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HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AT A CROSSROADS: THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND 

ANALYSIS’ VISION FOR 2008 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 26, 2008 

Serial No. 110–96 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

TODD GEE, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chair 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

THOMAS M. FINAN, Director and Counsel 

BRANDON DECLET, Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DERON MCELROY, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .................................................................. 1 

The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Mr. Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

(1) 

HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AT A 

CROSSROADS: THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS’ VISION FOR 2008 

Tuesday, February 26, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:20 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Carney, Perlmutter, and 

Reichert. 

Ms. HARMAN. The committee will come to order. We are meeting 

today to receive testimony on ‘‘Homeland Security Intelligence at a 

Crossroads: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ Vision For 

2008’’. 

Let me apologize to our audience and our witness for having to 

reschedule this hearing and having to delay the classified briefing 

which preceded this hearing. All of that was required because of 

the House schedule. None of us on this subcommittee sets the 

House schedule; and our apologies. 

Our witness today is Under Secretary Charles Allen. 

Charlie, we are here to discuss your priorities in the wake of the 

President’s budget request. But as you have been warned, I want 

to discuss one of my priorities first in introducing the hearing; and 

I believe it is a priority not just for me, but for every Member of 

this subcommittee and, so far as I can tell, for a huge number of 

the first responders that we talk to around the country. 

I&A is not a vacuum. Of all the agencies across the Federal Government, DHS was the one Congress expected would make breaking down stovepipes its No. 1 priority. As the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the FBI and others have adjusted their 

missions to do this, it still seems that your office in DHS is too 

much of a stovepipe. 

I&A’s mandate in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was 

straightforward: Find out the needs of State and locals and then 

build an organization to meet them. Instead, as the CENTRA report discussed in today’s Wall Street Journal makes clear, I&A is 

still struggling with this mission 2 years after you came on board, 

Charlie. Some of your struggle, we believe, is in the wrong direction. I have a major issue with I&A’s endless refusal, or let’s call 
2 

it ‘‘delay,’’ to build a robust ITACG that includes a robust State, 

local and tribal presence that all of us believe would help make the 

NCTC our national Fusion Center a better processor of intelligence 

information. 

Although you promised last year that your staff would make a 

full effort to ensure the ITACG’s success, and although you told us 

you were proud to be leading the effort, you did not have it going 

in a few weeks as you promised you would. When little happened, 

Congress spelled out what the ITACG needed to do in the legislation we recently passed, H.R. 1, the 9/11 Act and in the joint explanatory statement that accompanied it. It has been almost 7 

months since the President signed the 9/11 Act into law, and we 

have seen since that there are continuing obstacles in the ITACG’s 

path. 

Last summer at the tail end of the 9/11 bill negotiations, you and 

former Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson came to my office to 

make the case for why the ITACG should not be included in our 

bill. You both explained that DHS had done so much for State and 

locals, it wasn’t necessary. We, to the contrary, believed that you 

had not done enough and that it was necessary. So we included it 

in our bill. 

On the eve of Mr. Jackson’s retirement, he promised that he 

would sign the memorandum of agreement that had to do with 

agency cooperation with the ITACG. At the last minute, the last 

evening he was at work at DHS, he inserted, or you inserted, some 

addenda to the agreement which the other agencies signed on to 

which did two things. 

First, it made clear that DHS could control the information it 

disseminates. No one has ever argued with that, but that had to 

be added. But second, it just complicated, so I understand, the 

process of getting people full-time into the ITACG. 

The ITACG is not going to go away; and I want to say, in friendship and partnership, that this committee will continue to insist 

that we build a robust presence of State and locals and tribals as 

part of our national fusion effort. It is valuable because they bring 

value. It is also valuable because they can learn from the reading 

of the intelligence information that the NCTC has, that way, we 

will have fewer false alarms at the local level and that way we will 

have better products at the local level. 

So as we discuss your mission, which I am eager to do, and as 

we have been briefed on some additional budget requirements you 

have—budget numbers are classified, so we won’t discuss them— 

I just want to be clear that my priority is learning how you are 

going to be a better partner with the other Federal agencies in this 

effort to fully share information with our local communities, so that 

they know what to look for and what to do, and they are capable 

of preventing the next attack, which is, after all, a goal we all 

share. 

I now yield for an opening statement to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Welcome, Mr. Allen, 

once again. Thank you for coming before us this week. 

Some of my comments will also touch on some of the things that 

the Chair has already touched on. We are here to hear a little bit 

about your plan for different dollar figures and your outlook for the 
3 

year. But I, as you know, in my previous life as a local law enforcement officer and sheriff in the Seattle area, am really interested in 

how these plans and programs come together and translate into results for, you know, the cops on the street and the front lines, who 

are on the front lines in our community. 

For example, State and localities around the Nation have formed 

fusion centers, which we all agree are great things; and they are 

growing and improving, and their job is to bring together information on crimes and terrorism so that they might be better able to 

prevent a terrorist attack. 

These fusion centers also help analysts recognize patterns in 

crime that may indicate precursors of terrorist activity, as we saw 

in the case that we examined in Torrance. I understand that the 

Department of Homeland Security has plans to send additional analysts—in Seattle we do have one, and we appreciate his support— 

out to other States and local fusion centers; and we would like to 

hear how your budget would accomplish this. 

I think we have talked about this topic before in some of our 

other hearings. That is one important point I hope you address in 

your opening comments. 

Additionally, this morning there was a story in The Wall Street 

Journal about an internal report on fusion centers and information 

sharing at the Department; and I hope that you will address that 

issue in your opening comments. You have very strong support for 

your Fusion Center initiative from this subcommittee, and we 

would like to help you and our State and local fusion centers accomplish the goal of protecting this Nation from harm. 

You also have responsibility to provide intelligence support to a 

wide range of communities, including the border, port, transportation and private sectors. We would like to hear how in this budget this will allow you to accomplish that wide-ranging mission. 

Recently, I asked Secretary Chertoff, when he appeared before 

the full committee, about what is being done to help secure the 

northern borders. So we are interested in that, of course, from 

Washington State’s perspective. I believe it is essential that our 

port and border officials, transportation authorities and others receive robust intelligence support from the Department. 

Finally, I hope that you touch upon some of your expanded work 

in the area of open source intelligence, which creates products that 

can be easily shared and at an unclassified level. As you know, we 

are very interested in the issue of overclassification; and it seems 

to me that a big piece of combating overclassification is to consciously create as many unclassified intel products as possible, and 

open source is a big part of that fact. 

Mr. Allen, we once again welcome you and your testimony on 

how the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is working to strengthen our Nation’s intelligence community and secure our homeland. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

Our first and only witness, Under Secretary Charles Allen, is the 

Department’s chief intelligence officer. 
4 

By the way, Charlie, congratulations on your promotion to under 

secretary. We all supported that idea, and we think it is a great 

credit to you. 

Under your lead, the Department’s intelligence work through the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis—and you focused on improving 

the analysis and sharing of terrorist threat information. You are 

responsible for ensuring that information is gathered from the Department component intelligence units as well as Federal, State, 

local, tribal and private sector partners, and it is your job to ensure 

that this information is fused with intelligence from other parts of 

the intelligence community to produce analytic products and services for the Department’s customers. 

Without objection, Under Secretary Allen’s full statement will be 

inserted in the record. I now ask you to summarize your statement 

in 5 minutes, and then we will ask you questions. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Chair Harman and Ranking Member 

Reichert and other Members of the committee. 

I really would like to talk about the progress we have made in 

building a strong and unified DHS Intelligence enterprise and the 

challenges that we face in the days ahead. I hope in the questionand-answer period to answer fully all your questions and all your 

observations. 

The DHS community of intelligence professionals, which I described to you last year, continues to develop and expand. Over the 

last 12 months, we have further increased our productive and collaborative relationship with traditional intelligence community professionals as well as those at the State, local and tribal areas—as 

well, operational and law enforcement individuals. 

All members of this community, as you pointed out in your comments, Chair Harman, are essential to the success of DHS intelligence, given the very decentralized and complex threat that we 

face today. You are right, with the passage of the 9/11 Act, I do 

have the responsibility now to integrate and synchronize the activities of the intelligence offices of the operating components, as well 

as my own office. 

I do appreciate the elevation of this position to under secretary, 

something which I think will be vital to my successor. The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request provides funding that will 

allow my office to bolster and to sustain its core missions and further the overall integration. 

Let me just talk briefly on why your support is so essential. DHS 

Intelligence requirements, collection, dissemination capabilities 

grew significantly over the last year. For example, we increased the 

production of homeland intelligence reports from 2,000 to nearly 

3,100 reports. These unevaluated reports provide intelligence and 

homeland security communities with a trove of information that, in 

the previous year, went unharvested. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget will allow me to hire additional personnel to support the acquisition report and reporting of 

unevaluated DHS component information of intelligence value to 
5 

not only Federal, but State, local, tribal as well as the private sector. 

To accomplish your mandate to integrate intelligence, I am planning to create a Homeland Security Intelligence Program. This will 

be a DHS program similar in structure to the Director of National 

Intelligence’s National Intelligence Program, or NIP. It will encompass the resource planning and budgeting activities of all members 

of DHS Intelligence. 

I have already established a Homeland Security Intelligence 

Council, providing a venue for all DHS Intelligence leaders to discuss issues and to make collective decisions consequent for DHS Intelligence. An integrated enterprise, both within DHS and including our external partners, can only be built upon a robust common 

training program which we now have under way. However, we will 

require additional funding in order to sustain this program in the 

coming year. 

In getting to your comments in particular, my office leads information-sharing efforts across DHS. In addition to our departmental 

responsibilities to implement the information-sharing environment, 

we are leading the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination 

Group, the ITAC–G, at the National Counterterrorism Center to 

ensure that non-Federal stakeholders are provided tailored and 

federally coordinated perspectives on time-sensitive threats that 

would have a potential impact upon the safety of the homeland. 

The ITAC–G has achieved operating capability, and I will be 

pleased in the question-and-answer period to respond fully to your 

questions and to your comments. 

In the past year, my office has, in fact, made significant progress 

at enhancing our support to State and local. The internal DHS report cited an article in The Wall Street Journal today that is something that I really want to comment on in more specific ways. This 

study, which is internal, which I just received last week, is good 

government; and I would like to correct the record. The internal report was simply a study that reflects the progress we have made. 

Here is the story of reality: I commissioned this report about 6 

months ago precisely to get at the unvarnished, unfettered truth 

from the State and locals as to what was working and what was 

not working. The pilot program was designed to determine exactly 

what information and intelligence State and locals needed from 

DHS and the intelligence community. Finally, the pilot was designed to determine how DHS could assist State and locals with 

the vital process of exploiting open source information in support 

of their unique missions. 

But the process did not stop there. I instructed my office to put 

in place immediately measures to address shortcomings as they 

were uncovered. For example, we have improved the quality and 

timeliness of our responsiveness to the pilot Fusion Center request 

for information from weeks to days. 

Today, more than 85 percent of these were returned to State and 

local with answers within the deadline that they had set at the 

State level. Information needs at the pilot sites have been determined, and Fusion Center leaderships tell us that the information 

provided against these needs will significantly enhance their individual missions. These needs will now form the basis for informa-
6 

tion and intelligence analysis provided to these locations in the 

year ahead. The open source needs that Congressman Reichert 

spoke about of the pilot States have been determined and training 

has been provided to three of the States. 

The leadership of these fusion centers has described our assistance in this area as a grand slam home run. We will provide the 

same training and assistance in open source to the remaining fusion centers Nation-wide. 

In summary, our Fusion Center partners have repeatedly told us 

of improvements that they have found in our support and their 

confidence that we, together, are on the right track. The success of 

our endeavors I think is summed up in an excerpt from a 28 January 2008 letter sent to Secretary Chertoff by Los Angeles Chief of 

Police William Bratton following the production of a DHS-FBI joint 

regional bulletin addressing both the concerns over an upcoming 

anti-Islam Dutch film. In that letter, Chief Bratton wrote, ‘‘I would 

like to personally thank DHS and, specifically, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis for taking our partnership to the next level, 

and look forward to reading future joint intelligence products that 

highlight our shared interests as we work to protect and secure 

America.’’ 

The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget provides us the additional funds to handle a whole range of initiatives that have been 

given to us by the Secretary and by the DNI. 

I want to convey to you my sense of commitment and mission to 

ensure that we have in DHS the capability to address all threats 

to the homeland. This budget request will continue the process of 

integrating DHS Intelligence, as you mandate it, and will enhance 

our departmental capabilities to address the threats outlined in the 

President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security. Our success 

depends on our ability to work together at all levels of government 

while not losing sight of the public’s privacy and civil liberties that 

we must protect. 

The threats to our homeland from extremism and other threats 

are very serious. I need your strong support for the initiatives I 

have set forth. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chair Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the President’s 

fiscal year 2009 budget for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 

I testify before you today to speak to the progress that we have made in building 

a strong DHS Intelligence Enterprise as well as the challenges we face in the days 

ahead. As you know, the intelligence mission of my office flows directly from the 

mission of the Department itself. The mission of my office is clear—it is to identify 

and assess transnational and domestic threats to homeland security. We provide anticipatory, proactive, and actionable intelligence to support the Department; State, 

local, tribal, and private sector customers; and the intelligence community. The most 

critical and overarching threat to the homeland remains terrorism—transnational 

and domestic—and much of the IC’s resources are devoted to this issue. I believe, 

however, that my office adds unique value by viewing terrorism through the prism 

of threats to the homeland. This holistic perspective allows us to make connections—if and where they exist—between terrorism and other illicit transnational 
7 

criminal activities. Moreover, these other illicit activities often constitute serious 

threats to the homeland, and we must address these as well to support our departmental mission and to help secure the Nation. 

Last year, we developed our first annual integrated DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

research plan. This drove our flagship publication—the seminal Homeland Security 

Threat Assessment—of which I am very proud. This assessment represents the analytical judgments of DHS writ large and assesses the major threats to the homeland 

for which the U.S. Government must prepare and to which it must respond. The 

assessment looks out to 2010 and will be updated annually. Moreover, it provides 

us an important analytic framework by which we can identify and prioritize our 

gaps in knowledge and understanding of homeland threats. 

Further, this Enterprise research plan is part of an effort that includes development and publication of monthly Enterprise production plans; collaborative identification of priority collection gaps; coordinated efforts to harvest and extract information of intelligence value, and dissemination of unique DHS intelligence reporting 

to both our traditional and non-traditional customers; and Enterprise efforts to establish common tradecraft standards based on those delineated by the DNI. Collectively, these efforts demonstrate the significant capabilities a unified DHS Intelligence Enterprise can bring to bear against the threats facing our homeland. 

THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS

The principal threats we face today are borderless, global, decentralized, and more 

dynamic and volatile than ever before. Within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise context, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis continues to build its core capabilities 

while concurrently assessing and proactively staging the capabilities needed to 

transform DHS intelligence—to bring our resources, systems, capabilities, and 

knowledge base into alignment with longstanding and mature intelligence community organizations. This two-pronged effort requires resolve and careful timing, but 

I am convinced we have made significant progress. We have created an intelligence 

program that is attuned to fluctuations in the homeland security environment and 

one that is working synergistically across the Department to counter the threats 

faced by our country. 

Enhancing Analytic Focus, Quality, and Collaboration 

Since its inception, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has focused on building 

its core capacities to deliver high quality intelligence. We worked through the challenges of standing up a new organization with a highly diverse and committed workforce. Within the organization, we have defined, established, and integrated the 

‘‘Homeland Security intelligence’’ mission, our unique approach to intelligence, and 

our knowledge and understanding of widely diverse traditional and non-traditional 

customer requirements. 

Last year I realigned the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ analytic resources 

into five elements to focus on the principal threats to the homeland. In my view, 

this realignment has improved dramatically the quality of our analysis by honing 

our focus and pinpointing where we can collaborate with and leverage both our own 

departmental skills, knowledge, and resources as well as those of the intelligence 

community. This approach has led to major analytic achievements in my office and 

across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. We now regularly produce high quality 

Homeland Security intelligence assessments for the Secretary and other Department principals, directly support key Department efforts, such as the Secure Border 

Initiative (SBI) and the Visa Waiver Program, provide improved and more tailored 

analyses to State, local, tribal, and private sector, and better complement IC analysis with our own unique perspectives. 

As I noted, we now have five analytic thrusts to focus and energize our efforts. 

The first is threats to border security. We look at all borders—air, land, sea, and 

virtual—and examine a range of threats, such as narcotics trafficking, alien and 

human smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit transnational threats. These 

threats are interwoven and, importantly, can provide potential avenues for terrorists 

to enter the homeland. Our initial focus has been the Southwest border, per the secretary’s priorities. During 2007, Office of Intelligence and Analysis intelligence assessments on worldwide travel vulnerabilities and the potential for extremists, terrorists, and other transnational criminals to exploit travel to the United States 

raised decisionmaker awareness of U.S. border security concerns—an area previously under-reported in intelligence community channels. We also continue to be 

the only intelligence community organization looking at U.S. borders holistically. A 

key example of this is our Southwest Border Threat Assessment, which underscores 

the range of issues threatening border security as well as their potential nexus to 

terrorism. 
8 

My office’s Intelligence Campaign Plan (ICP) is expanding DHS intelligence capabilities focused on border security by forward-deploying intelligence officers to key 

border intelligence centers and augmenting border threat analysis, requirements, 

and classified communications infrastructure. This year, I deployed the first Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST) officer to El Paso, Texas, to provide direct 

intelligence support and information fusion to front-line operators and agents along 

the border. The HIST will be staffed with an integrated team of intelligence professionals responsible for identifying the intelligence needs of our border agencies, ensuring that information is coordinated with multiple Federal and local agencies, and 

facilitating the use of national intelligence resources to support them. The team also 

will ensure that critical Homeland Security information is appropriately shared with 

key mission partners external to DHS. 

In addition to our HIST in El Paso, as part of our expanding reports officer program, we are deploying reports officers at various cities along the southwest border 

to provide our operators with situational awareness and information support. The 

reports officers and the HIST will be coordinating their activities with the SBInet 

Program Office to fuse information, analysis, and technology to provide new 

strength to border security efforts. Our border agents are on the line every hour of 

every day, and the ICP, HIST, and reports officer deployments exist to support their 

needs. 

The office’s reports officer program is key to supporting DHS operating elements, 

the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and the IC—and I have made significant investments in it. It is improving the Department’s ability to move information with intelligence value that is gathered by DHS operating components throughout DHS and 

to other Federal agencies, to our non-Federal stakeholders, and to the intelligence 

community. I also have been expanding our reporting capabilities through reports 

officer training of headquarters, field intelligence, and selected operational personnel. Over the last calendar year, we have increased our Homeland Intelligence 

Report (HIR) production from 2,000 to nearly 3,100 HIRs. These unique, 

unevaluated reports provide the larger intelligence and homeland security communities with a trove of information that in previous years went unharvested and 

unevaluated. 

A second analytic element in my office is dedicated to assessing the threat of 

radicalization and extremism. Our top priority is radicalized Islam (Sunni and Shia 

groups); however, we also look at radicalized domestic groups; to include white supremacists, black separatists, and fringe environmentalists. We do not monitor 

known extremists and their activities; instead, we are interested in the 

radicalization process—why and how people are attracted to radical beliefs and 

cross the line into violence. We are using non-traditional intelligence and working 

closely with our State and local partners to leverage their insights and expertise to 

build a baseline of radicalization that leads to ideologically based violence in their 

localities. From this baseline, we plan to develop an integrated framework for tracking a radical or extremist group’s risk for terrorism and assisting policymakers in 

developing strategies to deter and prevent it. 

As a complement to our efforts to look at threats inside the homeland, such as 

radicalization, we further are collaborating with our DHS Operating Components to 

focus on a third analytic element, potential threats from particular groups entering 

the United States—groups that could be exploited by terrorists or other ‘‘bad people’’ 

to enter the homeland legally or to bring in CBRN or other materials. We further 

focus on travel-related issues of interest to the Department, such as visa categories 

and the Visa Waiver Program. Our key intelligence sources are the data that our 

Components gather in their daily operations. DHS Intelligence never before has pursued such an effort—one that is important to support the Department, our State 

and local partners, and the intelligence community. Last year, for example, Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis analysts assessed factors in global instability that are 

driving migration to the homeland—a phenomenon potentially exploitable by terrorists. Office of Intelligence and Analysis analysts also led a key effort last year in 

developing the U.S. Government’s security screening program to vet prospective 

Iraqi refugees entering the United States. 

A fourth analytic element assesses threats to critical infrastructure, both private 

sector and State-owned and operated. We are enhancing our existing analytic efforts 

in partnership with the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection in a center—the 

Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Assessment Center, or HITRAC—to assess terrorist threats to and vulnerabilities in the 17 critical infrastructures identified in HSPD–7. We have completed a baseline assessment for every sector; last 

year, we completed, from a geographical (vice sector) perspective, 56 State and territory threat assessments—the first ever infrastructure intelligence threat assessments for each State and territory in the Union—to support State and local require-
9 

ments on terrorist and other threats to U.S. critical infrastructure. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis engaged State and local partners in working groups to review and contribute to these assessments, as well as delivered tailored briefings to 

a wide range of State, local, and private sector customers to enhance their awareness and understanding of the threats. 

The last analytic element, but certainly not the least, supports a full range of customers on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We focus 

on the threat from improvised nuclear devices (IND) and radiological dispersal devices (RDD), or ‘‘dirty bombs.’’ We are also developing a major effort on bioterrorism 

threat analysis to support the Department’s role to deter bioterrorism in the homeland. In the bioterrorism area, we are emphasizing the threat of infectious diseases—such as avian influenza—to support the Department’s role in pandemic preparedness. Our concerns do not end with infectious human diseases, however, but 

include infectious animal diseases that could devastate our economy, and we are developing expertise in this area. 

Equally important is the fact that we have demonstrated the value of Homeland 

Security intelligence by contributing regularly—individually and collaboratively—to 

the President’s Daily Brief and the National Terrorism Bulletin. We also have developed key new product lines—such as the Border Security Monitor, CubaGram, 

Cyber Security Monitor, and Infrastructure Intelligence Notes, as well as a muchdemanded, rapid turnaround publication for State and local customers—our Chief 

Intelligence Officer Notes. These product lines respond to the demand for breaking, 

emerging, and quickly evolving information updates on foreign and domestic threats 

and incidents with a potential impact on homeland security and principally respond 

to the concerns of our non-traditional customers—homeland security operators and 

policymakers as well as Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners— 

for tailored, timely, and actionable intelligence. 

Sharing Information and Quality Analysis Across the Homeland Security Operating 

Environment 

Across this land, the ‘‘seamless community of intelligence professionals,’’ which I 

described to you last year, is expanding. Over the last year, DHS Intelligence continued to set the standard for integration by solidifying productive, collaborative relationships with traditional intelligence professionals; operational and law enforcement intelligence professionals; and State, local, tribal, and private sector intelligence professionals. As you know, all members of this community are equally essential to its success—the threat is too decentralized and complex to be destroyed 

without the full engagement of the community as a whole. 

Our success rests on our collective abilities to share information, collaboratively 

fuse this information into a clear threat picture, cooperate to fill the gaps in understanding the threat, and communicate the threat to the right stakeholder at the 

right place and time. As mandated by the Congress, my office leads informationsharing efforts across all of DHS. Working with the Program Manager—Information 

Sharing Environment (PM–ISE), I continue to create and implement the framework 

for the DHS information-sharing environment. 

Last year, the Department also improved substantially the foundation for its congressionally mandated Information Sharing Environment by establishing the information-sharing governance structure and improving information-sharing processes 

and products, such as the Data Asset Catalog. On behalf of the entire Department, 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is leading the development of the DHS Information Sharing Environment framework. A critical element of this framework is the 

information-sharing governance structure. We established the three-tiered structure 

to represent all DHS components and enable us to speak with ‘‘one voice’’ to our 

external partners. The Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB), which I 

chair, is the decisionmaking body on all DHS information-sharing and collaboration 

issues. The DHS Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC) is the implementing body for Department-wide information-sharing matters, and supports the 

ISGB. As part of this structure, we are building ‘‘shared mission communities’’— 

such as law enforcement—to provide a community-based forum to address barriers 

to information sharing and resolve issues which resonate across a shared mission. 

This allows us to ensure that while we address policy and technology aspects of information sharing, we’re also building a culture of collaboration. 

DHS also is addressing requests from the Intelligence Community for access to 

DHS information. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has been working with 

DHS Components and our intelligence community partners to remove informationsharing barriers and develop a standardized approach to information sharing using 

Information Sharing and Access Agreements (ISAA), in order to facilitate external 

requests for DHS information. We are also creating Shared Mission Communities 
10 

(SMC) to align component activities according to shared missions in an effort to increase efficiency and transparency across agencies; remove barriers to information 

sharing—both real and perceived; and develop a culture of information sharing and 

collaboration. The first SMC, the Law Enforcement Shared Mission Community 

(LE–SMC), has brought all of the DHS law enforcement components together to address information-sharing opportunities and to build a coordinated approach to information sharing. Other SMCs, including critical infrastructure, border security, 

and transportation, will follow. Through this framework, we have increased our momentum in implementing the secretary’s ‘‘One DHS’’ vision for improving information sharing—contributing to a more integrated DHS and ensuring the timely and 

efficient access of information between mission partners. 

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has continually expanded its outreach, 

both within the Department and outside the Department to support State and local 

partners. As a key cornerstone of our outreach efforts, my office has deployed 22 

representatives, and will be deploying more to reach 26 by the end of fiscal year 

2008. As the Chief Intelligence Officer in DHS, I have been uniquely challenged in 

developing a program that not only is consistent with the expectations of the 22 different areas within the Department of Homeland Security, but also meeting the 

needs of our Federal partners, and most importantly meet the needs of the State 

and local customers for which the program was developed. 

The partnerships the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has nurtured in the State 

and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office are demonstrably successful 

when one considers the enormity of the task. The first area the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis needed to bring partners together in the program’s creation were internal, meaning the divisions within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, whose resources would be stretched to support such a program. The Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis has developed a group of leaders from within each major area of the Office 

and worked with them to create a program that would work across any parochial 

mission areas and not interfere with existing work already being conducted with our 

State and local partners. The success of these endeavors is best summed up in an 

excerpt from a letter sent to Secretary Chertoff by the Los Angeles Chief of Police 

William Bratton. Chief Bratton wrote, ‘‘I would like to personally thank DHS, and 

specifically, I&A [the Office of Intelligence and Analysis], for taking our partnership 

to the next level and look forward to reading future joint intelligence products that 

highlight our shared interests as we work to protect and secure America.’’ Sheriff 

Bob Alford of Johnson County, Texas, echoed this spirit when he stated, ‘‘We very 

much appreciate the information that is passed along to our agency. It has been 

very beneficial in helping to stop rumors going around the county, keeps us informed as to any threat to our county and is the first time in my career that we 

have received regular and frequent information from the Federal Government.’’ 

Clearly, our information gathering, reporting, and analytic efforts would be undercut dramatically without a functional information technology and knowledge management backbone and structure. Recognizing this, last year we created the Homeland Secure Information Network (HSIN)—Intelligence, a secure but unclassified 

portal, to distribute unclassified DHS and State and local intelligence to Federal 

and non-Federal analysts and customers. We further developed a virtual analytic 

community of interest with our State and local partners—the Homeland Security 

State and Local Intelligence Community (HS SLIC)—on the HSIN–Intelligence portal and last year sponsored analytic conferences on radicalization, weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) threat detection and prevention, and border security. Each of 

these three collaboration activities brought together—and HS SLIC continues to 

bring together—over 100 analysts from across the country. Such efforts result in an 

enhanced shared analytical understanding between DHS and other Federal, State, 

local, and tribal agencies; a greater ability to assess threats via multi-level government participation, meshing domestic on-the-ground knowledge with overseas intelligence; and increased intelligence sharing with our Homeland Security partners 

such as Governors, homeland security advisors, private sector owners and operators, 

and State, city, and county officials. 

While the Office of Intelligence and Analysis continues to expand our reach we 

continue to realize the need to bring the customers in during the program’s growth 

to ensure their voice was heard as the program matures. Per the recommendation 

of Congress we have established a Law Enforcement Fellowship program that will 

soon be receiving its third candidate this year. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has also worked with many Federal partners and advocacy groups simultaneously to expand the Fusion Center Guidelines. This requires balancing the interest of many parties and ensuring that work is not allowed to be stalled by the parochial interest of any one participant. I believe this success was recently dem-
11 

onstrated when both OMB and the House and Senate appropriators doubled the 

program’s baseline in only its second year of existence. 

Further, we are streamlining and merging disparate classified networks into a 

single, integrated network—the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN)—to help 

increase the sharing of intelligence and other information securely to fulfill its 

homeland defense mission. Homeland security leaders envision that HSDN will become the major secure information thoroughfare joining together intelligence agencies, law enforcement, disaster management, and front-line disaster response organizations in the common goal of protecting our Nation and its citizens. We are actively deploying HSDN internally and to our State and Local partners. We have a 

program to ensure relevant information is made available on these networks. 

As the under secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis I work on a 

daily basis to influence the State and Local Fusion Center Program Management 

Office’s direction on a national level. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis conducts its work with our partners mindful of the very strong concerns of our citizens 

over the protection of civil rights, civil liberties and privacy at all levels of our relationship. As this committee is aware, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis continues to be a principal supporter of the Fusion Center National Conference at 

which nearly 500 State and local intelligence leaders will be present along with 

many of our Federal partners. In total nearly 800 people, including you Madam 

Chair, will be in attendance. This is nearly a 25 percent increase in participation 

over last year. In very real terms the Office of Intelligence and Analysis faces the 

task of maintaining these very important relationships on a daily basis and actively 

influences policy concerning this program at senior levels of Government. I remain 

committed to the program and our State and local customers as we move forward 

in this mutually beneficial relationship. 

Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITAC–G) 

A major emphasis of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has been the establishment of the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITAC–G), 

which has been stood up under the management of the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) to help us meet the information needs of our State, local, and tribal 

partners. I have provided two senior officers from the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, along with two officers provided by the FBI, to lead the stand-up of this 

organization. I am extremely pleased to report that the ITAC–G achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 30 January 2008 and that current staffing requirements 

have been met. In total, four Federal and four State personnel, as well as contractor 

officers, are working in dedicated spaces with essential systems connectivity in 

NCTC. 

The ITAC–G has already begun providing valuable input to intelligence products 

disseminated to State and local organizations, and its personnel regularly attend 

NCTC meetings and are engaged in NCTC production processes and activities critical to serving non-Federal customers. Since stand-up operations began on 23 October 2007 under DHS day-to-day leadership, the ITAC–G has reviewed more than 

25,000 finished intelligence products. From that review, the ITAC–G identified products that meet State and local needs, and has already disseminated many of them 

to State and local officials. Since 23 October, the ITAC–G also has reviewed 1,576 

separate reports on worldwide threats to U.S. interests, identifying 69 of these as 

possible threats to the homeland. Further review by the ITAC–G revealed five reports of questionable credibility, two of which required better characterization of the 

threat or source. As a direct result of the ITAC–G’s efforts, DHS and the FBI refined our characterization of the threat and released joint reports on the two cases 

noted above requiring further threat detail. 

We have also established the Advisory Council to the ITAC–G, which I head on 

behalf of the secretary that will meet for the second time tomorrow. I have set an 

ambitious agenda, centering on our discussion of a number of priority challenges 

that we all expected the fledgling group would encounter—from recruitment of 

State, local, and tribal personnel; to establishing a formal mechanism and feedback 

process for State, local, and tribal customers, who will be key to strengthening the 

ITAC–G’s value and evaluating its success. I am confident that DHS, FBI, and 

NCTC in collaboration with the ITAC–G Advisory Council and ITAC–G personnel 

will work closely together—not only to ensure that the ITAC–G meets the letter and 

spirit of statutory obligations vis-a`-vis State, local, and tribal needs, but also to synchronize and harmonize intelligence community support to our State, local, and tribal partners. 
12 

THE ROLE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY IN INTEGRATING THE ENTERPRISE

I am grateful for your support to my office in the Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The ‘‘9/11 Act’’ elevated my position to an 

under secretary, effectively codifying the authorities previously conferred on me by 

the secretary. I now have an even greater responsibility—under the law—for integrating the activities of the Component intelligence organizations of the Department. My goal is to ensure that we are efficient and effective in our approach toward inculcating a common intelligence culture. 

Passage of the 9/11 Act, and within it, the creation of the under secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, displayed farsightedness on the part of this subcommittee. 

The 9/11 Act underscored the need for a robust and integrated intelligence and information-sharing program within DHS. Using existing Intelligence Enterprise governance and oversight mechanisms, I have been laboring to evaluate and refine the 

direction, efforts and resources necessary to implement its objectives. Appropriate 

resourcing is fundamental to our success, and DHS will be assiduous in ensuring 

that we are extraordinarily efficient and effective in the use of our appropriated resources. I encourage the subcommittee to recommend that the DHS intelligence program be adequately resourced to fulfill the laudable objectives of the 9/11 Act. 

As the chief intelligence officer of the Department, I created in 2006 the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), providing a venue for all DHS Intelligence Enterprise leaders to discuss issues and collectively make decisions of consequence to the entire Enterprise. Under my authorities, I conduct annual DHS intelligence program reviews and work with the DHS Office of Policy and the chief 

financial officer to issue intelligence guidance as part of our resource planning and 

programming cycle. I am now required by law to present a consolidated DHS intelligence budget to the secretary. The program reviews provide the analysis and insights necessary for me to identify comprehensively for the secretary the requirements and activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. These reviews also show 

me how to streamline and structure departmental activities to leverage efficiencies 

of scale and eliminate unnecessary programmatic duplication. This year, I hope to 

expand and diversify beyond annual program reviews to include periodic, focused, 

issue-based evaluations of smaller component intelligence activities throughout the 

entire year. 

I have been guiding our program and budget efforts toward the creation of a 

Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) to manage the Department’s nonnational intelligence programs that contribute to homeland security intelligence collection and analysis. The HSIP will encompass the resource planning, programming, 

and budgeting activities of all members of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. I have 

been laying the groundwork to implement the HSIP for the last 2 years through the 

collaborative leadership of the HSIC, the Homeland Security Intelligence Integration Board (HIIB), the Intelligence Career Force Management Board (ICFMB), and 

the Intelligence Systems Board (ISB). I believe DHS is now well-positioned to establish a standardized basis for how the DHS Intelligence Enterprise conducts its activities, and fully bring into practice the goals envisioned in the 9/11 Act. The HSIP 

will allow the Department, through the Chief Intelligence Officer, to more effectively 

and efficiently provide oversight and direction to all DHS intelligence resource planning, programming, and budgeting in a concerted fashion to better ensure that all 

elements of DHS are properly resourced, equipped, and collaborating to maximize 

fusion and analysis of homeland security intelligence data collected. Over the next 

year, I will continue to establish policies, procedures, standards, and other guidelines to implement the HSIP in conjunction with the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of Policy, and the HSIC. 

Furthermore, as a member of the Intelligence Community and in my role as the 

program manager for the DHS National Intelligence Program, I participate in the 

DNI’s Executive Committee. As an active member of this committee, I ensure that 

the intelligence needs and capabilities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, State and 

local officials, and private sector owners and operators are a tightly woven, integral 

part of the fabric of intelligence community planning and requirements. 

I continue my efforts to recruit and develop an outstanding workforce and retain 

high performers by investing in a strong training, education, and professional development program. Without appropriate training and education, the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise will operate neither as a culture nor as a unified workforce. Thus, I have 

made it a cornerstone of my efforts with the HSIC to develop and institute training 

programs that serve the entire Enterprise as well as our State and local partners. 

The first two iterations of the 6-week Basic Intelligence Threat Analysis Course 

were conducted last year, and the third iteration is under way as I sit here before 

you. This key milestone of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Education, Training, 
13 

and Professional Development Strategy provides basic level intelligence training to 

new intelligence analysts and to State and local personnel who are customers of 

DHS intelligence. This year, I will begin development of a complementary Mid-level 

Intelligence Threat Analysis Course. We have made significant progress in establishing a strong collection requirements and management program, building an initial capacity in open source intelligence, streamlining the reporting of information 

of intelligence value by our reports officers, and improving our exploitation of information gathered through the Department’s conduct of its law enforcement authorities. 

THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET SUBMISSION

Now I would like to address how the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget submission supports the Office of Intelligence and Analysis efforts. First, I am pleased to 

inform you that the 2009 budget submission includes funding for seven critical 

areas that will allow the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to bolster and sustain 

its core missions and further integrate the DHS Intelligence Enterprise: State and 

Local Fusion Center deployments; intelligence analysis; intelligence requirements, 

collection, and dissemination; integration planning; information sharing; outreach; 

and mission support. In each of these areas, as I have sought to demonstrate 

throughout this testimony, we have made much progress. Still, we have much work 

ahead to accomplish. 

The President continues his commitment to a national fusion center network that 

is already demonstrating results by providing the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

with additional funds to expand its representation at State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFC) across the country. The fiscal year 2009 budget will enable the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis to deploy additional intelligence analysts and HSDN 

connectivity to SLFCs, provide security awareness training to SLFC personnel accessing sensitive Federal information, more robustly conduct privacy and civil liberties awareness and protection training, and continue the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis’ efforts to provide intelligence support to the SLFCs from headquarters. I 

am encouraged by Congress’ continuing support to the State and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office and look forward to working with them to fully 

fund the program in fiscal year 2009 in order to meet both the President’s goals and 

objectives and the requirements of the 9/11 Act. I must also be mindful that this 

direct customer support requires a robust analytical and support engine behind it 

to remain successful. I am eager to work with the legislative branch to ensure all 

levels of State and local support are funded at the President’s request level to ensure the continued success of the national network of fusion centers. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget provides additional funds to hire more WMD analysts 

within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. These analysts will focus on WMDrelated threats to the United States and provide the Office of Intelligence and Analysis with greater access to a critical source of WMD threat information, Project 

ARGUS, and the robust streams of human and animal biosurveillance data available from around the globe. 

These analysts also will contribute to a core Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

mission—integration of the Intelligence Enterprise—by working closely with analysts from other DHS Component intelligence organizations to develop timely, tailored, and actionable, homeland-focused public health and medical intelligence products for our Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners. They will further help to institutionalize my office’s relationships with other departmental partner organizations, such as the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Science and Technology Directorate, National Preparedness and Protection Directorate, and the Office of Health Affairs. 

In addition, these analysts will support the expansion of the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis’ ability to identify foreign persons posing a WMD threat who are coming to the United States or are already here. This expansion effort will facilitate the 

full analysis and screening of such persons in order to advise the law enforcement 

community and the intelligence community on potential WMD-related threats to the 

homeland. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget for intelligence requirements, collection, and dissemination will allow the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to hire additional personnel 

to support the acquisition and reporting of all unevaluated component information 

of potential intelligence value to Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector entities that have responsibilities relating to the security of the homeland. With these 

additional personnel, DHS will be able to increase its ability to acquire all threats/ 

all hazards information available through the State and Local Fusion Centers 

(SLFC). The reports officers will be trained on how to handle law enforcement infor-
14 

mation to ensure it is appropriately protected, and that departmental records and 

databases are reviewed within statutory and regulatory prescriptions. This activity 

supports the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ core mission of sharing relevant information across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and the intelligence community. 

The President’s budget will also provide increases for the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis’ open source (OSINT) research and analytic capabilities, recognizing 

the intelligence value of information that is freely found in the public domain. This 

increased capability will allow the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to conduct 

OSINT research, acquisition, collection management, content management, and 

knowledge management to increase the quantity of relevant OSINT provided to our 

customers. Exploiting this type of information complements the broader intelligence 

community’s open source investments and allows DHS to better serve Federal, 

State, and local customers. 

These new initiatives—along with the maturation of DHS’ Integrated Collections 

Strategy and fused approach to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—will 

improve the Department’s responsiveness to the needs of our internal and external 

partners. 

Overall, the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request sustains Office of Intelligence and Analysis investments in information sharing—the lynchpin of Enterprise Integration and Homeland Security outreach. The Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis will further develop the enterprise architecture and expand our 

connectivity with our Federal and non-Federal partners. One of the cornerstones of 

these endeavors is the expansion of a collaborative information environment at the 

SECRET level, which will foster classified communication among the Department’s 

components and with our State and local partners. This capability, coupled with the 

Department providing access to both intelligence reporting and analytical products 

at the unclassified and For Official Use/Sensitive But Unclassified levels, will enhance our information-sharing relationships with State, local, tribal, and private 

sector partners. 

Through an Integrated Product Team, we are fully engaged with the DHS Science 

and Technology (S&T) Directorate and other departmental components to identify, 

develop, and acquire technology to help us improve information sharing. For example, S&T resources are targeted to develop technology that will improve data sharing and data fusion for information sharing. 

As chief intelligence officer, and now as under secretary, I have initiated many 

programs within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis critical to the security of our 

Nation. Activities such as the National Immigration Information Sharing Operation, 

the National Applications Office, media exploitation, reports officers, and State and 

Local Fusion Center representatives are either providing or poised to provide broad 

access to unique DHS information. We must invest in the support network that allows all of these programs to function effectively. As an under secretary reporting 

directly to the secretary, I must capably manage taskings, people, and funding; ensure laws and Federal regulations are strictly adhered to; and create programs and 

policies to integrate the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. As intelligence activities within DHS expand, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis must realize a commensurate increase in staff capabilities to provide adequate organizational support and 

oversight. The fiscal year 2009 budget will allow me to hire qualified personnel to 

provide mission support in areas such as budget, human capital, and administration. 

Further, as the complexity of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ operations 

has grown so has the need for statutory and regulatory guidance. To this end, the 

fiscal year 2009 budget will also allow me to hire needed attorneys and program 

managers to ensure the Office of Intelligence and Analysis strictly observes all U.S. 

laws, regulations, and policies that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. 

Additional personnel will also be used to more effectively implement and monitor 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis operations, programs, resources, and performance. 

CONCLUSION

Members of the subcommittee, I want to convey to you my personal sense of urgency and commitment to the mission we all share—ensuring that DHS has the intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland. The United States and its 

allies are engaged in a global struggle against a broad range of transnational 

threats. DHS Intelligence is a modestly sized program, but the budget before you 

reflects this urgency. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis budget request will enhance departmental intelligence capabilities to address the ‘‘complex and dynamic 

threats’’ outlined in the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security and 
15 

continue the process of integrating the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as mandated 

in the 9/11 Act. 

As always, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to share 

our key accomplishments and review the major funding priorities in fiscal year 

2009. These priority areas are vital to advancing DHS Intelligence to where it 

should be. Overall, the realization of a national homeland security intelligence community rests on addressing these areas. The Office’s challenge in fiscal year 2009 

is to aggressively pursue DHS Intelligence and Analysis’ evolution and to maximize 

budgetary resources to build on our capabilities and sustain an inclusive partnership of equals to meet our critical mission of protecting the homeland. 

None of us—whether at the Federal, State, local level, or in the intelligence community—can unilaterally predict the threat, warn our stakeholders, and take action 

to mitigate the risks. Our success depends on our ability to work together, while 

never losing sight of the privacy and civil liberties of the public that we are sworn 

to protect. We are constantly besieged by enemies, foreign and domestic, which require perpetual awareness to mitigate the myriad threats. Our success in protecting 

our Nation’s security depends on how relentlessly we collaborate. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the witness. 

Now it is time for questioning, and I yield myself 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Mr. Allen, I listened carefully to your summary, and I do appreciate—I think we all appreciate that your office is making progress. 

But what I continue to hear is that your office is making progress 

inside of DHS, but I don’t really hear that your office is being a 

good partner to other agencies in helping the NCTC process to 

evolve. 

Let me remind us all that initially, when the Homeland Security 

Department bill was passed, the intelligence function and the intelligence fusion function were all within DHS. President Bush then 

decided sometime later to set up a separate office called the Terrorist Threat Information Center, TTIC, outside of DHS, free floating but more or less attached to the CIA. I am sure we all remember this. That office has evolved into the NCTC, which was given 

its status when we did the intelligence reform legislation. The 

NCTC is, again, free-floating, and it is a fusion center for all of the 

Federal agencies that work on intelligence. 

This committee expects you to be a full partner with the NCTC, 

and we set up this new—what you call the ITAC–G, and I just call 

the ITACG—system to incorporate State, local and tribal people in 

the process of developing Federal intelligence products for State, 

local and tribal consumption. The reason we did this is because we 

felt that their perspective would be enormously helpful in designing 

products for them to use. 

We still don’t feel—in the information I have, we still don’t feel 

that you are fully cooperating with this group. I am just curious, 

for example, have you met with the State, local and tribal detailees 

from Phoenix, Washington, DC, Boston and the New Jersey State 

Police who are now here as part of the ITACG? Have you personally met with them? 

Mr. ALLEN. I have personally met with all of them, and we have 

supported getting them—two of them, getting them on board and 

funding them through a process called IPA, independent—independent governmental authority in order to bring them on board 

and bring them on board effectively. 

We have worked very closely with NCTC on the whole process. 

We have worked closely with the FBI. We have—I have two of my 
16 

most senior officers leading and helping work with the FBI and 

State and local officials. We have worked very hard to get them onboard, to get them to meet all the security requirements of NCTC. 

I work closely with Mike Leiter, who is the acting director of 

NCTC, and he and I agree that it is working well. 

There is a report that will be coming, I believe from the information-sharing environment program manager, that will lay out the 

first quarterly report on the ITAC–G progress. I am very, very 

pleased with what we are doing. I can cite statistics, but I don’t 

really have time. They are putting in a lot of data into the State 

and local fusion centers and State governments. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me ask you to define what you think is 

the job of these participants in the ITACG and I am also curious 

to know whether they are involved in producing documents as part 

of their jobs that are stamped or identified as documents produced 

by the ITACG. 

Mr. ALLEN. Their job, as laid out in their charter, is not to do 

original analysis and research, but to ensure that all Federal information, whether it is at NCTC or in DHS or the FBI that can be 

sent down to the State and local level that is of threat interest to 

them, has done so. They have done an extraordinary, extraordinary 

job. 

I mean, the ITAC–G has reviewed over 34,000 intelligence products that are out at NCTC. Twenty-five of those products were 

identified, and a number of those products, 16 of those 25, were 

downgraded and are being sent out to the State and local government because they involve more detailed assessment on terrorism 

tactics, techniques and procedures. 

So there is a significant amount of work that is under way. 

These people are fully engaged. My support of them, everything, 

every joint advisory that we and the FBI have produced—Art 

Cummings and I—is reviewed and coordinated with the ITAC–G, 

which goes out as threat—joint threat advisories with the Bureau. 

Ms. HARMAN. Again, my understanding is that the joint explanatory statement says that they are not just to review products; they 

are empowered to create products. I also understand that most of 

their products to date have been disseminated through NCTC Online, which is a Secret-level network which most police and sheriffs 

departments don’t have access to. 

So, Mr. Allen, my time has expired, but I suggest to you that 

there is a lot more to do in terms of cooperating with this effort. 

This committee sees its mission as representing the people in the 

field and helping them to get better information from the Federal 

Government, not the other way around. In talking to those people, 

I don’t have—if we have a second round of questions, I will give 

you more time to respond. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. I would like to do that. 

Ms. HARMAN. In talking to those people, the impression I get— 

and this is from numerous field hearings and visits that we have 

had. The impression I get is that they are frustrated, and they 

don’t see full participation by your office in the ITACG group. 

Let me give you a chance to say something if you need to, but 

then I am going to yield to the Ranking Member. 
17 

Mr. ALLEN. Let me just say that I chair the ITAC–G Advisory 

Council. The ITAC–G Advisory Council is made up of 50 percent 

Federal, 50 percent State, local and tribal. We have met twice. We 

are supposed to meet quarterly. I have directed that we will meet 

monthly either by teleconference or in person. 

We have had two separate sessions. We have flown people in 

from around the country. 

We are going to broaden the State and local representation, and 

that is one that I have advocated, to put a tribal representative 

within the ITAC–G and, probably, someone representing the fire 

administration, all the fire departments of this country. 

So we are moving up I think quite swiftly. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

The Chair now yields 5 minutes to the Ranking Member for 

questions. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, I want to focus 

on the State and local partnerships through the fusion centers. 

I think I have seen some improvement as I have talked to police 

chiefs and some of my old sheriff friends across the country, and 

especially in the Northwest area. But there are still some concerns. 

How close contact or how closely do you work with the Office of 

Grants and Training? 

Mr. ALLEN. That is an area where we do the threat analysis. We 

look at threats as they are raised across this country at the State 

level and at the city level. 

We have a very, very good way of assessing that. We do the 

threat. However, the Infrastructure Protection Directorate then, 

along with FEMA, looks at vulnerabilities; and between threat and 

vulnerabilities, you make a policy decision on risk. 

We don’t make the decisions relating to grants. We provide the 

threat information keeping us out of policy decision-making, keeping us as professional intelligence officers. 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. But you definitely understand the connection 

between the financial support for local—State and local and their 

ability to participate in fusion centers. I hope that in your position 

you have—you voiced an opinion there on this, the need for that 

money. 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, my view is that the Fusion Center is a great 

new development in this country. It is going to make this country 

safer not only from terrorism, but a host of other threats; and our 

ability to share information and to embed officers out there is going 

to make, I think, a great deal of difference along—working with our 

partners, the FBI, I think is going to make a great deal of difference in the coming years in the security of our country. 

Mr. REICHERT. What are the top priorities of your office? Are 

they the ones mentioned in your statement, the realignment, the 

five points of realignment in your—— 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. My top priorities really involve building a cadre 

of professional officers; we did not have that when I arrived. We 

are hiring and recruiting from the university system, developing 

and mentoring and nurturing people who have analytic skills, to be 

able to send highly qualified officers out to the field to help us with 

information sharing. 
18 

Second, to build our information management systems that we 

did not have when I came there. 

Third, of course, is to train, to develop a robust training program. 

I would say, fourth, we need to build a more robust open source 

effort, and we are getting a lot of assistance from the Director of 

National Intelligence and David Shedd in that endeavor. 

Mr. REICHERT. So in the development of the fusion centers, just 

to kind of centerpiece this effort in bringing locals and Federal and 

State agencies together, will the budget allow you to perform this 

task to bring State and locals together? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, we obviously are going to be straining it this 

year to reach our stated goal of having 35 embedded officers out 

there. We do not have quite the funds to do that now. We will probably have to do some reprogramming in order to do that or to meet 

that goal. 

Fiscal year 2009, if fully funded, will meet some of our goals to 

do that. 

Mr. REICHERT. Are the 35 on top of the 19 that you talked about 

last year you added? 

Mr. ALLEN. I am sorry. I didn’t hear the question. 

Mr. REICHERT. Is that an additional 35? 

Mr. ALLEN. No. That is 35 in total last year. We obviously will 

have to grow beyond that. 

Some States have several fusion centers. Some States have very 

large populations. Our officers are really overtaxed trying to cover 

the States. Some of my officers work many additional hours each 

week, and out in the State, in order to cover—in order to meet the 

needs of the homeland security advisors and the heads of the fusion center. 

Mr. REICHERT. I want to ask this last question, basically for your 

information, too, that this is what I am hearing from sheriffs, very 

concerned. Again, I know that it is not your primary area of authority, but certainly you have a connection here. 

You repeatedly discussed the importance of State and local fusion 

centers to the Department’s intelligence mission. The President’s 

strategy for information sharing also knows the importance of fusion centers and discussed the need for sustainment of funding for 

these centers through the Federal Government. But we are told 

that there are some cuts that are coming to specific programs. 

What Federal resources are we going to use to fund these centers 

in the future? 

Mr. ALLEN. We obviously are going to be facing, I think, a crossroads on this, the level of Federal funding and how much it will 

be sustained over time and what will be State and local government responsibilities. 

I have this issue raised with me everywhere I go, whether it is 

in Florida or California or Wisconsin. You name it, we have some 

serious issues about sustained funding of fusion centers. Because 

as good as they are and as great at innovation as fusion centers, 

in my view they need to be sustained in order to help keep our 

country safe. 

Mr. REICHERT. I appreciate your answers. 

I yield. Thank you. 
19 

Ms. HARMAN. The Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Carney of 

Pennsylvania. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, Mr. Allen. Thank you for your testimony. 

I guess I have some questions, you know, besides things like the 

classification of personnel issues, what other sources of impediments do you see toward the standing up of the—sort of system of 

fusion centers that you would like, and what other things are slowing it down in places? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think there is a range of issues that does affect standing up the fusion centers. Some fusion centers do not 

have all the security requirements because we want to feed those 

fusion centers with Secret-level information. They clearly need to 

be certified and improved to handle secure intelligence. That is one 

issue. 

I think one of the things where—and I will acknowledge it—we 

have not put our homeland data network out there, or homeland 

security data network, Secret level, at the speed that we need to 

at the fusion centers. We are trying to move it as fast as we can, 

but we have a shortage of resources in doing that. So there are 

some impediments. 

At the same time, at the homeland security intelligence area, at 

the official use level, we are doing a lot of issues. We have 41 

States which we meet with on a weekly basis by secure—by teleconference, secure teleconference, where we talk about threat information, new terrorism techniques, tactics and procedures. This is 

a whole new innovation. We call it the SLICK system. 

We are having a major fusion center conference out in San Francisco. This is one we are doing jointly with the DNI and with the 

Department of Justice. I think this will be testimony to how far we 

have come in the last 2 years. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, that is good to hear that we are moving forward. 

How many fusion centers do we need in the Nation? 

Mr. ALLEN. We can’t dictate that. I think that comes from the 

States, the States, what will be required. California has four. Some 

others have more than one. Your State, Pennsylvania, they clearly 

would put one in Harrisburg and they are thinking of putting another one up in Philadelphia, which is a major UASIs center city, 

as well as seaport. 

So I think probably Pennsylvania will probably want to have a 

couple. We will want, as soon as you—most of these are not yet 

mature. But as soon as they are mature, it will go to the top of the 

list, and Pennsylvania will have one of my officers there helping. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, awfully glad to hear that, obviously. 

When we have less populous States, does every State need a fusion center, a couple of fusion centers? Do we need a system, do 

we need regional ones? How do you envision it? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think we will find that some of the States will go 

together in regional networks. We already have fusion centers engaging in regional networks today in the Southeast, out in the far 

Southwest, in the Northeast. We see a cooperation, I think, in some 

of the less populous States. We will have fusion centers maybe 

serving two or three States and I think that makes good sense. 
20 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Back to the issue of the classification thing. 

Is the State responsible for building the SCIFs that can hold the 

classified information or is it DHS? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think the States have to help build the SCIFs. We 

certify them. I have a senior officer behind me here who helps work 

the certification of secure networks. We help certify the security 

of—DHS Security does, but the States have a responsibility to sort 

of meet Federal requirements for the handling of classified Federal 

information. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. No questions at this time. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

The Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Perlmutter for questions. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Secretary, I would like to start with—you know, as we have 

talked about this, and I will move to the fusion centers in a second. 

But we need to have strong, you know, security apparatus in place; 

and one of the places where there have been developments we have 

not quite finished is in this National Applications Office. I just 

have questions to you as to—you know, we have this space kind of 

intelligence system in place. It is moved over from the Geologic 

Survey or whatever department it was in. 

One of the things we have been talking about is putting in the 

protocols to make sure we can use that in a way that benefits our 

country and, you know, aids in our security without, you know, 

stepping all over certain rights of privacy. Where are we on the 

protocols? 

Mr. ALLEN. We are in the final process of having the charter 

signed by the principals involved—the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Interior. We have—we believe we have an agreed-upon 

charter that will be very clear to you on permissible and impermissible uses of the National Applications Office. 

We really do believe that we have met your requirements and 

that of Chairman Thompson of your House Homeland Security 

Committee. We are very confident that we have privacy and civil 

rights and civil liberties fully protected. We will have a full-time 

attorney working within the National Applications Office. In addition to layered review that will occur in the National Geospatial 

Agency, because they will not accept a request for National Technical Means imagery without doing their own internal review. 

So I think what we have is something that you will be very 

proud of and very pleased with. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Good. Let me switch to open source issues. 

I would like to know what Homeland Security is doing today to 

provide open source information to—or to assist local law enforcement agencies with all this information that is out there by the 

bucketful or the truckloads or whatever. 

Is there some kind of procedure in place to assist local law enforcement with this information? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, that is exactly what we are doing with this 

State and local government pilot—with this pilot project that I 

have described to you. 
21 

One of the efforts is to grow our open source program in accordance with what they really need at the very local level. I think we 

have a very good idea, as a result of this pilot project in five States. 

At the same time, we are getting four billets from the Director 

of National Intelligence. We are also getting some small funding 

support to put against our pilot project, which we hope to expand 

across the country. We also then need to train at the local level, 

how to use open source, what is of value and what isn’t. 

So I am very, very pleased that our open source program is going 

to, I think, take—get real traction in this coming year. We would 

be happy to come back and talk to you in more detail on how we 

are using open source. There are a lot of research tools that will 

help you use open source more effectively, which the DNI and others and CIA have, which we would like to also use in working with 

State and local governments. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks. 

The committee has a bill that I introduced that might assist you 

with respect to open source, although I think you really have a lot 

of the tools at your fingertips now. I am glad to see that you are 

really focusing on this subject. 

I guess the last question I have is, what kind of—you know, 

going back to the fusion centers, I always—when I am asked questions about homeland security when I am out on the stump in Colorado, I say one of the places where there has really been an improvement is the fact that the agencies, whether it is the CIA, 

DHS, FBI, are all talking to one another so that they get a whole 

picture of what might—what kinds of threats might exist. 

How are you coming up with credentialing so that information 

can go down to the local law enforcement agencies? Have you run 

into any trouble, you know, being able to pass that information 

down to the ground in Colorado or anyplace else? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think—I think we are making progress. I think we 

need to make more progress. We look to the National 

Counterterrorism Center, as Chair Harman said, to help be the 

overall integrator and assessor of terrorism threats, both domestic 

and foreign. But we are actually working very closely with the FBI 

and Central Intelligence Agency, other agencies that collect technical intelligence in order to write for release. 

We have sent something at the Secret level today to State fusion 

centers, which we worked jointly with the FBI, which I showed to 

the secretary this morning. I said, this threat we don’t believe is 

serious, but here is an example of where we really have worked together with NCTC and the FBI; and the ITAC–G saw it and approved it as well. 

So I think things are starting to work the right direction. I think 

we are on course. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. We have the ability to ask a second 

round of questions if Members are interested. I have just a couple 

things I would like to say, and other Members are welcome to do 

this. Mr. Reichert said that he stepped out momentarily but may 

be back as well. So I suggest we stick around just a little longer. 
22 

Mr. Allen, you hear my frustration. We hear from people involved in the ITACG. There is no need to identify them, but they 

clearly communicate to us that they don’t feel you are the full partner they expect. 

I have now some of the language from the joint explanatory 

statement to the 9/11 Act, and it tasks you to identify information 

that is of interest—this is through the ITACG—of interest to State, 

local and tribal law enforcement to produce reports which can be 

disseminated to them in an unclassified format, or at the lowest 

possible classification level, and to assist in the targeted dissemination of products to appropriate customers. 

So one of the three pieces here is, produce reports. I am not sure 

that your answer on the record was clear enough. Do you believe 

that the ITACG detailees are producers of intelligence products? Or 

do you believe that they are just supposed to provide advice? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe that they are supposed to look at threats, 

stay abreast of the threats, because they have access to vast databases at the national counterterrorism workstations. We have 

made certain they have all the current activity and that they have 

all secure communications back to the rest of the intelligence community. 

In my view, they were not selected as terrorism in-depth analysts. Some of them are very good analysts, and they could produce 

information, additional information. But my view is that they are 

to look at all threats, all information as it flows in, to particularly 

look at products produced daily by the intelligence community, writ 

large—the Bureau, as well as ourselves, as well as the CIA and 

NCTC—and there is a plethora of that; and to ensure that there 

are those that have any interest at the State and local levels are 

sanitized, if necessary, and released at the official-use level or at 

a classified level that the States can use. 

That is what is occurring, and I am really impressed—really, at 

what has occurred. 

In my two meetings with the advisory councils, we went through 

a lot of this. We are going to have a teleconference here in March 

with the advisory council, and then we are going to have another 

full face-to-face meeting in April. If there are problems as we get 

under way with this ITAC–G and if the members of the ITAC–G 

have issues, then I am happy to listen to them and to adjust accordingly. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I appreciate that, the last part of that answer, because I think they do have issues; and I hope you will invite them to talk to you directly about the issues that they have. 

Again, I am not trying to be a counselor here to make job satisfaction better. My goal is to make certain that the provisions of the 

law, which I now have in front of me, are complied with and, bottom line, that accurate, actionable and timely information is communicated through this National Fusion Center that we have set 

up, that President Bush has set up, to State, local and tribal first 

responders so that they can prevent harm to our communities. 

I know you share the goal. The question is, are you personally 

and is I&A as an institution doing its maximum to make certain 

that this structure we have set up works? 
23 

I urge you to listen to what the people who work there tell you. 

I believe that there could well be some improvements that would 

reach our goal faster. I assume you share my interest in reaching 

that goal. 

Mr. ALLEN. I want to reach that goal and I will certainly listen. 

I am in frequent communication with the acting director of the 

ITAC–G, who is one of my senior officers. 

Ms. HARMAN. Great. Let me ask you just a few more questions 

about this and then yield to others. 

Are you taking steps to put to use input from the ITACG in your 

own intelligence products? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. As they look at issues, what they think should 

go to State and local governments, and advise us on what should— 

if there is an item that has been produced by the community that 

they think urgently needs to get to State and local, we take their 

advice. 

Ms. HARMAN. What if someone, a particular ITACG detailee 

thinks that some piece of intelligence needs to be disseminated to 

his or her home agency because that intelligence might be relevant, 

how do you respond to a request like that? 

Mr. ALLEN. We believe that the State and local representatives 

are there to represent State and local interests at large, whether 

it is fusion centers or police departments or fire administrators or 

tribal. But if they can make an argument that this particular fusion center in this State and the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the 

Bureau out in the State, needs to see it, I am sure that we would 

work very closely with the FBI and with Mike Leiter and the office—and the ITAC–G to get that product out there. 

Ms. HARMAN. Fine. 

Well, let me just summarize, I have pushed this issue pretty 

hard. We think the ITACG and, more importantly, the NCTC is a 

very critical part of our intelligence gathering and our intelligence 

dissemination effort. We want to make absolutely sure that State, 

local and tribal representatives have full participation there because, No. 1, they add value, and No. 2, they become more sophisticated by participating in the effort. 

You agree with that, right? 

Mr. ALLEN. I agree. I believe that they are developing a deep appreciation for what is and is not available at the Federal level. 

Having a tribal and having a fire administration representative 

there representing the fire departments of this country, I think is 

badly needed. 

Ms. HARMAN. Finally, it is absolutely critical that as we move 

forward, we break down stovepipes, we change what has been 

called the ‘‘need-to-know’’ culture into a ‘‘need-to-share’’ culture, 

fully respecting the need to protect sources and methods. Everybody understands that. 

But we don’t need to build parallel universes. We need to build 

one joint command that fuses intelligence as effectively as possible. 

That is the way we will connect the dots. 

This is something that I am absolutely passionate about. That is 

why we made mistakes pre-9/11. So I am urging you in every way 

I can to review the reports you are about to send us personally. 
24 

I know you are coming up here again. We are going to have a 

hearing on the ITACG report. We remain keenly interested in helping that function be as effective as possible. 

I now yield for additional questions, first to Mr. Carney. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you again, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Allen, a couple things. I just kind of want to understand sort 

of the flow, the architectural flow of the intelligence. Is it top-down, 

bottom-up, is it a push-pull system? You know, move from column 

A to column B? 

Mr. ALLEN. The intelligence in DHS—as you know, we work border security, the movement of chemical, biological, radiological and 

other dangerous materials across our border. We support the Secretary and the Department in much of this. 

We work protecting critical infrastructures, a lot of that data 

does flow down. On occasion we are getting more and more from 

the fusion centers of pushing—of the fusion center pushing things 

up, just as Chief Bratton said. Look, we have worked with the Federal Government to produce this wonderful assessment. We want 

to see more of this. 

So I welcome—I welcome the State fusion center. The Washington State Fusion Center produced a brilliant piece which we 

then turned into something that was sent to the President. So that 

kind of work, I think, is remarkable. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. You know I have a background in intelligence, and we are all familiar with the intelligence cycle, such as 

it is. 

Would I recognize that within the ITAC–G system? 

Mr. ALLEN. Within the ITAC–G system, I think you would see 

the requirements, the needs; and some of the pilot projects that 

were written up in The Wall Street Journal inaccurately, I think, 

reflect trying to determine the needs. The ITAC–G looks at that, 

looks at the flow of information from across the community. 

We are talking about a vast flow. The ITAC–G is, at this stage, 

a small organization with contractors—10, 12 people; it is not a 

huge organization at this stage. But then their job is to ensure that 

they identify those data, those intelligence pieces that need to go 

in a timely basis down to the very local level; and they work to do 

that. 

What they have done to date is not inconsequential, it is not trivial; it is very significant. 

Mr. CARNEY. Another thing I was very, very curious about in this 

whole process in the ITAC–G and the fusion centers, does FISA information ever come in and play a role in that? 

Mr. ALLEN. I don’t think I can answer that question in this particular forum. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. 

No further questions, ma’am. Thanks. Thank you, Ms. Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Carney. 

Mr. Perlmutter, do you have any additional questions? 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Only questions that I don’t think he can answer in this particular forum. But I do have one. 

Mr. Secretary, assume for the moment, or just for argument’s 

sake, that the President’s budgetary priorities and the budgetary 
25 

priorities of the Congress are different, and we don’t come to some 

kind of agreement on appropriations bills. 

What effect would a continuing resolution have on the budget in 

your Department? 

Mr. ALLEN. It would have—it would have a very, very serious effect. When we were under continuing resolution last fall and winter, I could not send people to travel. We held up sending officers 

out to the fusion centers. It also inhibited us in a number of ways 

in continuing, undertaking any new initiative or expanding what 

we do. Continuing resolutions are very detrimental to the efficacy 

of the Federal Government. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I hope we don’t come to that kind of a result 

this time around. But I would suggest you have a contingency plan 

in place. 

Mr. ALLEN. I thank you very much for that, because I think the 

risks and the threat to this country, the inbound threat in particular, is so serious that we have to have something in place to 

stay effective during any long continuing resolution. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I was going to ask some questions about FISA. 

But I will leave those for another day in another setting. The last 

question I have, on the security clearances for local law enforcement, is there a backlog in clearing individuals? Like, let’s say, in 

Colorado there is a fusion center now, what problems, if any, are 

you running into in clearing officers so that they can get, you 

know, more general intelligence information? 

Mr. ALLEN. I don’t know of any major problems. 

When I came to the Department, we had major problems in moving security clearances to State and local. We have cleared a lot of 

people—Nevada and California and New York; we have cleared 

over 100 people in New York City alone. 

So we do this, and most of the information, you know, can easily 

flow to those people at the Secret level. Getting Top Secret, Compartmented clearances takes longer, but we are doing that. We did 

that for the people coming in to the State and local officials in the 

ITAC–G. 

The DNI is leading a study to expedite the clearances. It takes 

about an average of several months. The President has, as you 

know, sent out a statement that says we have to do a better job 

in expediting the clearance of personnel, Government and non-Government; and I think we have made a lot of progress. I worked very 

closely with the Director of Security and the Department to expedite those clearances, and I am quite a tiger at pushing clearances 

and getting people cleared. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. I would just add, Mr. Perlmutter, that one of the 

things we are trying to do at this end is to reduce the amount of 

information that is classified. We have some legislation in draft 

form that we have been circulating and we have introduced one 

bill. But we are hoping to produce a bipartisan effort that will 

move faster. That, I assume, is a goal, again, that you share; is it 

not, Mr. Allen? 

Mr. ALLEN. It is a goal I share and it is a goal that Mike McConnell shares as a DNI, and he has given David Shedd, ahead of his 
26 

plans and policy, you know, full authority to move swiftly on getting clearances. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, it is not just getting clearances. It is reducing 

the amount of classified information which would therefore guarantee that people who needed to see it, who did not have clearances, could see it. 

Mr. ALLEN. That is absolutely the case. We try to write at the 

lowest classification possible the work that we do in our Critical Infrastructure Threat Assessment Division, that I run. It is amazing 

what we can get down to ‘‘official use,’’ where it talks about real 

threats to various sectors of our private—of our private industry 

and the steps that these sectors can take to mitigate the threat. 

I am rather amazed at what we have out there on a day-to-day 

basis. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I hope we have more out there. I hope that 

what is out there is accurate and actionable, and that we don’t 

have an attack on our homeland because the stovepipes didn’t permit the sharing of information in a timely fashion. 

So I appreciate your answers, Mr. Allen. We are going to keep 

at this information. We are reviewing your request for additional 

funds; we will review those carefully. We understand your priorities, and I think we have been crystal clear about our priorities, 

which are to make absolutely certain that State, local and tribal 

representatives are fully involved in the process of preparing and 

disseminating information that they are going to end up using to 

help protect our communities. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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