# Thailand - United States Department of State

- Thailand HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Thailand				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Thailand																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Thailand during the year; a new government took office in September.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary arrest and detention; political interference in the judiciary; political prisoners;  arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including arrests and prosecutions of those criticizing the government, censorship, and the use of lèse majesté and criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; serious government corruption; harassment of domestic human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence and sexual violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.Authorities took some steps to investigate and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.  Official impunity, however, continued to be a problem.Insurgents in the southernmost provinces committed human rights abuses and attacked government security forces and civilian targets; authorities investigated and prosecuted such actions.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.There were reports of killings by both government and insurgent forces in connection with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.On July 7, authorities charged a military officer and a security official with the killing of three Muslim villagers on a mountain in Ra-ngae District of Narathiwat in 2019.  Government security forces shot and killed the three during a raid, believing the villagers were insurgents.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.On September 28, a court dismissed murder charges against four national park officials charged for the alleged 2014 abduction and murder of Karen rights activist Porlajee “Billy” Rakchongcharoen.  The court cited insufficient evidence that Rakchongcharoen was dead, noting in particular that a DNA test on bone fragments was inconclusive.  The court previously found the director of the National Parks Office, Chaiwat Limlikitaksorn, guilty of misconduct for not recording Rakchongcharoen’s arrest and not handing him to the local police for the illegal possession of wild honey.  Chaiwat was sentenced to three years in prison but was later granted bail and allowed to appeal the case.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution stated, “torture, acts of brutality, or punishment by cruel or inhumane means shall not be permitted”; however, there were credible reports government officials employed them.  An emergency decree in effect in the three southernmost provinces since 2005 effectively provided immunity to security officers for actions committed in those areas during the performance of their duties.  The decree was lifted in 11 districts in the Deep South but remained in effect in 22 districts in Yala, Narithiwat, and Pattani Provinces.The Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act (in effect since October 2022) provided guidelines to prevent and punish torture and enforced disappearance.There were reports police abused and extorted prisoners and detainees, generally with impunity.  Few complaints alleging police abuse resulted in punishment of alleged offenders, and there were numerous examples of investigations into alleged security force abuses lasting years without resolution.Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and legal entities reported police and military officers sometimes tortured and beat suspects to obtain confessions, and newspapers reported numerous cases of citizens accusing police and other security officers of brutality.In May an NGO received a torture complaint from an insurgent who alleged that authorities beat him while he was detained for interrogation at a police cell in Yala Province.  As of September, the suspect was detained in a prison in Narathiwat pending trial for alleged involvement in violent attacks.  The NGO forwarded a complaint to the National Human Rights Commission, which accepted the complaint and asked relevant agencies for information.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in prisons and various detention centers – including drug rehabilitation facilities and immigration detention centers (IDCs) where authorities detained undocumented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and foreign nationals who violated immigration laws – were poor and overcrowded.Abusive Physical Conditions:  As of November, authorities held more than 275,000 persons in prisons and detention facilities with a maximum design capacity of approximately 220,000.Observers reported inadequate medical care at many prisons.  Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, a legal aid organization, stated one of their clients, jailed in June, struggled to access her bipolar disorder medication in prison and was moved to a hospital only in August after her weight dropped by 10 percent following a 14-day hunger strike.Conditions at the IDCs were not subject to many of the regulations that governed the regular prison system.  NGOs, international organizations, and detainees at some IDCs reported detainees were confined in overcrowded, unsanitary cells without access to physical exercise, appropriate medical treatment, or halal food for Muslim detainees.By law authorities could hold individuals without legal authorization to stay in the country, including refugees and asylum seekers or those who otherwise violated immigration law, in IDCs for years unless they were bailed out or paid a fine and the cost of their transportation home.Administration:  Authorities permitted prisoners or their representatives to submit complaints to ombudspersons but not directly to judicial authorities.  While government bodies reportedly investigated allegations of abuse in pretrial detention, NGOs stated authorities almost never investigated complaints of mistreatment in prisons and IDCs.Independent Monitoring:  The government facilitated monitoring of prisons by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, including meetings with prisoners without third parties present and repeat visits.  According to human rights groups, no external or international inspection of the prison system occurred.Representatives of international organizations had limited access to detainees in the IDCs across the country for service delivery and resettlement processing.  Access to individual IDCs varied from province to province.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government generally observed these requirements, although there were arbitrary arrests and detentions in security and political cases.The Deep South emergency decree, which gave the government authority to detain persons without charge for a maximum of 30 days in unofficial places of detention, remained in effect.Provisions of the Deep South emergency decree made it very difficult to challenge a detention before a court.  Under the decree, detainees had access to legal counsel, but there was no assurance of prompt access to counsel or family members, nor were there transparent safeguards against the mistreatment of detainees.  Moreover, the decree effectively provided broad-based immunity from criminal, civil, and disciplinary liability for officials acting under its provisions.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required police and military officers to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to making an arrest; courts tended to approve requests for warrants.  Authorities could detain a person for a maximum of 84 days with court approval.  By law authorities had to inform persons of likely charges against them immediately after arrest and allow them to inform someone of their arrest.The law provided for access to counsel for criminal detainees in both civilian and military courts, but lawyers and human rights groups claimed police sometimes conducted interrogations without providing access to an attorney.The law provided defendants the right to request bail, and the government generally respected this right; however, NGOs cited several political and national security cases in which human rights defenders were denied bail.NGOs reported transgender individuals were often denied bail; were assigned facilities that matched the sex on their birth certificate, not the gender they identified as; were deprived of hormonal drugs; and were harassed, with officers taking no action to prevent their harassment.  NGOs stated pregnant women in prison were required to remain in prison when giving birth and could either raise the baby in a prison medical facility for the first year, or have relatives collect the newborn the day of birth.Arbitrary Arrest:  Under the Deep South emergency decree, suspects could be arrested and held for a maximum seven days’ detention without a warrant.  Under the decree, authorities could detain a person for up to 30 days without charge.According to an NGO, in March authorities detained at least 15 persons they claimed were participating in a fundraising effort for families of suspected insurgents killed in clashes with government security forces during raid operations.  Authorities suspected the group was funding insurgent movements, not providing humanitarian assistance.  Some human rights defenders considered these detentions arbitrary.Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem, especially in sensitive political cases.  During the year political detainees were denied bail by the court even though legal requirements for bail were met.  Activists and human rights defenders who were granted bail were often subjected to restrictive bail conditions, including a ban on posting anything online.Lawyers raised concerns regarding the simultaneous use of laws applicable in national security cases that could result in lengthy pretrial detention for insurgency-related suspects in the far southern part of the country.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, and while the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality, the constitution provided the government with power to intervene “regardless of its effects on the legislative, executive, or judiciary” to defend the country against national security threats.  Human rights groups expressed concern regarding the use of the judicial process to punish government critics.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right, except in certain national security and lèse majesté cases.Although required by law, authorities did not always provide indigent defendants with counsel at public expense, and there were allegations authorities did not afford defendants their full rights during trials.  There were reports defendants were prohibited from meeting with their lawyer or from having family members or other trusted individuals observe their trial.  At times the prosecutor, police, or court reportedly objected to defendants’ request for evidence.On June 1, the Criminal Court insisted on continuing witness examination in the royal defamation trial of activist Chonticha Jangrew, despite her request for a delay because of her lawyer’s being unavailable to attend the hearing.  The incident was widely shared on social media, and the court subsequently postponed the hearing.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						As of September, the NGO Thai Lawyers for Human Rights estimated there were at least 29 political prisoners, mostly for online political expression and for participating in the 2020-21 student-led protest movement.  Authorities permitted human rights organizations to access political detainees, and there were no reports that political prisoners were treated differently than other prisoners.Human rights groups claimed the convictions of several lèse majesté offenders were politically motivated.  In September NGOs reported 257 persons were charged under lèse majesté laws, mostly for online political expression and participation in antigovernment protests.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution did not prohibit such actions.  Security forces used the Deep South emergency decree to conduct regular, warrantless searches in the southernmost provinces.  The law allowed the search and seizure of computers and computer data without a warrant in cases where the defendant allegedly entered information into computer systems that was “likely to cause damage to the public,” was “false,” or was “distorted.”The government monitored social media and private communications, including mail and telephone.  Government agencies used surveillance technologies, including computer-monitoring software and telecommunications interception equipment, to monitor politicians, NGOs, and others they deemed to be security threats.  Some legislation exempted data from privacy safeguards that were otherwise stipulated in law and provided broad powers to the government to access personal information without judicial review or other forms of oversight.There were numerous reports of security forces harassing citizens who publicly criticized the government, including by visiting or surveilling their residences or places of employment.  According to the Monitoring Center on Organized Violence Events (MOVE), the Internal Security Operations Command (the army’s political and intelligence arm) collaborated with the Ministry of Interior to deploy commercial spyware and other cyber tools to surveil individuals and to conduct online content manipulation, perceived as a means to deter challengers and support the government.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Internal violence continued in the ethnic Malay Muslim-majority southernmost provinces.  Frequent attacks by suspected insurgents and government security operations stoked tension between the local ethnic Malay Muslim and ethnic Thai Buddhist communities.The emergency decree in effect in much of the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provided military, police, and some civilian authorities significant powers to restrict some basic rights and delegated certain internal security powers to the armed forces; the decree also provided security forces broad immunity from prosecution.  Martial law, imposed in 2004, significantly empowered security forces in the southernmost provinces.Killings:  Human rights groups accused government forces of extrajudicial killings of persons suspected of involvement with the insurgency.  According to the NGO Deep South Watch, as of July there were 51 raids by security forces, resulting in the deaths of six suspected insurgents.  Government officials insisted the suspects in each case resisted arrest, necessitating the use of deadly force, a claim disputed by the families of the suspects and human rights groups.According to Deep South Watch, as of August violence resulted in 89 deaths and 157 injuries in 351 incidents.  The main targets of insurgent attacks were government security forces, including police, military, and armed security volunteers, but civilians were also attacked.  On March 3, an insurgent group launched a combined bombing and shooting attack against a military unit traveling on a road in Si Sakhon District of Narathiwat.  Two officers were killed while another was injured in the attack.  The group was returning to base after investigating a March 2 bombing and shooting attack at a different military base.On June 20, two Buddhist villagers were killed in a gun attack on a road in Ruso District of Narathiwat.  Authorities believed they were killed by separatist insurgents.  Critics claimed insurgent attacks on Buddhist villagers were retaliation for the government security forces’ killing of Muslim insurgent suspects.On August 17, a bomb exploded at a Muslim family’s house in Si Sakhon District of Narathiwat.  One government security official from the Corps of Engineers was killed and four others were injured.  A civil society organization reported insurgents planted a bomb in a house that was part of a military project aimed to provide humanitarian assistance for those impacted by the insurgency; the bomb was detonated remotely when the security officials came to repair the house the next morning.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  In certain cases, authorities detained noncombatant family members of suspected insurgents for inquiry and, in a few cases, for DNA collection.  Some human right defenders considered these detentions arbitrary.On August 16, a civil society group reported a government security official, after firing on a group of Muslim teenagers gathered outside a furniture shop in Nong Chik District of Pattani (no injuries reported), forced his way into the house of a Muslim family and fired shots in the house.  A woman was injured when the security official hit her with his gun.  A preliminary inquiry by police reported the security official had mental health problems.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media.  This right, however, was restricted by laws and government actions.  The government imposed legal restrictions on criticism of the government and monarchy, harassed antigovernment critics, monitored media and the internet, and blocked websites.Freedom of Expression:  The lèse majesté prohibition made it a crime, punishable by a fine or three to 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense, to criticize, insult, or threaten the king, queen, heir apparent, or regent.  The law allowed citizens to file lèse majesté complaints against one other.On March 7, a criminal court convicted a man to three years in prison for selling satirical calendars that authorities alleged defamed the monarchy.On August 28, the Chiang Mai Provincial Court sentenced two Chiang Mai University students to prison for displaying artwork at a 2021 political rally depicting the country’s flag without the color blue, which represents the monarchy.  The court later suspended the sentences, allowing the defendants to serve two years of probation instead.Similar restrictions on freedom of expression occurred in the Deep South.  On June 25, the Fourth Army Region lodged a complaint with police in Pattani, seeking the investigation of a group of individuals, including students, lecturers, politicians, and members of civic groups, who participated in a public forum during which a mock referendum on self-determination was held.  The complaint accused the group of engaging in activities that could be deemed to constitute insurrection, instigation of unrest, criminal association, and threatening national security, in violation of the constitution.  According to a civil society group in the region, police summoned some of the persons involved in the mock referendum for questioning but did not press charges against any of them.University authorities, civil society groups, and media reported the occasional presence of security personnel on campuses, monitoring lectures and attending student political events or rallies.  Authorities reportedly arrested students for exercising freedom of expression, although arrests resulted in few formal charges.  Academics reported fear of security personnel monitoring their instruction, leading to greater self-censorship.  Journalists reported digital harassment hampered their work because of its effects on their personal life and mental health.Violence and Harassment:  In September a high-ranking police officer in Nakhon Pathom Province threatened to shoot a member of an Amarin TV news team who called to interview him regarding an investigation into the killing of a police major during a party the high-ranking officer also attended.  In response to the release of an audio clip of the conversation, provincial police assigned a special unit to protect media.On November 11, police in Yala issued a summons for two journalists from Wartani following their February 26 live broadcast of a clash between security forces and relatives of an insurgent suspect killed during a raid operation.  The relatives wanted to bring the corpse back home for a funeral ceremony, while authorities wanted to keep it for a postmortem autopsy.  Authorities charged the individuals with obstructing them from performing their duty.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The government owned all broadcast frequencies and leased them to private media operators, allowing the government to exert indirect influence on media.  Laws allowed the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission to suspend or revoke the licenses of radio or television operators broadcasting content deemed false, defamatory to the monarchy, harmful to national security, or unnecessarily critical of the government.  Authorities monitored the content of all media, including international media.  Local practice leaned toward self-censorship, particularly regarding anything that might be seen as critical of the monarchy or members of the royal family.In July the Royal Thai Police (RTP) preemptively banned Pavin Chachavalpongpun’s book Rama X:  The Thai Monarchy under King Vajiralongkorn (scheduled to be published abroad in October) because it defamed the monarchy.  Anyone convicted of importing the book could face imprisonment or a fine.Filmmakers reported fear of retribution when creating movies and entertainment, leading to greater self-censorship.The Deep South emergency decree empowered the government “to prohibit publication and distribution of news and information that may cause the people to panic or with an intention to distort information.”  It also authorized the government to censor news it considered a threat to national security.Libel/Slander Laws:  In addition to lèse majesté laws, defamation was a criminal offense punishable by a fine and imprisonment.  Military and business figures filed criminal defamation and libel cases against political and environmental activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and politicians.In January Mongkol Tirakote was sentenced to 42 years in prison (reduced to 28) following two separate lèse majesté cases; he was convicted of posting defamatory comments regarding the monarchy online.On August 29, human rights campaigners Angkhana Neelapaijit, Puttanee Kangkun, and Thanaporn Saleelphol were found not guilty of criminal defamation in social media posts after a four-year-long court battle.  Poultry businessman Chanchai Pheamphon sued them for defamation for online comments alleging abuses of migrant workers at his chicken processing plants; according to media reports, as of August he had filed 37 defamation lawsuits, losing 36.National Security:  Various orders issued by the 2014-19 military government continued to provide authorities the right to restrict distribution of material deemed to threaten national security.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted online content and penalized those who criticized the monarchy.  The government monitored social media and private communications without warrants for what it considered false content and “fake news” and blocked websites.By law the government could imprison and fine individuals for posting on the internet false content found to undermine public security, cause public panic, or harm others, based on vague definitions.  Any service provider that consented to or intentionally supported the publishing of illegal content online was also liable to punishment.  By law authorities were required to obtain a court order to ban a website, although officials did not always respect this requirement.The Ministry of Digital Economy and Society required internet service providers and social media platforms to collect and keep user data for 90 days for the government to access if requested, including user identities, user activity, records of attempts to access systems, accessed files, and transaction records.Although individuals and groups generally were able to engage in peaceful expression of views via the internet, there were numerous restrictions on content.  Civil society reported the government used prosecution or the threat of prosecution as a tool to suppress speech online.  Authorities prosecuted individuals for posting a range of social media commentary, including criticism of the government’s operations, reporting on government scandals, statements deemed to constitute lèse majesté, and warning of government surveillance.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government sometimes restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution granted the freedom to assemble peacefully, subject to restrictions enacted to “protect public interest, peace and order, or good morals, or to protect the rights and liberties of others.”  The government did not consistently respect this right.On August 22, the Criminal Court ordered the RTP to compensate two antigovernment protesters severely injured by police in 2021.  A teargas canister thrown by police into a crowd during a Bangkok protest injured Thanat “Luk Nut” Thanakitamnuay; the RTP was ordered to pay Luk Nut 3.05 million baht ($87,300).  Thanakorn Phanpinij, who suffered similar injuries during a protest in Din Daeng, was awarded 4.2 million baht ($120,000).						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided individuals the right to free association subject to restrictions by law enacted to “protect public interest, peace and order, or good morals.”The law prohibited the registration of a political party with the same name or logo as a legally dissolved party (see section 3).																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https:/www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; the government enforced some exceptions for “maintaining the security of the state, public order, public welfare, town and country planning, or youth welfare.”In-country Movement:  The government restricted the movement of persons registered as stateless and members of hill tribes and other minority groups who were not citizens but held government-issued identity cards.  Authorities prohibited holders of such cards from traveling outside their home provinces without a pass approved by the district chief.  Offenders were subject to fines or a jail term of 45 to 60 days.  Persons without cards could not travel at all.  Human rights organizations reported that police at inland checkpoints often asked for bribes in exchange for allowing stateless persons to move from one province to another.Foreign Travel:  Local authorities required resident noncitizens, including thousands of ethnic Shan and other non-hill-tribe minority group members, to seek permission from the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Interior for foreign travel.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government generally cooperated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons, as well as other persons of concern, although with many restrictions.The country hosted more than 95,000 refugees and asylum seekers and generally provided protection against forced returns.  Authorities permitted refugees and asylum seekers to resettle to third countries.  International observers were not granted meaningful access to some persons newly displaced by fighting or other violence in Burma; as a result, UNHCR was unable to determine whether returns of these persons were voluntary.Access to Asylum:  The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had no system for providing legal protection to refugees.During the year, the government introduced a new National Screening Mechanism to identify individuals with protection concerns.  The system was open only to certain individuals and did not confer any new rights under the law.  UNHCR continued to carry out screenings of asylum seekers.  The Thai Immigration Bureau, however, was working on details of the program as of October.UNHCR had varying levels of access to the estimated several hundred asylum seekers in IDCs to conduct status interviews and monitor new arrivals.  Authorities allowed resettlement countries to conduct processing activities in IDCs and allowed humanitarian organizations to provide health care, nutritional support, and other assistance.  Access to specific asylum-seeker populations varied, reportedly depending on the preferences of IDC leadership, as well as central government policies restricting UNHCR and NGO access to certain politically sensitive groups.The government periodically allowed UNHCR to monitor the status of approximately 91,000 Burmese refugees and asylum seekers living in nine camps along the border with Burma.The government facilitated third-country refugee resettlement or private sponsorship to multiple countries for those who were official residents in the camps, as well as other refugees and asylum seekers.  In May the government, jointly with UNHCR, began a new large-scale resettlement program for registered Burmese refugees in the nine camps.Refoulement:  Persons from Burma without legal permission to be in the country were detained and, in some cases, escorted back to the Burmese border.  Authorities sometimes provided preferential treatment to members of certain Burmese ethnic minority groups, allowing them greater leeway to remain in Thailand without formal authorization.  In April Thai authorities reportedly deported three men back to Burma and into the custody of a military-affiliated Border Guard Force.  The three, believed to be soldiers in armed antigovernment resistance organizations, were detained by Thai security forces on March 31 at the Ban Huay Hun Fon checkpoint.  There were similar reports of repatriation across the border in Chiang Rai, also allegedly connected to the armed antiregime Burmese People’s Defense Force.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  Immigration authorities inconsistently permitted bail for certain categories of detained refugees and asylum seekers.  NGOs, refugees, and asylum seekers reported numerous instances of immigration authorities demanding bribes in connection with requests for bail.  In February and April, two Uyghur detainees were reported to have died in immigration detention.Freedom of Movement:  The freedom of movement for refugees residing in camps on the border with Burma was highly limited outside their camps.  Refugees apprehended outside the official camps were subject to fines, detention, deregistration, and deportation.  Authorities sometimes allowed camp residents limited travel outside of the camps for purposes such as medical care, travel to other camps, and education and training.For certain foreign trafficking victims, including Rohingya refugees, the law allowed temporary-stay permits while trafficking investigations were underway.  Most such victims, however, had to remain in closed, government-run shelters with some limits on freedom of movement.Employment:  The law prohibited some refugees recognized by UNHCR from working in the country.Access to Basic Services:  The international community provided basic services, including health care and education, for refugees in the nine camps on the border with Burma.  Burmese refugee children living in the camps generally had limited access to the government education system.Access to government-funded basic health services for asylum seekers and recognized refugees, whether in IDCs or outside them, was minimal.  NGOs reported access to public schools for refugee children varied from school to school and often depended on the preferences of individual school administrators.Temporary Protection:  Authorities generally did not deport persons of concern holding valid UNHCR asylum-seeker or refugee status.  The government continued to protect from involuntary deportation the majority of Rohingya refugees detained by authorities.  The government continued to conduct preliminary screenings of Rohingya migrants apprehended transiting the country for indicators of whether they were victims of trafficking, although this policy was applied unevenly.  As of October, authorities identified one Rohingya individual as a trafficking victim.  Authorities generally placed Rohingya mothers and children into shelters run by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security as an alternative to detention in the IDCs.  UNHCR had access to these shelters while authorities conducted formal screenings of the migrants’ eligibility for benefits as trafficking victims.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										Although stateless individuals had access to a pathway to citizenship and a process to reduce the harmful effects of statelessness, the country contributed to statelessness, including through difficulties accessing legal pathways and birth registration criteria.The government continued to identify stateless persons and provided them with identity documentation that allowed them to access basic services such as health care, employment, and some freedom of movement.  The law allowed a pathway to citizenship for qualifying individuals, including some stateless persons.  As of June, the government registered 573,898 persons as stateless, of whom approximately 81 percent resided in provinces near the border.Authorities excluded Rohingya and other Muslims from Burma, including individuals whose families had lived in Mae Sot near the Burmese border for generations, from the statelessness recognition process.  Without legal status, they and other unregistered and undocumented stateless persons were vulnerable to various forms of abuse, including threat of deportation.Birth within the country did not automatically confer citizenship.  The law granted citizenship at birth to children with at least one citizen parent.  Individuals could also acquire citizenship by means of special government-designated criteria.By law stateless members of hill tribes, like any noncitizens, could not vote or own land, and their travel was restricted to their home province.  Recognized stateless persons were legally permitted to work, but licenses for certain professions (including doctors, engineers, and lawyers) were provided only to citizens.  Stateless persons had difficulty accessing credit and government services, such as health care.  The law permitted undocumented migrant and stateless children to enroll in government schools, although access to education was uneven.  There were reports that school administrators placed the term “non-Thai citizen” on these students’ high school certificates, severely limiting their economic opportunities.  Stateless persons were permitted to enroll in tertiary education but did not have access to government educational loans.Humanitarian organizations reported village heads and district officials routinely demanded bribes from stateless persons to process their applications for official registration or to obtain permanent residency or citizenship.  Police also demanded bribes from stateless persons at inland checkpoints in exchange for allowing them to move from one province to another.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to vote for their preferred candidates in local elections and for the lower parliamentary house in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  The May 14 general election was widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.  The Asian Network for Free Elections and other civil society organizations reported instances of vote buying.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Critics complained that the army’s International Security Operations Command, political opponents, and private citizens used legal action to harass and impede liberal opposition parties and officials.  A conservative party associated with the outgoing military-dominated government brought several legal challenges against the Move Forward Party and its then leader Pita Limjaroenrat.  In September Pita was suspended from parliament (and resigned as party leader) after being accused of breaching laws governing the business dealings of political office candidates by owning shares in a defunct media company.On September 20, the Supreme Court banned Pannika Wanich, a member of the now dissolved Future Forward Party, from politics for life.  Pannika was found guilty of making posts on social media in 2010 insulting the monarchy.  On September 13, the Constitutional Court rejected a petition by a former minor government official seeking to dissolve the Move Forward Party on the grounds it advocated for the succession of the Deep South border provinces; other legal cases against Move Forward remained at various points in the drawn-out legal process.According to an NGO, ahead of the May election, opposition members were discredited through state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, while prodemocracy activists faced arrest, surveillance, and extralegal harassment in retaliation for their online content.  The group also alleged that authorities blocked websites and removed content under claims that it violated provisions of the restrictive Computer-Related Crimes Act.  There was no follow up on this case after the May election.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  No law limited participation of women and members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process, although cultural mores circumscribing women’s activities in public spaces deterred full participation in some areas of the country.  There were procedures for persons with disabilities and the elderly to make voting more accessible; however, information on that process was not widely publicized, and some persons with disabilities were unable to vote in the May election.  No women were elected to parliament in the Deep South; eight women ran as candidates.  Women political candidates noted that women in politics were not respected in Muslim majority constituencies, including discouragement from members of the provincial Islamic councils, and therefore it was unlikely they could win constituency seats or become local political leaders.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials; the government generally did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption:  In September a village chief in Nakhon Pathom commonly known as Kamnan Nok was arrested after a police officer was shot and killed during a dinner party at his home.  National police were investigating the killing and allegations that Kamnan Nok and local police were engaged in a wide range of corrupt practices, including bid rigging, money laundering, and forcing truck drivers to pay bribes.Senior government officials were implicated in corruption investigations during the year, which exposed further corruption at the national and local levels.  On September 5, an arrest warrant was issued for former Culture Minister Itthiphol Khunpluem, accusing him of improperly granting a construction permit to Bali Hai Company Limited for a waterfront hotel and residential complex in Pattaya, Chonburi, in 2008.  Given the 15-year statute of limitations that expired three days after the warrant, however, Itthiphol did not face charges.  Similarly, in 2022 authorities accused Senator Upakit Pachariyangkun of money laundering and transnational crime, but his arrest warrant was canceled the same day it was approved.  In September the Judicial Commission launched a disciplinary probe against the Criminal Court judges who interfered with police attempts to arrest Upakit.Petty corruption and bribetaking were widespread among police.  In June more than 40 highway police officers were transferred for alleged involvement in an overloaded-truck bribery scandal where operators who loaded their trucks beyond the legal weight bought a special sticker indicating to highway police they paid the bribe.  These truck drivers could drive their overweight trucks on the highways without being stopped and weighed, allowing them to travel faster.  Of the police officers transferred, 12 were set to face criminal charges for taking bribes.  Reporting suggested this bribery scheme was operating for at least the past 20 years.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings.  Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.  NGOs that dealt with sensitive political matters, such as political reform or opposition to government-sponsored development projects, faced periodic harassment and government refusal to issue visas for their international counterparts.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Following a 2022 investigation that revealed human rights defenders and prodemocracy activists were targeted by Pegasus commercial spyware, more than 40 human rights defenders reported notifications from Facebook early in the year suggesting they change their passwords due to recent suspicious activity originating in state-sponsored accounts and targeting their accounts.  According to an NGO, many human rights defenders reported digital harassment directly weakened their collective action by generating public misperception of their work.Human rights workers focused on violence in the southernmost provinces were particularly vulnerable to harassment and intimidation by government agents.  MOVE stated human rights defenders in these provinces were closely monitored by authorities, who assumed they were associated with the Malay Muslim insurgents.  According to two NGOs, on March 11, police in Narathiwat summoned an activist from The Patani, an NGO in the Deep South, after he accompanied grieving family members who refused to allow police to dig up a family member’s body for DNA testing on suspicion the individual was a member of a separatist group.  The activist was called in for questioning and charged with sedition.Civil society activists alleged security services monitored their activities, and that in some cases monitoring escalated into intimidation.  They stated the security services focused on activists who supported or were perceived to support organizations that agitated for reform of the monarchy and for the repeal or reform of the lèse majesté laws.  According to MOVE, human rights defenders, especially women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals, were subject to technology-facilitated gender-based violence, including character assassination, doctored images, comments about their appearance, cyberstalking, and digital threats.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The mission of the independent National Human Rights Commission of Thailand was to protect human rights and to produce an annual country report.  Human rights groups continued to press for greater independence for the commission, and for the right for it to file lawsuits against human rights abusers on its own behalf or on behalf of complainants.  The Office of the Ombudsman was an independent agency empowered to consider and investigate complaints filed by any citizen.  Following an investigation, the office could refer a case to a prosecutor for further review or provide recommendations for further action to the appropriate agency.  The office examined all petitions, but it could not compel agencies to comply with its recommendations.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  Rape of women and men was illegal, although the government did not always enforce the law effectively.  The law narrowly defined rape as acts in which male sex organs were used to physically violate survivors, thereby leaving those assaulted by perpetrators in other ways without legal remedies.  The law permitted authorities to prosecute spousal rape, and prosecutions occurred.  The law specified penalties for rape or forcible sexual assault ranging from four years’ imprisonment to the death penalty as well as fines.NGOs stated that rape was a serious problem and survivors underreported rapes and domestic assaults, in part due to a lack of understanding by authorities that impeded effective investigations of violence against women.  Survivors often perceived police as incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice.An NGO focused on migrant issues stated undocumented migrant survivors of gender-based violence often lacked legal protection.  The NGO stated survivors often did not report such crimes to authorities due to fear of deportation or other retribution.  The group highlighted a case in which a girl, age five, from Burma was raped by another migrant in Mea Sot in July.  Neither the girl, her family, nor the perpetrator were in the country legally, so the family had no avenue to pursue justice, and the perpetrator continued to live in the community.  The NGO also noted cases in urban areas where police exploited their position of power over undocumented migrant women.NGOs reported high rates of gender-based violence against persons with disabilities, particularly women with disabilities.  According to an NGO, women with disabilities were often survivors of repeated domestic violence.  They often could not escape their abuser and lived in fear that if they spoke out, food and necessary assistance could be restricted.In August former deputy Democratic Party leader Prinn Panitchpakdi was convicted and sentenced to two years and eight months in prison for sexual assault.  He resigned in April 2022 following allegations by a woman of sexual assault.  After the allegation became public, more women came forward to file complaints against Prinn; in 2022, 16 separate sexual misconduct cases were filed against him.Domestic violence against women was a significant problem.  The Ministry of Public Health operated one-stop crisis centers in state-run hospitals to provide information and services to survivors of gender-based violence throughout the country.  According to an NGO, not all one-stop crisis centers were operational and emergency response hotline workers were often not trained to properly assist survivors of gender-based violence.The law established measures designed to facilitate both the reporting of domestic violence complaints and reconciliation between the victim and the perpetrator.  NGOs expressed concern that the law’s family unity approach put undue pressure on a victim to compromise without addressing safety problems and led to a low conviction rate.  Another NGO noted that survivors of gender-based violence faced long waits between reporting to police and throughout the legal process.Authorities prosecuted some domestic-violence crimes under provisions for assault or violence against a person, under which they could seek harsher penalties.  The government operated one shelter in each province for domestic-violence victims.  According to an NGO, however, women were able to access the state-run shelter only if they were identified or under the legal identification process, meaning that women who decided not to seek prosecution due to social pressure or shame were unable to access these shelters.  Additionally, an NGO noted that LGBTQI+ women and women with disabilities faced additional barriers to accessing state-run shelters.  NGOs also reported that individuals in commercial sex were often targeted by police and government officials who accused them of being on drugs and arrested them, rather than filing reports for them, if they tried to report cases of gender-based violence.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):  No specific law prohibited this practice.  NGOs and international media reported Type IV FGM/C occurred in the Muslim-majority south, although statistics were unavailable.  There were no reports of government efforts to prevent or address the practice.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  Sexual harassment was illegal but remained widespread.  NGOs claimed the legal definition of harassment was vague and prosecution of harassment claims difficult, leading to ineffective enforcement of the law.An NGO cited multiple examples of technology-facilitated gender-based violence during the year against women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, including against human rights defenders, which damaged their mental health.  The group noted that in instances when survivors reported online harassment and abuse to authorities, they were told it was not rape, and therefore they were not taken seriously, or were even verbally abused by police.  Survivors reported that the responsibility to find evidence was put on the victim.  In one case, perpetrators threatened to bring a legal case against the survivor and their family to dissuade further investigation.Discrimination:  The constitution provided that “men and women shall enjoy equal rights and liberties.  Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of sex...shall not be permitted.”  NGOs reported discrimination commonly occurred against women.Women comprised approximately 12 percent of the country’s military personnel.  Ministry of Defense policy limited the percentage of women officers to 25 percent in most units, with specialized hospital or medical, budgetary, and finance units permitted 35 percent.  Military academies (except for the nursing academy) refused to allow women to apply.  Women were barred from applying to the police academy; the RTP continued to list “being a male” as a requirement in employment announcements for police investigators and other positions.Women were prohibited from working underground, in mining, or in underwater construction; on scaffolding higher than 33 feet; and in the production or transportation of explosive or inflammatory material.Women were unable to confer citizenship to noncitizen spouses in the same way as male citizens.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, including emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis.  No law prevented access to sexual and reproductive health services and contraceptives, although noncitizens or stateless persons were ineligible for government-funded services.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution stipulated all persons were equal before the law, including having the right to equal protection.  The government did not enforce these provisions effectively.  During the year there were reports of violence and discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Although the constitution included provisions aimed at protecting the traditional culture and way of life for Indigenous peoples, by law stateless members (approximately 50 percent) of hill tribes faced restrictions on their movement, were not permitted to own land, had difficulty accessing bank credit, and faced discrimination in employment.  Restrictions for stateless Indigenous persons included the requirement for those who were not registered to obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior to leave their designated “control area” every time they wanted to travel.  Although labor law gave them the right to equal treatment as employees, employers often disregarded those rights by paying them less than their citizen coworkers and less than minimum wage.  The law further barred them from government welfare services.The law provided citizenship eligibility to members of certain categories of hill tribes:  the Karen, Hmong, Mien, Akha, Lahu, Lisu, Lua, Khmu, and Mlabri.  The government supported efforts to register new citizens and educate eligible hill-tribe members regarding their rights.  According to Indigenous groups, the government used policies on natural resources preservation to displace and constrict Indigenous communities without proper warning.  Indigenous communities emphasized the lack of recognition of nationalities because it was difficult for them to access transportation and travel far to get identification papers, which further impeded their access to health care.  Additional concerns from Indigenous communities arose regarding restrictions on ancestral land where they conducted rituals.  The government permitted the use of Indigenous languages in schooling and provided access to government schools, regardless of identification status, although implementation of such policies was uneven due to a lack of understanding of the law by school administrations and long distances required to travel to public schools.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  The law stipulated that every child born in the country receive an official birth certificate regardless of the parents’ legal status.  In remote areas, however, some parents did not obtain birth certificates for their children due to administrative complexities and a lack of recognition of the importance of the document.  In the case of hill-tribe members and other stateless persons, NGOs reported that misinformed or unscrupulous local officials, language barriers, and restricted mobility made it difficult to register births.Child Abuse:  The law provided for the protection of children from abuse, and laws on rape and abandonment carried harsher penalties if the victim was a child.  The law provided protection to witnesses, victims, and offenders younger than age 18 in abuse and pedophilia cases.  Advocacy groups stated police often ignored or avoided child abuse cases.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The minimum legal age for marriage for both sexes was 17; anyone younger than 20 required parental consent to marry.  A court could grant permission for children younger than 17 to marry.  The government effectively enforced the law.In the Muslim-majority southernmost provinces, Islamic law used for family matters and inheritance allowed the marriage of girls after their first menstrual cycle with parental approval.  While the minimum legal age to marry was 17, a Muslim younger than 17 could marry with a written court order or written parental consent, which was considered by a special committee of three members, including at least one woman, all with knowledge of Islamic law.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The minimum age for consensual sex was 15.  The law provided penalties for persons who procured, lured, compelled, or threatened children younger than 18 for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation, with higher penalties for persons who purchased sexual intercourse with a child younger than 15.  Authorities could punish and revoke parental rights of parents who allowed a child to be sexually exploited.  The law prohibited the production, distribution, import, or export of child pornography.  Government enforcement of laws against commercial sexual exploitation of children and child pornography was inconsistent.  Child sex trafficking remained a problem.  The country continued to be a destination for child sex tourism, and there were increasing cases of online sexual exploitation of children.  Children from migrant populations or ethnic minority groups, LGBTQI+ children, children with disabilities, and children from poor families remained particularly vulnerable.  Police arrested parents who forced their children into commercial sexual exploitation.  Residents and foreign sex tourists committed pedophilia crimes, including child sex trafficking and the production and distribution of child pornography.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish population was estimated to be between 200 and 1,000.  There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No law criminalized expression of sexual orientation or consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.Violence and Harassment:  LGBTQI+ persons reported police harassment of individuals who identified as nonbinary or whose appearance did not match the sex on their identification card.  If arrested, such persons had to appear in court in attire associated with their sex assigned at birth.In the case of sexual crimes against LGBTQI+ persons, police tended to downplay sexual motives, abuse, or harassment.  NGOs stated that when LGBTQI+ individuals reported harassment, often no action was taken or responsibility to prove the claim was put on the survivor.  LGBTQI+ students were reportedly targeted and unjustifiably punished or bullied by teachers and other students often for their appearance or not conforming to dress codes to match their sex assigned at birth, especially in the Deep South.  Civil society groups reported harassment of LGBTQI+ persons in military camps by trainers, supervisors, and fellow soldiers.LGBTQI+ persons reported police and polling station workers questioned their identity because their appearance did not match the sex on their identification card.  Police did not track data on hate speech or hate crimes, such as killing of transgender women, limiting understanding on the extent of the problem.Discrimination:  The law prohibited discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, including in employment.  The law recognized LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families but did not grant them rights equal to those of other persons, such as marriage.  The law mandated gender equality and prohibited discrimination “due to the fact that the person is male or female or of a different appearance from his or her own sex by birth.”  NGOs, however, stated the law was not enforced, citing instances of LGBTQI+ individuals being evicted from their homes with few options for recourse.  The UN Development Program and NGOs reported LGBTQI+ persons experienced discrimination, particularly in rural areas.  The UN Development Program also reported media represented LGBTQI+ persons in stereotypical and harmful ways resulting in discrimination.NGOs and the United Nations reported transgender persons faced discrimination in various sectors, including in the military conscription process, when in detention, and in education because of strict policies in place at most schools and universities that required students to wear uniforms that aligned with their biological gender.  LGBTQI+ persons reported barriers to accessing gender-affirming care.  Access to gender-affirming surgery was limited to a few Ministry of Public Health-approved specialists in Bangkok.In April and June, the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security published a warning about monkeypox, HIV and AIDS, and sexually transmitted infections using photographs of individuals from a Pride event and mentioning entertainment areas popular with LGBTQI+ persons, further stigmatizing the community.Despite legal protections, members of the LGBTQI+ community faced frequent discrimination in the workplace, partly due to common prejudices.  Transgender workers reportedly faced even greater constraints, and their participation in the workforce was often limited to a few professions, such as cosmetology, entertainment, and sex work.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  The law did not permit transgender or nonbinary persons to change their gender on identification documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  There were reports that government agencies attempted to involuntarily subject LGBTQI+ persons, especially children, to so-called conversion therapy.  Some individuals assigned as male at birth but who did not identify as such were forced to join military training, especially in the Deep South, or become Buddhist monks in the belief that these experiences would “normalize” their gender identity.  Some individuals assigned as female at birth faced so-called corrective rape or forced childbirth.  According to Intersex Thailand, some intersex children were subjected to involuntary and irreversible genital surgeries, which was not illegal.According to Marriage Equality Network, in most cases so-called conversion therapy was forced on LGBTQI+ persons by their family or religious community.  Advocacy groups emphasized the impact of such practices on the mental health of LGBTQI+ persons and the lack of state-funded mental health resources available to members of this group.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  No such restrictions on LGBTQI+ individuals or topics were reported, but due to fear and stigma, self-censorship of LGBTQI+ communities in the south, such as not hosting Pride events, was common.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities were not able to access education, health services, public buildings, or transportation on an equal basis with others.  The law mandated persons with disabilities had to have access to information, communications, and newly constructed buildings, but authorities did not uniformly enforce these provisions.The government maintained dozens of separate schools and educational centers for children with disabilities and operated occupational and career development centers for adults with disabilities.  An NGO reported children with physical and intellectual disabilities were restricted from attending regular public schools.  The alternative for children with disabilities was to attend boarding schools specifically for persons with disabilities.  Children with disabilities in rural provinces, however, often did not have access to these schools because they were expensive, distant, or otherwise inaccessible.  According to a civil society organization, as of 2022, 80 percent of children with disabilities did not complete secondary school.The law required workplaces with more than 100 employees to hire at least one worker with disabilities for every 100 workers or pay a fine.  These companies were then offered tax incentives by the government; however, an NGO focused on supporting youth with disabilities reported collusion between employers and government officials to embezzle wages or loans intended for employees with disabilities.Organizations for persons with disabilities reported difficulty in accessing information concerning a range of public services, and accessibility for services varied between urban and rural centers.  Persons with disabilities also highlighted the lack of accessibility of trains and boats.  While the Bangkok city government provided free transportation for individuals with disabilities on public transportation, it was difficult for them to access transport without assistance, and the subsidy did not apply to transportation outside Bangkok.  LGBTQI+ groups noted that LGBTQI+ persons with disabilities, especially the deaf, were often unaware of medical information on HIV and AIDs, contributing to a high rate of infection.NGOs expressed concern regarding the lack of resources and legal options available to women with disabilities who were survivors of gender-based violence.  Additionally, they noted persons with disabilities struggled with physical and mental health problems because of the general isolation they experienced and the inability to use public transportation to reach medical services.There were procedures to make voting more accessible for persons with disabilities; however, this information was not widely publicized, so some persons with disabilities were unable to vote in the May election.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution stated that a person shall enjoy the liberty to unite and form an association, cooperative, union, organization, community, or any other group.  The law provided workers the right, in private-sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to form and join independent trade unions.  The law allowed two types of labor union:  the house or company union and the industrial union.  A house or company union required workers to be with the same employer; an industrial union required workers to be in the same sector, but they could work for different employers.  Committee members of all unions had to be Thai citizens.  Seasonal workers who had no permanent employer could not form a union.  Migrant workers could join, but not form, a union.  Civil servants could assemble as a group, provided that such assembly did not affect the efficiency of national administration and continuity of public services and did not have a political objective.The law provided a framework binding collective bargaining for private-sector employers but not for civil servants.  The law provided for the right to strike and the Labor Relations Committee – which consisted of representatives of employers, government, and workers groups – was mandated to protect employees from antiunion discrimination and unfair treatment.  Subcontracted workers, even if doing the same job as permanent workers in the same factory, could not join the same union because they were classified as belonging to the service industry, while full-time workers came under the manufacturing industry.  The inability of subcontracted and full-time workers to join the same union limited unions’ ability to bargain collectively together.  Short-term contract workers were less likely to join unions, fearing antiunion retaliation in the form of nonrenewal of their contracts.  Labor advocates claimed that many companies employed subcontracted workers to undermine unionization efforts.The law allowed migrant workers to join unions but did not allow them (nor contract-based or daily wage employees) to form one or serve as union officers.  Migrant worker participation in unions was low due to language barriers, weak understanding of legal rights, frequent changes in employment status, membership fees, restrictive union regulations, and segregation of citizen workers from migrant workers by industry and by zones (particularly in border and coastal areas) as well as due to migrants’ fears of losing their jobs due to their support for a union.To register a union, at least 10 workers were required to submit their names to the Department of Labor Protection and Welfare within the Ministry of Labor.  Many unions had only enough members to form a union but not enough to collectively bargain with employers.  The law required unions to have 20 percent of workforce membership to bargain collectively.  The law did not protect union members against antiunion discrimination by employers until their union was registered, so NGOs explained that employers often used the gap between when workers submitted their labor union application to the Ministry of Labor and when the ministry reached out to the employers to confirm their employment status to dismiss the employees.According to the Ministry of Labor, there were more than 1,000 registered labor unions in the country, although many were inactive because employers fired their leadership.  The law required union officials be full-time employees of the company or SOE and prohibited permanent union staff.In SOEs, the law allowed only one union per enterprise, and if an SOE union’s membership fell below 25 percent of the eligible workforce, regulations required dissolution of the union.  The law restricted formal links between unions of SOEs and their private-sector counterparts because they were governed by two separate statutes.  SOEs operated in various sectors of the economy:  banking, rail and air transportation, airports, marine ports, and postal services.The law allowed employees at workplaces without a union to submit collective demands if at least 15 percent of employees were listed as supporting that demand.Employees in private enterprises with more than 50 workers could establish “employee committees” or “welfare committees.”  Welfare committees were nominated by employees or employers and their termination was not protected by law.  Employee committees were nominated by labor unions or in elections and their termination required judicial order.  The law prohibited employers from obstructing committee work.  Union leaders often joined employee committees to avail themselves of the additional legal protection.  According to an NGO, migrant workers could be part of a welfare committee, which had less legal protection.In November 2022, the Y-Tec Company fired five workers who formed and organized a union.  Despite a Labor Relations Committee reinstatement order, the company, while paying them, did not allow them back in the factory; the company also withheld other allowances, and several of those fired left the company.  Y-Tec also forced 30 workers who participated in union activities to do nonwork-related activities such as physical labor, refused to allow them to work overtime, and rated them poorly on performance evaluations.  On April 28, the Labor Relations Committee ruled the company violated the Labor Relations Act, ruling that the discrimination was due to the workers’ union activity.  The Labor Relations Committee ordered the company to return the workers to their original positions, allow overtime work, and adjust the bonus payments.The law required unions to call a general meeting and obtain strike approval from at least 50 percent of union members for any strike.  Unions claimed this effectively limited the right to strike because many factories used shift workers, making it difficult to attain a quorum.The government could block private-sector strikes it deemed as having national security implications or negative repercussions on the population at large, which could be appealed in the Court of Appeals.  Strikes and lockouts were prohibited at SOEs, and penalties for violations included imprisonment, fines, or both.The law protected employees and union members from criminal or civil liability for participating in negotiations with employers, initiating a strike, organizing a rally, or explaining labor disputes to the public, except when such activities caused reputational harm.  Reputational damage charges were used to intimidate union members and employees, and employers used lawsuits to intimidate or silence critics in multiple instances.Labor courts or the Labor Relations Committee could decide complaints of unfair dismissal or labor practices and could require compensation or reinstatement of workers, including union leaders, with wages and benefits equal to those received prior to dismissal.  Unregistered associations, community-based organizations, and religious groups often represented the interests of migrant workers but had no legal standing to bargain with employers on their behalf.  NGOs reported few cases where migrant workers’ collective demands were successful in effecting change, particularly along the border areas.Labor rights advocates reported that judges and provincial labor inspectors often attempted to mediate cases, even after labor rights violations requiring penalties were found.  There were reports from unions and NGOs that employers attempted to negotiate terms of reinstatement after court orders were issued, offering severance packages for voluntary resignation, denying reinstated union leaders access to work, or demoting workers to jobs with lower wages and benefits.Employers sometimes filed lawsuits against union leaders and strikers for trespass, defamation, and vandalism.  Private companies also continued to pursue civil and criminal lawsuits against NGOs and journalists as well as workers.Police and other officials were at times complicit in suppressing labor activism.  In Mae Sot, an NGO reported 100 employees working in a hemp sack production factory, all migrants hired under contract-based agreements, were paid less than the minimum wage and denied days off or holidays.  The employees, as migrant workers, could not form a union, so they formed an informal association to file a complaint under the Labor Relations Act.  A local NGO helped them throughout the complaint mechanism; they were able to arrange a tripartite negotiation among the employer, employees, and government officials.  A written settlement was agreed among the parties.  When a labor inspector, however, came to the factory the day after the agreement was made, the employer locked the workers in the factory to prevent them from providing further information to the inspector.Labor law enforcement was inconsistent and sometimes ineffective in protecting workers who participated in union activities.  Penalties included imprisonment, a fine, or both and were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights; however, authorities rarely applied penalties against employers found guilty of labor violations.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The minimum wage varied by province; it was above the government-calculated poverty line in all provinces.  It did not apply to employees in the public sector, SOEs, domestic work, and seasonal agricultural sectors.  Regulations provided household domestic workers some protections regarding leave, minimum age, and payment of wages, but they did not address minimum wage, regular working hours, social security, or maternity leave.The maximum workweek by law was 48 hours, or eight hours per day over six days, with an overtime limit of 36 hours per week.  Employees who engaged in “dangerous” work, such as in the chemical, mining, or other industries involving heavy machinery, could work a maximum of 42 hours per week and could not work overtime.  Petrochemical industry employees could not work more than 12 hours per day but could work continuously for a maximum period of 28 days.  It was common to find wage, hour, and overtime violations in the agriculture, construction, and fishing sectors.  The mobility of fishing boats and the uncertainty of catching time made overtime common in the fishing industry.  Farming and agricultural sites in remote areas made labor inspections harder.  The relocation of the construction sites and the contracting employment basis prevented workers from accessing protection and welfare services.In April the government amended the Labor Protection Act to support remote workers and regulate arrangements between the employer and employee to ensure access to social security and other welfare.  Employees who worked from home also had the right to “disconnect,” meaning the right to refuse all communication with the employer after the end of normal working hours.Occupational Safety and Health:  The law established occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate for the main industries.  The law required safe and healthy workplaces, including for home-based businesses.  The law prohibited pregnant women and children younger than 18 from working in hazardous conditions.  The law also required employers to inform employees of hazardous working conditions prior to employment.  The law did not grant workers the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.  The government conducted investigations following complaints.  If labor inspectors determined there was a violation, they generally would issue an order to the employer and fine them.Ministry of Labor regulations provided for a workers’ compensation plan covering workplace accidents and injuries, but these did not cover vendors and domestic workers.  Labor union leaders reported that compensation for work-related illnesses was rarely granted because the connection between the health condition and the workplace was often difficult to prove.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Department of Labor Protection and Welfare was responsible for enforcement of wage, hour, and OSH law and regulations.  Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and issue orders to employers to comply with the law.  If an employer failed to comply with the order within a specified period, inspectors had a duty to refer the case for criminal law enforcement and could impose penalties.  Fines for wage, hour, and OSH violations were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence; however, their potential criminal penalties (imprisonment) were less than those for fraud or negligence.According to civil society groups, the number of inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance and efficiency and enforcement of inspections remained low.  OSH experts actively identified unsafe work conditions, but the numbers of OSH experts and inspections were insufficient; most inspections only took place in response to complaints.  The Ministry of Labor did not track the application of sanctions through the courts and did not have information related to whether penalties were applied against violators.  An NGO reported that eight labor inspectors in Chiang Mai were responsible for inspecting more than 40,000 firms in all sectors, including the agricultural and domestic service sectors.  Of the eight, two or three were responsible for all OSH inspections.The law imposed fines and imprisonment for minimum wage noncompliance.  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and holiday-pay laws in small enterprises, in certain geographic areas (especially rural or border areas), or in certain sectors (especially agriculture, construction, and sea fishing).  NGOs also reported inconsistent enforcement of wage law resulted in widespread irregular or delayed payment of wages, illegal wage deductions, and illegal recruitment fees for migrant workers.Regulations on migrant labor limited the maximum charges for recruitment fees, but effective enforcement of the rules was hindered by the lack of documentary evidence of underground recruitment, documentation fees, and migration costs.Firms used subcontract labor, by which workers signed contracts with labor brokers to evade regulations.  By law businesses had to provide such subcontract laborers “fair benefits and welfare without discrimination.”  Employers, however, often paid subcontract laborers lower wages and provided few or no benefits.  Migrant workers also faced withholding of documents and contracts in the Thai language, which many did not understand well.The International Transport Workers Federation reported, based on surveys of fisheries workers in the country, that vessel inspections did not adequately identify, report, or require the correction of violations, which were widespread, and that the mostly migrant crewmembers were not interviewed privately or with interpretation.  The federation reported fishing crews faced widespread violations of wage, hour, and OSH law and regulations, notably including prolonged working hours, insufficient rest periods, and illegally prolonged time at sea.The Labor Protection in Fishing Work law required workers in fisheries to have access to health care and social security benefits and that certain vessels provide adequate living conditions for workers.  As of November, key implementing regulations related to work hours and age limits were pending.  Government regulations required registered migrant fishery workers to buy health insurance and vessel owners to contribute to the workers’ compensation fund.  Migrant fishery workers holding a border pass were eligible for accident compensation.While the country provided universal health care for all citizens, social security and workers’ compensation programs were only available to employed persons.NGOs reported many construction workers, especially contracted or subcontracted workers and many migrant workers, were not in the social security system or covered under the workers’ compensation program because their employers failed to register them or did not transfer the payments to the social security system.Workers for online mobile delivery services were not protected under labor laws, as they were considered a “partner” rather than an employee.The country’s informal sector was estimated at approximately half of GDP.  Labor laws largely did not apply to the sector.																																				    							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- Thailand New Year – Songkran Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the Government and people of the United States of America, I wish the people of the Kingdom of Thailand a peaceful and prosperous new year ahead on the occasion of Songkran.This year, I am especially delighted to join the Thai people in celebrating the holiday’s recent designation as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).  The designation highlights just one of many cultural treasures Thailand and its people have shared with the world.I am proud of what we have accomplished over the past year to strengthen the enduring U.S.-Thai alliance.  We were honored to receive His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn Phra Vajiraklaochaoyuhua and Her Majesty Queen Suthida Bajrasudhabimalalakshana for the opening of the “Weaving Our Stories” exhibition at the Bangkok Art &amp; Culture Centre, culminating our year-long celebration of the 190th anniversary of U.S.-Thai bilateral ties.  We established new academic partnerships and enhanced existing relationships that will benefit tens of thousands of Thai and U.S. students.  And as we welcomed a new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, an increase in high-level engagements opened additional paths toward strengthened cooperation on trade and investment, security, humanitarian assistance, climate change, and a range of regional and global challenges.In the year ahead, we look forward to realizing these opportunities.  Our alliance and partnership with Thailand will enable us to achieve a stable, thriving, prosperous, and innovative Indo-Pacific region that benefits the people of Thailand and of the United States.We wish the people of the Kingdom of Thailand a joyous New Year.
- United States and Thailand Hold 4th Energy Policy Dialogue and Deepen Clean Energy Cooperation Bureau of Energy ResourcesThe text of the following statement was released by the United States Department of State and the Ministry of Energy of the Kingdom of Thailand at the conclusion of the fourth United States-Thailand Energy Policy Dialogue.Begin text:Delegations from the United States and Thailand met in Bangkok for the fourth annual United States-Thailand Energy Policy Dialogue on April 4-5, 2024.  Thailand’s Permanent Secretary of Energy, Dr. Prasert Sinsukprasert and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) Deputy Assistant Secretary Kimberly Harrington led the delegations.The delegations discussed global energy market trends affecting the energy policies of both countries. They also agreed on priorities for continued bilateral clean energy cooperation such as power market development; energy conservation and efficiency; electric power transmission and distribution infrastructure; energy storage; and emerging policy and regulatory tools that will support the energy transition and help achieve net zero emissions by 2050. The United States and Thailand reaffirmed their Net Zero World Initiative partnership through which U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories provide deep analysis, modeling, and technical cooperation to support Thailand’s net zero vision.Thailand and the United States discussed the future of advanced clean energy technologies such as offshore wind, small modular reactors, hydrogen, electric vehicles, sustainable aviation fuel, and battery energy storage, as well as Thailand’s consideration of the role of liquefied natural gas and efforts to reduce methane emissions in the oil and gas sector. Both sides welcomed cooperation on methane emissions reduction with potential partners including PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP).The United States and Thailand reaffirmed their commitment to the Clean Energy Demand Initiative (CEDI), building on private companies’ decarbonization commitments to mobilize investment in clean energy in Thailand. Thailand also highlighted the development of the utility green tariff that private companies can use to spur clean energy uptake and help meet their sustainability commitments. Under CEDI, ENR’s Power Sector Program announced new technical assistance with Thailand aimed at reducing barriers to private sector investment in clean energy development.Thailand and the United States also highlighted ongoing and new technical and regulatory engagements in support of the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) under the Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP).  Notably, ENR’s Power Sector Program and Thailand highlighted five years of collaboration under JUMPP, as well as progress on pilot projects to establish common grid codes on two cross-border electricity interconnections; technical analyses for Thailand’s electric utility on energy storage and an Electric Vehicle charging strategy; and new regulatory partnerships with Thailand’s regulator on the ongoing effort to reform Thailand’s electricity market. In addition, ENR announced new JUMPP technical assistance and invited Thailand to two power market and renewable energy study tours in the United States.  The tours will take place later this year and will be led by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and U.S. Energy Association, with the participation of other JUMPP partner governments.  Additional technical assistance will focus on providing recommendations for the utility green tariff and third-party access framework – both part of Thailand’s efforts to liberalize its power market.The United States and Thailand reaffirmed their commitment to continue efforts to implement policies and practices that will expand opportunities for women’s leadership in the energy sector.End text.
- Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs Supporting Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Thailand, Malaysia, Nepal, and India Funding Opportunity Number: DFOP0010747Assistance Listings (CFDA) numbers: 19.511 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for East Asia19.523 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Program for South AsiaAnnouncement issuance date: Monday, March 20, 2024Announcement type: Cooperative AgreementProposal application submission deadline: Friday, April 25, 2024, at 11:59:59 p.m. (23:59:59) EDT. Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Anticipated timeframe to award for selected proposals: Pending the availability of funds, PRM anticipates, but makes no guarantee, that awards will be made within three months of the submission deadline.																											                        Download the Announcement							 [441 KB]																									Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																								Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs																								India																								Malaysia																								Nepal																								Thailand
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Special Envoy Finkenauer’s Travel to Australia and Thailand Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Department of State Special Envoy for Global Youth Issues Abby Finkenauer will travel to Australia and Thailand from March 4-15, 2024. Special Envoy Finkenauer&#8217;s trip will focus on engaging with emerging leaders and advocates in the Indo-Pacific region, fostering dialogue on crucial issues such as civic engagement, women’s leadership, and social empowerment.During her visit to Melbourne, Australia, Special Envoy Finkenauer will attend the Global Citizen NOW Summit, engaging with and elevating over 300 young innovators on important topics such as ending extreme poverty, addressing the climate crisis, fighting food insecurity, and combating gender inequity.In Perth, Australia, the Special Envoy will mark International Women’s Day through engagements with the Western Australian Football League (WAFL) Women’s Competition and alum of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), the U.S. Department of State’s premier professional exchange program. She will also promote civic engagement through a dialogue with She Runs and an engagement with young Western Australian parliamentarians.In Bangkok, Thailand, the Special Envoy will underscore the United States’ commitment to youth leadership and development globally. She will have discussions with students, young professionals, community leaders, and journalists, emphasizing the importance of collaboration between the United States and Thailand on youth-focused initiatives.For more information on the trip, follow along on Instagram , X , and Facebook .
- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink’s Travel to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink will travel to Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, February 23-March 4 to underscore the United States’ strong and enduring commitment to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia.In Singapore, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue alongside Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Albert Chua.  They will discuss the wide-ranging U.S.-Singapore partnership, including defense and security ties, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.In Phnom Penh, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Cambodian officials to advance our shared vision of a free, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific.  The Assistant Secretary will also underscore U.S. commitment to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a democratic and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will co-lead the 9th U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue alongside Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi.  He will also co-lead the Second Strategic and Defense Dialogue alongside Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Royal.  During these two dialogues, under the auspices of the U.S.-Thai Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will work to advance bilateral cooperation in areas of shared interest including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.In Hanoi, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will meet with Vietnamese officials and participate in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue.  Building on the recent upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Assistant Secretary will seek to further deepen U.S.-Vietnam relations and advance our shared vision of a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful Indo-Pacific Region.In Bandar Seri Begawan, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei relations.  He will also meet with senior Bruneian officials to discuss key issues in the bilateral relationship, including economic and security initiatives, efforts to tackle climate change, and regional cooperation.
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Parnpree Office of the SpokespersonWashington, D.C.The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara today in Washington, D.C.  Secretary Blinken reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Thailand alliance, and the two sides discussed opportunities to strengthen cooperation across a range of bilateral and global issues.Secretary Blinken emphasized U.S. commitment to increasing collaboration on trade and investment, broadening our security cooperation as we promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and deepening people-to-people ties, including through new academic partnerships and enhanced existing institutional relationships. He affirmed the United States’ unwavering commitment to ASEAN centrality and implementation of the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  The two sides spoke about the importance of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the need to ensure that all citizens can freely participate in the political process.Secretary Blinken also discussed regional and global issues, including efforts with Thailand and ASEAN to address the worsening crisis in Burma.  They emphasized the urgent need to expand humanitarian assistance to displaced people in Burma and in the region and urged the regime to pursue inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders, release all those unjustly detained, end the violence, and put Burma back on a path to democratic civilian governance.  Secretary Blinken stressed U.S. commitment to secure the release of all remaining hostages held by Hamas. Lastly, Secretary Blinken welcomed the increase in high-level engagements between the United States and Thailand, pointing to the U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue on February 28-29 as another example through which U.S. and Thai officials will build upon 190 years of diplomatic relations to further strengthen our alliance and partnership.
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara Before Their Meeting Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, good afternoon, everyone, and Mr. Minister, welcome.  It’s wonderful to have you here.  We celebrate 190 years of diplomatic relations between Thailand and the United States, and a longstanding alliance.  But even as we celebrate the past, we are relentlessly focused on today and the future, a present and a future that join us together in our alliance, in a determination, I believe, to strengthen it even more, to work together on the many challenges we face, whether it’s in the region or even globally when it comes to security, when it comes to climate change, when it comes also to deepening our own economic relationship.  And so much of the work that you’ve done in that area I look forward to discussing.So we have – we have a number of challenges, mutual challenges before us, but we’re grateful to have a partnership, to have an alliance that can effectively address them together.  So welcome.MINISTER BAHIDDHA-NUKARA:  I’m very delighted to be here in Washington and at the invitation of the Secretary.  My visit underscores our desire to reinvigorate our strategic alliance and partnership.  As a democratically elected government, we firmly believe that our shared values of democratic principles, human rights, and human security will play a pivotal role in our partnership and bind our countries even closer together.The Thai Government is focusing on promoting Thailand’s economic growth and transiting its economy to its green and digital economy, which will open up new opportunities to enhance our economic partnership.  We also seek to enhance our longstanding security ties with the U.S.  At the regional level, we see ourselves as an important anchor for your engagement in the region to advance common peace, security, and prosperity.  In this regard, we hope to continue working closely with the U.S., including through ASEAN, development of Mekong subregion, and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEF.Thank you, Excellency.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you, Minister.  Thanks, everyone.
- Gauging Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Acceptability and Expanding PrEP Access as an HIV Prevention Intervention for Key Populations in Thailand WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM?In September 2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended, “...oral pre-exposure prophylaxis as an additional prevention choice for people at substantial risk of HIV infection as part of combination HIV prevention approaches.”  WHO defines substantial risk of HIV infection, in the absence of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), as an incidence of HIV infection that is &gt;3%. Offering PrEP in regions with such incidence could potentially make it a cost-saving or cost-effective intervention. In Thailand, the estimated national HIV prevalence among men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender women (TGW) is 19% and 14%, respectively. As part of the efforts to scale-up HIV testing services (HTS) and prevention interventions, along with proactive referrals to antiretroviral treatment (ART), PrEP for HIV prevention was formally made available in late 2015. However, there were no data on the acceptability to guide targeting and roll-out. Since PrEP is a relatively new prevention intervention in PEPFAR countries, PEPFAR’s partners will need technical assistance to scale best practices with fidelity and to ensure that implementation addresses the diversity of target populations across varied settings.FULL SOLUTIONWHAT IS THE SOLUTION?Two PrEP pilot studies were successfully implemented in Thailand. One of these studies was the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Key Population Implementation Study (KPIS) and another was conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implementing partner, LINKAGES. The CDC-supported study implemented a “Test, Treat, and Prevent HIV Program” at five hospitals in four provinces to increase HIV testing, to help HIV- positive clients begin ART, and to increase access to PrEP among HIV-negative clients. The primary objective for the PrEP component of the pilot was to determine if HIV-negative men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender women (TGW) would choose to take PrEP as a preventative measure. The team documented factors associated with PrEP acceptance, including: attitudes towards PrEP, PrEP knowledge, and the type of treatment venue (facility or community-based). Given the mobility of key populations, the KPIS study used a tailored methodology to enroll Thai MSM and TGW who reported anal intercourse without using a condom in the previous six months (this tailored approach included a respondent-driven, sampling-based, peer-driven recruitment intervention. HIV-positive patients were systematically offered ART, while HIV-negative patients were offered PrEP.The USAID/LINKAGES program supported the availability of PrEP across a community-based network of nine KP-led community health centers in four provinces, a MSM-owned and operated private clinic, and a well-known and long-established HIV testing center operated by the Thai Red Cross. Through a unique collaboration arranged by the Thai Red Cross, free PrEP was made available at LINKAGES-supported sites through support from Her Royal Highness Soamsawali, a member of the Thai Royal Family, which is known as the “Princess PrEP” Program. PrEP was advertised through outreach workers, community events, MSM mobile-phone based applications (apps), and websites frequented by MSM and TGW in Thailand. Furthermore, in order to understand characteristics of PrEP uptake during the initial period of introduction, a cohort of PrEP users was established as part of a multi-year KPIS Test and Start Study.WHAT WAS THE IMPACT?Of the 1,880 people enrolled in the original KPIS study, 531 tested HIV-negative. Of these 531, 167 (31%) started PrEP, with those reporting sex with an HIV-infected partner (p=0.003), receptive anal intercourse (p=0.02), or receiving PrEP information from a hospital (p&lt;0.0001) being more likely to start PrEP than those without these behaviors or characteristics. While the KPIS PrEP pilot successfully initiated one-third of the eligible participants onto PrEP, there was variance across the different sites, which needs to be explored further. The LINKAGES sub-study reported that 37% of their participants initiated PrEP.Chart provided by the Thai Red CrossAs shown in the above graph, PrEP use in Thailand increased from only a few individuals in June 2015 to almost 3,500 in June 2017, with a majority of that increase occurring within the past year. Also illustrated is the increase of PrEP use at a variety of sites. The Pulse Clinic, Princess PrEP, and PrEP-30 account for the highest number of users.The PEPFAR Asia Regional Team, which supports programs in Thailand, reported initiating 1,877 new clients on PrEP in fiscal year 2017, greatly exceeding the annual target. Demographically, the majority of PrEP users are male, with 76% aged 25-49; 15% aged 20-24; and 2% aged 15-19.These strong results, coupled with PEPFAR country team success in achievement towards programmatic targets, support the scale-up of PrEP as part of a combination prevention package of services for MSM and TWG. Community-based PrEP services can extend access and empower MSM and TGW to use PrEP as a part of a comprehensive HIV prevention package. PrEP may be a viable prevention strategy among MSM and TGW especially for those who do not perceive themselves to be at risk, but who actually are. Thus, the need for improved marketing, education, and behavior-risk screening is indicated.HOW DOES IT WORK?For the KPIS study, PrEP was offered at two of the five hospitals in the study. Despite limited marketing of the KPIS study, 1,880 people met eligibility criteria and chose to enroll in the study from April 2015 to October 2016. HIV-positive patients were systematically offered ART, while HIV-negative patients were offered PrEP. An analysis to compare those who were recruited through the peer-driven recruitment intervention (PDI) vs “walk-in on their own” is still needed. In addition, a higher demand for PrEP’s increased marketing, as a prevention strategy, could possibly improve uptake. The key elements of success for the KPIS study were:Offering PrEP systematically and analyzing early vs. late vs. non-PrEP adopters.Multiple streams for enrollment (PDI and walk-in).Demand creation for PrEP (which needs to increase further).For the USAID LINKAGES sub-study, the PEPFAR Asia Regional Program examined characteristics of HIV-negative participants at four community-based organizations (CBOs) in Bangkok and Pattaya and at two hospitals in Bangkok and Pathumthani. Participants in the Test and Treat implementation study were offered enrollment into a PrEP sub-study. Approximately two thirds of MSM and TGW accessing HIV services in the CBOs and one third from the hospital settings accepted PrEP, when offered. Key elements of success from the LINKAGES study were:Availability of both free and low-cost PrEP (approximately $1 per day).Social media-based information about PrEP, and users’ experiences.High-level political support from a respected leader.Well-established networks of CBOs that informed clients about PrEP and provided eligible clients with PrEP in a timely manner.These studies demonstrated that PrEP is an appropriate prevention strategy for MSM and TGW and that it can be implemented in both community- and facility-based settings. Individuals recruited from the peer-driven modality, as well as those who “walked-in” for HIV-testing were receptive to learning about PrEP with a significant number initiating PrEP. Offering PrEP in diverse settings with KP-friendly staff will increase the number of MSM and TGW that get tested, receive prevention messaging, and potentially initiate PrEP (or in the case of HIV-positive test results, get started on treatment).Findings highlight the need for education through demand creation and marketing, if uptake is to be successful. Creating KP-friendly sites will increase the scope of reach through PDI, but also by word of mouth in KP communities. Increased community awareness may increase walk-in clients, in addition to those referred directly through the PDI model. Importantly, PrEP as a prevention intervention lends attention to the full HIV cascade, rather than focusing primarily on treatment for HIV-positive clients.&nbsp;SCALING UP PREP IMPLEMENTATIONLessons learned from KPIS on PrEP provision at facilities are being used to inform the scale-up of access to PrEP in nine clinics at pilot PrEP2Start sites across seven provinces, with financial support from the Thai Government and technical assistance (TA) from the PEPFAR Asia Regional Program. PrEP scale-up is targeting MSM and TGW in priority provinces, which have the largest estimated numbers of PLHIV, high estimated numbers of MSM and TGW, and the largest combined numbers of KPs in Thailand. The following factors contributed to the success of the PrEP pilot study intervention:Inclusion of relevant partners: The PEPFAR Asia Regional Team organized a Technical Steering Committee that provided a forum to ensure collaboration, coordination, and communication between the PEPFAR team; the Royal Thai Government; the Thai Red Cross; civil society organizations, and other development partners for the implementation and evaluation of relevant activities. The committee was highly engaged and met quarterly, both of which were critical to programmatic success. The PEPFAR Team and Technical Steering Committee developed and implemented the KPIS study. This collaboration was pivotal to the success of the community- and facility-based PrEP projects. This close collaboration and engagement with key stakeholders and implementing partners will need to continue for a cost-effective PrEP scale- up.Attention to challenges for target populations: MSM and TGW face significant stigma and discrimination. Thus, it was critical for staff to be well-trained and for the clinical setting, including both community sites and facilities, to be KP-friendly.Access to KPs: Inclusion of members of the MSM and TGW communities who can foster trusting relationships through the PDI model increased the number of individuals who accessed resources.Demand creation/market/education: Time and resources invested in informing the target populations about PrEP contributed to those who initiated on PrEP.As with all new interventions, adequate resources must be devoted to the dissemination of information. That is, marketing and demand creation must occur if “buyers” are to invest in purchasing a new product. The number of new individuals on PrEP progressively increased, quarter-by-quarter, throughout fiscal year 2017 as information disseminated through peer networks and site staff members.DEMAND GENERATIONPromotion messages about the benefits of early HIV testing and treatment were provided through the “Buddy Station” web portal, community events, and the “Test BKK” campaign. The “Buddy Station” website served as a hub for uploading informational materials on early “Test and Treat” and PrEP. The site’s main objective was to promote HIV testing and provide HIV education in an entertaining and accessible manner. Activities were conducted to promote the website. From April to October 2014, 22,000 users visited the website. The “Test BKK” campaign targets MSM who are high-risk, but are not typically reached through traditional peer-outreach approaches.SYSTEMS TO INCENTIVIZE HIV CASE-FINDINGInnovative efforts by Population Services International (PSI) to incentivize case-finding and implement payment schemes for the HIV treatment cascade have been implemented. A partnership was formed with a magazine that is popular among MSM to disseminate key messages on the benefits of and locations to access HIV testing services (HTS). This partnership included the use of private sector gift vouchers as complimentary rewards when readers accessed HTS services at community-based organizations. PSI has also deployed innovative approaches to conduct “virtual” outreach to MSM through applications like “Grindr” and “Line.”  Efforts to incentivize pharmacists to support an HTS referral network are being explored.COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENTThe success of PrEP implementation has been greatly impacted by engaging KPs and community stakeholders. The PEPFAR Asia Regional team has meaningfully engaged with communities and developed collaborative relationships with KP and civil society organizations. They have utilized the Local Capacity Initiative to  improve technical and organizational capacity of consortium partners, provide effective, cost-efficient, and sustainable TA, and enhance, broaden, and expand local and regional civil society advocacy efforts.IMPLEMENTING QUALITY STANDARDSCDC has worked with Thai Red Cross MSM clinic and the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) to develop a set of assessments for MSM-friendly clinics. To ensure coherence with the national program, the same assessment guideline was used for the four MSM clinics where the CDC and MOPH provided TA. Community-based providers have received training to meet quality standards for HTS at the site level. Additional advances in program quality improvement are listed below.Investments in innovative information systems: One national confidential unique identifier code (UIC) scheme now exists, and it is now feasible to follow clients confidentially across a cascade using a combination of UIC (in communities) and national identification (in HTS and ART sites).Creation of an enabling environment for service uptake: Trainings to minimize stigma and discrimination and to acknowledge the specific health needs of MSM and TGW now exist for HIV healthcare providers.CDC KPIS STUDY COSTING ANALYSISA standard-method, itemized cost analysis was applied to derive the total programmatic financial and unit costs. Retrospective data for 12 months was collected for PrEP analysis. The analysis assumed the continued employment of the same facility staff, and an equivalent cadre (with the same pay scale) was assumed for the project staff as well. Key findings included:Cost per person, per year (PPPY) for PrEP is less than cost PPPY for ART (it is 12% to 31% less, depending on the price of the PrEP regimen used).Overall, drugs were the key cost driver for PrEP (~83% of the cost).PDI drove down the cost of the intervention.Volume drives down the cost per person reached.Pay scales for staff may vary, depending on their level of involvement.A costing analysis for USAID LINKAGES study will be performed in FY2017 and 2018.RESOURCESWorld Health Organization implementation tool for pre-exposure prophylaxis of HIV infectionICAP-developed PrEP Tools (Available in English and Spanish)PrEPWatchRevised by the PEPFAR Solutions Team, May 2018DISCLAIMER:The Department of State assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions in the written content or visual images of this site. 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