seen that. That – obviously it’s an issue we’ve been following. I haven’t seen that specific report, but let me talk to others in the building who might have and get you a response.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: With that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:12 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Turkey
- Department Press Briefing – March 11, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 11, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 11, 2024																																																					March 11, 2024																																																								1:17 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. We have a couple of guests today who are going to give opening comments. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Rich Verma will start, followed by Deputy Administrator of USAID for Management and Resources Paloma Adams-Allen. They will give opening comments, they’ll be happy to take a few questions, and then we’ll resume the usual briefing after they finish.With that.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Thank you. Matt, thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Nice to see you, and I want to thank my friend and colleague, USAID Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources Paloma Adams-Allen, for being here with us today. I also want to thank our Director of Bureau of Planning and Resources Doug Pitkin and our new Director of Foreign Assistance Tracy Carson, as well our USAID Budget Lead Roman Napoli, for being with us here as we walk through our FY25 budget with all of you.The budget request we are sending to Congress today will allow the Department of State and USAID to continue advancing the Biden administration’s vision of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world while delivering on issues that matter most to the lives and livelihoods of the American people. The President’s FY25 budget request includes 58.8 billion for the State Department and USAID. This is a $718 million or 1 percent increase above FY23. We are grateful for Congress’ partnership in resourcing State and USAID to meet the many challenges that we face today.U.S. diplomacy and development are more essential than ever to ensure American security and prosperity to solve global challenges and uphold universal values. Over the past year, the United States, with our friends and colleagues and allies around the world, have faced a range of significant challenges – from the conflict in the Middle East, to Russia’s ongoing brutal war against Ukraine, to historic levels of irregular migration and forced displacement, to unprecedented and growing global humanitarian needs.Our budget request invests in the personnel, the programs, and assistance that the State Department and USAID need as we stand at the front lines of these issues. Just allow me to outline some of our highest-priority areas in the request.First, we must employ all the tools at our disposal to outcompete China wherever possible. The FY25 request will allow us to continue to invest in the foundations of our strength at home aligned with likeminded partners to strengthen our shared interests and address the challenges posed by the PRC and harness those assets to compete with the PRC and defend our interests. We are aligning our foreign assistance to advance U.S. values by building a network of likeminded allies and partners both globally and with concerted focus on the Indo-Pacific as a region of vital importance to the U.S. and global security and prosperity.The $4 billion discretionary request across foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement for the Indo-Pacific Strategy represents our ironclad commitment to advancing an affirmative vision of U.S. values for the region. While many aspects of the discretionary request help advance this goal, discretionary resources alone cannot meet this need. It is imperative to our national security that we also have mandatory, reliable funding to outcompete China, and that is why the request also includes $4 billion over five years in mandatory funding to enable the United States to invest in new ways to outcompete China and focus on new and critical investments split between two important funds.We are requesting $2 billion to create a new international infrastructure fund which will outcompete China by providing a credible, reliable alternative to PRC options while also expanding markets and opportunities for U.S. businesses. This fund will support transformative, quality, and sustainable hard infrastructure projects. Additionally, we are seeking $2 billion to make game-changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen partner economies, improve good governance and the rule of law, bolster connectivity between partner countries, and support their efforts, including through multilateral fora, in building resilience and pushing back against predatory efforts.Our second key priority in this request is ensuring Russia’s war in Ukraine remains a strategic failure. We are requesting 482 million, which would sustain crucial support for Ukraine in its resolute defense of its people and independence from Russia. Our request also provides the resources needed to deliver critical economic development and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine’s brave and resilient citizens.Let me be clear, though. These funds are in addition to the October 2023 National Security Supplemental Request. The FY25 resources start re-establishing a base budget for core and enduring programs for Ukraine but cannot replace the funds requested as part of the supplemental.Third, advancing peace and security in the Middle East remains a top priority for us, including working with our partners to end the conflict between Israel and Hamas and deliver lifesaving assistance to Palestinians. The President’s request of 7.6 billion maintains our longstanding investments to support key partners in the Middle East and North Africa and their security against growing violence by extremists and Iran-linked malign actors. The funds would unlock resources to partner with citizens of the region, foster economic growth, and advance good governance and respect for human rights.Fourth, delivering solutions to shared global challenges such as irregular migration and forced displacement, countering synthetic drugs, a rapidly changing climate, and growing humanitarian crises. Now, to do this we are mobilizing resources to promote economic prosperity, grow energy sectors, strengthen health systems, invest in food security, and to mitigate the impacts of the climate crisis. Our partnerships are crucial to tackling these global challenges, and ones that affect our own hemisphere, including irregular migration, forced displacement, and the illegal synthetic drug crisis in the United States. These additional resources will allow us to work together with key allies and partners on these challenges and towards a free, open, and secure, prosperous world.Fifth, we will continue to work – continue our work to ensure U.S. interests and values are protected in the digital and emerging technology sector, including through the CHIPS Act. We are grateful to Congress for providing 500 million over five years to work with our partners and allies to secure and expand our critical semiconductor supply chains and promote the adoption of trustworthy telecommunication technologies.Now, success in all of these policy areas is not possible if we do not have the people, the platforms, and the tools to achieve these objectives while being responsible stewards of taxpayer resources. So to that end, with FY25 funds, we must also continue the Secretary of State’s ambitious agenda to modernize American diplomacy, to ensure we are equipped to seize the opportunities of the 21st century. These resources will strengthen the department by improving the morale, recruitment, and retention of our global workforce, which spans the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and our locally employed staff at embassies around the world.And to meet these global challenges and to fulfill the President’s priorities, we need a growing workforce empowered by more training and greater flexibility. Our request expands State’s and USAID’s workforce by establishing nearly 350 new positions, and also filling 200 of State’s existing Foreign Service vacancies. We will focus on expanding our engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing professional development and training options, and establishing a new diplomatic reserve auxiliary corps to meet future crises. We will also continue to advance diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility initiatives, to include broader recruitment and retention. We’ve requested 5.6 billion to keep our people, our buildings, and information around the globe safe and secure, including for an expanded presence in the Indo-Pacific, in Libya, and the Eastern Caribbean.In addition, the United States multilateral contributions are indispensable to shaping international institutions and partnerships critical to our national security interests. Therefore, our request includes 1.7 billion for contributions to international organizations such as the UN, WHO, NATO, and UNESCO, as well as 1.2 billion for contributions to UN international peacekeeping.Finally, I would also like to emphasize what we are doing to provide better services to the American people. Our request will enhance the department’s consular services for passports, visas, and U.S. citizen services overseas. Increased staffing and IT capacity will reduce wait times and improve customer service that many Americans and visitors to the United States count on.Now, as I said at the outset, this budget will advance the Biden administration’s vision of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world, but it also delivers on issues that matter to the lives and livelihoods of Americans. Better, faster, and more convenient services from our consular services is one area. But so is reducing the flow of fentanyl, promoting greater economic opportunity, ensuring global health security, and creating jobs. And these are all other examples of how the department will deliver on things that matter most to Americans.Now, with that, let me hand the floor to Deputy Administrator Paloma Adams-Allen, who will address the key USAID elements of the FY25 budget request, and then we would look forward to a few of your questions as well. Paloma.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: Thank you, Rich. Thanks so much, Rich. Thank you, Matt. Good morning. Good afternoon. As Rich has just described, we really find ourselves at another decisive juncture, where U.S. leadership on the global stage is critical for continued growth and prosperity here at home, for our national security, and for extending the reach of dignity around the world.The President’s FY25 budget request calls for 28 billion for USAID, a request that reflects our commitment to responding to the historic conflict and climate-driven disasters that continue to wreak havoc globally, while also advancing longer-term development objectives like strengthening democracy, global economic resilience, and our systems for the response and prevention of climate and health shocks. This request also assumes the appropriation of the critical humanitarian and economic support funds we’ve been fighting for in the National Security Supplemental. So before I take questions alongside Rich, I just wanted to highlight a few of the areas that are critical for USAID.On the humanitarian assistance front: In the last three years alone, due to natural disasters and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and beyond, the number of people in need of assistance has grown to 300 million, an increase of 64 million from 2021. For the U.S. to continue to lead, to support our partners and allies, and to save lives amidst some of the world’s toughest challenges, this year’s budget requests 6.3 billion for USAID’s humanitarian assistance efforts, which cover an average of 75 crises per year, including ongoing emergencies in Gaza, Haiti, and Afghanistan. It also includes 1.1 billion for USAID’s Feed the Future programs to address the global food crisis driven by climate-induced shocks and exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine.Ukraine’s long-term economic stability depends on its ability to continue generating revenue, so this year’s request includes 321 million to bolster its economy, including building up its energy infrastructure and increasing agricultural exports. It also includes funding to continue the support that the government provides in terms of basic social services as well as the Ukrainian people’s work to strengthen democracy.In terms of our economic and democracy-strengthening priorities, we know that leveraging private sector capital and business expertise is critical to closing the gap between the current levels of development assistance and the increasing need. So we’re requesting $50 billion for USAID’s EDGE Fund, which is already generating partnerships and attracting the additional resources needed to promote sustainable business practices, market-based innovations, and inclusive entrepreneurship. And we’re asking for another 50 million to boost the economic resilience of countries facing mounting debt, slowing growth, high inflation, declining investment, and widening inequality, all of which we know can undermine democratic gains.To meet the urgency and magnitude of the digital threats to development progress, the request includes 94 million to scale USAID’s digital, cyber, and emerging technology programming, including our work to build and strengthen open, inclusive, and secure digital ecosystems, and leverage proven technology for better development outcomes.To meet our commitment to tackle the global climate crisis, this year’s budget requests 2.8 billion for USAID-managed climate programs that lay the foundation for the modernization and expansion of the energy infrastructure needed to power schools, hospitals, and economic growth. We will also continue to increase food and water security by providing people with access to lifesaving early warning systems and more resilient agriculture and conservation practices.To reaffirm the U.S. global health leadership, the budget request includes 4 billion for USAID-managed accounts to prevent child and maternal deaths, bolster nutrition, control the HIV/AIDS epidemic, protect the global health workforce through the President’s Global Health Worker initiative, and it includes 650 million for USAID to sustain global health security programs to help detect, respond to, and prevent future infectious disease threats.And last but not least, as Rich noted, we’re supporting our people. Beyond our critical programmatic funding, this request also reflects our commitment to strengthening and investing in our global workforce. With our $2.2 billion request, we are prioritizing the recruitment, retention, and training of the personnel with the skills and experience needed in a modern development and humanitarian enterprise. So an additional 145 positions will help us grow our ranks of career humanitarians, contracting and AI specialists, economists, engineers, and others. And it will position us to better address the compensation and other concerns of our local staff who serve our missions overseas, ensuring that we live up to our values but are also able to compete for much-needed talent.So, to wrap up, from day one the Biden-Harris administration – of the Biden-Harris administration, the United States has confronted and led the world to respond to complex threats and the most pressing global challenges of the day. We look forward to continuing this work with the support of the American people. Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. Take a few questions. Matt.QUESTION: Thanks. I guess these are to both of you, and I don’t know, Rich, do we call you ambassador or a deputy secretary?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Whatever you want.QUESTION: What do you prefer?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Rich is great. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Okay. I have a couple, but I think they’ll be really quick. And the reason that I have a couple is because we have not actually seen the Function 150 justification. We’ve only seen a couple fact sheets that were sent out.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: I think it came out just &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I haven’t seen it. It’s not been in my email, so anyway – but I think these will be real quick. Ukraine – in the 2025 budget, you said 482 million. Is that correct?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Correct.QUESTION: And then – and – but that’s on top of what is in the supplemental, which has not yet been approved already.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: That’s correct.QUESTION: Which is – how much is that? That’s part of the 60 billion?DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: It is 16.3 billion.QUESTION: 16.3?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Yes.QUESTION: Okay. So of the – all right. And then – okay, I just wanted to make sure that was right.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: And Matt, just – maybe I’ll just make the point that I made that this base budget in FY25 is not a substitute for that supplemental, and that supplemental is growing more and more important every day.QUESTION: Right. Okay. And then also part of that supplemental is some stuff for the Middle East, but in the 2025 request, you have 7.6 billion, right? Is it correct that about half of that, roughly – a little less than half, 3.3 billion – is for Israel alone?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Correct. Yes.QUESTION: And then on Taiwan, you mentioned – the Indo-Pacific, you say – in one of these fact sheets that we got a little while ago, it says that you’re making a historic investment in Taiwan’s military.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Think it’s $100 million in security assistance.QUESTION: Yeah, but you know what? I’ve seen individual arms sales to Taiwan that you guys have put out to TECRO that are more than 100 million, so I don’t understand how this is historic. Can you explain that?And then I’ve got one last one which is about embassies and consulates. I don’t know if you want to take those.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Happy to take that. Look, we break out Taiwan for the first time and have a specific line item for it. It reaffirms our commitment to security assistance for Taiwan and to a free and open Indo-Pacific. I think it’s very clear. I think it stands on its own.QUESTION: Okay. But, I mean, it is not in itself historic because – the size of it is not historic. I mean, you guys have sold them &#8212;DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: I think – yeah, here’s what I would say &#8212;QUESTION: You guys have – there have been many, numerous, transfers to the Taiwanese over the years that have exceeded 100 million at a time.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: That’s true. That’s true, and we’re very proud of the longstanding security assistance we’ve provided. I’d also say take a look at our Indo-Pacific Strategy more broadly and the new kind of funding requests that have gone in, including mandatory spending and new accounts.QUESTION: Okay. Last one – and this is just on – you said 5.6 billion for supporting the staff or&nbsp;– and improving and expanding the diplomatic presence abroad. Does that include funding for the new embassy in the Seychelles, which I know that you were there to announce? The Maldives, which former Secretary Pompeo was there to announce? And is there any funding for the consulate in Western Sahara that was announced by the previous administration? And is there any funding for a consulate in Jerusalem?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: So I was in Seychelles. I was also in Maldives, so glad to see the progress there. And we are kind of – Doug, why don’t you jump up? Yeah.MR PITKIN: On Western Sahara – Western Sahara, not at this time. I think that some of the planning is still ongoing for the appropriate presence, given the security conditions. And then at this point – no additional funding for Jerusalem at this point, but that still remains in a planning stage.QUESTION: All right. Then you mentioned Libya and the eastern Caribbean, so in Libya where? Back in Tripoli?MR PITKIN: Libya &#8212;QUESTION: Because you had an embassy that you closed down. I mean, it was in a hotel room, basically, but it was an embassy.MR PITKIN: We’re in active negotiations for an interim facility that would provide appropriate security and staffing support adjacent to other international &#8212;QUESTION: In Tripoli?MR PITKIN: Yeah. Yeah.QUESTION: All right. And then you mentioned, Rich, the eastern Caribbean.MR PITKIN: Eastern Caribbean. That planning is still going on, but several islands &#8212;QUESTION: For where?MR PITKIN: The Secretary has not made a final determination on which specific islands. That planning is ongoing, but would enable two very small, focused posts.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: This would build on the Vice President’s trip where she made the initial announcement, and the planning actually does continue. And I think what you’ll see is a very strategic focus on key areas where we believe having a diplomatic presence is important – the Indo-Pacific, eastern Caribbean, coming back to Libya – so these are again, I think, reflective of the need to be where the greatest kind of urgency and some of our crises are, but also just to kind of regularize our diplomatic presence in places.QUESTION: Thank you.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Paloma, you want to add anything?DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: No, I’m good.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Okay.MR MILLER: Humeyra.QUESTION: Hi, thank you very much.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Thank you.QUESTION: Can I follow up super quickly on Western Sahara? I think, if I got it right, you said there’s still ongoing for the appropriate presence given the security conditions. Do you have at all a timeline on when you might move on opening this consulate in Western Sahara?MR PITKIN: I think we’d have to come back on the specifics for that, so we can follow up.QUESTION: You don’t have any timeline?MR PITKIN: Not at this point.QUESTION: But you have – can you confirm you have the political will to open it within this administration?MR PITKIN: All those elements are part of the decision process, both the political will, the security, the appropriate resources. So at this point I think we’d have to take that for the – a more specific timeline.QUESTION: Okay, understand. Thank you. And I just want to ask something about UNRWA, and please correct me if I missed it somewhere, but in the bullet points that are sent out and in the fact sheet, I did not see any funding for UNRWA. I do believe it falls under State Department/USAID. So does that – I mean, is it somewhere that’s hidden or we don’t – we haven’t seen or &#8212;DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: No, it’s not hidden. We have – as has been discussed here, I think, multiple times, we have a pause on our funding &#8212;QUESTION: Right.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: &#8212; to UNRWA until the investigation is complete. That doesn’t mean we are not providing funding for Gaza, for the West Bank, for the humanitarian needs, and there’s a significant commitment in here. But until that particular investigation concludes itself, we’re going to look to other organizations as we do today: World Food Program, UNICEF, other outlets.QUESTION: Right. And so it’s – it would be wrong to say that U.S. has written off the possibility to resume funding for UNRWA.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: I think what I would say is there is a pause pending the outcome of the investigation.QUESTION: And you said there is significant commitment for Palestinian people. I’ve seen 3.3 for Israel. Does that number include for West Bank or Gaza?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: No, there’s an additional amount of funding. I think it’s around – Tracy, do you want to take that? Yeah.MS CARSON: There’s 10.3 billion in humanitarian assistance, and those are the sources we would use to support Palestinian refugees.QUESTION: Okay. And in terms of the agencies, the WFP, did you say?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Yeah, I think – look, we work with a range of partner agencies, and that’s what we do today to deliver the assistance, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: Thank you.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: Thank you. No, that’s it.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Okay.MR MILLER: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. I appreciate that. A couple of questions, if I may. On Eurasia – Central Asia and Europe – what I have written there, line 199 – you mentioned some portion will go to Armenia’s economic and democratic resilience. Can you just give us the numbers? How much of that portion will go to &#8212;DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Sorry, you said on Armenia?MS ADAMS-ALLEN: Armenia.QUESTION: Yes.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Okay. You got it.MS CARSON: I’ll get back to you on that.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: In one – we have it broken out, but we’ll make sure we get that to you.QUESTION: I appreciate it. On democracy programming, I didn’t see any funding for a summit, democratic – democracy summit for 2025. Do you guys not expect a summit for 2025?DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Again, if &#8212;MS CARSON: There is. There’s $3 billion in democracy, and of that we’re assuming roughly $345 million will support the work that we’ve been doing related to the democracy summit.QUESTION: In the summit. Yeah. And finally, well, Madam Deputy Administrator, can you speak to how much past couple of months impacted the capabilities in terms of delivery of humanitarian assistance in Ukraine? I see funding for upcoming year, but if you don’t – if you don’t have a lot of partners who will help you in Ukraine to deliver that assistance, do you – how much past couple of months have impacted your capabilities?DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: So we’re still providing assistance in Ukraine. We provided about 14.6 – up to 14.6 thousand – million folks. So we still have ongoing funding. The challenge will be if we don’t get the supplemental funding, that’s where we will have to cut off 400 or so health centers that are providing support, food assistance that’s going out to folks. So we are currently providing assistance, but that is ramping down, and that’s why we need the supplemental.Roman, do you have a figure in terms of numbers of folks who have received assistance? Sorry for &#8212;MR NAPOLI: Tracy might, I think.MS CARSON: I’ll get back.MR NAPOLI: Yeah.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: Yeah.MR MILLER: Okay.MR NAPOLI: Go ahead.MR MILLER: We’ll take one &#8212;DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, sorry.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: That continues our issue, and this is why the supplemental is so urgent.MS CARSON: I’ll just answer your Armenia question. The budget assumes $52 million for Armenia.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: One more from Nike, and then we’ll wrap, and I’ll take questions.QUESTION: Thank you. This question is to follow and to clarify to both of you. The fact sheet mentioned “100.0 million for an historic investment in Taiwan’s security including new bilateral Foreign Military Financing request, to strengthen deterrence and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” Can we please have a breakdown? Does that include a permanent training mission by the U.S. Special Forces, troops in Taiwan, Republic of China? Thank you.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: I don’t – I don’t believe so. I think this is the traditional security assistance. There’s also IMET assistance. And again, you have to read that together with the totality of our assistance in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the new mandatory funding we’ve also added. So I think that’s how I would describe that particular &#8212;MS CARSON: Yeah, it’s Foreign Military Financing grant-based assistance that we would provide to Taiwan.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Yeah.MR MILLER: Okay.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Okay.MR MILLER: Thank you both.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Thank you.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: Thank you.DEPUTY SECRETARY VERMA: Thank you, Matt. Thanks, everybody.MS ADAMS-ALLEN: Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR&nbsp;ADAMS-ALLEN: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. Just get situated here. All right. Who wants to go first? I don’t know if I have to call on Matt first and if he’s already a first question, or I go to somebody else.QUESTION: You can go to someone else. I want to &#8212;MR MILLER: It doesn’t matter. I just want to – I just want to follow the rules, formal or informal.QUESTION: I don’t think there are any rules. I think you can – you can go to someone &#8212;MR MILLER: So we’ll go to somebody who hasn’t asked &#8212;QUESTION: I wanted to ask about Haiti.QUESTION: I mean, I also wanted to ask about Haiti.MR MILLER: We’ll go to somebody who hasn’t asked a question.QUESTION: What can you tell us about the expectations for the meeting in Jamaica today?MR MILLER: So the Secretary is in Kingston, Jamaica today to attend the CARICOM High-Level Meeting on Haiti to advance a compromise on the – to the ongoing political stalemate threatening the country’s citizens and security. The proposal that is on the table that CARICOM has developed over the past several days in consultation with Haitian stakeholders, in consultation with the United States, would expedite a political transition through the creation of a broad-based, independent presidential college to steer the country towards the deployment of a Multinational Security Support Mission and free and fair elections, and that’s what I expect the Secretary will be discussing with his colleagues.QUESTION: Will Prime Minister Henry have any presence there, virtually or other?MR MILLER: I am not aware of any, but as always, I will defer to him speak to his travels.QUESTION: And is it your understanding he’s still in Puerto Rico?MR MILLER: Again, I’m going to defer to him to speak to his travels.QUESTION: And then can you tell us any more about the decision to evacuate some embassy personnel over the weekend?MR MILLER: So as you may aware, we have been on ordered departure status since last July, where we have ordered a certain number of embassy personnel to leave. Since we went to that status last July, there have been embassy personnel that have left at different times, and at times we have moved additional personnel in. So we had a number of embassy personnel that left over the weekend. We had additional security forces that deployed to the mission because of the security situation there. And we’ll continue to assess the situation and what – make whatever appropriate decisions we need to protect our staff and personnel there.Camilla.QUESTION: Can you get – can you say anything further about any American passport holders in Haiti, if there’s any American citizens reaching out to the embassy hoping for assistance, given the – the precariousness of flights in and out of Haiti and things that are developing quickly?MR MILLER: So – yeah, so we are in contact with a number of American citizens in Haiti. I do want to reiterate that we have had a Level 4 travel alert for Haiti for more than four years now, making very clear to American citizens that, number one, they should not travel to Haiti, that it is not safe to travel to Haiti; and number two, that they are – if they’re in Haiti, they should leave as soon as it’s safe for them to do so. Now, obviously, that’s a warning that has been in place for four years. It’s not safe for a number of them to leave right now, and they’re not able to leave right now because the airport has been damaged and commercial carriers have suspended flights.So what we are asking U.S. citizens to do today is to register through our crisis intake form, which you can get to through the embassy’s website, and we will communicate with them the best information we have when we have it.Said – oh, Humeyra, go ahead. I will – let’s &#8212;QUESTION: If it’s on Haiti &#8212;MR MILLER: Let’s finish up on Haiti.QUESTION: Mine is about Palestine – yeah.MR MILLER: Yeah, we’ll finish up on Haiti and then go – yeah, Nike.QUESTION: MSS – the United States has placed $200 million assistance to the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti. Can you provide more details on MSS? What are the exact plans? And is the United States able to execute the assistance under current security circumstance?MR MILLER: So we are committed to the success of the MSS. You have seen not only the United States commit money to the MSS, but also the Secretary has met with his foreign counterparts to seek to raise funds from additional countries to fund the MSS. Secretary spoke to the president of Kenya on Friday to discuss the deployment of the MSS, and we continue to look to expedite that mission as soon as possible. And so that’s something we’re in the – in conversation with the Government of Kenya about, and something we’re in conversation with other countries around the world. And I can assure you that the United States will do its part to fund that important mission.QUESTION: Can I please follow up?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: No offense here, but just for example, it’s fair to assume the Kenya forces do not speak Creole. So my question is: How are they going to communicate with the Haitians National Police? How are they going to tell who is good cop, who is bad cop? And same thing goes with other multinational forces.MR MILLER: So I will defer ultimately to the Government of Kenya to speak to how that mission will operate. We are there in a support function by – with providing them financial assistance and providing them logistic support. But obviously, there are translators that you can bring to bear, there are other resources you can bring to bear to work through those issues, and it’s something that we will look to do in the coming weeks.QUESTION: The bureau – State Department’s Bureau for INL used to have a – some teams on the ground to help with Haitian police – National Police forces to fight drugs, illegal – I mean, illegal drugs and crimes, and to help maintain security. Are they still there on the ground, or where are they when this violence happened?MR MILLER: I’ll have to take that back and follow up. I’m happy to look into it and follow up with you. Anything else on Haiti before we move on? Hands go up; hands go down.Go ahead, Tom. (Laughter.)QUESTION: We’re okay to move on now? Why is the United States building a port off the coast Gaza when there’s a perfectly good one that &#8212;MR MILLER: Wait, I thought we – let me just – I thought we were still on Haiti. Nothing else on Haiti?QUESTION: We’re still on Haiti?MR MILLER: Okay, we are moving on. Yeah, let me just – let me just – I’ll come to you &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, no, that’s fine. It’s fine.MR MILLER: Let me just – let me just make – let me – I want to close out Haiti before we move on.QUESTION: Yeah, yeah.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. So what’s going to happen with U.S. citizens who are still in Haiti? Are there any evacuation plans? And then second, how does this affect the southern border in terms of migrants and also drugs?MR MILLER: So I had spoke to the question with respect to American citizens a moment ago, which is that they should register with our crisis intake form. We will provide them information to the extent that we are able to do so at – the airport is – currently has been damaged, and the commercial carriers have suspended flights. And I just want to reiterate that we have made very clear for more than four years that United States citizens should not travel to Haiti.With respect to the question about the border, I would defer ultimately to other agencies to speak to this.Now, Haiti or something else?QUESTION: No – Gaza.MR MILLER: I promised Tom I’d come to him first, and then I’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Thanks. Why is the United States building a port off the coast of Gaza when there’s a perfectly good one about a 30-mile drive further north, in fact a major international container port?MR MILLER: So we are looking to build or looking to – or exploring a maritime option to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza because the other options have not proven sufficient so far, is the bottom-line answer to that question.So we are – have provided air drops. We’ve been providing those over the past – a little over a week to get emergency assistance in, and we are exploring a maritime option to get additional assistance in. But I should be clear – and you’ve heard me say this and others in the administration say that – that there – it is no substitute for assistance continuing to come in over land. And so we’ll continue to push for it to come over land. Now, whether that comes through Ashdod Port and then travels over land, or it comes through Jordan, or comes from Egypt, ultimately doesn’t actually matter. It matters how it gets – it matters that it gets into Gaza, whether it comes through a port or another means.So we’re going to push to see the land routes expanded. What we are doing is to supplement that, not replace it.QUESTION: But, I mean, it’s turned what is a political issue into a logistical one. This is not about trying to get into some remote region of the world with a natural disaster. This is a place that is very easily accessible. And you talked about the current situation you haven’t been able to get to sufficiently. That means you haven’t been able to persuade the Israelis to let enough aid in over land and to secure its distribution. So why is that still a problem?MR MILLER: So I will say that, first of all, we have seen some modest improvements in the humanitarian situation and the distribution of aid over the past few days. We’ve seen trucks able to move around the southern part of Gaza with more freedom than they were able to do, say, a week or 10 days ago. We’ve seen additional trucks move to the north of Gaza from the south. We saw for the first time flour released from Ashdod and make its way into Gaza, something we have been supporting for some time. And we saw the Government of Israel agree to open additional crossings.So yes, they need to do more. We’ve seen an improvement but we think they need to continue to do more, and so that’s what we’re going to continue to push them to do.QUESTION: I mean, it does just come back to this fundamental point about leverage. And when you’re providing the amount of military aid that you are providing, in fact, there’s a – the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act says that humanitarian aid should not be blocked by countries that are recipients of military aid from the United States. And it would seem extraordinary still that leverage cannot be brought to bear when the UN is now saying malnutrition is so severe, they’re quoting that 25 people have died now.MR MILLER: Well, first of all, it is the intervention of the United States that has led humanitarian assistance to go into Gaza in the first place. Secretary Blinken has engaged on this consistently in his meetings and his phone calls with leaders of the Government of Israel. The President of the United States has been involved in this. The President of the United States traveled to Israel and cemented a deal that Secretary Blinken initially reached to allow Rafah to open in the first place; and it was our intervention that allowed – that got Kerem Shalom to open; and it is our intervention that has led to the Government of Israel agree – to agree to open additional crossings into Gaza.So it is the work of the United States that has led to an improvement in the humanitarian assistance situation. Now, that improvement hasn’t been enough, and that’s why we continue to engage consistently at the highest levels of the Government of Israel, and that’s why the President continues to speak out on this and that’s why the Secretary continues to speak out on this, and that’s what we’ll continue – that’s what we will keep doing.QUESTION: Matthew?MR MILLER: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Has the Israeli Government presented Biden administration with a humanitarian and/or military plan for Rafah?MR MILLER: They have not.QUESTION: What is your latest assessment, based on your conversations with them, whether or not they would go ahead without the humanitarian plan?MR MILLER: So I won’t speak to the conversations that we have had with them, but we have made clear, both in those private conversations and as you have heard us say publicly a number of times, that it is our judgment that they cannot, should not, go into Rafah without a humanitarian assistance plan that is credible and that they can actually implement.QUESTION: Right. And Netanyahu, we’ve heard him say multiple times, I think, over the past couple of days that the Rafah operation will happen one way or the other. And the President said in the MSNBC interview that Rafah is a red line, although he then quickly said he will continue to support Israel. So I guess I’m asking, what is the U.S. prepared to do when and if Israel goes ahead with the Rafah offensive?MR MILLER: So the “if” there – I think you know – triggered my answer that I’m not going to&nbsp;&#8212;QUESTION: But it’s not – it’s not &#8212;MR MILLER: Well, you – no, no, no, hold up. Well, you said that &#8212;QUESTION: What &#8212;MR MILLER: But the – no, because the “if” I &#8212;QUESTION: But the prime minister said that.QUESTION: I think the – well, no. Here’s the – here’s what I’m going to say. The “if,” I think, does make it a hypothetical, because we have said what we need to see to be able to support a Rafah operation, and that is a credible and implementable humanitarian assistance plan. The Government of Israel has said that they will implement a humanitarian assistance plan. They haven’t just said that to us; they have said that publicly. We haven’t seen such a plan yet. So I think before we either pass judgment on whether this is possible or whether any such plan is credible and can be implemented, and whether we talk about what we would do next, I think let’s wait and see what it is that they come up with.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Yeah, just a couple of things on the Rafah thing because we’re talking about 1.4 million people. It’s a lot of people. It’s crowded and so on. And, in fact, the Israelis have been bombing it, so they’re reducing the area in which people can live. So what, in your view or in your discussion – what methods, what methodology is Israel – will Israel use to basically move these people and get them out of harm’s way?MR MILLER: So, Said, I can’t &#8212;QUESTION: What is conceivable?MR MILLER: Sorry. I can’t answer that question because I haven’t seen the plan. It is incumbent upon them, not us, to develop that plan. We will wait and look at it and pass judgment on it when we see it.QUESTION: But can you see that you can actually move that many number of people to &#8212;MR MILLER: I &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; let’s say either south or north and so on?MR MILLER: I think I want to &#8212;QUESTION: Will they be allowed to go north?MR MILLER: I think I want to wait and see what any plan looks like before I pass judgment on it &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: &#8212; which should be obvious.QUESTION: Yeah, one more question. Now, isn’t – doesn’t U.S. law call for stopping shipments of arms to a country that prevents the distribution of American aid, humanitarian aid, as we have seen with the flour?MR MILLER: So that is the law and we have seen the Government of Israel take steps to allow humanitarian assistance in, including to allow humanitarian assistance in. Now, they haven’t done enough &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; but we’ve seen them take steps. And because it’s our judgment that they haven’t done enough, that’s why we’re pushing them to do more.QUESTION: But they are still holding flour that you guys have sent to Gaza.MR MILLER: No, that’s not accurate.QUESTION: That’s not – okay.QUESTION: Can I follow up on Gaza?QUESTION: All right, let me just follow up on a couple of things.MR MILLER: Just hold on. Let me just – one at a time.QUESTION: On UNRWA, I wanted to ask about UNRWA. Now, today I think Canada and Sweden said that they will resume aid to UNRWA. They – basically they paused because of the very same reason, so they must be convinced that the evidence is enough, sufficient to allow the resumption of aid. Why not with the United States?MR MILLER: So every country has to make its own determination. But again, we’ve laid out a very clear standard that we’re going to apply, which is we are going to await the outcome of the investigations that the United Nations is conducting. I think it’s important to remember, Said, it’s not Israel that’s conducting this investigation, it’s not another body. It’s the United Nations itself, which of course administers all of this aid, that is conducting the investigation.Despite the number of times you have asked me this, we are going to wait until the outcome of that investigation before making any determinations, which I think is obviously the appropriate step to take.QUESTION: I fully understand, but it’s the same set of evidence and the same set of investigators and the same set of investigations that other countries are privy to, like you are.MR MILLER: It’s &#8212;QUESTION: If they can arrive &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t – hold on. Said, I don’t believe anyone is privy to the outcome of this investigation because it’s not been completed, let alone briefed to us yet or to any other country, for that matter.QUESTION: I just am saying they’re not different sets of investigations. It’s the same investigations.MR MILLER: Correct. And every country will have to make its own determinations.QUESTION: And one last thing. Have you – are you aware that UNRWA reports says that Israel coerced some agency employees to falsely admit Hamas links? Were you aware of &#8212;MR MILLER: I have seen those reports. I don’t have any independent &#8212;QUESTION: You haven’t &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any independent ability to assess them.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Do you still expect a truce to be announced during Ramadan, and is there any progress in the talks that the U.S. is doing?MR MILLER: So I am not going to make any forecasts one way or the other. We continue to believe that an agreement to achieve a ceasefire and secure the release of hostages is important. We’re continuing to work on it, we’re continuing to pursue it, but I wouldn’t want to offer any kind of assessment.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Can you just – like I’m trying to understand when President Biden said that entering Rafah is a red line, and the same time he will say we’re going to keep sending weapons and support Israel. I mean, just in English wording, how does it work? Red line, don’t enter Rafah; and the same time we’re going to give you weapons if you enter Rafah or not. Is that right?MR MILLER: So I think the President’s remarks were very clear. But again, as I said, with respect to Rafah, let’s just wait and see what the plan that Israel develops looks like before we pass any judgment either on whether it’s credible, whether it can be implemented, or what the United States will and will not do. But as the President said in that interview and as you’ve heard the Secretary say and me and others from the administration say a number of times, we support Israel’s right to continue to defend itself, and that’s what we’ll – that will be our policy.QUESTION: And so what about – did you watch the report on CNN inside Gaza hospital and see the starvation of children? Images we used to see in Uganda, some images we see in African countries like 20 years ago, now we’re seeing it in 2024. Kids are starving to death.MR MILLER: So I didn’t see that specific report, but obviously we’ve seen multiple reports of incredibly dire humanitarian conditions on the ground in Gaza. And that’s why we not only have been pushing the Government of Israel to do more – and as I’ve said, we’ve seen some modest improvements but not enough – but it’s why the United States has air dropped its own humanitarian assistance in and is working on a maritime option to get assistance in.Go ahead.QUESTION: A last question. Just last &#8212;MR MILLER: Last one. Last one, then I’m going to go to – go ahead.QUESTION: So basically, we experienced like dramatically the changing of tone of this administration. I mean, from this podium, Israel has a right to defend itself. People are dying day after day. Today the tonality changed. We saw the primary election. Some voters decided to stay uncommitted votes. President Biden in his speech changes tonality toward the – what’s happening in Gaza. Who is going to hold accountability for all the crimes that Israel committed for the past five months?MR MILLER: So first of all, I don’t think that’s an &#8212;QUESTION: Do you still think it’s &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me just say I don’t think that’s an accurate assessment of the situation. We have made our judgments based on the facts on the ground, and that is what has driven our policy and what will continue to drive our – to &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Hold on. I said I was going to go to Matt next. Matt, go ahead.QUESTION: I just want to ask one brief thing about what you said in response there. You said let’s wait until we’ve seen the plan before we pass judgment on whether it is credible or implementable, correct?MR MILLER: Correct. Correct.QUESTION: So does that – does that mean that you are going to pass judgment on the plan when you see it?MR MILLER: I would expect that &#8212;QUESTION: So when – when the Israelis – so when the Israelis put out the plan, we’ll get the U.S. perspective?MR MILLER: I would expect that &#8212;QUESTION: Judgment up, down? Needs improvement?MR MILLER: I’m not going to say exactly the outcome, but I would expect that ultimately we will have a view on that plan, yes.QUESTION: Well, ultimately.MR MILLER: But I mean &#8212;QUESTION: After they finish, after they – if they’re done?MR MILLER: We are waiting to be briefed on that plan, but yes, we will obviously have a view on what it looks like.QUESTION: Okay. So if you don’t like it or if you do like it, we can expect to hear?MR MILLER: I’m going to wait to see what it looks like, but I am sure that &#8212;QUESTION: But you’re going to say &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. Hold on, Matt. Just to say I am –QUESTION: You’re going to pass judgment on it?MR MILLER: I am sure that I will be here and you will have questions, and I will answer those questions about the plan.QUESTION: All right.QUESTION: Matt, sorry. Just on that.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Whoa, whoa, everyone. I’ll get to you. Go ahead.QUESTION: Just on that &#8212;MR MILLER: Humeyra, then – and then Nadia third.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Nadia, I’m going to get to you.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: You seem to be putting a lot of hope on that plan, but do you – does the administration have any indication or any knowledge that the plan is being indeed developed?MR MILLER: The Government of Israel has said privately to us that they’re developing such a plan, and they &#8212;QUESTION: Have they said so in recent days?MR MILLER: Hold on. And they have said publicly that they are developing a plan.QUESTION: Right, that was a little while ago. Like, I mean, this moves really, really fast, and we have seen Netanyahu sort of say things that they’re going to go ahead with Rafah regardless.MR MILLER: I cannot speak &#8212;QUESTION: So do you still – you’re still certain they’re developing this plan?MR MILLER: I cannot speak for any government but my own, and I can tell you that they have told us that privately and they have said it publicly.QUESTION: And just one last thing, because I think – I’m just going through your answer to Tom’s question. You talk about how U.S. has pushed a lot Israel on the humanitarian aid and made progress even though incremental or sort of bigger in some other things. But what he was asking you – I think – was specifically related to 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that says humanitarian aid should not be blocked by countries that are recipients of military aid from the United States. So we have heard you a lot from this podium saying Israel should do more. So based on that, does the United States consider Israel to be impeding the flow of U.S. aid into Gaza or not?MR MILLER: That is not a judgment that we have made.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Two questions on Turkish foreign minister’s – Fidan’s meeting with Secretary Blinken last week. First, the joint statement mentions a commitment to a result-oriented and a positive bilateral agenda. I was wondering if you could elaborate more on the specific areas of positive agenda between the two countries.MR MILLER: So we continue to work closely with Türkiye on a number of issues. They’re an important NATO Ally. We have worked with them on the Black Sea Grain Initiative and ensuring that Ukraine can continue to export grain through the Black Sea, and have worked with them on a number of regional security matters both in Europe and in the Middle East. And as you know, we have discussed with them post-conflict governance and issues related to Gaza.QUESTION: Thank you. And on the fight against terrorism, the – according to the joint statement, the two countries relaunched counterterrorism consultations to expand fight against terrorism. What steps will be taken in this regard? And additionally, what are the steps that the U.S. plan to take in order to overcome disagreements with Türkiye regarding its approach to defeating ISIS or Daesh in Syria, as Türkiye sees the U.S. support to YPG as the biggest obstacle to relations?MR MILLER: So I don’t have any additional steps with regard to your first question to announce other than that we will be working with our Turkish allies on this question very intently over the coming weeks and months. And when it comes to disagreements that we have with the Government of Türkiye, we will raise them directly and candidly, as we have done on a number of occasions, and seek to work through those.QUESTION: And was that discussed during the meetings, the U.S. support to YPG in Syria?MR MILLER: I don’t have any readout on the meetings other than the one that we put out on Friday.I promised Nadia I’d go – and she’s going to really get angry at me if I don’t, if I break that promise. (Laughter.) She’s already interrupting like everybody else, so &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Okay, thank you. So in addition to the questions asked by my colleagues, I have two more. So the President said that he – we cannot afford to have 30,000 more Palestinian dead, indicating a red line if Israel carries on with the plan to go to Rafah. So 60,000 Palestinian dead is a red line and 30,000 was not a red line?MR MILLER: So you are – hold on.QUESTION: And if your answer – just one second. If your answer is we don’t want to see any civilian Palestinians dead, which is the usual answer you give us, what did you do in the last five month to make sure that Israel avoid killing civilians, which we know as a fact 70 percent are women and children?MR MILLER: So first of all, I think you’re completely distorting the President’s remarks. That was not what he said. It’s not the intention of his remarks and I don’t think is a fair reading of his remarks. What he was saying is consistent with what we have always said, which is we don’t want to see a single civilian die in this conflict.Now, as we have talked about at length both in this room and in other rooms here in Washington, from other podiums and in other forums from – on behalf of the United States, this is a difficult situation precisely because of the way Hamas chose to conduct this war. Hamas launched this war on October 7th, went into Israel, then immediately fled back into Gaza, and not only hid behind hostages that they took – Israeli citizens, but hid behind Palestinian civilians. And so Hamas bears a great deal of responsibility for putting civilians in harm’s way.But that said, when you ask what it is that we have done, we have consistently engaged with the Government of Israel to encourage them to take steps to minimize civilian casualties. That has been the hallmark of our engagement with the Government of Israel since day one. But just the very tragic fact of the matter is that they are engaging in an urban environment where Hamas hides its tunnels under schools, under mosques, under apartment buildings. We see Hamas leaders embed themselves in apartment buildings with civilians, including children, including women. And so it is a very difficult situation.And that is – so I will say finally that because of that incredible human toll and because of the incredibly dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, it is why we have been so intensely engaged on trying to achieve a ceasefire that would see a cessation of hostilities, an alleviation of suffering of the Palestinian people, and an increase in humanitarian assistance coming in.QUESTION: Okay. But Hamas is not your ally, is not your partner. You designate it as a terrorist organization. I’m asking on the other side, which is you share the same value with them, which is Israel. So my question to you is not about Hamas and how the war was started, because we passed that stage.MR MILLER: No, no, but &#8212;QUESTION: Not to take away from what happened on October 7th. But my point to you is: What the – does this administration do &#8212;MR MILLER: yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; to use the leverage that Israel – that you have over Israel to make sure that no more civilians are dead?MR MILLER: But – but Nadia, my point is you can’t answer the question about Israel’s conduct without giving an accurate assessment of the situation that they are in of trying to conduct legitimate military and counter-terrorism operations against an enemy that has sworn the destruction of Israel – sworn that they would destroy Israel and kill Israeli civilians – and hides behind civilians. So this isn’t a situation – a traditional battle situation where Hamas troops are out in a field or deployed in a military garrison sometime and you conduct a – you can conduct a military operation where you have a simple target and you know there’s going to be no civilian harm. That’s just not the situation that Israel faces in Gaza because of the way Hamas is – has decided to quite cowardly hide behind civilians.So we will continue to press Israel to do everything it can to minimize civilian casualties, and everything I have said about the situation that they face doesn’t in a bit minimize their responsibility to do so. And that’s why we’ll continue to engage with them.QUESTION: Is &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Yes &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on, hold on – I’m going to move on, only because we’ve –QUESTION: No, just – just &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on. We’ve been here an hour already, and I’ve got other people I have to get to before we break.QUESTION: Matt, there’s a video &#8212;MR MILLER: So – go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; that shows how Israel &#8212;MR MILLER: I – as I’ve said, we’ve been here an hour and I’ve got other people I got to get to before I cut this short. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Two questions – China and North Korea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a press conference that U.S. and South Korea are more responsible for causing security anxiety to North Korea by mentioning the war on Korean Peninsula. How do you react to Wang Yi’s statement that the U.S. and South Korea are responsible?MR MILLER: So obviously we don’t agree with that comment. It is the – it is North Korea’s repeated reckless and provocative acts that have brought instability and continue to bring instability to the Korean Peninsula, and it’s why we stand with our South Korean allies.QUESTION: Second question. And the – the Chinese Government is forcibly sending North Korean defectors back to North Korea. What message is the United States taking in response to this?MR MILLER: Let me take that back and get you an answer.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead. Guita, I’ll come to you next. Behind – and then &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Ramadan Kareem; today is the first day of the Ramadan.QUESTION: Yes, it’s holy month for the Muslim.QUESTION: The Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission attorney accused and sought legal action against the U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh, Peter Haas, for his comments in favor of Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammud Yunus. As you’re aware, the ruling regime is harassing Professor Yunus in a political manner and worldwide criticism is mounting against the regime’s action. Could you please share your thoughts?MR MILLER: So we are aware of the comments in question. You have heard me speak before about the U.S. Government’s concerns surrounding the cases against Muhammad Yunus, including that they could represent a potential misuse of Bangladesh’s laws to harass and intimidate the doctor. Ambassador Haas simply reiterated those comments, acting in his capacity as the U.S. Government’s highest ranking representative in Bangladesh.QUESTION: One more, Matt. According to media reports, the “India out” campaign is growing larger in the region. Following the one-sided sham elections in Bangladesh, people are promoting a boycott of goods made in neighboring India, suspecting Indian authorities of covertly wanting to keep Sheikh Hasina in power. How do you read this situation?MR MILLER: So we are aware of the reports of this campaign. I’m obviously not going to comment on any individual consumers’ decisions, whether it’s in Bangladesh or anywhere around the world. But we value our relationship with both Bangladesh and India. We will continue to work with both countries’ governments to pursue our shared interests, including to ensure a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A lawsuit filed in Iran against the U.S. Government and a U.S.-based Iranian opposition group headed by Jamshid Sharmahd has ended, and the verdict is a – the payment of almost $2.5 billion in damages to the plaintiffs. Now, the incident – it was a bombing; it happened in 2008. Over 2,000 – 200 people were killed or wounded. And as you recall, Mr. Sharmahd is a dual citizen who is still in prison in Iran. I was wondering – I know it wasn’t during the Biden administration’s time, but does the U.S. Government in general back any opposition groups, any dissident groups living outside of Iran or their country of origin, and condone violent approach to a struggle for democracy?MR MILLER: So ultimately it is – we back the Iranian people in their expression of their democratic – legitimate democratic political aspirations, and we will continue to do that. We don’t endorse violence in any instance.QUESTION: How do you see the trials recently that Iranian judiciaries just putting on trials against – bringing lawsuits against the U.S. Government? See, they’re asking also for reparations in each of them. When the Iranian Government or even the plaintiffs don’t have any way of collecting, then what do you think these trials are for?MR MILLER: So I think we – it is safe to say that we have long had concerns about the rule of law in Iran, including the independence of its judiciary system.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead. Alex, you’ve already had one. I’m not sure I’m going to get back to you today. Go ahead. Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Oh.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So India today has tested the – a missile with the MRV technology. Since India is such an important partner in the Indo-Pacific, what does this really mean for the stability of the region?MR MILLER: So let me take that question and come back to you.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. I’m going back to the question about your meetings with Turkish counterparts. Have you raised the concern – your concern about the Turkish military operation in Kurdistan region of Iraq and also northwest Syria?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t have any comments other than that we put out – about that meeting other than we put out in the readout. Other than that, I’ll keep the diplomatic conversations private.QUESTION: One more question on the – on Iraq. Is there any unannounced truce between you and the Iraqi militia groups through Iraqi Government, which they stopped the attacks on your forces in Iraq?MR MILLER: Certainly we welcome any decrease in hostilities against our forces. We have made clear that the attacks on our forces were unacceptable and that we would take action to defend U.S. interests and U.S. personnel, and we will continue to do so if appropriate.Go ahead, and then we’ll wrap there.QUESTION: So I’m sure you’ve seen that Pope Francis has called on Ukraine to have the courage to raise a white flag and negotiate with Russia. I’m curious about your response to that.MR MILLER: Sorry. So I have seen that the Vatican has subsequently clarified those comments. Obviously, we support Ukraine’s right to defend itself. We have said time and time again that nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. We support its peace formula, and we would support its efforts to peacefully end this war, but that requires Vladimir Putin to stop attacking, to stop trying to take and claim and hold Ukrainian territory, and to agree to negotiations – and he has so far not been willing to do so.QUESTION: And &#8212;QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; one thing that ahead of his White House meeting Polish President Duda said in a Washington Post op-ed, that he will propose that NATO should raise the pledge of defense spending, the minimum defense spending from 3 – 2 to 3 percent. Would the U.S. support that?MR MILLER: I think the first step is to get every country meeting the 2 percent threshold, and we’ve seen improvement in that where nearly two-thirds of them now are, but I think that’s the first step before we start talking about additional proposals.QUESTION: Just a follow-up?MR MILLER: And then I’m going to wrap for today because I’ve got to run. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.(The briefing was concluded at 2:20 p.m.)# # # 1 $50 million						Tags																					Armenia																								Bangladesh																								China																								Haiti																								India																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								South Korea																								Taiwan																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								Western Sahara