IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0271

FILED 6-27-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD42120

The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa

By Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer L. Thorson

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

OPINION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which 

Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

2

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Adrian P. appeals from the juvenile court’s order adjudicating 

his alleged son, George,

1 dependent. We hold that the juvenile court erred 

by adjudicating George dependent as to Adrian without first determining 

parentage. We vacate the order and remand for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Adrian is George’s alleged father.2 George is 14. Adrian lives 

in Georgia. Adrian never established paternity of George, never sought 

custody of George, had not seen George in person for about four years, and

had only sporadically spoken with him by phone.

¶3 The Department of Child Safety (“Department”) received 

reports that George’s mother left George and his two siblings with a friend 

for over two months and had not returned. After an investigation, the 

Department petitioned to adjudicate George and his two siblings 

dependent as to their mother and each of the children’s alleged fathers. The 

Department alleged that Adrian was “unwilling or unable to provide 

proper and effective parental care and control due to abandonment” and 

“neglected to provide for [George’s] basic needs.” See A.R.S. 

§ 8-201(15)(a)(i), (iii). The Department also petitioned to establish paternity 

of the children and asked the court to enter a paternity adjudication for any 

child whose paternity had not been established. See A.R.S. § 25-806.

¶4 Later, the court dismissed one alleged father when it 

determined he was not the father of George’s sibling despite being 

identified as such. The alleged father of George’s other sibling chose not to 

contest the dependency allegations. But Adrian contested the dependency 

allegations against him.

¶5 When Adrian and George’s mother appeared at the contested 

dependency adjudication, Adrian’s paternity was still unknown. Adrian 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the child’s identity.

2 In the briefing, the parties alternatively use the term “alleged father” 

or “putative father.” See A.R.S. § 8-106.01. For consistency, we use the term 

“alleged father.”
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

3

asked the court to continue the hearing until the Department established 

paternity.

¶6 Adrian asserted that proceeding with the hearing would be

unfair to him “if he is not even the established parent.” The Department did 

not object to Adrian’s continuance request. The Department apologized for 

failing to test for paternity but contended Adrian “has had opportunities to 

establish paternity prior to this case coming into being.” The court asked 

whether there were any other potential fathers for George. Mother 

interjected and said, “[h]e’s the only father” and “[t]here is no John Doe at 

all.”

¶7 The court questioned exceeding the 90-day requirement for 

holding dependency adjudications. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(b). The court 

ultimately found that the lack of paternity did not justify delaying the 

hearing and denied the request for a continuance.

¶8 Mother then chose not to contest the allegations against her,

and the court found the three children dependent as to her.

3 The court 

committed the children “to the care, custody, and control of the 

Department.” Then, the court proceeded with Adrian’s dependency 

hearing.

¶9 A child welfare investigator testified and confirmed the 

Department had not scheduled a paternity test for Adrian and was unsure

why the Department had not made the referral. Adrian testified he had 

never personally sought a paternity test before because he was “pretty 

confident” he was George’s father.

¶10 After considering the evidence, the court found “that the 

allegations of the petition [were] true by a preponderance of the evidence” 

and that George was dependent as to Adrian. It reasoned that Adrian never 

established paternity, supported George, or developed a significant 

relationship with him. The court ordered the Department to offer Adrian 

paternity testing, drug testing, counseling, parenting classes, and case 

management. The court also ordered the Department to investigate 

Adrian’s criminal record and arrange an assessment of his home in Georgia. 

The court adopted a case plan for family reunification. Adrian appealed.

3 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

A. We Have Jurisdiction to Review Adrian’s Appeal.

¶11 Although neither party challenges this court’s jurisdiction

over the appeal, we have an independent duty to determine our 

jurisdiction. Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, 442, ¶ 19 (App. 2022). An order 

declaring a child dependent is a final, appealable order. Jewel C. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 347, 350, ¶ 8 (App. 2018). An aggrieved party may 

appeal from a final order of the juvenile court. A.R.S. § 8-235(A). “To qualify 

as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny the party some 

personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden on the party.” 

Jewel C., 244 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 3 (quoting Pima County Juv. Action No. B-9385, 

138 Ariz. 291, 293 (1983)). A parent who contests his or her child’s 

dependency adjudication is an aggrieved party. Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 12 (App. 2006).

¶12 A parent is “the child’s biological, adoptive, or legal mother 

or father whose rights have not been terminated.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 102(v).4

But “‘[p]arent’ does not include a person whose paternity has not been 

established pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-812 or § 25-814.” Id.; see also A.R.S. 

§ 25-401(4) (defining legal parent); A.R.S. § 25-812(A)(1) (Parties can 

establish paternity by filing a notarized or witnessed acknowledgment of 

paternity by both parents.); A.R.S. § 25-812(A)(2) (Parties can establish

paternity by agreeing to be bound by genetic testing results.); A.R.S. 

§ 25-814(A) (A man is presumed to be a child’s father if the child was born 

within the marriage, genetic testing affirms paternity, he appears on the 

birth certificate, or the parties acknowledge paternity by a notarized or 

witnessed statement.).

¶13 Neither Adrian nor the Department established paternity 

before the dependency adjudication. Although Adrian was “pretty 

confident” he was George’s father, and George’s mother interjected, saying

Adrian was the “only father,” the record contains no sworn statements of 

both parties acknowledging paternity. See A.R.S. §§ 25-812(A)(1), 

25-814(A)(4). Nor is Adrian presumed to be George’s father. He was never 

married to George’s mother, did not sign a notice of acknowledgment at the 

4 For dependency proceedings, a parent “also includes a guardian 

appointed by the court under Title 8 or Title 14 and an Indian custodian.” 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 302(a). Neither party asserts Adrian is George’s 

appointed guardian or an Indian custodian.
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

5

time of George’s birth, was not listed on the birth certificate, and had not 

yet participated in genetic testing. See A.R.S. §§ 25-814(A), 25-812(A)(2). 

Thus, Adrian was not a parent at the contested dependency hearing. See 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 102(v), 302(a).

¶14 Before the Department filed the dependency petition, Adrian 

had no parental rights because he was not a legal parent. A.R.S. § 25-401(4);

see Pima County Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 96 (1994). 

When the court found George dependent as to Mother and committed him 

to the Department’s custody, Adrian still had no custodial claim because he 

had not established paternity. See Maricopa County Juv. Action No. 

JD-500200, 163 Ariz. 457, 460 (App. 1989) (The alleged father could not seek 

custody of the child until he established paternity.). And when the court 

found George dependent as to Adrian, Adrian lost no custodial rights 

because none had been established.

¶15 Even so, a dependency adjudication has independent 

consequences. As a prime example, the Department maintains a central 

registry of substantiated child abuse and neglect reports, including 

dependency findings. A.R.S. § 8-804(A). If the Department recorded the 

court’s dependency finding in the central registry, Adrian could be 

disqualified “from obtaining or maintaining various licenses, certifications, 

or employment in working with children.” Phillip B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 253 Ariz. 295, 296, ¶ 1 (App. 2022); see generally A.R.S. § 8-804.

¶16 Because of the dependency adjudication, the court ordered 

the Department to investigate Adrian’s record and arrange an assessment 

of his home. Despite Adrian’s lack of paternity, the court still found George

dependent as to him, thereby placing a “substantial burden” on Adrian. See 

Jewel C., 244 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 3. Thus, Adrian is aggrieved by the adjudication, 

and we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

B. The Juvenile Court Erred by Adjudicating George Dependent as 

to Adrian Before Establishing Adrian’s Paternity.

¶17 Adrian argues the record contains no reasonable evidence to 

support the dependency finding. We review a dependency adjudication for 

abuse of discretion and will affirm a dependency finding unless no 

reasonable evidence supports it. Louis C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 

484, 488, ¶ 12 (App. 2015).

¶18 We review the juvenile court’s interpretation of statutes and 

procedural rules de novo. Louis C., 237 Ariz. at 488, ¶ 12. When we interpret 

a statute, we first review its text. Chaparral Dev. v. RMED Int’l, Inc., 170 Ariz. 
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

6

309, 311 (App. 1991). “If the language is plain and unambiguous, then no 

construction is necessary and our duty is simply to apply that plain and 

unambiguous language.” Id.

¶19 Relevant here, a child is dependent if he or she is “[i]n need 

of proper and effective parental care and control and who has no parent or 

guardian, or one who has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or 

capable of exercising such care and control.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i). A child 

is also dependent if his or her home is unfit because of abuse or neglect “by 

a parent, a guardian or any other person having custody or care of the 

child.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(iii). The dependency petition must contain facts 

supporting a dependency finding. A.R.S. § 8-841(C)(3).

¶20 The juvenile court determines “whether a child is dependent 

based upon the circumstances existing at the time of the adjudication 

hearing.” Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). 

If the court finds that the allegations in the dependency petition are true by 

a preponderance of the evidence, it must make specified findings about

each parent. A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1)(a). Because the juvenile court considers 

only “circumstances existing at the time of the adjudication,” we decline to 

consider paternity developments after the dependency adjudication. See 

Shella H., 239 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 12. As noted above, the court had not established

paternity before the dependency hearing.

¶21 We prioritize juvenile court proceedings “except as otherwise 

provided by law.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 103(a). But the law provides paternity 

proceedings “have precedence over other civil proceedings.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-807(A). Thus, when the Department simultaneously petitions for 

dependency and paternity, a court should generally resolve the paternity 

issue first.

5 See id.; see also Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JD-05401, 173 

5 Even if no party seeks to establish paternity, the juvenile court may 

rule on paternity matters relevant to a dependency. Albert L. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 253 Ariz. 146, 148–49, ¶ 11 (App. 2022). After a preliminary 

protective hearing, if paternity has not been established, the court must 

order establishment through testing or a voluntary acknowledgement. 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 332(e)(3). At the initial dependency hearing, the court 

revisits remaining paternity issues. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 334(c)(2)(C). 

Again, at the end of the initial hearing, if paternity has not been established, 

the court must order that it be established. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 334(g)(2). And 

if an alleged father fails to comply, the Department may petition for 

termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B).
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

7

Ariz. 634, 641 (App. 1993) (“A juvenile court may determine issues under 

Title 25 that are properly before it if its jurisdiction has been properly 

invoked.”).

¶22 Because paternity proceedings take precedence over other 

civil proceedings, we hold that in a dependency proceeding, the parties 

must address, and the court must resolve, relevant paternity issues before 

the court determines dependency. In this case, the court erred by finding 

George dependent as to Adrian because paternity was relevant to prove the 

allegations.

¶23 If paternity is irrelevant to the dependency petition, the court 

may proceed with a dependency adjudication before establishing paternity. 

For example, A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(v) provides a child is dependent if the 

court finds he or she is “[i]ncompetent or not restorable to competency and 

who is alleged to have committed a serious offense as defined in § 13-706.”

So for an allegation under this section, a parental determination is not 

required before proceeding with the dependency. But here, the Department 

alleged Adrian was George’s father, and each of the Department’s

dependency allegations against Adrian required a finding that Adrian was 

a parent, guardian, or custodian.

¶24 First, the Department alleged Adrian was “unwilling or 

unable to provide proper and effective parental care and control due to 

abandonment.” “‘Abandoned’ means the failure of the parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, 

including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-201(1) (emphasis 

added). For the court to find that Adrian abandoned George, the court

would need to find that Adrian was George’s parent. See id.

¶25 Second, the Department alleged Adrian “neglected to provide 

for [George’s] basic needs.” The court can make a dependency finding due 

to neglect only as to “a parent, a guardian or any other person having 

custody or care of the child.” See A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(iii). Adrian did not 

have custody of George, and the court never appointed him as George’s 

guardian. So the court could have found this allegation true only if Adrian 

were George’s parent.

¶26 Based on the facts and allegations, the juvenile court lacked

the evidence to adjudicate George dependent as to Adrian because it could 

not find that Adrian was George’s parent. See A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(2) (If the 

court “[d]oes not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

8

allegations contained in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the 

petition.”).

¶27 The juvenile court acknowledged Adrian’s lack of paternity 

but was concerned that continuing the hearing would place the matter

outside the 90-day window for dependency hearings. Generally, a court 

must complete the dependency adjudication within 90 days after service. 

A.R.S. § 8-842(C); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(b)(1) (“The dependency 

adjudication hearing must be completed no later than 90 days after service 

of the dependency petition on the parent.”) (emphasis added).

¶28 When served with the petition, Adrian was not George’s legal 

parent. A.R.S. § 25-401(4). Thus, for the allegations against Adrian, the clock 

for his hearing would not run until Adrian’s paternity had been established.

¶29 The juvenile court could have continued Adrian’s

dependency adjudication hearing without violating the 90-day requirement 

so long as it held the hearing within 90 days of establishing Adrian’s

paternity. Also, a court may extend the deadline by 30 days if “necessary 

for the full, fair, and proper presentation of evidence and the child’s best 

interests would not be adversely affected.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(b)(2)(A); 

see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(b)(2)(B) (The court may grant a continuance 

exceeding 30 days for extraordinary circumstances.). Finally, the parties can 

always waive the 90-day requirement. See Joshua J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

230 Ariz. 417, 423, ¶ 21 (App. 2012). And here, the Department did not

object to Adrian’s request for a continuance.

¶30 As noted above, the court had options. But given the 

allegations in the petition, it could not enter a dependency finding against 

Adrian without first resolving the pending paternity issue. Thus, the court 

erred by proceeding with the dependency adjudication as to Adrian.
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.R.

Opinion of the Court

9

CONCLUSION

¶31 We vacate the juvenile court’s dependency order and remand 

for proceedings consistent with this opinion. If the court finds that Adrian 

is George’s parent, it may proceed with a dependency adjudication, 

assuming compliance with other laws and procedures.