# Libya - United States Department of State

- 2024 Interagency Fact Sheets HomeU.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability &#8230;2024 Interagency Fact Sheets				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										2024 Interagency Fact Sheets																																																																										The following fact sheets were created to provide a snapshot of efforts under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) in each priority country/region.  Each fact sheet details the main objectives and lists a sample of activities that the wider U.S. government is leveraging for SPCPS.Coastal West AfricaHaitiLibyaMozambiquePapua New Guinea						Tags																					Benin																								Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations																								Côte d&#039;Ivoire																								Ghana																								Guinea																								Haiti																								Libya																								Mozambique																								Papua New Guinea																								Togo
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Libya HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Libya				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya concluded its three-year mandate in March and found reasonable grounds to believe state and nonstate actors committed crimes against humanity in Libya. The Fact-Finding Mission’s final report identified the Libyan Coast Guard, the Tripoli-based interim Government of National Unity and its aligned armed groups, the Government of National Unity’s Department for Combatting Illegal Migration, and the Benghazi-based nonstate actor known as the Libyan National Army and its aligned armed groups as perpetrators of abuses against Libyans and migrants. The conclusion of the Fact-Finding Mission’s mandate without establishing a follow-on mechanism raised questions about addressing abuses documented in the report and holding perpetrators accountable. Amid increased pressure on civil society across the country, the Government of National Unity revived a Gaddhafi-era law restricting the registration and operation of civil society organizations. Following objections from civil society and the international community, the Prime Minister’s Office of the Government of National Unity issued new rules in March allowing local and foreign organizations to operate temporarily until they were registered. In addition to worsening repression in areas under its control in the east and south, the Libyan National Army launched a campaign to oust Chadian rebel groups. Critics characterized the campaign as a pretext for targeting members of the marginalized Tebu community.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by the government and armed groups on all sides; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly widespread civilian deaths or harm; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence against journalists and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on Internet freedom; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; refoulement of refugees to a country where they would face torture or persecution; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic violence and sexual violence; crimes involving threats of violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Tebu and Tuareg communities; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which the government enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.The Government of National Unity took limited steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses within areas it controlled, but its limited resources, lack of political will, and inability to control significant portions of the country reduced its ability to do so.Reports of human rights abuses committed by groups aligned with the government, the Libyan National Army, other nonstate actors, and foreign actors, including mercenaries from various countries, were widespread throughout the year. These included abuses involving killings, arbitrary detention, unlawful recruitment or use of children, and torture.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that armed groups aligned with the Government of National Unity (“the government”), as well as with the Libyan National Army (LNA) and other nonstate actors, including foreign fighters and mercenaries, committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Shifting alliances between government officials, nonstate actors, and former or active officers in the armed forces participating in extralegal campaigns made it difficult to ascertain the role of the government in attacks by armed groups.The final report of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), released in March at the conclusion of the FFM’s three-year mandate, documented the arbitrary killing of hundreds of persons in the country since 2016, including during hostilities and violent clashes.In April, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Lawyers for Justice in Libya and Libya Crimes Watch documented abuses in the LNA-controlled al-Kwaifiya prison’s Military Police wing in Benghazi. According to witness testimonies, at least 16 detainees died between 2017 and 2022 of causes ranging from torture to medical neglect.In June, government authorities identified the remains of al-Khoms primary court judge Mohamed Bin Amer in one of the mass graves discovered in the western town of Tarhouna. Bin Amer was kidnapped in 2020 in Tripoli during the al-Kaniyat militia’s attack on Castleverde.The government continued to discover mass graves throughout the year. In January, the General Authority for Search and Identification of Missing Persons announced the discovery of 18 unidentified bodies in Sirte. In July, the organization announced the discovery of 12 unidentified bodies in a grave near al-Jufra Airbase, south of Sirte.																																				b. Disappearance										Government-and LNA-aligned armed groups, other nonstate armed groups, criminal gangs, and tribal groups committed an unknown number of forced disappearances. Domestic and international human rights organizations reported security services or armed groups throughout the country forcibly disappeared or detained dozens of civil society activists, politicians, judges, and journalists for making comments or pursuing activities perceived as disloyal to the government or the LNA. The FFM final report noted that a victim’s family origin or ties were also factors in some cases of forced disappearance. According to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the whereabouts of thousands of men, women, and children remained unknown. Some were illegally detained and later released, while the bodies of other missing and disappeared persons were found in locations throughout the country, including in mass graves. Authorities made few effective efforts to prevent, investigate, or penalize forced disappearances, although a military court in February convicted 30 persons of murder for their role in the 2019 mass killings in Tarhouna. Prison terms ranged from six years to life in prison. As of year’s end, the whereabouts of Siham Sergiwa, a parliamentarian abducted from her home in 2019 after criticizing the LNA’s Tripoli offensive in a televised interview, remained unknown.In February, local media reported masked gunmen kidnapped Tarhouna member of parliament Hassan Jaballah al-Ferjani as he exited the headquarters of the Administrative Control Authority in Tripoli. Local media alleged the gunmen were members of a Tarhouna militia led by Feraj Keshar, working under the direction of the government-aligned Security Deterrence Force (SDF or Rada).In June, gunmen allegedly affiliated with the eastern Internal Security Agency (ISA East) kidnapped activist, university professor, and parliamentary candidate Belgasem Mohamed al-Jared from his home in Benghazi and took him to an undisclosed location, according to local NGO Libya Crimes Watch.Migrants, refugees, and other foreign nationals were especially vulnerable to kidnapping. UNSMIL received reports that hundreds of migrants and refugees intercepted or rescued at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) and other entities went missing after disembarking at Libyan ports. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported such individuals remained vulnerable to seizure by armed groups engaged in human trafficking or migrant smuggling. In July, the UN Panel of Experts expressed serious concern regarding the situation of 120 migrants and refugees allegedly released by the Libyan Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) from a warehouse in the southeastern oasis of Tazirbu in February. According to the Panel of Experts, the migrants and refugees were taken to an undisclosed location and continued to be detained without access to lawyers, assistance, or protection.The International Commission on Missing Persons estimated that up to 10,000 missing-person cases in the country remained unresolved, dating back to the Gaddhafi era.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration and postrevolutionary legislation prohibited such practices. The FFM final report documented widespread instances of torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in all prisons it investigated, irrespective of prison location or the entity in control of the detainees.An unknown number of individuals, including refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants, were held in facilities under the control of armed groups affiliated with either the government or the LNA, or in extralegal facilities run by smugglers and other nonstate actors. The criminal and nonstate armed groups controlling extralegal facilities routinely tortured and abused detainees, subjecting them to arbitrary killings, rape and sexual violence, beatings, electric shocks, burns, forced labor, and deprivation of food and water, according to dozens of testimonies shared with international aid agencies and human rights groups. In many instances, the purpose of this abuse was reportedly to extort payments from detainees’ families.In April, Lawyers for Justice in Libya and Libya Crimes Watch documented torture, rape, medical neglect, arbitrary detention, lack of access to family and legal counsel, and other mistreatment inside the al-Kwaifiya prison’s military wing in Benghazi. Witnesses stated that the center’s staff routinely administered severe beatings to detainees and committed harassment and rape. Male detainees testified they often heard screaming coming from the women’s wing. They reported one woman detainee attempted to climb over the detention center wall to commit suicide.In April, protests erupted in the northwestern city of Zawiya after a video posted to social media purported to show sub-Saharan African mercenaries torturing young Libyan men inside the headquarters of a local unnamed militia. According to local media, the videos showed the apparent mercenaries flogging, burning, and suspending the youths by their limbs from the ceiling.Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces. The government took limited steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses and acts of corruption within its area of reach; however, its limited resources, as well as political considerations, reduced its ability and willingness to prosecute and punish perpetrators.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prisons and detention facilities were often overcrowded, and conditions were harsh and life threatening.In its final report, the FFM found reasonable grounds to believe the SDF elements in control of Mitiga detention complex in Tripoli committed crimes against humanity, as did the LNA, LNA-aligned Tarek Ben Ziyad (TbZ) Brigade, and ISA East elements in control of Gernada and al-Kwaifiya prisons in Benghazi. According to the FFM, no detainee it interviewed during its three-year mandate had been held in acceptable conditions of detention.Abusive Physical Conditions: Prisons were grossly overcrowded. The FFM final report found detainees were denied adequate access to water, food, toilets, sanitation, light, exercise, medical care, legal counsel, and communication with family members. Poor and unsafe infrastructure was common and exacerbated sanitation problems, which contributed to the spread of communicable diseases. The ratio of detainees and prisoners to guards varied significantly during the year. Monitoring and training of prison staff by international organizations remained largely suspended, although training of judicial police continued. There was a lack of adequate gender-sensitive training for male guards.Although there were often separate facilities for men and women, women were almost universally guarded by male prison guards. UNSMIL and international NGOs received numerous reports of women subjected to forced prostitution in prisons or detention facilities in what amounted to sexual slavery.Communicable diseases, including tuberculosis, scabies, and HIV and AIDS, affected detainees in some prisons and detention centers. Most prisons lacked functioning health units, and inmates depended on family members for medicine. Inmates needing medical attention were sometimes transferred to public hospitals within the jurisdiction of whichever police unit or militia controlled the prison; these transfers often depended on the availability of private vehicles, as most prisons lacked ambulances. In February, a local NGO reported the death of Fathi Mohammed, age 72, Khawaja in SDF-controlled Mitiga prison as a result of illness and deliberate medical neglect throughout his six-year detention.There were reportedly no functioning juvenile detention facilities in the country.Administration: There was no credible information available as to whether authorities conducted investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring: Multiple independent monitoring organizations reported difficulties gaining access to prison and detention facilities, particularly those administered by the LNA. The government permitted limited, chaperoned independent monitoring of its detention facilities by international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, but controlled these movements tightly. UN and international aid organization sources reported DCIM officials repeatedly denied access requests. Although some international organizations received permission to visit DCIM-administered migrant detention facilities, the responsiveness of government authorities and level of access varied widely from visit to visit. As of October, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners had conducted 486 monitoring visits to DCIM facilities during the year to administer aid and register refugees and asylum seekers.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										Neither the 2011 Constitutional Declaration nor the Gaddhafi-era criminal code prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, nor did they provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government had weak control over police and armed groups providing internal security, and some armed groups carried out illegal and arbitrary detentions unimpeded. The low level of international monitoring meant there were no reliable statistics on the number of arbitrary detentions.As of March, the government reported there were 18,523 detainees in prisons across the country. The FFM assessed the true number of individuals arbitrarily detained was likely much higher. An unknown number of individuals were arbitrarily held without judicial authorization, for extended periods, without legal charges, in unknown locations, in prisons nominally controlled by the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defense, or in extralegal facilities controlled by government-affiliated armed groups, LNA-affiliated armed groups, and other nonstate actors.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required an arrest warrant for a formal arrest, but authorities could detain persons without charge for as long as six days and could renew detention for up to three months, provided there was “reasonable evidence.” The law also specified that authorities were required to inform detainees of the charges against them and have a detainee appear before a judicial authority every 30 days to renew a detention order, although these rights were not respected, according to UNSMIL. Detainees often faced prolonged and sometimes indefinite detention, without judicial oversight, procedural guarantees, or consideration of individual protection needs.The law gave the government power to detain persons for up to two months if considered a “threat to public security or stability,” based on their “previous actions or affiliation with an official or unofficial apparatus or tool of the former regime.”Although the 2011 Constitutional Declaration recognized the right to counsel, most detainees did not have access to a lawyer. Government authorities and armed groups held detainees incommunicado for protracted periods in official and unofficial detention centers.According to the FFM final report, detainees were almost never informed of the reason for their arrest or provided with information on the charges against them. Some detainees were imprisoned for years without appearing before a judge, and release orders were frequently ignored.Arbitrary Arrest: Various government-aligned and nonstate armed groups arrested and detained persons arbitrarily throughout the year.In July, local media reported elements of the government-aligned ISA West detained former Finance Minister Faraj Bomtari, allegedly in response to his bid to replace Central Bank of Libya Governor Sadek Elkaber. Bomtari was released after his tribe shut down crucial oil fields.In October, local media and rights groups reported the LNA-aligned ISA East detained former member of the National Transitional Council and former ambassador to Canada Fathi Bajaa and two colleagues on charges of seeking to overthrow the LNA. ISA East personnel reportedly detained the three men for participating in a discussion at a Benghazi-based think tank regarding the collapse of two dams during the September 10-11 floods in Derna, a city in the eastern region under LNA control.The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported state and nonstate actors detained migrants and refugees arbitrarily in official and unofficial detention centers.UNICEF reported authorities continued to arbitrarily detain migrant children in detention centers in and around Tripoli. These children lacked access to legal assistance, due process, and basic protection and health services, according to UNICEF. UNSMIL called for the release of all arbitrarily detained individuals and stressed the imperative to conduct any security operations in full respect of the rights and freedoms of the population.Pretrial Detention: While authorities had to order detention for a specific period not exceeding 90 days, an ambiguity in the language of the law permitting judges to renew the detention period if the suspect was of “interest to the investigation” resulted in extended pretrial detentions. In addition, limited resources and court capacity caused a severe backlog of cases. According to international NGOs, many pretrial detainees were held for periods longer than the sentences for the minor crimes they allegedly committed. UNSMIL continued to call on the Ministry of Justice to apply international standards for pretrial detention. The number of persons held in pretrial detention in Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and extralegal detention facilities was not publicly known.Armed groups held most of their detainees without charge and outside the government’s authority. With control of the security environment divided among various armed groups and a largely nonfunctioning judiciary, circumstances prevented most of these detainees from accessing due process.The law allowed a detained suspect to challenge pretrial detention before the prosecutor and a magistrate judge. If the prosecutor did not order release, the detained person could appeal to the magistrate judge. If the magistrate judge ordered continued detention following review of the prosecutor’s request, and despite the detainee’s challenge, there was no further right to appeal the assigned detention order. A breakdown in the court system, intimidation of judges, and difficulties in securely transporting prisoners to the courts effectively limited detainee access to the courts. For persons held in migrant detention facilities, there was no access to immigration courts or due process.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for an independent judiciary and stipulated every person had a right of recourse to the judicial system. Nonetheless, thousands of detainees lacked access to lawyers and information concerning the charges against them. In some cases, trials were held without public hearings. Judges and prosecutors, lacking resources and facing threats, intimidation, and violence from armed groups, cited concerns regarding the overall lack of security in and around the courts in various parts of the country, further hindering the rule of law.UNSMIL and local NGOs documented several cases, especially in LNA-controlled areas, in which military “judicial authorities” tried cases that would normally fall under the jurisdiction of civilian courts; according to UNSMIL, these “trials” did not meet international standards. UNSMIL also received reports of the unlawful deprivation of liberty and the issuance of sentences by so-called courts operating outside national and international legal norms.																Trial Procedures						The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and the right to legal counsel, provided at public expense for the indigent. Government and nonstate actors did not respect these standards. There were multiple reports of individuals denied fair and public trials, choice of attorney, language interpretation, the ability to confront witnesses, protection against forced testimony or confessions, and the right to appeal.According to reports from international and domestic NGOs, arbitrary detention and torture by armed groups, including those operating nominally under government oversight, contributed to a climate of lawlessness that made fair trials elusive. Armed groups and families of the victims or the accused regularly threatened lawyers, judges, and prosecutors.Amid threats, intimidation, and violence against the judiciary, the government did not take steps to screen detainees systematically for prosecution or release. The courts were more prone to process civil cases, which were less likely to invite retaliation, although capacity was limited due to a lack of judges and administrators.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of political prisoners and detainees. Armed groups, some of which were nominally under government authority, held persons on political grounds, particularly former Gaddhafi regime officials and others accused of subverting the 2011 revolution, in a variety of temporary facilities. As of December, UNSMIL and local and international NGOs reported the government continued to prohibit access by human rights or humanitarian organizations to such facilities.Due to the lack of international monitoring, there were no reliable statistics on the number of political prisoners.In February, former Gaddhafi Internal Security chief Abdalla Mansour was released from prison, after nine years in detention, as part of the Presidential Council’s national reconciliation process. It was the only known case of a released political prisoner during the year.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Past government policy actions and a weak regulatory environment complicated property rights in the country. The government eliminated all private property rights and most private businesses in 1978. This step, in addition to the destruction of some official files at the property registrar in 1986, greatly complicated any subsequent effort to prove clear title to property throughout the country. There was no clear pathway for restitution or compensation for property seized during the Gaddhafi period. The national property register remained frozen since 2011.In March, UNSMIL and local media reported forced evictions and demolition of cultural sites in central Benghazi, purportedly as part of the LNA’s campaign to restore parts of the city damaged by fighting. As of September, the UN Panel of Experts reported TbZ members, functionally under the control of LNA commander Khalifa Haftar’s son Saddam, and Brigade 20/20 evicted more than 20,000 Benghazi residents on short notice and forced them to surrender their property or ownership documents. According to reports received by the Panel of Experts, there were no prior consultations with concerned residents nor any publicly communicated decision-making process. According to the reports, there was no compensation scheme in place and evicted residents were not offered assistance to secure new housing of equal value. Residents who opposed or protested the eviction plans were pressured into compliance or silence, including through power cuts, harassment, and violence.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration considered correspondence, telephone conversations, and other forms of communication inviolable unless access, collection, or use was authorized by a court order. Nonetheless, media reports, including on social media, indicated government-aligned groups violated these prohibitions by monitoring communications without judicial authorization, imposing roadside checks, and entering private homes.Domestic human rights organizations continued to protest authorities’ searches of cell phones, tablets, and laptops at roadside checkpoints, airports, and border crossings. These organizations noted the practice was widespread across both western and eastern regions of the country to target activists, lawyers, media professionals, bloggers, and migrants.Invasion of privacy left citizens vulnerable to targeted attacks based on political affiliation, ideology, and identity. Extrajudicial punishment extended to targets’ family members and tribes. Armed groups arbitrarily entered, seized, or destroyed private property with impunity.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Civil society and media reports documented abuses by government-aligned groups, LNA-aligned groups, nonstate groups, foreign actors including mercenaries from various countries, and terrorist organizations. Conflict-related abuses committed by armed groups reportedly included killings, kidnapping, arbitrary detention, and torture.Killings: There were numerous reports members of government-aligned groups, LNA-aligned groups, foreign actors, mercenaries, and other nonstate actors committed arbitrary and unlawful killings of civilians. According to the FFM final report, evidence obtained by the FFM established reasonable grounds to believe elements of the LNA and its affiliated groups killed members of the Tebu community in 2019. Video footage showed eight bodies, two of them handcuffed, of alleged Tebu members off a main road north of the city of Murzuq. The FFM also found reasonable grounds to believe Tebu men killed two children, ages five and 14, from the al-Ahaali community with gunshots to the head in the presence of their relatives in a family home in Murzuq in 2019, allegedly because their father was fighting for the LNA.Abductions: Government-aligned groups, LNA-aligned groups, and other armed groups were reportedly responsible for the disappearance of civilians, although few details were available. Kidnappings targeted activists, journalists, government officials, migrants, and refugees. Kidnappings for ransom, including of migrants and other foreign workers, remained a frequent occurrence in many cities.The FFM final report documented 21 cases of alleged disappearances and abductions of al-Ahaali community members around Murzuq, mostly in 2019.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: According to UN and NGO reporting, guards at both government and extralegal detention centers tortured prisoners, although the law prohibited torture.Child Soldiers: The Secretary of State determined Libya had government-supported armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.The United Nations reported an LNA-affiliated armed group recruited or used children in support roles.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for freedom of opinion, expression, and press, but censorship was pervasive by all sides and various armed groups, including those aligned with the government, exerted significant control over media content. Unidentified assailants targeted journalists as reprisal for their reporting.Freedom of Expression: Freedom of expression was limited in law and practice. The law criminalized acts that “harm the February 17 revolution,” which was the start of protests in 2011. The House of Representatives, since its election in 2014, and the government, since taking power in Tripoli in 2021, did little to reduce restrictions on freedom of expression. Observers reported individuals censored themselves in everyday speech. Civil society organizations (CSOs) practiced self-censorship because members of armed groups previously threatened or killed activists. Skirmishes in major urban areas deepened the climate of fear and provided cover for armed groups to target vocal opponents with impunity.Press freedoms were limited in all forms of media, creating an environment in which virtually no independent media existed.Violence and Harassment: The international NGO Reporters Without Borders reported all sides used threats and violence to intimidate journalists. Harassment, threats, abductions, violence, and killings made it nearly impossible for media to operate in any meaningful capacity in several areas of the country. Freedom House’s annual report on internet freedom found activists and journalists continued to experience physical insecurity, with several individuals kidnapped in retaliation for online content.Impunity for attacks on members of media exacerbated the problem, with no monitoring organizations, security forces, or functioning judicial system to constrain or record these attacks.Many armed groups aligned with the government or the LNA maintained databases of persons being sought for their alleged opposition activities or due to their identity. Some journalists and human rights activists chose to depart the country rather than remain and endure harassment.Armed groups reportedly used social media to monitor and target political opponents, incite violence, and engage in hate speech.In April, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor reported a TbZ unit arrested Benghazi municipality media office director Maher Elgheryani after he criticized the campaign to demolish buildings and forcibly evict residents in Benghazi.In September, local media reported armed men associated with the government-aligned Joint Operations Force (JOF) kidnapped journalist and activist Abdulmalik al-Madani in Misrata after he shared a Facebook post criticizing Prime Minister Dabaiba concerning Foreign Minister Mangoush’s meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen. Closed-circuit television footage posted on social media purportedly showed JOF vehicles surrounding al-Madani’s car before armed men forced the journalist into a JOF vehicle.According to UNSMIL, various news publications and television stations published calls to violence, intentionally spread false news, and permitted defamation.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Journalists practiced self-censorship due to intimidation and the lack of security. The unstable security situation created hostility towards civilians and journalists associated with opposing armed groups or political factions. International news agencies reported difficulties obtaining journalist visas, encountered refusals to issue or recognize press cards, and were barred from reporting freely in certain areas, especially eastern cities. UNSMIL documented restrictions imposed by the Foreign Media Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously affecting the operations of journalists in Tripoli.Libel/Slander Laws: The penal code criminalized a variety of political speech, including speech considered to “insult constitutional and popular authorities” and “publicly insulting the Libyan Arab people.” The penal code and other laws provided criminal penalties for defamation and insults to religion; these were generally applied only to cases involving alleged defamation of Islam.National Security: The penal code criminalized speech considered to “tarnish the [country’s] reputation or undermine confidence in it abroad,” but the government did not enforce this provision.Nongovernmental Impact: Members of nongovernmental armed groups, terrorist groups, and civilians regularly harassed, intimidated, or assaulted journalists.																Internet Freedom						The government and LNA occasionally restricted or disrupted access to the internet and continued to censor online content. According to the Freedom House report, internet freedom continued to decline. Selective filtering or blocking of access existed, although no reliable public information identified those responsible for censorship. There were reports elements of government-aligned groups monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. Activists on social media reported Facebook pages were regularly hacked by unknown actors or overwhelmed by a deluge of critical comments.In February, local media reported security forces affiliated with the Benghazi-based “Government of National Stability Ministry of Interior” arrested two women, Ahlam al-Yamani and Hanin al-Abdali, in Benghazi for “violations of moral turpitude” under the cybercrime law, which gave government authorities broad remit to remove digital content deemed offensive to the country’s culture and values.In October, Benghazi faced an eight-day telecommunications outage that coincided with local media reports of fighting between LNA-aligned armed groups and supporters of former Government of National Accord Defense Minister Mahdi al-Barghati. UNSMIL called on “eastern authorities” to urgently restore telecommunications, emphasizing that “obtaining and sharing information is a human right, and communications represent a lifeline for civilians in conflict zones.”A significant body of evidence suggested foreign actors sought to influence domestic opinion and incite violence in the country by spreading deliberate misinformation on social media and other platforms.Many bloggers, online journalists, and citizens reported practicing self-censorship due to intimidation by armed groups and the uncertain political situation. The online space reportedly became less diverse as internet users increasingly self-censored and online activists ceased their activities in response to harassment from authorities. Journalists, activists, and bloggers continued to face online harassment, arbitrary detention, and, in some cases, physical violence relating to their online activity.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but in practice the government limited these freedoms.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for a general right to peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The law on peaceful demonstrations, however, failed to include relevant assurances and severely restricted the exercise of the right of assembly. The law required protesters to inform the government of any planned protest at least 48 hours in advance and permitted the government to ban a protest on as little as 12 hours’ notice.In August, local media reported government-affiliated security forces at the al-Khoms port fired live ammunition into a crowd of approximately 1,000 protesters who were chanting antigovernment and anti-Turkish slogans following the spread of rumors that the government had signed a 99-year lease with the Turkish government to operate the port. Media reported injuries among protesters.						Freedom of Association						The 2011 Constitutional Declaration included freedom of association for political and civil society groups. The government lacked capacity, however, to protect freedom of association. Targeted attacks on journalists, activists, and religious figures by state and nonstate actors severely undermined this freedom and caused some activists to seek sanctuary abroad. Numerous CSO staff members received threats, including death threats, because of their human rights activities, and several of them believed they were under surveillance by intelligence services; they also reported being unjustly detained for short periods.In March, the Supreme Judicial Council declared that all civil society organizations not registered were illegal, under a Ghaddafi-era civil society law that had not been used since 2011. The Prime Minister’s Office issued a memorandum supporting the council’s opinion and confirming the illegality of unregistered organizations. According to the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the law reimposed an executive approval process to establish CSOs; gave authorities broad latitude to close, dissolve, or merge organizations; and prohibited the establishment of organizations working on human rights. Following objections from civil society and the international community, the Prime Minister’s Office issued another memorandum in March allowing local and foreign organizations to operate temporarily until they were registered.In May, the Government of National Unity created a new committee under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office to oversee CSOs. In August, the committee began soliciting registration applications from local and international civil society groups. The mandate of the newly established committee overlapped significantly with the existing civil society commission, whose Benghazi and Tripoli branches reunified in August. As a result, local and international civil society organizations reported significant confusion in registering or renewing registrations, including in clarifying if registrations issued by one body would be respected by the other.In May, the Benghazi-based General Intelligence Service published a warning to local CSOs and public institutions receiving foreign funding that they would be subject to prosecution and security measures if they did not disclose their finances, activities, and the movement of foreign employees.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration recognized freedom of movement, including foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, although the law provided the government with the power to restrict a person’s movement if it viewed that person as a “threat to public security or stability,” based on the person’s “previous actions or affiliation with an official or unofficial apparatus or tool of the former regime.”The law criminalized irregular migration and required the detention of irregular migrants. As of the end of October, IOM and UNHCR reported authorities had intercepted at sea and disembarked more than 12,600 migrants in 178 operations. The largest groups were from Bangladesh, Syria, and Egypt, although nationalities for the vast majority of disembarked individuals remained unrecorded due to lack of UNHCR access to disembarkation points.In-country Movement: The government did not restrict internal movement in the west, although armed groups aligned with it established some internal checkpoints. The LNA established checkpoints restricting movement in the east and south.There were reports armed groups controlling airports within the country conducted random checks on departing domestic and international travelers, including of their personal electronic devices. The country lacked a unified customs and immigration system.Foreign Travel: In May, the government-affiliated ISA West began requiring women traveling without a male escort to complete a detailed form about the reasons for their travel, past travel, and why they were traveling alone. Human Rights Council Special Procedures mandate-holders expressed in a July public statement deep concern regarding a discriminatory policy issued by the Government of National Unity in April that effectively restricted the rights of women and girls to travel abroad without a mahram (male guardian). According to the UN Panel of Experts, the policy was systematically implemented without formal or prior announcement. In July, the Panel of Experts reported attempts by ISA West personnel to intimidate human rights defenders, including women, who spoke out against these policies. Women and girls who refused to complete or submit the form were reportedly denied exit.In July, local media reported ISA West confiscated the passports of five High State Council members at Mitiga Airport in Tripoli, allegedly to prevent them from traveling to Turkey for a work trip.Citizenship: The law stated citizens could lose citizenship if they obtained a foreign citizenship without receiving permission beforehand from authorities, but there was no process for obtaining such permission. The state lacked the capacity to investigate the authenticity of citizenship applications.If a father’s citizenship was revoked, his children lost theirs as well. The law did not specify whether a wife lost her citizenship if her husband’s was revoked, or whether minors and adult children could lose their own citizenship due to the revocation of their mother’s.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										Government cooperation with UNHCR, IOM, and other international agencies operating within the country was inconsistent, and government-imposed restrictions often prevented humanitarian access and movement. These agencies were allowed to assist refugees and migrants in some geographic areas and facilities across the country. UN agencies monitored and publicly reported on refugees and migrants in the country, including those in government detention centers. International aid organizations provided basic services directly and through domestic implementing partners to refugees and asylum seekers. This report uses the term “migrant” to refer also to refugees and asylum seekers.Access to Asylum: Libya was not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, although the 2011 Constitutional Declaration recognized the right of asylum and forbade forcible repatriation of asylum seekers. The government had not established a system for protecting refugees or asylum seekers by year’s end. Absent an asylum system, authorities could detain and deport asylum seekers without giving them the opportunity to request asylum. The government did not legally recognize asylum seekers without documentation as a class distinct from migrants without residency permits.As of October, UNHCR put the number of registered refugees and asylum seekers in the country at 50,986. The vast majority of these were from the nine registered nationalities, among whom Sudanese and Syrians were the largest groups. UNHCR registered 53 refugees and asylum seekers from other nationalities as of September. Each adult asylum seeker was issued a printed UNHCR asylum seeker certificate that included a photograph and basic biodata serving as evidence that the bearer was entitled to protection and assistance under the UNHCR mandate.Authorities made no progress in the registration of migrants and refugees at disembarkation points after interception operations, or in detention facilities. Due to the complexity of direct resettlement out of the country, UNHCR relied on processes such as the Emergency Transit Mechanism to resettle vulnerable populations of concern.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: The country’s unique political, security, and economic landscape made distinguishing between migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers all but impossible; all were highly vulnerable to abuse. As of June, IOM reported there were 704,369 migrants in the country. According to UNICEF, 74,797 of the migrants were children, of whom approximately 21,000 were unaccompanied.According to various UN agencies and rights groups, migrants routinely experienced unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual exploitation, and other abuses. Perpetrators included state officials, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers, and criminal gangs. The FFM observed that perpetrators profited financially from the exploitation of migrants.Various UN entities documented human rights abuses committed against migrants in detention centers throughout the year. Specifically, the FFM final report stated the Ministry of Interior, DCIM, and armed groups in de facto control of migrants in Tariq al-Matar, Abu Isa, Gharyan, Tariq al-Sikka, Zawiya, Salah al-Din, Mabani, and al-Shwarif committed crimes against humanity. According to the FFM, the systematic and widespread character of documented crimes strongly implicated DCIM personnel and officials at all levels. The FFM also found reasonable grounds to believe the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) elements committed crimes against humanity in detention facilities under their control in Ayn Zarah and Abu Salim. According to the FFM, conditions in government and extralegal migrant detention facilities included severe overcrowding, insufficient access to toilets and washing facilities, malnourishment, lack of potable water, and spread of communicable diseases. As of October, UNHCR estimated that over 4,900 migrants were in official detention centers across the country.According to OHCHR, women migrants in detention centers were also routinely held in facilities without female guards and strip-searched by male guards. Women and girls were vulnerable to sex trafficking and were routinely detained in houses in Tripoli and Sabha. Migrant women and girls were forced into commercial sex in both official and unofficial detention facilities in conditions that sometimes amounted to sexual slavery. The FFM final report found reasonable grounds to believe sexual slavery was present in detention facilities in Bani Walid and Sabratha under the actual or nominal control of the DCIM.The FFM found the LCG responsible for crimes against humanity for returning migrants to detention centers where crimes against humanity were committed. The FFM also found reasonable grounds to believe personnel on LCG ships shot at or near boats carrying migrants, causing migrants to jump into the water to seek temporary safety. According to the final report, LCG personnel and other security officials often physically and verbally assaulted and threatened migrants during their transfer onto Libyan LCG ships and forced them to return to Libya. The FFM also found reasonable grounds to believe high-ranking LCG staff, the government-aligned SSA, and the DCIM colluded with traffickers and smugglers to intercept, detain, and exploit migrants. The FFM did not assign responsibility to specific individuals or elements within the SSA.A July report from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime documented a rise in migrant departures from the eastern part of the country, particularly Tobruk. The report assessed that sophisticated, transnational human smuggling networks previously involved in drug trafficking contributed to the movement of large numbers of migrants through the eastern region.IOM reported 13,611 migrants intercepted at sea by Libyan authorities as of November, as well as 938 deaths and 1,248 missing at sea. As of June, IOM also reported 83 deaths and disappearances of migrants along land routes in the country. In June, the migrant vessel Adriana departed Tobruk with approximately 700 passengers on board and sank off the coast of Greece, killing hundreds. In August, the Ministry of Interior Border Guards reported recovering the bodies of 27 sub-Saharan African migrants among the hundreds of migrants whom Tunisian authorities expelled starting in July.Numerous reports suggested migrant smugglers and human traffickers caused the death and serious injury of migrants. In July, the UN Panel of Experts reported an estimated 700 migrants, including victims of trafficking, were transferred to detention centers after suspected smugglers held them captive, tortured them for ransom, and subjected them to starvation and sexual violence, in various locations in Tazirbu during the past two years. Videos of torture and other abuses were reportedly sent to victims’ families to demand ransom. Graveyards containing the remains of at least 20 migrants and refugees who were victims of torture were reportedly found.International organizations documented extensive cases of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, as well as against men and boys. The FFM final report found instances of rape and gender-based violence in migrant detention facilities in Mabani, al-Shwarif, Zuwarah, Sabha, Sabratah, and Bani Walid. Observers reported rape was often used as a form of torture and in some cases resulted in death.The mistreatment of migrants resulted in long-term physical and emotional harm and could lead to suicide attempts, according to the FFM final report. In one incident the FFM documented, a boy hanged himself in Ayn Zarah after allegedly being tortured and suffering severe headaches. His body was left hanging in front of other migrants for at least a day and a half before being taken down.The government conducted limited arrests and prosecutions of persons engaged in human trafficking or migrant smuggling. In July, courts in Tripoli and the eastern city of al-Bayda handed various sentences, including life in prison, to 38 defendants convicted of human trafficking. The UN Panel of Experts expressed concerns in July that investigations into detention abuses were limited and often focused only on non-Libyan perpetrators.Freedom of Movement: Migrants were generally considered to be illegally present in the country and were subject to fines, detention, and expulsion. The government considered migrants intercepted by the LCG while attempting sea crossings on the Mediterranean to have violated the law and often sent them to migrant detention facilities in the west. The FFM final report described an “ever-revolving door” of capture, release, recapture, escape, and interception. Migrants who were able to pay a ransom to leave detention sites were often recaptured by the same actor or another group.In January, a regional NGO reported the LNA expelled 600 migrants detained at the DCIM Al Kufra detention center, including Sundanese asylum seekers registered with UNHCR.In June, local and international press reported the LNA expelled approximately 4,000 Egyptian migrants. According to reports, LNA officials deported the migrants to Egypt on foot across the land border.According to IOM, UNHCR, and UNSMIL, the country could not be considered a safe port for the return or disembarkation of migrants intercepted or rescued at sea. Returns reportedly often violated the principle of nonrefoulement, as migrants systematically and routinely faced the risk of death, disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, mistreatment, gender-based violence, exploitation, and other human rights abuses by both state and nonstate actors. UN agencies continued to express concern that thousands of migrants who remained unaccounted for after disembarkation had disappeared into informal detention by human trafficking networks.Access to Basic Services: Refugees registered with UNHCR could access basic protection and assistance from UNHCR and its partners, but the government did not provide refugees with reliable access to health care, education, or other services.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Previously internally displaced persons continued to return to their places of origin. According to IOM, there were 125,802 IDPs in the country as of April; Storm Daniel displaced an additional 43,421 individuals in September. Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli were the regions hosting the largest number of IDPs. Limited access for local and international assistance organizations into areas affected by fighting among rival armed groups and to official and unofficial detention centers hampered efforts to account for and assist the displaced.The government struggled to facilitate the safe, voluntary return of IDPs to their place of origin. While the government made nominal efforts to promote return in certain cases, the lack of adequate laws, policies, or government programs prompted international organizations and NGOs to assist IDPs in the form of cash payments and provision of health services, including to those with disabilities.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org/ .																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness, including through discrimination against women in nationality laws. Women generally could not transmit citizenship to their children. The law permitted women citizens to confer citizenship to their children only in certain exceptional circumstances, such as when fathers were unknown, stateless, or of unknown nationality. In contrast, the law provided for automatic transmission of citizenship to children born of a citizen father, whether the child was born inside or outside the country, and regardless of the citizenship of the mother.The former Gaddhafi regime revoked the citizenship of some inhabitants of the Saharan interior of the country, including minorities such as the Tebu and Tuareg, resulting in many nomadic and settled stateless persons in the country.According to some reports, up to 30 percent of the population in the south was of undetermined legal status, which fueled discrimination in employment and services. Noncitizens without national identification numbers could not access basic services; register births, marriages, or deaths; hold certain jobs; receive state salaries; vote; or run for office.Due to the lack of international monitoring and governmental capacity, there were no comprehensive data on the number of stateless persons.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: The most recent national election took place in 2014. Elections were scheduled for December 2021 but were not held. A new date had not been set as of year’s end.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: The 2011 Constitutional Declaration allowed for full participation of women and minorities in elections and the political process, but significant social and cultural barriers – in addition to lack of security – prevented their proportionate political participation.Ethnic minorities and Indigenous groups, including the Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg, expressed frustration with what they perceived as their deliberate marginalization from political institutions and processes.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.There were many reports and accusations of official corruption due to the lack of transparency in the government’s management of security forces, oil revenues, and the national economy. There was no unified national budget. As a result, the government carried out public spending with “limited accountability and transparency,” according to the World Bank’s Economic Monitor report.Divisions in economic and oversight institutions between the east and the west, including the Central Bank of Libya and the Audit Bureau, limited transparency and capacity for institutional oversight. Efforts continued to reunify institutions. In August, the central bank announced its reunification, although operational and technical divisions remained between the Tripoli headquarters and the Benghazi branch, which split off in 2014.There were allegations that government officials sometimes misused the letter of credit system to gain access to government funds.Corruption: Internal conflict and the weakness of public institutions undermined implementation of the law. According to reports by the government’s Audit Bureau, the country’s highest financial regulatory authority, officials frequently engaged with impunity in corrupt practices such as graft, bribery, and nepotism. There were also numerous reports of government corruption, including involvement in money laundering, human smuggling, and other criminal activities.In June, the Attorney General’s Office launched an investigation into allegations government officials had misappropriated scholarships intended for Libyan students to study in Turkey. A leaked list of scholarship recipients included numerous relatives of government officials, such as two brothers, ages 57 and 70, accompanied by 10 relatives and a woman, age 74, allegedly related to the leader of a Tripoli armed group, according to local media. A formal investigation by the attorney general, which reportedly revealed that 757 scholarships were misappropriated, resulted in the suspension of several Ministry of Higher Education officials.Slow progress in implementing decentralization legislation, particularly regarding management of revenues from oil and gas exports and distribution of government funds, led to accusations of corruption and calls for greater transparency. In July, the Presidential Council created the High Financial Committee composed of western and eastern representatives, to develop a budget and a process for equitable revenue distribution.The Audit Bureau made efforts to improve transparency by publishing annual reports on government revenues and expenditures, national projects, and administrative corruption, but it did not have oversight of eastern-based institutions due to the government’s limited ability to exert control in the east.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Strategy Control Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several human rights groups operated in the country but encountered government restrictions when investigating alleged abuses of human rights. The government and affiliated nonstate armed groups used legal and nonlegal means to restrict some human rights organizations from operating, particularly organizations with an international affiliation.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: International and domestic human rights organizations claimed human rights defenders and activists faced continuing threats – including physical attacks, detention, threats, harassment, and disappearances – by armed groups, both those aligned with and those opposed to the government.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: UNSMIL maintained its headquarters and staff in Tripoli. The government was unable to assure the safety of UN officials, particularly in areas of the country not under its control, but generally cooperated with UN representatives in arranging visits within the country.The FFM final report documented numerous access problems as an obstacle to its work. According to the FFM, the LNA denied its requests to visit areas in the south under LNA control. The government reportedly also denied the FFM permission to depart from Tripoli to enter southern areas. During its mandate, the FFM submitted several requests to the Presidential Council, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ministry of Public Health to visit prisons and detention facilities but did not receive official responses. The FFM added that a “climate of fear” among witnesses and civil society frequently hindered its ability to document potential human rights abuses.Government Human Rights Bodies: The National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights was unable to operate fully in the country due primarily to political divisions between the east and west. The council, which had offices around the country, maintained limited engagement with other human rights organizations and the UN Human Rights Council. Its ability to advocate for human rights and investigate alleged abuses was unclear.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape, including of men, but did not address spousal rape. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration prohibited domestic violence but did not contain reference to penalties for those convicted of violence against women. Specialized courts in Tripoli and Benghazi addressed violence against women, men, and children. As of December, sufficient information was not available to assess whether the government enforced the law effectively.There were no reliable statistics on the extent of domestic violence. Social and cultural barriers – including police and judicial reluctance to act and family reluctance to publicize an assault – contributed to lack of effective government enforcement. Several domestic CSOs reported women continued to experience higher rates of domestic violence than men.By law a convicted rapist could avoid a 25-year prison sentence by marrying the survivor, regardless of her wishes, provided her family consented. Rape survivors who could not meet high evidentiary standards could face charges of adultery.Migrant women and girls remained particularly vulnerable to rape and sexual violence, including forced commercial sexual exploitation in conditions amounting to sexual slavery. There were reports of egregious acts of sexual violence against women and girls in government and extralegal detention facilities. Migrant women also reported being harassed when leaving their homes to search for work. Many migrant women who had been abused reported they could not return to their countries of origin due to stigmatization.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law criminalized sexual harassment, but there were no reports on how or whether it was enforced. According to CSOs, there was widespread harassment and intimidation of women by armed groups, including harassment and arbitrary detention based on accusations of “un-Islamic” behavior.There were reports armed groups harassed women traveling without a male “guardian” and that armed groups asked men and women socializing in public venues to produce marriage certificates to verify their relationships.Discrimination: The 2011 Constitutional Declaration stated citizens, regardless of gender, were equal under the law and enjoyed the same civil and political rights. The government did not effectively enforce these declarations.Women faced social discrimination that affected their ability to access employment, their workplaces, their mobility, and their personal freedom. Although the law prohibited discrimination based on gender, there was widespread cultural, economic, and societal discrimination against women.The country lacked a unified family code. Sharia (Islamic religious law) often governed family matters, including inheritance, divorce, and property rights. While civil law mandated equal rights in inheritance, women often received less due to interpretations of sharia that favored men.In April, Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace documented the arrests of sisters Ibtisam and Rabia Bin Omran, who ran an animal shelter in Benghazi. After their arrest, the eastern “Government of National Stability Deputy Minister of the Interior” reportedly posted a video on Facebook purporting to show evidence that the sisters had engaged in “suspicious activities,” including “witchcraft.”Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) noted family planning services were significantly limited due to cultural and social norms favoring large families, as well as the absence of prioritization of the matter by the government. Access to information on reproductive health and contraception was also difficult for women to obtain due to social norms surrounding sexuality.Women’s access to maternal health-care services and contraceptive supplies remained limited due to continued political instability. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the large number of IDPs and access restrictions in certain areas significantly affected the provision of reproductive health services. The WHO also reported lack of access to family planning services, obstetrical care, and treatment of sexually transmitted infections. Reliable data on maternal mortality, menstruation, contraception rates, and sex education remained unavailable as of December, according to UNFPA.The government generally did not effectively provide access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, including access to emergency contraception or postexposure prophylaxis. Civil society actors provided limited legal assistance to survivors in the absence of the government.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided equal protection for all Libyans before the law, without distinction on the grounds of tribal, regional, or familiar adherence. Nonetheless, there were multiple reports that marginalized racial or ethnic groups faced discriminations by government and nongovernmental actors.Some members of the Tebu minority residing in the south reported their access to higher education was limited, since university campuses were in geographic areas controlled by Arab tribes that routinely harassed or denied them freedom of movement. Universities reportedly did not provide offsite learning alternatives to these Tebu students.The extent to which the government enforced official recognition of minority rights was unclear. There were reports that teachers of minority languages faced discrimination in receiving accreditation and in being eligible for bonuses, training, and exchange opportunities provided by the Ministry of Education.There were also reports individuals with non-Arabic names encountered difficulties registering these names in civil documents.Ethnic minorities faced instances of societal discrimination and violence. Racial discrimination existed against dark-skinned citizens, including those of sub-Saharan African heritage. Government officials and journalists often distinguished between “local” and “foreign” populations of Tebu and Tuareg in the south and advocated expulsion of minority groups affiliated with political rivals on the basis they were not truly “Libyan.”In August, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies reported the LNA-affiliated TbZ Brigade detained hundreds of civilians, including members of the Tebu community, in “inhumane conditions” in the southern part of the country, at the LNA’s Tamanhint military base, 120 miles away from their home of Umm al-Aranib. The TbZ Brigade reportedly released the women and children but prevented them from returning to their homes.Several Tebu and Tuareg communities received substandard or no services from municipalities, lacked national identity numbers, faced widespread social discrimination, and suffered from hate speech and identity-based violence. In the south, if a member of one tribe or group attacked a member of another tribe or group, retribution against multiple members of the attacking group was not uncommon.Some members of ethnic minority communities in the south and west reported being unwilling to enter certain courthouses and police stations due to intimidation and fear of reprisal.There were numerous reports throughout the year of ethnic minorities being injured or killed in confrontations with other groups.There were numerous reports migrants, particularly sub-Saharan Africans, experienced harassment or discrimination by citizens due to the perception that foreigners were transmitting communicable diseases.																																				Children										Birth Registration: By law, children derived citizenship from a citizen father. The law permitted citizen mothers who marry foreign men to transmit citizenship to their children, although some contradictory provisions perpetuated discrimination against women married to foreign men. There were also naturalization provisions for noncitizens.Education: The law granted the right for “all linguistic and cultural components to have the right to learn their language,” and the government nominally recognized the right to teach minority languages in schools. Minority and indigenous groups complained their communities were often allowed to teach their languages only as an elective subject within the curriculum.Child Abuse: The penal code included provisions outlawing the mistreatment of minors and protected children’s rights in cases concerning custody, guardianship, care, and juvenile justice. The government did not enforce those laws effectively, particularly regarding migrant children.The FFM final report found reasonable grounds to believe some members of the SDF and ISA East, among other armed groups, tortured child detainees and that “numerous” children were held at al-Kwaifiya prison in Benghazi. The FFM did not assign responsibility to specific elements within the SDF or ISA East.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage was 18 for both men and women, although judges could permit those younger than 18 to marry. LNA authorities reportedly continued to impose a minimum age of 20 for both men and women. Early marriages were relatively rare, according to the most recent information from UN Women in 2019, although comprehensive statistics were not available due to the lack of a centralized civil registry system and the continuing conflict.There were anecdotal reports of child marriage occurring in some rural and desert areas where tribal customs were more prevalent. There were also unconfirmed reports that civil authorities could be bribed to permit underage marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: There were no laws prohibiting or penalties for the commercial sexual exploitation of children or for child pornography, nor laws regulating the minimum age of consensual sex.																																				Antisemitism										The majority of the country’s once-thriving Jewish community departed between 1948 and 1967. No members of the Jewish community were believed to remain in the country.After reports leaked in September regarding a meeting between then Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush and her Israeli counterpart, a Libyan social media influencer described Mangoush as “the dog of the Jews” in a Facebook post.Following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October, the Government of National Unity minister of Islamic affairs and endowments (Awqaf) posted a statement on Facebook requesting the country’s imams to deliver a Friday sermon warning Muslims that “the danger of Jews and those who help the Jews is not without consequences; they want to colonize and expand and won’t surrender Jerusalem without force.” In the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza in October, Government of National Unity-recognized Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Gharyani accused “the Jews and their allies” of knowingly “exterminating civilians.”For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: Same-sex sexual activity between consenting adults was criminalized with a penalty of three to five years’ imprisonment. The law was enforced. Human Rights Watch reported punishment could include flogging in addition to imprisonment.Violence and Harassment: There were reports of physical violence, harassment (including by government agents), and blackmail based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Armed groups often policed communities to enforce compliance with their commanders’ understanding of “Islamic” behavior, harassing and threatening with impunity individuals believed to have lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) orientations, as well as their families.The FFM final report documented the arbitrary arrest of two young men perceived to be gay. Heavily armed men reportedly forced the individuals to unlock and provide access to their phones before transferring the individuals to SDF custody at the Mitiga airport prison complex. According to the report, a man described as a “sheikh” tortured the young men and denigrated their perceived sexual orientation. One of the men reported guards ordered him at gunpoint to strip and raped him, allegedly also asking him for information regarding other men perceived to be gay.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Societal discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons was widespread, and official discrimination was codified in local interpretations of sharia. Disproportionate enforcement of public order laws against LGBTQI+ persons reportedly served to justify arbitrary arrest. Human rights groups reported punishment could include flogging and up to five years’ imprisonment.Little information existed on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in employment, housing, access to education, or health care. Observers noted the threat of possible violence or abuse could dissuade persons from reporting such discrimination.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Information on the existence or prevalence of the practice of so-called conversion therapy on adults or children to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression was not available by year’s end. Information on the practice of performing unnecessary surgeries on intersex persons was also not available.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: The penal code indirectly restricted freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. According to civil society activists, the ISA West increasingly relied on laws reportedly intended to criminalize actions undermining traditional Libyan culture and values as a pretext for arresting and detaining suspected LGBTQI+ individuals. According to UN bodies and human rights organizations, such individuals were subjected to intimidation, harassment, forced confessions, and torture.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The 2011 Constitutional Declaration addressed the rights of persons with disabilities by providing for monetary and other types of social assistance for the “protection” of persons with “special needs” with respect to employment, education, access to health care, and the provision of other government services, but it did not explicitly prohibit discrimination. The government did not effectively enforce these provisions. IDPs, migrants, and refugees with disabilities were especially vulnerable to poor treatment in detention facilities.Years of postrevolutionary conflict led to a high incidence of persons maimed by shelling or explosive war remnants.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law did not provide for the right of workers to form and join independent unions. It provided for the right of workers to bargain collectively and conduct legal strikes, with significant restrictions. The penalties for violating these rights were less than those under other laws involving denials of civil rights. Information on how regularly violators faced penalties was not available. The law neither prohibited antiunion discrimination nor required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The government did not effectively enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers.By law workers in the formal sector were automatically members of the General Trade Union Federation of Workers, although they could elect to withdraw from the union. Only citizens could be union members, and regulations did not permit foreign workers to organize. The government was limited in its ability to enforce applicable labor laws. The requirement that all collective agreements conform to the “national economic interest” restricted collective bargaining. Freedom House found security conditions and weaknesses in the legal system prevented unions from conducting normal collective-bargaining activity. Workers could call strikes only after exhausting all conciliation and arbitration procedures. The government or one of the parties could demand compulsory arbitration, thus severely restricting strikes. The government had the right to set and cut salaries without consulting workers. Employees organized spontaneous strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins at a number of workplaces, generally to protest unpaid salaries.According to a February report, more than two dozen union representatives from across the country told UNSMIL the political and security situation meant that they were regularly discriminated against through nonpayment of salaries, had problems with poor equipment, and sometimes faced harassment from armed groups.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited and criminalized the worst forms of child labor and provided for a minimum age of employment, prohibiting children younger than 18 from employment except in a form of apprenticeship. The law stipulated employees, including those in apprenticeships, could not work more than 48 hours per week or more than 10 hours in a single day. The law set occupational safety and health (OSH) restrictions for children. The government lacked the capacity to enforce the law. No information was available to determine whether abuses of child labor laws incurred penalties commensurate with those for other analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping. There were reports of children forced into labor or military service by nonstate armed groups. These accounts were difficult to verify due to the absence of independent monitoring organizations and the continuing hostilities.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: There was a national monthly minimum wage but no set official poverty income level. According to a 2021 needs assessment conducted by the humanitarian initiative REACH, “little information exists about income, expenditure, and poverty within Libya. Due to the fragmented governance system in Libya, income data is scarce and rarely covers all regions.” The law stipulated a workweek of 40 hours, standard working hours, night shift regulations, dismissal procedures, and training requirements. The law did not specifically prohibit excessive compulsory overtime.Occupational Safety and Health: The Ministry of Labor was responsible for OSH issues, but no information was available on enforcement and compliance. OSH standards were appropriate for the main industries, but the government generally did not enforce them. Certain industries, such as the petroleum sector, attempted to maintain standards set by foreign companies. Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts and not the worker. The law provided OSH standards and granted workers the right to court hearings regarding abuses of these standards. The law did not provide workers the right to remove themselves from a hazardous workplace without jeopardizing their employment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The Ministry of Labor was responsible by law for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws. The number of labor inspectors was not sufficient to enforce compliance. The law did not indicate whether inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.No accurate data on the size of the informal economy were available. The law did not provide for OSH standards for workers in the informal economy.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Libya
- Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Darby FitzSimmonsIn December 2002, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship – the So San – was in the Arabian Sea carrying missiles destined for Yemen. The U.S. alerted the Spanish navy, which had ships in the area and agreed to intercept the ship.The intelligence was right. Upon boarding the So San, Spanish naval personnel discovered 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, and 23 tanks of missile fuel, all hidden under bags of cement.However, after a day of back and forth between the U.S. and Yemeni governments, the ship was released. The U.S. said it lacked clear legal authority to seize the missile parts.Less than a year later, in October 2003, the U.S. and UK once again received intelligence that a ship, the BBC China, was carrying illicit cargo. U.S. government officials contacted German authorities who intercepted the ship. They found and permanently confiscated nuclear centrifuge parts destined for Libya. In 2018, PSI countries held a Mediterranean maritime exercise in the bay of Catania in Sicily. (State Department photo)The difference in outcome between these two events was no accident – it was the result of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003 by eleven like-minded countries, the PSI is a global effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.A Global EffortToday, there are 111 participating countries that endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. These include committing to stopping the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials, and enhancing relevant legal, diplomatic, financial, military, and law enforcement tools.Although the PSI does not have any formal legal authority, the PSI has played a key role in global counterproliferation efforts for more than 20 years. PSI-endorsing countries agree to work together to impede or stop shipments of WMD-related materials to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.Many PSI-endorsing countries also have ship boarding agreements, allowing them to carry out searches and seizures of illicit material on ships originating from each other’s countries.PSI in AfricaPSI endorsing states regularly conduct multilateral meetings, workshops, and exercises to improve their counterproliferation readiness and share best practices. One such event occurred in early February when the United States and Morocco co-hosted the 2024 Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach event. This was the largest ever PSI event on the African continent. More than 160 attendees from 35 countries attended, including 25 African countries.During the three-day event, civilian and military leaders discussed the current state of counterproliferation, shared best practices, and emphasized the importance of continuing to expand upon nonproliferation efforts on the African continent through the PSI and similar mechanisms. Representatives from 35 countries gather in Marrakech for the kick-off of a PSI event in February. (State Department photo)Looking AheadThese PSI efforts are more important than ever. In recent months, several developments have shaken the global nonproliferation regime. These include:Iran withdrawing permission for international verification at several nuclear sites;DPRK continuing to develop its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, andRussia continuing to violate nonproliferation norms by attacking Ukraine with missiles and has doubled down on its dangerous nuclear rhetoric – including withdrawing from the PSI in 2022.However, despite the challenges posed by the current security landscape, the PSI remains strong. Following the meeting, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia became endorsers of the PSI, affirming their commitment to countering the spread of WMDs.The success of the 2024 PSI African Political Meeting and Outreach event is a sign that the international community at large is steadfast in their support of counterproliferation efforts. The United States looks forward to working with the five new endorsing countries to improve our multilateral interdiction efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies.Darby FitzSimmons is an intern in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
- Les atrocités commises par le groupe Wagner en Afrique : mensonges et vérité Global Engagement CenterAprès avoir démenti  pendant des années tout lien entre le gouvernement russe et le groupe Wagner, le président Poutine a admis  en juin 2023 que le Kremlin avait fourni un soutien financier au groupe à hauteur de 86 milliards de roubles (l’équivalent de quelque 940 millions de dollars au mois d’octobre 2023) entre mai 2022 et mai 2023. La mort du patron du groupe Wagner, Evgueni Prigojine, le 23 août 2023, offre l’occasion de revenir sur certains des mensonges les plus flagrants du gouvernement russe concernant le rôle, les objectifs et les prétendus succès du groupe Wagner. Le présent rapport analyse et réfute les fausses déclarations que la Russie continue de propager sur les activités du groupe Wagner en République centrafricaine (RCA), au Mali, au Soudan et en Libye, et lève le voile sur ce qu’il est réellement, à savoir un groupe de criminels motivés par la cupidité plutôt qu’une force antiterrorisme efficace.L’exploitation des ressources africaines, notamment l’or, les diamants et le bois, par le groupe Wagner ne représente qu’un aspect de l’influence déstabilisatrice de cette organisation criminelle transnationale en Afrique. Les forces du groupe auraient  rasé des villages entiers et assassiné des civils en République centrafricaine (RCA) pour faire avancer leurs intérêts économiques dans le secteur minier ; pris part à des exécutions illégales au Mali ; pillé des mines d’or artisanales au Soudan ; et porté atteinte aux institutions démocratiques dans chaque pays où elles ont opéré. Elles ont également été accusées d’avoir réglé leurs factures avec de la monnaie contrefaite. Ce comportement criminel et prédateur envers les Africains, ne s’arrêtera pas avec la mort d’Evgueni Prigojine.Partout où le groupe Wagner se déploie s’ensuit une forte hausse du nombre de décès parmi les civils. Selon The Economist  et des données récentes publiées par l’Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) , la violence perpétrée par le groupe Wagner à l’encontre des civils au Mali et en République centrafricaine (RCA) est non seulement fréquente, mais aussi bien plus meurtrière  pour les non-combattants que les attaques menées par l’État ou les forces rebelles. The Economist rapporte qu’en date du mois d’août 2023, le groupe avait tué au moins 1 800 civils africains. Wagner justifie  sa présence brutale en Afrique en affirmant que c’est un « soutien à la paix et à la stabilité ». Pourtant, rien qu’au Mali, la violence terroriste contre les civils a bondi de 278 %  depuis 2021.Les mensonges de la Russie en République centrafricaineL’écosystème de désinformation et de propagande de la Russie présente une image faussée d’un groupe Wagner qui jouerait un rôle positif dans des nations comme la République centrafricaine (RCA). Bien que le groupe Wagner soit déployé en RCA depuis 2018, les responsables russes continuent d’appeler les forces de Wagner des « instructeurs russes » lorsqu’ils discutent des activités du groupe, un narratif qui a continué après la mort de Prigojine en août 2023. Des responsables  russes cités dans des médias  financés par l’État russe prétendent que ces instructeurs russes ont « sauvé » la RCA et qu’ils y « renforcent la paix et la stabilité » afin d’y apporter  une « paix durable ». La Communauté des Officiers pour la Sécurité internationale (COSI) , qui a été sanctionnée par les États-Unis, sert de société écran aux opérations du groupe Wagner en RCA. Son directeur, Aleksandr Ivanov, sanctionné lui aussi par les États-Unis, justifie la présence de Wagner en RCA en affirmant  : « Les combattants du groupe Wagner restent en RCA et permettent ainsi aux habitants de la République de dormir en paix ! (&#8230;) La République est devenue un endroit sûr pour la vie et le développement de la population locale. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner en République centrafricaineDes rapports des Nations unies et de médias indépendants documentent la vérité sur les activités du groupe Wagner et sa brutalité envers la population de la RCA.CBS a rapporté en mai 2023 que les forces de Wagner  s’étaient livrées à des tueries, à des enlèvements et à des viols systématiques en vue de prendre le contrôle d’une zone minière de premier plan située près de la ville de Bambari. Les survivants ont décrit en détail les attaques : « Parler de tuerie, c’est un euphémisme. C’était un carnage total. On aurait dit l’Armaguédon (&#8230;) Ils parlaient russe. Même tchétchène. Certains portaient des masques et avaient de longues barbes. »Des personnes en République centrafricaine, notamment des journalistes, des travailleurs humanitaires et des membres de minorités, ainsi que des forces de maintien de la paix internationales, ont été violemment harcelées et menacées par les soi-disant « instructeurs russes » du groupe Wagner, ont rapporté  des experts de l’ONU en octobre 2021.Malgré les affirmations de la Russie et de Wagner selon lesquelles il apporte la stabilité dans les zones où il intervient, le groupe — qui opère depuis la République centrafricaine et soi-disant à l’insu du gouvernement hôte — a monté un complot visant à renverser le gouvernement du Tchad  au début de 2023, une action qui aurait pu aggraver une situation humanitaire déjà difficile pour les femmes, les enfants et d’autres civils.Les mensonges de la Russie au MaliLes responsables russes, les médias financés par l’État russe et les chaînes Telegram liées au Kremlin continuent de diffuser des messages sur le rôle prétendument « positif » du groupe Wagner au Mali depuis son déploiement  en 2021. Malgré ces publications, le gouvernement de transition du Mali n’a toujours pas reconnu publiquement la présence du groupe sur son territoire. Des vidéos  de propagande présentant les forces du groupe Wagner comme des sauveurs et des « anges guerriers  » circulent toujours en ligne. Avant le déploiement du groupe au Mali, la Russie mettait en avant des narratifs mensongers semblables à ceux utilisés en République centrafricaine, répétant le mythe selon lequel des « instructeurs russes » apporteraient la paix, la stabilité et poseraient un nouveau jalon dans la lutte antiterroriste dans le pays. Aleksandr Ivanov, le directeur de la COSI sanctionné par les États-Unis, a salué  le groupe Wagner dans des sites d’actualité maliens, déclarant qu’il faisait « un travail excellent partout dans le monde », et affirmant qu’il allait « combattre le terrorisme partout ». Une vidéo  de propagande liée à la Russie et diffusée après le déploiement du groupe Wagner au Mali à la fin de 2021 suggérait à tort que les États-Unis et la France soutenaient les extrémistes religieux violents au Mali.La vérité sur le groupe Wagner au MaliLes faits révèlent une tout autre réalité.Contrairement à ce qu’affirme la Russie, le groupe Wagner n’a pas mené de lutte efficace contre le terrorisme au Mali depuis son premier déploiement en décembre 2021. Le Groupe d’experts de l’ONU sur le Mali a signalé  en août 2023 que la surface du territoire malien contrôlé par Daech au Sahel avait presque doublé en moins d’un an. Le groupe Wagner n’a pas réussi à améliorer la sécurité du Mali, 2022 ayant été l’année la plus meurtrière pour les civils dans ce pays depuis le début du conflit en 2012.Les forces du groupe Wagner ont été filmées  en avril 2022 en train d’enterrer une dizaine de cadavres dans une fosse commune près de la base militaire de Gossi au Mali. Le groupe Wagner a ensuite produit des vidéos modifiées et trompeuses afin d’essayer de faire porter la responsabilité de cette affaire à l’armée française et d’attiser ainsi le sentiment anti-français et anti-occidental au Mali.Les mensonges de la Russie au SoudanLes responsables russes et les représentants du groupe Wagner ont affirmé à de multiples reprises que Wagner n’avait pas de présence militaire au Soudan et que la Russie n’était pas impliquée dans la guerre civile sanglante qui oppose les forces armées soudanaises aux forces de soutien rapide (RSF) dirigées par le général Dagalo. Le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères a déclaré que la Russie ne souhaitait rien de plus  qu’une « résolution pacifique  » du conflit. Dans une déclaration  datant d’avril 2023, Prigojine a ajouté  : « Le groupe PMC  Wagner n’est nullement impliqué dans le conflit soudanais. » En outre, la Russie se présente systématiquement comme un acteur désintéressé au Soudan, qui cherche simplement à aider le pays à renforcer sa sécurité, sa stabilité et son développement économique. Lors d’une réunion en juin 2023 avec le vice-président du Conseil de souveraineté de transition du Soudan, le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov, a exprimé  sa « profonde inquiétude » face à la crise. « La Russie, a-t-il ajouté, observe avec inquiétude ce qui se passe au Soudan et souhaite contribuer à créer les conditions d’une normalisation de la situation. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner au SoudanLes civils soudanais et les victimes des activités de Wagner ne sont pas de cet avis.Des mercenaires du groupe Wagner ont tué des dizaines de mineurs soudanais travaillant dans des mines d’or artisanales le long de la frontière entre le Soudan et la République centrafricaine (RCA) au cours de leur pillage des riches mines d’or du Soudan, selon  ceux qui ont survécu à de telles attaques.D’autres survivants rapportent que des mercenaires de Wagner ont attaqué de grands campements de travailleurs migrants et de mineurs le long de la frontière entre le Soudan et la RCA, ouvrant le feu à l’aveuglette. Un témoin qui a perdu son frère et six membres de sa famille aux mains des soldats de Wagner a déclaré  que plus de 70 personnes avaient été tuées lors d’une seule attaque.Les mensonges de la Russie en LibyeLes médias d’État russes accusent régulièrement les forces de l’OTAN de détruire  l’État libyen et d’être à l’origine de l’instabilité qui y règne actuellement, en vue de servir les intérêts des États membres de l’Alliance. Ces organes de propagande soutiennent le narratif mensonger de la Russie, qui se présente comme une puissance altruiste et anticoloniale cherchant uniquement à venir en aide aux pays africains. Pendant des années, le gouvernement russe a rejeté  toute allégation de présence de mercenaires ou de militaires russes en Libye, la porte-parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, Maria Zakharova, ayant affirmé  en 2020 qu’il n’y avait « aucune présence russe en Libye » et que « les CMP ne sont pas autorisées par le droit russe ». Des représentants du gouvernement russe ont affirmé à plusieurs reprises  que les accusations selon lesquelles la Russie avait pris parti dans le conflit libyen étaient des « mensonges » et qu’elle s’efforçait de parvenir « à un cessez-le-feu et à un règlement politique du conflit ». En 2020, l’envoyé de la Russie auprès des Nations unies, Vassily Nebenzya, a condamné  les accusations d’implication de mercenaires russes en Libye : « Cette information (...) est en grande partie fondée sur des données non vérifiées ou fallacieuses et elle vise à discréditer la politique de la Russie à l’égard de la Libye. Il s’agit manifestement d’histoires inventées. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner en LibyeIl existe des preuves sans équivoque montrant que le groupe Wagner s’est introduit en Libye à des fins politiques et financières, qu’il a commis des violations des droits de la personne contre le peuple libyen et qu’il intensifie l’instabilité actuelle.Le groupe Wagner, que le gouvernement russe a reconnu avoir soutenu , aurait agi en violation de la résolution 1970 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et d’autres résolutions pertinentes en fournissant des équipements militaires et des mercenaires  sur les lignes de front du conflit libyen, notamment des avions de chasse, des véhicules blindés et des systèmes de défense antiaérienne. Selon le Commandement des États-Unis pour l’Afrique (AFRICOM) , au moins 14 Mig-29 et Su-24 ont été repeints pour dissimuler leurs marquages russes d’origine et ont ensuite été transportés par avion vers la Libye depuis des bases russes en Syrie. Le groupe Wagner « prolonge un conflit responsable de souffrances inutiles et de la mort de civils innocents », a déclaré  l’AFRICOM.Le groupe Wagner a placé  des mines terrestres et des pièges lors de son retrait de Tripoli en 2020, selon des informations publiques. Les mines et autres engins explosifs auraient  tué ou blessé plus de 300 personnes en Libye entre mai 2020 et mars 2022, notamment dans des zones précédemment contrôlées par les forces du groupe Wagner. Le rapport final  de la Mission d’établissement des faits en Libye (FFM), relevant de l’ONU, indique que les forces de Wagner ont placé « des explosifs militaires dans des logements, à l’intérieur de canapés et d’équipements de salles de bain, et dans d’autres zones où se trouvent des civils, ce qui a fait des morts et des blessés dans la population ». La FFM a déterminé que le personnel de Wagner « pourrait avoir violé le principe de proportionnalité du droit international et l’obligation de réduire les effets indiscriminés des mines et autres explosifs » et qu’il a également « violé le droit  à la vie » en s’abstenant d’éliminer les munitions pour assurer la sécurité des civils.Selon le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, le groupe Wagner a mené  des campagnes de désinformation en Libye pour tenter de renforcer le soutien aux personnalités alliées à la Russie qui s’opposent au gouvernement reconnu par l’ONU à Tripoli. Le groupe Wagner a mis en place un appareil de médias sociaux en Libye qui a pour objet de promouvoir Haftar, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi et d’autres personnalités politiques dont le Kremlin pensait qu’elles pourraient devenir de futurs clients de la Russie, et ce, en utilisant des méthodes qui rappellent celles qu’employait Prigojine pour s’immiscer dans d’autres élections étrangères, selon  le Stanford Internet Observatory. Wagner a créé au moins 12 groupes Facebook pour manipuler l’opinion publique libyenne, et ces pages ont été consultées par plus de deux millions d’utilisateurs chaque semaine. Le groupe a également acheté 50 % de l’ancienne société de radiodiffusion publique libyenne, A1 Jamahiriya TV , dont il a transféré les studios à l’étranger avant de renouveler ses émissions en Libye.La Russie est responsableL’écosystème russe de désinformation et de propagande continue de déployer des narratifs mensongers tels que ceux décrits ci-dessus pour détourner l’attention des violations des droits de la personne et des atrocités commises par le groupe Wagner et le soustraire à ses responsabilités. Le groupe Wagner, soutenu par le Kremlin, exploite l’insécurité pour étendre la présence de la Russie en Afrique à des fins d’influence politique et de gain financier. Ce faisant, il menace la stabilité et les droits de la personne sur le continent. En janvier 2023, le département du Trésor des États-Unis a désigné  le groupe Wagner comme une organisation criminelle transnationale pour avoir commis, parmi d’autres faits scandaleux, « des actes criminels graves, notamment des exécutions de masse, des viols, des enlèvements d’enfants et des violences physiques en République centrafricaine (RCA) et au Mali ».&nbsp;
- The Wagner Group’s Atrocities in Africa: Lies and Truth Global Engagement CenterThis report is also available in French.After years of denying the Russian government’s links to the Wagner Group, President Putin admitted in June 2023 that the Kremlin provided 86 billion rubles (approximately $940 million in October 2023) in financial support to the group from May 2022 to May 2023. The death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin on August 23, 2023, provides an opportunity to review some of the most egregious ways in which the Russian government has lied about the role, purposes, and so-called successes of the Wagner Group. This report analyzes and counters the false claims Russia continues to spread about the Wagner Group’s activities in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, and Libya – and reveals them for what they are &#8211; criminals motivated by greed rather than an effective counterterrorism force.The transnational criminal organization Wagner Group’s exploitation of African resources, notably gold, diamonds, and timber, is only one node of its destabilizing influence across Africa. Wagner Group forces have reportedly razed entire villages and murdered civilians in the Central African Republic (CAR) to advance their economic interests in the mining sector, participated in the unlawful execution of people in Mali, raided artisanal gold mines in Sudan, and undermined democratic institutions in every country where they have worked. They have also been accused of paying their bills in counterfeit currency. This pattern of criminal behavior – and of preying on Africans – is not going to end with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death.Wherever Wagner deploys a stark rise in civilian deaths follows. According to the Economist and recent Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) data, violence perpetrated against civilians by Wagner Group in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) is not only frequent, but far more deadly to non-combatants than state-led or rebel force attacks. According to The Economist, Wagner killed at least 1,800 African civilians as of August 2023. Wagner justifies its brutal presence in Africa as “supporting peace and stability.” However, in Mali alone, terrorist violence against civilians since 2021 has surged by 278 percent.Russia’s Lies in the Central African RepublicRussia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem falsely portrays the Wagner Group as playing a positive role in nations such as CAR. Although the Wagner Group has been deployed in CAR since 2018, Russian officials still refer to the group’s forces as “Russian instructors” when discussing the group’s activities, a narrative that continued after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. Russian officials quoted in Russian state-funded media claim that Russian instructors have “saved” CAR and are “strengthening peace and stability” to bring a “lasting peace.” The U.S.-sanctioned Officer’s Union of International Security (OUIS or “COSI”) serves as a front company for Wagner Group operations in CAR. Its U.S.-sanctioned director, Aleksandr Ivanov, justifies Wagner’s presence in CAR, saying “The fighters of the Wagner Group remain in CAR, so the inhabitants of the Republic can sleep peacefully! ...the Republic has become a safe place for the life and development of the local population.” The Truth about the Wagner Group in Central African RepublicReports from the United Nations and independent media document the truth about the Wagner Group and its brutal treatment of the people of CAR.CBS reported in May 2023 that Wagner forces used indiscriminate killing, abductions, and rape to gain control of a key mining area near the city of Bambari, with survivors describing the attacks in detail: &#8220;To say &#8216;killing&#8217; is an understatement. It was total carnage. Like Armageddon&#8230; They spoke Russian. Even Chechen. Some wore masks and had long beards.&#8221;People in CAR, including journalists, aid workers and minorities, as well as international peacekeepers, have been violently harassed and threatened by so-called “Russian instructors” from the Wagner Group, UN experts reported in October 2021.Despite Russia and Wagner’s claims that it brings stability to the areas it operates in, the group – operating from CAR and allegedly outside of the host government’s awareness – plotted to overthrow the government of Chad in early 2023, an action that could have exacerbated an already challenging humanitarian situation for women, children, and other civilians.Russia’s Lies in MaliRussian officials, Russian state-funded media, and Kremlin-linked Telegram channels continuously message on the Wagner Group’s allegedly “positive” role in Mali since the group’s deployment in 2021. Despite these posts, Mali’s transition government has yet to publicly acknowledge that Wagner Group is in Mali. Propaganda videos continue to circulate online portraying Wagner Group forces as saviors and “warrior angels.” Before Wagner’s deployment to Mali, Russia highlighted false narratives like those it deployed about CAR, repeating the myth that “Russian instructors” would bring peace, stability, and would also have new success at fighting counterterrorism in the country. Aleksandr Ivanov, the U.S.-sanctioned director of the OUIS, boasted to Malian news sites that the Wagner Group was “doing excellent work all over the world,” claiming it “will fight terrorism everywhere.” A Russia-linked propaganda video circulating after Wagner’s deployment to Mali, at the end of 2021, falsely suggested that the United States and France are supporting violent religious extremists in Mali.The Truth about the Wagner Group in MaliThe facts tell a different story.Contrary to Russia’s claim, the Wagner Group has not been effective in countering terrorism in Mali since first deploying in December 2021. The UN Panel of Experts for Mali reported in August 2023 that ISIS-Sahel almost doubled its territorial control in Mali in less than a year. Wagner Group has failed to make Mali safer, with 2022 being the deadliest year for civilians in Mali since the current conflict broke out in 2012.Wagner Group forces were captured on video in April 2022 burying a dozen bodies in a mass grave near the Gossi military base in Mali. Wagner Group then produced misleadingly edited videos and attempted to falsely blame the French military for the incident, in order to increase anti-French and anti-Western sentiment in Mali.Russia’s Lies in SudanRussian officials and Wagner Group representatives have repeatedly claimed that Wagner has no military presence in Sudan and that Russia is not involved in the country’s bloody civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Dagalo. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Russia only desires a “peaceful resolution” to the conflict. In an April 2023 statement, Prigozhin added: “Wagner PMC is in no way involved in the Sudanese conflict.” Russia also consistently portrays itself as a disinterested actor in Sudan, merely seeking to assist the country in strengthening its security, stability, and economic development. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, in a June 2023 meeting with Sudan’s Deputy Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, expressed “deep concern” over the crisis. Lavrov added that “Russia is watching with concern what is happening in Sudan and is interested in helping to create the conditions for normalizing the situation.”The Truth about the Wagner Group in SudanSudanese civilians and victims of Wagner activities say otherwise.Wagner Group mercenaries have killed scores of Sudanese miners working in artisanal gold mines along the border between Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), according to survivors of these attacks, while they loot Sudan’s rich gold mines.Other survivors report that Wagner mercenaries have attacked encampments full of migrant workers and miners along the Sudanese/CAR border, shooting indiscriminately. A witness who lost his brother and six relatives at the hands of Wagner soldiers said more than 70 people were killed in a single attack. Russia’s Lies in LibyaRussia’s state-sponsored media outlets regularly accuse NATO forces of destroying the Libyan state and of initiating the ongoing instability there in pursuit of its member states’ own interests. These propaganda outlets support Russia’s false narrative, portraying itself as an altruistic, anti-colonial power seeking only to help African countries. For years, the Russian Government rejected any claims of a Russian mercenary or military presence in Libya, with Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova in 2020 asserting that there was “no Russian presence in Libya,” and that “PMCs are not allowed under Russian law.” Russian Government representatives repeatedly argued that accusations it had taken sides in the Libyan conflict were “lies,” and that it strove for a “ceasefire and political settlement of the conflict.” In 2020, Russian Envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzya, condemned accusations of Russian mercenary involvement in Libya as “largely based on unverified or spurious data and aimed at discrediting Russia&#8217;s policy on Libya. These are obviously planted stories.”The Truth about Wagner Group in LibyaThere is clear evidence that Wagner Group has inserted itself in Libya for political and financial gain, committing human rights abuses against the Libyan people and intensifying ongoing instability.Wagner Group, as an admitted Russian Government-backed entity, reportedly has acted contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1970 and other relevant resolutions by providing military equipment and mercenaries to the front lines of the Libya conflict, including fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. According to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), at least 14 Mig-29s and Su-24s were painted over to disguise their Russian marks of origin and then flown from Russia’s bases in Syria to Libya. Wagner Group is “prolonging conflict responsible for the needless suffering and the deaths of innocent civilians,” AFRICOM has stated.The Wagner Group placed landmines and boobytraps while withdrawing from Tripoli in 2020, according to public reporting. Mines and other explosive ordnance reportedly killed or wounded more than 300 people in Libya between May 2020 and March 2022, including in areas formerly controlled by Wagner Group forces. The UN Fact-Finding Mission in Libya’s (FFM’s) final report indicates that Wagner forces placed “military explosives in homes, inside sofas and bathroom fixtures, and other civilian areas, which led to death and injury of civilians.” The FFM determined that Wagner personnel “may have violated the international law principle of proportionality and the obligation to minimize the indiscriminate effects of mines and other explosives” as well as “violating the right to life” of Libyans by not clearing the ordnance for the safety of civilians.Wagner conducted disinformation campaigns in Libya in an attempt to boost support for Russian-allied figures who oppose the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, according to the African Center for Strategic Studies. Wagner built a social media apparatus in Libya to promote Haftar, Saif al-Islam Gaddhafi, and other political figures whom the Kremlin believed could become future clients of Russia, using methods reminiscent of previous Prigozhin-led interference in other foreign elections, according to the Stanford Internet Observatory. Wagner created at least 12 different Facebook groups to manipulate Libyan public opinion, and these pages were viewed by over two million users each week. Wagner also purchased 50% of the former Libyan state-run broadcasting company, A1 Jamahiriya TV, transferring its studios to a location overseas and renewing its broadcasts into Libya.Russia is ResponsibleRussia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem continues to deploy false narratives such as those outlined above to deflect attention from and avoid responsibility for the Wagner Group’s human rights abuses and atrocities.The Kremlin-backed Wagner Group exploits insecurity to expand Russia’s presence in Africa for political influence and financial gain. In doing so, they threaten stability and human rights on the continent. In January 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization for committing, among other egregious acts, “an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.”
- Libya HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Libya				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Libya																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Libya																																												Libya				Overview:  Libyan government officials continued to work with U.S. counterparts to combat terrorism, although fractured security institutions limited cooperation.  After elections scheduled for December 2021 were “postponed,” the Libyan House of Representatives, with the backing of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), appointed a new interim “Government of National Stability” to replace the Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli; however, the United Nations and most countries, including the United States, continued to recognize the Government of National Unity (GNU) as the Government of Libya.Despite the political impasse, terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb were unable to regroup or exploit the political uncertainty.  While terrorist groups controlled no territory in Libya and have been significantly degraded in terms of numbers and capacity, they remained a threat.  The GNU is a reliable and willing U.S. counterterrorism (CT) partner, although the GNU’s capacity to eliminate terrorist safe havens, deter the flow of foreign fighters, counter terrorist financing, and ensure effective counterproliferation efforts across Libya’s territory were limited.  The LNA, which exerts control over most of the areas outside the northwestern part of the country, countered terrorism in the east and the south of the country, but its counterterrorism gains were limited to areas under its direct control.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no confirmed significant terrorist incidents in Libya in 2022.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  There were no changes since 2021.The GNU retained the former Government of National Accord’s 2020 CT Strategy and its national CT coordinator.  In practice, however, because of the fractured political situation, coordination between relevant authorities occurred largely on an ad hoc basis, and an implementation plan for the 2020 CT Strategy was not promulgated.  Throughout 2022 the GNU and the LNA conducted CT operations in areas where they exerted control.Although Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, the Libyan penal code criminalizes offenses that may threaten national security, including terrorism, the promotion of terrorist acts, and the handling of money in support of such acts.Libya’s porous southern border was nominally controlled by the LNA, but the LNA relied on local armed groups, militias, and foreign fighters to exert control over the southern frontier.  Smuggling and trafficking, including in persons and arms, were rampant.  The LNA conducted CT operations in the South, where and when it could.Libya’s four largest international airports, located throughout the country and falling in areas under the control of the GNU and the LNA, continued to participate in the CT Bureau’s Aviation Security Program, which trains airport screeners and managers.  The GNU did not make any tangible progress in 2022 on the installation of the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (or MIDAS), which the CT Bureau funded through the International Organization for Migration, despite receiving the equipment and agreeing to do so in November 2021.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.  Its FIU is in the Central Bank of Libya.  There were no significant changes in 2022.Countering Violent Extremism:  The Libya Antiterrorism Center’s Community Protection Department, which was launched in 2021, continued in 2022 its efforts to counter “extremist ideology” through education and media outreach in partnership with civil society organizations, and religious and educational institutions.International and Regional Cooperation:  Libya regularly votes in favor of counterterrorism measures in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.																												    							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- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Foreign Ministers from the Middle East HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Foreign Ministers from the Middle East				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Foreign Ministers from the Middle East																																		Readout																														October 24, 2023																																							The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today in New York City with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, Libyan Acting Foreign Minister Taher al-Baour, Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riad al-Malki, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, UAE Minister of State Reem Al Hashimy, and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit on the margins of the UN Security Council open debate on the situation in the Middle East.&nbsp; The Secretary condemned Hamas for its abhorrent terrorist attacks, reinforced Israel’s right to self-defense, and discussed ongoing efforts to secure the release of hostages, prevent the conflict from spreading, and deliver humanitarian aid to&nbsp;civilians in Gaza.&nbsp;&nbsp;						Tags																					Algeria																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Egypt																																Hostage Recovery																																																					Human Rights and Democracy																															Israel																								Jordan																								Libya																																Middle East																															New York																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official Domestic Travel																															Palestinian Territories																								Saudi Arabia																																Secretary Trip																															The Secretary of State																								Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs																								United Arab Emirates
- Assistant Secretary Witkowsky’s Travel to Libya and Tunisia Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations Anne A. Witkowsky visited Tripoli, Libya, accompanied by U.S. Special Envoy to Libya Ambassador Richard Norland on October 10.The Assistant Secretary met with the Presidential Council and other Libyan officials to welcome continued input and engagement from Libyan partners as progress continues on the implementation of the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in Libya. She conveyed the United States’ condolences on the devastation wrought by dam failures and flooding in Derna and reiterated that the United States stands with the Libyan people in confronting this tragedy.The Assistant Secretary reinforced continued U.S. support for Libyan institutions and individuals in their work towards peace, prosperity, and democratic representation for all Libyans. She encouraged progress toward stability and national reconciliation, including through the participation of women and other groups historically underrepresented or marginalized, as integral elements of the development and peacebuilding process.Assistant Secretary Witkowsky continued the dialogue on the United States’ longstanding security and development partnership with Libya in Tunis, Tunisia on October 11, where she met with representatives of the United Nations and other organizations operating in Libya to foster information sharing and support for our efforts there. For further information, follow @StateCSO on Twitter or contact CSOPublicAffairs1@state.gov.
- Special Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Richard Norland, U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland, U.S. Special Envoy for LibyaDubai HubMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Dubai Regional Media Hub.  I would like to welcome our participants joining us from Africa, the Middle East, and around the world for this on-the-record briefing with U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland.  During this call, Ambassador Norland will discuss the U.S. response to the recent devastating floods in Libya and ongoing efforts supporting the UN‐facilitated political process in Libya.  After opening remarks, Ambassador Norland will take questions from participating journalists.We are pleased to offer simultaneous interpretation for this briefing in Arabic.  We request that everyone keep this in mind and speak slowly.And without further ado, I will now turn it over to Ambassador Norland.  Ambassador, the floor is yours.AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Well, thank you, Hala, and hello, everybody.  (In Arabic), as our friends in Libya like to say.  I’ll be brief with some opening remarks.  It’s been almost four weeks since devastating floods struck eastern Libya, and I’d like to begin by saying that our hearts go out to the families of those who lost their lives and to those struggling now to rebuild as they cope with unimaginable personal loss.In response to what happened, the United States has committed $12 million in humanitarian aid and a program of diplomacy, development, and defense engagements which are ongoing.  We are the largest donor to the humanitarian response for people affected by the floods in Derna and eastern Libya.  Our embassy declared a disaster emergency on the day of the flood, and USAID’s Tunis-based director from the Disaster Assistance Response Team was activated on September 13th and continues to coordinate with humanitarian partners and Libyan officials across the country to deliver support.  Our USAID Libya representative John Cardenas spent more than a week on the ground in Tripoli for engagements with local authorities and humanitarian partners in support of the international flood relief effort.Over the span of visits to Libya by myself and General Langley, the United States airlifted over 29 metric tons of critical, lifesaving humanitarian supplies to Benghazi to support the most urgent needs in flood-affected communities.  On the security and diplomatic front, as I just mentioned, the commander of AFRICOM, General Michael Langley, and I traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi September 20th to 21st for meetings with Libyan military and political leaders to reiterate the importance of east-west cooperation in Libya to the long-term recovery and stabilization of the country.  The general’s C-130 delivered relief commodities to Benghazi.We also discussed the urgent need for further progress in the political process, aiming to reach the stage of elections and the formation of a unified government capable of effectively serving all the people across the entire country in the wake of this crisis.So indeed, in addition to the immediate humanitarian relief needs of the people in flood-affected areas, a unified national mechanism is required to effectively and efficiently implement reconstruction efforts.  Earlier this week, the United States joined France, Germany, Italy, and the UK in endorsing the special representative of the secretary-general Abdoulaye Bathily’s call for a unified national mechanism coordinated with local, national, and international partners that can deliver transparent and accountable relief and respond to reconstruction needs.  Other European partners have echoed these calls.  Unifying relief efforts responds to the demands of the Libyan people and is crucial to facilitate additional support and technical assistance from both the United States and other international partners.And finally, perhaps it’s not by coincidence, but the discussion around reconstruction has also generated renewed debate and focus on electoral laws and the formation of an agreed caretaker government that would lead the country to elections.  We hope to see more progress in the coming days and weeks on a pathway to elections and concerted efforts to reconstruct and assist the people of Derna and eastern Libya.So thanks very much.  I’ll stop there and I look forward to your questions.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s call.  And with that, our first question is a pre-submitted one and goes to Khalid Tawalbeh from Qatar Tribune, and the question is:  “Can you provide details about the immediate measures taken by the United States to assist Libya in dealing with the floods and resulting humanitarian crisis?”AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Sure.  Well, as I mentioned, on the day of the disaster our embassy declared a disaster emergency, which immediately began to release U.S. funding to support the humanitarian response.  Within days the U.S. had gone from committing a million dollars to committing $12 million.  President Biden announced that.  You could say that the response can be divided into three parts.  So one is the immediate rescue and relief phase, and there our focus was on donations to organizations that were immediately involved in those efforts.Then there’s a recovery phase, which we’re engaged in now in coordination with the United Nations, which I have to say has played a remarkably rapid and effective role in trying to coordinate relief and recovery efforts around Derna and in eastern Libya, and that, again, is done in many ways through partner organizations from the international system and international NGOs.  We have a focus now on trying to help people prepare for winter and to deal with issues like food, medicine.  There are thousands of orphans now whose needs need to be met with psychological assistance.And then the third phase gets into the area of reconstruction, and there the U.S. focuses on trying to help the Libyans pull together a unified reconstruction effort to maximize its effectiveness.  The Libyan people have made clear that they want to be reassured that resources that are supposed to be devoted to the reconstruction effort in fact are going to go there.  And having two separate entities, two separate governments trying to implement this is not as effective as having a unified effort.  With a unified effort, it’s also easier for the international community to provide the kind of technical support, accountability, transparency that will make for a more effective effort.  And if you have a unified Libyan effort, the international community can plug in more effectively.So, again, in addition to the money that we’ve contributed and the 29 metric tons of supplies, the United States is very focused on doing what we can in cooperation with local, national, and international partners to support the relief, the recovery, and reconstruction efforts in Libya.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  We’ll now go to a question from the live queue, and the question goes to Suzy Elgeneidy from Al-Ahram. Suzy, you’re free to talk.  Go ahead and please unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Okay.  Hi.  How are you?  Thank you for this.  Actually, it’s very important to know what’s happening from the side of the United States helping Libyans.  But my question is in your opinion, Mr. Ambassador, what are the chances of holding an election in Libya before the end of this year?  And are there any U.S. objections against any of the expected runners like Saif al-Islam Qadhafi or Khalifa Haftar?  Thank you very much.AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Right.  Well, it’s kind of my observation that the need for unity on flood reconstruction is matched now by the need for political unity.  And it may not be a coincidence that we’re seeing a flurry of activity break out in the – in some of the key Libyan institutions here, like the House of Representatives and the High State Council focused immediately on the adoption of electoral laws that would set the stage for presidential and parliamentary elections.There is still some debate about exactly where those laws stand right now, but from our perspective, now is absolutely the time for key Libyan leaders to agree to meet and discuss how to move forward with these electoral laws and how to set up a technocratic caretaker government that would actually lead the country to elections.  It’s critical that all of the key partners be involved here, that it’s not a matter of forcing one party’s way in or forcing somebody out.  That was tried a year ago, it resulted in some bloodshed, and nobody wants to be responsible for that.I think the really important thing here is that the UN is ready to play a very positive role.  SRSG Bathily has offered compromise ideas, which he outlined to the UN Security Council not long ago.  He has reiterated more recently his offer to provide a negotiating format and platform for the key parties to come together or send their representatives and begin a process of moving towards elections.I don’t think anybody believes this will happen overnight.  People are looking for a credible roadmap to elections where the goal is clear, there are milestones along the way.  And with the necessary buy-in from the key leaders, it’s – it becomes credible that they – they’ve agreed that they’re going to play by the rules.The key players are pretty clear.  It&#8217;s the high – the House of Representatives, the High State Council, the Presidential Council, the Government of National Unity, and the LNA.  And we would reiterate Mr. Bathily’s call that now is the time for them to send representatives to take part in these discussions.  This really offers the best hope for Libyans not only to move forward on the reconstruction process but also towards the political unity and the legitimization of their institutions which is so badly needed.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  Now for the next question, we’ll go to Alaa Elamari from Libya Al Ahrar TV.  And the question is:  “Can the United Nations’ and the United States’ call for a unified mechanism to support flood-affected cities succeed amidst the political division in Libya?”AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Well, I think it can succeed.  We’ve already been struck by the outpouring of engagement from across the country in support of the population affected by the floods in Derna and eastern Libya.  People rallied from not just the west, from Tripoli, but even from the south, from the most marginalized part of the country, to provide supplies and even soldiers to come and help to try to dig through the rubble.  So we think that there’s a will to participate together in this.  And I think leaders at the top recognize this.I think they also recognize that for the international community – well, they recognize that the Libyan people are looking for reassurance that resources devoted to flood relief are actually going to go there.  And the best way to do that is to have the involvement of some technocratic international organizations like the World Bank, the UN Development Program – which have indicated they’re ready to play a role in this process – to bring them into the process.And to do that it’s just much better and easier to do it if there’s a unified structure.  In the absence of such a structure, certainly the United States – and I think most of the organizations I mentioned – will continue to deal with Libyans across the board in any way that will help to advance the relief and reconstruction effort.  But imagine how much more effective it can be if it’s a unified structure.  And this shouldn’t be now a matter of any particular party trying to gain credit for flood relief.  The issue now is how to deliver credible, transparent, accountable relief to the people of Libya who need it so badly.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  And the next question from the live queue goes to Hasan Elbakoush from Almasar TV.  Hasan, please feel free to ask your question.  You can unmute yourself.QUESTION:  (In Arabic.)MODERATOR:  Hasan, let me – (in Arabic).  I will ask your question in English for the ambassador.QUESTION:  (In Arabic.)MODERATOR:  If it’s in Arabic, I will – I have your question that you submitted to the live queue.  I will ask it.QUESTION:  I don’t understand.  (In Arabic.)MODERATOR:  (In Arabic.)  Okay.  So his question is:  “Does the United States agree with the proposal to form a new government to conduct the elections?”AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  As I said earlier, I think we’re entering a period of real – once again, a period of real political ferment.  And the events in Derna and eastern Libya have added now new urgency to the need to unify the country’s institutions.  And I think that the process of – that that process involves a couple of stages.  One is to agree on the electoral laws, and we seem to be very close there.  There’s been progress just in the last couple of days.  The other part is agreeing on a caretaker government that everybody can agree will have a neutral role in taking the country to elections and giving every candidate equal opportunity.These are issues that can only be decided by the key parties themselves, and they need to do that at the negotiating table that SRSG Bathily has offered.  If there’s an attempt to try to force one party out or force one party in, it just risks bloodshed, as we saw a year ago.  And so I believe that the stage is actually set for development of an agreed credible roadmap to elections that could take place sooner than people think.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  The next question goes to the live queue to Nadia Bilbassy from Al Arabiya.  Nadia, please feel free to unmute.  Go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Now we can hear you.  Go ahead with your question.QUESTION:  Great.  Thank you.  Good morning, Ambassador.  I just want to follow up with what you said about meeting with General Haftar along with General Langley.  After that meeting, General Haftar went to Moscow and he met with President Putin.  How do you read his meeting there, and can you give us some kind of assessment of the Wagner Group influence in Libya?  Has it been waned or stronger or the same after the death of Prigozhin?  Thank you so much.AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Well, in fact, General Langley’s visit to Tripoli and to Benghazi was scheduled before the flood.  But of course, the issue of flood relief and recovery was uppermost in our minds when we had our meetings there to begin with.  But in – the original purpose of the trip was in fact to focus on the security and well-being of the Libyan people, particularly in the context of growing turmoil on Libya’s southern borders.  If you look at the borders with Sudan, Chad, and Niger, these are all very precarious and fragile situations.  And regrettably, Wagner has contributed to destabilizing activities, not only in Libya but in each of those border regions.And so when Libyan leaders engage with Russian counterparts, our suggestion is that they press the Russians on why Wagner should be the tool of choice to engage in in Libya.  And our focus – and this is something that General Langley spoke about with General Haddad in Tripoli and with General Haftar in Benghazi – it’s how to bring – to start a process of reunifying the Libyan military, beginning with a joint force that could patrol the south.  And this is something that was first brought up by the Joint Military Commission when they announced their ceasefire, the so-called 5+5 back in October of 2020.  And that institution, the 5+5, continues to function.And there’s been a lot of discussion in the Berlin Process Security Working Group and other forums of how to unify the Libyan military.  It’s obviously not something that’s going to happen overnight, but we continue to push that, and that’s something that General Langley spoke about, and we think this joint unit to patrol the south would be a good place to begin.  Once you have that kind of unified security institution, you have a unified government with elections, then Libya is in a position to choose from a range of security cooperation partners, and that’s going to be Libya’s sovereign choice.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  The next question will go to Kamel Mansari from Algeria, Jeune Independent.  And the question is: “Has the dire situation in Derna caused a shift in U.S. priorities in Libya, particularly in terms of a political solution?”AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  I think if anything it’s intensified our interest in reaching a solution that will not only unify the economic – unify and make more accountable the economic instruments in Libya that will be focused on reconstruction, but also the political – unifying the political institutions to help restore the country’s sovereignty and its unity.So again, as I said earlier, Derna produced an outpouring of engagement from across the country, and I think people want to see that continue.  They aren’t looking – and I want to say that we’ve seen strong efforts on the leadership on both sides to try to address the recovery and reconstruction issues.  There’s no lack of interest.  The issue is can these – wouldn’t it be more efficient to unify those efforts?  And now would seem to be the time to do it, and of course it would have some benefit on the political front as well.I would highlight one institution that was created a few months ago, the High Finance Committee, which brought together representatives from all of the parties in Libya, all of the key actors, to try to agree on how best to spend Libya’s mounting oil revenues, and at least to identify some priority areas for expenditure and then to make sure the money’s going there.  That committee has begun to function, and I think the reconstruction effort now involving Derna is a project that the High Finance Committee could make one of its top priorities.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  The next question is in the live queue from Jared Szuba from Al-Monitor.  Jared, please feel free to unmute yourself and ask your question.QUESTION:  Hi, Mr. Ambassador.  Thank you so much for doing this.  Just want to follow up on Nadia Bilbassy’s question about General Langley’s with Khalifa Haftar.  Does the U.S. envision a role potentially for Mr. Haftar in a future unified Libyan security structure?  I know in the past the – U.S. officials have encouraged Mr. Haftar to distance himself and his forces from Russia and Russian-backed forces.  Given that he has since traveled to Moscow and signed a defense MOU, does the U.S. still envision a role for him in a future Libyan security structure, and will the U.S. enact sanctions for this?AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Yeah, I’m not aware of anything that was signed, but if you have some information on that, that would be interesting.  No, the role of not just General Haftar but of other figures in the Libyan political process going forward is something that Libyans are going to have to decide for themselves.  This is not something that the United States will decide.  We are engaging with all of the key leaders, including General Haftar, because they have an important role to play in moving things forward, and they can play an important role in blocking things if they decide to do that.  And our goal is to try to help SRSG Bathily bring the key actors to the table, beginning with their representatives, to focus on a credible roadmap to elections.  And to do that, I think we have to engage with all the key actors.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  The next question goes to Husam Alter from Aswat newspaper.  And the question is:  “What mechanisms will the United States implement to ensure transparent reconstruction in Derna and prevent the misuse of funds allocated for Derna?”AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Well, that’s a very important question.  One of the first steps in this process is a needs assessment that the World Bank will conduct over the next five or six weeks.  There are – then there’s the thought of getting the UNDP involved.  Of course, it has a very robust track record of accountability and knowing how to help countries manage projects like this and processes like this transparently and effectively.There’s something called the Derna and Benghazi reconstruction fund, which right now is relatively small, but it’s something that could be built on to help with this reconstruction effort.  And again, with international involvement it would be pretty straightforward to make sure that this is all managed in a transparent and accountable way.  So I mean, the reality in Libya is, of course, people – some people are skeptical about how – where money’s going, and our goal is to try to help reassure the Libyan public that reconstruction funds are going where they’re intended.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  And now for the next question from the live queue to Jack Jeffery from the Associated Press.  Jack, please feel free to unmute yourself and ask a question.QUESTION:  Hi.  Thank you very much for doing this.  I wanted to know if in any of the recent meetings with Khalifa Haftar – if any representative from the U.S. addressed the issues regarding the clampdown and restrictions on journalists during the – in the post – immediate post-flood period, and also the alleged crackdown on dissent and protests that also followed them.AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Yeah.  Well, I think, the issue of civil society and free speech is something that we’ve raised with all parties in Libya consistently for quite some time.  We’re conscious that in the situation in Derna there have been situations where some civil – some relief groups, some journalists have encountered restrictions.  Those are due to security concerns or not wanting bad press – honestly, it’s hard for us to say.Our message has been that the more press coverage there is of the crisis out there, the better the international community will be informed about what’s needed, the more resources are likely to be steered towards the afflicted area.  So this is something that certainly is on the agenda, not just for the United States but the international community, the UN.  It’s about trying to – it’s all part of the basic theme of how to work with Libyans to produce the most effective response to the flood crisis.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  And we have time for actually not even one more question, unfortunately.  So we’re going to have to wrap it up at this point.  Thank you very much, Ambassador.  If you have any closing remarks, I’ll just turn the floor back over to you.AMBASSADOR NORLAND:  Well, thanks very much.  Thanks for the high level of interest in this and the excellent reporting that we’ve seen globally on this crisis.  I would just say in closing that Libyans have been waiting for a long time to try to see the kind of political progress that they’re looking for.  There’s one doctor I spoke with once who said:  After 42 years of darkness, Libyans deserve to see the sun.  And those 42 years were followed by 10 or 12 years of turmoil.There’s a real opportunity to try to move forward on a viable political process.  The crisis in Derna has kind of brought renewed attention to this, but it hasn’t changed the fundamental picture that it&#8217;s time for Libyan leaders now to bring their institutions together, to legitimize them.  It’s not going to happen overnight, but the UN has offered a viable platform for representatives from the key parties to begin the discussions to get there.  And we strongly urge these leaders to seize the opportunity.Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  That concludes today’s call.  I would like to thank Ambassador Norland for joining us.  We appreciate how busy you are, Ambassador, so thank you for taking the time to speak to journalists.  And thank you to all of our colleagues from the media for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, you can contact the Dubai Regional Media Hub at DubaiMediaHub@state.gov.  Thank you all very much, and we hope you have a wonderful rest of your day.# # #