# Philippines - United States Department of State

- Joint Statement on U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Joint Statement on U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Joint Statement on U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue																																		Media Note																														May 13, 2024																																							The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Philippines at the inaugural U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue.Begin TextAs called for in the May 2023 U.S.-Philippines Joint Leaders’ Statement, the United States and the Philippines held the first bilateral Space Dialogue in Washington, D.C. on May 2, 2024. The U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue is a platform designed to strengthen cooperation and advance bilateral exchanges in civil space matters including the use of space for maritime domain awareness and space situational awareness. It represents an expansion of U.S.-Philippines cooperation into outer space, including the use of space-based Earth observation satellite data for a wide variety of socio-economic applications.In their welcome and keynote messages, Jennifer R. Littlejohn, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Chirag Parikh, Executive Secretary of the National Space Council; and Joel Joseph Marciano Jr., Director General of the Philippine Space Agency (PhilSA) and Head of the Philippine Mission to the United States on Space Science and Technology Applications, expressed their confidence that the inaugural Space Dialogue will deepen space cooperation for the benefit of the peoples of both countries.The U.S. delegation to the Space Dialogue was led by Rahima Kandahari, Deputy Assistant Secretary, State Department Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and the Philippine delegation by Gay Jane Perez, Deputy Director General for Space Science and Technology of PhilSA.Both sides agreed that Earth observation is a priority area for bilateral cooperation. They discussed a range of programs that use satellites to better forecast weather patterns; support agricultural and infrastructure planning; help monitor and combat climate change and pollution; prepare for and respond to disasters; improve natural resource use; and provide vital telecommunications services. They agreed to consider the possible hosting in the Philippines of a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Landsat ground station, and the Philippines expressed interest in possible expansion of cooperation, through programs such as the joint USAID-NASA SERVIR program, which expanded last year to include the Philippines.The delegations recognized the potential for expanded cooperation on the use of space for maritime domain awareness, including through the U.S. Department of Transportation-led SeaVision program. Such programs can help monitor and document vessels in the Philippines’ territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone, ensure the safety of mariners at sea, monitor and help protect the environment, and help combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The delegations also highlighted efforts to expand the provision of satellite-enabled broadband Internet services to remote and underserved areas of the Philippines, including a PhilSA initiative in cooperation with USAID BEACON, leveraging U.S. commercial low-earth orbit communication satellites.Both countries reviewed joint efforts to promote the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. This includes work in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) and other UN bodies, and in regional forums such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). The Philippines expressed that it is considering signing on to the Artemis Accords, which establish guidelines to ensure safety and responsible behavior in outer space as countries explore the Moon and beyond. The two countries agreed to stay in close communication on expanding commercial space ties and space situational awareness (SSA), as U.S. responsibilities for civil and commercial SSA shift in the coming years from the Department of Defense to Department of Commerce. Both sides recognized the importance of addressing space debris.Both countries agreed to work together to expand bilateral exchange and training programs on the use of Earth observation satellite data, development of space applications and technologies and other space science and skills, including fellowships, scholarships and internship programs. The two sides highlighted the launch of Fulbright-PhilSA space science scholarships, and agreed to enhance exchanges under that agreement. The two sides agreed to explore collaborative education and capacity building efforts through PhilSA’s Advanced Degrees for Accelerating Strategic Space R&amp;D and Applications (AD ASTRA) scholarship program, NASA’s DEVELOP and other programs, and U.S. State Department exchange and speaker programs.Both countries agreed to continue to work together in the areas mentioned above and to explore other collaboration such as space industry sector development, including at the next U.S.-Philippines Space Dialogue, to be held in the Philippines at a mutually-agreed upon future date.End Text						Tags																													Artemis Accords																															Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Philippines																																														Science, Technology, and Innovation																																							Space
- Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Verma’s Travel to the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma will travel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Philippines May 6-10.In the PRC, Deputy Secretary Verma will visit the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulates General in Shenyang, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to thank personnel and ensure that their teams have the right equipment and facilities to most effectively serve U.S. interests.  The Deputy Secretary will also meet with members of the U.S. business community in Shanghai to advocate for a level playing field for U.S. workers and firms operating in China.In the Philippines, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet with senior government officials to build on the progress made during the annual U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue on April 22-23, the bilateral meeting between President Marcos and President Biden, the historic Japan-Philippines-U.S. Trilateral Leaders’ Summit on April 11, and the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Ministerial on April 12.  The Deputy Secretary will also participate in a wreath laying ceremony at the Manila American Cemetery and Memorial and host a dinner with Philippine U.S. Exchange Program alumni.
- U.S. – Philippines Joint Committee Meeting on Science and Technology Office of the SpokespersonOn April 30, 2024, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines convened in Washington D.C. for the latest in-person Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) on science and technology under the 2019 Science and Technology Agreement. The JCM supports Presidents Joseph R. Biden and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.’s “shared vision of partnership, peace, and prosperity” for the United States and the Philippines, and further strengthens the partnership between the two countries&#8217; economies and scientific communities.Ms. Rahima Kandahari, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Technology, and Space Affairs, in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and Dr. Leah J. Buendia, Undersecretary for Research &amp; Development at the Philippine Department of Science and Technology convened this forward-looking dialogue.The JCM, first launched under the 2003 U.S.-Philippines Science and Technology Agreement and re-established under the 2019 U.S.-Philippines Science and Technology Agreement, provides a regular opportunity to exchange views on some of the most important science and technology endeavors in our countries, and to prioritize future collaboration. This JCM convened representatives from government agencies and research institutions in the United States and the Philippines to discuss cooperation on OneHealth; agriculture and development; industry, energy, and emerging technology; environmental research; and transdisciplinary approaches to science, technology, and innovation research and communication.For further information, please reach out to OES-Press@state.gov.
- Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 30, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024																																																					April 30, 2024																																																								1:17 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Let’s see. I have – I don’t have anything off the top, so Daphne, do you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yes, thank you so much.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Prime Minister Netanyahu said today that Israel will carry out an operation against Hamas in Rafah regardless of whether or not &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: (Laughter.) Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, regardless of whether or not a ceasefire and hostage release deal is reached. Is it still the case that the U.S. hasn’t seen a credible plan for entering Rafah? And what will you do if they go ahead, as Netanyahu is warning?MR PATEL: That is correct. We – it continues to be the case that we have not seen a credible plan that would address the varying areas of concerns that you’ve heard me talk about a number of times from up here and others, primarily the ability to address the serious humanitarian concerns surrounding – again, Rafah is a region with more than 1 million people seeking refuge, so that an area that continues to be an important conduit for humanitarian aid as well as the safe departure of foreign nationals. And so any kind of operation that’s – that does not address some of these key concerns would certainly be opposed by us.I’m not going to get into any hypotheticals, but this is something we’re continuing to engage with our partners in Israel. Conversations continue to be happening at all levels, and we continue to press forward on those conversations and asking for what their plans may or may not be as it pertains to Rafah.QUESTION: And are you concerned that this warning that they would go ahead with whether or not a ceasefire and hostage deal is reached could derail hostage talks?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speculate on that. What I can say, Daphne, is that we remain committed to reaching a deal for the immediate – for an immediate ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and allows for additional steps to be taken in terms of surging humanitarian aid, and something that we hope will help bolster the protection of civilians as well.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?QUESTION: A follow-up on that?MR PATEL: Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Israel’s track record in heeding to the U.S. statements or calls could be arguably not great. What gives you confidence or what makes you think that Israel would, in fact, listen and hear your calls not to go into Rafah?MR PATEL: I’d dispute, though, the premise of that a little bit, Leon. Over the course of this conflict, there have been a number of endeavors in which the United States has pressed for that we have seen our partners in Israel undertake, dating back to the beginning of this conflict even in the early days of this conversation that we were having around humanitarian aid. We also continue to see steps being taken as it relates to their cooperation on a number of other lines of effort in the humanitarian aid space.But both – look, when it comes to humanitarian aid, when it comes to the protection of civilians, and when it comes to a potential operation in Rafah, our answer continues to be we need to see more, we need to see more steps being taken. And as it relates to an operation in Rafah, we have yet to see a credible plan that would address the underlying concerns that I laid out to Daphne.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?MR PATEL: Olivia, go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Just because the Secretary was also asked about this not long ago. He said that the U.S. views on this were well known. But he didn’t address part of the question that – whether Israel had in fact committed to present a military and humanitarian plan. So absent the plans themselves, has there been a formal commitment from the Israeli Government to present those plans before launching any – an invasion?MR PATEL: I am not going to be a spokesperson for the Government of Israel. Through the Strategic Consultative Group that you have seen National Security Advisor Sullivan and Secretary Blinken undertake their consultations with counterparts in Israel, discussions at those levels and through other interlocutors as part of those engagements, those conversations are ongoing. As the Secretary said, the United States position on this could not be clearer. For how long we’ve been talking about this, we have expressed our serious concern about any kind of operation that does not address some of these key pieces, and we’ll continue to stress and raise these very important issues.QUESTION: Thank you. I mean, I totally appreciate not asking you for the Israeli perspective on this, only whether the U.S. has actually received a commitment from the government to have formal plans presented prior to any invasion.MR PATEL: I am just not going to speak to further specificity about this process.QUESTION: Okay. Two others on the region, if that’s okay.MR PATEL: Mind if I jump to Gillian?QUESTION: Sure.MR PATEL: And then we can – we’ll – I’m sure we’ll get to everybody. Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, thanks. I’m just wondering if State has any comment or any information, anything today on the anti-Israel protests across the nation now, really going from California all the way to New York. A lot of these student protesters are accusing the Biden administration of being complicit in genocide. Wondering if you – if diplomatically &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; foreign-policy-wise, you guys have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, so I’ve spent a number of the last few daily press briefings talking about this, and I’m happy to reiterate what I said before. First, I will echo what the Secretary said in talking to one of your colleagues on the margins of his trip to Beijing. Demonstrating – demonstrations, I should say, expressing your opinion about any kind of government action, expressing your opinion about foreign policy, exercising your First Amendment right – none of those things are problematic or antisemitic or Islamophobic, in their own right. It is when those things are coupled with the use of certain language, and rhetoric, and insults that we have seen and have been part of some of these demonstrations.Beyond that, those kinds of things of course we would condemn and take issue with. But we believe that every American has every right to express their points of view, to exercise their First Amendment right. When it comes to policies that are – that as it relate to any particular campus, those campus officials are better suited to speak to those policies that they have in place both in terms of dealing with expressions of First Amendment rights or otherwise. I am not in a space to speak to that.But of course, everyone has every right to make their point of view heard, and from our perspective across this administration we’ve made clear that we insist that these happen in a peaceful, nonviolent manner. And any kinds of these demonstrations, when they are paired with or coupled with rhetoric, language that is antisemitic, Islamophobic, essentially insults or target someone for just who they are, that’s deeply problematic.QUESTION: A quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: One thing that’s kind of new as far as I’m aware is you’re seeing regimes now like the Iranian regime, China has started to weigh in – the government, and criticize the Biden administration’s response to these protests. We saw overnight the Chinese saying that the way the U.S. Government is responding is violating these students’ rights. Do you have a comment on these adversaries kind of using it as an opportunity to criticize?MR PATEL: Look, the policies and procedures as it relates to demonstrations, protesting, things like that that may or may not exist on a particular college campus, or may or may not exist in a particular town, city, or municipality, it is certainly not in the remit of the State Department so I am not going to even delve into that.QUESTION: Isn’t it hypocritical though &#8212;MR PATEL: There’s other agencies that are better suited to speak to that. But what I can say broadly, we of course support anybody to be able to express themselves and to exercise their First Amendments rights. They should not and cannot become violent, not peaceful. And in those particular circumstances, we believe it is the right of the appropriate law enforcement and – enforcement and security officials to take appropriate actions consistent with the policies of that jurisdiction. Again, we are delving far away from foreign policy and into law enforcement, which is not the remit of this – of this department.QUESTION: No, because what I’m asking really is: Is it not from a foreign policy, foreign relations, diplomacy perspective, isn’t it, I mean, hypocritical of the Chinese and the Iranians, some of the worst human rights violators in the world, to be criticizing the Biden administration’s policy response to America?MR PATEL: I don’t think anybody in this administration is interested in taking a human rights lesson from the Iranian regime, or the People’s Republic of China for that matter. And both of those regimes’ crackdowns on self-expression, on free and fair press, on basic human rights, is clear.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving &#8212;QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up on a couple of things.MR PATEL: Hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving of the United States with the protesters being arrested is not necessarily the one you would want to have.MR PATEL: Leon, there are laws in this country. Again, we are delving away from the topics that are discussed in this department. But if laws are being broken on certain college campuses, in certain municipalities, in certain towns, in certain cities, in certain counties, it is will within the right for the officials of those jurisdictions to enforce whatever laws that are so appropriate as it relates to that region. Beyond that, we fully support anybody’s ability to exercise their First Amendment right and make their opinions as it relates to any action or policy the government may or may not be taking and making their points of view heard.QUESTION: Vedant &#8212;MR PATEL: Said.QUESTION: Thank you, I just have quick follow-ups and then I have a couple questions of my own.Now, in response to Gillian, you said there are certain things that are being said in these protests that you have issue with. Could you share some of those with us?MR PATEL: I’m not going to repeat them from up here, Said, but &#8212;QUESTION: But you made an assertion that you are obviously in command of. What are these statements?MR PATEL: Said, there have been a number of these demonstrations in which the imagery, in which the language that has been written on some of the poster material, has either been akin to what I would believe to be antisemitism. But we’ve also seen expressions, rhetoric, signage that is akin to Islamophobia and the targeting of Arab Americans and Palestinian Americans, as well. Of course any kind of language or rhetoric in that space is concerning, troubling, and unacceptable. But again, we fully support people’s ability to peacefully make their – express their First Amendment rights.QUESTION: Now on the statement by the Israeli prime minister on Rafah, I mean, he is saying very plainly that whether there is a deal or there is no deal, I am going storm Rafah. And you don’t have a position on this? I mean, he’s not waiting for a deal to be arrived at.MR PATEL: I think our position on Rafah – I really don’t appreciate you, Said, twisting my words or the words &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not.MR PATEL: &#8212; of the Secretary or other officials up here. We have made our point of view &#8212;QUESTION: I am quoting what the prime minister of Israel said. I’m not &#8212;MR PATEL: I understand. I understand your question. And in response to your question, and Daphne’s question, and the number of times that we have asked – been asked about a potential operation into Rafah from up here, we have been unambiguous about the concerns that we have when it comes to the more than a million people seeking refuge in that region, when it comes to this region in particular in Gaza being an important conduit for the delivery of humanitarian aid, it being a region in which foreign nationals at least at the beginning of this conflict were able to use, are able to use consistently for safe departure.So any kind of operation that does not address these concerns would be a non-starter for us. And you’ve heard me say this. You’ve heard the Secretary say this. You’ve heard Matt say this; you’ve heard Admiral Kirby, Karine, the President. We have been consistent on this.QUESTION: Yeah. So would it be appropriate for the United States of America to say, whether there is a deal or not a deal, we find that the storming of Rafah is unacceptable?MR PATEL: I – we have been pretty clear about that, Said.QUESTION: Very clear?MR PATEL: We have been very clear that many – any kind of military operation into Rafah that does not address these concerns would be unacceptable to the United States.QUESTION: Right. Now I have a question on the humanitarian situation. Officials at the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, leaked a – they leaked a document that says that the Israeli Government intently sort of put obstacles in the way of these humanitarian aid convoys or whatever, getting food to Gaza. Now are you aware of that report?MR PATEL: So I’m just not going to comment on leaked documents, Said.QUESTION: Why won’t you comment on this document?MR PATEL: I’m not going to comment on leaked documents, on things that continue to exist under a deliberative process. I will just say that the Secretary and the leaders of this administration, they hear a diverse range of views from across this department, from across the interagency. When it comes to processes that are within the deliberative process, we take those points of view into consideration, but beyond that, I am just not going to speak to purportedly leaked documents.QUESTION: Okay. Would you agree that there is a – almost a common opinion among professionals and experts and so on that Israel is in fact – and the prime minister of Israel are in fact – take measures day after day to sort of make these humanitarian aids, including American – large portions of American aid &#8212;MR PATEL: I would disagree with your characterization.Julia.QUESTION: Thank you. I know the State Department and Secretary Blinken have made clear that the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction in your view over the Palestinian conflict. But I wanted to get your response to remarks from Netanyahu just today, especially in context of the conversation we just had about the campus protests. He said, “Branding Israel’s leaders and soldiers as war criminals will pour jet fuel on the fires of antisemitism, those fires that are already raging on the campuses of America and across capitals around the world.”Do you agree with that assessment that it’s antisemitic for the ICC to pursue Netanyahu? And what do you make of him connecting this to the campus protests?MR PATEL: So fundamentally, at the heart of this, Julia, we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction over this issue, and that’s the crux here. Beyond that, I’d let the prime minister and officials within the Israeli Government clarify or offer any commentary on his comments.But at the crux of this for the United States is that we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction on this. That being said, we work closely with the ICC on a number of key areas. We think that they do important work – important work as it relates to Ukraine, Darfur, Sudan. But again, on this particular incident – instance – in this particular instance, I’m sorry, they just do not have jurisdiction.QUESTION: If I may, another on Saudi Arabia.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: There have been reports that Saudi Arabia has decided to normalize relations with Israel but is waiting to determine when they do that based on the U.S. election and the results of the election. What do you make of Saudi Arabia potentially weighing this presidential election so much, when the urgency is now?MR PATEL: So I would – I’d defer to officials in the Saudi Government to speak to their position. I’m not a spokesperson for them. What I can say from the United States is that we also have been unambiguous about how we feel that a greater – a more integrated Middle East region is better for not just the interests of the United States, but it is better for peace and stability in the Middle East region. It is also something that we believe other officials across the Middle East region and Arab world view this as well.We are continuing to work this. We think that Israel’s further integration in the Middle East region can unlock additional benefits. It can offer greater security, which is in the interests of the United States. It’s in the interest of the people of Israel, and it’s also in the interest of other partners as well.But of course, we also are continuing to stress and underline the importance of doing everything we can to reaching a deal for an immediate ceasefire – one that releases the hostages, one that allows a surge of humanitarian aid into the region as well.Go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: I don’t know if somebody asked you about this or not, but I want to ask you about the Amnesty International report.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. So basically, Amnesty just published its report. I don’t know if you’ve seen it in details. But they say there is a reasonable evidence that Israel has committed war crimes, a gross violation of international – of human rights and violation of international humanitarian law. I’m just wondering – I mean, with something as serious as this from a very reputable organization, that normally use it to talk about rogue states, et cetera, when they finding and they publish their reports – why the State Department still now has not published anything to either contradict or to support other human rights organizations been talking about what’s happening in Gaza? Basically &#8212;MR PATEL: So first, I’ve not seen that specific report, Nadia. But I think you were in the briefing room just about a week and a half ago in which we – when we unveiled the 2024 Human Rights Report, in which there was, in fact, a section outlining Israel and the Palestinian territories.When it comes to the current conflict in Gaza – and I have spent a number of days talking about this – we are continuing to assess what is happening on the ground. We have a number of tools at our disposal to look into what is happening on the ground and, if required, hold appropriate and relevant parties accountable. You’ve heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about Leahy. You have heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about the CHIRG process. We continue to have those options as well as other avenues under the Foreign Assistance Act to look into these things. And as in any conflict zone, Nadia, this work is ongoing and we are feeding into that process in close coordination with not just our embassies and consulates, but also civil society, independent media reporting of such things, and, of course, NGOs as well.QUESTION: Can you just assure us that, actually, you treat Israel the same way as you treat any other country that found in violation of international law? Because what we hear from you is all the statements and some actions, like we see with the settlers, but many believe that when the prime minister of Israel pick up the phone, call the White House, the finding is changed and delayed and pushed, just like we heard about – even the Secretary, we were together in Italy when he assured us that we’re going to hear about this report – about the Leahy report and the violation of using U.S. weapons. But we haven’t heard about it. So I just wanted an assurance from you that actually you’re taking these things seriously.MR PATEL: Well, I spent about 50 percent of the daily press briefing yesterday talking about it, so I would take issue with how you laid that out. There are absolutely – we hold Israel to the same standard that we hold any country with, and that is with – in Gaza, outside of Gaza, anywhere. International law, international humanitarian law needs to be followed, and it needs to be abided by. And when we find violations or when we find issues that are concerning, not only do we raise them with the Israeli Government, we will take appropriate actions consistent with the systems and tools that we have in the United States to take appropriate actions.I spent a great deal of yesterday talking about the Leahy process in which we found five violations of – gross violations of human rights. So when we see issues, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action. There is no different standard or different set of rules when it comes to any country on which we have a relationship with.QUESTION: Okay. Just one final clarification.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary said that the offer they gave to Hamas is generous. Who decide what is generosity? Is it the United States and Israel? What is it – is it Arab partners in the Saudi summit that they decided it was generous? I mean, I guess my question: How do you define what is generous and what is (inaudible)?MR PATEL: So Nadia, over the course of this conflict, we have seen Hamas move the goal post, renege on agreements that they have made as it – as relates to part of this deal. And so the Secretary was simply underlining the fact that we are in this position in which Hamas has a generous offer on the table, and it’s imperative for them to move and to act on it as swiftly as possible.Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Just one point of clarification on Leahy, which I know you amply addressed yesterday, but you mentioned yesterday that the process was open-ended, right? It was subject to the MOU that exists between the Israeli Government and the United States. This new information that Israel has provided with regard to the fifth unit, is – can it continuously supply new information with regard to that unit until the U.S. sort of adjudicates in a particular direction? Or is this a finite set of information on whose basis the U.S. will decide whether to take punitive action?MR PATEL: I would say the information is definitive and it is more that, consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have, we are bound by that to consult and engage with officials in Israel on the process, on steps that they may or may not be taking, and we are assessing all of those things to ensure that they are in standard with what is laid out in the Leahy Law. And if not, as I said yesterday, there will, of course, be a resistance of applicable – a restriction on applicable U.S. assistance.QUESTION: Okay. And then a separate question on aid.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary from Jordan earlier mentioned the opening of new crossings into northern Gaza. I was hoping you could just update us on the overall metrics, on the volume of aid that’s going in, and how that compares to what the U.S. believes is necessary.MR PATEL: So look, we are still very much in the same place that we were when David Satterfield came and talked to you all. We have seen some measurable steps in the right direction. Northern crossings including Erez and Zikim are preparing to reopen. We are seeing that routes from Jordan and Ashdod are showing progress, but not fully yet realized. And southern crossings, specifically Kerem Shalom and Rafah, have seen some fluctuating numbers of trucks, but trending in the right direction.This is all to say that we still need to see more. And some metrics that I can offer is that April – on April 25th, approximately 303 trucks entered Gaza according to the UN; 282 trucks via Kerem Shalom, and 21 trucks via Rafah. That is not nearly enough, but it is a step in the right direction. We want to continue to see more. And I know also we spend a lot of time up here talking about trucks and their inflows and outflows, possibly because it might be the most digestible metric out there when talking about this issue.But ultimately, when we talk about humanitarian aid, it is great to see trucks enter Gaza; it is even better when the humanitarian aid that enters Gaza is getting to the Palestinian people, to Palestinian civilians who need it. And we will continue to work closely with the Government of Egypt, Government of Jordan, Government of Israel, and relevant NGO partners, including the United Nations, to ensure that that final step is happening and it’s getting to the places it needs to go.Go ahead.QUESTION: I’ve asked several times about the right to defend one’s self for Palestinians, and out of this room we’ve heard that the U.S. does not exhibit any double – double standards. And today in the West Bank there – the Israelis’ occupation forces chased, beat, and threw off a roof a 32-year-old man – Palestinian man, Hassan Mansiya, near – in the Hebron district. Also, the Israeli forces attacked at least two schools with tear gas, two – inside and outside schools in the Hebron and Jenin districts, where students were, and teachers, and some of them experienced some suffocation. Since October 7th, we’ve – I mean, we’ve had, like, what is it, 95 minors that have been killed in the West Bank. I asked before: Do Palestinians have a right to defend themselves? I’m not talking about rogue individuals. I’m talking about as far as a legal authority to defend Palestinians. Do they – does the State Department view that Palestinians have a right and duty to defend themselves?MR PATEL: So look, I have not seen those reports that you outlined. I’m happy to look into them, and I have no doubt our partners in the IDF may be able to share more. What I can say is that actions like these, if true, they are destabilizing. They contribute to a deteriorating security situation, and they are not in the interest of Israel’s own security. And when we have seen actions like this, when we see actions from – we believe quite strongly that these kinds of activities take us away from a two-state solution, and they feed into further instability.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: That &#8212;QUESTION: But does – does the Palestinian Authority have the right to defend its citizens?MR PATEL: Absolutely it does. Absolutely it does.QUESTION: It does? Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up on the campus protests.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have a question. The U.S. Government, everybody from President Biden on down to here at the podium has been quick to call out antisemitism at these protests, but there’s also been an enormous number of examples of Islamophobia and racism from counterprotesters. Why doesn’t the administration denounce that as well, and would you do that here?MR PATEL: I did. You can check the transcript. I did.QUESTION: Well, and let me ask you about Netanyahu’s – the news on Netanyahu today &#8212;MR PATEL: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: &#8212; where he said that even if there’s a hostage deal, they’re still going into Rafah.MR PATEL: Ryan, you’ve got to be on time. You’ve got to come to the briefing on time.QUESTION: Did you get asked about that this morning?MR PATEL: I spoke to that too. Come on, man.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: All right.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Today photos of pier in Gaza were published. My question: Will the Palestinian Authority, PA, be the one who will control this pier?MR PATEL: Sorry, you &#8212;QUESTION: The port.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: Today I – there is photos of this port published. I wonder if the PA, the Palestinian Authority, will control this port in Gaza.MR PATEL: I do not believe that the Palestinian Authority has a role in the maritime corridor, but I am happy to defer you to my colleagues at the Defense Department and USAID to speak to this process in a little bit more specificity.QUESTION: Don’t – just one – don’t you think this port will build over the Palestinian territories, and should Palestinian people have the authority over this port?MR PATEL: So broadly, when we are talking about the future of Gaza and the future of a two-state solution and ensuring that Gaza is no longer a launch pad for terrorism against the Israeli people, part of that for us, of course, includes a Gaza that is reunited under the Palestinian Authority. But as it relates to this maritime corridor, I do not believe that they have a specific role. But that being said, my colleagues at the Pentagon and USAID may be in a better place to speak to some of the more logistical components of this.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. I just wanted to ask about the Erez border crossing.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: It’s also reopening in the north weeks after POTUS’s call with Netanyahu. What should we read into the timing of this opening considering that Blinken is now there to request more aid, and also this ceasefire deal hangs in the balance?MR PATEL: I would not read anything into the timing of this beyond us just stressing, again, that all of these things need to happen as swiftly as possible. But we also fully understand that there may be steps that need to be taken in when factoring in vetting, safety, other things as it relates to crossings that are used for the inflow of aid. We are not naive to the fact that this is a process, but look, we have been clear that we need this to happen as swiftly as possible.QUESTION: And I just want to touch on some of the other questions as well.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Was it the U.S.’s aim to try to beat the clock on a Rafah invasion by getting the ceasefire deal in place beforehand? And if so, have Netanyahu’s comments this morning altered that at all?MR PATEL: It’s not about beating any clock. We – if you go back and look at the history and trajectory of this conflict, there have been a number of instances in which we have been hoping, encouraging, working tirelessly for a deal that would release the hostages that we hope would be partnered with some kind of ceasefire. That has been our position for quite some time. And simultaneously, as it relates to Rafah, it has also been our position for quite some time that any kind of operation that does not address the sort of various components of humanitarian concern that we have would be unacceptable to us.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah. Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Any comment on John Bass’ trip to Doha and Islamabad? Was the meeting with Taliban official in his schedule?MR PATEL: So, as you so noted, acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass is on travel to Doha and Islamabad. In Doha he’ll meet with senior Qatari officials and other diplomatic missions to discuss support for Afghanistan and other shared security interests in the region, and in Islamabad we expect him to meet with senior Pakistani officials and discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues as well.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR PATEL: Go ahead next. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know the State Department already talked about the Kurdistan Region’s local elections &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; some time ago, as it has been scheduled for June 10th. So now there’s a discussion that should be postponed for at least three months, so what’s your comment?MR PATEL: So we understand that President Barzani and various Iraqi authorities and other political parties are actively considering next steps. From our point of view, we would encourage them to schedule free, fair, and timely elections, and we hope that process takes place, but I don’t have anything to offer beyond that.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have two questions on two separate topics.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: At the White House Correspondents Dinner on Saturday, the President called on Putin to release RFE/RL journalist Alsu Kurmasheva. I was wondering if the State Department is following up her case into seeing whether she’s been – she can be identified as wrongfully detained.MR PATEL: So first, let me just say we have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas, and in the case of Alsu Kurmasheva, we remain deeply concerned about her detention in Russia. And to echo the President, we believe she should be released, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists and other civil society actors.In terms of a wrongful detention designation, I’m just not going to get ahead of our process. There is a deliberative and fact-driven process underway. That process continues to be ongoing, and we constantly review circumstances surrounding detentions of U.S. nationals, so I don’t have anything to offer there.QUESTION: How often – can you tell us how often you may review cases?MR PATEL: I – we – I am not going to speak to the specifics of this process.QUESTION: Okay, another one on Burkina Faso.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Voice of America and BBC have been banned there. I was wondering if the State Department is doing anything in that regard.MR PATEL: So we are very alarmed that Burkina Faso’s Superior Council of Communication has suspended multiple independent outlets, including Voice of America and BBC, for covering the Human Rights Watch report about some recent massacres. You’ve heard the Secretary say, and including from this very podium, that far too many governments use repression to silence free expression, particularly against journalists and media organizations, for simply doing their jobs. Freedom of expression, particularly for media, is critical for accountable and transparent governance.Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: You should allow more journalists as well, Mr. Vedant.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: I mean, one is – when you talk about free journalism, are you going to give a chance (inaudible) &#8212;MR PATEL: You’re interrupting your colleague, Jalil.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: This is my third time and you have not given me a chance. Is this free journalism?MR PATEL: You’re – I’m happy to come to you – I’m happy to come to you after.QUESTION: Please.MR PATEL: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much, Vedant. Can you please clear up – either validate or keep alive – some of the reports claiming that the U.S. has eased some of the sanctions on Russian banks, including central bank, to allow some energy-related operations? Why?MR PATEL: I’m not sure what reports you’re referring to, Alex. What I can just say broadly, though, is that when it comes to our efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its infringement on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our Ukrainian partners, we have not taken our foot off the gas, going back to February of 2022 since this invasion occurred. And we will continue to take steps both to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, but also through sanctions, export controls, and other measures hold the Russian Federation accountable.QUESTION: So there is no shift at all in that policy?MR PATEL: There is no policy shift at all.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On Poland, Poland today handed official request to United States to host nuclear weapons in Poland. Do you have any reaction?MR PATEL: I don’t have any comment for you on that. I’m sure my colleagues at the Pentagon can speak to that greater.QUESTION: Sure, thank you. And final topic on Armenia-Azerbaijan. The Secretary spoke with both leaders over the weekend. Any reason to why he called this – any, like, intel or any concern did he want to convey? And separately on Azerbaijan and human rights, a portion of the discussion was about human rights, but hours after that call Azerbaijan arrested another civil society leader. So how much is it the reflection of functional relationship?MR PATEL: So first let me just say, Alex, it should come to no surprise to you that this is an area of the world that the Secretary himself is personally deeply engaged on. And over the course of his time as Secretary, he has had regular engagements at regular intervals with both of these countries. And our engagements with both of them are ongoing, and we continue to believe that a peace and – is possible here. And that’s something that we’re going to continue to work towards.On the second question that you raised, we are deeply troubled by the continuing arrests of members of Azerbaijani civil society, most recently Anar Mammadli. And we urge the Azerbaijani Government to immediately release all individuals who are unjustly detained.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Vedant, and thank you very much, State Department, for bearing with me these nine years. Just one question, and then if you’ll allow me, I’ll ask another question.How do you feel – when journalists here are friends with the same podium people from the U.S. since last two decades, and you guys – this administration since last two years – if a journalist doesn’t agree – agree with you, you just ignore them. I mean, this is the beauty of this newsroom. This is the beauty of this press room. Why you guys like – you guys not feel bad to be treating somebody like this? Like, what’s the reason?MR PATEL: I’m sorry. Who are we treating in what way?QUESTION: I’m talking about this gentleman right here. Since last two years &#8212;MR PATEL: Did something happen to you?QUESTION: Sir, I feel very ignored. I ask one question, and you pass me, you are &#8212;MR PATEL: First of all, it is never a guarantee that everyone gets a question every day. We try our best to get to everybody, but sometimes we’re dealing with the confines of time. And I will just say, Jalil, in my time up here and Matt’s time and Ned’s time, we have taken questions from you pretty regularly.QUESTION: I don’t agree. But anyway, thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: I just have a question about &#8212;MR PATEL: You just used your one question, so I’m going to move – I’m going to move on now. Go ahead.QUESTION: Sir, I had a follow-up question on Kabul expansionism.MR PATEL: That’s fine.QUESTION: Under secretary is going there. The region has terrorism going on.MR PATEL: Then you should ask that question, Jalil.QUESTION: Half of the country is &#8212;MR PATEL: Then you should &#8212;QUESTION: Half of Afghanistan is under no education for girls. The under secretary is going. How do you feel talking to a nation where terrorism is once again growing up? Today in Kabul, six people were killed. Every week there is terrorism. Why is the under secretary holdings talks with the Taliban if the girls do not have education and what’s your interest there?MR PATEL: So let me just say a couple things. First, I will just – since you’ve gotten us way off topic, if you have a question, you should ask a question, not waste your colleagues’ time about other things.Secondly, I’m not aware of any travel to Afghanistan by any undersecretary, but let me just say that when it comes to our engagements with the Taliban, we engage when it is in the United States interest to do so. This is the best way to not just protect U.S. national interests but also support the Afghan people. Engagement allows us to speak directly with the Taliban, and it’s an opportunity for us to continue to press for the immediate and unconditional release of U.S. nationals in Afghanistan including those who we have determined to be wrongfully detained. We’ll also use those opportunities to directly talk about the Taliban’s commitments to counterterrorism, and of course, as always, human rights is also on the agenda.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much.QUESTION: A quick one: Do you have anything on the talks between Türkiye and the U.S. – U.S. energy firm ExxonMobil? A Turkish energy minister said that they are interested in diversifying Türkiye’s national gas supplies. What is your comment on this? And was this a topic of discussion between the two countries?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any more specifics to offer as it relates to the Secretary’s engagement with Foreign Minister Fidan, but let me just say I’ve seen those public reports, and I’m not going to offer anything additional on potential commercial negotiations, but from our vantage point we would encourage any country to diversify its energy supply and curb dependence on Russian energy. And to just broaden the aperture a little bit, Türkiye has played a very important role as the host of the Southern Gas Corridor in helping diversify European energy supplies and European gas supplies away from dependence on Russia, and as the host of multiple LNG liquification facilities which have received a lot of American LNG since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine.QUESTION: Can I have a quick one on Middle East?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Hamas and Fatah leaders meeting in Beijing at the invitation of China? What is your comment on dialogue between Hamas and Fatah?MR PATEL: So our message on this has been what it was since October 7th. If any country purports to have influence or relationships with Hamas, the message is quite clear: release every single hostage and it can no longer be business as usual. They should call on Hamas to lay down their arms, and that is the best and fastest way to get us where we need to be.Taka, go ahead.QUESTION: So the family of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea met State official this morning. Do you have any detail about the meeting? Who met the families? How do you describe the meeting?MR PATEL: So I’m happy to check if there’s any specific officials that we can share, but the U.S. stands with the long-suffering relatives of Japanese abductees, and we continue to urge the DPRK to right this historic wrong and provide full accounting of those that remain missing. And we don’t have any other meetings on this to announce at this time.QUESTION: Details?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check some more specifics but I don’t have anything for you at the – go ahead, Diyar.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You talked about the Kurdistan Region’s election &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but I need a clarification on that. What do you mean when you say that you encourage them to schedule a free and fair election? Because it’s already been scheduled for June 10. Does the U.S. support rescheduling that election?MR PATEL: Our understanding is that President Barzani and various other authorities are actively considering next steps, and we will let that process play out before commenting further.QUESTION: Do you support rescheduling this election?MR PATEL: That’s not for us to decide. What we would encourage is for these elections to be scheduled and for them to be free, fair, and credible. But beyond that, our understanding is that President Barzani and various other entities are actively discussing additional next steps.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Pakistani ambassador in Washington, D.C., (inaudible) Masood Khan, recently talked about the importance of Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation and the need to bolster Pakistan’s defense capabilities due to regional challenges. Do you have any – something to tell us, what kind of strategy or initiative both of our countries are working on to enhance security cooperation?MR PATEL: Yeah. So the United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in combating threats to regional security. And we support Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and ensure the safety and security of its citizens in a manner that promotes the rule of law and protection of human rights. Our partnership with Pakistan on security issues includes, of course, a high-level counterterrorism dialogue, funding robust counterterrorism capacity, and building programs and supporting a series of U.S. and Pakistan military-to-military engagements.QUESTION: Sir, The Washington Post’s latest article revealed that Indian Prime Minister Modi inner circle, including spy chief Samant Goel and even the national security advisor, were aware of the assassination plot on a Sikh activist in New York. So how concerning is this for you?MR PATEL: So we continue to expect accountability from the Government of India based on the results of the Indian inquiry committee’s work, and we are regularly working with them and enquiring for additional updates. We’ll also continue to raise our concerns directly with the Indian Government at senior levels, but beyond that I’m not going to parse into this further and will defer to the Department of Justice.Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On Sudan, I had a follow-up on &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; the UN Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield’s comments calling it a – the potential for a large-scale massacre. And she also said that the U.S. is appealing to countries, including the UAE, to stop support for the warring parties. Has any progress been made with the UAE and other countries, and what is the U.S. doing to try to prevent this catastrophe?MR PATEL: So to put it bluntly, as Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said yesterday, this – we certainly do not view this as conjecture, and we are seeing the possibility of history repeating itself in Darfur in the worst possible way. There are credible reports that the RSF and its allied militias have razed multiple villages west of El Fasher and are planning an imminent attack on El Fasher, putting 500,000 internally-displaced persons at risk on top of the 2 million Sudanese who call El Fasher home. We also know, as the ambassador said, that both sides are receiving weapons and other support to fuel their efforts. And we’ve directly raised our concerns about reports of UAE support to the RSF with our Emirati partners, and we have made clear that the provision of arms to either side only deepens and prolongs the conflict.Go ahead, Daphne, and then we’re going to wrap.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: You said all – you said you’d take everybody’s questions.MR PATEL: That’s not what I said. I said I would get to as many people as I &#8212;QUESTION: You didn’t even &#8212;MR PATEL: I said I’d get to as many as I can.QUESTION: That’s not what you said.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Daphne.QUESTION: The Philippines today said a coast guard ship and a fisheries vessel were damaged by water cannons used by Chinese coast guard ships. This comes right after Blinken’s trip to China. Do you have any comment on this, concerns?MR PATEL: So the repeated harassment of Philippine vessels near Scarborough Reef is detrimental to regional peace and stability, and our belief is that the Chinese coast guard installation of these barriers also endangers Philippine fisherfolk’s livelihoods and prevents them from exercising their legal rights to fish in those waters. These are rights that were set out in 2016 in a final and legally binding judgment in the Philippines-China arbitration brought to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and consistently – and this is something that the Secretary made clear on his travels as well – is that we urge the PRC to respect the navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all states under international law.All right. Thanks, everybody.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Burkina Faso																								China																								India																								Iraq																								Israel																								Japan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Qatar																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								Sudan																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Office of the SpokespersonThe following statement was jointly released by the United States and The Philippines on the occasion of the successful conclusion of the 11th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in Washington, D.C.:Begin Text:Senior Philippine and U.S. officials gathered in Washington for the 11th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD) on April 22 and 23. First held in 2011, the BSD serves as the main annual platform for our two countries to: discuss the full range of political, security, and economic cooperation; exchange views on current challenges and strategic priorities; and identify new collaborative initiatives.Both sides recalled milestones of the intervening year, reflecting shared dedication to further fostering the bilateral partnership and alliance. These include: two meetings between Presidents Biden and Marcos; the joint State and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (“2+2 Ministerial”); a U.S. Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to the Philippines; a trilateral ministerial; and leader-level trilateral summit with Japan, as well as inaugural bilateral dialogues on food security and energy policy.In keeping with Presidents Marcos and Biden’s “shared vision of partnership, peace, and prosperity,” the two sides re-dedicated themselves to cooperation by:Expanding the Breadth of Partnership. The two sides renewed pledges to work together to address pressing global and regional challenges in support of a free, safe, and open Indo-Pacific. Underscoring the importance of continued dialogue to ensure cooperation on issues of mutual interest, both sides committed in 2024 to:Hold the fourth “2+2” ministerial dialogue;Convene the inaugural joint committee meeting under the U.S.-Philippines Science and Technology Agreement;Establish a Roles, Missions, and Capabilities (RMC) Working Group to replace the Defense and Security Working Group;Establish inaugural bilateral dialogues on cyber-digital, space, and democracy; andDeepen collaboration on countering foreign information manipulation.Modernizing Alliance Cooperation. The Philippines and the United States reiterated the importance of the security alliance and shared commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty in an increasingly complex security environment. They committed to establishing a new framework for alliance communication and coordination, enhancing operational cooperation and interoperability in the maritime domain, including with likeminded partners, and accelerating capability development. Building upon the historic progress in the defense relationship, including the unprecedented scope and scale of this year’s Exercise BALIKATAN, a combined exercise with Japan and Australia in the South China Sea, and monthly bilateral maritime cooperative activities, the two sides committed to further defense and security cooperation by continuing discussions with a view to:Concluding the bilateral Philippines – Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (P-SSAR);Fully finalizing the addition of sites and implementing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), to include DoD investing $128 million for infrastructure as part of the President’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget;Prepositioning USAID disaster relief commodities for Philippine civilian disaster response authorities at key EDCA sites;Concluding a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) by the end of 2024; andExpanding multilateral cooperation with likeminded countries, including through maritime cooperative activities, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and security cooperation coordination.Promoting An International Law-Based Maritime Order. In reiterating their shared commitment to a maritime order based on international law, the two sides called upon the PRC to comport its maritime claims in the South China Sea with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “Convention”), to respect the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction, to comply with the final and binding July 12, 2016 judgment in the Philippines v. China arbitration, and to cease its aggressive and dangerous actions that are inconsistent with its obligations under the Convention, including its unlawful interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.The two sides recognized the importance of maintaining peace and security in the maritime domain, including transit routes for foreign merchant and commercial vessels, and called for the safe and immediate return of the Filipino seafarers affected by the crisis in the Red Sea.The U.S. and Philippine governments decided to:Convene the 3rd Maritime Dialogue in September/October 2024 in Manila and build upon the outcomes of the countries’ prior dialogues and meetings;Explore additional opportunities to strengthen global support for upholding the international law of the sea;Deepen cooperation to strengthen efforts in addressing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, in line with relevant international law and voluntary guidelines; and,Consider and develop, as appropriate, procedures and protocols on cooperative maritime law enforcement operations, in accordance with international law and our respective national lawsAdvancing Our Common Prosperity, Protecting Our Shared Planet. Both sides stressed that our partnership should continue to benefit our peoples and future generations alike. They welcomed work to advance best practices in strategic trade management and the clean and renewable energy transition, noting the ongoing engagement on civil nuclear cooperation and the signing of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement.  They recognized the significant outcomes made under the U.S. 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host year and progress under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), especially through the entry into force of the Supply Chains Agreement and conclusion of the Clean Economy and Fair Economy Agreements.  The Philippines welcomed the development of a Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold program and the United States’ commitment to considering the Philippines for the Compact Program based on updated data later this year. The two sides committed to advancing the Luzon Economic Corridor under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)-IPEF Investment Accelerator, to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas and investments in rail, port modernization, clean energy and semiconductor supply chains, and agribusiness. Both sides also discussed opportunities for further cooperation on critical minerals processing, digital upskilling, and semiconductor supply chains under the CHIPS Act and in cooperation with USAID. Both sides exchanged views on addressing economic vulnerabilities and approaches to strengthening private sector partnerships, recognizing the imperative of increasing economic growth in both countries. They also shared priorities for the May 21 Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Manila, which will be sponsored by the U.S. Government in partnership with the Government of the Philippines.Strengthening Multilateral Cooperation. Both sides discussed their respective and shared multilateral priorities, identifying opportunities for closer cooperation at the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. They emphasized the importance of strengthening the free, safe, and open international order based on rule of law and respecting the UN Charter as the foundation of cooperation among nations. Both sides:Underscored the urgent need to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals;Strongly opposed any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;Reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait; andCommitted to advance a free, safe, and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, and based on international law, and that protects shared principles including territorial integrity; sovereignty; sovereign rights and jurisdiction; and the peaceful resolution of disputes.End Text
- Deputy Secretary Campbell Chairs the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Senior Officials’ Meeting HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Deputy Secretary Campbell Chairs the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Senior Officials’ Meeting				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Deputy Secretary Campbell Chairs the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Senior Officials’ Meeting																																		Media Note																														April 23, 2024																																							Deputy Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell chaired the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Senior Officials’ Meeting between senior U.S. officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council and their counterparts from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippine Department of Defense, and Philippine National Security Council in Washington, D.C. today. The meeting follows the annual U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue on April 22-23, as well as the bilateral meeting between President Marcos and President Biden, the historic trilateral leaders’ summit with Japan on April 11,&nbsp;and the U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Ministerial&nbsp;on April 12.The parties discussed outcomes from the recent leaders’ engagements and how both countries can continue to facilitate a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The officials discussed strengthening coordination on challenges in the South China Sea and increasing economic cooperation and resilience. The parties further decided to explore additional opportunities to strengthen global support for upholding the international law of the sea.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Deputy Secretary of State																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Philippines
- Senior State Department Official Previewing Secretary Blinken’s Upcoming Travel to the People’s Republic of China Office of the SpokespersonVia TeleconferenceApril 19, 2024MODERATOR:  All right and good afternoon, everybody, and thanks so much for joining us on this preview call to preview some forthcoming travel that Secretary Blinken is going to be undertaking.  This call is going to be on background, attributable to senior State Department officials.  Not for reporting but just so folks are aware, joining us today as our speaker is .  Again, we’ll do this call on background from Senior State Department Officials, and it will also be under embargo till 2:00 p.m. Eastern tomorrow, Saturday, April 20th.  We’ll have some time for questions at the end, but I want to go ahead and pass it over to  to kick us off.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you, , and good afternoon,  everyone.  Really delighted to be with you.  I wanted to let you know that Secretary Blinken will travel to the People’s Republic of China April 24 through 26.  He will meet with senior PRC officials in both Shanghai and Beijing.  The Secretary will be joined by Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Liz Allen, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd Robinson, and Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy Nathaniel Fick.The Secretary’s visit will, of course, build on our intensive diplomacy over the past year to responsibly manage the U.S.-China relationship by strengthening lines of communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict.  The Secretary’s trip will follow President Biden and President Xi’s summit meeting in Woodside, California in November, National Security Advisor Sullivan’s meeting with Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok in January, DHS Secretary Mayorkas’s meeting with MPS Minister Wang Xiaohong in Vienna in February, Secretary Blinken’s meeting with Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Munich in February, Treasury Secretary Yellen’s trip to Guangzhou and Beijing earlier this month, and Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink and NSC Senior Director Beran’s recent meetings in Beijing.We are in a different place than we were a year ago, when the bilateral relationship was at an historic low point.  We have set out to stabilize the bilateral relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests.  We also believe, and we have also clearly demonstrated, that responsibly managing competition does not mean we will pull back from measures to protect U.S. national interests.The Secretary has three primary objectives for his trip to China: first, making progress on key issues; second, clearly and directly communicating concerns on bilateral, regional, and global issues; and third, responsibly managing competition, again, so that it does not result in miscalculation or conflict.  We’ve grounded these objectives in the administration’s approach to the PRC, which you have heard many times, of course, and that’s namely our invest, align, and compete strategy.  We’ve made significant progress on each pillar of our strategy, and we believe that our doing so has strengthened our competitive position.We’ve invested in the foundations of American strength with historic legislation on infrastructure, chips and science, and clean energy.  We have reinvigorated our network of alliances and partnerships.  I think many of you know these elements of our strategy well, but I do want to draw attention to some of the remarkable things we’ve achieved with our allies and partners really just over the past several weeks.  For example, just two weeks ago Secretary Blinken was in Brussels, where he joined the sixth U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, and then consulted at NATO with foreign ministers on our collective security, including those regarding our shared challenges with the PRC.Last week here in Washington, the United States hosted Japanese Prime Minister Kishida at the White House for a state visit, as well as the first-ever trilateral leaders’ summit between the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines.  And this week in Capri, the Secretary and other G7 foreign ministers discussed supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, addressing the crisis in the Middle East, stabilizing Haiti, and deepening partnerships around the world on issues of mutual interest.I would also note that the UN General Assembly has adopted by consensus in the last month a U.S.-led resolution on artificial intelligence, co-sponsored by more than 120 member states, marking the first time that UN member states have spoken with one voice to define a global consensus on safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems for advancing sustainable development.At the same time, we have continued to take actions to protect our interests and values, ranging from steps to protect our data, our critical infrastructure, addressing the unlevel playing field for U.S. workers and companies created by the PRC’s nonmarket practices, and ensuring that advanced and sensitive technologies that our companies are developing do not become a source of vulnerability.We will build on the momentum of the successes we have achieved, and we will keep working to manage our competition with the PRC responsibly.  We believe that investing in our strengths at home and strengthening our alliances abroad have helped create the conditions for more effective diplomacy with the PRC.Now let me say just a little bit more about each of the Secretary’s three goals for this trip. First, making progress on key issues.  We believe that high-level diplomacy allows for us to press for progress on issues that matter to the American people and the world and where direct engagement with the PRC is particularly important.  For example, in Shanghai and Beijing, the Secretary will focus on implementing the leaders’ commitments in San Francisco to advance cooperation on issues such as counternarcotics, bolster mil-mil communication, and establish talks on artificial intelligence risks and safety.  The Secretary will also explore ways to strengthen people-to-people ties.  And of course, Under Secretary Allen, Assistant Secretary Robinson, and Ambassador Fick will help lead our efforts on these key issues.We have seen initial progress, of course, and good momentum coming out of San Francisco, but we recognize that implementation is key, and that will require assiduous follow-up in the weeks and months ahead.Second, the Secretary will clearly and directly communicate U.S. concerns on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues.  As he always does, he will stand up and speak out for our values and our interests.  The Secretary will raise clearly and candidly our concerns on issues ranging from human rights, unfair economic and trade practices, to the global economic consequences of PRC industrial over-capacity.  The Secretary will also reiterate our deep concerns regarding the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base.  He will discuss the crisis in the Middle East, and of course, the Secretary will discuss challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including PRC provocations in the South China Sea, as well as the DPRK’s threatening rhetoric and reckless actions.  He will also discuss the crisis in Burma.  The Secretary will also reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.And third and finally, the Secretary will make clear that the United States intends to responsibly manage our competition with the PRC.  We believe that intense competition requires intense diplomacy on a range of issues, and in-depth, face-to-face diplomacy is particularly important to managing tensions endemic to strategic competition between two major powers.  As we continue to take actions to protect our interests and values, we’ll maintain open channels of communication to clearly communicate our positions and policies so as to, again, prevent misperception or miscalculation.I want to make clear that we are realistic and clear-eyed about the prospects of breakthroughs on any of these issues, but we will continue to use diplomacy to communicate our positions and policies, clear up misperceptions, and underscore that we will continue to take actions to protect our national security and economy.  Our primary focus is not solely on deliverables, but rather to have candid, direct, and constructive discussions that defend U.S. national interests and, again, prevent miscalculation.We expect additional high-level diplomacy and interactions to occur in the coming weeks and months.  I want to assure you that the United States is committed to responsibly managing our competition with China, and we know that that’s what the world expects of us.So , let me stop there.  I’ll turn back to you for questions and answers.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Thanks so much, everybody.  I really, really appreciate it.  If you have a question, please use the raise hand function on your Zoom interface, and we’ll get through as many questions as we can.  Why don’t we first start with Shaun Tandon from AFP.QUESTION:  Hey , and thanks for doing this.  Hope you’re doing well.  Could I follow up on a couple of the concerns that you said will be raised?  Russia and Ukraine.  Are there specific asks the Secretary will have?  I know that more generally there have been concerns about building up the Russian industrial base, defense industrial base.  Are there specific asks, things that he’ll be asking China to do or not to do, regarding that?  And how receptive do you think they have been, maybe in the PRC, to that so far about the U.S. concerns on Russia?And also on Taiwan, I know there are the usual lines on Taiwan, but the inauguration is coming up with the new president.  Are there any asks of China in terms of keeping stability during that period?  Thanks.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Shaun, nice to hear from you.  Thanks for your questions.  Look, I think it’s safe to say both of the issues that you raised will feature prominently during the discussions that the Secretary will have in Beijing.  I think you’ll see that the Secretary even today has spoken, together with his G7 foreign ministerial counterparts, about the depth of our concern about the transfers to Russia from businesses in the PRC of a range of dual-use materials and weapons components that Russia is using to advance its military production.  And of course, the concern there is that through Chinese support, Russia has largely reconstituted its defense industrial base, which has an impact not just on the battlefield in Ukraine but poses a larger threat, we believe, to broader European security.  So that’s deeply concerning to us.  We’ll express those concerns to China and we will express our intent to have China curtail that support which is having – which is starting to pose, of course, such a threat to European security.Also on cross-strait issues, of course, Shaun, I think you can – you can expect that the Secretary will underscore both in private and public America’s abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.  We think that is vitally important for the region and the world.  And our expectation will be – particularly during this important and sensitive time leading up to the May 20 inauguration – that all countries will contribute to peace and stability, avoid taking provocative actions that may raise tensions, and demonstrate restraint.  That will be our message going forward.MODERATOR:  Great.  Let’s next go to the line of Nike Ching with Voice of America.QUESTION:  Thank you, good afternoon. Thank you so much for this pre-call briefing.  I would like to ask schedule, some housekeeping thing.  Is the meeting between Secretary Blinken and Chinese President Xi Jinping expected in Beijing next Friday?And then a follow-up on China’s providing material support for Russia.  Senior officials have renewed warnings to China against helping Russia’s defense industrial base.  What leverage does the U.S. have to follow through its warning that it is prepared to take further steps as necessary?And finally, if I may, is there any indication that China will use its influence over Iran to prevent escalation in the Middle East or do you think it’s under control now and there is no need for China to weigh in?  Thank you.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Thank you, Nike.  Nice to hear from you.  Look, on the schedule, Nike, I think – I think we’ll have more to share on the specifics of the Secretary’s schedule as we get a little bit closer to the visit itself.  As I did indicate, the Secretary will go both to Shanghai and Beijing, and of course I think it’s safe for you to expect that he’ll spend considerable time with his counterpart Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  But I think beyond that, we’ll provide additional information at a later date.  But here’s what I will say:  We are confident that our Chinese hosts will arrange a productive and constructive visit, and we’re very grateful to them for their efforts to do so and the hospitality that we know that they will provide.On your question – I believe your second question was about the – Chinese support for the Russian defense industrial base.  Look, Nike, I don’t have anything specific to announce to you today, but I’ll just underscore that as you’ve seen us demonstrate over the past many weeks and months, we’re committed to taking the steps necessary to defend our national interests, and we’re prepared to take steps when we believe necessary against firms that are taking steps in contravention to our interests and in ways that – as we’ve indicated here – severely undermine security in both Ukraine and Europe.  And I think we’ve demonstrated our willingness to do so regarding firms from a number of countries, not just China.  And at any rate, again, I think this will be a key issue of discussion while we’re in Beijing.And then finally you asked about Iran.  I’ll just underscore here that, of course, we have been in contact with Chinese counterparts.  Secretary Blinken has had the opportunity to be in touch with Wang Yi, and others of us have had the opportunity to interact with Chinese interlocutors.  And I think we’ve underscored to them the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, the need for all sides to show restraint, and of course we’ve asked – we’ve expressed our interest in China to use whatever channels or influence it has to try to convey the need for restraint to all parties, including Iran.  And I think you’ve seen in China’s own public readouts that they in fact have engaged with Iranian counterparts and have called for restraint.Thank you.MODERATOR:  Great.  Let’s next go to Michael Birnbaum with The Washington Post.QUESTION:  Hi.  Sorry, I was muted.  Thanks for doing this.  Just &#8212;SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Michael, I seem to have lost you.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Now you’re back.QUESTION:  Okay.  Sorry about that.  Question about the Russia-China thing.  I mean – I guess I – I’m just trying to understand what kind of assurances or thoughts you can give us that China will actually listen to you in terms of trying to – you’re trying to get it to restrict its helping the Russian defense industrial base.  I mean, you mentioned the potential of kind of negative consequences for Chinese companies.  Is there any – are there any carrots that you’re offering them, the government or companies, loosening restrictions on other things if they’ll go along with your requests?  I mean, it just seems like the overall context is one in which the relations between China and the U.S. are not particularly good, you have a lot of restrictions already in place, and so I guess I’m just wondering how you think you’ll manage to make a difference in these talks.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Well, Michael, I do appreciate the candid question.  Look, here’s what I would say:  Certainly, as I tried to outline in my opening comments, we do place a value on our diplomacy with the PRC, including because it’s really the only way to effectively convey, I think, in detail and clearly the depth of our concerns on a range of issues, including on China’s support for the Russian defense industrial base.  And I think we’ll be prepared to lay out why we have those concerns, the implications of that support and what it means for European security in particular, and then, of course, it will be up to China to determine its next steps.I think the only point that I would add here, which I think will play an important role as well, is obviously friends in Europe are also deeply concerned about the implications of China’s support for the Russian defense industrial base.  I think you see those concerns coming out of the G7 foreign ministerial today, and my expectation is that friends in Europe will have opportunities to express those concerns both in public and private to Chinese friends as well.  So I think our objective will be to clearly make the case what the implications are of this support and why that may in fact not be in China’s interest going forward.MODERATOR:  Let’s next go to Simon Lewis with Reuters.QUESTION:  Hi.  Thanks, , and hi, .  Firstly, since Todd Robinson is on the trip, I wonder if you could talk a bit about what you’re hoping to achieve on fentanyl, and particularly whether you’ll be raising some of the concerns that have been raised by the House of Representatives this week regarding China sort of effectively subsidizing fentanyl substances.  Is that something that you would – you will raise directly and whether – and that you might hope to get some action on?And secondly, , I just wondered if – you mentioned that the crisis in Burma will come up.  I wonder what kind of help you are asking the Chinese for to try to resolve that crisis.  Thanks.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Simon, thanks very much for your question.  I missed a little bit at the beginning, but I think I understood the two questions to be first on fentanyl and then on the crisis in Burma.Look, on fentanyl, I think, obviously, the Secretary will be prepared to raise this issue as one of the most important issues on the U.S.-China agenda today, both because of the incredibly harmful impact that fentanyl and these – and the role that chemical precursors play in the synthetization of fentanyl and what that means.  Again, fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans 18 to 49.  So as the President had done – excuse me – as the President had done in Woodside, we’ll underscore how important this issue is to the United States.  We’ll underscore why we believe it’s in China’s interests to cooperate in reducing and ending the flow of chemical precursors to the United States, and given the agreements that were reached at Woodside, we’ll focus primarily on follow-up.  And I think the key there, I would say, Simon, is making sure that we get down to detailed implementation of the agreement, particularly between our respective law enforcement agencies, and that’s what we’re focused on: implementation and concrete progress to curb the flow of these chemical precursors.I think regarding the crisis in Burma, I would just say it is in no one’s interest to see the potential of a failed state in the heart of Southeast Asia.  I think it’s clear that the United States and China have a shared interest in trying to preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia.  We have, I think, a shared interest in trying to reduce the level of violence in Southeast Asia, and we’ll – the level of violence in Myanmar in particular, and I think we’ll make clear as well that U.S. policy is predicated not just on taking steps to compel the regime to reduce and end violence, but also to release prisoners and increase the flow of humanitarian assistance into Burma.  So I think – I would anticipate the Secretary will be prepared to lay out what our policy is, to lay out the areas where we think we have a shared interest, and to see if at a minimum we can ensure that we’re not working at cross purposes or if perhaps there is a way that we could together contribute to those shared goals in Burma.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Let’s next go to Michael Gordon with The Wall Street Journal.QUESTION:  Thank you.  One and a half questions, a follow-up and then a question.You mentioned the effort the U.S. has made to reach out to European nations on China’s support for Russian defense industry and its rehabilitation that began with Secretary Blinken’s trip to Europe in the early part of the month, his meeting with Macron, April 4th foreign ministers meeting, and now again with Capri.  So my question is:  What specific actions are the Europeans telling you they are prepared to take as a result of your consciousness-raising initiative here?And my second question is in November the director-general of the Chinese Department of Arms Control met with Mallory Stewart to engage in a dialogue on arms control and nonproliferation measures.  What progress has been made since then, if any, in advancing this dialogue either in discussions or specific steps on the Chinese side?SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Michael, thanks for your question.  Look, on Chinese support for the Russian defense industrial base, I think all I’ll say is that obviously European partners as much as anyone have a vested interest in doing everything possible to reduce Chinese support of Russia that’s having such a negative effect on European security.  So, and I think you saw – as I indicated earlier, I think you saw coming out of some of the statements from the G7 foreign ministerial today that I think our European partners obviously share these concerns.  And our goal will be to work collaboratively going forward to share those concerns with China and work towards a reduction of that – of that support.On the – on interaction with Chinese counterparts responsible for arms control, I don’t have anything on that with me.  I think it might be safer for me to get back to you, consult with my colleague Mallory.  But look, I mean, I’ll just say in general terms we do have a number of specific interactions with Chinese counterparts designed – designed to advance our shared interests and protect U.S. national interests.  Certainly, we have a range of concerns about certain elements of the Chinese military buildup, but as for that specific interaction I’d have to get back to you on any further details.  I’m happy to do that.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Let’s next go to Laura Kelly.QUESTION:  Hi, thanks – oh, hi, thanks so much for taking my question.  I’m wondering if you can talk about what needs to happen for the State Department to lower its Level 3 travel warning for China, and if any steps on that are looking to be taken in the near future or at all.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Laura, thanks very much for the question.  Look, I think, again, all I’ll say here in general terms is the United States takes very seriously its responsibility.  This is our top – I would argue perhaps our most important – responsibility, which is to do everything possible to ensure the safety and security of American citizens overseas.When we are aware of conditions in a country that we both believe pose a risk to American citizen residents or travelers to those countries, we have an obligation to make clear what those risks are.  And the current travel advisory warning for the PRC is based on a range of concerns about how Chinese law has been applied in a certain sector, about the detention of certain American citizens, and other cases that have caused us concern.So we’re very clear and transparent and public about that.  We’ve raised those concerns with Chinese counterparts – again, raised concerns about specific cases involving detentions and exit bans, raised concerns about the opaque and arbitrary application of certain national security laws, and we’ll continue to raise those concerns.  I’m confident that the Secretary will raise these concerns while he’s in China.  And it is the case, really with any country around the world, if we find that those conditions – those concerns, rather, are addressed, and through addressing those concerns there’s a material impact on the conditions that resulted in that warning level, we’ll, of course, re-evaluate and, as appropriate, adjust.But really, this is a pretty rigorous process.  The focus is on safety and security of the American citizen traveling public, and that’ll be our focus going forward.  But I’m confident these issues will be discussed while the Secretary is in China.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  All right, let’s – we’ve got time for one last question, and let’s go to Lalit Jha with the Press Trust of India.QUESTION:  Yeah, thank you for doing this.  I wanted to ask you about – recently India’s foreign secretary was here, and I guess China was one of the major conversation between the two countries.  Would Secretary during his meetings would raise the concern that China’s neighbors has with China regarding the incursion to the border – borders and in causing other activities with its neighbors?  Thank you.SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Lalit, thanks very much for your question.  Look, I think this is what I would say in response to your question.  Look, we continue to underscore that as the United States of America we stand for the respect of international law, for the peaceful resolution of disputes, for ensuring that territorial – territorial disputes are resolved peacefully, and that any and all territorial claims are rooted in international law.  And in instances where, whether it’s China or any other countries act in ways in contravention of international law or act in aggressive ways that are escalatory or coercive, we are, of course – we are, of course, going to speak out against such actions.  But again, the focus from our perspective is the importance of maintaining peace and stability and the peaceful resolution of such disputes.And I guess the only other thing that I would add is that we certainly stand for investing in the collective capacity of our friends, partners, and allies so that all friends and partners have the ability to defend their own national interests.  And I think through that process, we actually believe – we believe that doing so contributes to stability, which is in our collective interest going forward.I’ll also just underscore, as we often say, the United States of America is not in the business of asking friends and partners to choose between the United States and China, but we do want to ensure that partners always have the ability to make their own choices and their own sovereign decisions free from coercion.  That’s what we stand for, and we continue to make that clear at every opportunity.  Thanks for your question.MODERATOR:  All right, everybody.  Thanks so much for joining us today.  Again, just a reiteration of the ground rules:  This call was on background, attributable to senior State Department officials, and it is under embargo till 2 p.m. Eastern tomorrow, Saturday, April 20th.  Thanks again, everybody.  Really appreciate it.
- Philippines HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Philippines				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																													Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Philippines during the year, although the number of incidents of arbitrary and extrajudicial killings and of some other abuses by government agents decreased.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by and on behalf of the government, and other physical abuses by nonstate actors; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including unlawful civilian deaths, enforced disappearances or abductions, and torture and physical abuses; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers by terrorists and groups in rebellion against the government; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence, threats of violence, and unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and the use of criminal libel laws; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence including but not limited to domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child abuse, and early and forced marriage; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association such as threats and violence against labor activists.The government investigated some reported human rights abuses, including abuses by its security forces and paramilitary forces.  Concerns about police impunity remained, given reports of continued extrajudicial killings by police.  Significant concerns also persisted about impunity for other security forces, and civilian national and local government officials.Muslim separatists, communist insurgents, and terrorist groups continued to attack government security forces and civilians, displacing civilians and resulting in the deaths of security force members and civilians.  Terrorist organizations also engaged in kidnappings for ransom, bombings of civilian targets, beheadings, and the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers in combat or auxiliary roles.  These actions were, at times, investigated and prosecuted, although there were allegations that charges were often leveled for political reasons.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										Extrajudicial killings, largely by police but also by other security forces, remained a serious problem.  In addition, politically motivated killings, including of journalists, were reported during the year.There were numerous reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings by police in connection with antidrug operations.  The Marcos administration continued the antidrug campaign – which began under the Duterte administration – albeit with a focus on treatment and rehabilitation, due process, and rule of law-based investigations.  The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Dahas PH reported 209 killings related to antidrug operations from January to August.The Philippine National Police’s (PNP) Internal Affairs Service and other government bodies, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) unit charged with monitoring human rights violations by members of the military, the Center for Law of Armed Conflict, and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), investigated whether security force killings were justifiable.The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent government ombudsman’s office constitutionally responsible for investigating possible human rights violations, investigated 51 new complaints of alleged extrajudicial or politically motivated killings through July.  The cases involved 82 victims and allegedly were perpetrated by six PNP personnel, two members of the military, seven insurgents, four civilians, and 33 unidentified persons.  The commission also investigated 15 specifically drug-related extrajudicial killings with 18 victims, and suspected PNP involvement in eight of these complaints.  The CHR also investigated the May killing of a radio commentator in Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro Province.Negros Oriental Governor Roel Degamo and five other individuals were killed in March by unknown individuals.  The NBI named Negros Oriental Congressman Arnie Teves, Jr. as having ordered the killing undertaken by a private militia under his control.  Teves fled the country.  In August the Anti-Terrorism Council designated Teves as a terrorist, and he was expelled from Congress for abandonment of public office.  After Degamo’s killing, and in light of other attacks on local officials, President Marcos ordered the National Task Force for the Disbandment of Private Armed Groups, originally formed to disband private militias in Mindanao after the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in 2014, to take the lead in dismantling private militias used to commit political violence.On August 2, six Navotas City police officers killed 17-year-old Jemboy Baltazar.  Police were told a murder suspect was on Baltazar’s fishing boat and when they boarded it, Baltazar jumped overboard and began to swim away.  The police gave no warning before firing and their body cameras were not on; both actions were violations of police regulations.  The six were removed from duty August 9 and faced charges of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,” according to media outlet Rappler.  A PNP Internal Affairs’ investigation of the incident led to the dismissal of the local police chief, Allan Umipig, for attempting to cover up the involvement of the officers and other matters and called for a wholesale reorganization of the local police force.  The six officers voluntarily surrendered in October after arrest warrants were issued against them.																																				b. Disappearance										Although long-term disappearances were rare, kidnappings were common and predominantly committed for criminal purposes (i.e., ransom); in the past, they were carried out for both pro- and antigovernment political motives as well.  Terrorist groups were implicated in many kidnappings in Mindanao.The AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict reported no cases of enforced disappearance attributed to or implicating the armed forces from January to July.  The CHR, however, reported 10 cases involving 14 persons who were victims of abduction and enforced disappearance from January to July.  Four cases were allegedly perpetrated by members of the PNP, three by unidentified persons, one by other state agents, one by a civilian, and one case did not indicate the perpetrator.Media reported on kidnappings throughout the year.Some kidnappings involved Chinese nationals.  In March police arrested three Chinese and one Vietnamese national suspected of kidnapping for ransom and later killing a Filipino-Chinese businessman (not further identified).  In June a Chinese national was kidnapped, allegedly by an organized crime kidnapping syndicate linked to offshore gambling operations.The law allowed family members of alleged victims of disappearances to compel government agencies to provide statements in court about what they knew about the circumstances surrounding a disappearance (or an extrajudicial killing) and the victim’s status.Evidence of a kidnapping or killing required the filing of charges, and police generally opened investigations.  In many cases, however, evidence and documentation were unavailable, not collected, or insufficient to support charges.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited torture, and evidence obtained through its use was inadmissible in court.  According to the CHR, however, members of the security forces and police were accused of routinely abusing and sometimes torturing suspects and detainees.  Common forms of abuse during arrest and interrogation reportedly included electric shock, burning with cigarettes, and suffocation.As of July, the CHR investigated 21 cases of alleged torture involving 36 victims.  Of those, 17 involved members of the PNP, one a local government official, one a corrections officer, one a member of the NBI, and one an inmate.In May, NBI Region VII filed criminal rape and other charges against five Cebu City police officers who illegally detained a woman in September 2022.  The woman, detained on suspicion of drug trafficking, was held in a private apartment for three days.  One of the five was charged with raping the woman; he and the others faced a range of other charges related to illegal detention.In June the CHR investigated an alleged torture case involving a boy who reported physical abuse by his father to the local police station.  Instead of receiving assistance and protection, the boy was allegedly tortured by three police officers who poured a mixture of vinegar and chili on his genitals.  PNP Regional Office XI filed criminal and administrative charges against the three officers.Human rights groups continued to express concerns about the contribution of corruption to abuses committed by the PNP and other security forces and noted little progress in implementing and enforcing reforms aimed at improving investigations and prosecutions of suspected human rights violations.  The national police’s institutional deficiencies and the public perception that police corruption was endemic continued.The Congressional Commission on Appointments could withhold a PNP promotion indefinitely if it uncovered a record of abuses, although no such action was reported, and alleged abusers were promoted.Witnesses to abuses were often unable to obtain protection.  The Office of the Ombudsman reported that witnesses often failed to come forward or to cooperate in police abuse or corruption cases.  This reticence sometimes followed pressure on witnesses and their families or arose from an expectation of compensation for their cooperation.Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces, particularly in the PNP, as reported by local and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  A former police officer, however, was convicted in March for the 2017 murder of two teenagers in a drug war operation.  Three other individuals were prosecuted for extrajudicial killings since the start of the drug war in 2016.The AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict reported that, from January to October, it had not received any allegations against any member of the military for alleged extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, or other rights abuses.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were often harsh and life-threatening and included gross overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions, physical abuse, and a chronic lack of resources including medical care and food.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Bureau of Corrections facilities operated at approximately four times their operating capacity of 12,272, holding 51,721 prisoners.The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), under the Department of the Interior and Local Government, controlled 479 city, district, municipal, and provincial jails that held pretrial detainees, persons awaiting final judgment, and convicts serving sentences of three years or less.  The bureau reported its jails operated at 350 percent of designated capacity as of July.  The Dasmarinas City Jail for women in Cavite Province was one of the most congested jails in the country; with an official capacity of 11 inmates, as of July it held 328 detainees.Access to quality food was generally poor.  Poor sanitation, inadequate ventilation, poor access to natural lighting, overcrowding, and a lack of potable water were chronic problems in detention and correctional facilities and contributed to health problems.  Prison authorities attributed most of the 758 inmate deaths reported from January to July to illness.Prisoners had few opportunities for recreation, education, and self-improvement.The prison services reported insufficient custodial and escort personnel, especially in large jails, with a national average of approximately 43 prisoners assigned to each custodial staff member.  In larger prisons the ratio was higher; for example, in the New Bilibid Prison, one prison guard oversaw 191 prisoners.  This contributed to rampant gang activity in most prisons.  Observers and others with direct access to prisons noted that gangs effectively served as the de facto source of discipline.  Violence between gangs was common.  The Bureau of Corrections reported a gang-related shooting inside the New Bilibid Prison’s maximum-security compound in July that killed one and injured nine.Administration:  Prisoners, their families, and lawyers could submit complaints to independent government agencies, and the CHR referred complaints it received to the appropriate agency.NGOs reported that although abuse in prisons was common, prisoners, fearing retaliation, generally declined to lodge formal complaints.Independent Monitoring:  Authorities permitted international monitoring groups, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, and civil society groups, such as the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, free and timely access to jails and prisons.  The constitution granted the CHR the authority to visit jails, prisons, or detention facilities to monitor the government’s compliance with international treaty obligations.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court; however, the government and its agents frequently disregarded these requirements, albeit reportedly less frequently than in previous years.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by an authorized official were required for an arrest except in limited, defined situations.  After a warrantless arrest, courts could subpoena suspects to allow a preliminary investigation; authorities had to file charges within 12 to 36 hours of an arrest, depending on the seriousness of the crime.  In terrorism cases the law permitted warrantless arrests and detention without charge for up to 24 days.Irregularities in issuing warrants and making arrests were reportedly common.Detainees had the right to bail, except when held for capital offenses or those punishable by a life sentence.  The bail system largely functioned as intended, and suspects were allowed to appeal a judge’s decision to deny bail.  The law provided an accused or detained person the right to choose a lawyer, including a public defender if the suspect could not afford a lawyer.  Due to a lack of resources, however, the Public Attorney’s Office failed to provide all indigent persons with access to public defenders.Arbitrary Arrest:  Security forces detained individuals, including juveniles, arbitrarily and without warrants on charges other than terrorism, especially in areas of violent unrest.In June the PNP-Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement Group arrested and dismissed seven police officers from the Angeles City, Pampanga Province police office for the alleged illegal arrest and arbitrary detention for five days of 13 persons detained May 28 for suspected drug activity.  Police did not charge or record the arrests of those detained in the station’s records.  According to media reports, the officers offered to reduce possible charges to illegal gambling in exchange for a substantial bribe.The CHR investigated 21 alleged illegal detention cases involving 24 individuals from January to July, of which 13 were perpetrated by the PNP, two by members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, three by members of military, one by a local government official, one by a member of the NBI, and one by an unidentified person.Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem due largely to the slow and ineffectual justice system.  The great majority of prisoners in BJMP facilities were pretrial detainees; the balance were convicted criminals serving less than three-year sentences.  Pending cases were not evenly distributed among the courts, which resulted in some severely overburdened courts.  Large jails employed paralegals to monitor inmates’ cases, prevent detention beyond the maximum sentence, and assist with decongestion efforts.  The BJMP helped expedite court cases to promote speedy disposition of cases.  Through this program authorities released 50,491 inmates from BJMP jails from January to July.  In some cases, detainees spent longer awaiting trial than the maximum sentence for their alleged crime, often extending over many years.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary.  The government generally respected judicial independence, but officials did pressure or otherwise intervene in some cases.  Moreover, NGOs and others reported that pressure, threats, intimidation, and the corruptibility of the judiciary undermined judicial independence.Corruption through nepotism, personal connections, and bribery continued to result in relative impunity for wealthy or influential offenders.  Insufficient personnel, inefficient processes, and long procedural delays also hindered the judicial system.  These factors contributed to widespread skepticism that the criminal justice system delivered due process and equal justice.																Trial Procedures						The constitution and law provided for the full range of procedural rights in trials.  Some of these rights, however, were frequently denied, including the rights to a speedy trial and judicial impartiality.  Trials effectively had no time limits.  Trials took place as a series of separate hearings, often months apart as witnesses and court time became available, contributing to lengthy delays.  Government officials estimated it took an average of five to six years to obtain a decision.  In addition, a defendant’s right to counsel was often impaired; the Public Attorney’s Office used its limited resources to represent indigent defendants at trial rather than during arraignments or pretrial hearings.  During pretrial hearings courts could appoint any lawyer present in the courtroom to provide on-the-spot counsel to the accused.  To address some of these problems, the Law Student Practice Rule required all law schools to incorporate a clinical legal aid program into their curriculum and establish at least one law clinic to serve marginalized and underprivileged populations.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						The constitution stated that “no person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs or aspirations.”  As of July, the Bureau of Corrections identified 124 persons as “political prisoners,” but there was no clarity as to how this term was defined and applied.  The BJMP did not identify persons in its custody as political prisoners.Political prisoners identified by the Bureau of Corrections included self-identified political prisoners in Davao, which held most of the country’s political prisoners.Various human rights NGOs maintained lists of incarcerated persons they considered political prisoners.  The NGO Task Force Detainees of the Philippines defined political prisoners and detainees based on motivation and excluded persons guilty of or charged with crimes against persons or property.  The Task Force noted that in most cases, authorities mixed political prisoners with the general inmate population, except in the New Bilibid Prison where most political prisoners were held in maximum security facilities.While in principle human rights or humanitarian organizations had the same right of access to political prisoners as to others, these groups reported prison officials barred or limited such visits.On November 13, former opposition senator Leila De Lima, arrested in 2017, was released on bail after nearly seven years of police detention on drug trafficking conspiracy charges.  These charges were widely regarded as fabrications of the previous administration because of De Lima’s vocal opposition to former President Duterte and his administration’s drug war and other human rights abuses.  De Lima was acquitted of two of three drug-related charges; the second verdict was delivered in May.  Several key state witnesses in the cases against De Lima recanted their testimony; some claimed they were compelled to testify by officials in the Duterte administration; others said the rewards promised them if they testified against De Lima had not been provided.  As of December, one case was still pending resolution.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										Some leaders of communist and leftist organizations, rural NGOs, and human rights defenders complained of routine surveillance and harassment.  Although the government generally respected restrictions on search and seizure within private homes, searches without warrants continued.  Judges generally declared illegally obtained evidence to be inadmissible.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										For decades the government has contended with armed Muslim separatist groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front; a communist insurgency supported by the New People’s Army (NPA); and violence by smaller transnational terrorist organizations such as ISIS-East Asia, the Abu Sayyaf Group, Maute Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and other terrorist groups and criminal syndicates.  Additionally, interclan violence continued in Mindanao, causing civilian deaths and displacement.The AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict reported that it did not refer any cases of alleged international humanitarian law violations by communist terrorist groups to the Inter-Agency Committee on Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced Disappearances, Torture, and Other Grave Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of Persons.Killings:  Armed clashes between government and insurgent, separatist, and terrorist forces frequently led to deaths on both sides, and sometimes resulted in the deaths of civilians.  In August security forces clashed with an alleged leader of the NPA in Sultan Kudarat who was reportedly attempting to recruit among high school students.Police and the AFP also supported and armed civilian militias.  The armed forces controlled Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units, while Civilian Volunteer Organizations fell under national police command.  In September NPA rebels killed five Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary members and three members of the military in Quezon Province.NGOs sometimes linked the killing of activists to counterinsurgency operations by government security forces, particularly the military.The NPA, ISIS-East Asia, Abu Sayaf Group, Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and other violent extremist groups used roadside bombs, ambushes, suicide bombings, and other means to kill political figures and other civilians, including persons suspected of being military and police informers.  In June, two police officers were killed and four wounded in an ambush near the Maguindanao del Sur police headquarters.  Local media speculated that local insurgent group Dawlah Islamiyah was responsible, retaliating for the killing of their leader in Marawi earlier that day.Abductions:  The AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict received no reports of hostages being taken by terrorist organizations from January to August.  Armed criminal and terrorist groups, however, kidnapped civilians for ransom.  Authorities reportedly facilitated ransom payments on behalf of victims’ families and employers through unofficial channels.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  Human rights activists reported abuse of detained insurgents, separatists, and terrorists by police and prison officials.Multiple sources reported the NPA sought to intimidate government officials and attacked or threatened businesses, power stations, farms, and private communication facilities to enforce collection of extortion payments, or so-called revolutionary taxes.Child Soldiers:  The use of child soldiers, particularly by terrorist and antigovernment organizations, remained a problem, especially in parts of Mindanao affected by low-level violence.  The AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict recorded three children used as soldiers by communist terrorist groups from January to June.  UNICEF monitored the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts and the release of child soldiers.  Government reporting mechanisms on child soldiers provided inconsistent data across agencies and regions, especially in conflict-affected areas, which made it difficult to evaluate the problem’s scale.  The NPA continued to claim it did not recruit children as combatants but admitted that it recruited and trained children for noncombat purposes, such as cooking.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government sometimes respected this right.  Threats and actions by government, allied groups, and powerful individuals against journalists, media organizations, government critics, and others continued.Freedom of Expression:  On the surface, individuals could criticize the government publicly or privately and discuss matters of public interest.  Observers and NGOs maintained that the chilling effect on public expression engendered under former President Duterte continued at a lower level under the Marcos administration.  International watchdogs such as Reporters Without Borders noted fewer and less violent attacks against journalists in the first year of the Marcos administration, but several problems remained.The practice of “red-tagging” – labeling human rights advocates, unions, religious groups, academics, and media organizations as fronts for or clandestine members of insurgent and other political groups – continued under the Marcos administration, which has neither suppressed nor condemned the practice.  Per civil society groups, the practice was intended to silence criticism of the government, intimidate opponents in local disputes, or provoke legal action against political opponents.Civil society groups continued to express concern about the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, which some claimed was prone to abuse and contributed to red-tagging.  Responding to NGOs’ and opposition lawmakers’ petitions, in 2022 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the part of the law defining terrorism, deeming it “overbroad and violative of freedom of expression.”  Opponents argued the legislation could be used to red-tag individuals engaged in common forms of speech or typical political activities.Violence and Harassment:  Journalists continued to face harassment, threats of violence, and violence, including from individual politicians, government authorities, and powerful private persons critical of their reporting.  Physical attacks, including at least one killing, against journalists continued and several cases from previous years remained unresolved.The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) reported 60 press freedom violations from January to April, 19 of which were harassment cases and 12 were red-tagging.  Broadcast network Sonshine Media Network International, owned by indicted human trafficker Apollo Quiboloy, was the most frequent source of red-tagging allegations against journalists, including the NUJP’s chairperson.  The NUJP condemned these allegations as an effort to discredit and intimidate journalists.On May 31, two assailants on motorcycles shot and killed radio broadcaster Cresenciano Bundoquin in Calapan City, Mindoro Province, the third journalist slain since President Marcos took office in June 2022.  The PNP chief directed provincial police to set up a Special Investigation Task Group to investigate the killing and noted Bundoquin’s reporting may have made him a target.Two suspects were charged in the June 29 attempted murder of photojournalist Rene Joshua Abiad in Manila, in which three family members were also injured; the two were jailed as of October.  At least six other suspects remained at large.  Investigators linked the attack to Abiad’s forced testimony for the state about his observation of antinarcotics operations.  Journalists continued to call for amending the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to exclude media from being forced to serve as witnesses in drug cases.On June 27, eight of 17 persons indicted for the October 2022 killing in Manila of radio broadcaster Percival “Percy Lapid” Mabasa pled guilty as accomplices to the murder.  Mabasa’s was the most high-profile murder of a journalist under the Marcos administration.  One gunman surrendered to police and admitted his role shortly after the killing.  He identified his immediate accomplices and implicated a number of senior officials in the prison system, including Bureau of Corrections Director-General Gerald Bantag, in the murder.  Mabasa had criticized Bantag on his radio show.  Bantag was subsequently dismissed from duty and formally charged.  The cases against Bantag and another accomplice were suspended pending their arrest.  As of December, Bantag, although the subject of an arrest warrant, was still at liberty; his attorneys had filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the charges.Following Mabasa’s murder, in late 2022 the National Capital Region Police Office conducted surprise visits to the homes of several journalists who had expressed concern that police kept a database of their addresses.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  News organizations generally were not subjected to official censorship, but journalists and media watchdogs alleged several instances of government interference.  Media generally remained free, active, and able to voice criticism of the government, despite the chilling effect caused by killings of and attacks on journalists, red-tagging, and political and nongovernmental pressure.The online news website Rappler and broadcaster ABS-CBN continued to fight, with some success, legal challenges arising from allegedly spurious charges levied during the Duterte administration.Rappler, its Chief Executive Officer Maria Ressa, and other staff were subjected to at least 11 criminal complaints – most related to taxes and alleged foreign links — throughout the Duterte presidency; at least 10 arrest warrants were issued against Ressa from 2019 to 2021.  Prosecution of some cases continued under the Marcos administration.On September 12, a court acquitted Ressa on the last of five tax evasion charges.  She continued to await a Supreme Court decision on her October 2022 appeal of an online libel conviction and the reversal of the 2022 Securities and Exchange Commission’s decision to revoke Rappler’s registration to operate for violating foreign media ownership rules.  After the acquittal, Ressa acknowledged a “lifting of fear” under the new administration and said, “the court system works and we hope to see the remaining charges dismissed.”ABS-CBN, whose broadcast license was suspended in 2020, had not returned to the air as of December.  Former ABS-CBN frequencies were acquired by close friends and allies of former President Duterte.  Observers cited political pressure behind the termination of negotiations between ABS-CBN and rival network TV5 for a $39 million investment deal that would have allowed ABS-CBN to return to broadcast television.The NUJP argued traditional media faced problems gaining accreditation and access to government offices they covered, at times being labeled as purveyors of “fake news” by officials who did not want their activities reported.Cyberattacks on media outlets, usually in the form of distributed denial-of-service and phishing attacks, remained a problem.  Significant denial of service attacks were reported against CNN Philippines and local news outlet Bulatlat on numerous occasions.  International digital forensic group Qurium Media Foundation recorded 19 cyberattacks against Bulatlat in the year to December.Libel/Slander Laws:  Laws stipulated criminal penalties for libel, which authorities used to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against journalists and others.  The NUJP sought revisions to the libel law and the 2012 cyber libel law, but without success.In affirming the cyber libel conviction of Maria Ressa in July, the Court of Appeals ruled that the statute of limitations for cyber libel was 15 years, making it more severe than the one-year statute of limitations for offline libel.Baguio City-based editor Frank Cimatu was convicted of cyber libel in December 2022 over a social media post which the local court found defamed a former cabinet secretary.  Cimatu was sentenced to imprisonment of six months to five years and ordered to pay a substantial fine for “moral damages” (damage to reputation).																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet other than temporarily blocking mobile communications during special events for security purposes.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government allowed many public protests and generally respected the right to freedom of association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of interference with freedom of assembly.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees or asylum seekers, and other persons of concern.  As of June, UNHCR reported 911 recognized refugees in the country.Access to Asylum:  No comprehensive legislation provided for granting refugee status or asylum.  The Department of Justice’s Refugee and Stateless Persons Protections Unit determined which applicants qualify as refugees in accordance with an established, accessible system that NGOs judged to provide basic due process.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Decades of sectarian and political insurgency, sporadic interclan fighting, and natural disasters generated significant internal displacement.  The number of IDPs was uncertain and fluctuated widely; UNHCR estimated approximately 240,000 IDPs in the country during the year.Counterinsurgency campaigns against the Abu Sayyaf Group, primarily in Sulu and Basilan Provinces, and clashes with the NPA, concentrated in the most geographically remote provinces, caused sporadic and small-scale displacement.  Most IDPs were women and children.  The bulk of the displaced population lived on Mindanao, most in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.  UNHCR estimated that the great majority of the country’s IDPs were displaced by armed conflict and most of the balance were displaced by natural disasters.Security forces sometimes carried out military operations near IDP sites, creating a risk of civilian casualties and physical damage and restricting freedom of movement.  Impoverished IDPs were highly vulnerable to human trafficking.At times the government encouraged IDPs to return home, but they were often reluctant to do so for security or welfare reasons.  For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:   https://www.internal-displacement.org&nbsp;.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government by secret ballot in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by public officials, but the government did not implement these laws effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.  Prolonged delays in the justice system reinforced the perception of impunity for the security forces and for national, provincial, and local government actors accused of corruption and human rights abuses.Corruption:  To combat corruption, the constitution provided for the independent Office of the Ombudsman, an appellate-level anti-corruption court, and the Commission on Audit.  All three organizations actively collaborated with the public and civil society and appeared to operate independently and use their limited resources effectively.  The Office of the Ombudsman successfully prosecuted more than 300 corruption cases from January to July, but officials continued to engage in corrupt practices with relative impunity.Former Congressman Candido Pancrudi Jr. and two other individuals were convicted in April on eight counts of graft and theft of public funds, four counts of malversation of public funds, and another four counts of falsification of public documents – all linked to the 2007-08 misuse of the Priority Development Assistance Fund.  The convicted officials were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, fined 32.8 million pesos ($582,000) each, and ordered to reimburse the amount embezzled, 36.9 million pesos ($655,000).  The convictions came more than 15 years after the crime and six years after charges were first filed.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.  Local human rights activists criticized President Marcos’ silence and lack of action on human rights problems.  Human rights activists continued to report harassment by local security forces, including arbitrary arrest and abuse of detainees by police and prison officials.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  President Marcos announced in July that his government would not cooperate with the International Criminal Court after the court rejected the country’s appeal to pause the investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed before and during the Duterte administration (2011-2019).  Human Rights Watch reported that the government “has done little to advance accountability” for the numerous extrajudicial killings that form the basis for the investigation.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The CHR’s constitutional mandate was to protect and promote human rights; investigate all human rights violations, including those reported by NGOs; and monitor government compliance with international human rights treaty obligations.  Approximately three-quarters of the country’s 42,000 villages had human rights action centers that coordinated with commission regional offices.  The legislature slightly decreased the commission’s budget for the fiscal year, providing insufficient resources to investigate and follow up on all cases presented to its regional and subregional offices.The Office of the Ombudsman was an independent agency that responded to complaints about public officials and employees.  It had the authority to make administrative rulings and seek prosecutions.The Presidential Human Rights Committee served as a multi-agency coordinating body on human rights problems.  The committee’s responsibilities included compiling the government’s submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review.  Many NGOs considered it independent but with limited ability to influence human rights policy.  The committee also chaired the Inter-Agency Committee on Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced Disappearances, Torture, and Other Grave Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of Persons.  This body determined the appropriate mechanisms to resolve cases of political violence.  It was also tasked with recording all cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and other grave violations and for classifying them as unresolved, under investigation, under preliminary investigation, or at trial.The Regional Human Rights Commission was a constitutionally mandated body tasked with monitoring alleged human rights violations in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  Rape, including spousal rape, was illegal with penalties ranging from 12 to 40 years’ imprisonment with pardon or parole possible only after 30 years’ imprisonment.  Conviction could also result in a lifetime ban from political office.  The law applied to both men and women.  Penalties for forcible sexual assault ranged from six to 12 years’ imprisonment.  The law criminalized physical, sexual, and psychological harm or abuse to women (and children) committed by spouses, partners, or parents.  Penalties were related to the severity of the crime and could include imprisonment or significant fines.The government did not effectively enforce the laws on rape.  NGOs noted that in smaller localities perpetrators of abuse sometimes used personal relationships with local authorities to avoid prosecution.Domestic violence against women remained a serious and widespread problem.  The government did not effectively enforce the domestic violence law.  NGOs reported that cultural and social stigma deterred many women from reporting rape or domestic violence.  NGOs and media reported that rape and sexual abuse of women in police or protective custody continued.The law provided 10 days of paid leave for domestic violence survivors.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law prohibited sexual harassment.  Sexual harassment remained widespread and underreported, including in the workplace, due to victims’ fear of losing their jobs.The law was intended to prevent and punish acts of sexual harassment in public places, online workplaces, and educational institutions; observers believed the government did not enforce the law effectively.Discrimination:  In law, although not always in practice, women had most of the rights and protections accorded to men and the law sought to eliminate discrimination against women.  The law accorded women the same property rights as men.  In Muslim and Indigenous communities, however, property ownership law or tradition granted men more property rights than women.The law prohibited sex discrimination in employment but not in hiring; the law also prohibited discrimination based on marital status.  Women continued to face discrimination on the job as well as in hiring.  Social beliefs that women’s roles were in the home and lack of access to affordable childcare were barriers to women’s entry to the economy.  Some labor unions claimed women employees suffered punitive action when they became pregnant.  Although women faced workplace discrimination, they occupied positions at all levels of the workforce.The law did not provide for divorce for non-Muslims (Muslims could divorce under Muslim family law).  Legal annulments and separations were possible, and courts generally recognized divorces obtained in other countries if one of the parties was a foreigner.  These options, however, were costly, complex, and not readily available to the poor.  The constitution required the Office of the Solicitor General to oppose requests for annulment.  Informal separation was common but brought with it potential legal and financial problems.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The constitution upheld the basic right of couples and individuals to decide freely the number, spacing, and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, and violence.Although the law provided for universal access to methods of contraception, sexual education, and maternal care, it also allowed health practitioners to deny reproductive health services based on their personal or religious beliefs in nonemergency situations; required spousal consent for women in non-life-threatening situations to obtain reproductive health care; required children in non-life-threatening situations to get parental consent before obtaining reproductive health care; and did not require private health-care facilities to provide access to family-planning methods.Provision of health-care services was the responsibility of local governments, and disruptions in the supply chain, including procurement, allocation, and distribution of contraceptives, reduced their availability to the poor, although modern forms of contraception were available on the market in most areas.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence and protection for rape victims, including emergency contraception and post-exposure prophylaxis.According to the 2021-2022 UN Human Development Report, the maternal mortality ratio was 121 per 100,000 live births, and skilled attendants participated in 84 percent of births.  According to a March 2022 media report, the Department of Health and the Philippine Commission on Population and Development attributed a sharp increase in maternal deaths from 2020 to 2021 to mothers not getting optimal care in hospitals and other birthing facilities during the pandemic.  The UN Population Fund’s 2016 analysis of maternal death concluded poverty, remote locations, and a lack of education exacerbated delays in seeking potentially lifesaving maternal medical care; midwives at times had little formal training; and medical personnel routinely mistreated and denied proper care to women who sought assistance for complications from unsafe abortions.The World Bank reported in 2019 that the adolescent birth rate was 55 per 1,000 for women between ages 15 and 19.  International media and women’s health NGOs cited limited access to adequate sex education and contraceptives as a driving factor of adolescent births.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination against individuals based on ethnicity, race, and religion or belief; however, the government stated in its report to the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination that there was no formal, legal definition of racial discrimination in the country, resulting in little to no reporting of such cases.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Although no laws discriminated against Indigenous groups, cultural bias and the geographical remoteness of the areas many inhabited prevented their full integration into society.  Indigenous children often suffered from a lack of health care, education, and other basic services.  The law required representation by Indigenous groups in policy-making bodies and local legislative councils, but the rate of compliance with the law was unknown.  Indigenous leaders observed that local governments and politicians routinely ignored or rejected the selection process for mandatory Indigenous representatives.Lumad (a group of Indigenous ethnic communities in Mindanao) schools and students were subject to red-tagging, often resulting in raids by the security forces, illegal arrests, and forced closure of community schools.The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, a government agency staffed by tribal members, was responsible for implementing constitutional provisions to protect Indigenous groups.  It had authority to award certificates identifying “ancestral domain lands” based on communal ownership, thereby stopping tribal leaders from selling the land.  Indigenous rights activist groups criticized the commission, noting that it approved projects on ancestral lands without the free, prior, and informed consent required by law.Armed groups frequently recruited from Indigenous populations.  Indigenous persons’ lands were also often the site of armed encounters related to resource extraction or intertribal disputes, which sometimes resulted in displacement or killings.In June the government’s Anti-Terrorism Council designated four activists from the Cordillera Peoples Alliance, an NGO that sought to protect Indigenous peoples’ rights, as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and NPA.  A month prior to the terrorist designation, a court had thrown out a rebellion case against the four (and others) for lack of evidence and three of the four individuals sought protection from the Supreme Court from state-led harassment.  The Cordillera People’s Alliance condemned the Anti-Terrorism Council’s designation as part of a “relentless attack against Indigenous peoples’ activists.”																																				Children										Birth Registration:  The government promoted birth registration, and authorities immediately registered births in health facilities.  Births outside of facilities were less likely to be registered promptly, if at all.  The lack of a birth certificate did not generally result in denial of education or other services, but it could cause delays in some circumstances, for example if a child became involved in the court system.Education:  Education was free and compulsory through age 18, but the quality of education was often poor and access difficult, especially in rural areas where substandard infrastructure made traveling to school challenging.Supplemental costs for supplies or uniforms could be a barrier to students from poor families.  The Department of Education continued to prioritize improving resources at and access to the most isolated schools.  In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, the region with the country’s lowest rate of school attendance, the government likewise sought to increase its education budget.  According to the World Economic Forum’s 2022 Global Gender Gap Report, the primary school enrollment rate for girls was equal to the rate for boys, while the attendance rate for girls was significantly higher than the rate for boys in secondary and tertiary schools.  The Forum’s 2023 report assessed the educational attainment of girls in the country as 99.9 percent of that of boys.Child Abuse:  Child abuse remained a problem.  The law provided special protection of children against all forms of abuse, exploitation, and discrimination; government efforts to enforce the law were ineffective.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The law imposed a total ban on marriage for persons younger than 18; anyone younger than 21 was also required to have parental consent.  Under the law, any person who arranged the marriage of a child could be imprisoned for up to 10 years and fined.  The penalty would increase to up to 12 years and a larger fine if the violator were the child’s parent or guardian.  While recent data were unavailable, observers believed forced and early marriage was a problem.Under Muslim sharia law, however, boys could marry at 15, and girls when they reached puberty (no age specified).  There were no legal penalties for forced and child marriage.  Records from sharia district courts showed some Muslim girls were married as young as age seven.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law prohibited commercial exploitation of children and child pornography and defined purchasing commercial sex acts from a child as a trafficking offense.  The age of consent was 16.  Sex with a child (a person younger than 18) involving force, threat, or intimidation was a crime.  The maximum penalty for child rape was 40 years in prison plus a lifetime ban from political office.  The production, possession, and distribution of child pornography were illegal, and penalties ranged from one month to life in prison plus significant fines, depending on the gravity of the offense.  The government made efforts to enforce the law and collaborated with foreign law enforcement authorities, NGOs, and international organizations.Inadequate prosecutorial resources and the inability to analyze alleged abusers’ computers for evidence were among the challenges to effective enforcement.  Despite the penalties and enforcement efforts, law enforcement agencies and NGOs concluded that perpetrators, usually family members, used children in the production of pornography and in cybersex activities.Traffickers exploited children in sex trafficking, and the country remained a destination for foreign and domestic child sex tourists.  Additionally, live internet broadcasts of young girls, boys, and sibling groups performing sex acts for paying foreigners continued.  The government continued to prosecute accused pedophiles, deport those who were foreigners, and bar the entry of identified convicted sex offenders.  To reduce retraumatizing child victims and to spare children from having to testify, the government increased its use of plea agreements in online child sexual exploitation cases, which significantly reduced the case disposition time.																																				Antisemitism										An estimated 2,000 persons of Jewish heritage lived in the country, almost all foreign nationals.  There were no reports of antisemitic acts.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct among adults or cross-dressing.Violence and Harassment:  No criminal justice mechanisms existed to aid in the prosecution of bias-motivated crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals.  Violence and harassment against LGBTQI+ persons by private persons remained a problem.In August the Supreme Court penalized five lawyers for their homophobic comments posted in a conversation on social media in 2021.  The lawyers, who commented about a judge and an accused person who were both members of the LGBTQI+ community, were reprimanded by the high court, and one of the five was fined.Discrimination:  National law did not prohibit discrimination with respect to sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.  Several LGBTQI+ organizations submitted anecdotal reports of discriminatory hiring practices that targeted LGBTQI+ persons.  Other discrimination practices included the enforcement of rules, policies, and regulations that disadvantaged LGBTQI+ persons in the workplace.Some antidiscrimination ordinances at the municipal or city levels prohibited employment discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender – but not intersex – persons.  More than 20 local governments, including the country’s largest cities of Manila, Quezon City, Cebu City, and Davao City, had antidiscrimination ordinances to protect LGBTQI+ persons.  In August Lapu-lapu City in Cebu Province passed an antidiscrimination ordinance providing protection against all forms of gender-based discrimination and violence in private and public offices and educational institutions.In an October 2022 incident of social discrimination, the microphone and lights were shut off during a transgender social media personality’s speech at a graduation ceremony at a church in Cavite.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Officials prohibited transgender individuals from obtaining passports or other official documents that reflected their gender identity.  They were also not officially surveyed by the government.  Authorities printed the sex at birth, as reported on the official birth certificate, in the individual’s passport.  This practice created difficulties for transgender persons seeking to travel, such as instances of being denied boarding on aircraft, and accessing appropriate health-care services.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Although no law prohibited the practice of so-called conversion therapies, there were no reports of these types of therapies being forced on individuals.  Likewise, there were no reports of medical procedures being forced on nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There were no known incidents of nonofficial persons or groups seeking to prevent LGBTQI+ persons from exercising these rights.  In October, however, drag performer Amadeus Fernando Pagente, who performed as Pura Luka Vega, was arrested by Manila police for failure to appear at a preliminary hearing on charges of “immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.”  A religious organization, the Philippines for Jesus Movement, filed a criminal complaint against Pagente after a video of a performance during which he dressed as Jesus Christ and sang a remixed version of the Our Father prayer.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities were not able to access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.The law provided for equal access for persons with disabilities to all public buildings and establishments and to education.The law was not effectively enforced, and many barriers remained for persons with disabilities.  Disability advocates contended that equal access laws were ineffective due to weak implementing regulations, insufficient funding, and inadequately focused integrative government programs.  The great majority of public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with physical disabilities.  Many schools had architectural barriers that made attendance difficult for persons with physical disabilities.  Government efforts to improve access to transportation for persons with disabilities were limited.Persons with disabilities continued to face discrimination and other challenges in hiring and employment.  The Department of Labor estimated that 10 percent of employable persons with disabilities were able to find work.  The government had limited means to assist persons with disabilities in finding employment.  The law required most government agencies and government-owned corporations to reserve 1 percent of their positions for persons with disabilities; government agencies engaged in social development had to reserve 5 percent.  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Local Employment maintained registers of persons with disabilities that indicated their skills and abilities and promoted the establishment of cooperatives and self-employment projects for such persons.According to the Philippine Statistics Authority 2022 Labor Force Survey, the low educational attainment of persons with disabilities in the country led to a skills and qualifications gap.Some children with disabilities attended schools in mainstream or inclusive educational settings.  The Department of Education’s special education programs did not provide nationwide coverage.  The government lacked a clear system for informing parents of children with disabilities of their educational rights and did not have a well-defined procedure for reporting discrimination in education.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS, including in access to basic health and social services.  Nevertheless, there was evidence of discrimination against HIV or AIDS patients in the government’s provision of health care, housing, employment, and insurance services.  Men who had sex with men were banned indefinitely from donating blood.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										Examples of violence and abuse directed at labor activists may be found at the end of this sub-section.The law provided for the rights of workers, except for the military, police, short-term contract employees, and some foreign workers, to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes; it prohibited antiunion discrimination and required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.  The law placed several restrictions on these rights, however.  Threats and violence against trade union leaders continued.Laws and regulations provided for the right to organize and bargain collectively in both the private sector and in corporations owned or controlled by the government.  The law prohibited organizing by foreign national or migrant workers unless a reciprocity agreement existed with the workers’ countries of origin specifying that migrant workers from the Philippines were permitted to organize unions there.  The law also barred temporary or outsourced workers and workers without employment contracts from joining a union.  The law required the participation of 20 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit where the union sought to operate; the International Labor Organization (ILO) called this requirement excessive.The law subjected all labor and employment disputes to mandatory mediation/conciliation for one month.  If mediation failed, the union could issue a strike notice.  For a private-sector strike to be legal, unions had to provide advance strike notice (30 days for collective bargaining matters and 15 days for unfair labor practice matters), respect mandatory cooling-off periods, and obtain approval from a majority of members.  The law provided for a maximum prison sentence of three years for participation in an illegal strike, although no such conviction ever occurred.  The law also permitted employers to dismiss union officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike.The law prohibited government workers from joining strikes under the threat of automatic dismissal.  Government workers could file complaints with the Civil Service Commission, which handled administrative cases and arbitrated disputes.  Government workers could also assemble and express their grievances on the work premises during nonworking hours.The secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and in certain cases the president, could intervene in labor disputes by assuming jurisdiction and mandating a settlement if either official determined that the strike-affected company was vital to the national interest.  Essential sectors included hospitals, the electric power industry, water supply services (excluding small bottle suppliers), air traffic control, and other activities or industries as recommended by the National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council.  These definitions of essential services were broader than international standards.In most cases, the government respected freedom of association and collective bargaining and made some efforts to enforce laws protecting these rights.  The Department of Labor had general authority to enforce laws on freedom of association and collective bargaining.  The National Labor Relations Commission’s labor arbiter could also issue orders or writs of execution for reinstatement that went into effect immediately, requiring employers to reinstate the worker and report compliance.  Allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with union activities were grounds for review by the quasi-judicial commission as possible unfair labor practices.  If there was a definite preliminary finding that a termination could cause a serious labor dispute or mass layoff, the labor secretary could suspend the termination and restore the status quo pending resolution of the case.Penalties under the law for violations of freedom of association or collective bargaining laws were regularly applied against violators.Antiunion discrimination, especially in hiring, was an unfair labor practice and carried criminal or civil penalties that were, however, not commensurate with analogous crimes; generally civil penalties were favored over criminal penalties.Administrative and judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.The Tripartite Industrial Peace Council served as the main consultative and advisory mechanism on labor and employment for organized labor, employers, and government on the formulation and implementation of labor and employment policies.  It also acted as the central entity for monitoring recommendations under and ratifications of ILO conventions.  The Department of Labor, through the Industrial Peace Council, was responsible for coordinating the investigation, prosecution, and resolution of alleged violence and harassment of labor leaders and trade union activists pending before the ILO.Workers faced several challenges in exercising their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining and the right to strike.  A Labor Department order set guidelines on the use of labor contracting and subcontracting.  Some labor unions, however, criticized the guidelines for not limiting forms of regular, short-term temporary contractual work and subcontracting, which they reported could be used to undermine worker protections.  Some employers reportedly chose to employ workers who could not legally organize, such as short-term contract and foreign national workers, to minimize unionization and avoid other rights accorded to “regular” workers.Unions continued to claim that local political leaders and officials who governed the Special Economic Zones explicitly attempted to frustrate union organizing efforts by maintaining union-free or strike-free policies.  Unions also claimed the government stationed security forces near industrial areas or Special Economic Zones to intimidate workers attempting to organize and alleged that companies in the zones used frivolous lawsuits to harass union leaders.  Local zone directors claimed exclusive authority to conduct their own inspections as part of the zones’ privileges intended by the legislature.  Employers controlled hiring through special zone labor centers.  For these reasons, and in part due to organizers’ restricted access to the closely guarded zones and the propensity among zone establishments to adopt fixed term, casual, temporary, or seasonal employment contracts, unions had little success organizing in the Special Economic Zones.  The Department of Labor did not have data on compliance with labor standards in the zones.Threats and violence against union members continued.On January 10, two labor rights activists, Dyan Gumanao and Armand Dayoha, were abducted by security personnel in Cebu and held for six days, during which time they were interrogated and accused of being terrorists.  Dayoha was an instructor at the University of the Philippines Cebu and organizer for the Alliance of Health Workers, while Gumanao was the project coordinator of the Community Empowerment Resource Network and regional coordinator of the union, Alliance of Concerned Teachers.On March 4, Vice President Sara Duterte, who also held the positions of education secretary and co-vice chair of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC), accused PISTON, a transport workers organization, of being “communist-inspired” in advance of a planned strike.  Duterte also red-tagged the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, describing them as a “lover” of the ideology espoused by the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA.On April 4, the Department of Education and NTF-ELCAC held a joint press conference officially reiterating Duterte’s claims and accusing the leaders of  the Alliance of Concerned Teachers of urging its members to conduct criminal or socially unacceptable activities.  The NTF-ELCAC, working with the Department of Education, routinely conducted meetings at schools during which it red-tagged the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, which the CHR has condemned as a serious violation of human rights.  The Department of Education also issued a memorandum to all regional directors and schools division superintendents to identify all teachers who were affiliated with the Alliance of Concerned Teachers.In April, Alex Dolorosa, a paralegal with the Business Process Outsourcing Industry Employees Network, an organization representing employees in the outsourcing industry, was killed in Bacolod City.  The NTF-ELCAC previously alleged that the network was a front for the Communist Party.The ILO’s Committee on the Application of Standards noted the numerous allegations of murders of trade unionists and antiunion violence, allegations of serious and systemic violations of the right to freedom of association, as well as of lack of investigation in relation to these allegations.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law provided for minimum wage for all sectors.  Official minimum wages were below the poverty line.  By law the standard workweek was 48 hours for most categories of industrial workers and 40 hours for government workers, with an eight-hour-per-day limit.  The law mandated one day of rest each week.  The government mandated an overtime rate of 125 percent of the hourly rate on ordinary days, 130 percent on special nonworking days, and 200 percent on regular holidays.  There was no legal limit on the number of overtime hours that an employer may require.The wage and hour law did not cover many workers, since wage boards exempted certain employers such as distressed establishments, new business enterprises, retail and service establishments with fewer than 10 employees, and establishments affected by natural calamities.Domestic workers worked under a separate wage and benefit system that laid out minimum wage requirements significantly lower than regular minimum wage requirements, payments into social welfare programs, and mandated one day off a week.  While there were no reliable recent data, informed observers believed two million or more persons were employed as domestic workers, with nearly 85 percent being women or girls, some as young as age 15.Violations of minimum wage standards were common.  Many firms hired employees for less-than-minimum-wage apprentice rates, even if there was no approved training in their work.  Complaints about payment below the minimum wage and nonpayment of social security contributions and bonuses were particularly common at companies in the Special Economic Zones.Occupational Safety and Health:  The law provided for a comprehensive set of appropriate occupational safety and health (OSH) standards.  The government proactively identified unsafe working conditions.  Regulations for small-scale mining, for example, prohibited certain harmful practices, including the use of mercury and underwater, or compressor, mining.  The law provided for the right of workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.Various labor groups criticized government enforcement efforts, in particular the Department of Labor’s lax monitoring of occupational safety and health standards in workplaces.  OSH violations were common in the wholesale and retail industries.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Working Conditions monitored and inspected compliance with wage, hour, and OSH laws in all sectors, including workers in the formal and informal sectors, and nontraditional laborers.  It also inspected Special Economic Zones and businesses located there.  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage and hour laws.  Penalties for noncompliance with minimum wage rates and for OSH violations were commensurate with similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence.  Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.  Fines for OSH violations were used for OSH training sessions and related programs.In addition to fines, the government used administrative procedures and moral suasion to encourage employers to rectify violations voluntarily.  The number of labor inspectors who monitored and enforced the law, including by inspecting compliance with core labor and occupational safety standards and minimum wages, was insufficient, particularly in rural areas, and impeded the Department of Labor’s ability to investigate labor law violations effectively, especially in the informal sector and in small- and medium-sized enterprises.  Inspectors had the authority to conduct unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.The Department of Labor continued to implement its Labor Laws Compliance System for the private sector.  The system included joint assessments, compliance visits, and occupational safety and health investigations.  Department of Labor inspectors conducted joint assessments with employer and worker representatives; inspectors also conducted unannounced compliance visits and occupational safety and health standards investigations.  The Department of Labor and the International Labor Organization also continued to implement an information management system to capture and transmit data from the field in real time using mobile technology.Following a deficiency finding, the Department of Labor could issue compliance orders that could include a fine or, if the deficiency posed a grave and imminent danger to workers, suspension of operations.  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Working Conditions did not close any establishments during the year.  Such closures required prior notification and hearings.A Labor Department order set guidelines on the use of labor contracting and subcontracting.  Some labor unions, however, criticized the order for not restricting forms of regular, short-term temporary contractual work and subcontracting, which they claimed could be used to undermine worker protections.There were also gaps in the law, and the government enforced contracting and occupational safety and health laws inconsistently.  Media reported, for example, problems in the implementation and enforcement of the domestic workers’ law, including a tedious registration process, an additional financial burden on employers, and difficulty in monitoring employer compliance.The government and several NGOs worked to protect the rights of the country’s overseas citizens, most of whom were Philippine Overseas Employment Agency contract or temporary workers.  Although the agency registered and supervised domestic recruiter practices, authorities often lacked sufficient resources to provide complete worker protection overseas.  The Overseas Worker Welfare Administration assisted overseas workers in filing grievances against employers via its legal assistance fund.  The fund covered administrative costs that could otherwise prevent overseas workers from filing grievances.  Covered costs included fees for court typing and translation, visa cancellation, and contract termination.The government continued to fine and bring criminal charges against domestic recruiting agencies found guilty of unfair labor practices.Nearly 40 percent of the country’s workforce was in the informal sector.  They were covered by labor law but did not receive social benefits similar to workers in the formal economy.																																				    							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- Joint Readout on the Inaugural U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Meeting Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Philippines on the occasion of the inaugural U.S.-Philippines 3+3 Meeting.Begin text:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro, and Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo M. Año in Washington, DC today. The meeting followed President Biden’s bilateral meeting with Philippines President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and the historic Japan-Philippines-United States Trilateral Leaders’ Summit on April 11.The parties reaffirmed their shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and discussed ways to deepen coordination regarding shared challenges in the South China Sea, including repeated harassment of lawful Philippine operations by the People’s Republic of China. Secretary Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, and National Security Advisor Sullivan reiterated the United States’ ironclad commitment to the U.S.-Philippine Alliance and recalled that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea.  The parties underscored their determination to increase U.S. support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to improve interoperability and to achieve our shared security objectives. The parties further decided to explore additional opportunities to strengthen global support for upholding the international law of the sea.End text.
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro, and Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo M. Año Before Their Meeting Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C.Benjamin Franklin RoomSECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp; Well, good morning, everyone.&nbsp; Secretary Manalo, Secretary Teodoro, Advisor Año, wonderful to welcome you here to the State Department.&nbsp; Today’s meeting follows the meeting between our presidents yesterday and the historic trilateral meeting with President Marcos, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Biden.&nbsp;And I think today’s meeting – an unprecedented 3+3 – reflects the growing and deepening cooperation between our countries on a broad array of issues, and of course our shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, including in the South China Seas.&nbsp; We very much welcome this opportunity to pursue that cooperation, collaboration, and of course we stand with the Philippines in our ironclad defense commitments, including the Mutual Defense Treaty.Ricky, with that, let me welcome you and give you the microphone.&nbsp;FOREIGN SECRETARY MANALO:&nbsp; Thank you very much, Tony.&nbsp; Good morning, Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.&nbsp; A great pleasure to be here with my colleagues.&nbsp; As you mentioned, in a way today’s meeting of the 3+3 is also a historic meeting, as it follows on the heels of the even more historic trilateral summit yesterday.I just wanted to mention that we attach a lot of importance to this meeting, especially in the light of recent developments in the South China Sea, especially China’s escalation of its harassment resulting most recently in the injury of four Filipino seamen.&nbsp; But more importantly is we are determined to assert our sovereign rights, especially within our economic – Exclusive Economic Zone, and in accordance with the UNCLOS and the arbitral ruling.&nbsp;I think our meeting today will enable us to hopefully be in a better position to coordinate our responses, both diplomatic and on the defense and security fronts in relation to any actions in the South China Sea, whether they’re positive or negative, including in the Ayungin Shoal.So we also hope that this 3+3 meeting will be a regular event, and also reinforce our regular Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, as well as our ongoing maritime dialogue.&nbsp; And finally, we do underscore the need to continue further clarificatory discussions on the MDT, as we think this would also help in deterring further escalation by China.&nbsp; Thank you.SECRETARY AUSTIN:&nbsp; Thanks, Tony.&nbsp; Good morning, and it’s great to be here with everyone.&nbsp; It’s a – this is a historic meeting.&nbsp; It’s the first time that all six of us have gathered to discuss the diplomatic and defense priorities at the heart of our alliance.&nbsp; Under the leadership of President Biden and President Marcos, our alliance is stronger than ever.&nbsp; And today, we’ll discuss a whole-of-government vision for this alliance.We all know that our shared security relies on strong military bonds, shared economic opportunities, and robust people-to-people ties.&nbsp; And at the Department of Defense, we’re working in lockstep with our colleagues at the Department of National Defense, to strengthen interoperability between our forces, to expand our operational coordination, and to stand up to coercion in the South China Sea.&nbsp; And our commitment – as Secretary of State said just a couple of seconds ago, our commitment to our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines remains ironclad.&nbsp;And later today, I’ll be hosting President Marcos at the Pentagon, and I’ll share with you what I’m going to tell him, and that is that the United States and the Philippines are more than allies – we’re family.&nbsp; And thanks again, and I look forward to a great discussion.SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp; Thank you very much.&nbsp; Mr. Secretary.DEFENSE SECRETARY TEODORO:&nbsp;&nbsp;Thank you, Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin, our honorable counterparts and colleagues.&nbsp; Following from what Secretary Austin had already said, it’s indeed an honor to represent the Department of National Defense of the Philippines in this historic meeting today.&nbsp;And it will be an opportunity to have a fresh, open, and candid discussion of our departments’ objectives in line of the broader strategy of a free and open Indo-Pacific, because this is the area where our interests converge.&nbsp; And in doing so, we hope that the family becomes a stronger family with bonds of a shared vision, not only for today but for the future generations.&nbsp; Thank you very much.&nbsp;&nbsp;NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SULLIVAN:&nbsp;&nbsp;Well, I want to thank my Philippines counterparts for being here.&nbsp; I want to say I’m honored to be at this unprecedented 3+3 meeting.&nbsp; And our presidents, each of our presidents, tasked us to work across our governments and then to work across this alliance to make sure that we not only reaffirm the alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines, but we put the alliance commitments at the heart of it into practice, that we operationalize it, that we execute it, and that we do so entirely in lockstep.&nbsp; So I look forward to the discussion today.&nbsp;NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AÑO:&nbsp;&nbsp;Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, NSA Sullivan, first allow me to thank the United States Government for hosting the historic inaugural trilateral leaders summit yesterday.&nbsp; I’m honored for the opportunity to be part of the whole process that began during the inaugural trilateral national security advisors meeting in Tokyo last June.&nbsp;Seizing this momentum, we are now here for another milestone – the first bilateral 3+3 ministers meeting.&nbsp; So thank you also for hosting this occasion, and I look forward to our insightful and fruitful discussions.&nbsp; This will further concretize our deepening security partnership and enduring alliance, grounded on shared democratic values and aspirations of our peoples, with activities carefully curated to achieve our collective goals.&nbsp;Thank you, and&nbsp;magandang umaga.SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp; Thanks, everyone.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Philippines																								The Secretary of State