DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LAWTON COHEN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D16-1342

[November 8, 2017]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; David A. Haimes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14-3395 CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard 

Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Lawton Cohen appeals his second-degree felony fleeing and 

misdemeanor reckless driving convictions. We address his insufficiency 

of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, and affirm

for the reasons explained herein. 

Background

Appellant rammed his vehicle through a security gate and entered Port

Everglades. A fifteen-minute police chase ensued, during which Appellant

ran a red light, drove over sidewalks, crossed over medians, jumped over 

curbs, and zig-zagged across roads. At one point, Appellant crossed four 

lanes of traffic, nearly hitting two civilian vehicles. Appellant was 

eventually forced off the road by police, after which he backed into a police 

cruiser, injuring an officer.

Appellant was initially charged with third degree felony fleeing. The 

State elevated the charge to second degree before trial. Appellant’s 

attorney overlooked the amendment, only realizing the oversight when 
2

conferencing on the final jury instructions with the trial court and State. 

He argued that he did not defend on the added element of wanton 

disregard while fleeing. See § 316.1935(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). When the 

State pointed out that the reckless driving charge had the same wanton 

disregard language, see § 316.192(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016), defense counsel 

stated he did not care about that charge and that he practically conceded 

wanton disregard. In an attempt to remedy the failure, the trial court

instructed the jury on both second and third degree felony fleeing. The 

jury found Appellant guilty of second degree felony fleeing.

Analysis

Wanton disregard is a “conscious and intentional indifference to 

consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to 

persons or property.” Domoah v. State, 189 So. 3d 316, 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2016) (quoting Lewek v. State, 702 So. 2d 527, 530-31 (Fla. 4th DCA

1997)). The evidence presented at trial, including a video of much of the 

chase, amounted to competent, substantial evidence to support the jury’s

finding of wanton disregard for second degree fleeing and reckless driving. 

Generally, ineffective assistance claims may not be raised on direct 

appeal. Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 403 (Fla. 2016). A rare exception 

exists when the ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the record, the 

prejudice is indisputable, and tactical explanation is inconceivable. 

Lesovsky v. State, 198 So. 3d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Prejudice is 

disputable on both charges in the instant case because there was 

competent, substantial evidence of wanton disregard. Appellant’s

ineffective assistance claim does not meet the narrow exception, and we 

affirm on this issue, as well as on all other issues raised in the appeal.

Conclusion

The trial court’s final judgment is affirmed in all respects, without 

prejudice to Appellant bringing an action for postconviction relief.1

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

 

1 We take no position on the merits of such a claim should one be made.